Argentina: Santa Fe Provincial Adjustment Loan Social ...€¦ · flicts that might hinder the...

Paper No. 41June 2003

Argentina: Santa Fe ProvincialAdjustment Loan

Social Impact Assessment andImpact Mitigation Program

Maria E. Castro-Muñoz

THE WORLD BANK

SOCIAL ANALYSISPub

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Social Development PapersEnvironmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network

Paper No. 41June 2003

Argentina: Santa Fe Provincial AdjustmentLoan

Social Impact Assessment and ImpactMitigation Program

Maria E. Castro Muñoz

Argentina: Santa Fe Provincial Adjustment Loan Social Impact Assessment

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“Social Development Papers” are published informally by the Social Development Department in the Environmentally andSocially Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank. They are aimed at encouraging discussion and comment amongthe development community on key social development issues. SD Papers represent the views of their author(s) and do notnecessarily reflect the official policies of the World Bank.

For additional copies, contact the Social Development Department, World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, MSN MC5-507,Washington, DC 20433, USA, Fax: 202-522-3247, E-mail: [email protected].

This paper was prepared by Maria E. Castro-Munoz in the Social Development Family of the Environmentally and SociallySustainable Development Department of the Latin American and Caribbean Region of the World Bank. For more informationon social assessment, go to www.worldbank.org/socialanalysis or contact [email protected]. For moreinformation on social development in the World Bank go to www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment.

Printed on Recycled Paper

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Contents

Abstract...................................................................7

Preface.....................................................................9

Introduction............................................................11

Santa Fe Socioeconomic Profile...........................12

Social Risks and Challenges................................14

Public-Sector Response........................................17

Propsed Reforms and Social Impacts.................22

Social Development Strategy...............................24

Conclusions and Recommendations..................27

Bibliography...........................................................31


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Abstract

Provincial finances are important toArgentina’s efforts to reduce macroeco-nomic vulnerability, improve fiscalperformance and increase competitive-ness. Provincial reform has thus been afederal government priority since theearly 1990s. The Bank has supported sixsuch provincial reform loans (PRL) since1997. These experiences together indicatethat a participatory approach enhancesthe legitimacy of the reforms and im-proves their implementation andsustainability. With the same participa-tory approach in mind, the task team forthe Santa Fe PRL conducted a socialimpact assessment to identify the socio-economic conditions affecting the poor inthe province and to get their views onsocial risks and other factors that shouldaffect the loan’s design.

This is the first such assessmentdone for this type of operation. Theexercise was designed to assess whatsocial impacts might result from theproposed reforms and recommend miti-gation measures accordingly. Theassessment’s main contributions are: (i)An analysis of socioeconomic factorsinfluencing the reform, including theimpact of economic restructuring, andidentification of alternatives that fit in thenew competitive environment with lesssocial impact; (ii) Identification of vulner-able populations and an analysis ofunemployment and other social issuesaffecting the poor, to better target social

programs; (iii) Promotion of a participa-tory approach to provincial reforms, tobring social capital into the effort; and(iv) Providing guidance to improve theresponsiveness of social-protectionefforts.

The paper has six sections: (a) thesocioeconomic background of the prov-ince, including existing risks and con-flicts that might hinder the success of theproject; (b) the identified vulnerablepopulation and new social challenges; (c)ongoing social programs and institu-tional responses to social demands; (d)an assessment of the proposed socialreforms under PRL VI, identifying posi-tive aspects and possible risks; (e) aproposed Social Development Strategy;and (f) conclusions and recommenda-tions.

The proposed Social DevelopmentStrategy would enhance reform effective-ness through a participatory approachand promote equitable poverty reductionvia two lines of action:

(a) Economic recovery, through selectedpublic-sector interventions that willimprove the climate for investmentand growth; and

(b) Promoting equity, through comprehen-sive social-protection interventionsthat target the vulnerable populationand promote productivity for sustain-able self-development and social-capital strengthening.


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Preface

Social adjustments loans are quick dis-bursements tied to specific macroeco-nomic and sector goals deemed neces-sary to achieve economic stability and toencourage investment and growth. Bothstability (for example, reduced inflation)and growth would help reduce poverty.In many cases, however, this does nothappen, either because reforms are notimplemented or because of further eco-nomic shocks. The social impacts of suchloans are rarely identified. Only a fewsuch operations have included impact-mitigation measures, usually throughsocial-protection programs.

The social impact assessment donefor the Santa Fe PRL was the first onedone for an adjustment loan. It wasspecifically designed to identify possiblesocial impacts from the proposed re-forms and to propose any necessarymitigation measures. The actual assess-ment took a more holistic approach,analyzing not only the proposed reformsbut also the overall socioeconomic condi-tions of Santa Fe. Thus, the assessmentidentified critical factors such as unem-ployment, pointed out vulnerablegroups, and sought the beneficiaries’point of view about social programs. Itrecommended using public investmentsto help induce economic recovery, andpromoting social programs to support

self-employment and income-generatingactivities rather than just social protec-tion and temporary relief programs.These recommendations were only partlyfollowed, mainly because of constraintsin the design of the loan itself. The diffi-cult economic situation also meant thatthere was little money to support thoserecommendations.

At the time, Santa Fe province wasstill recovering from the impact of the so-called “first generation reforms.” Itseconomy was still in transition fromtraditional to more export-orientedactivities. The unemployment rate hadshot upward and social violence hadworsened. The collapse of the Argentineeconomy later that year wiped out mostgains and worsened ongoingproblems.The national crisis has had aoverwhelming social impact: the percent-age of households below the poverty lineincreased from 23.2 in 2000 to 45.7 in2002, while those in extreme povertygrew from 9 to 27.5.1 The Gini coefficientreached 0.51.2 Access to education andhealthcare and other indicators of well-being have deteriorated nationwide.

For Santa Fe, the impact has beendevastating. The devaluation of the pesohas tripled the province’s debt. Theprospects for growth are poor, and social

1 Source: Official Household Survey, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares; data October 20022 Using family income adjusted by adult equivalent.


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violence and political conflicts haveresumed. The situation was aggravatedby floods in the north and east of theprovince, including the capital. At least23 people died, 50,000 were evacuatedand 50,000 fled. The damage is estimatedat $200-300 million.

