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Are A & B Different · discretion due to market conditions or opportunities. International and...

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  • 1

    Are A & B Different Shades of Gray?

    Source: Edward H. Adelson, 1995.

  • 2

    Are A & B Different Shades of Gray?

    Source: Edward H. Adelson, 1995.

  • 6

    Prospect Theory & Framing

    System 1 (fast thinking, taking short cuts)• “operates automatically”• “little or no effort”• “no sense of voluntary control”

  • 7

    Prospect Theory & Framing

    System 2 (slow thinking)• “effortful mental activities”• “agency, choice and concentration”

    Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2013.

  • 8

    Prospect TheoryMental Value

    Losses Gains

    Fear = 2xGreed

    Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2013.

  • 9

    More News = More Information?

    Get Rich.com– Time,

    September 27, 1999

    “Bubble Fears as U.S. Stocks Break Records”

    – Financial Times, November 20, 2013

    “Bailout Fails; Stocks Plunge.”

    – The New York Times,September 29, 2008

    “The Death of Equities”

    – Business Week, August 13, 1979“The Rebirth of Equities.”

    – Business Week, March 9, 1983

    “Bear Trap: Will Tech Stocks Sink the Rest of the Market and the Economy?”

    – U.S. News & World Report, March 26, 2001

  • 10

    In 1977, at the time of Elvis Presley’s death, there were 170 Elvis impersonators worldwide.

    In 2000, there were 85,000 Elvis impersonators.

    At this rate of growth, statisticians predicted that by 2019, Elvis impersonators would make up 1/3 of the world’s population.

    Extrapolation

    Source: http://www.murderousmaths.co.uk/elvis.htm; Freemovement.org, November 13, 2007

    http://www.murderousmaths.co.uk/elvis.htm

  • 11

    Attention Response & FramingS&P 500 Annual Returns (1928-2015)

    Source: Prof. Robert Shiller data. http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. One cannot invest directly in an index.

