Area Handbook - Saudi Arabia

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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study

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National Security

the national guard's active complement. The principal combat unitswere eight brigades: two armored, five mechanized, and one air-

borne. There were five artillery battalions. A separate Royal GuardRegiment consisted of three light infantry battalions. Accordingto Norman Friedman's Desert Victory: The Warfor Kuwait,the Saudiland forces had deployed two armored brigades and two mechanizedbrigades on the Kuwaitiborder in December 1990 prior to Opera-tion Desert Storm. The dispositionof the remaining ground unitsincluded a mechanized brigade on the western Iraqi border, amechanized brigade on the Yemeni border, the Royal Guard Regi-ment in Riyadh, and the airborne brigade in reserve. The loca-tion of one mechanized brigade was not given.

Despite the addition of a number of units and increased mobil-ity achieved during the 1970s and 1980s, the army's personnel com-

plement has expanded only moderately since a major buildup waslaunched in the late 1960s. The army has been chronically under-strength, in the case of some units by an estimated 30 to 50 per-cent. These shortages have been aggravated by a relaxed policythat permitted considerable absenteeism and by a seriousproblemof retaining experienced techniciansand noncommissionedofficers(NCOs). The continued existence of a separate national guard alp')limited the pool of potential army recruits. Two months after thePersian Gulf War, in April 1991, the government announced thata decision had been taken to expand the ground forces sufficientlyto provide a more convincingdeterrent against threats to the king-dom's borders. Possibly 90,000 or more troops would be recruitedduring the 1990s and organized into seven or eight divisions. Withthe expected organization of a reserve force, the total number thatcould be called upon in an emergency might reach 200,000. For-eign observers,however, awareof past failures to meet personnelgoals, doubted that the limited manpowerpool would permit a dou-bling of the size of the army.

Smaller and less important than the national guard until the1960s, the army began to modernizeafter Egyptian incursions ontoSaudi territory during the Yemeni civil war (1962-65). RadicalArab nationalism and the emergence of Marxist movements innearby countries, as well as Israel's crushing defeat of Arab armiesin the June 1967 War, also spurred efforts to build a credible groundforce. The surplus of revenues from oil exportsprovided the means

to spend lavishly onarmy facilitiesand advanced equipment. Thefirst Saudi armored brigade, designated the Fourth ArmoredBrigade, was structured and trained along French lines. It wasequipped with 300 AMX-30 main battle tanks and 500 AMX-10P

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armored infantry fighting vehicles,both French-made(see table 12,Appendix).The other armored brigade, designated the Eighth Armored

Brigade, was formed under United States guidancesoon afterwardin the late 1970s. To equip this brigade, SaudiArabia purchasedM-60A3 main battletanks and M- 113 armored personnelcarriers(APCs) from the United States. In 1990 Saudi Arabia placed anorder for 315 M1A2 Abrams, the most advanced United Statestank; deliverywaE scheduled for 1993. Each brigade consistedofthree tank battalions, a mechanized infantry battalion, and a sup-port battalion.The French-equippedarmored brigade was stationedat Tabuk in the northwestand the United States-equippedbrigadeat Khamis Mushayt in the southwest.

The army's four mechanizedbrigades had been convertedfrominfantry brigades between the late 1970s and the mid-1980sandwere equipped with a varietyof United States and French armoredfighting vehicles. Each brigade consistedof one tank battalion, threemechanized infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and a sup-port battalion. The infantry brigade consistedof three motorizedbattalions, an artillery battalion, and a support battalion. The air-borne brigade consistedof two paratroop battalions and three spe-cial forces companies. Fieldartilerylxwalions were equipped withUnited States and French 155mm self-propelled howitzers and105mm and 155mm towed guns.The principalantitank weapons,many of them mountedon armoredvehicles, were the United StatesTOW, the B ritishDragon, and the French HOT. Tactical air de-

fense weapons included self-propelled guns, the French Crotalesurface-to-air missile (SAM), and Stinger and Redeye shoulder-fired missiles. The army used transport and medical evacuationhelicopters but had no assault helicopters.

The most visibleunit of the army, because of its deploymentaround Riyadh and wherever the king traveled in the country, wasthe Royal Guard Regiment. The Royal Guard had been autono-mous until it was incorporated into the army in 1964; neverthe-less, it remained directly subordinate to the king ard maintainedits own communicationsnetwork.The mission of the regimentwasprotection of the House of Saud. Detachments accompanied theking as well as several other members of the Al Saud at all times.Mainly recruited from the tribesof Najd, guardsmen were selected

on the basis of their loyalty to the king and the Al Saud. The regi-ment's equipment included light weapons and armored vehicles.The army's strength was normally concentrated at four large

military cities, built at great expense in the 1970s and 1980s withthe assistanceof the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The

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AMX-30 main battle tank used by the Royal Saudi LandFo,,:esCourtesyArmedForces Office, Royal SaudiArabian Embassy, Washington

first of these cities was at Khamis Mushayt in the mcnrntains ofthe southwest, about 100 kilometersfrom theYemeni border-. Thesecond was at Tabuk, protecting the northwestern routerleading

fromJordan, Israel, and Syria. A third site, Assad MilitaryCity,was at Al Kharj, about 100 kilometers southeastof Riyadh, wherethe national armaments industry was also located.

The largest of the military cities, King Khalid, began function-ing in 1985 although constructioncontinued throughoutthe 1980s.Located near Hafar al Batin dose to the border area facing Kuwaitand Iraq, King Khalid Military City was sited near the strategicTrans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) road connectingAd Dammamwith Jordan. It was a self-contained cityof 65,000, bothmilitaryand civilian, built with a perimeter in the form of a huge octagonwithin which werea series of concentric smalleroctagons. Housesand apartments for 6,500 familieswere provided, as well as numer-ous schools and mosques, power plants, shoppingarcades, theaters,and clubs. Water was supplied by seventeen deepwells. Adjacentto the main installation were a hospital, race course, maintenanceand supply areas,underground command bunkers,and antiaircraftmissile sites. The logistic and other base resources at King KhalidMilitary City were indispensable to the allied buildup before thesweep into Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It was reported

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that construction would begin in 1992 on a fifth military city inthe Empty Quarter, 550 kilometerssouth of Riyadh. The new basewould havea residential area to accommodate 20,000 people anda large air base with hardened aircraft shelters. The existingarmybase at Ash Sharawrah in the Empty Quarter was remote but im-portant because of its proximity to the Yemeni border.

The equipmentof the land forces came from a varietyof sourcesbut primarily from Western countries. However, in 1989 it wasrevealed that SaudiArabiahad purchased the intermediate range(2,600-kilometer)CSS-2 surface-to-surface missile (SSM) fromChina. According to The MilitaryBalance, 1992-1993publishedbythe InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies, as of 1992 SaudiArabia had a stock of thirty launchers and fifty missiles. Of lim-ited accuracyand reliabilityand with a payload ofonly 750 kilo-grams, the value of theSSMswas largely symbolic. Nevertheless,disclosureof the secret transaction-Saudi Arabia's first majorac-quisition of hardwarefrom a communistcountryand a system thatcould strike anywhere in the Middle East and beyond-created anuproar in the United States. To placate Washington, King Fahdprovided written assurances that the missileswould not be armedwith chemical weapons, and Saudi Arabia later signed the NuclearNonproliferationTreaty to demonstrate that it had no intentionof acquiring nuclear warheads.