Under these circumstances, it is clearthat Santa Fe will not be able to meet itsreform goals. Some amendments aretherefore being considered for the secondand third tranches, including reducingthe public expenditure targets for infra-structure and roads. The fiscal surplustarget will be adjusted to maintain equi-librium in total spending. In response tothe social crisis, resources have beenchanneled into the Province’s EmergencyFeeding Program and the flood-reliefefforts. Ongoing social assistance pro-grams will be evaluated, and a benefi-ciary registry of those participating in theprovince’s social-assistance program willbe established. On a more positive note,education and health reforms are on trackand are expected to be fully imple-mented. The public electric distributioncompany has not been privatized due toa lack of buyers. This situation is notlikely to change in the near future, so anaction plan to maintain the utility’sservice and financial health will be put inplace to keep the utility attractive forfuture concession.3

In Santa Fe as in many other adjust-ment loans, the impact of the nationalcrisis overwhelmed the reforms, makingit difficult to assess whether economicrecovery and sustainable poverty reduc-tion might have been possible otherwise.The challenges that the social assessmentidentified are still there, and perhapsgreater. Picketers are back on the street

demanding jobs; the need for jobs, ratherthan social protection, remains the stron-gest demand of the poor and the impov-erished middle class. No safety net willgive them the income, economic securityand dignity that they demand.

There are four main lessons fromthis assessment:

• The importance of a holistic approachto identify the risks involved in ad-justment operations, the impacts onvulnerable groups and any opportu-nities to promote equity and poverty-reduction objectives.

• The importance of an integratedstrategy to improve public-sectormanagement and use public invest-ment to promote economic recovery,linked to income-generating socialprograms that go beyond mitigationand safety nets.

• The need to identify vulnerablegroups, including a gender perspec-tive, to design social programs thatrespond to their needs and promotecommitment and social responsibility.

• The need to monitor progress onreform implementation alongsidemacroeconomic conditions, and toadjust goals accordingly before caus-ing negative impacts.

The Santa Fe social impact assess-ment was a first step. It is necessary toimprove analytical methods, to assesswhich impacts fit within the format of aquickly processed adjustment loan. It isalso clear that an integrated social strat-egy requires linking adjustment opera-tions to well–funded social programs.

3 Privatized services including telecom, electricity, water, gas and transport are suffering because tariffs arenow paid in ‘pesos’ while many have foreign currency debts and are affected by non-compliance withpayments due to the income deterioration of clients. Legal and economic uncertainty aggravates thissituation.

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Santa Fe Provincial Adjustment LoanSocial Impact Assessment and ImpactMitigation Program

INTRODUCTION

Background

Provincial finances are important toArgentina’s efforts to reduce macroeconomic vulnerability, improve

fiscal performance and increase competi-tiveness. Provincial reform has thus beena federal government priority since theearly 1990s. Because public services likehealth, education, infrastructure andsecurity have been decentralized, socialand economic progress is now moredependent on the provinces’ ability todeliver such services effectively andwithin budget. Progress has beenachieved in many areas, and the federalgovernment recognizes the need tocontinue with the reforms. In this regard,provincial reform loans (PRL) have beendesigned to help provincial governmentsmaintain fiscal balance and improveresponsiveness, quality and equity inpublic services. Because Santa Fe prov-ince has already implemented the firstgeneration of reforms, the PRL willfinance more advanced reforms in publicfinance and administration, as well as inthe social sectors.

Previous PRLs suggest that a partici-patory approach helps legitimate reformsand improves their implementation andsustainability. This social impact assess-ment therefore used a participatoryapproach to identify the reforms’ likely

impact on the poor population, takingtheir socioeconomic conditions and theirviews about social risks into account inthe design of the PRL. This assessmentrecommends specific tools to mitigateimpacts and social risks and to promoteequity within the framework of soundfinancial policies.

Objectives, Scope and Methodology

The objectives of this social impact as-sessment are:

i. to assess social impacts that mightresult from the proposed reforms andrecommend mitigation measures;

ii. to identify the vulnerable population,to better target social programs;

iii. to promote a participatory approach,to bring social capital into the effort;and

iv. to give advice on improving theresponsiveness of the institutionsinvolved.

The paper has six sections: (a) thesocioeconomic background of the prov-ince, including existing risks and con-flicts that might hinder the success of theproject; (b) the identified vulnerablepopulation and new social challenges; (c)ongoing social programs and institu-tional responses to social demands; (d)an assessment of the proposed socialreforms under PRL VI, identifying posi-tive aspects and possible risks; (e) aproposed Social Development Strategy;


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and (f) conclusions and recommenda-tions.

This assessment was done using (i)secondary information, including publicstatistics and studies commissionedduring project preparation; (ii) field tripsto the urban areas of Rosario, Santa Feand Rafaela, and the rural areas of SanLorenzo, Sargento Cabral, San Javier andReconquista; (iii) consultation with some100 potential/actual beneficiaries ofsocial programs; (iv) key-informantinterviews with provincial officials,municipal officials, representatives ofprivate-sector organizations, and civil-society organizations; and (iv) papersprepared by and discussions with theproject-preparation team. The results andrecommendations are summarized be-low.

SANTA FE SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE

Santa Fe is one of the most importantprovinces in Argentina. Its capital, alsocalled Santa Fe, and the city of Rosariotogether have around 10 percent of thenational population and significantindustrial infrastructure. The province isthe largest producer of oils, flour anddairy products in Argentina, and thesecond-largest producer of corn, wheatand sorghum.1 It accounted for 18.5percent of the country’s exports in 1999.Santa Fe ranks at or above the nationalaverage on most social indicators. Lifeexpectancy is higher and infant mortalityis lower than nation-wide, and a smallershare of the population falls below thenation’s basic-needs standard. However,the combined impact of the externalshocks and economic reforms of the1990s and sluggish growth in recentyears have created an explosive socialsituation, characterized by high rates ofunemployment, social unrest and in-

1 Private-sector study2 INDEC

creasing violence. The most importantfactors influencing this situation from asocial perspective are discussed below.

Economic Restructuring

The economic profile of Santa Fe changeddrastically in the last decade. Externalcompetition and globalization haveforced many local industries incorporatenew processes and technology, whileothers have closed. As it has elsewhere inthe world, this transformation has some-times meant the decline of flourishingcities and their middle-class population.Santa Fe and Rosario have lost the mostindustry, but smaller cities reliant onagricultural exports and agribusinesshave also suffered. Such was the case inSan Lorenzo, Sargento Cabral, San Javierand Reconquista. The El Niño phenom-enon, which caused floods in the southand droughts in the north, has aggra-vated this situation. After four years ofbad weather, small rural producers havelost their working capital and some 2,500agricultural workers have lost their jobs.This trend is not well documented, butthe changes in Santa Fe’s exports are agood indicator: primary-product exportsfell 25 percent between 1996 and 1999;meats, leathers and beer also fell. Mean-while industrial products have hadmixed results. Some manufactures, liketransport materials, rose dramatically,while others such as machinery andelectric materials have fallen more than10 percent (see table 1).2

Although the restructuring processhas some success stories of firms accom-modating to the new economic environ-ment—by either relocating or incorporat-ing new, capital-intensive technologiesthat have reduced social impacts—SantaFe lacks a comprehensive strategy topromote such successful initiatives,

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prevent bankruptcy or mitigate theirimpacts on employment.

