Aristotle’s Conception of Truth: An Alternative View

Aristotle’s Conception of Truth: An Alternative View

Blake Hestir

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 51, Number 2, April 2013,pp. 193-222 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University PressDOI: 10.1353/hph.2013.0042

For additional information about this article

Access provided by Mount Allison University Libraries (24 Sep 2013 16:03 GMT)

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v051/51.2.hestir.html

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v051/51.2.hestir.html

Aristotle’s Conception of Truth: An Alternative View

B l A k e H e s T i r *

1 . i n t r o d u c t i o n

Aristotle famously proclaims at Metaphysics G.7, 1011b26 –27:

To men gar legein to on mê einai ê to mê on einai pseudos, to de to on einai kai to mê on mê einai alêthes, . . .

Aristotle is inclined to think of this as a definition of truth and falsehood;1 we are inclined to wonder what he means by it. Perhaps a reasonable approximation in english would amount to something like:

Tdf : For to state [of] that which is [that] it is not or [of] that which is not [that] it is [is] false, and [to state of] that which is [that] it is and [of] that which is not [that] it is not [is] true.

Many have considered this to be the expression of a correspondence theory of truth, and so it is tempting to smooth out the grammar by rephrasing it:

For to state of that which is the case that it is not the case or of that which is not the case that it is the case is false, and to state of that which is the case that it is the case and of that which is not the case that it is not the case is true.

This translation treats ‘to on’ and ‘to mê on’ veridically, and so provides a definition suggesting that statements are true because they state that some state of affairs is as that state of affairs really is. in other words, true statements are true because they correspond in some sense to states of affairs that obtain. i take this to be the “standard view” on Aristotle’s “theory” of truth because it is widely held, though in widely varying degrees.2

* Blake Hestir is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas Christian University.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 51, no. 2 (2013) 193–222

[193]

1 Met. G.7, 1011b25, 1012b7–11. see ross, Metaphysics, 284–85. This definition of truth is presum-ably one in a rough sense, general enough to be acceptable to the opponent.

2 Perhaps see Ammonius, On Int. 21:9–13, where he employs ‘schesei’ and ‘epharmosei.’ Cf. Aquinas, On Int. in the contemporary world, see for example Brentano, “On the Concept of Truth”; ross, Aristotle ; Ackrill, Cat. and De Int.; kahn, Verb ‘Be’ ; Thorp, “Aristotle on Being and Truth”; irwin, First Principles;

194 journal of the h istory o f phi lo so phy 51 :2 apr i l 2013

i should come clean right away and say that i consider the idea that truth depends on the world to be a completely plausible way of understanding truth. But, correspondence theories face a variety of challenges. Part of the concern is whether there must be some entity in the world to which a truth corresponds, or whether every truth has a truthmaker like a fact or state of affairs, or whether truth requires a specific dependence relation between mind-independent entities and true statements or thoughts, and if so what that relation amounts to.3

Aristotle thinks truth directly depends on being. He is by no means the first to think so. in the Sophist, Plato presents a conception of truth that characterizes truth as dependent upon being: a true statement states of the things that are that they are and a false statement states of the things that are not that they are (Soph. 263b4–8), etc. This statement has also struck some scholars as the embodiment of a correspondence theory of truth. F. M. Cornford’s comment on the passage is representative: “The [true] statement as a whole is complex and its structure corresponds to the structure of the fact. Truth means this correspondence.”4

i argue there is an alternative case to be made that Aristotle’s conception of truth does not depend on correspondence in most cases (thoughts, statements, judgments), but not all (simple, primary thoughts of incomposites like essences where truth looks to be identity of intelligible form [strong resemblance with metaphysical implications, e.g. De An. iii.4–5, 7; Met. Q.10] or likeness [weak resemblance] if the content of thought is a likeness of the universal [De Int. 1; see section 2.2 below]), and so he is not committed to a correspondence theory in the way some think about correspondence. One approach to unpacking Metaphysics 1011b26–27 is to examine his conceptions of truth and meaning as they emerge in the Categories, De Interpretatione, and De Anima. in these works, Aristotle’s remarks are consistent with a more minimal conception of truth similar to Plato’s concep-tion in the Sophist. Despite the fact that Plato and Aristotle are hardline realists, in some respects their conceptions of truth prefigure contemporary conceptions that purport to be theoretically less burdensome than robust correspondence theories and that capture our everyday understanding of truth.

The evidence for my view is as follows. There are good reasons why Aristotle frequently couches his discussion of truth in terms of linguistic statements. Aristotle clearly thinks language and thought are closely related. Both are tied to judgment and naturally emerge together in the cognitive development of humans, and are intentional insofar as assertions purport to indicate something. Aristotle claims that the components of language are signs and symbols of the components of thought. And Aristotle seems in places to follow Plato in thinking that (complex)

Whitaker, Contradiction; szaif, Platons Begriff der Wahrheit; cf. szaif, “Wahrheitsbegriffs”; Pritzl, “Being True”; Wheeler, “semantics” and “Truth” (with qualifications); Modrak, Meaning ; De rijk, Semantics and Ontology; künne, Truth (with qualifications); Crivelli, Aristotle on Truth (see 131 n. 9 for a more extensive list of citations); lewis, “Predication.” On the other side, see for example Campbell, Truth and Historicity; David, Correspondence; Davidson, “Folly”; Hestir, “Plato’s Sophist”; and Barnes, Truth, Etc.

3 see David, Correspondence, 6, and ch. 2; Alston, Truth, 32–33; Merricks, Truth and Ontology, chs. 1, 8; and “Truth and Freedom,” 29–30, 41–42; künne, Truth, 93–112.

4 Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, 311.

195aristotle ’ s co n cepti o n o f tr u th

thought is something like silent speech.5 if this is true then an examination of thought should reveal something about language, and likewise an examination of language can reveal something about thought. specifically, aside from content issues, i argue that because of the unique relation between language and thought, an investigation of language can reveal something about the structure of thought (syntactic structure) and an investigation of thought can reveal something about the functionality of language (semantic functionality).

some of these results have important implications. Aristotle’s conception of truth does not require—and neither does he plainly say —that either (a) there be some ontological entity in the world like a fact to which true thoughts or statements correspond, or (b) there be a specific universal dependence relation that holds between truths and ontological entities. in fact, although Aristotle is committed to the view that truth and falsity involve combination and separation at both the noetic/linguistic (thought/language) and ontic levels, i argue that neither a mirroring relation nor a specific type of causal connection like a truthmaking relation,6 nor even an isomorphic or “agreement” relation between states of af-fairs and statements or complex thoughts, is necessary for instances of them to be true. Combination and separation at the noetic/linguistic level are required for truthbearing; combination and separation at the ontic level are required for “truthmaking.” But Aristotle’s commitment to realism and some notion of truth-maker does not entail that he is committed to a correspondence theory of truth, since truth is not defined as a specific relation between a state of affairs that obtains or an entity such as a fact and true assertions about it.7

in the end some may find that my interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of truth looks suspiciously correspond-ish. That is fine, as long as one understands in what respect.8

2 . l a n g u a g e , t h o u g h t , a n d r e a l i t y

Aristotle mostly explains truth in terms of statements. Why? it will be useful to have a closer look at what he says about truth in the Categories and De Interpretatione, but in order to get in a position to do this, there are two pressing interrelated inter-pretational issues to consider regarding his vague remarks about signification. This path is well worn but an obvious one to take; hopefully a scenic cul-de-sac for some.

At De Interpretatione 16b26, Aristotle defines logos as “a significant spoken sound some part of which is significant in separation.” shortly thereafter he claims that all

5 For example in Plato see Tht. 189e4–a10; Soph. 263b3–5; Phlb. 38c5–39a7; and perhaps also Phdr. 276a5–7; Aristotle, De Int. 16b9–18, 23a32, 24b1; APo. 76b25; De An. 427b11–14, 428a22–24; De Sen. 437a4–17; Met. G.4, 1006b8–9; and EN 1139b15, 1142b13–14.

6 Armstrong claims, “The notion of truthmaker may be traced right back to Aristotle;” see Truth and Truthmakers, 14–15, 128–29.

7 see David, Correspondence, 18 n.1; Merricks, Truth, chs. 1–2, 8. Cf. lynch, Truth, ch. 2.8 see lynch, True to Life, 11. One potentially interesting implication of this interpretation is that

it leaves open the possibility that although Aristotle thinks truth involves being —that being is some-how what unifies and thereby provides the necessary foundation for the possibility of truth (Met. G.2, 1003a32)—he can potentially accommodate sundry ways of explaining truth within other subjects, including ethics, mathematics, and science. On my view then, Aristotle’s conception of truth would have significant explanatory value.


statements are significant, though “not every [logos] is a statement-making [logos], but only those in which there is truth or falsity” (De Int. 17a2–3). Logoi with truth values are either affirmations or negations, and Aristotle claims that “a single af-firmation or negation is one which signifies one [thing] about one [thing; hê hen kath’ henos sêmainousa]” (De Int. 18a12–13; cf. APr. 24a16–7). For example, the statement ‘Theaetetus is sitting’ signifies sitting about or of Theaetetus.

in De Interpretatione 1, Aristotle specifies further syntactic and semantic condi-tions that must be met for the possibility of truth:

For falsity and truth have to do with combination [sunthêsin] and separation [diaresin]. Thus names and verbs by themselves—for instance ‘man’ or ‘white’ when nothing further is added—are like [eoike] the thoughts [noêmati] that are without combination and separation; for so far they are neither true nor false. A sign of this is that even ‘goat-stag’ signifies [sêmainei] something but not, as yet, anything true or false—un-less ‘is’ or ‘is not’ [to einai ê to mê einai] is added (either simply or with reference to time).9 (De Int. 16a12–18)

single words cannot be true or false. statements require combinations of verbs and nouns, and they signify that properties hold of subjects. The proper syntactic “combining” of verbs and nouns is required in order for statements to state, and anything that manages to state or assert will have a truth value.