Royal Saudi Air ForceAs of 1992, ... e first line combat air strengthof theRoyal Saudi

Air Force (RSAF) consistedof some 200 aircraft, organized intosix fighter/ground-attacksquadrons and five fighter-air defensesquadrons. The personnel strength of the air force was estimatedto be about 18,000. Althoughmodest in comparison to the air powerof neighboringcountries, the RSAF was considered to be the mostmodem and effective of the Saudi services. Its mission was to de-fend the economic installations and the widely scattered popula-tion centers of Saudi Arabia against attackand, particularly, torepel air attacks or amphibiousassaults againstthe country'shighlyvulnerable oil pumping stations, processingand loadingfacilities,and oil platforms in the Persian Gulf.

The first-linecombat fighterswere deployedat four key airfields:Dhahran, to defend the main oil facilitiesof the Persian Gulf; AtTaif, covering the ports and holy cities of the lower Red Sea;Khamis Mushayt, defending the Yemeniborder zone; and Tabuk,to defend the key ports of the upper Red Sea area andSaudi airspace adjacent to Jordan and Israel. These four bases and the airbase at Riyadh were protected from air attack by ImprovedHawk

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Alpha jet of the Royal Saudi Air ForceCourtesyArmedForces Office, Royal SaudiArabian Embassy, Washington

(I-Hawk) SAMs, hardened aircraft shelters, and undergroundcom-mand posts.

The RSAF was established in 1950 during the reign of Abd alAziz. Its early air operations had been under control of the army.In its initial years, the air force was influenced chiefly by the Brit-ish, who providedaircraft and advisers and helped train Saudi pilotsand maintenance personnel in the kingdom and in Britain. UnitedStates influence,emanating from the air base at Dhahran that wasleased by the United States from 1952 to 1962, was also pivotalto the early developmentof the Saudi air force. Some United Statesaircraft were transferred to the RSAF from units operating atDhahran and the United States Military Training Mission atDhahran trained Saudi pilots and maintenance personnel.

In 1972 the first of 114 Northrop F-5s were delivered to theRSAF, and, as of 1992, the air force stillused threesquadrons oflater versionsof the F-5 in the fighter-groundattack role, one squad-ron for reconnaissance, and a number of aircraft as advanced jettrainers. In 1984 first deliveries were taken of the more advancedF-15s. By 1992 the SAF had seventy-eight F-15s, includingfighterconversion trainers (see Cooperationwith the United States, this ch.).

Afterthe United States refuseda Saudi arms request, Saudi Arabiaturned to Britain to meet its requirements. In mid-1988, it was

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announced that as part of a huge transaction, Saudi Arabia wouldacquire Tornado fightersfrom Britain in their strikeand air defenseconfigurations, plus Hawk jet trainers and Pilatus PC-9 trainersbuilt in.Switzerlandand outfitted in Britain. As of early 1992, threeof the RSAF fighter-groundattack squadronswere equipped withTornadoesand three squadronswere equipped with F-5Es. Tw oair defense squadronswere equipped with Tornadoes and threesquadrons were equippedwith F-15Cs.The three transportsquad-rons were equipped with C-130s in various versions and CASAC-212s, a medium transportof Spanish desigu.. The two helicop-ter squadrons employed a variety of smaller rotary-wingaircraft(see table 13, Appendix). Undauntedby its previous failure to es-tablish an assured supply of combat aircraft from the United States,Saudi Arabia announced in late 1991 that it had placed an orderwith McDonnell Douglas for an additionalseventy-twoF-15s. Itappeared doubtful whether the sale would be approved by theUnited States administration and the Congress.

Because ground-based radar could not provide adequate ad-vanced warning of attacks on sensitive targets alongthe PersianGulf,particularlyfrom nearby Iranian air bases, Saudi Arabiaor-dered five E-3A AWACS aircraft in 1981. To allay Israel's con-cerns, the aircraft were equipped specificallyfor the defensiveneedsof the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas only. The first aircraftreached operational status in 1987 in time to assist United States

naval operations in the tanker war in the Persian Gulf. Trainingand support services were provided by the BoeingCorporationanda United StatesAir Force team. Congressrequired that the UnitedStates have substantial control over the use of the airplanes anda sharing of the AWACS data.

In 1985 SaudiArabiaalso contractedwith a consortiumheadedby Boeing for the Peace Shield command, control, communica-tions, and intelligence (C3I) system. Its purposewas to link infor-mation collectedby AWACS and ground-basedsurveillanceradarwith fightersand groundair defense, includingthe I-Hawk SAMs,to provide integratedair defense against attacksacross the gulfandRed Sea and from the directionof Yemen. In 1991 it wasannouncedthat the Hughes Aircraft Corporationhad assumed managementof the project, whichhad been sub-ject to delays in its completion.Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces

Saudi air defense units were separated from the army in themid-1980sto form a fourthservice branch responsiblefor territorialair defense. The new fourth commandwas initially entrusted to

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Amir Khalid ibn Sultan Al Saud, son of the minister of defenseand aviation.

The air defense forces, with an estimated 4:.000 personnel in 1992,had as their primary responsibility the operation of thirty-threeSAM batteries. Of these, sixteen batteries were equipped with 128I-Hawk SAMs with a forty-kilometer range, which were emplacedaround Riyadh, Ras Tanura, Dhahran, Jiddah, and key air basesat Khamis Mushayt, Hafar al Batin, and Tabuk, as well as theapproaches to strategic oil facilitiesof the Eastern Province. Theremaining seventeenbatteries, forminga secondline of air defense,were equipped with sixty-eight Shahine SAM fire units with a rangeof sixteen kilometers. These SAMs were - version of the FrenchCrotale missile system mounted on AMX-30SA chassis. This mo-bile missile defense guarded the Saudi oil fields and other vital in-stallations. An additional seventy-three Shahine fire units wereemployed as stadc defense. Both theI-Hawk and Shahine systemswere linked to AWACS and to the PeaceShield command andcon-trol system. In addition to the missile defense,the air defense forceswere equipped with Vulcan 20mm self-propelledguns and 30mmguns mounted on AMX-30SA chassis (see table 14, Appendix).

Royal Saudi Naval Forces

The development of the navy as a guardian force in the PersianGuJf and Red Sea dates from 1974 when the Saudi Naval Expan-sion Program (SNEP) was initiatedwith the assistanceof the UnitedStates. Previously, the navy had only a few obsolete patrol boats,landing craft, and utility boats. As of 1992, the main combat ves-sels were four guided-missile frigates and four corvettes, ninemissile-armed fast attack craft, and four minesweepers.

Between 1980 and 1983, the United States supplied four PCG-1corvettes (870 tons), each with eight Harpoon antiship missiles inaddition to six torpedo tubes. Nine fast attack craft, also deliveredin the early 1980s, were similarlyequipped with Harpoon missiles.The principal combat ships of the navy were four French F-2000frigates (2,870 tons) commissioned in 1985 and 1986, each armedwith a Dauphin helicopter, eight Otomat antiship missileshavinga range of 160 kilometers, torpedo tubes, and a 100mm gun. Inthe same contract with France were two logistic support ships,twenty-four Dauphin helicopters, mostarmed with AS-15 anti-ship missiles, and support programs for training and maintenance.Saudi Arabia had contracted to purchase three Lafayette-typefrigates (3,700 tons) from the French, armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles, and a 100mm gun. The Lafayettes were scheduledto enter into service after 1995. Discussions had been held with

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France and other countries for the supply of up to eight subma-rines. The large arms agreement with Britain in 1988 resulted ina contract for three Sandown-classminsweepers to be deliveredbetween 1991 and 1993 (see table 15, Appendix).