Unemployment

In 1990 unemployment averaged 6.9percent in the province. It was 9.6 percentin Rosario, 6.1 percent in Santa Fe andaround 3 percent in rural areas. Today itaverages 17.1 percent, reaching 18.5

percent in the Rosario metro area and16.1 percent in the capital. Anecdotalevidence suggests rates as high as 25percent in areas like San Lorenzo andCarcaraña. Despite economic growth,unemployment has increased since 1991and has become one of the most worri-some problems in the provnice (see chart1).

NBI Population3

The NBI population in 1991 numbered475,000. or 17.6 percent. Presently, theprovincial government estimates it at500,000, roughly the same percentage asearlier. However, the data is out of date;the real number could be much higher.What information exists suggests justthat: an analysis of some 48,000 house-holds done in 2000 revealed that 34percent of the heads of NBI householdswere unemployed and that 54 percenthad a per-capita monthly income of $30or less. With this, they could hardlyafford the basic consumption basket.4

Informal Sector

Though there is no up-to-date informa-tion for the whole province, some esti-mates indicate that about 28percent of thelabor force (164,000 persons) is self-

Chart 1: Unemployment Rate

6.5 9.4 8.411.8 12.3

17.118.1

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000

3 NBI population is calculated using the following indicators: housing conditions, access to sanitationservices, children not attending school, dependency rate and education background of head of household4 SEPC, Sistema de Información Social, Registro Unico de Beneficiarios(RUB).RUB has registered 40% ofNBI population comprising 48 095 households with 217,689 members.

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5 IPEC Monthly Labor Market Report, October 2000.6 “villas” in Argentina7 SEPC report8 SEPC registry9 IPEC10 10 INDEC: NBI is estimated according to the following factors: housing conditions, access to sanitation

employed in the metropolitan areas ofGran Santa Fe and Rosario.5 In addition,the underemployment rate has remainedsteady for a decade: 6 percent in Rosarioand 8 percent in the capital. Shanty townshave sprouted in urban areas;6 118 suchsettlements with 140,000 inhabitants(some 12 percent of the city’s population)have been identified in Rosario alone.7

Interviews with community organiza-tions in several municipalities mentionedthis situation and also the bureaucraticdifficulties micro-enterprises face informalization. The result is an increasingnumber of people at risk with no socialprotection.

Social Unrest

Given these circumstances, the recentdemonstrations throughout the provincedemanding that the government takeaction are not surprising. Rosario hasbeen the scene of massive demonstra-tions, and it is common there to seeworkers picketing next to closed factoriesor facilities. Violence has been increas-ing, particularly among young people.There is a pervasive sense of despair andfear that the situation could worsen andthat the government will be unable tocome up with quick solutions.

Partnerships and Social Capital

On the positive side, partnerships be-tween workers and employers in theprivate and public sectors have grownand helped reduce the impact of eco-nomic restructuring. The field researchidentified some innovative initiatives:some modernized industries in Rafaelathat have combined employment protec-tion and use of new technologies; the

rescue from closure of Mocovi Rice Mill,the main source of employment in SanJavier, which is now owned and man-aged by its workers; the support torecovering agribusiness in Reconquista;and community-based initiatives invarious cities. Social capital in Santa Fehas increased. There are 600 mutuales and400 cooperatives that together have2,800,000 partners, the largest enrolmentin the country.8 New community andwomen’s organizations are addressingsocial impacts and implementing pov-erty-alleviation activities.

SOCIAL RISKS AND CHALLENGES

Because Santa Fe used to be a relativelyrich province with a predominantlymiddle-class population, the most seri-ous risks identified derive from theeffects of unemployment on spreadingpoverty and vulnerability.

The “New Poor”

The “new poor” comprise formerlyemployed persons, members of themiddle class, and young people enteringthe labor force who can not find jobs (aconstant phenomenon in the 1990s).Between 1991 and 1995 unemploymentalmost doubled, increasing from 17,505to 34,644 in the capital and from 43,149 to85,479 in Rosario.9 It was estimated thanin 2000 around 100,000 persons wereunemployed. Many of these were previ-ously employed and have not been ableto find a new job for at least one year.These persons are not necessarily in-cluded in the NBI population, because ofthe way this index is calculated.10 Thisnonetheless means that some 20,000families are living without a stable

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source of income for a long period oftime. In Rosario for instance, 81.2 percentof the unemployed heads of householdare people who lost their job; 50 percenthave no income and 27 percent have amonthly income of $200 or less; 22.3percent have been unemployed morethan one year. In Santa Fe the previouslyemployed represent 97.9 percent, ofwhich 62.4 percent have no income, 27.2percent have an income of $200 or lessand 10.6 percent have been unemployedmore than one year (see table 2)11 .

Because of their middle-class back-ground, many persons find it very diffi-cult to seek public help. The fact thatdemands for social protection mostlycome from women is very revealing. Thisreluctance is more worrisome becausemany of the middle-class unemployedmight not find a job even if economicgrowth improves, because of their rela-tive lack of education and skills. InRosario two thirds of the people have aprimary education or less; 36.3 percent ofthe unemployed were in their forties and28.3 percent in their fifties. In the capitalthe respective numbers were 58, 18.8 and32.7 percent. This bloc of middle-agedpeople with low skills will not easily fitinto the competitive, open economy ofSanta Fe (see table 2).

It is significant from the social pointof view that 70 percent of the unem-ployed are heads of household. Sincemost are conventional householdsheaded by men, this has had seriousconsequences for the whole family,socially and psychologically as well aseconomically. “Men lose their dignity”was the common expression that peopleused during interviews. Many alsomentioned an increase in the break-up of

families, in men deserting their families,and in domestic violence.12

Vulnerability

The growth of the “new poor” and thedeteriorating conditions for many NBIhouseholds have left some groups espe-cially vulnerable. These include womenwho have lost their jobs and/or thesupport of male family members, youngpeople who have been forced to leaveschool and who face difficulties finding ajob and elderly people who have lost theirjobs and/or family support and lackpensions or other social protection. Formany, the coping strategy has been tojoin the informal sector without any typeof social protection. According to datafrom the SIS Registro Unico de Beneficiarios,in 2000 the NBI households had a totalpopulation of 217,689.Of these, 18,397were teenagers (14-17 years old), 29percent of whom did not study or work.Similarly, among the 18,757 young per-sons (18-24 years old), 34.7 percent nei-ther studied nor worked. According tothe same source, of the 2,563 registeredpersons over 60 years old, almost 64percent were at risk. (Unfortunately,there is no gender-disaggregated data.)