Aristotle’s account of signification has been understood by some to constitute a theory of meaning, and i am not against thinking of it as such.10 i will borrow an expression: Aristotle’s account of meaning is a particular type of “dog-legged” semantic theory wherein a word is reinterpreted into another medium like an idea or thought that plays an intermediate functional role in meaning.11 The central passage to this interpretation occurs at De Interpretatione 16a3–8:

spoken words are symbols [sumbola] of affections in the soul [tôn en têi psuchêi pathê-matôn], and written words [are symbols] of spoken words. And just as written letters [are] not the same for all humans, neither [are] spoken words. But what these primarily12 [are] signs of [sêmeia], the affections of the soul, [are] the same for all, as also are those things [pragmata] of which the same [affections are] likenesses [homoiômata]. (see also 23a32 and 24b1–2.)

individual verbal and written words are conventional symbols of affections (pathê-mata) that are natural likenesses (homoiômata) of things (pragmata) and presumably

9 All translations are generally based on the CWA translations and the following: Ackrill, Cat. and De Int.; Barnes, Posterior Analytics ; and smith, Topics. Modifications are merely for the sake of consistency across works and to emphasize relevant nuance.

10 The evidence here looks promising: Bolton, “semantic Theory,” and “Aristotle on the significa-tion of Names”; Charles, “Aristotle on Names and Their signification,” 37–73, and Meaning ; shields, Homonomy, ch. 3; Modrak, Meaning ; Wheeler, “semantics”; and Carson, “Aristotle on Meaning and reference.” On the other side, see kretzmann, “spoken sound”; irwin, “signification,” and Polansky and kuczewsky, “speech.” A different line is taken by Di Mattei, “symbols.”

11 Blackburn, Spreading the Word, ch. 2. 12 Here reading ‘prôtôn.’ Other texts have ‘prôtôs,’ some ‘prôton.’ There is considerable debate

whether ‘prôtôn’ qualifies ‘pathêmata,’ ‘sêmeia,’ or ‘graphomena’/‘grammata’/‘phônai’ (words). i take it with ‘pathêmata,’ but with qualifications (see below). see Whitaker (Contradiction, 18–23), who follows Ammonius in De Int.; cf. kretzmann, “spoken sound”; Belardi, “riconsiderando”; Pépin, “De Int. et Pol.”; and Walz, “Opening.” However, i agree in part with those who think names have a unique rela-tion to cognitive entities in addition to the conventional relation. i argue this below.


constitute the content of thoughts. so, the written word ‘dog’ is a symbol of the spoken word ‘dog,’ and this in turn is a symbol of the content of the thought dog, which is the same for anyone who has the thought because the affection of dog that becomes the content of the thought is a “likeness”13 of the form dog (the pragma or intentional object one might say),14 which spends its time in actual dogs chasing squirrels. Additionally Aristotle claims that words are not only symbols of pathêmata but also signs (sêmeia) of them, in the sense that they refer directly to them.

2.1. Direct and Indirect Signification

There are a variety of interpretational issues to raise at this point. The two perti-nent to this project are the following. First, Aristotle makes conflicting remarks about the nature and direction of signification. in some places he says that words follow the indirect, dog-legged path to the world, yet in a number of other places he suggests that words refer directly to something non-mental and non-linguistic, which one might expect him to say since he thinks that thought becomes its object and language is another vehicle for the content of thought. But there is a story to tell. second, i am assuming that affections constitute in some sense the content of thought, but Aristotle says nothing directly to that effect. scholars have had a lot to say about it. What sort of relation, if any, is there between pathêma (affection) and thought? i will take these issues in order, although my sketch of a response to the latter is instrumental to resolving the former.

The claim that statements signify “one [thing] about one [thing]” (18a12–13) is ambiguous. The central passage seems to leave Aristotle in the position of denying that words such as ‘dog’ and ‘kuôn’ refer directly to dogs; they do so only indirectly, “mediated” by the content of thoughts. However, there are other passages where Aristotle seems to think that words can refer directly to the world. For example, at Categories 1b25–27, Aristotle claims, “Of the things said without combination, each signifies [sêmainei] either a substance or quality or qualification or a relative or where or when. . . .” so, the things said without combination (presumably here “words” like ‘dog’ and ‘sits’) signify some subject or property falling within one of the real-world predications (see also Cat. 5b27, 10a18; and De Int. 16b8–32).

The tendency toward direct signification recurs in Topics 7, where Aristotle considers different ways ‘same’ is used. He discusses the phenomenon of referring to the same person by either a name or a description of an accidental feature, as when someone shouts, “Yes, you in the back row”: “we change it [the way of call-ing someone] . . . and tell him to call to us ‘the one sitting’ or ‘the one talking.’ Obviously believing the same [thing] to be signified [sêmainein] by the name as by the accident” (103a37–39). Here the name and description directly signify the same thing, the person.

13 Or “likenedness” or “liken-ness.” Cf. Charles, Meaning, 114–15; and Walz, “Opening,” 231–33. Polansky and kuczewski (“speech”) also employ “likened.” Polansky (De Anima) takes this farther; see, for example, 246–49. i take ‘homoiômata’ in the weaker sense of “likenesses.”

14 lewis’s interpretation treats the affections as “sentences of the language, lt, of thought . . .”; see lewis, “Predication,” 355–59, 356 n. 12; cf. too Walz, “Opening.” i remain unconvinced that this is the proper reading, for reasons associated with my understanding of thought (see section 2.4) and pragma (see section 3.3).


in the De Interpretatione, Aristotle claims that a verb is “always a sign of what holds, that is, holds of a subject [hupokeimenou]” (De Int. 16b9–10). The expres-sion ‘to hupokeimenon’ (“that which underlies”) in this context is Aristotle’s term for a subject, and it is of these subjects that other things are predicated. Aristotle attempts to explain, contra Plato et al., that the hupokeimena are those entities that constitute the fundamental furniture of the world, the primary beings or substances (Cat. 2b15–17, 3b10–23; De Int. 16b19–25; cf. Cat. 12b5–16, 14a6–14; and Met. k.9, 1065b30–31).15 if Aristotle is consistent in his use of ‘hupokeimenon’ across these works, one obvious way to interpret his remarks in De Interpretatione 3 about verbs is as directly signifying something about what hold of real-world subjects (cf. De Int. 17a17–24; and Soph. El. 165a6–8), rather than as following the indirect path.

if this is the correct line, there is a competing interpretation of signification: a word like ‘dog’ directly signifies the form dog (or an instance of it) in the external world. And a verb like ‘runs’ not only signifies the property (universal) of running but when combined makes a direct indication; the verb ‘to be’ when the proper linguistic entities are combined signifies some mode of being in the external world, and combination is there to be thought.

Aristotle then is committed to at least two sorts of signification:

1. indirect: words (nouns, verbs) are symbols for and signs of affections in the soul that are likenesses of pragmata, and so words are indirect signs of pragmata.

2. Direct: words are direct signs of pragmata.

1 and 2 outwardly look incompatible. One response is to suppose that in places where Aristotle discusses the semantic functionality of words in terms of direct reference to the world, he is simply assuming indirect or mediate signification and employing a short-handed way of discussing what words do.16 Another way is to suppose that Aristotle collectively employs the nouns ‘sumbolon’ and ‘sêmeion’ and the associated verb ‘sêmainein’ in radically different ways throughout the texts. The latter is plausible but less charitable since it saddles Aristotle with vagueness or worse. Yet in light of Aristotle’s emphasis on language in these contexts, the former approach seems a bit strong.

On purely philosophical grounds, Aristotle must have it both ways: assuming he stands by his later remarks that the universal is somehow replicated in the soul, if a word is a sign of the universal in the soul, it necessarily is a sign of the universal present in the world because they are the same universal, and so words signify directly. However, this fact alone is not sufficient to explain how words acquire their meaning.

There is a way to reconcile 1 and 2 while capturing Aristotle’s understanding of how words function. since Aristotle begins the discussion of De Interpretatione by declaring that spoken words are symbols, the road to reconciliation involves how

15 Cf. Met. Z.3, 1028b36–1029b1, but APo. 73b8–9. 16 see Ammonius, On Int. 17:24–30. On the contemporary front, see Modrak, Meaning, pts. 1,

3, 4; Charles, Meaning, 80–87; and Wheeler, “semantics,” 192–226. Also cf. Charles, Meaning, ch. 4.


