Aristotle and Protagoras: The Good Human Being as the Measure of Goods

Anstotle and Protagoras:The Good Human Being asthe Measure of Goods1

Paula Gottlieb

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that the excellent person (oσπουδαίος) is the measure of what is good, fine, pleasant, honourableand so on. This claim is strikingly reminiscent of Protagoras's famousdoctrine that man is the measure of all things. Moreover, Aristotlesometimes seems sympathetic to Protagoras's view as it applies toperceptual qualities such as sweet and white.2 Since, in putting forwardhis own measure doctrine, Aristotle draws an analogy between what isgood, just, fine and so on and what is sweet, bitter, white and so on, thisraises an important question about how much of Protagoras's viewAristotle means to endorse in his Ethics. Indeed, it can be no accidentthat the qualities which Aristotle mentions in drawing his analogies areprecisely the ones which Plato brings up when discussing Protagoras'sview in the Theaetetus (151D-183). In this paper, I focus on NicomacheanEthics III 4 and examine the way in which Aristotle's measure doctrineapplies to what is good, to see how closely Aristotle's position is relatedto Protagoras's thesis.

1 Translations are based on T.H. Irwin's translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics,Indianapolis: Hackett 1985, H. Rackham's translation of Eudemian Ethics,Cambridge: Harvard University Press, reprinted 1981 and on translations from TheComplete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation edited by J. Barnes, 2 vols,Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984.

2 I examine the evidence in section 3.

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26 Paula Gottlieb

I begin by examining the puzzle about the object of wish whichprompts Aristotle to introduce his own measure doctrine. I then de-scribe Protagoras's thesis and consider two interpretations of Aristotle'smeasure doctrine, one of which incorporates some key features ofProtagoras's view ( I call this interpretation 'the Protagorran interpreta-tion') and one of which does not. I argue that, despite the prima faciecase for the Protagorean interpretation, Aristotle's account of goodselsewhere in the Corpus and in the Nicomachean Ethics itself shows thatthe non-Protagorean interpretation of the measure doctrine is correct.Despite first appearances, the analogies which Aristotle draws betweengoods, healthy things and perceptual qualities are appropriate for ex-pressing this non-Protagorean account.

1 NE III 4: A puzzle about the object of wish

At NE III 4,1113a29, Aristotle introduces his own measure doctrine, thatthe excellent person is the measure of all things ethical, in order to solvea puzzle about the object of wish, to το βουλητόν. The puzzle is asfollows. There are two views, one, that the object of wish is the good, theother, that the object of wish is the apparent good. The first view,according to Aristotle, has the paradoxical consequence that what some-one wishes for if he chooses incorrectly is not an object of wish. Tor,'Aristotle says, 'if it is wished for, then it is good; but what he (the personwho chooses incorrectly) wishes for is bad, if it turns out that way ...'The second view, Aristotle argues, has the unwelcome consequence thatthere is nothing which is the object of wish by nature.

Aristotle's argument is very compressed, but the missing premisescan be supplied as follows. The first view which Aristotle considersassumes that things are really good (or bad) independently of what

I do not mean to suggest that there is a question about whether Aristotle's view isProtagoras's. There is an obvious difference in that Protagoras thinks that eachindividual is the measure whereas Aristotle thinks that only the good person is themeasure. However, there is an important question about the way in which Aristotlethinks that the good person is the measure. On one interpretation, the Protagoreanone, Aristotle's doctrine is best understood as a development of Protagoras'sposition. On the other, it is not.



Aristotle and Protagoras 27

anyone thinks of them and that what anyone wishes for is what is reallygood. Since what is really good does not depend on what people think,it is possible for someone to wish for something which he thinks is goodbut which turns out to be bad. However, if it is possible for someone towish for something that is not really good, then it is possible to wish forsomething which is not really an object of wish.

The second view avoids this problem by abandoning the idea thatthere is anything which is really good (or bad) independently of whateach individual happens to think. On this account, all there is to some-thing's being an object of wish is its appearing good to the person whowishes for it, and all there is to something's being good is its appearingso to its perceiver. On this view, it is impossible to wish 'incorrectly' forthere is nothing which can legitimately override an individual's percep-tions. Aristotle objects that such a view entails that there is nothingwhich is the object of wish by nature; anything can be an object of wish,and nothing has a better claim than anything else to be an object of wish.

Aristotle solves the dilemma by rejecting the assumption of the firstview that what anyone wishes for is the real good, and also the asump-tion of the second view that there is no real good beyond what appearsgood to the individual. According to Aristotle, each person wishes forwhat appears good to him, the apparent good, but that does not meanthat each person is necessarily right about what is good.4 Aristotle claimsthat the real good is what appears to be good to the good person. Theexcellent person, he says, 'sees what is true ... being a sort of standardand measure' (NE III 4,1113a29-31).