Rural Poverty

The rural population makes up only 13percent of the total, but it has the largestnumber of poor people as measured bythe NBI index. It is worrisome that thereis no information about poverty in ruralareas and that few actions are taken toaddress this poverty. Information col-lected during field trips suggests thatunemployment is high, especially in thenorth, as a result of shrinking incomefrom agricultural exports and the per-

services, children not attending school, dependency rate and educational background of head of household.The new poor profile indicates that 71.6 percent are homeowners; they have low dependency rates and theirchildren attend school.11 EPH, May 200012 In this regard, see the Gender Analysis discussion in the MOP of the Santa Fe PRL

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verse weather. According to some esti-mates, there are 2,500 unemployed in therural areas. Small farmers are in crisis.13

Farmers interviewed during field tripssaid that the three biggest problems werethe loss of working capital, the lack ofaffordable credit and the migration of theyoung and skilled. Those who leave thecountryside swell the ranks of the urbanunemployed, increasing the populationat risk and the social pressures there. Theimplications for resuming growth andreducing poverty are not good.

PUBLIC-SECTOR RESPONSE

Public actions in Santa Fe comprise threeareas: health, education and “communitypromotion,” or social protection. Alto-gether, these activities accounted for halfof the province’s 2000 budget of $3.58billion (39 percent to education, 9 percentto health and 2 percent to social protec-tion).14 This percentage sounds impres-sive, but it is misleading. Most of theeducation budget goes to paying teach-ers and administrative personnel. Fur-thermore, the 2 percent spent on socialprotection amounts to just $36 million forthe entire province. Local authoritieshave acknowledged that quality hasdeclined in some services and that anincreasing number of people do notreceive social services. These inefficien-cies in resources allocation and lack ofresponsiveness have resulted in inequi-table social-sector service delivery.

Education

Santa Fe has developed a good educationsystem with broad coverage and highquality. However, the sector is ill-pre-pared to give its students the skills for amore sophisticated and competitive

economy or to give an increasing poorpopulation the new qualifications theyneed for the changed job market. Thepublic sector provides 75 percent ofschooling in all three levels and enjoysan 80 percent approval rate.15 In 1991enrolment in primary school was almostuniversal (96 percent); in high school, 55percent; and in tertiary education anduniversity, 15 percent.16 Rates have risensince then; still, they are well below whatSanta Fe should have, given its incomelevel. The provincial government’s goalis to reach an average of 13 years ofeducation. This policy might not benefitthe poor, because there are no specificmechanisms to target poor students.Though the reported performance oneducational standards is good, the pro-vincial government recognizes someproblems in practice. The student/teacher ratio, officially 15:1, can be ashigh as 45:1 in the classroom. The schoolsdo not always provide the skills thatemployers demand. Private-sector execu-tives interviewed during field researchmentioned for example that despite theirhigh-school or college background, theirstaffs lack adequate knowledge of for-eign languages, which is now a priority.Providing such knowledge has increasedtraining costs considerably. Eighty-sevenpercent of respondents also said thatincreasing violence at schools, particu-larly among students, is also affecting thequality of education. Education reform-ers should take these challenges intoaccount when defining their priorities. In1999, personnel expenditures absorbed92 percent of the $800 million budget,while public transfers to private schoolsreached $160 million. This situation callsfor a thorough review and improvementof human-resources management. From

13 SEPC14 Santa Fe Government Finances Ministry, 2000 budget15 Evaluación Social Provincial de las Reformas del Sector Público en la Provincia de Santa Fe16 Number of students at school over total population in respective age range: primary 6-12; high schools13-18 and third level 19-29 years old


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an equity standpoint, public-sectortransfers to private schools should bethoroughly reviewed, taking into accountthe disadvantaged youth who havedropped out of school and the increasingdemand for more skilled workers. Thereis a reserve of support for such a review;the respondents had a more favorableview of the public schools than the pri-vate ones.

Health

Santa Fe has universal access to healthservices, if private and public service areconsidered together. Most health indica-tors are positive, such as life expectancy(72 years in 1995) and infant mortality(16.3 per 1000), which was lower than thenational average in 1997. The situation isdifferent in rural areas, where infantmortality reaches 25 per 1000 and mater-nal mortality was 43.5 per every 100,000in 1998—both above the provincial andnational averages. The infection rates ofinfectious diseases such as tuberculosis,AIDS and mal de chagas are higher thanthose of other provinces with similarincome.17 The percentage of the popula-tion without formal enrollment in healthservices, which averaged 30 percent andreached 45 percent in rural areas in 1991,has likely risen because of long-termunemployment and the growth of theinformal sector. Two other issues affect-ing public health are reduced quality inthe services provided and inequitableaccess, influenced by skewed budgetaryallocation, poor public hospital perfor-mance and weak regulatory capacity.Ninety-five percent of the 1999 public-health budget went to large hospitals,leaving only 5 percent for ambulatoryprimary-care facilities. Currently, just 7percent of the budget is dedicated tohealth promotion and disease preven-

tion. Meanwhile, complex public hospi-tals, which still absorb 85 percent of theresources, are crowded with low-impactcases. Local authorities have sworn toaddress this bias.18

Social Protection

The State Secretariat for CommunityPromotion (Secretaría de Estado dePromoción Comunitaria, SEPC) is respon-sible for social protection in the province.It has two main activities: (a) social assis-tance to the poor through in-kind andmoney transfers; and (b) promotion ofhuman development through productiv-ity-enhancement and social-capitalstrengthening programs. Between 1995and 1999 SEPC reached 306,392 beneficia-ries, 78 percent of them through assis-tance programs and 22 percent throughpromo tion programs. Between Januaryand October of 2000 SEPC assisted147,949 persons and spent $ 29.3 million,or $198 per capita (see table 3).19

During 2000, SEPC has made threeefforts to improve service delivery. First,it devolved its operations to 31 “one-stop-centers” in poor neighborhoods ofRosario and Santa Fe, where potentialbeneficiaries can apply for and obtainany of the secretariat’s programs andservices. Second, it promoted public-private partnerships for specific services.Third, it established coordination mecha-nisms with other ministries and munici-pal authorities. SEPC is also compiling aregistry of beneficiaries to better target itsprograms and a registry of non-govern-mental organizations (NGOs) in theprovince to help coordinate their work.The organization has also improved itsinternal budget- and expenditure-track-ing. The effect of all these efforts onSEPC’s ability to do its two main activi-

17 Social Sectors Report18 Institutional Assessment19 SIS Registro Unico de Beneficiarios

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ties is described below.