Naval personnelstrength, which was less than 1,000 in 1974,had reached 9,500 by 1991, including 1,500marines. The marineswere organized as an infantry regimentand were equipped with140 armored vehiclesof Spanish manufacture. Itwas reported in1991 that an expansion ofthe marine corps was contemplatedandnew inventory requirementswere being prepared.

The main naval headquarterswere locatedat Riyadh. The navyvws organized intothe Western Fleet, with headquartersatJiddahon the Red Sea, and the Eastern Fleet, withheadquarters at AlJubayl on thePersianGulf. All four frigates werebased inthe RedSea and the four corvettesin the PersianGulf. Other naval facili-ties were located at Ynnbu, Ad Dammam, and Ras al Mishab.The port of Ad Dammam had a large military sea terminal thatproved fully adequate to handle United States and other cargoesduring the buildup precedingthe PersianGulfWar. The two mainbases 'tJiddah and Al Jubayl were constructedunder SNEP. Theywere similar to the militarycities of the army, with hardened com-mand centers, familyhousing, schools, mosques. shoppingcenters,and recreational facilities for naval personnel and their families,in addition to maintenance, logistics, and training facilities.

Saudi Arabian National GuardAlthough not subordinate to the minister of defense and avia-

tion and frequentlyreferred to as a paramilitaryor an internal secu-rity force, the national guardcame to be regarded as a integralpart of the Saudi military establishment with the modernizationof its active units and its role in the PersianGulf War. The forcewas a directdescendantof the lkhwan, the tribal army that servedAbd al Aziz so well during his long effort to retake the ArabianPeninsula for the House of Saud. After having to curb the indepen-dent militaryoperations andexcessesof the l'hwan, Abd al Azizpermitted it to reappear as the so-called White Army (the namestemmed from the traditional Arabdress rather thanuniformswornby :he membcrs), which later became thenational guard. It wasnot a reserve component similar to the nationalguard of the UnitedStates; at least part of it was an active-duty armed force existingparallelto, but separate from, theregular militaryservicebranches.The strength of the guard in 1992 was estimated at75,000, but20,000 of that total served in a militia status, oncall for mobiliza-tion rather than on daily active duty.

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Trailer-mountedHawk missile launcherCourtesyArmed Forces Officer, RoyalSaudi Arabian Embassy, Washington

Truck carlying Shahine suiface-to-air missilesCourtesyA ined Forces Office, Royal SaudiArabian Embassy, Washington

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The head of the nationalguard for three decades since 1962 wasKing Fabid's half brother and designated successor, Amir AbdAllah. Three ofAbd Allah's sons alsoheld positionsin the guardorganization.The guaid chain of commandwas completelyseparatefrom regulai militarychannels, as was its communicationsystem.

Commanders of major units reported directlyto Abd Allah, andhe reported to the king. In the post-WorldWar II era, as Arabmonarchsin othcr countries fell to coupsand revolutions,the Saudiroyal familyevidentlydecided that a parallelarmy such as the na-tional guardwould be a formof insuranceagainst coups. Its con-tinuedexistence was,however, also a matter of tribal and family

politics. Abd Allah was considered theleader of the Shammarbranchof the Al Saud, a rival source of power tothe Sudairibranchthat dominated the regulararrr~ed forces (see The Royal Family,ch. 4).

Training of the national guard became the responsibilityof theVinnell Corporationof the United States in 1975. About 1,000United States Vietnam veterans were initially recruited to servein the long-term trainingprogramdesigned to convertthe guardinto a mobile and hard-hittingcounterinsurgencyforce that couldalso reinforcethe regulararmy ifnecessary. Thesecontractorsweresupervisedby a United States militarygroup with the designationOffice of the ProgramManager-Saudi Arabian NationalGuard(OPM-SANG).

Extensivemilitary infrastructurefacilitieshave been built to en-sure thecomfort and well-beingof nationalguard units.Their majorcantonments were inAl Ahsa Oasisnear Al Hufufand the majoroil installationsof the Eastern Province and at Al Qasim in NajdProvince inan area where many of the tribal elements were re-cruited and most training was conducted. A large new housingproject for guard personnel, with associatedschools, shcps, andmosques, has beenconstructed nearRiyadh, also the site of theguard's militaryacademy, the KingKhalid MilitaryCollege. Othernational guardmilitarycitieswere locatedat At Taif, Ad Dammam,and Jiddah. A new headquarterscomplex was built in Riyadh inthe early 1980s.

Daringthe 1950sand early 1960s, the regular armyand the na-

tional guard were both small and of roughly equalstrength. Theguard suffered when thearmy'sexpansionwas givenpriority, butin the 1970s the declinewas reversedwhen the guard was convertedto a light mechanizedforce with the helpof United States advisers.Initially consisting offour combined arms battalions, the active-

duty component had by 1992 been enlarged to two mechanizedbrigades, each with fourinfantrybattalions, an artillerybattalion,

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F-2000 class frigate of the Royal Saudi Naval ForcesCou'tesyArmed Forces Office, Royal Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington

and engineering and sign'AS companies. The guard's mobility overdesert terrain was assured by 1,100 V-150 Commando wheeledAPCs. Firepower came from 105mam and 155mam towedlhowitzers,106mam recoilless rifles, and TOW antitank mis siles mounted onAP~s (see table 16, Appendix).

The second component of the national guard, made up of tribalbattalions under tie comrmand of local shaykhs, was organized intofour infantry brigades. These men, often the .sortsof local chiefsor of veterans of the original Ikhwanforces, reported for duty aboutonce a month for the purpose of receiving stipends. They wereprovided waith obsolete rifles, although many had individually ac-quired Soviet AK-47 a~stault rifles. Although neither particularlywell trained nor well equipped, they could be counted on to be loyalto the House ofSaud if called for service. Their enrollment in theguard was largely a means to bolster the subsidies paid to localshaykhs and to retain the support of their tribes.

The national guard was swiftlydeployed to the border area afterIraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and ws actively engaged in thewar, notably in the fighting to retake the town of Ras al Khafji (seePersian Gulf War, 1991, this ch.). After the war ended, it was re-ported that an enlargement of the national guard to eleven or twelveactive brigadeswas contemplated. In addition, the Commando AP~s

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were to be replaced by more than 1,000 eight-wheeledlightarmoredvehicles (LAVs) manufactured by General Motors in Canada. TheLAVs were to be mounted with a Yriety of armaments, such as25mm guns, kinetic energy guns, and TOW missile launchers.

TrainingAny Saudi male citizen-including citizens who had been

naturalized for at least five years-could apply for training as anofficer if he met the physical and mental standards. Most officercandidates attended military preparatory schools in Riyadh andother cities, where they received free tuition if they committed them-selves to attend a militarycollege upon graduation. The King Abdal Aziz MilitaryAcademy was the principal source of second lieu-tenants for the army. Designedfor a capacity of 1,500 cadets, thismodem facilitywas a self-containedsmall cityabout fortykilometersfrom Riyadh. The curriculumrequired three years of study, withsuccessfulcompletionleading to a bachelorofmilitarysciencedegreeand a commission. After graduation the new second lieutenantsattended a branch school for specialization in infantry, artillery,armor, ordnance, airborneunits, the engineers, communications,military police, or administration.Officers in mid-careercompetedfor placesat the Command and StaffCollege atRiyadh to earna master of military science degree, a required step toward pro-motion to the senior ranks. Selected officers also attended highermilitary colleges in the United States and other countries.