There is, however, more than one way of interpreting Aristotle'smeasure doctrine. As I shall show, on one interpretation, Aristotle'smeasure doctrine is a modification of Protagoras's position; on the other,it is a complete rejection of it.

Aristotle does not mean to suggest that the person who is not good (and wishes forsomething that turns out bad) thinks to herself, 'I'm wishing for the apparent good'.She is wishing for what appears to her to be really good. Therefore, when askedwhat she is wishing for, she will say that she is wishing for the real good, just as theman who is about to buy a very unreliable car will say that what he wants is areliable car, not an apparently reliable car, even though the car he wants to buy isonly apparently reliable. Aristotle's solution to the puzzle, and the puzzle itself,make best sense if taken, as I have taken them, 'de ref.



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2 Protagoras's thesis, Aristotle's measure doctrineand the two interpretations

Protagoras's thesis that man is the measure of all things, as explained byPlato and Aristotle, means that each individual human being is themeasure of all things.5 Thus if I think that χ is F and you think that χ isnot F, we are both right. What appears F to me is F for me as long as itappears so to me. What appears not F to you is not F for you as long asit appears so to you. According to Protagoras, how things are for aperson depends on how they appear. On Protagoras's view it makes nosense to talk of how things are independently of a particular perceiver.'How things are' can only describe how things are for a particularhuman being, and how things are for a particular human being consistsin how they seem to that individual at a particular time.

Aristotle's own measure doctrine, his solution to the puzzle about theobject of wish, can be interpreted in two different ways. On one inter-pretation, Aristotle formulates his own measure doctrine from within aProtagorean framework. Aristotle accepts the Protagorean assumptionthat what appears good to (and is wished for by) a given personconstitutes what is good for that person, and stipulates that what ap-pears good to the good person counts as really good. On this interpre-tation, Aristotle thinks that the object of wish, what is good, is fullydetermined by the attitudes of its desirer. On this view, there just isnothing to the distinction between the real and the apparent good exceptthe distinction between what appears good to the good person and whatappears good to the bad person. What is really good is what is good forthe good person and what is good for the good person is simply whatappears good to him. What is not really good is what is good for the badperson and what is good for the bad person is simply what appears goodto him. There are no further facts in the world which make it the casethat what appears good to the good person is what is really good, apartfrom the fact that the good person wishes for it.

On this interpretation, Aristotle differs from Protagoras in definingthe good by way of what appears good to the good person rather thanto just anyone, but agrees with Protagoras in thinking that there is

5 Plato Tht 152B1-10, Aristotle Metaph IV 5




nothing more to being good than appearing so to someone. I shall callthis interpretation Trotagorean' because according to it the good personis the measure in the very same way that the individual is the measureon Protagoras's view: 'What is really F' describes what is F for χ (thegood person) and what is F for χ consists in what seems F to x.6

On another interpretation, Aristotle rejects the Protagorean positionin its entirety. According to this interpretation, Aristotle thinks that thereis more to being good for an individual than simply appearing good tothat individual. The bad person may well be wrong about what is goodfor himself as well as what is good for human beings. The good personis a measure not because what appears good to him constitutes what isreally good, but because he accurately detects what is really good forhuman beings independently of his view of the matter. The good personthinks that something is good because it is good. It is not good simplybecause the good person thinks that it is.7

To find out which reading of Aristotle's measure doctrine is correct,I shall begin by considering the case for the Protagorean interpretationin more detail.

3 The case for the Protagorean interpretation

The case for a Protagorean interpretation centres on the analogies whichAristotle draws between goods, healthy things and perceptual qualities.At first sight, these analogies raise difficulties for a non-Protagorean

The resulting Protagorean position has some affinity with Hume's, although Humehimself is not completely consistent and his position is open to competing interpre-tations in the same way as is Aristotle's. See, for example, E.S. Radcliffe, Hulchesonand Hume on Moral Perception, Ph.D. Diss., Cornell University (Ann Arbor· UMI, 19758525687).

The difference between the two interpretations of Aristotle's measure doctrine ishard to express unambiguously, which makes it difficult to see which is correct.John Cooper, for example, describes Aristotle's position in a way which is oftenambiguous between the two interpretations described here (Reason and Human Goodm Aristotle [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1975], 129), and at one pointhe seems to endorse some form of the Protagorean interpretation (Reason and HumanGood in Aristotle, 130, final paragraph).



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interpretation of the measure doctrine and so appear to support theProtagorean interpretation over its rival.