(a) Social Assistance

SEPC’s social assistance activities includefour food programs, two programs toaddress disasters and other emergencies,and three umbrella programs to assistspecific at-risk groups (children, theelderly) or to provide drug-treatment.SEPC runs these programs both directlyand through intermediaries (NGOs andmunicipalities). In addition, in 2000 SEPCinitiated the Programa de Ayuda SolidariaSanta Fe (PASS). This program gives upto $100 monthly to families in exchangefor volunteer work, caring for children orthe elderly, and training others. Familiescan enroll in PASS for up to four months.

These numerous, overlapping activi-ties have high transaction costs, andSEPC has no system for assessing theireffectiveness. The deeper problem with

SEPC’s approach to social assistance,though, is that focuses on short-termresponses to the symptoms of problemsthat are deeply rooted in the social struc-ture. PASS, for example, gives sometemporary relief to jobless heads ofhouseholds but does not address themain problem—the lack of jobs. Thereare also long-term costs to such relianceon short-term solutions: dependency,mounting costs and political manipula-tion. That Santa Fe lacks an efficientbeneficiary register makes matters worse.

These problems are not unique tothis province; in designing solutions,policymakers should note internationalexperience. To wit: social assistanceshould focus on the poorest, vulnerablepopulation while the agency improvesits coordination and control of the vari-ous programs involved. Transparency inresource-allocation will improve respon-siveness. Combining social assistance

Source: SIS, November 2000

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20

with productivity-enhancement pro-grams, meanwhile, can help make out-comes better and longer-lasting.

(b) Promotion

SEPC’s production-enhancementinitiatives involve three main programs:(i) Programa de Micro-EmprendimientosSociales Productivos (PMSP), designed toassist micro-business developmentthrough free technical assistance andreimbursable financial support; (ii)Programa de Apoyo a Proyectos ComunitariosSustentables (APCS), which offers technicalassistance and some funding to commu-nity-based organizations for providingsocial services, promoting participationand social commitment, and developingsocial networks; and (iii) Programa deCapacitación Alternativa (PCA), whichprovides short training courses to youngpeople to improve their job skills. PCAalso runs three programs of sportingevents, meant to develop social cohesion.

SEPC intends to expand PASS andPMSP. While both programs have posi-tive aspects, they are young and theirresults are inconclusive. They should beassessed, taking into account beneficiarydemands, identified social issues andinternational experiences in similarprograms.

• PASS: This program has the advan-tage of providing quick, direct assistance,which has helped ease the short-termimpact of the economic crisis and miti-gated social unrest. The program hasbeen well received; 73 percent of thoseconsulted approved of the way it targetsheads of households. In its first year,PASS reached some 16,000 beneficiaries

and spent $11.5 million, well above its15,000-person goal and $10 million bud-get.20 This does beg the question ofwhether the program is sustainable.Right now, PASS benefits last only fourmonths, but half the potential beneficia-ries face long-term unemployment.21

There will likely be pressure to extendbenefits, which will strain the programbudget.22 As has happened in othercountries, extending benefits will prob-ably make more people dependent onthe program. SEPC should instead com-bine PASS with its promotion programsto improve its effectiveness. The agencyshould also do a beneficiary impactevaluation of PASS to assess its impact,procedures and instruments, identifyrisks and give feedback before it expandsthe program.23

• PMSP: SEPC launched PMSP in May2000 to give technical assistance andfinancial support to micro-business.24

The program’s scope, coverage, financingmechanisms and institutional responsi-bilities are not yet fully developed.Interviews with more than a hundredlikely beneficiaries showed its potentialfor success: the program has alreadygenerated considerable demand andstrengthened social capital. Many ofthose interviewed were hopeful that theprogram would help them start newenterprises. PMSP has several advan-tages. It requires beneficiaries to commit,share risks and take a more active rolethan social assistance interventions do. Itgives the unemployed chances to usetheir prior experience to develop newproductive activities. It also offers micro-businesses a chance to move into theformal sector, and more experiencedmicro-entrepreneurs the resources to

20 SEPC21 This figur has been estimated based on the unemployed and underemployed profiles of the Rosario laborforce, as explained in the Institutional Assessment22 See Annex 1 and Institutional Assessment23 A rapid social assessment of PASS is planned24 SEPC: Lineamientos Generales, July 2000

21

expand.

Field research identified three typesof potential PMSP beneficiaries. Thereare those who plan to create new busi-ness, those who want to strengthen orformalize existing ones and those whowant to restructure or expand well-established businesses. The staff incharge of PMSP has compensated forSEPC’s lack of resources by obtainingexternal funds and seeking alliances withmunicipal governments and regionaldevelopment organizations. At the sametime, though, PMSP has been givingtechnical assistance, support for prepar-ing projects, and financing (grants andrefundable, zero-interest loans) to allthree types of beneficiaries, regardless oftheir actual capacity. This practice couldbankrupt the program if it goes on toolong. However, it is important to recog-nize that PSMP is new and that it canimprove its performance, provided thatsome actions are taken.

Expanding PMSP solely as a micro-credit initiative would help only thethird beneficiary group and exclude themost vulnerable.25 PMSP should insteadhave three services, in accord with de-mand: (i) Social support, providing one-time help to the poorest beneficiaries,who can start new activities; (ii) Promotingproductive reinsertion by giving limitedmoney and technical assistance to exist-ing micro-enterprises to eventually enterthe formal sector; and (iii) Micro-businessdevelopment to help consolidate or expandthe more experienced entrepreneurs, bygiving them money and technical assis-tance in the form of micro-credit. Thetype and scope of money and technicalassistance and the source of fundingshould be defined separately for each

demand segment. Santa Fe’s rich socialcapital will help support such a strategy,as it has worldwide.

SEPC should evaluate several alter-natives: (a) developing partnerships toimplement PMSP through selected inter-mediaries; (b) concentrating on the firsttwo groups of beneficiaries, leavingmicro-business support to more experi-enced organizations; and (c) addressingall three groups, provided secure fundsand improved institutional capacity arein place. In any case, SEPC institutionalstrengthening is critical to reduce transac-tion costs and ensure sustainability.