    11.4%

    Average Annual Return

    http://www.econ.yale.edu/%7Eshiller/data.htmChart1

    1928

    1929

    1930

    1931

    1932

    1933

    1934

    1935

    1936

    1937

    1938

    1939

    1940

    1941

    1942

    1943

    1944

    1945

    1946

    1947

    1948

    1949

    1950

    1951

    1952

    1953

    1954

    1955

    1956

    1957

    1958

    1959

    1960

    1961

    1962

    1963

    1964

    1965

    1966

    1967

    1968

    1969

    1970

    1971

    1972

    1973

    1974

    1975

    1976

    1977

    1978

    1979

    1980

    1981

    1982

    1983

    1984

    1985

    1986

    1987

    1988

    1989

    1990

    1991

    1992

    1993

    1994

    1995

    1996

    1997

    1998

    1999

    2000

    2001

    2002

    2003

    2004

    2005

    2006

    2007

    2008

    2009

    2010

    2011

    2012

    2013

    2014

    2015

    1931

    0.4381115515

    -0.0829794661

    -0.2512363636

    -0.4383754889

    -0.0864236453

    0.4998222543

    -0.011885657

    0.4674042105

    0.3194341028

    -0.3533672875

    0.2928265403

    -0.0109756469

    -0.1067287319

    -0.1277145558

    0.1917376295

    0.2506131013

    0.1903067695

    0.3582108434

    -0.0842914747

    0.052

    0.0570457516

    0.1830322368

    0.3080553901

    0.2367846304

    0.1815098864

    -0.0120820474

    0.5256332124

    0.3259733185

    0.0743951187

    -0.1045736019

    0.4371995499

    0.1205645716

    0.0033653531

    0.2663771296

    -0.0881146052

    0.226119271

    0.1641545588

    0.1239924248

    -0.0997095424

    0.2380296651

    0.1081486265

    -0.0824137108

    0.0356114491

    0.142211503

    0.1875536292

    -0.1430804744

    -0.2590178575

    0.3699513711

    0.23830999

    -0.0697970408

    0.0650928391

    0.1851949017

    0.3173524551

    -0.0470239025

    0.2041905508

    0.2233715586

    0.06146142

    0.3123514949

    0.1849457876

    0.0581272164

    0.1653719281

    0.3147518364

    -0.0306445161

    0.3023484313

    0.0749372797

    0.0996705148

    0.0132592068

    0.371951989

    0.2268096602

    0.331036531

    0.2833795328

    0.2088535099

    -0.0903181896

    -0.1184975914

    -0.2196604796

    0.2835580005

    0.1074277594

    0.0483447752

    0.1561255798

    0.0548473525

    -0.3655234411

    0.2593523388

    0.1482109228

    0.0209837473

    0.1589058524

    0.3214508586

    0.1352442165

    0.0135994949

    Pct Declines

    DateS&P 500100

    192843.811%1923143.81115515291931-0.43837548891

    1929-8.298%1924131.87778227632008-0.36552344112

    1930-25.124%192598.74528781281937-0.35336728753

    1931-43.838%192655.45777398951974-0.25901785754

    1932-8.642%192750.6649111930-0.25123636365

    193349.982%192875.98836103172002-0.21966047966

    1934-1.189%192975.08518943871973-0.14308047447

    193546.740%1930110.18032313051941-0.12771455588

    193631.943%1931145.3756757912001-0.11849759149

    1937-35.337%193294.00466756191940-0.106728731910

    193829.283%1933121.53172913471957-0.104573601911

    1939-1.098%1934120.1978397911966-0.0997095424

    1940-10.673%1935107.36927676792000-0.0903181896

    1941-12.771%193693.65665728261962-0.0881146052

    194219.174%1937111.61416273311932-0.0864236453

    194325.061%1938139.5861342081946-0.0842914747

    194419.031%1939166.15032047531929-0.0829794661

    194535.821%1940225.66716689961969-0.0824137108

    1946-8.429%1941206.64534862051977-0.0697970408

    19475.200%1942217.39090674881981-0.0470239025

    19485.705%1943229.79213442271990-0.0306445161

    194918.303%1944271.85150279481953-0.0120820474

    195030.806%1945355.59682354111934-0.011885657

    195123.678%1946439.79668599091939-0.0109756469

    195218.151%1947519.624132509219600.0033653531

    1953-1.208%1948513.346009098619940.0132592068

    195452.563%1949783.177720941320150.0135994949

    195532.597%19501038.472761619820110.0209837473

    19567.440%19511115.73006602219700.0356114491

    1957-10.457%1952999.054154286120050.0483447752

    195843.720%19531435.840180853119470.052

    195912.056%19541608.951637194820070.0548473525

    19600.337%19551614.366327651119480.0570457516

    196126.638%19562044.396596104419870.0581272164

    1962-8.811%19571864.255397225319840.06146142

    196322.612%19582285.799468600719780.0650928391

    196416.415%19592661.023871838319560.0743951187

    196512.399%19602990.970674101719920.0749372797