Aristotle presents the analogies as follows:

(1) To/for the excellent person, then, the object of wish is what iswished in reality, while to/for the bad person it is whatever itturns out to be, just as

(2) really (κατ' άλήθειαν) healthy things are healthy to/for peoplein sound physical condition while other things are healthyto/for the ill,

(3) and similarly with what is bitter, sweet, hot, heavy and so on.For

(4) the excellent person judges each correctly, and in each case whatis true appears to him.For

(5) each state (of character) has its own special fine and pleasantthings, and presumably

(6) the excellent person is far superior because he sees what is truein each case, being a sort of standard and measure of these verythings .... (NE III 4,1113a25-33)

On a non-Protagorean interpretation, the Greek datives, marked'to/for' throughout this passage, are ambiguous. They could mean 'to',i.e., 'in the view of, or 'for' (which does not necessarily imply 'in theview of). For example, on the 'to' reading, (2) would be, 'really healthythings are healthy to, i.e., in the view of, people in sound physicalcondition'. On the 'for' reading, this would be, 'really healthy things arehealthy for people in sound physical condition'. Nothing follows fromthe latter reading about the healthy person's view of what is healthy forhim/her.

In (6), Aristotle says that the excellent person is far superior (to thebad person) because he sees (i.e., has a view of) what is true in each case,and, according to Aristotle, this explains (4) which, in turn, explains(l)-(3) (See for... for ...and...). (6) then makes best sense as an explanationif the datives of (l)-(3) are read as 'to' rather than as 'for'.)

On a non-Protagorean reading, (2) is a maverick. Here, the 'for'reading is more natural, since it is not obvious that the healthy and the




sick person will have the right and wrong views respectively about whatis really healthy. As a result of this problem, Ackrill makes the followingcomplaint:

Aristotle fails to distinguish clearly between two contrasts: (a) thecontrast between really F and apparently F, and (b) the contrast be-tween F to (or for) most (or normal) people and F to (or for) some (oran abnormal) person.

However Ackrill's complaint only applies to a non-Protagorean in-terpretation of Aristotle's measure doctrine. One might take Aristotle'sfailure to distinguish the two contrasts as prima facie evidence that heholds a Protagorean view instead. This is because a Protagorean wouldnot need to distinguish the two contrasts. On a Protagorean view, whatis F to someone is what is F for him, and the distinction between whatis really F and what is apparently F just is the distinction between whatis F to and for the good person and what is F to and for everybody else(in cases where the two disagree).

Ackrill continues:

Often indeed, the normal is the criterion for the real; but a gruel diet isreally good for an invalid though not for the normal person ...

Here too Ackrill takes the non-Protagorean reading of the passage tobe correct, and he therefore accuses Aristotle of denying that a gruel dietis really good for the invalid. By implication, Aristotle would also bedenying that what is good for the bad person is really good for him.

Again, Ackrill's complaint does not arise if we accept the Protagoreaninterpretation of Aristotle's measure doctrine. On this interpretation,what is healthy or good for the bad person just is whatever seemshealthy or good to her, and there is no denying that what is healthy orgood for the bad person is what is really healthy or good for her.Aristotle's comparison of goods to healthy things therefore seems tosupport a Protagorean interpretation.

J.L. Acknll, Aristotle's Ethics (New York: Humanities Press 1973), 251. I havereservations over Ackrill's view that, according to Aristotle, the healthy and thegood person are statistical norms, but this does not affect my present discussion.



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The analogy between goods and perceptual qualities provides moregrist to the Protagorean mill. At NE III 4,1113a27- 30, Aristotle comparesthe good person as the measure of goods with the healthy perceiver asthe measure of what is bitter, sweet, hot, heavy and so on. The passage isobscure, but some light may be shed from a passage in Metaphysics IV 5where Aristotle explicitly addresses the issue of the healthy person as themeasure of perceptual qualities. Significantly, Aristotle's commentscome in the midst of a general discussion about Protagoras. AlthoughAristotle approves ofthefactthatinthe case of disagreemen t over colou rs,contra Protagoras' s general thesis, we accept the views of the healthy andnot those of the sick (Metaph IV 5,1010b3f), Aristotle also denies that thesenses can ever be mistaken about their special objects (Metaph IV 5,101 Obi -3). Thus sight can never be mistaken abou t colours, hearing abou tsounds, taste about flavours, smell of smells, and touch about textures.Aristotle argues that there never has been any dispute about the affection(e.g., sweet, white), l>ut only that in which the affection coincides; I meanfor instance that the same wine might be thought sweet at one time andnot sweet at another, if there is alteration either in it or in the body; butthe sweet such as it is, when it is, has never yet altered, and one alwayshas the truth about it...' (Metaph IV 5,1010bl9-25).

Aristotle's comments, especially those concerning the special sensi-bles, suggest the following Protagorean construal: Each person is rightabout how the wine is to and for him/herself at a particular time, but ifwe want to say how the wine 'really' is, we just take the view of thehealthy person. This interpretation can be supported from elsewhere. Inde Anima, Aristotle says that the actual object of perception is in somesense identical with the actual perception of it and that it is in theperceiver (de An III 2,426all-19; cf. Sens 6,446bl7f).