(c) Institutional arrangements

To carry out the proposed strategy, SEPCmust overcome severalweaknesses.26 SEPC should strengthen itscapacity to allocate resources based onits identified priorities, develop instru-ments and skills to assess whether itsprograms are effective relative to theircosts, and modernize its internal struc-ture and coordinate more with otheragencies.27

Pensions

Fifteen percent of the population wasabove 60 years old in 1995; of these, twothirds had some kind of protection underthe Instituto Nacional de Jubilados yPensionados (INJP). However, while 94percent of public-sector employees werecovered, only 65 percent of private-sectoremployees and less than 7 percent ofdomestic employees were. Coverage alsovaries regionally: it is more than 70percent in the departments ofCastellanos, Belgrano and Constituciónand as less than 40 percent in rural areaslike San Javier. In Rosario department, 68

25 See Susana Sanchez’s BTO of January 14, 200126 See the project’s Institutional Assessment: Olympia Icochea, “Institional Assessment in the MOP.”27 See Olympia Icochea’s BTO of January 25, 2001 and the Institutional Assessment28 IPEC: Situación y Evolución Social Provicial Santa Fe


22

percent of the elderly were covered; in ofthe capital, 58.4 percent. In 1995, around63 percent of women (and their depen-dents) were covered by the INJP.28 Benefi-ciaries also include 4.8 percent of theprovince’s children and 44.3 percent ofpersons over 70, for whom the pensionmight be the only source of income (seetable 4).

The provincial pension systemunder the Nueva Caja de Jubilación has53,355 beneficiaries (retirees and pen-sioners) and $41.6 million in assets.29 Theinefficiencies of this system have threat-ened the province’s finances. The provin-cial government’s Emergency Law of1999 temporarily reduced pension ben-efits, but in 2001 the system still has adeficit of some $85 million. A new pen-sion reform should reduce the pensionburden on the province’s public finances,but not by excluding large numbers ofpeople. The reform should includeproposals to extend the service to theone-third of elderly people who have nopension protection. The reform shouldalso identify possible social impacts andpropose relevant mitigation measures.

PROPOSED REFORMS AND SOCIAL

IMPACTS

Santa Fe has already started the firstgeneration of PRL reforms. PRL VI will

therefore finish several reforms, includ-ing reforms of the social sectors, Educa-tion, Health and Social Protection; pen-sion reform; and privatization of theelectricity distribution company EmpresaProductora de Electricidad de Santa Fe(EPESF). The project should include aspecific component to support a coherentand well-funded social-protection strat-egy. This section analyzes the proposedreforms, identifies possible social im-pacts and proposes mitigation measuresand recommendations for the proposedsocial-protection strategy.

Education Reforms

Education reforms comprise: (i) imple-menting the new Higher SecondaryEducation Cycle (Polimodal); (ii) increas-ing the coverage of Lower SecondaryEducation (EGBS); (iii) improving theTeacher Training Institutes; (iv) betteruse of the Student’s Achievement Evalua-tion; (v) further decentralization to re-gions and schools; (vi) improving theefficiency of human–resource manage-ment; and (vii) rationalizing publicsubsidies to private schools.

The reforms should save money andimprove quality without major socialimpacts. An improved human-resourcemanagement system has already beenimplemented. Permitting teachers totransfer between schools could savealmost $12 million. Disseminating resultsfrom the national and provincial aca-demic achievement tests will help im-prove school quality.

Extensive consultation and partici-pation are necessary to deal with opposi-tion from teachers and administratorswho are attached to the old system. Thereforms also need a more active strategyto promote equity of access to and qual-ity of education.

Source: IPEC

29 Ministerio de Hacienda y Finanzas de Santa Fe; Nueva Caja de Jubilacion

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23

Health Reforms

Health reforms comprise: (i) expandingand improving primary care, especiallyfor uninsured citizens; (ii) improvingpublic hospital performance; (iii)strengthening the Ministry of Health’sregulatory capacity; and (iv) maintainingthe financial stability of the Instituto deAdministracion Pública de la Obras Sociales(IAPOS). The new primary-care approachwill be tested in one of the poorest areasof Santa Fe (Zone 3) and then dissemi-nated throughout the province. A con-tracted network of primary-care provid-ers will offer a basic health package topoor beneficiaries.

No adverse social impacts are ex-pected from these reforms. On the con-trary, some measures, such as improvingprimary care and the rural pilot, can helpreduce inequity. Health reforms will beextremely beneficial, provided that thegovernment takes specific measures totarget the identified vulnerable popula-tion. This includes the unemployed andthe NBI population, who might not beformally enrolled in the health system.Special attention is still required in ruralareas, where the worst health problemsare found.

Social Protection

The main goal of the social-protectionreforms is to improve the province’scapacity to meet the needs of prominentat-risk groups. Specific activities include:(i) support for the redesign and expan-sion of PASS and PMSP; (ii) assessingthese programs before expansion tomake adjustments (as discussed above)and evaluating results after expansion;(iii) up-dating the province’s povertyindicators; (iv) completing the registry ofsocial-program beneficiaries; and (v)

using funds from the Compromiso Federal($15 million) for social-protection pro-grams. These reforms do address identi-fied social risks, but a more active socialstrategy to improve equity and reducepoverty is recommended.

Pensions

Public-sector employee pensions are thetarget of one of Santa Fe’s remainingreforms. Santa Fe has signed an agree-ment with the federal government: theprovince will reform its pension system,and in return the federal government willabsorb its deficit over four years, startingwith 25 percent in year one. The reformcontemplates “harmonizing” the provin-cial pension system with the nationalone, though the exact changes have notbeen agreed. Though there is no plan tocut benefits for current beneficiaries, it isimportant that the reform not otherwiseharm those who rely solely on theirpensions. Because the retirement age forwomen might be raised in the province,the proposed reform should also look atthe impacts of such a change.

At the national level, the pensionreforms passed by Presidential Decree(No. 1306) in December 1999 were de-signed to: (i) extend coverage to thosesegments of the population who face thehighest risk of indigence in old age; (ii)lower incentives to evade participating inthe formal system; (iii) cut the costs toworkers of saving for theirretirement;30 and (iv) reduce the fiscalcost of government contributions toretirement funds administered by theAdministración Nacional de la SeguridadSocial en Argentina to make the programmore sustainable.31 These reforms maycertainly help the province’s finances andmake the retirement system sounder

30 Workers can put money in the Administradora de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones pillar of theirindividual bank accounts; this allows them to manage their money independently of the government.31 MOP Programatic Reform Loan Social Sectors, p. 27


24

financially. On the other hand, if thenational system is any indication, theretirement age for women will probablybe raised to 65 from 60. This and otherlikely social impacts still need to beaddressed.