    1966-9.971%19612692.742356985719930.0996705148

    196723.803%19623333.69491850420040.1074277594Source: NYU Sternas of 12/31/15

    196810.815%19633694.229445163619680.1081486265

    1969-8.241%19643389.774288172219590.1205645716

    19703.561%19653510.489062543319650.12399242481930-0.25123636361

    197114.221%19664009.720988337420140.13524421651931-0.43837548892

    197218.755%19674761.75871158219710.1422115031937-0.35336728753

    1973-14.308%19684080.444016268320100.14821092281940-0.10672873194

    1974-25.902%19693023.536149489220060.15612557981941-0.12771455585

    197536.995%19704142.097493447820120.15890585241957-0.10457360196

    197623.831%19715129.200705777619640.16415455881973-0.14308047447

    1977-6.980%19724771.197675053519880.16537192811974-0.25901785758

    19786.509%19735081.768477709919520.18150988642001-0.11849759149

    197918.519%19746022.886091275319490.18303223682002-0.219660479610

    198031.735%19757934.263778934219860.18494578762008-0.365523441111

    1981-4.702%19767561.16373278319790.1851949017

    198220.419%19779105.081920035619720.1875536292

    198322.337%197811138.898259597319440.1903067695

    19846.146%197911823.510763827219420.1917376295

    198531.235%198015516.602025374619820.2041905508

    198618.495%198118386.3322075319990.2088535099

    19875.813%198219455.078518894419830.2233715586

    198816.537%198322672.402365298719630.226119271

    198931.475%198429808.582644967319960.2268096602

    1990-3.064%198528895.1130533219510.2367846304

    199130.235%198637631.505158637519670.2380296651

    19927.494%198740451.507787137919760.23830999

    19939.967%198844483.330392392519430.2506131013

    19941.326%198945073.144068086920090.2593523388

    199537.195%199061838.189655870119610.2663771296

    199622.681%199175863.688438399819980.2833795328

    199733.104%1992100977.34069068420030.2835580005

    199828.338%1993129592.25231742519380.2928265403

    199920.885%1994156658.04907246619910.3023484313

    2000-9.032%1995142508.97770141619500.3080553901

    2001-11.850%1996125622.00708807119850.3123514949

    2002-21.966%199798027.81676541319890.3147518364

    200328.356%1998125824.38848080419800.3173524551

    200410.743%1999139341.42061832619360.3194341028

    20054.834%2000146077.85027872220130.3214508586

    200615.613%2001168884.33934842619550.3259733185

    20075.485%2002178147.19823435519970.331036531

    2008-36.552%2003113030.22131020719450.3582108434

    200925.935%2004142344.8735594519750.3699513711

    201014.821%2005163441.93862372219950.371951989

    20112.098%2006166871.56296795419580.4371995499

    201215.891%2007193388.43092558519280.4381115515

    201332.145%2008255553.30808629619350.4674042105

    201413.524%2009290115.41501103619330.4998222543

    20151.360%2010294060.83811089919540.5256332124

    &A

    Page &P

    Pct Declines

    % Return

    S&P 500 Index (1928-2015) Annual % Declines in Excess of 10%

    -25%

    -44%

    -35%

    -11%

    -13%

    -10%

    -14%

    -26%

    -12%

    -22%

    -37%

    Scatter

    DateS&P 500100

    192843.811%1923143.81115515291931-0.43837548891

    1929-8.298%1924131.87778227632008-0.36552344112

    1930-25.124%192598.74528781281937-0.35336728753

    1931-43.838%192655.45777398951974-0.25901785754

    1932-8.642%192750.6649111930-0.25123636365

    193349.982%192875.98836103172002-0.21966047966

    1934-1.189%192975.08518943871973-0.14308047447

    193546.740%1930110.18032313051941-0.12771455588

    193631.943%1931145.3756757912001-0.11849759149

    1937-35.337%193294.00466756191940-0.106728731910

    193829.283%1933121.53172913471957-0.104573601911

    1939-1.098%1934120.1978397911966-0.0997095424

    1940-10.673%1935107.36927676792000-0.0903181896

    1941-12.771%193693.65665728261962-0.0881146052

    194219.174%1937111.61416273311932-0.0864236453

    194325.061%1938139.5861342081946-0.0842914747

    194419.031%1939166.15032047531929-0.0829794661

    194535.821%1940225.66716689961969-0.0824137108

    1946-8.429%1941206.64534862051977-0.0697970408

    19475.200%1942217.39090674881981-0.0470239025

    19485.705%1943229.79213442271990-0.0306445161

    194918.303%1944271.85150279481953-0.0120820474

    195030.806%1945355.59682354111934-0.011885657

    195123.678%1946439.79668599091939-0.0109756469

    195218.151%1947519.624132509219600.0033653531

    1953-1.208%1948513.346009098619940.0132592068

    195452.563%1949783.177720941320150.0135994949

    195532.597%19501038.472761619820110.0209837473

    19567.440%19511115.73006602219700.0356114491