Finally, the Protagorean interpreter can appeal to the end of thepassage in the-Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle says that each statehas its own fine and pleasant things (NE III 4,1113a31). If this means thatfine and pleasant things are constituted by a particular state, it supportsthe Protagorean interpretation.9

There is therefore prima facie a strong case for a Protagorean inter-pretation of Aristotle's measure doctrine. To respond to it, I shall first

9 I shall return to this passage in section 8.




clarify the sort of goods which the excellent person measures correctly.Next I shall consider the problems raised by the analogies which Aris-totle uses to explain his position.

In section 5 I shall argue that the goods which the excellent personmeasures, the απλώς goods, fail to fit the Protagorean interpretation ofthe measure doctrine. First, I shall explain what the απλώς goods are,and how they differ from goods τινι.

4 Aristotle on goods: The άπλώς/τινι distinction

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that the good is ambiguousbetween what is good απλώς and what is good τινι (e.g., EN VII 12,1152b27). Aristotle first explains what it is for something to be F απλώςin the Topics. There Aristotle contrasts F απλώς with F at a certain timeor F in a certain relation (Top I 5,102a26), and he contrasts good απλώςwith good in a certain place and to certain people or to people in a certaincondition (Top II12,115bll). Aristotle also argues that F απλώς is moreproperly contrasted not with F at a certain time or at a certain place, butwith F to or for someone in a certain condition, no matter where or whenhe is in that condition:

... it is in some places honourable to sacrifice one's father, e.g., amongthe Triballi, whereas, απλώς, it is not honourable. Or possibly this againmay indicate a relativity not to places but to persons; for it makes nodifference where they may be; for everywhere it will be honourable tothem. Again, at certain times it is beneficial to take medicines e.g. whenone is ill, but it is not so απλώς. Or possibly, this may indicate a relativitynot to a certain time but to a certain state of health; for it makes nodifference when it occurs, if only one is in that state. A thing is απλώςso which, without any addition (μηδενός προστεθέντος), you will sayis fine or the contrary. (Top U 12,115b22-30)

The most important point to emerge from this passage is that, accord-ing to Aristotle, a thing is απλώς F which you will say is F withoutqualification. However, there are two different ways in which some-thing can be F without qualification. First, what is F απλώς may be whatis F for anyone in any condition and in any circumstances. For example,Aristotle says that



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that which is good απλώς is more worthy of choice than that which isgood τινι, e.g., the enjoyment of health than a surgical operation; forthe former is good απλώς, the latter is good only τινι, namely, for theman who requires an operation. (Top III 1,116b8-10)

Here, Aristotle contrasts what is F απλώς with what is F τινι as follows:it would be good for anyone (the sick person included) to enjoy health,but surgical operations are only good for a person in a sick conditionwho needs them. What is F απλώς, then, is what is F for anyone in anycondition. In Aristotle's ethical works, this characterisation of what isαπλώς good holds in the case of the virtues and good actions. These areαπλώς good in that they are good for any human being, no matter whatcondition that human being is in.

Second, according to Aristotle, something is F απλώς if it is F foreveryone except someone in a particular bad state. For example, Aris-totle says that the goods subject to fortune and which the unjust persontries to grab are απλώς always good but are not always good τινι, for anindividual in a particular state (NE V 1,1129b3). Aristotle also says thathonour, wealth and so on are natural goods despite the fact that theymay be harmful τινι:10

If a man is foolish or unjust or profligate he would gain no profit fromusing them, any more than an invalid would benefit from using thediet of a man in good health or a weakling and disabled person fromthe equipment of a healthy man and of a sound one. (EE VIII 3,1248b31-4)

There are therefore two sorts of goods which are good for humanbeings απλώς, those which are good for anyone in any conditions, andthose which are good for anyone in the absence of countervailingconditions such as illness or vice." In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotlerecognises these two sorts of goods as distinct. The former are good and

10 The natural goods are good απλώς. See, e.g., EE VII2,1237a4-5.

11 cf. MM I 2, 1183b39-1184a4: There is yet another way in which we may classifygood things. Some of them are choiceworthy without reservation and in anycircumstance; but not others. Justice, for example, and the other virtues are entirelyand under all circumstances choiceworthy; but strength and riches and power andso on are not.'




praiseworthy, the latter (strength, honor, birth, wealth and power) aregood but are not praiseworthy (EE VIII 3,1248b24f). In the NicomacheanEthics, Aristotle calls the second sort of goods potentialities (NE I 12,1101bl2), presumably (as in the Magrta Moralia) in contrast with thefirst.12

5 The απλώς goods and Protagoras

In this section I shall argue that Aristotle's account of the απλώς goodsdoes not fit a Protagorean interpretation. First, according to Aristotle,what is good for χ is not just what χ happens to think good at the time.Second, Aristotle thinks that what is good απλώς is not good for the goodhuman being simply because the good human being thinks that it isgood. Third, Aristotle's distinction between what is good απλώς andwhat is good τινι is meant to mark a real distinction in the world andnot just a distinction between what different people happen to think.Fourth, Aristotle thinks that there is more to the natural goods than theirsimply appearing good to and being good for the actual good person.At the end of the section I explain how the απλώς goods are really goodin a way in which goods τινι are not.