Aristotle uses ‘sumbolon.’17 How, and to what degree, does Aristotle conceptualize words as symbols of pathêmata? There is an answer to this question; it involves the relation between language, thought, and pathêma—thus the need for a detour through the second interpretational issue.

2.2. From Pathêmata to Noêmata via Phantasia

There is no question that Aristotle (and Plato for that matter) thinks there is a close connection between language and thought. At De Interpretatione 16a9–15, Aristotle claims that words by themselves (i.e. not taken as elliptical or context-dependent expressions) are like (eoike) individual thoughts (noêmata) in that they lack combination (being) or separation (not being), and so are neither true nor false. My utterances or inscriptions of ‘dog,’ ‘sits’ and my thoughts dog, sits are by themselves neither true nor false. reading 16a9–16 with 16b19–21 (esp. “the speaker arrests his thought and the hearer pauses”) as well as 23a32–35 and 24b1–2 suggests that words are not only relevantly similar to thoughts in some respects, but that there is some substantive relation between them beyond that of signification.

One wonders though what Aristotle means by introducing noêmata in the con-text of a discussion of pathêmata and words, or why he did not focus exclusively on noêmata since thinking and judging involve combination and separation of thoughts. Perhaps words are signs and symbols of thoughts because they are signs and symbols of pathêmata and these are what ultimately provide the content for thoughts, but the path from pathêmata to noêmata is not one he considers there. On the other hand, maybe there is not a path. some scholars at least back to Ammo-nius (On Int. 24:10–13) seem to assume Aristotle thinks pathêmata just are noêmata.

elsewhere Aristotle maintains that our cognitive states are connected to the perceptible world. For example, at Posterior Analytics 100a3–11, he claims that the principle of skill or knowledge comes about “from all the universal which has come to rest in the soul” (a6–7), and “the states [i.e. memory, experience, skill, understanding] neither belong in us in a determinate form, nor come about from other states that are more cognitive; but [they come about] from perception” (a10–11); and he claims, “[T]hough one perceives the particular, perception is of the universal—e.g. of man but not of Callias the man” (APo. 100a16–b1; see too De An. 417b21–24, 429a15–18, 429b5–6, 430a2–3, and 431b26–32a6). His remark in the De Interpretatione that the pathêma is a likeness of the universal features of pragmata and as such common to all and his view in the De Anima that thought takes on or becomes the universal suggest that thoughts and pathêmata are identical.

On the other hand, since Aristotle does not ascribe the same characteristics to thought, and he acknowledges that there is a perceptual route to thought, it seems unlikely that thought and pathêma are strictly identical. A more likely explanation is that pathêmata as likenesses of pragmata somehow supply the content for noêmata.

17 On the relation between sign and symbol, see kretzmann, “spoken sound,” 3–9. i make the distinction between conventional languages and language as such, but see his discussion, “spoken sound,” 16. Cf. Di Mattei, “symbols,” 18. Modrak (Meaning, 20) is critical of kretzmann’s view. see also Bolton, “semantic Theory,” 156; irwin, “signification,” 256 n. 15; and Crivelli, “signification,” 81–100.


The De Interpretatione is silent about how that might happen, but the introduc-tion of phantasia in the De Anima supplies a solution, of sorts. (Whether Aristotle means to refer at 16a8–9 to the De Anima need not be a concern here.) Aristotle there claims, for example, that when the mind “actively attends” (theôrein) to something, it necessarily carries along a phantasma (image, De An. 432a7–9). in the De Anima the best candidate for the content of thought looks to be the phan-tasma. But there are also places where Aristotle relates pathêma and phantasma. For example, at De Anima 403a3–25 ‘pathêmata’ and ‘pathê ’ are treated as synonyms,18 emphasizing the perceptual character of pathêmata, and 427b14–2419 indicates a close relation between phantasia and pathê, as well as between pathêmata and both phantasmata and noêmata.

The introduction of phantasia in the De Anima is intriguing, though the exact details of its function and how it performs it remain controversial. Nevertheless, the general view is fairly straightforward and sufficient to ground a resolution to the puzzle over thought and pathêma. in book iii Aristotle provides an account of the various types of cognitive and perceptual faculties and states, including perception (aisthêsis), thought (nous, noêsis), imagination (phantasia), judgment (hupolêpsis), and belief (doxa), with the bulk of chapter 3 dedicated to distinguish-ing phantasia from the others. Thinking is different from perceiving and is in part imagination and in part judgment (427b28–9, 432a1–6). Aristotle claims thinking “thinks the forms in images” (ta men oun eidê to noêtikon en tois phantasmasi noei, De An. 431b2–3), and that “neither these [i.e. simple thoughts] nor even our other thoughts occur without them [i.e. images], though they necessarily involve them” (De An. 432a12–13; see also De Mem. 449b2–50a15).

Phantasia is “that in virtue of which an image arises for us” (428a1–2), and as such functions as a representational mechanism that is non-identical with either simple perception or thought; it bridges the gap, so to speak, between thought and perception.20 Although phantasia has a perceptual flavor to it, unlike simple perceptions phantasmata have a certain independence from the world (429a4–5). Clearly they must, since one can have mental representations of things without them being perceptually present.21 But neither are phantasmata thoughts, because we can form representations of possible states, conditions, or events (like the sun’s being a foot in diameter), while simultaneously thinking or judging correctly that such states do not obtain.22

since animals have both perception and the ability to represent the particular features of perceptible objects (see De An. 429a6–8), Aristotle makes a further distinction between different types of phantasia: “sensitive imagination [aisthêtikê

18 Cf. Met. E.4, 1028a1.19 reading ‘noesis’ at b17 with most manuscripts rather than ‘phantasia’ with C2, U2, and simpli-

cius’s lemma. see ross, De Anima. 20 see De An. 403a3–16. Aristotle may think that phantasmata have a physical nature to them; see

Wedin, Mind; Caston, “intentionality” and “Phantasia”; and Modrak, Perception, 123–24. For a helpful survey of this issue in relation to perception, and an intriguing alternative, see Caston, “spirit and letter,” 245–316; cf. Frede, “Phantasia,” 292–94.

21 And Aristotle provides reasons involving animals and the “brutes”; see De An. 429a6–8.22 see De An. iii.3, 427a17–b7, 428a20–b9; Met. A.1, 980a22–81a16; and EN 1147b4–5.


phantasia], as we have said, is found in all animals, deliberative imagination [bou-leutikê] only in those that are calculative [logistikos]” (434a5–7; see also 433a9–12). Only animals such as humans who possess reason (logos, also logismos, logistikon, “rational faculty”) can formulate concepts and abstract their thoughts from imme-diate desires and appearances and consider alterative choices of action. Phantasia supplies the content for these abstractions by taking on the sensible properties of the particulars and having the capacity to combine and separate them in complex representations.23 so, it is likely that the phantasmata are necessary conditions for the possibility of thought, but not sufficient, otherwise animals could think, form concepts, and deliberate, too.24

if the pathêma were construed as a thought, it would defeat the role that phan-tasia plays in meaning and obscure Aristotle’s position that phantasia is required for thought and language development (for example, see 420b29–21a6).25 On the other hand, if a pathêma is the same as a phantasma, then the connection between meaning and thought would be threatened because it would suggest that since animals are capable of phantasia to some degree, they have the capacity for thought.

Not surprisingly, Aristotle’s solution involves a distinction between the ways in which the phantasma resembles or represents the world. in the De Memoria (449b32–50a6), Aristotle maintains that in one respect phantasmata resemble external objects by sharing sensible features with them, but in another way resemble them by representing the universal, intelligible features of those objects. since the features of phantasmata possessed in the latter way (i.e. being formally and intel-ligibly like their objects) would be common to all (De Int. 16a6), these universal features can constitute a meaning. Quite plausibly then, a pathêma simply is a phantasma that functions as a meaning as grasped by someone, and this becomes the foundational content of thought.26 Therefore, given that in this way words can be signs and symbols of affections and thoughts, Aristotle can legitimately proceed with a point about assertion and truth.

2.3. The Compatibility of Direct and Indirect Signification

This relationship between thought and language has implications for the issue over the direction of signification. As discussed above, Aristotle proceeds as though language—at least in terms of its semantic functionality—has a direct, privileged relationship with both thought and the world. Moreover, there is reason for think-ing that although Aristotle claims that language is a matter of convention, he sug-gests in places that the relation between language and thought is a bit cozier. This relationship allows language to be a more robust stand-in for thought: language

23 My interpretation is among those that emphasize the empirical nature of Aristotle’s account of concept acquisition. see also Barnes, Posterior Analytics, 259–71; Modrak, Meaning, pt. 3; Hankinson, “Avant nous le déluge,” 42–50; Caston, “spirit and letter,” 299–316. On phantasia’s different functions, see Wedin, Mind, 140–41, 151, and throughout; Modrak, Perception, ch. 4; Caston, “imagination” and “Phantasia” throughout; and scheiter, “Phantasia,” 251–78; cf. sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, 14–17; and in connection with thought, Polansky, De Anima, chs. 3 and 7, especially 499–500.