A network of aimy schools trained NCOs in branchand special-ized services. Basic training of enlisted personnel was conductedby Saudi NCOs, but most subsequent training was carriedout withthe assistance of foreign military personnel or specialists undercontract.

Science graduatesof technical institutionsand universitiescouldobtain direct commissionsas second lieutenants. In September1990, the kingissued a directiveopeningmilitary trainingprogramsto all male universitygraduateswithoutdistinctionas togeographi-cal and tribal balance, which had been factors in the past.

Air force flighttraining took place at the KingFaisal AirAcademyat Al Kharj. The flight training consistedof a twenty-seven-monthcourse that began with intensiveinstruction in the English language.British instructors under contract to British Aerospace (BAe--formerly the British Aircraft Corporation)held mostof the facultypositions at the air academy as well as at the Technical StudiesInstitute at Dhahran,where Saudi aircraft technicianswere trained.

After successfulcompletionof primarytraining, cadetswere as-signed for several monthsof advanced training on British Strike-masters and Hawks, which had sufficient avionics and weapons

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an old system of tribal levies to fill its ranks, yieldinga compositionmuch less representativeof the nation as a whole. Guardsmen wererecruited mainly froma few of the important camel-rearingtribesof Najd, r-putedly the most trustworthy in th, kingdom.

The kingdom's populat~on was 16.9 million, according to the1992 census; of this number, 12.3 million were Saudi nationals.This population level would be sufficient to maintain the desiredstrength levels of the regular armed services, assuming the needededucation and skill levels were available. (Population statistics forSaudi Arabia, however, were regarded by some Western sources

as unreliable.) Accordingto the United StatesGovernment, an esti-mates 159,000males reachedthe military age of eighteen eachyear.The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency(ACDA) reported that Saudi Arabia had 5.4 persons in the armedforces per 1,000 of population. This figuoe was far lowerthan theaverage for the. Middle East as a whole (18.3 per 1,000 of popu-lation).

The cor'servativeMuslim attitudethat stronglydiscouraged Saudiwomen from seeking jobs outside the home has eased only slightly.Some womenworked in human servicesand medicaloccupations,but generally social and religious barriers precluded women fromworking in positions that would place them in public contact withmen. Thus, the military services remained closed to female ap-plicants.

The military enlistment period was three years; cash and otherrewards were offered as inducements to reenlist. Pay scales wereset at levels higher than that for other government service, and themilitary have been spared salarycuts that applied to civil servants.Allowances and fringe benefits weregenetous. The governmentspent huge sums of money to improvethe amenities and comfortfor personnel in order to increase the attractiveness of militarycareers. The military cities included excellent family housing formarried officers and NCOs, as well as modern barracks for un-married personnel.The militarycities also offered excellentschoolsand hospitals as well as convenient shopping centers and recrea-tional facilities.

To attract applicants to the military profession, the Ministry ofDefense and Aviation founded its own technical highschools andcolleges, which offered subsidizededucationand granted degrees.Anyone seeking a commission,by attending a military academy hadto be eighteen yearsold and a citizen bybirth or a naturalizedcitizenfor at least five years. The candidate also had to be of good repu-tation, havingneither been subjected to asharia penaltynor im-prisoned for a felony within five years of the dateof his application.

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Saudi princes perform a traditional sworddance at the Janadriyah _festi'al in 1985, spnsored by the Saudi Arabian National Guard.

Courtesy Aramco World

Officers were noi free to resign. However, they enjoyed extensivebenefits, including hardship pay for service in remote areas suchas Ash Sharawrah in the southwestern desert. They were entitledto buy land and housing for themselvesor as an income-producinginvestmentwith generously subsidizedloans. Although officers werepromoted on a regular basis, they were oftenfrustrated by the lackof opportunity to assume increasing responsibility because of thesmall size of the services.

As A iesult of the advanced technology inherent in the militarymodernization programs, large numbers of foreign militaryandcivilian personnel have been needed to service and maintainweapons systems and to train Saudi personnelin their use. Althoughprecise data were not available, it was estimated that in the late1980s about 5,000 United States civilians and 500 military tech-nicians and trainers anad perhaps 5,000 British, French, and otherEuropeans provided this support. In addition, a considerablenumber of officers from Muslim areas--including Pakistanis,Jor-danians, Syrians, Palestinians, and Egyptians--were contractedon an individual ba~is, mo.tly in training and logistics assignments.As many as 11,000 to 15,000 Pakistani troops and advisers hadbeen recruited to bring the two armored brigades to full strength,

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as well as to serve in engineering unitsand the air force. The 10,000troops in the armored service left the country beginningin late 1987,reportedly because Pakistanwas unwilling to screen the Shia elementfrom the Ic.rce at a time when conflictwith Iran seemeda possibility.

Unifm-ms, Ranks, and InsigniaUniforms ,vorn by personnel of Saudi Arabia's armed services,

including the national guard, were closely patterned on the Britishand United States models that influenced those forces during theirearly development. The most common uniform colors were khakior olive drab for the army and national guard, blue or white forthe navy, and blue for the air force. Officers had semidress uni-forms for various functionsand drers uniformsfor formal occasions.All personnelwore berets, and officersalso had visored,caps. Mem-bers of the RoyalGuard Regiment often wore the flowing whitethaub (robe) and white kaffiyah and qutrah (traditional Arab head-gear of skullcap and scarf). Berets wereusuallyof distinctive colorsthat designatedbranches, e.g., paratroopswore maroon, tank troopswore black, and the Royal Guardsmen-when in conventionaluniforms-worebright green berets. National guardsmenwore thetraditional red-checkered Arab headdress, although some moremodern unitswore redberets. Tribal units often wore thedmaabwithcrossedbandoliers.The brass badge wornby all ranks depicted thenational symbol-a date palm with crossed sabersbeneath a crown,

all enclosed by a wreath.There were ten grades ofcommissionedofficers in thearmy, navy,air force, and air defense force, corresponding to the grades of sec-ond lieutenant (ensign) to general (admiral) in the United Statesforces. The Saudi ranksin all serviceswere known by the samedesig-nations;for example, mu'dzim thari correspondedto second lieutenantin the army, air defense force, and air force and to ensign in thenavy (see fig. II).

Enlisted rank structure was the same in all services, and rankswere known by the same terms. There were seven enlistedratingsplus the entry level of recruit. Chevronsto denote rankwere wornon both sleeves; the recruit hadno chevron The NCOgrades didnot correspondexactly to those ofthe United States forces, and theSaudi army or air force warrant officer (the navy had none) cor-responded more closely to master sergeant or sergeant major thanto any of the four gradesof warrantofficer in the United States forces(see rig. 12).

Military JusticeThe administrationofjusvice in the armed iorces was regulated

by the Code of Militay Justice, decreed and published by the

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minister of defense in 1947. It was applicable to all members ofthe armed forces, all retired personnel, and civilians working forthe armed forces who committed crimes or offenses of a militarynature or in violation of military regulations. Military trial courtsoperating under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Avi-ation had jurisdiction over personnel subject to the code. Crimesin violation of the sharia, however, wereunder the jurisdiction ofsharia courts.