In de Anima, Aristotle says that what is immediately pleasant seemsboth απλώς pleasant and απλώς good because we do not see the future(de An III 13,435b8-10), implying that if something is απλώς F, it must beF for more than a fleeting period, i.e., it must be more than just F at aparticular time. Aristotle makes a similar point in the Eudemian Ethics.In a discussion about friendship, he says

For men are like wines and foods; the sweetness of those is quicklyevident, but when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, andsimilarly in the case of men. For the απλώς pleasant is a thing to be

12 MM 12,1183b27-33;'... the virtues are examples of things commended since praiseaccompanies the deeds they inspire. Other goods, again, are potentialities; asauthority, riches, strength and beauty; for of these the good man has the power tomake good use, and the bad man the power to make evil use. Hence goods of thiskind are termed "potentialities". Such potentialities are undoubtedly good things(since in each case the touchstone is the use made of them by the good man and notby the bad)....'



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defined by the end it effects and the time it lasts. And even the manywould agree, not in consequence of results only, but in the same wayas in the case of a drink they call it sweeter — a drink fails to be sweeternot because of its result but because its pleasantness is not continuous,although at first it quite takes one in. (£E VII 2,1238a27-31)

If the point holds in general, then goods απλώς are not goods whichare sometimes good for the good person and at other times not, but theyare permanently good for someone in the good person's condition. Thismarks the first sharp contrast between Aristotle's and Protagoras'saccounts of goods, for, according to Protagoras, what is good for anindividual is just whatever is good for that individual at a given time,this being constituted by whatever appears good to that individual atthat particular time.

In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle says:

Things good are some of them απλώς good, others good τινι but notαπλώς; and the same things are απλώς good and απλώς pleasant. Forthings advantageous for a healthy body we say are good for the bodyαπλώς, but things good for the sick body not — for example, doses ofmedicine and surgical operations; and likewise also the things pleasantfor a healthy and perfect body are pleasant for the body απλώς, e.g., tolive in the light and not in the dark, although the reverse is the case fora man with opthalmia. (££ VII2,1235b32-8)

The context here makes it clear that what is F απλώς is what is F forthe body and not what is F in the view of someone in a particularcondition. If what is good for the healthy and perfect body is good forthe body απλώς, presumably too what is good for the good person iswhat is good for human beings απλώς. There is therefore no reason tothink that on Aristotle's view what is good απλώς is merely constitutedby what seems good to someone in the appropriate condition, or thatwhat is good τινι is necessarily just what seems good to that person.Things can be good for a person whatever his view of the matter. Thismarks another important difference between the views of Aristotle andProtagoras, for what is good απλώς is what is good for the good humanbeing, not just what is good in his view.

Third, the distinction which Aristotle draws between what is goodαπλώς and what is good τινι is not merely a linguistic distinction, i.e., adistinction about what we say. According to Aristotle, it reflects adistinction which exists in the world, independently of any human




conventions: The απλώς goods are not goods by convention, but arenatural goods.13 In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle says, 'By nature thingsαπλώς good are good for a human being' (££ VII 2, 1237a4-5). Furtheron, he comments, 'Now a good man (αγαθός) is one for whom the naturalgoods are goods' (EE VIII 3, 1248b25-6), and in the Nicomachean EthicsAristotle says that an excellent friend would seem to be choiceworthyby nature for the excellent person, 'for, as we have said, what is good bynature is good and pleasant in itself for an excellent person' (NE IX 9,1170al3-16).

According to Aristotle, then, there is more to the natural goods thantheir simply appearing good to the good person. Finally, there is alsomore to the natural goods than their being good for the good personhimself. In the Politics, Aristotle says (about the sort of natural goodswhich may not be good for everyone), 'It has been established in theethical works that the good man is the man of such a character thatbecause of his virtue the απλώς goods are goods for him', and he adds;'It is clear that his employment of these goods must also be excellent andfine απλώς' (Pol VII13,1332a22f). In the hands of the good person, then,the use of the natural goods is good. Since it is the mark of the goodperson to act virtuously, presumably, he will often use his natural goodsto help others too. By contrast, the bad person, who uses the same goodsincorrectly, will not only be doing himself harm in exacerbating his badcharacter, but will not be doing anyone else any good either.14 In thegood person's hands, then, the natural goods such as wealth and officeare not goods exclusively for himself. Similarly, the virtues, whichbenefit the good person who exhibits them, will also bring good toothers.15

13 John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, 127, and A. Kenny, The AristotelianEthics: A Study of the Relationship between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics ofAristotle (Oxford Clarendon Press 1978), 65, also treat the απλώς goods and thenatural goods as the same.