24 see Wedin, Mind, 158, and his general discussion in ch. 4, 100–159. Cf. EN 1147b3–5. 25 Following Modrak, Meaning, 245–62, which builds on Modrak, Perception.26 i generally agree here with Modrak, Meaning, 256–63, particularly 259–60.


understood as a natural extension of thought receives semantic functionality that is parasitic upon its natural symbolic relation to thought. i argue that Aristotle thinks language broadly construed (language as such) has a “natural” semantic functionality derived from thought despite the conventional form and structure of particular languages.

Aristotle claims in the De Anima that thinking/thought (dianoeisthai; also noein [427b27] and nous [430b6]) does not occur without logos (427b13). Clearly ‘logos’ has a maddening variety of uses, but here it shares the senses of language/speech and reason. When one thinks, judgments are formed and can be expressed in speech (logos). supposing a close similarity between language and thought would certainly not be foreign to Aristotle. He has read Plato. At Sophist 263e3–4, the stranger remarks, “Thought and statement are the same, aren’t they: except the conversation without voice that comes-to-be within the soul, with itself, is just what for us has got the name ‘thought’” (cf. Tht. 189e4–90a10; Phil. 38c5–39a7; and perhaps also Phdr. 276a5–7). This view was not lost on Aristotle: “[i]f names do not signify, conversing [to dialegesthai] with others is eliminated, and also with oneself with respect to the truth” (Met. G.4, 1006b8–9).27 Yet Aristotle goes further, not only emphasizing the closeness of the association of thought and speech, but also the naturalness of the association, particularly evident in his remarks about linguis-tic and cognitive development, where he suggests some degree of codependency between language and thought.28 Animals are capable of making sound, though expressions of sound in voice by themselves do not constitute having a language. language develops naturally in humans because of its importance for cognitive development: “similarly a child begins by calling all men father, and all women mother, but later distinguishes each of them” (Phys. 184b12–13).29 Family issues aside, words give us something to hang on to.30 Although this is not a conclusive claim that language is definitive of being a human, he certainly thinks that it is distinctive, and not simply of a human’s function, but of a general ability to func-tion well (Pol. 1253a7–15).

Other passages throughout the corpus suggest that Aristotle thinks linguistic development naturally parallels conceptual development, especially in cases involv-ing the employment of judgment and deliberation (i.e. obvious cases involving the combination and separation of thoughts). in the De Sensu, Aristotle compares sight and hearing, which he thinks is important for the development of thought:

indirectly, hearing makes the largest contribution to intelligence. For discourse [lo-gos], which is the cause of learning, is so because it is audible; but it is audible not in itself but indirectly, because [speech] is composed of words, and each word is a symbol.

27 see De Int. 16b9–18, 23a32, 24b1–2; De An. 427b11–14, 428a22–24; De Sen. 437a4–17; and EN 1139b15, 1142b13–14. Also see Halper, Alpha–Delta, 424n126.

28 some have even argued that language is necessary for thought. For instance, labarriere, “imagination humaine.” Cf. Wedin, Mind, 146–59; and Polansky, De Anima, 408. Wedin cites APo. ii.19; Phys. 184b13–14, 193a4–9; De Sen. 437a9–15; Hist. An. 536a32–b8, b13–19; Gen. An. 786b19–22; EN 1143a25–8; Pol. 1253a9–15; and Rhet. 1355b1–2; some of these i quote below. see also Met. G.4, 1006a14–5. Cf. views in kretzmann, “spoken sound”; Pépin, “De Int. et Pol.”; and Walz, “Opening.”

29 Wedin, Mind, suggests reading this with EN Vi.11 emphasizing the public nature of cognitive development and the requirement of language for public interaction.

30 Cf. Millikan, Clear and Confused Ideas, ch. 6, particularly 91.

203aristotle ’ s co n cepti o n o f tr u thConsequently among those who have been deprived of one sense or the other from birth, the blind are more intelligent than the deaf and dumb. (De Sen. 437a10–17)

Humans are social creatures, and our ability to think is enhanced by hearing insofar as we hear words being used, especially when we are being told things.31 linguistic competence follows the same path as cognitive ability and allows for the public component of judgment and deliberation.

Given this natural developmental connection between language and thought, there is a pertinent distinction to be made between the ways words can function as symbols. Words can be symbols for the content of thoughts in two ways:

(a) words can be symbols by standing for the content of thoughts proper, yet (b) words can be symbols of the content insofar as thoughts are functionally

about something extra-mental.

This distinction offers a resolution to the tension between direct and indirect sig-nification. Thoughts have a natural ability to be about things. Their intentionality derives from their likeness relation to universals. if words as natural extensions of thoughts secure their meanings from them, they can equally acquire their semantic functionality from thoughts, too: words are legitimate vehicles for content because they are symbols for the sort of entities (thoughts) that have that natural func-tion. The intentional capacity of words is no magical endowment of the power of pointing since for Aristotle it stems from natural function.32 The De Interpretatione makes some gesture in this direction. Aristotle’s remarks at 24b1–2 suggest that statements can be about things in the world because they are symbols for “things in our souls” (tôn en têi psuchêi), which are ultimately about the world. Moreover, Aristotle makes an initial, albeit vague, suggestion at 16a26–27 that once names are established in any given language, qua name they functionally refer outward, but only insofar as they are symbols for things that do that sort of thing.

While Aristotle thinks particular languages are matters of convention, he is also inclined to think that it is no surprise to find humans with language: it is our nature, and our linguistic tools that develop naturally in concert with thought are significa-tory. This reading, then, explains why words are primarily signs of pathêmata even though conceptually Aristotle is committed to a word equally signifying the pathêma and the pragma. Aristotle can perfectly well get along with a discussion of truth in terms of linguistic entities as having a privileged, direct reference to the world. in a way they do: that is their function acquired from the symbolic connection with thoughts, which consist of components that are natural likenesses.33 Words have a robust semantic capacity and can be a more robust substitute for thoughts and therefore serve as legitimate truthbearers. There need not be any inconsistency between direct and indirect forms of signification as Aristotle presents it, since both are related: in the end, he offers a happy reconciliation.

31 Thanks to a referee for suggesting this latter point. 32 Cf. Blackburn, Spreading the Word, 50. 33 Cf. Crivelli, “signification,” 84–86. i offer a stronger version of his position. Also, i do not think

my view conflicts with shields, Homonomy, 83–88, since the developmental interpretation focuses on language as such. see also kretzmann, “spoken sound,” 16.


2.4. Language and the Structure of Complex Thought

There is another pertinent implication here. if the relation between language and thought explains something important about language (semantic function-ality), language ought to be able to explain something about thought (syntactic structure).34

in De Anima iii.6 and 8, Aristotle suggests that there is a distinction to be made among types of thought. At 430b26–29, Aristotle claims,

Assertion is the saying something concerning something, as too is denial, and is in every case either true or false; but not all thought [nous; sc. is this way]: the [think-ing of] the definition [ti esti] in the sense of what it is for something to be [to ti ên einai] is true [alêthês] nor [is it the assertion] of something concerning something. (Cf. Met. Q.10, 1051b24–25)

The thought of an essence, say, is like the essence (here simple, incomposite). But if, as Aristotle claims several times through iii.3–5, thought becomes its object, what can he say about a false thought?35 For example, if i think that Theaetetus is flying when he is actually sitting, my thought is simply false, but if my thought has become the object Theaetetus flying, then it looks like my thought would be true. How could it not be?36 At Metaphysics Q.10 Aristotle claims that one way of understanding “being as truth” (to einai hôs alêthes, 1051b33) is as thinking the objects (to noein tauta, presumably here incomposites like essences,37 1052a1) in the sense of contact and assertion (thigein kai phanai, 1051b24), and in these cases there is no possibility of falsehood, only ignorance.38

But there is a distinction to be made among thoughts; it turns out to be an important one. in De Anima iii.8 he claims, “imagination is different from asser-tion and denial; for what is true or false involves a synthesis of thoughts. in what will the primary thoughts [prôta noêmata] differ from images?” (432a10–11).39 Aristotle says in a number places from the Categories through the Metaphysics that truth involves combination and separation, both in the case of thoughts and in the case of statements.40 in Q.10’s statement of being in the sense of truth and not being in the sense of falsity, the condition of truth is that the subject and the attribute are combined, falsity not combined (1051b33–b35). read with De Anima iii, there are primary thoughts (prôta noêmata) and secondary thoughts (complex thoughts derived from combination and separation) that are composed of primary thoughts and are assertions insofar as they assert “something of something”; i.e. secondary thoughts indicate certain things about other things.

These primary thoughts constitute the components of complex thought. At De Anima 430a26–b6, Aristotle claims,

34 Contra Modrak, Meaning, 245–46, 257. 35 see De An. 428b10 and following.36 Cf. Caston, “Conditions of Thought,” 205.37 Cf. Halper, Central Books, 223. 38 For helpful discussion of this curious view, see Butler and rubenstein, “Aristotle on Nous of

simples.” 39 see ross’s note on 432a10–11 in De An. Hicks, De Anima, comes to the same conclusion. 40 Following De An. iii.3, i take thinking to be an activity involving some confluence of logos,

phantasia, and hupolêpsis.