Electric Company Privatization

The province plans to sell or leaseEPESF’s assets. Its goals are to reducecosts, increase investment, improveservices, reduce tariffs for residentialusers and smaller firms, and provideexplicit subsidies to vulnerable groups(such as the poor, and isolated ruralcommunities). It also expects to use themoney saved and generated byprivatization to create jobs, spur eco-nomic growth and provide a fiscal cush-ion of sorts.

Law No. 11.727, Marco RegulatorioEléctrico y Transformación Energética Pro-vincial of 30 December 1999 provides thelegal framework to privatize EPESF. Thelaw defines the rights and responsibili-ties of final consumers, including partici-pation in public hearings to discussservice and in consumer associations todefend their rights. The law establishesthat “tariffs should be internationallycompetitive and ensure a reasonableprofitability.” The discussions onprivatization have indicated that tariffsare high for international standards. Forexample, the average residential tariff is15 cent/kWh versus the 9 cent/kWhcharged by EPESF’s rival Edesur/Edenor. A tariff reduction can reasonablybe expected from privatization. Thiswould be positive for consumers.

The Law does not discuss the role ofworkers in the industry. However, it hasbeen recognized that staff costs are ex-tremely high and the utility employsabout 50 more workers than the industrystandard . EPESF has gradually reducedits staff in recent years. About 450 work-

ers accepted voluntary retirement; thereare now about 3,000 employees. It isestimated a privatized EPESF will re-quire fewer than 2,000 employees. Thegovernment has launched a new programof early retirement for the 650 employeeswho are within seven years of retirement.At least 2,500 workers will be transferredto the new operator, which would thenbe responsible for further downsizing.The workers not needed by the newoperators would have the option ofaccepting severance packages or takingpositions elsewhere in the provincialgovernment. In the latter case, theywould receive training for their newposition, but they would fall under thenormal civil-service pay regime (EPESFemployees are currently paid far morethan the public administration).

Privatizing EPESF may provideSanta Fe with substantial resources. Atleast part of these resources should beused to address identified social impactsand to support economic recovery andequity initiatives.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Though no major adverse impacts areexpected from the proposed reforms, asocial development strategy is recom-mended to address the identified socialrisks and challenges, as well as somespecific measures to mitigate the pos-sible impacts from EPESF privatizationand the pension reform.

The social development strategycomprises economic recovery and equitypromotion. Economic recovery includesusing selective public investments bothto reduce poverty and to build a climatefor investment and growth. Equity will bepromoted through social-protectioninterventions and health and educationreforms that target vulnerable popula-tions. This social development strategy32

would integrate the relevant efforts of

25

province and municipal governments. Itwould be financed with resources fromthe Compromiso Federal, the proceeds fromprivatization and savings from social-sector reforms.

(a) Promoting Economic Recovery

This part of the strategy stems fromongoing private-sector initiatives, mu-nicipal programs to improve competi-tiveness and worker organizations’demands to avoid negative impacts. Itcomprises the following actions:

• Selective investments in infrastructure todevelop areas that can produce com-petitive exports and to develop newmarket opportunities, thus creatingtemporary and long-term employ-ment;

• An investment program for rural areas tohelp them once more to be competi-tive. This will include shifting tohigher-value crops; working withindustry to produce more value-added exports and to developagribusiness, taking into accountinternational trends; and co-financingtechnical assistance to increase pro-ductivity.

• Selective and more efficient support ofsmall and medium enterprises (PYMES,pequeñas y medianas empresas) to pro-mote links with larger firms.

• Selective co-financing and technicalassistance to promote economic restruc-turing of regionally important eco-nomic activities.

• Continuing the deregulation process;this includes better coordinationamong national, provincial and mu-nicipal authorities to avoid overlap-ping regulations and facilitate newinvestments and initiatives;

• Simplifying the procedures andincentives for formalizing micro-

business.

The Ministry of Production (for-merly MAGIC) is best suited to carry outthese types of activities. It should how-ever try to work with municipalities andlocal organizations, such as the RegionalDevelopment Associations (Asociacionespara el Desarrollo Regional), to benefit fromtheir knowledge of local problems andcloser interaction with potential benefi-ciaries.

(b) Promoting Equity

Social Protection

To promote equity, the social protectionstrategy includes a mix of social-assis-tance and productivity-enhancementprograms that will be more responsive tothe beneficiary needs that the socialimpact assessment identified (see table5).

The social protection strategy includesthe following actions:

• A beneficiary assessment of ongoingprograms to define priorities, allocateresources, create performance indica-tors and improve responsiveness.Assessing PASS’s sustainability andpossible negative side effects, andany alternatives for improved effec-tiveness, is a priority.

• There should be three productivity-enhancement efforts., First, PMSP couldbe redefined as a three-fold programthat addresses the needs of the threegroups mentioned above. Its financesand operating policies could besound and transparent. Second, theongoing Special Training programcould focus on giving unemployedyoung people the skills the labormarket demands. Third, the Commu-nity-Based Productive Initiatives

32 This initiative fits within SEPC’s Plan Social proposed by the government to the provincial legislature inMay 2000.


26

program could be expanded andmodified to promote social-capitaldevelopment through in-serviceinitiatives. Each of these three effortscould be tested through pilots paidfor by the Compromiso Federal and theproceeds from privatizing EPESF. Ex-post evaluation would provide feed-back on their effectiveness.

• Because women lead social-protectionefforts, a gender approach is recom-mended to help women’s participa-tion and support their efforts to in-clude their families. Such an approachwould include (i) targeting trainingand technical assistance to women’sneeds; (ii) promoting empowermentand self-assurance; (iii) helping tobring their families into the effort; (iv)addressing bias and discrimination;and (v) monitoring outcomes toimprove gender policy. This ap-proach would help balance powerwithin families and offset the demor-

alization of many unemployed headsof households.

• Support SEPC institutional strengtheningthrough technical assistance andtraining, integrated managementsystems, mechanisms to improveinter-institutional coordination, andmechanisms to promote beneficiaryparticipation. SEPC should alsocontinue its decentralization efforts,such as building partnerships withmunicipalities and local organiza-tions.