    1957-10.457%1952999.054154286120050.0483447752

    195843.720%19531435.840180853119470.052

    195912.056%19541608.951637194820070.0548473525

    19600.337%19551614.366327651119480.0570457516

    196126.638%19562044.396596104419870.0581272164

    1962-8.811%19571864.255397225319840.06146142

    196322.612%19582285.799468600719780.0650928391

    196416.415%19592661.023871838319560.0743951187

    196512.399%19602990.970674101719920.0749372797

    1966-9.971%19612692.742356985719930.0996705148

    196723.803%19623333.69491850420040.1074277594Source: NYU Stern

    196810.815%19633694.229445163619680.1081486265

    1969-8.241%19643389.774288172219590.1205645716

    19703.561%19653510.489062543319650.12399242481930-0.25123636361

    197114.221%19664009.720988337420140.13524421651931-0.43837548892

    197218.755%19674761.75871158219710.1422115031937-0.35336728753

    1973-14.308%19684080.444016268320100.14821092281940-0.10672873194

    1974-25.902%19693023.536149489220060.15612557981941-0.12771455585

    197536.995%19704142.097493447820120.15890585241957-0.10457360196

    197623.831%19715129.200705777619640.16415455881973-0.14308047447

    1977-6.980%19724771.197675053519880.16537192811974-0.25901785758

    19786.509%19735081.768477709919520.18150988642001-0.11849759149

    197918.519%19746022.886091275319490.18303223682002-0.219660479610

    198031.735%19757934.263778934219860.18494578762008-0.365523441111

    1981-4.702%19767561.16373278319790.1851949017

    198220.419%19779105.081920035619720.1875536292

    198322.337%197811138.898259597319440.1903067695

    19846.146%197911823.510763827219420.1917376295

    198531.235%198015516.602025374619820.2041905508

    198618.495%198118386.3322075319990.2088535099

    19875.813%198219455.078518894419830.2233715586

    198816.537%198322672.402365298719630.226119271

    198931.475%198429808.582644967319960.2268096602

    1990-3.064%198528895.1130533219510.2367846304

    199130.235%198637631.505158637519670.2380296651

    19927.494%198740451.507787137919760.23830999

    19939.967%198844483.330392392519430.2506131013

    19941.326%198945073.144068086920090.2593523388

    199537.195%199061838.189655870119610.2663771296

    199622.681%199175863.688438399819980.2833795328

    199733.104%1992100977.34069068420030.2835580005

    199828.338%1993129592.25231742519380.2928265403

    199920.885%1994156658.04907246619910.3023484313

    2000-9.032%1995142508.97770141619500.3080553901

    2001-11.850%1996125622.00708807119850.3123514949

    2002-21.966%199798027.81676541319890.3147518364

    200328.356%1998125824.38848080419800.3173524551

    200410.743%1999139341.42061832619360.3194341028

    20054.834%2000146077.85027872220130.3214508586

    200615.613%2001168884.33934842619550.3259733185

    20075.485%2002178147.19823435519970.331036531

    2008-36.552%2003113030.22131020719450.3582108434

    200925.935%2004142344.8735594519750.3699513711

    201014.821%2005163441.93862372219950.371951989

    20112.098%2006166871.56296795419580.4371995499

    201215.891%2007193388.43092558519280.4381115515

    201332.145%2008255553.30808629619350.4674042105

    201413.524%2009290115.41501103619330.4998222543

    20151.360%2010294060.83811089919540.5256332124

    11.412%

    Source: NYU Sternas of 12/31/15

    &A

    Page &P

    Scatter

    S&P 500 Annual Returns 1928 - 2015

    1931

    Sheet7

    Avg

    &A

    Page &P

    Sheet8

    &A

    Page &P

    Sheet9

    &A

    Page &P

    Sheet10

    &A

    Page &P

    Sheet11

    &A

    Page &P

    Sheet12

    &A

    Page &P

    Sheet13

    &A

    Page &P

    Sheet14

    &A

    Page &P

    Sheet15

    &A

    Page &P

    Sheet16

    &A

    Page &P

  • 12

    Attention Response & Framing

    Source: Prof. Robert Shiller data. http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. You may not invest directly in an index. Does not represent all market declines of 10% or more.

    -25%

    -44%-35% -11%

    -13%

    -10%

    -14%-26%

    -12%-22% -37%

    10

    100

    1000

    10000

    100000

    1000000

    % R

    etur

    n

    S&P 500 Index (1928-2015) Calendar Years With Declines in Excess of 10%

    http://www.econ.yale.edu/%7Eshiller/data.htm

  • 13

    Meet Dr. Eben Otuteye and Mohammad Siddiquee

    “Volatility is not a surprise. Volatility is neutral;

    it is just part of what the asset is.

    “Redefining Risk and Return”

    Volatility ≠ Risk

    But you can turn it into risk if you mishandle it.”