The thinking of indivisibles41 is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible, where the ‘true’ and ‘false’ [apply], [there is] already a sort of combining of thoughts [suntheis noêmatôn] as being a unity [hôsper hen ontôn]. . . . For falsity always depends upon combination; for even if someone says that white is non-white he combines [white and] non-white.42 it is possible to say that these are all separations too. . . . And that which produces a unity, this is thought [nous].43

Thoughts insofar as they are judgments are themselves complex in the sense of having parts, and like assertions they must assert one thing of or about something else (a universal, particular, or even another thought [De An. 430a2–3]) and form a unity when combined.

Combination and separation are necessary for the formation of complex thought. Truth value requires combination and separation at both the noetic/linguistic and ontic levels.44 Aristotle treats combination as an activity and a state, and in a broad and narrow sense. Narrowly construed, combination is contrasted with separation. For example, ‘socrates is pale’ is a combination and so is Socrates’s being pale. Socrates’s not being pale is a separation.45 Yet at the noetic/linguistic levels combination and separation involve doing something with thoughts and words: “nothing, in fact, that is said without combination is either true or false” (Cat. 13b10–11); “he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth”46 (Met. Q.10, 1051b2–3, emphasis mine; see also b33–35; cf. De An. iii.5, 430a18).

This “combining” is retained in oral and written linguistic entities insofar as they are, as such, functionally tied to thought (as per sec. 2.3). One way to combine or separate thoughts or words is to affirm or deny something of something (De Int. 17a20–22 and a25–26), and what is affirmed or denied is that something holds or does not hold (De Int. 17a23–4; see too Cat. 12b26–30; and Top. 109a29–30).

What is combined indicates something (De Int. 17a15–19 has ‘dêlôn’47), in the sense that it “signifies one [thing] of one [thing]” (De Int. 18a12–13).48 Take ‘kuôn’ and ‘trechei.’ When combined they form a simple statement that affirmatively indi-cates running of a dog, not the state of affairs running-of-the-dog but the instance of running in the case of a dog. The latter is the pragma that the statement purports

41 Cf. Met. Q.10, 1051b16–17.42 Hamlyn follows ross’s addition of ‘phêi, to leukon kai.’ 43 see also 430b26–30, 432a10–14; and Met. Q.10, 1051b2–5. 44 e.g. De Int. 16a12–18; Cat. 13b10–11; Met. E.4, 1027b18–19, 25–31, Q.10, 1051b33–35. Also,

there are apparent inconsistencies in Aristotle’s remarks about truth and being in Met. D.7, 29, E.4, and Q 10.

45 These unities do not form an incomposite or simple object; they are combinations of particulars and universals. For example, see Cat. 14a6–14; and Met. E.4, Q.10. Composite unities are as close as Aristotle gets to states of affairs, but he does not treat them as facts or as singular entities beyond the combination or separation of their components. This is most evident in the case of separations. Cf. Crivelli, Truth, 49–50, 130–31.

46 Or more literally, “he who thinks [with respect to] that which is separated [that] it is separated and [with respect to] that which is combined [that] it is combined has the truth. . . .” This squares more closely with Met. 1011b26–27.

47 Ackrill (Cat. and De Int.) translates ‘dêloun’ here as “reveals.” Cf. Bolton, “semantic Theory,” 528, on the distinction between ‘dêloun’ and ‘sêmainein.’

48 Cf. Sophist 261c5–262e2. see Crivelli, “Plato’s Philosophy of language,” 232.


to indicate (see sec. 3). so, in affirming paleness of socrates in the sense of stating that paleness holds in the case of socrates, ‘socrates is pale’ makes an indication or signification about socrates’s paleness.

Broadly construed, combination is unity, whether in affirmation or denial. What unifies is thought (430b5–6).49 Unity is a condition for truthbearing insofar as any truthbearer will exhibit the requisite unity of its components so as to make an indication (De Int. 17a15–22), and this is true of both thinking and stating. ‘socrates is pale’ and ‘socrates is not pale’ exhibit unity in that they make an indica-tion affirming or denying paleness of socrates. A combination broadly construed combines or separates subjects and predicates in a unique way characteristic of assertion. Unity is a condition for truthmaking insofar as what is required for truth is the combination of subjects and universals insofar as they are or are not in relation to each other. As i argue in section 3, this unity does not form a simple thing like a fact.

The unity of thought and statement is expressed by the copula.50 Aristotle claims at De Interpretatione 16b19–25 that the copula signifies in a different way than other words:

When uttered just by itself a verb is a name and signifies something [sêmainei ti]—the speaker arrests his thought and the hearer pauses—but it does not yet signify whether it is or not. For not even ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ is a sign of the thing [to einai ê mê einai sêmeion tou pragmatos]51 (nor if you say simply ‘that which is’ [to on]); for by itself it is nothing [auto . . . ouden estin], but it signifies-when-added [prossêmainei52] some com-bination, which cannot be thought [noêsai] of without the components [sugkeimenôn].

What is different about the copula is that it does not require an additional noêma or pathêma as do words like ‘black,’ ‘dog,’ ‘runs.’53 On the noetic/linguistic side the copula expresses a combination or unity;54 ontologically it signifies the being of universals with respect to particular subjects.

so, Aristotle appears committed to holding that the transition from pathêmata to phantasmata to simple noêmata, on the one hand, to complex noêmata, on the other, includes some sort of transformation. This transformation, a structural “unlikening” to the world, involves the activities of combining and separating, rational processes (logismos, logistikos) that are characteristic of thought and think-

49 Met. E.4. 1027b23–27. 50 statements containing verbs other than forms of ‘einai’ have it implicitly; see De Int. 19b19,

21b9–10; and Met. D.7, 1017a27–30.51 see Ackrill, Cat. and De Int., 122–23. With emphasis on the property in its being with respect to

some subject. Presumably the pragma in question is the same as the ti at b20.52 lsJ: “signify besides” or “connote.” Cf. 16b6, b8, b9, b12, b18. The point seems to be that ‘is’

signifies when added to other words. 53 Here i generally agree with Caston, “Conditions of Thought,” 205. 54 Cf. Gaskin, “Unity,” 173: “[T]he copula . . . designates nothing, i.e. it is not its job to designate. it

is mere propositional form”; see also Gaskin, Proposition, 136–37. On Aristotle’s view, a verb like ‘runs’ has two components: (a) a semantically significant verb (‘run’); and (b) a copulative component (‘is’) responsible for sentential unity. The copula then is a third element that brings about predication only when it is embedded in the right context. Cf. APr. 48b4. second, that ‘is’ signifies does not entail that it has a meaning in the same way as ‘dog.’ Take ‘is’ as a second-order signifier that is better conceived in terms of unity and use; see Davidson, Truth and Predication, ch 4; see also section 3 below.


ing (dianoia, dianoeisthai), which do not occur without logos (427b13). Aristotle is vague about the exact mechanisms of the transformation of thought into com-plex thought (no doubt enhanced by the ambiguity of ‘logos’), but he thinks that both complex thought and statement share the feature of combination (broadly construed). since he makes no indication that this sort of combination shared between complex thought and statement differs in any relevant way, and a requi-site feature of proper combination (broadly construed) of words into statements is syntactic structure, Aristotle is committed to complex thought exhibiting syntactic structure too. Particular syntaxes obviously vary across languages, but syntax as such is necessary for language as well as for complex thought.55

On this picture, a complex thought is a mental construct whose components are likenesses but whose features can be expressed in language. The homoiôma of a pathêma remains, but as the soul employs the pathêma-phantasma-noêma pathway, the homoiôma-relation is altered as the simple thoughts are combined (sumplokê noêmatôn, 432a11, ‘sumplokê ’ employed broadly to cover combining and separating) via the activity of thinking (dianoia) into something akin to a logos with sentential structure. The likeness would remain in the components of thought, the simple thoughts, but the complex thought takes on syntactic structure analogous to that of properly formed statements independent of any specific syntactic token-language features. Thoughts that involve accidental and (especially) essential predications become uniquely unlike the world, both qualitatively and structurally, even when they are true.56 And this is generally what one would expect of someone who con-siders thought to be silent speech to maintain.57 These results have implications for Aristotle’s conception of truth.

3 . t r u t h

Consider again Metaphysics 1011b26–27:

Tdf: For to state [of] that which is [that] it is not or [of] that which is not [that] it is [is] false, and [to state of] that which is [that] it is and [of] that which is not [that] it is not [is] true.

Many scholars think Tdf expresses the basic conception of a correspondence theory of truth, and insofar as correspondence theories maintain that truth depends in some sense on the world, Aristotle concurs. For him, truth depends on being, and presumably this condition places Aristotle in the correspondence camp. But there is room for an alternative interpretation.

55 Cf. Pritzl, “Being True,” 181–82. Although Aristotle occasionally writes as though complex thought is one (Met. E.4, 1027b23–25), he still must make a distinction between that and the thought of an essence, which is incomposite.

56 And if there is any one-to-one correspondence relation involved in truth, it looks to be between statement and thought; see Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 39.