A military trial court consistedof officers, who hadto be seniorto the defendant if an officer were tobe tried. The court includeda president and four other voting members, plus a legal adviser,

an attorney representing the government, and an attorney repre-senting the accused. Trial procedures were direct and uncompli-cated, and trials were conducted in a manner intended to protectthe rights of the accused. The burden of proof was on the govern-ment. A case was brought to trial only after a thorough and im-partial investigation, after which a complete report of the allegedcrime or incident was submitted to the military commander hav-ing jurisdiction, who then could recommend either trial or dismis-sal of charges. The court's decision could be invalidated or asentence commuted by the minister of defenseand aviation or theking for irregularities,omissions, evidenceof prejudice, or evidencethat pressure had been brought to bear. The king and the ministerhad sole power of review of sentences imposedby military trial

courts, and, subiect to their concurrence,the judgmentsof the courtswere final.Punishable offenses under the Code of Military justice were class-

ified as felonies, misdemeanors,or disobediences. Felonies and mis-demeanors were subject to trial, and upon convictiona defendantcould be sentenced to severe punishment or to disciplinarypunish-ment as prescribed by the court. Disobedienceswere less seriousoffenses and were punishable administratively.

Felonies punishable under the militarycode included hightrea-son against the kingdomand disloyaltyto the king or to the armedforces. Severe punishmentswere prescribedfor those found guiltyof such crimes. Military misdemeanorsmeLiting the impositionofdisciplinary punishment included such acts as misbehavior thatbrought discredit on the armed thrces, misuse of authority, mis-use of military funds or equipment, agitation to leave the service,and violation of military regulations anddirectives. Disciplinarypunishments rangedfrom forfeituresof pay and allowancesfor fromone to three months to imprisonmentfor up to eighteenmonths.Disobedienceand failure to obey orders were punished adminie-trr.ively. Punishments,which ranged from forfeit-ureof one day's

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pay and imprisonment for twenty-four hours to imprisonment forforty-five days, were scaled according to the seriousness of theoffense as prescribed in the Code of Military Justice.

Defense ExpendituiesDuring the 1980s, Saudi Arabia's outlays onnational security

were among the highest in the world in spiteof its relatively smallpopulation. In 1989 its expendituresof US$14.7 billionrankedeleventhamong the countries of the world. Nonetheless,this levelof spending reflected a declining trend from a peak of US$24.8billionreached in1983. Budgeteddefenseexpendituresmaintainedthis gradual decline between 1988 and 1990. Actual defense ex-penditures rose dramaticallyin 1990, however, to almostUS$31.9billion to meet thecosts of additional arms and the contributionsto United States and British military expendituresnecessitated bythe Iraqi aggression againstKuwait. The defensebudget of US$26.8billion in 1991 included more than US$13.7 billion in contribu-tions to the United States, French, and British war efforts, bu. didnot include projectedheavy additionalarms purchases. Saudi Ara-bia also contributed to the costs of other non-Western membersof the coalition forces facing Iraq.

In early 1991, Saudi officialsestimated that during the first fivemonths of the gulf crisis the country had earned roughly US$15billion in windfall oil profits arising from increased production andhigher marketprices, while assuming an additional US$30 billionin commitments related to the crisis. The latter figure includedUS$13.6 billion in new arms and equipment, US$2.7 billion inextra mobilization and deployment costs and civil defense, withthe remainder consisting of grants and loans to other governmentsto offset the economic effects of the crisis.

During 1983, when defense spending reached a peak, militaryexpendituresper capitawere at an annual level of nearly US$2,500.This amount was more than twice the per capita defense spendingin the United States, and was not approached by any other coun-try except Israel, Iraq, and the other oil-exportingstatesof the Per-sian Gulf. As a consequenceof the reduced rate of defense spendingafter 1983, military expendituresper capita had declined to US$897by 1989.

The share of gross national product (GNP-see Glossary) origi-nally earmarked for defense in 1990 was 16.9percent, materiallybelow the peak of 22 percent rcached in 1983 but still about twiceas high as the Middle East as a whole. Defense outlays constituted35.5 percent of central government expenditures in 1989; this per-centage was also higher than theMiddle East averageof 32 percent.

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The declining rate of defense spending between 1984 and 1990resulted largely from reductions in oil revenues that produced anegative growth rate for the entire economy. A secondary factormay have been the completion of several large-scale infrastructureprojects. Arms imports, which accounte .1 or 16 percent of thedefense budget in 1983, had risen to 25 percent by 1988. The majorcontracts for weaponry placed withBritain, the United States, andFrance since 1988; th.,. extraordinary expenses of the Persian GulfWar; and plans forexpansior of the armed forces during the 1990sseemed certain to impose pres,,'ure on the defense budget for years

to come.Foreign Involvement and Influence

Until the 1930s, Abd al Aziz, concerned with conquest and thereestablishment of the House of Saud on the peninsula, showedlittle interest in developingarmed forces fornational defense, relyinginstead on British support and diplomacy. After the clash withYemen in the early 1930s and the discoveryof oil, the Saudikingrecognized theneed for a standingarmy and sought assistance fromBritain, Egypt, and the United States. By the mid-1940s, the Saudiswere relying more on the United States than on any other coun-try, mostly because of the successful relations between Saudioffi-cials and Aramco.

Onlynominal sums were spent on defense until Saudi Arabia'sinvolvement in the Yemeni civil war of the early 1960s. When the

need for stronger national defense became apparent to the leader-ship, Saudi Arabia was obliged to turn to foreign sources for ar-maments, military training, and the construceionof facilities. Thelong-standingmilitaryrelationshipbetween SaudiArabia andtheUnited States servedas a foundation for the buildup of the defenseforces and military infrastructure begun under Faisal.

Cooperation with the United StatesBctween 1947 and 1991, Saudi Arabia's purchases under the For-

eign Military Sales program of the United States Department ofDefense totaled approximately US$60 billion. More than 80 per-

cent of these purchases were for construction of infrastructure-Ibases and command and control facilities-together with main-tenance, spare parts, and training. Fewer than 20 percent of thepurchases were for weapons.

The first United States military mission of any consequence ar-rived in Saudi Arabia in 1943, but the first significant mutualdefense agreement was not formalizeduntil June 1951. As a resultof that agreement, a United States Milita, Training Mission

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(USMTM) arrived for duty in the kingdom in 1953 to superviseall military assistanceand training activities. Until the late 1960s,this assistance was provided primarily on a grant basis. Duringthe reign of Saud, the governmentwas continually faced with largebudget deficits despite increasingoil revenues. By 1964, after Saudhad been deposed and Faisal had becomo king, the country wason a better economic footingand it was able to pay for the majorpurchases of arms, infrastructure, and training services that fol-lowed.

Initially, the primary purpose of the United States in establish-ing the special relationship with Saudi Arabia was to check thespread of Soviet influence in that area of the world and the conse-quent threat to Middle East oil. The Saudis were conscious of theSovietdanger, and the royal family wasinherentlyanticommunist;nevertheless, becauseof proximity, Israel and IrLn were perceivedto be the most immediate threats to the securityof the kingdom.Saudi Arabia did not want the Arabian Peninsula to become anarena of superpower contention and was opposed to the establish-ment of United States bases or to th, stationing in the kingdomof large numbers of United States military personnel.