    Source: Otuteye, Eben and Mohammad Siddiquee. “Redefining Risk and Return in Common Stock Investment from a Value Perspective.”https://www.brandes.com//docs/default-source/brandes-institute/2015/redefining-risk-and-return

    https://www.brandes.com/docs/default-source/brandes-institute/2015/redefining-risk-and-return

  • 14

    Source: Inspired by Marks, Howard. The Most Important Thing: Uncommon Sense for the Thoughtful Investor. New York: Columbia University Press. 2011. Hypothetical illustration does not represent any particular investment. Actual results will vary.

    Risk Perceptions

    More Risk Doesn’t Necessarily Mean More Return

    -100

    -50

    0

    50

    100

    150

    200

    Low Low to Medium Medium Medium to High High

    Pote

    ntia

    l Ret

    urn

    %

    Risk Level

  • 15

    Risk Tends to Diminish Over Time…

    Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices, as of 12/31/15. U.S. stocks represented by the S&P 500 Index. Rolling periods represent a series of overlapping, smaller time periods within a single, longer-term time period. For example, over a 20-year period, there is one 20-year rolling period, eleven 10-year rolling periods, sixteen 5-year rolling periods, and so forth. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. One cannot invest directly in an index.

    -60%

    -40%

    -20%

    0%

    20%

    40%

    60%

    2 Yr 5 Yr 10 Yr 20 Yr 30 Yr

    Ran

    ge o

    f Tot

    al R

    etur

    ns (A

    nn.)

    %

    Range of Total Returns for U.S. Stocks Over Various Rolling Periods (1926-2015)

  • 16

    Risk and Return: Ask Your Clients a Simple Question

    “What do you expect returns to be next year for the stock market? Give me a range of outcomes.”

    • Do they include a negative number in their range? • If not, have a conversation about expectations and short-term returns.

    Source: Jay Mooreland, www.theemotionalinvestor.org

  • 17

    4.7

    0

    1

    2

    3

    4

    5

    6

    7

    8

    9

    S&P 500 Avg. Investor

    Extrapolation & the Impact of Emotions

    Source: Dalbar QAIB, as of 12/31/15; http:www.talkmarkets.com/content/us-markets/dalbar-2016-yes-you-still-suck-at-investing-tips-for-advisors?post=96516.Reflects the 20-year period ended December 31, 2015. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. One cannot invest directly in an index.

    Investors don’t do as well as they should.Annualized Returns for S&P 500 Index and Average Equity Investor (12/31/1995 – 12/31/2015)

    8.2

    %

    http://www.talkmarkets.com/content/us-markets/dalbar-2016-yes-you-still-suck-at-investing-tips-for-advisors?post=96516

  • 18

    Source: Carl Richards at www.behaviorgap.com

    Avoid This Behavioral Pattern!

  • 19

    Investment Process: The Essentials

  • Source: CFA Institute report, “Manager Selection” by Scott D. Stewart, CFA. Dec. 2013.

    IPS Features and Implications1. Client description (asset size, cash flow profile, liabilities) 2. Duties (asset class selection, manager selection, fee negotiation,

    monitoring)3. Objectives (total vs. relative, real vs. nominal, risk objectives,

    fees/expenses)4. Constraints (liquidity, horizon, taxes, legal, restrictions) 5. Asset allocation targets (asset class selection, acceptable styles,

    number of classes)6. Rebalancing guidelines (frequency and rules) 7. Schedule for reviews (frequency and access)

    Investment Policy Statement

  • Source: Jim Ware, CFA and Brian Singer, CFA. “Decision Making: A Process Check for Investment Firms.”

    Decision Rights

    How Do We Make Decisions?

  • 22

    Evaluating “Success”

    Source: Russo, J. Edward and Paul J. H. Schoemaker. Winning Decisions: Getting It Right The First Time. 1st ed. New York: Random House. 2002.

  • 23

    Investor Stress Management Plan (ISMAP)

    1. Positive activities they control

    2. Investment plan

    3. Sign it

    Source: MarketPsych and Brandes Investment Partners

  • Hiring or firing managers

    Adopting strategies/approaches that have had recent success—or abandoning strategies that have fared poorly recently

    Confusing skill with luck when evaluating managers

    Looking at high returns without considering risks

    Recognizing Potential Biasesin Decision-Making

    Source: Bob Maynard. “Behavioral Finance: Pitfalls and Prevention for Plan Sponsors.” Brandes Institute. 2004.