57 Where does Aristotle stand on the nature of complex thought? On the one hand, Aristotle seems to follow Plato in thinking that thought is internal speech, and as such thinking is akin to thinking in natural language. On the other hand, if the components of thought are “the same for all” and are likenesses of universals, and the content of thoughts (concepts) can be the same between those who do not share the same language, complex thought looks propositional in nature. The distinction between linguistic thought and propositional thought is one Aristotle would have done well to make. Aristotle’s account of complex thought is quasi-propositional and quasi-sentential. Cf. lewis, “Predication.”


Distinctions among correspondence theories generally revolve around whether there be some entity in the world to which a truth corresponds, or whether every truth have a truthmaker like a fact or a state of affairs that obtains (if there is such a distinction), or whether truth requires a specific dependence relation between ontological entities and true statements or thoughts, and if so what that relation amounts to.58 stronger versions of the correspondence view explain the relation in terms of congruence or structural isomorphism between truthbearers and truthmakers; weaker versions maintain that the relation is merely one of, say, correlation.59

i argue that Tdf taken within either the general context of the discussion of truth or the context of Aristotle’s ontology, psychology, and semantic theory does not require the additional explanatory features of correspondence to fact.

3.1. Relation

Albeit compact, Tdf displays a number of interesting features. Aristotle claims that a true statement states of that which is that it is. At face value Tdf seems to make a nod toward relation: stating something of something. However, the Greek is not so straightforward. The verb ‘legein’ here takes the accusative ‘to on’ with the negated infinitive ‘mê einai.’ so, the translation of the first part of Tdf amounts to something like “to state with respect to that which is that it is not,” which is non-committal about relation, but this means that stating of that which is that it is involves more than simply affirming some predicate of some subject. Truth requires ontological combination (broadly construed), in addition to noetic/lingustic combination. so, if Tdf is non-trivial, it must be claiming not only that a true statement affirms or denies something of something—a feature of any predicative statement—but also that it states with respect to that which is (is not) (ontic level) that it is (is not) (noetic/linguistic level). Perhaps this is an appropriate place to unpack the mag-nifying glass and focus cautiously on ‘is.’60

3.2. The Verb ‘To Be’ and Instantiation

Consider the story of Dr. Asclepius: socrates says he has heard a ghost, and he is pale. Crito takes him to the doctor, who says he is fine. Crito exclaims, “But Doc, look how pale he is!” The doctor suggests socrates should sit and have a drink.

58 see künne, Truth, 110–11; and Tarski, “Concept of Truth,” 613–17. 59 see Pitcher, Truth, 9–11. 60 i do not think that by itself ‘is’ has meaning as ‘dog’ has meaning, at least as far as meaning

is cashed out in terms of signification, and i doubt Aristotle thought so either, though he does place importance on being kath’ hauto and kata sumbebêkos (Met. D.7, 1017a7–8). But this is not to say that it cannot be used in different ways (Met. Z.1, 1028a10) to express or emphasize different ways of being; see for example Phys. i.3, 186a24–32; and Met. D.7, E.2, 4. The distinction between the ‘is’ of existence and the ‘is’ of predication looks to be syntactical, not semantic. Dancy calls the tendency to locate the difference in character between sentences in single ambiguous words like ‘is’ the “fallacy of the magnifying glass.” see helpful discussions in Dancy, “existence,” 409–42, esp. 424; and “Hintikka,” 311–28. On the issue of existence, see also Owen, LSD, 180 –99, 181, 259–78; Dancy, Sense and Contra-diction, 127–31; Hintikka, “Varieties of Being in Aristotle,” 81–114; and kirwan, Metaphysics, 214–17. Cf. Halper, Central Books, 223, and Alpha–Delta, 82.


Crito’s concern about the paleness that is in socrates’s face illustrates a point about how Aristotle tends to emphasize properties (universals) insofar as they are or hold of some subject, especially in the case of predications beyond essential (cf. Met. Z.1, 1028a15–31). Crito’s remark suggests a way to understand the referent of ‘that which is’ (to on) in Tdf.

Much has been written on the proper interpretation of the verb ‘to be.’ Generally some think that ‘einai’ and its various forms can have different uses or meanings depending on context.61 A reasonably fine-grained set of distinctions is this: a complete use is one in which there is no complement to the verb; an incomplete use is one in which the verb has a complement. Those who think ‘to be’ has different senses between its complete and incomplete uses claim that in its complete use ‘to be’ means “exists” (existential), or “is true”/“is the case” (ve-ridical) when the statement takes as its subject a sentence or state of affairs. The incomplete ‘is’ can also have a number of different uses including “is such and such” (copulative), “is the same as” (identity), “is enduring” (temporal), and “is located in space” (locative).

Aristotle’s use of ‘to on’ and ‘einai’ in Tdf has been interpreted widely and vari-ously, but generally either as employing the existential, copulative, or veridical use, or a combination of two or more.62

e. A true statement states of that which exists that it exists, and of that which does not exist that it does not exist.

V. A true statement states of that which is the case that it is the case, and of that which is not the case that it is not the case.

C. A true statement states of that which is P that it is P.

There are significant and persuasive criticisms of each view. On purely philosophi-cal grounds, one can eliminate e for two reasons. Plato offers a serious attempt to resolve the problem of not being which Parmenides first wrestled with in dactylic hexameter. Aristotle knows this problem well.63 if Aristotle were to mean by ‘that which is’ and ‘that which is not’ “what exists” and “what does not exist,” he would face the difficult problem of “absolute” non-being, and as a result those against

61 For more on the different “senses” or uses of ‘be’ and their relation, see also Brentano, Senses of Being ; kahn, “Concept of Being,” 249–52; “Uses of to be,” 105–34; more extensively, Verb ‘Be,’ and a summary of that work in “return,” 381–405. see also Brown, “Being in the Sophist,” 49–70; and Brown, “Verb ‘to be,’” 213. Contrast De rijk (Semantics and Ontology) who takes the primitive, focal meaning of ‘is’ to be something like “being there.” see also De rijk, Semantics and Ontology, 80–84, especially 83 n. 23, on kahn’s view and on Matthen (“Greek Ontology”). For response, see kahn, “return,” 386.

62 One need not take these to be mutually exclusive possibilities. Brown and kahn have argued that there is no hard distinction between the existential, copulative, and veridical uses of ‘einai.’ Wheeler, “Truth,” argues, correctly i think, that Aristotle needs ‘to on’ and ‘einai’ to be taken in the broadest scope possible to capture common usages, so the likely reading is a “comprehensive” use (see Matthen, “Greek Ontology,” 115 and following; and ross, Metaphysics). Wheeler claims one of the benefits of this reading is that it does not presuppose a particular ontological framework. Nevertheless, i think Tdf must be read within the history of the discussion of being and not being, particularly in conjunction with Aristotle’s treatment of substance, and i think it is here that the quasi-copulative works better insofar as it captures the general way of talking about truth independent of specific logical and ontological concerns. Cf. Bäck, Aristotle’s Theory of Predication, 264–71.

63 see Phys. i.3 and Met. N.2


whom Aristotle is objecting would certainly have grounds for counter-objection. second, if ‘to be’ is understood existentially, the definition of truth will not be sufficiently general to cover all types of statement. The account could handle ‘This parrot is not’ in the sense that he is no more, but unable to handle all the variety of, say, predicative statements like ‘socrates is pale,’ ‘socrates is a man,’ etc.

And strictly speaking there is no naked existence in Aristotle’s world: particulars are insofar as they are something or other, and universals are insofar as they hold of some subject or other—the world is ontologically G-rated.64 But this is not to say that the ‘is’ in an expression such as ‘there is a man’ (Cat. 14b14, see also Cat. 13b19) should not be treated as if it were being used existentially—surely the syntactic arrangement has that emphasis (cf. Aristophanes, Clouds 367: oud’ esti Zeus). Ontologically though, things are different.65

The veridical use gains support from Aristotle’s occasional tendency to treat things (pragmata) or composites (suntheta) as facts or states of affairs, like white wood and the incommensurability of the diagonal (Met. Q.10, 1051b20–21).66 But suppose after returning from the beach socrates is not pale (i.e. he displays an instance of not being pale, a way of not being, i.e. a case of that which is not) and i tell him that he is not pale. i speak the truth: I have stated of that which is not that it is not. Treat ‘that which is not’ veridically. The result is that a true statement states of that which is not the case that it is not the case. However, one might ask, What is not the case? socrates’s not being pale? No, socrates’s not being pale is something that is the case. so, i would be speaking falsely: i state of what is the case (it is the case that socrates is not pale) that it is not case. And surely Aristotle

64 see for example, Cat. 14a6–9; De Int. 19b19–30; Top. 103b27–39; and Phys. 186a24–32. But the story is a bit more involved: Met. G.2, 1003b5–10, D.7, Z.1, 1028a13–20, Q.10, 1051b33–a2.