After the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which triggereda sharpincreasein oil prices, Saudi Arabia was able to allocatelarge sums

to the modernization and training of the armed forces. Until thelate 1980s, the primary areas of activity bythe United States werethe wide range of construction activities bythe Army Corps of En-gineers, the Saudi Naval Expansion Program, and the SaudiOrd-nance Corps Program to establish an integrated logistics, supply,and maintenancesystem. In 1988 the Corps of Engineers completedthe program that had kept it tiigaged in the kingdom for twenty-three years.

PresidentJimmy Carter's proposal to sell advanced F-15 fighteraircraft to Saudi Arabia in 1978 and his proposal to loan and laterto sell the kingdom AWACS aircraftafter the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 touched off bitter disputes in Congress. The saleof the F- 15s was approved under conditionsthat limited their rangeand offensive power because of fears that they could tip the regionalbalance against Israel.President Ronald Reagandecided thesaleof the AWACS aircraft should proceed to help the Saudis guardagainst attacks on their oil installations. He urged that the trans-fer of five AWACS and seven arial refuelingtankersbe approved.The package alsoincluded auxiliaryfuel tanks for the F-15 fightersand more than 1,000 Sidewinderair-to-air missiles. For SaudiAra-bia, the purchaserequest became a test of the firmnessof the rela- Iionship, but for the UnitedStates it became a 'olitical nightmare

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because Israel and its supporters in the United States raised strenu-ous objections to the sale. After lengthy congressionalhearings andinvestigations,the package was narrowly approvedwith special re-strictions on the use of the AWACS aircraft.

In 1985 President Reagan sought authority to sell Saudi Arabiaforty-two additional F-15s, antiaircraft missiles, Harpoon antishipmissiles, and Blackhawk troop-carrying helicopters. Again, theproposal raised a storm of opposition in Congress and had to bewithdrawn. In 1986 and 1988, scaled-downpackages were intro-duced and eventually approved by Congress after Stinger anti-aircraft and Maverick antitank missileswere deleted. Amongtheapproved items were Bradley fighting vehicles, TOW II antitank

missiles, electronic upgrades for the F- I5s, and twelve additionalF-15s to remain in the United States until needed as replacements.United States arms transfer agreements with Saudi Arabia in-

creased dramatically in 1990. Of a total of US$14.5 billion in con-tracts signed, US$6.1 billion preceded the Iraqi invasionof Kuwait.Ti-ey included LAVs, TOW II launchersand missiles, and 155mmhowitzers, all for the national guard; 315 MIA2 tanks; and thirtytank recovery vehicles. After the invasion, the United Stateshastilyarranged a package that includedF-15 aircraft; M1A2 and M-60A3tanks and other armored vehicles; Stinger, TOW II, and Patriotmissiles; Apache helicopters; and about 10,000 trucks.

A second phase of the arms package, worth an estimated US$14billion, was postponed in early 1991 to reassessSaudi needs in the

postwar atmosphere in the Persian Gulf. It was reported to includeadditionalF-15s, M1A2 tanks,AWACS aircraft, and Bradley fight-ing vehicles. As of 1992, the United States faced the question ofreconcilingSaudi Arabia's desire for further large-scalearms pur-chases to build its deterrent strength with the United States desireto limit the export of advanced weaponry to the volatile MiddleEast region. The issue was linkedto negotiations over the prelimi-nary positioning of equipment for up to one army corps in depotson Saudi territory to permit the rapid deploymentof United Statesground forces in the event of renewed Middle East hostilities.

Cooperation with Other Countries

Although the United States was the dominant foreign influencein the post-World War 11 developmentof the Saudi military estab-lishment, the kingdomhas regularly awarded contracts to other gov-ernments or to private corporations in other countries to avoidcomplete dependenceon a sing!e supplier. Britain aiimFrance havebeen the other two major recipientsof Saudi contrac:, for weaponsand equipment, maintenance, training, and constructionof facilities.

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According toACDA statistics, Britainwas actually the largest sup-plier of arms from 1985 to 1989, providing militarygoods and ser-vices totaling US$7.7 billion. France was second with $US7.Jbillion, and the United States was third with US$5.0 billion. Im-ports from Chinawere US$2.5 billion, arising principallyfrom thesale of the CSS-2 missile system. Among the major French trans-actions, disclosed in 1984, was a US$4.5 billion contract for aShahine mobile antiaircraft missile defense system toguard theSaudi oil fields and other sensitive targets. In addition to sellingSaudi Arabia tanks and other armored equipment in the 1970s,France was a leading supplier of ships and helicopters.

During World War II, Britain, which L.,d been the dominantforeign power in the MiddleEast for many years, and the UnitedStates coord;natedtheirefforts to train and modernizeAbd al Aziz'ssmall armed forces. British trainingmissions wereactive in the king-dom, and some Saudis were sent to Britainfor militaryschooling.After the war, theUnited States took over mostof the training andmodernization ofthe Saudi military,but Britain continuedto sharein the contracts forarms, equipment, andservices. For manyyears,a majority of Saudi combataircraft were British Lightnings andStrikemastersmanufactured byBAe, which had long-standingcon-tracts to provideservices and maintenanceto the Royal Saudi AirForce. The company also operated the King Faisal Air Academy

and the Technical Studies Institute.In 1986, after beingthwarted in its efforts to purchaseadditional

F-15s from the UnitedStates, SaudiArabia respondedby announc-ing the purchase ofTornado fighter-bombersand interceptorsbuihtby a BritiK -ledconsortium, as well as Hawkjet trainers and Pilatustraining aircraft. The advanced Tornadoes were offered withoutthe restrictionson basing and armaments that the United Stateshad imposed onits sale of F- 15s to reduce the risk of their beingused againstIsrael. In July 1988, the Saudisannounced anagree-ment in principle topurchase US$20 to US$30 billionworth ofaircraft and othermilitaryequipment andconstructionservices fromBritainover a ten-yearperiod. The 1986and 1988 agreementsweresometimes referred to bythe code names, Al Yamamah I and AlYamamah II. Under Al Yamamah 1I, Saudi Arabia signaled itsintention to acquire additionalTornadoes,jet trainers, British ver-sions of the Blackhawi" helicopter, and minesweepers for the navy.The cost of the huge armsagreement was to be offset by proceedsfrom Saudi oil shipments and by British investments in militaryand civilian production plantsin Saudi Arabia.

Under an agreement announcedin 1983, Spain has suppliedSaudi Arabiawith CAoSAC-212 transportaircraft, built as a joint

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venture between Spain and Indonesia, as well as other equipment.In 1990 negotiations with West Germany over the sale of 300Leopard II tanks reportedly failed when Germany decided not toproceed in light of its policy against arms sales tc areas of tensionand what it viewed as its moral obligation to the state of Israel.

Western Cooperation in Domestic Arms ProductionA small defense-manufacturing ind.astrybased on coproduction,

offset, and licenbrq agreements with Western arms suppliers wasstill emerging in L 92. Saudi policy was to reduce its exposure tothe political uncertainties of importing arms and to achieve a degree

of self-sufficiency asa source of prestige in the Middle East. Thechronic shortage of trained technicians and lack of skilled man-power, however, forced the industry to rely on foreignmanagers,technical assistance, and imported lab3r. Such joint ventures wereentitled to industrial development loans, tax holidays, and othersubsidies.