14 cf. MM II 3, 1199b6-9: '... the goods which he [sc. the unjust man] chooses and forwhich he commits injustice are απλώς good, not what are good for him. For wealthand power are good απλώς, but for him presumably they are not good, for byobtaining wealth and power he will do much evil to himself and to his friends, forhe will not be able to make right use of his power.'

15 Here, I do not intend to suggest that 'good απλώς' means 'good for other people '



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Aristotle says that the political philosopher is the 'ruling architect ofthe end which we refer to in calling something απλώς bad or good' (NEVII12,1152b). We are also told that the end of political science is humangood which is the good of the individual and the good of the state (NE12). What is good απλώς, then, is not simply good for the individual goodhuman being, but is good in a broader context too.

A crucial point which Aristotle makes about the απλώς goods is thatwe should pray not for the απλώς goods but that the απλώς goods shouldbe good for us (NE V 1,1129b4-7). Presumably, he means that each of usshould wish to be in the condition in which these goods would be goodsfor us. This suggests that even if there were no good people around, thenatural goods would not cease to be naturally good for human beings.They would still be goods for which it would be worth an individualgetting into the state in which they were good for him. In this sense, theywould still be really good.

According to Aristotle, then, it is clearly best to be in a condition inwhich one can appreciate and have the απλώς goods. This explains whyAristotle says that

that which is good απλώς is more worthy of choice than that which isgood τινι, e.g., the enjoyment of health than a surgical operation; forthe former is good απλώς, the latter is good only τινι, namely, for theman who requires an operation. (Top III 1,116b8-10)

In the Politics, Aristotle explains that punishments and so on areonly good εξ υποθέσεως and not απλώς. Presumably, he means thatthese things are only good on the assumption that there will be somebad people in the State. It would be better if such measures were notneeded at all (Pol VII3,1332allf). I assume that he thinks that the samegoes for whatever remedial treatment is good for the bad person. Thiswill not be απλώς good, because it would be better if it did not provenecessary.

Aristotle's account of the απλώς goods therefore goes beyond any-thing which could be accounted for by the more Protagorean version ofthe measure doctrine.16 On Aristotle's account, what is good απλώς is

16 Whether or not one can reconstruct a 'quasi-realist' position from a Protagoreanstandpoint lies beyond the scope of this paper.




not good απλώς simply because it appears good to the good person. Onthe contrary, what is good απλώς seems good to the good personprecisely because it really is good for a human being.

Clearly, Aristotle means to give a non-Protagorean account of goods.The question, then, is whether the analogies Aristotle draws in settingout his measure doctrine in book three of the Nicomachean Ethics areappropriate for expressing this non-Protagorean account.

6 The analogy between goods andhealthy things

As we have seen, Ackrill raises two problems for a non-Protagoreaninterpretation of the analogy which Aristotle draws between goods andhealthy things.17 First, Ackrill says that Aristotle seems to be confusingtwo contrasts (the contrast between really F and apparently F and thecontrast between F to (or for) normal people and F to (or for) an abnormalperson). Second, Ackrill complains that Aristotle seems to be denyingthat a gruel diet is really good for the invalid (and therefore that what isgood for the bad person is really good for him).

One way of dealing with these problems is to translate all the Greekdatives by 'to' rather than by 'for', and to take the healthy things whichAristotle refers to to be healthy activities and not things like opera-tions, diet and so on. Perhaps then, Aristotle is thinking of the follow-ing sort of case — the case of the sick person who does not think thathe needs much exercise. As a result of this mistaken view about whatis healthy, the sick person takes little exercise. He therefore becomeslethargic, and, in this state, he sees even less point in exercising, and sobecomes even more lethargic and so on. Here, sickness and having thewrong view about what is healthy for oneself clearly go together. If thisis the kind of case which Aristotle has in mind, the analogy is apt, forthe bad person and this kind of sick person are exactly analogous ineach having a faulty view of their own good in cases where their viewsdiffer from those of the healthy and good person. Moreover, just as thesick person's view of what is healthy and his sickness reinforce one

17 J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Ethics, 251



40 Paula Gottlieb

another, so do the bad person's view of what is good, and his badcharacter.18

The problem with the above suggestion is that it is only plausible onthe dubious assumptions that the datives must be read to mean 'to'throughout and that the class of healthy things is very restricted. Tomake sense of this passage, then, we need to read the datives in (2) as'for', as does Ackrill, so that Aristotle is saying that really healthythings are healthy for the person in sound physical condition whileother things (ετέρα) are healthy for the invalid (just as the object ofwish can be one thing for the good person and another for the badperson). When Aristotle says that the good person sees the truth, musthe be implying, as Ackrill suggests, that a gruel diet is not really goodfor the invalid?