65 i more or less side with ross, Meta. 1:308; Owen, LSD, 260; Dancy, Sense and Contradiction, 208–9; and kirwan, Metaphysics, 214–15. Cf. Whitaker, Contradiction, ch. 2 and p. 136; Crivelli, Truth, 100–125; and Bostock, Metaphysics: Books Z and H, 49 and 57. On being holôs, haplôs, see for example, Met. Z.1, 1028a30–31, but in the case of existential statements regarding incomposites like universals, see Q.10, 1051b23–28, b33–a4; see also lewis, Substance, 63–73.

66 On the veridical side, see kirwan, Metaphysics, 117; kahn, Verb ‘Be,’ 336n7, 363, 367–68; and kahn, “return,” 391. Crivelli (Truth) opts for something like the veridical reading, but it turns on the notion of being as “being true” which he applies to 1011b26–27. Crivelli (Truth, 46–50) thoughtfully argues that Aristotle recognizes only affirmative states of affairs (though note Cat. 12b14–16; he thinks this does not support negative states of affairs). The evidence derives from Met. Q.10, 1024b17–21. However, i remain unconvinced, primarily because it is unclear to me that Aristotle requires or even recognizes states of affairs (non-mental, non-linguistic objects of a propositional nature [3–5]). On Crivelli’s view, the statements ‘socrates is standing’ and ‘socrates is not standing’ are likenesses (in the sense of signification) of the same state of affairs, Socrates’s standing, which if ‘socrates is not standing’ is true, is not in the sense of being false (Crivelli, “signification,” 95). But curiously as Aristotle presents it, the truth conditions for statements seem to bypass the Crivellian states of affairs and refer directly to the combined or divided objects, and as on my interpretation, with emphasis on the predicate expres-sion. Crivelli may address the former issue; see 130–38. Also, if Crivelli is right about the distinction between about states of affairs and the objects (universals and individuals) involved, it would seem to introduce new objects between noetic/linguistic entities and the world. Truth and falsehood emerge at two levels: (a) between the state of affairs and the objects, and (b) between assertions/denials and states of affairs. And if so, it seems to commit Aristotle to an ontology of universals, individuals, and states of affairs, where states of affairs function as tertiary entities (some true, some false) that are at once truthbearers and truthmakers. lewis adopts a quasi-propositionalist view; see lewis, “Predica-tion,” 352, qualified at 376–84.


does not want to assert this. second, if the veridical reading is correct, Tdf would claim that every true statement would state of some state of affairs (like socrates’s being pale) that is the case that it is the case (i.e. “Socrates’s being pale is the case”), but statements rarely have this structure.67 Third, if the expressions ‘to on’ and ‘einai’ are both taken linguistically, Tdf amounts to something like: “stating of ‘s is P’ is true that ‘s is P’ is true,” etc. But then the statement becomes uninterestingly redundant.68 The veridical reading will not do.

in the context of Metaphysics G, the copulative use looks more promising, though the reading i defend is “quasi-copulative”—perhaps the ‘is’ of instantiation. The bulk of G is dedicated to a discussion of the principle of non-contradiction and a criticism of those, including the Heracliteans and sophists, who Aristotle thinks are committed to denying the law, but in G.7, with Anaxagoras on his mind, Aristotle turns to an ad hominem defense of the principle of excluded middle. The defini-tion of truth and falsehood arises because Aristotle thinks it will make it clear why there cannot be any intermediate property between two contradictories.

Consider the way Aristotle formulates the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) and Principle of excluded Middle (PeM). At G.3, 1005b19–20, Aristotle says,

PNC: [For] the same [thing] to hold [huparchein] and not to hold simultaneously of the same [thing] and in the same respect is impossible.

And he says at G.7, 1011b23–24:

PeM: it is impossible that there be anything between a contradiction, but it is neces-sary either to assert or deny any one [thing] of another.69

supposing a comfortable shift between formulations of the principles in terms of particulars and universals, on the one hand, and linguistic subjects and predicate expressions, on the other, Aristotle tends to emphasize the properties insofar as they hold of, or regarding linguistic predicates that they are asserted or denied of, some subject (‘socrates is pale’ asserts that being pale belongs to socrates). in the case of both PNC and PeM, there is an emphasis on the predicate expression, but insofar as it indicates that a property is (or is not) in the case of a subject. For instance, one can assert being pale in the case of socrates and not being pale in the case of socrates, but PNC does not permit claiming that being pale and not being pale hold of socrates at the same time and in the same respect, and PeM entails that one can either assert being pale of socrates or deny being pale of socrates (i.e. assert not being pale of socrates).

Aristotle’s tendency to emphasize the properties insofar as they do or do not belong to a subject is nothing new. in the De Interpretatione, he claims that an as-sertion “signifies one [thing] about one [thing]” (18a12–13), and in the Posterior Analytics, he claims that although we perceive individuals, “perception is of the universal” (100a16–b1). Universals play a key role in his semantics and theory of perception. so, his emphasis here on predicate expressions insofar as they

67 künne, Truth, 96. But cf. Crivelli, Truth, 47–50, 130. 68 see Wheeler, “Truth,” 78–83.69 see further Gottlieb, “Non-Contradiction.”


are asserted or denied of a subject suggests a plausible reason why Aristotle has a version of the copulative use in mind when formulating his definition of truth and falsehood. if it is necessary to assert or deny any one thing of another, and what he means by this is that it is necessary that one can assert or deny that some property holds of some subject, one thing Crito can assert truly about socrates is being pale, since being pale really holds of socrates.

This reliance on the copula with an emphasis on the predicate expression is supported throughout G. Here are three cases:

1. Met. G.4, 1006b33–34: Consequently it is not possible that it should be simultane-ously true to say of the same [thing; i.e. the subject] that [it] is a man and is not a man [anthrôpon einai kai mê einai anthrôpon].

Here the copulative use of ‘einai’ with the emphasis placed firmly on the predicate insofar as it is or is not with respect to the subject is pretty clear: “to be a man” and “not to be a man” are not the sort of things we can state of the same subject.

2. Met. G.4, 1007b23–25: For if a man is thought by someone not to be a warship [mê einai triêrês], it is plain that he is not a warship [hôs ouk esti triêrês]; so that he also is [esti; i.e. in the sense that he is a warship], if the contradiction is really true.

Here the emphasis is on the subject expression insofar as some property is being asserted (or in this case “thought”) and denied of it, and a copulative reading of ‘einai’ and ‘esti’ provides the best sense of the passage.70

3. Met. G.4, 1007b32–34: i mean for instance that if it is true to say of a man that [he is] not a man [eipein ton anthrôpon hoti ouk anthrôpos], clearly [he is] also either a warship or not a warship. so if the affirmation [holds good of him], necessarily its denial [does], too.

What is accomplished when the statement that ‘socrates is a man’ is true is success-fully affirming with respect to the actual socrates that he is a man,71 though ultimately what ‘is a man’ signifies is the particular instance of man in the case of socrates. likewise what ‘is pale’ signifies is the particular instance of paleness in the case of socrates, though both ‘pale’ and ‘man’ by themselves signify the universals pale-ness and human, respectively.72

each passage illustrates Aristotle’s reliance on a version of the copulative use of ‘be’ in which there is tendency to shift focus between the being of what occupies one or the other side of the copula. Formulate the general assumption Aristotle makes about the “bi-directionality” of being (BD) this way:

BD: For any subject s and universal property P, one way for s to be and one way for P to be is for s to be P.

BDn: For any s and P, one way for s not to be and one way for P not to be is for s not to be P.

70 Cf. Met. G.5, 1009a7–8, b4, 1010b22.71 Cf. Met. G.4, 1008a19–30, b30–33, G.5, 1010b14–18.72 There are of course concerns about nonsubstantial individuals that i do not have space to

address here. see helpful discussion in Wedin, Substance, 38–66. Whether nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent (for example, Owen, LSD, 252–58; and Frede, “Unity”) or not (Ackrill, Cat. and De Int.; and Wedin, Substance), on my view Aristotle thinks the truthmaker is the instantiated universal; see further section 3.3.


supposing that Aristotle accepts BD and BDn,73 the copulative interpretation of

‘that which is’ (to on [‘o’]) would follow these principles (‘B’ = Being):

Bo1: ‘That which is’ (to on) can refer to any s when, for some P, s is P.

Bo2: ‘That which is’ can refer to any P when for some s, P is with respect to s.74

BD can apply to the expression ‘that it is’ (einai [‘e’]) as well, to give:

Be1: ‘that it is’ (einai) can refer to any s when for some P, it is stated that s is P.

Be2: ‘that it is’ can refer to any property P when for some s, it is stated that P is with respect to s (in other words, that s is P).

Given this way of interpreting the text, the expressions ‘that which is’ and ‘that it is’ may refer directly to the subjects and/or universals insofar as they are in the case of the other. This quasi-copulative reading of the verb ‘to be’—the ‘is’ of instantiation—is not exactly as straightforward as that expressed in C, or even in the comprehensive combination of e and C. stating of that which is that it is need not necessarily mean that one states of that which is P that it is P: ‘that which is’ and ‘that it is’ can refer either to real-world subjects or universals as if each in its particular instance of being were fragmented from that to which either adheres.