  • Evaluating the products without evaluating the firm

    Avoiding “high-risk” investments because of perceived volatility

    Relying on skill in selecting a “better-than-average” manager

    Decisions where leverage is involved

    Source: Bob Maynard. “Behavioral Finance: Pitfalls and Prevention for Plan Sponsors.” Brandes Institute. 2004.

    Recognizing Potential Biasesin Decision-Making

  • Explanations in simple language

    Appoint a devil’s advocate

    Establish and perpetuate a culture of debate

    Use quantitative evidence—wisely

    Source: Bob Maynard. “Behavioral Finance: Pitfalls and Prevention for Plan Sponsors.” Brandes Institute. 2004.

    Preventing Bias From Affecting Decisions

  • Create and follow a comprehensive investment policy

    Focus on the long term

    “Pre mortem”

    Document successes and failures

    Source: Bob Maynard. “Behavioral Finance: Pitfalls and Prevention for Plan Sponsors.” Brandes Institute. 2004.

    Preventing Bias From Affecting Decisions

  • Review staff capabilities

    Set clear objectives and short-term risk tolerances

    Provide “stabilizing, rational consistency”

    Maintain stable committee with terms of 5 to 6 years, renewable once

    Achieve average manager tenure of 10 years or more

    In What Areas Should Investment Committees Focus?

    Source: CFA Institute report, “Manager Selection” by Scott D. Stewart, CFA. Dec. 2013.

    CFA Institute Recommendations

  • Understand how we make decisions―and which system we use

    Be aware of specific biases and use tools/tactics to help counter them

    Think long term Seek additional resources if

    needed

    In Closing…

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    VALUE SPECIALISTS SINCE 1974 CALL BRANDES NOW 800.237.7119

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  • 31

    Disclosures

    Robert Maynard is a member of the Brandes Institute Advisory Board.

    The S&P 500 Index with gross dividends measures equity performance of 500 leading companies in industries of the U.S. economy.

    The information provided in this material should not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any particular security. It should not be assumed that any security transactions, holdings or sectors discussed were or will be profitable, or that the investment recommendations or decisions we make in the future will be profitable or will equal the investment performance discussed herein. Portfolio holdings and allocations are subject to change at any time and should not be considered a recommendation to buy or sell particular securities. Strategies discussed herein are subject to change at any time by the investment manager in its discretion due to market conditions or opportunities. International and emerging markets investing is subject to certain risks such as currency fluctuation and social and political changes; such risks may result in greater share price volatility. Unlike bonds issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government or its agencies, stocks and other bonds are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. Stock and bond prices will experience market fluctuations. Please note that the value of government securities and bonds in general have an inverse relationship to interest rates. Indices are unmanaged and are not available for direct investment.

    The foregoing reflects the thoughts and opinions of Brandes Investment Partners® exclusively and is subject to change without notice. Brandes Investment Partners® is a registered trademark of Brandes Investment Partners, L.P. in the United States and Canada.

    Rolling periods represent a series of overlapping, smaller time periods within a single, longer-term time period. For example, over a 20-year period, there is one 20-year rolling period, eleven 10-year rolling periods, sixteen 5-year rolling periods, and so forth.

    The recommended reading has been prepared by independent sources which are not affiliated with Brandes Investment Partners. Any securities mentioned reflect independent analysts’ opinions and are not recommendations of Brandes Investment Partners. These materials are recommended for information purposes only and should not be used or construed as an offer to sell, a solicitation of an offer to buy, or a recommendation for any security. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. No investment strategy can assure a profit or protect against loss.

    Brandes Investment Partners does not guarantee that the information supplied is accurate, complete or timely, or make any warranties with regard to the results obtained from its use. Brandes Investment Partners does not guarantee the suitability or potential value of any particular investment or information source.

    No investment strategy can assure a profit or protect against loss.

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    VALUE SPECIALISTS SINCE 1974 CALL BRANDES NOW 800.237.7119

    BRANDES.COM11988 El Camino Real │ Suite 600 │ P.O. Box 919048 │ San Diego, CA 92191-9048

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