The answer is, No, if we suppose that Aristotle takes the measure tobe the measure of the απλώς goods which I discussed earlier. The pointabout the απλώς goods is that they are really good in the sense that it isworth getting in the condition in which they are good for oneself. Bycontrast, what is good for the bad person is not really good in this sensesince, although it is really good for the person in a bad state, it would notbe worth getting in a bad state in order to enjoy what would be good forone then, i.e., remedial treatment.

Similarly, then, Aristotle need not be denying that a gruel diet is reallygood for the invalid. All he need be claiming is that the gruel diet is notreally good for human beings in the sense that it would not be worthbecoming ill simply to benefit from a gruel diet. (By contrast, exercise isreally good in that it would be worth getting well in order to benefit fromit.)

Therefore, the non-Protagorean interpretation of Aristotle's measuredoctrine can stand and Ackrill's complaint can be answered. The moralof the measure doctrine is that if we want to know what is really good,i.e., really good for human beings without qualification, in cases wheregood and bad people have conflicting views of the matter, we shouldlook at what is good for the good person, just as, when we want to knowwhat is healthy for human beings without qualification, we should lookat what is healthy for the healthy human being.

18 Cf. NE VI 1,1129al4-5 on what is healthy.




The way Aristotle puts his view may seem confused, especially sincehe shifts from discussing what is good for someone to a conclusion aboutwhat is good to someone, the excellent person. However, the shift isvalid in the case of the good person, since what is good for him is alsogood to him.

7 The analogy between goods and perceptualqualities

The question remains whether the arguments for a Protagorean inter-pretation of the analogy between goods and perceptual qualities in NEIII 4 and in Metaph IV 5 are conclusive. They are not.

First, Aristotle's comments in Metaph IV 5 are also compatible with anon-Protagorean interpretation. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle seemed tobe arguing that both the healthy person and the sick person are rightabout the qualities they perceive when, for example, they taste the samewine. The sick person really does perceive bitterness, while the healthyperson really does perceive sweetness: but the sick person, unlike thehealthy person, is wrong about the wine. The wine is not really bitter.

The resultant view is compatible not only with a Protagorean inter-pretation but also with the following alternative interpretation: Eachperson is right about the perceptual quality he or she perceives, but onlythe healthy person is right about its bearer. Since the wine is really sweet(no matter what anyone thinks of the matter), the property which thesick person perceives presumably belongs to something else, e.g., mois-ture in his tongue.19 The important difference between this and theProtagorean interpretation is that what is really sweet is not constitutedby how it seems to the healthy person. Nor is what is sweet for theunhealthy person merely caused by what he happens to think.

This line of interpretation, like its Protagorean rival, can be supportedfrom elsewhere in the Corpus. In the Categories (7bl5f), in the early booksof de Anima and in the bulk of de Sensu, Aristotle gives a realist accountof perceptual qualities according to which colours and other perceptualqualities are external to the perceiver and can exist unperceived.

19 Seede/lnII10,422b8.



42 Paula Gottlieb

A further point clinches the non-Protagorean interpretation of WE III4. Aristotle's account of the infallibility of the senses only applies to thespecial sensibles. Heaviness is not a special sensible, and since it is onlythe thesis of the special sensibles which seems to commit Aristotle to theProtagorean viewpoint, the fact that Aristotle uses heaviness in hisanalogy tells against a Protagorean construal.

Aristotle's measure doctrine, then, runs as follows: The good humanbeing, the measure, has the correct view of what is really good for humanbeings, and he also has the correct view of wha t is good for himself sincewhat is good for human beings is the same as what is good for a goodperson such as himself. The bad human being, however, has an unreli-able view of what is really good for human beings. Sometimes he willwish for things which are not good for anyone. At other times he maywish for things that are good for the good person, but are not good forhimself.20 According to Aristotle, then, whenever the good person andthe bad person disagree over what is good for human beings and why,it is the good person who detects the truth.

8 The role of character

We are now in a position to understand EN III 4,1113a31. Literally, theline says that according to each state of character, there are one's specialfine and pleasant things. According to the more Protagorean version ofthe measure doctrine, this means that fine and pleasant things areconstituted by one's character (and presumably the same applies togoods).

However, according to the non-Protagorean version of the measuredoctrine, this is wrong: Aristotle's point is not that fine and pleasantthings are constituted by someone's character, but, rather, that whetheror not things seem fine and pleasant to a person is a function of thatperson's character. Line 31 means that each character has its own specialview of what is fine, pleasant, and so on. It does not mean that whetheror not things are fine and pleasant depends solely on an individual's

20 Cf. MM II3,1199bl-4, the unjust person 'knows that supreme power, and rule andauthority are απλώς good, but he still does not know whether for him they are goodor not, or when they are good and under what conditions (πώς διακειμένω).