During the 1970s, Saudi Arabia had been involved withEgypt,Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in establishingthe Arab Or-ganizationfor Industrialization (AOI). Its goal was to combine cap-ital of the gulf oil states with Egyptian production capabilities '-create an arms industry located mainly on Egyptian territory.Although Egypt carried out a number of coproduction schemesunder the AOI designation, the plan foundered because of Arabanger over Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel.

Saudi Arabia later established its own small arms industry atAl Kharj, producing United States and Federal Republic ofGer-many (West Germany) rifles, machine guns, and ammunitionunder license. In 1985 a royal decree by King Fahd led to the cre-ation of the General Establishment of Military Industries to over-see and coordinate the kingdom's existing and proposed domesticdefense projects. In the same year, a contract was concluded witha Boeing-led consortium committing the consortium to US$350million worth of investments in Saudi Arabia as an offset to thecost of the Peace Shield air defense system. Under this arrange-ment, the Boeing group agreed to enter into a US$130millionjoint

project for an airframe maintenance facility and a US$117 millionadvanced jet maintenance and repair facility. A ten-year agree-ment was also concluded to develop a computer center and an air-craft hydraulics maintenance center, all to be built at King KhalidInternational Airport at Riyadh. The Boeing consortiumalso helda 50-percent interest in a local company to produce military tacti-cal radios.

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The A] Yamamah I arms agreementwith Britain co mmittedBAeto offset US$7.5 billion in Saudi arms purchaseswith US$1.5 bil-lion of investments in Saudi Arabia. Three such projects wereunderway in 1991. They included a British-Americanjoint ven-ture to product missiles for Tornado fighter aircraft, dhe local as-sembly of heavy-dutytrucks, and a BAe investment in an aluminumsmelter at Yanbu. A West German company had built a plant toproduce mortar shells and as of 1990 was negotiating a contractto produce tank and howitzer ammunition.

Public Order and the Justice SystemThe successful forging of the different tribesof the ArabianPenin-

sula into a coherent nation d "ing the first half oa the twentiethcentury must be credited to Abd al Aziz and the I fouse of Saud.If there were one singular element in Saudi society that explainedthe relative stability during the first sixty years of the kingdom,it was the allegiance that had been exhibited by a preponderantsegment of the population to the Al Saud. Internal order and thecontinued existence of the monarchy, however, did not come auto-matically to the country simplybecause of the leadership and cha-risma of Abd al Aziz. Of great significance durin his reign wasthe establishment of the country's basic security foi ces and a code

of behavior intended tc instill fear and respect for the law and obe-dience to it.With its tasks of preventing intertribal warfare and protecting

the Hou;.e of Saud from any possible threat, the national guardhas been the primary agency for upholding the security of thegovernment. The loyalty of the guard has, however, been morethan blind "llegiance tothe personof the king. Ia 1964, when thekingdori was in trouble under King Saud, the guard supportedFaisa: and the Al Saud in deposing the monarch, acting as an in-stnoment in a controlled process of succession. Under its com-mander, Abd Allah, one of the powerful princes in the kingdom,the national guard remained an imporant factor in national sta-bility in 1992. It was, however, increasingly being supplanted by

more modern agencies of control under the Ministry of Interiomthat had the king's full brother, Amir Nayif, at its head and anotherfull brother, Amir Ahmad ibn Abd al Aziz, as the deputy minister.

Traditionally, the allegiance o( the people has been to the tribeand to the extended family (aee Diversity and Social Stratification;Cultural Homogeneity and Values, ch. 2). One of Abd al Aziz'struly significant accomplishmentswas to implant the concept of al-legiance tj the House of Saud andby extension to the governmentand tlh judkial system. Alsoimportant was the recognition by the

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Saudis of their ethnic identity as an Arab people and their reli-gious identity with Wahhabi Islam. Each aspect of a person's day-to-day conduct could be categorized as being within the boundsof acceptable behavior or outside those bounds, with no distinc-tion between the secular and the religious spheres. Few Saudis cLoseto live outside the law, and their basic attitudes supported an or-derly society.

In theory, all persons, including the king and foreigners, wereequal before the law and subject to both the sharia and law bydecree. In practice, however, members of the royal family and otherleaders have rarely been brought to public trial. Cases involvingforeigners have often been handled outside the court system, fre-quently by deportation.

Law EnforcementIn the limited public security structure inherited from the Otto-

man Empire, police work was done informally and justice was ad-ministeredby l orribal authorities.Gradually, during the reignof Abd a] Aziz, modem organs of government were introduced andbecame responsible for maintaining public order. By royal decreein 1950, Abd al Aziz created a general directorate to supervise allpolice functions in the kingdom, and a year later he established

the Ministry of Interior, which has since been in charge of policematters. Subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, general directoratescharged with maintaining internal security included Public Secu-rity, Investigation, Coast Guard, and Special Stcurity. The officesof the deputy ministers for administration, national security affairs,and immigration and naturalization, and the Internal SecurityForces College were all on the same organizational level as the fourgeneral directorates. Governors of the amirates reported directlyto the minister of interior (see fig. 8).

In return for their loyalty and the maintenance of peace and orderin the tribal areas, the king provided subsidies to the shaykh-s anda minimum of government interference in tribal affairs. Under thissystem, offcn*.'s and breaches of the peace were punished by theresponsible shatkh. The rational guard acted as a support forceto quell disturbances or restore order if tribal authority could not.

The public security forces, particularly the centralized PublicSecurity Police, could A',o get emergeny support from the national

guard or, in extremis, from the regular armed forces. The PublicSecurity Police, recruited from all areas of the country, maintainedpolice directorates at provinrial and local l'els. The director generalfor public ecuriiy retained responsibility for police units, but, in

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practice, provincial governors exercised considerableautonomy.Provincialgovernors were frequently senior amirs of the A] Saud.

Since the mid-1960s, a major effort has been made to modernizethe police forces. During the 1970s, quantities of new vehicles andradio communicationsequipmentenabled police directorates to oper-ate sophisticated mobile units, especially in the principal cities.Helicopterswere also acquired for use in urban areas. Police uni-forms were similar to the khaki and olive drab worn by the Armyexcept for the distinctive red beret. Policemen usually woreside-arms while on duty.

Dealings withthe security forceswere often a source of difficultyfor foreigners in the kingdom. Ordinary policemen could be im-patient with those who did not speak Arabic and, often, were illit-erate. Darker-skinnedworkere were saidto be treated more roughlythan Europeans or North Americans. Everyone connected withaserious crime or accident could bedetained until the police hadinvestigated matters.

The police security forces were divided into regular police andspecial investigativepolice of the General Directorate of Investi-gation (GDI), commonly called the muboiuith (secret police). TheGDI conducted criminal investigationsin addition to performingthe dormestic securityand counterintelligencefunctionsof the Minis-try of Interior. The Directorate of Intelligence, which reporteddirectly to the king, was responsible for intelligencecollectionandanalysis and the coordination of intelligence tasks and reportingby all intelligence agencies, including those of the Ministry ofDefense and Aviation and the national guard.

An important feature of domestic security was theMinistry ofInterior's centralized computer system at the National Informa-tion Center in Riyadh The computer network, linking1,100 ter-minals, maintained records on citizens' identity numbers andpassports, foreigners' residence and work permits, haj visas, ve-hicle registrations, and criminal records. Reports from agents andfrom the large number of informants employed by the sec.urity ser-vices were also entered. Official- of the Directorate of Intelligencehad authority to carry out wiretaps and mail surveillance.