Education

The following activities would help theeducation reforms to reduce inequity.The could be financed by sector savings:

• Incorporate incentives for poor students(grants, special training, flexiblecurricula.) to enrol in EGBS, completethe Polimodal cycle and thus have

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27

access to tertiary education.• Develop alternative education options

(internships, apprenticeships) andnew curricula to allow unemployedyoung people to get skills for newjobs.

• Adult programs to help the unem-ployed update their skills.

• Public transfers to private schools shouldbe evaluated in terms of equity.

• Extensive consultation and activeparticipation is advised to build owner-ship among staff, teachers and stu-dents.

• Design and implement a participatorymonitoring and evaluation system tofollow-up reforms with inputs fromstudents and parents.

Health

The following actions could help healthreforms to reduce inequity:

• Ensure coverage of poor and vulnerablepopulations, particularly in rural areas.

• Special programs might be required toovercome dangerous infectious dis-eases, such as tuberculosis, AIDS, and“mal de chagas.” Public-awarenesscampaigns should complement theseefforts.

• A gender approach, including a repro-ductive-health program, shouldguide the reform process.

• Extensive consultation is advised tobuild ownership among staff, medicalpersonnel and users of the system.

• A participatory monitoring and evalua-tion system would provide usefulfeedback to monitor the reforms andimprovement in quality.

Impact Mitigation

(a) Electricity Privatization

To make the best of EPESF privatization,the process should ensure that consum-

ers benefit from the sale and restructur-ing and that measures are taken to re-duce the impact of layoffs. Such mea-sures should include an agreement thatproductivity gains benefit consumersthrough reduced tariffs and improvedservice, a category in the tariff schedulefor dispersed rural customers, and aseverance package that includes training,payment and support in finding a newjob. A public information campaignshould explain the advantages of priva-tizing EPESF.

(b) Pension Reform

The provincial pension reform should tryto imitate the positive changes in thenational system, and identify what im-pacts other changes would have in theprovince. The reform process shouldincorporate a socioeconomic study toprofile beneficiaries and identify pos-sible social impacts, an specific analysisof the impact on women and their depen-dents, any necessary mitigation measuresand an equity approach to ensure thebroadest possible coverage. If necessary,mitigation measures can be providedthrough existing social-protection pro-grams.

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS33

The proposed reforms are not expectedto cause any major adverse social im-pacts. In the case of the pension reformand EPESF privatization, though, somemitigation measures are needed andshould be implemented. In the case ofeducation and health reforms, a moreactive equity approach is suggested. Inaddition, a comprehensive social devel-opment strategy is recommended toaddress identified social risks and newchallenges, such as the impact of theongoing economic restructuring of the

33 Draft matrices comprising these recommendations have been drafted; see table 6.


28

province; unemployment, the “newpoor” and related social issues; and theincreased vulnerability of the poor popu-lation, particularly the young, elderlyand women. This effort should promotesocial-capital development and buildpartnerships with local authorities,community organizations and the privatesector. A gender approach would guideits design and implementation.

The proposed social developmentstrategy would enhance the effectivenessof the reforms through a participatoryapproach and promote equitable povertyreduction through two main lines ofaction:

(a) Economic recovery, with a focus onselected public-sector interventions tobuild the climate for investment andgrowth; and

(b) Promoting equity, through a com-prehensive social-protection interventionthat would target vulnerable populationsand promote productivity-enhancementinitiatives.

This social development strategywould integrate the relevant efforts ofprovincial and municipal governments,the above-mentioned mitigation mea-sures and the actions recommended bythe PRL framework. Resources from theCompromiso Federal, the proceeds fromprivatization proceeds and sector savingswould finance this effort.

29

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31

Bibliography

General InformationBertranou, Fabio. Pension Reform and the Gen-der Gap in Latin America. October 2000.Fundación Capital. Reporte sobre los programassociales de la Provincia de Santa Fe. FundaciónCapital, Buenos Aires.Ley No. 11.727: Marco Regulatorio Eléctrico yTransformación Energética Provincial.Murillo, Nestor. Evaluación social de la reformadel sector público de la Provincia de Santa Fe.Fundación Centro, Buenos Aires.Reporte de la Asociación para el Desarrollo Re-gional Gral Obligado-San Javier.Suárez, Waldino. Los objetivos de la Secretariade Estado de Protección Comunitaria (SEPC): Ejespara una estrategia social en una coyuntura deescasez. October 2000.Subsecretaría de la Mujer. Mujeres en Argen-tina. Subsecretaría de la Mujer, 2000.

StatisticsINDEC. Programa de Informacion Estadistica yApoyo a los Municipios (PRINEM). Estadísticasde Santa Fe.INDEC. Argentina: Sinopsis Estadística. 2000.IPEC. Situación y Evolución Social de la Provinciade Santa Fe: Síntesis Estadística.SEPC. Sistema de Informacion Social: Reportesobre programas sociales. October 2000.

World Bank Publications and ReportsGuasch, Luis, Yevgeny Kuznetso and SusanaSanchez. “Small and Medium Enterprises inArgentina: Securing Sustainable IncentiveDriven Framework.” Concept paper, October2000.Holzmann, Robert and Steen Lau Jorgensen.“Manejo Social del Riesgo: Un marco concep-tual para la protección social y más allá.”Working document no. 0006, February 2000.

Icochea, Olympia. “LCSPG Gender Team: Ar-gentina Provincial Reform Loan III.” GenderOperations Report Series No. 2, World Bank,March 2000.World Bank. Argentina CMU: An Assessmentof Social Sector Reform in Argentina, Vols. I andII. Human Development Department, theWorld Bank.----------. “PRL ICR Launch.”----------. Poor People in a Rich Country: A Pov-erty Report for Argentina, Vols. I and II. ARDReport No. 19992.----------. “MOP on a Proposed ProgrammaticLoan Social Sectors.”----------. “Unemployment and Unemploy-ment Protection in Three Groups of Coun-tries.” Social Protection Discussion Paper No.9911, World Bank, May 1999.

PRL VI Team ReportsGillete Hall. Ayuda memoria Mission. 27 Sep-tember 2000.Susana Sanchez. BTO. 14 January 2001.Olympia Icochea. BTO. 16 January 2001.“Small and medium enterprises report.”“Public finances report.” 1 December 2000.Mark Hagerstrom. “Progress notes.”Olympia Icochea. “Gender Report.”

Social Development DepartmentEnvironmentally and Socially Sustainable Development NetworkThe World Bank1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20433, USAFax: 202-522 32 47Website: www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopmentE-mail: [email protected]

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