Anstotle and Protagoras 43

character. If that were the case, the person in a bad condition would beright about what was good and fine. However, according to Aristotle,the bad person may be wrong about what is good without qualification,and he may be wrong about what is good for himself.

According to Aristotle, the good person has the correct view of goods,not because his character constitutes what is good, but because havingthe right sort of character is a necessary condition for having the appro-priate sensitivities and cognitive ability to detect what is really good.Aristotle explains this more clearly as follows:

[φρόνησις] this eye of the soul, cannot reach its fully developed statewithout virtue, as we have said and as is clear. For inferences aboutactions have an origin: 'Since the [highest] end and the best good aresuch and such', whatever it actually is ... And this is apparent only tothe good person; for vice perverts us and produces false views aboutthe origins of actions. (NE VI12,1144a29-36)

According to Aristotle, then, our characters are responsible for howthings appear to us. If they are bad or defective, they prevent us fromdeveloping the cognitive ability to detect the truth. In that case, theymake things appear differently from how they really are. In that respect,they are like our sense-organs:

The same thing never appears sweet to some and the opposite of sweetto others, unless in the one case the sense-organ which discriminatesthe aforesaid flavours has been perverted and injured. And if this isthe case, the one party must be taken to be the measure, and the othernot. And I say the same of good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, andall other such qualities. (Metaph XI6,1063al-6)

Aristotle often points out that the good person's use of certain goods(those goods which are called 'potentialities' in the Magna Moralia)makes them good (for himself and for others). These goods withoutqualification are good for the good person because he uses them in thecorrect way, and he uses them in the correct way because he has a certaincharacter. Thus, it may be objected, the good person's character does notjust affect how things appear to him, but also how things are for him.

However, this, though true, does not show that the good person'scharacter constitutes how things are. True, the goods without qualifica-tion are good for the good person because he has a certain character.However, they are not good for the good person simply because he



44 Paula Gottlieb

thinks they are good, or because that is how they appear to him. Nor arethey good for him simply because he has a certain character. He mustalso make use of them in a particular way. Action, not mere thinking, isessential.

The unqualified goods are really good for the good person and forhuman beings, regardless of the good person's opinion. If a good personchanges his mind about these goods, this would show that his characterhas deteriorated and not that the unqualified goods have changed.Aristotle's measure doctrine is therefore far from Protagorean.

9 Conclusion

Aristotle's measure doctrine, applied to goods, is the doctrine that thegood human being is the measure of what is really good for humanbeings independently of his view of the matter. According to Aristotle,the measure's views do not constitute what is good for human beings;they accurately detect it.

Aristotle uses two analogies when presenting his own measure doc-trine, an analogy between goods and perceptual qualities, and an anal-ogy between goods and healthy things. At first sight, the analogybetween goods and healthy things seems problematic. However, it doesnot commit Aristotle to the counterintuitive claim that what is healthyfor the sick person is not really healthy for the sick person, nor to the claimthat what is good for the bad person is not really good for the bad person.

Furthermore, the analogy between the good person as the measureof goods and the healthy perceiver as the measure of perceptual qualitiessupports a non-Protagorean interpretation, so long as Aristotle is relyingon a non-Protagorean account of perceptual qualities to draw the anal-ogy. Such an account is not hard to find; Aristotle gives at least one suchaccount in the Corpus. More important, Aristotle's list of analogousperceptual qualities includes one which is not amenable to Protagoreantreatment on either of Aristotle's theories of perception.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle says:

Protagoras says "man is the measure of all things" as if he had said"the man who knows" or "the man who perceives"; and these becausethey have respectively knowledge and perception, which we say arethe measures of objects. Such thinkers are saying nothing outrageousthen, while they appear to be saying something extraordinary. (MetaphXI1,1053a35-1053b3)




This is certainly a tongue-in-cheek version of Protagoras's measuredoctrine, but, if I am right, it is an excellent description of Aristotle's ownview.21

Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison

5185 Helen C. White Hall600 N. Park Street

Madison, Wl 53706U.S.A.

21 An ancestral version of portions of this paper was read to audiences at CornellUniversity, Duke University and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The presentpaper has benefitted as a result. I should like to thank G. Fine, D. Lyons, N. Sturgeonand, most recently, T.M.I. Penner and R.A. Shiner for helpful written criticisms andsuggestions. I am also grateful to the following for helpful discussion of the issuesraised in this paper: J. Gentzler, D. Moran, P. Railton, R. Miller, J. Moore, S. Sauv£,M. Condyks, S. Sullivan and H. Newell. Most of all I should like to thank T.H. Irwinfor numerous thought-provoking comments and helpful criticisms on a host ofprevious drafts





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Aristotle and Protagoras: The Good Human Being as the Measure of Goods

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