The Special Security Force was the Saudi equivalent of a spe-cial weaponsassault team(SWAT), such as had been incorporatedinto police fo,'ces in various parts of the world. Reporting directlyto the minister of interior, the force was orranized after the poorperformance of the national guard during the revolt at the GrandMosque at Mecca in 1979. The force was equipped with UR-416armored vehicles from West Germany and nonlethal chemicalweapons. Accordingto The Military &klnac, 1992-1993, the force

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had a personnel strength of 500 in 1992, although estimates fromother sources have ranged much higher. It was reported in 1990that the antiterrorism unit of the Special Security Force was beingdisbanded and its German training staff repatriated.

The strength of the Coast Guard was 4,500 as of 1992 and ofthe Frontier Force 10,500,according to Th7Military BaLnce, 1992-1993. The Frontier Force patrolled land borders and carried ou tcustoms inspections.The Coast Guarddeployed its units from portsalong the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea with a primary missionto prevent smuggling. Amongits varied inventoryofcraft, the larg-est were four 210-ton offshorepatrol craft acquired from WestGer-many in 1989. Two were based at Jiddah and two at Ad Dammam.The Coast Guard also had about thirty large patrolcraft, 135 in-shore patrol craft, and sixteen British-builtHovercraft.

An unusual, if not unique, internal security force in SaudiArabiawas the autonomousand highly visible religious police, or mutawwiin(see Glossary).Organized under the authorityof the king in con-junction with the ulama, the mutawwiin were charged with ensur-ing compliance with thepuritanical precepts of Wahhabism. Anationwideorganization known in Englishas the Committeesforthe Propagationof Virtue andPreventionof Vice (also seen asCom-mittees for PublicMorality), the mutawwiinhad earned a reputationfor fanaticism and brutality that had become an embarrassment.

TheAl

Saud,however, hasseemingly beenreluctant to confront

the ulama in a showdown. Primarily, the muawwwiinenforced publicob-&rvance of such religious requirements as the five daily pray-ers, fastingduring Ramadan, the modestyof women's dress, andthe proscriptions agains, the use of alcohol (see Wahhabi Theol-ogy, ch. 2).

Once an important instrument of Abd a] Aziz for upholding stan-dards of public behavior, by the early 1990s the ultraconservatismof the mutaw,,ii had become an anachronism, contrasting withthe modernization processes working in other sectors of society.The government h-s occasionallydivciplined ovei zealous mulawuiin,following complaints from a foreign govern,.'nt over treatmentof its nationals. After a series of raids on rich an :nfluentialSaudisin 1990, the government appointcd a new and more compliantleader of tb.! religious police.

The religious pelice had the legal right to detain suspects '-.rtwenty-fourhours before turning them over to the regular policeand were known to have$ogged detaineesto elicit confessions.Theyoften used switch-like sticks to beat those perceivedto be in viola-tion of religious laws. Foreign workers, including some from theUnited States, have beentargets (f harassment andraids. According

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to one estimate, there were about ,0,000 mutawwiin in 1990. Mostmutawwiin wore the traditional white thaub, were salaried,and wereregarded as government employees.Some incidentsof harassmenthave been attributed to self-appointed vigilantes outside the regu-lar religious police hierarchy.

Criminal Justice SystemThe judicial system is founded upon the sharia, particularly the

Hanbali schoolof Sunni Islam, in accordance witha ruling by KingAbd al Aziz in 1926. The Hanbali system ofjur;.prudence, whichrejected analogy as a source of law and gave prominence to thetraditions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, was regardedas especiallyrigid by mostMuslimjurists. If there were no guidancein Hanbali texts, however, Saudijurists could referto other schoolsor exercise their own reason;..g.

Two categoriesof crime are delineated in the sharia: those thatare carefullydefined and those that are implicit in the requirementsand prohibitions of the sharia. For the first category, there are spe-cific penalties; for the second, punishment can be prescribed bya judge (qadi) of a sharia court. A third category of crime has de-veloped through the years as a result of various governmentaldecrees that specifiedcodes of behaviorand regulationsconsiderednecessary to maintain public order and security. Thie first twccategories aretried in sharia courts. The third, dealing with cor-porate law, taxation, oil and gas, and immigration, is handled ad-ministratively by govcnment officials (see The Legal System,ch. 4).

The sharia carefully definescrimes-such as homicide, personalinjury, adultery, fornication, theft, and highway robbery-and pre-scribes apenalty (hadd) for each. Various degrees of culpability forhomicideand bodily injury are recognizeddepending on intent, thekind of weapon used, and the circumstancesunder which the crimeoccurred. Homicideis considered a crime against a person ratherthan a crime against soc.'ty in which the state administersjusticeof its own volition. Under the sharia,the victim or the victim's fam-ily has the right to demand punishment, to grant clemency, or to

demand blood money (diya)-a et payment as recompense for thecrime.An act of self-defense is recognized as a right nullifying crimi-

nality. Retaliation is permitted to the mal: nwxt of kin of the vic-tim by killing the criminal in the case of a homicide or exactingthe same bodily injury that was inflictedon the victim. Acceptanceof diya is, however, consideredpreferableunder the sharia. Incasesinvolvir.- death or grievous injury, the accused is usually held

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incommunicado. Imprisonment before trial can !astweeks or evenseveral months. The right of bail or habeas corpus is not recog-nized, although persons ac,'utaed of crimes are sometimes releasedon the recognizance of a patron or employer. The accuscd is nor-mally held not more than threedays before being formally charged,but it is common for detainees to be held for long periods if theinvestigation is incomplete.

At trials for minor offenses, qadis hear complaints and thencross-exar'ne plaintiffs, defendants, and any witnesses. The judge as-signs great significance to a defendant'.- sworn testimony, although

the testimony of two women is required to equal that of one man.In the absence of two witnesses, oral confess;ons before a judgeare almost always requiced for conviction. Trials are held withoutjurors and are generally closed. They are normally held withoutcounsel, although lawyers can advise the accused before the trial.Attorneys may also be allowed to act as interpreters for those un-familiar withAra.bic. Consular access is not usually permitteddur-ing the trials of foreign nationals. After guilt or innocence isdetermined, a sentence, ifappropriate, is imposed by the judge.In certain criminal cases, punishmaentcan be referred to a localgovernor or shaykh for sentencing upon the advice of a lacal Mus-lim jurist or the ulama.

Appeals against judges' decisions areautomatically reviewedbythe Ministry of Justice or, in more serious cases, bya court of ap-peJ. In the early 1990s, there were two sharia courts of appeal,one sitting in Rivadh and the other in Mecca. Appeals are heardby panels of three judgts except for sentences of death or amputa-tion, which can only be adjudicated by a panel of five judges. De-cisionsof the appellate courts are final except for sentencesofdeathand amputation. Cases of capital punishment are automaticallyreferred to the king for final review.

Crime and PunishmentThe incidence of crime was considered to be relatively low in

Saudi Arabia, and violent street crime was particularly unusual.Crime rates had, however, risen with the presenceof foreign work-"e-s.An increase noted in the level of petty crime in 1989 was linkedto unemployed Saudis ?nd to Yemneni residents of the kingdom.The severity of penalties and the rigid systemof enforcement werecredited by both officials and ordinary citizens with contributingto the high standards of public safety. Supporters of severe punish-ment believed that, although carried out infreqiiently, a behead-ing or stoning reminded the people that such penalties remainedin force. Some observers disagreed, citing

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Area Handbook - Saudi Arabia

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