The idea underwrites the significance of claims such as: “for when a man is healthy, then also health is . . .” (Met. L.3, 1070a22–24; see also Cat. 14a6–14; Met. G.2, 1003b5–10, and Z.1, 1028a13–20), while at the same time capturing the additional condition expressed by claims such as, “it is because the thing [here, ‘particular’] is or is not that the statement is said to be true or false” (Cat. 4b8–9). Yet given Aristotle’s emphasis on the universals when he discusses assertion, signi-fication, and perception, there is justification for interpreting his understanding of the copulative use in Tdf in terms of Bo2 and Be2.

The beauty of this alternative interpretation is that it

(1) avoids the pitfalls of having to read the verb ‘to be’ with any particular sense in mind, though it emphasizes the common, first-order75 copulative use of the verb while at the same time embodying the existential use;(2) dovetails nicely with the discussion of being and not being that precedes G.7; (3) illuminates to some extent what Aristotle means by combination, broadly construed; (4) fits well within the discussion of subjects and universals presented alongside truth in the Categories and De Interpretatione;

73 Here i see compatibility with lewis, Substance, 69, but there is a story to tell since predicating ac-cidents of individual substances is different from predicating form of matter; see Matthews, “Accidental Unities,” 223–40; lewis, “Predication,” 376–84. For example, paleness is in the case of socrates, but socrates, a form–matter compound, is because he is a man. in other words, paleness is instantiated in the case of an instance of man. Whether an essential predication expresses an actual combination of subject and predicate poses a real challenge. But certainly there is a distinction between referring to the essence as universal and the instance (i) of the essence in cases i1–in, as well as between the instance of the essence and the individual instances of non-essential properties. This issue lends more support for my reading, since the structure of subject–predicate expressions need not precisely capture condi-tions at the ontic level between essential and accidental predication when such statements are true.

74 This works for “not being” as well, and linguistic employment of B1–2. For additional textual support, see De Int. 10; in particular, De Int. 19b13–30.

75 see kahn, “return,” 385–86.


(5) is consistent with and perhaps even motivated by the Posterior Analytics claim that “perception is of the universal” (100a16–b1; see too 87b28–33; De An. 417b22–23; and Met. Z.1, 1028a31 and following; cf. De An. 417a29; and Met. M.10, 1087a10–25) and subsequently Aristotle’s commitment to the central explanatory role of universals; and finally, (6) makes sense within the development of Aristotle’s conception of substance, particularly in the Metaphysics, where Aristotle struggles to locate primary sub-stance in form-matter compounds (see for example Met. D.8, 1017b10–26; Z.3, 1028b34 and following; Z.6; Z.11, 1037a21–b7; Z.13, 1038b2–6; and H.1, 1042a12–15, 26–31).

Perhaps Crito was prescient.

3.3. Truth and the Facts, Funny or Otherwise

if truth requires the existence of a truthmaker like a fact or state of affairs, then one might claim that Aristotle has a correspondence theory of truth since he seems to treat combinations like Socrates’s being pale and the incommensurability of the diagonal as “things” or pragmata. lsJ lists a good number of different uses of ‘pragma,’ including fact, matter, affair, activity, circumstance, trouble, and an-noyance. sometimes ‘pragma’ means plain old “object” or “thing.” Both Plato and Aristotle are rarely clear about what constitutes a pragma, though there is good evidence that, depending on the context, they mean something either like a particular circumstance or loosely speaking a state of affairs, or some entity like a form, species, universal, substance, or particular.

One striking passage involving ‘pragma’ is Categories 14b11–22, where Aristotle claims,

For of things which reciprocate as to implication of being [tôn gar antistrephontôn kata tên tou einai akolouthêsin], that which is in some way [hopôsoun] the cause [aition] of the other’s being [tou einai]76 might reasonably be called prior by nature. And that there are some such cases is clear. For there being a man [to gar einai anthrôpon] reciprocates as to implication of being with the true statement about it: if there is a man [ei gar estin anthrôpos], the statement whereby we say that there is a man [hoti estin anthrôpos] is true, and reciprocally —since if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. And whereas the true statement is in no way a cause of the thing’s being [oudamôs aitios tou einai to pragma], the thing [to pragma] does seem in some way [pôs] the cause of the statement’s being true; it is because the thing is or [is] not [tôi gar einai to pragma ê mê ] that the statement is called true or false.

The example is an existential claim: ‘There is a man.’77 Whatever the pragma is that is the condition for the truth of ‘There is a man’ involves the universal man.

76 What sort of being might this be? line b20 picks out being true. so, in this respect, Aristotle is specifying an ontological condition for being true. This would place him in line with Met. D.7, 1017a31–32, Q.10, 1051b1–5, and 1051b33–35; cf. Crivelli, Truth.

77 This existential claim need not express an incomposite, but it can. i take it that given the con-text, Aristotle is using this statement to express a general point about priority with respect to truth. so, ‘there is a man’ could be read as elliptical for ‘Crito is a man’ or ‘socrates is pale,’ in which case ‘there is a man’ signifies the instantiated universal man, or as the emphatically existential ‘Man is.’ Cf. Crivelli, Truth, ch. 3; Whitaker, Contradiction, 135–37; and Owen, LSD, 264–68.


is pragma a simple fact? This is unlikely, since he does not specify the use of the word in this way, though he occasionally slips into this way of speaking.78 it is more plausible that a pragma is something like a state of affairs. But in the context of the Categories and De Interpretatione, it is difficult to justify reading it this way since Aristotle tends to use ‘pragma’ to emphasize either the universal that the predi-cate expresses or the particular(s) that the subject term expresses. For example, Aristotle claims,

Now of the things [tôn pragmatôn] some are universal [katholou], others particular [kath’ hekaston] (i call universal that which is by its very nature [pephuke] predicated of a number of [things], and particular that which is not; man, for instance, is a universal, Callias a particular). (De Int. 17a38–b1)

Here ‘pragma’ refers either to the universal or particular. But he also claims,

With contraries it is not necessary if one is [êi] for the other to be [einai] too. For if everyone were well health would be [estai] but not sickness, and if everything were white whiteness would be [estai] but not blackness. Further, if socrates’s being well is contrary to socrates’s being sick, and it is not possible for both [amphotera] to hold at the same time of the same [person; tôi autôi], it would not be possible if one of the contraries were for the other to be too; if socrates’s being well were, socrates’s being sick would not. (Cat. 14a6–14)

Here Aristotle places emphasis on the being of the instantiated universals—health/sickness, whiteness/blackness—rather than whiteness generally, etc., or the par-ticular Socrates. Although ‘tou Sôkratê hugiainein’ (‘socrates’s being well’) suggests that Aristotle is referring to the state of affairs Socrates’s being well, the referent of ‘amphotera’ at a12 taken in conjunction with ‘tôi autôi’ is likely the being well and being sick referenced in the previous line. so here Aristotle is emphasizing the universal insofar as it is with respect to the particular, socrates, like socrates’s untreatable paleness.79 Other times the subject is emphasized (Cat. 13b12–19; see also Cat. 4b8–9; and Top. ii, 109a27). But in neither case does Aristotle treat pragma as a fact or state of affairs.

Although there are other passages that employ ‘pragma’ in less precise ways (for example, Cat. 12b5–16) and some passages that more strongly suggest treating pragma as states of affairs, really the issue is whether Tdf requires some truthmaker like a fact or state of affairs that obtains.80 But the texts do not support that it does. Aristotle thinks that truth depends on being and not being, and this being resides in a universal’s being or not being in the case of some subject.

3.4. Asymmetrical Relations and Truthmaking

The reasons for attributing a correspondence theory to Aristotle are diminished in light of the above considerations, though Categories 14b11–22 again raises a question about whether Aristotle thinks truth is explained in terms of some sort

78 Crivelli, Truth, 130, cites APr. 64b10, Gen. et Corr. 325a18, Phys. 263a17, and Met. A.3, 984a18. Cf. Pritzl, “Being True,” 183–84.

79 see also Top. ii, 109a27–33.80 künne, Truth, 96n17.


of relation between noetic/linguistic entities and ontological combinations and separations. The word ‘cause’ (aition) suggests as much, though note that Aris-totle is emphatically hesitant to commit himself to the strict sense of cause when he qualifies by claiming that the pragma is a cause “in some way” (hopôsoun, b12), and reiterates the point at b20 (pôs).81 Conceivably Aristotle thinks of a pragma as a loose explanation of truth, rather than as a causal or definitional explanation, and his referencing it merely reveals his realist commitments (see Met. Q.10, 1051b6–9).82 More to the point, this “causal” dependency can be taken more plausibly against the background of his semantic views. since meaning is tied to the world via the route explicated in section 2 above, when Aristotle claims that a statement is true because of entities in the world—in other words, that a state-ment is true in virtue of something else—his point is a consequence of his semantic theory: truth depends on the world because meaning does. However, such “worldly” ties need not explain truth per se. Ultimately as far as Aristotle is concerned, there are background semantic and ontological conditions necessary for the possibility of truth. ‘Truthmaking,’ then, as i use it, suggests nothing more than that truth depends on the world, and not that truth is defined by a truthmaking relation.

Another reason not to think that Aristotle considers truth to be a relation is that he does not treat the truth predicate in the same way he treats other predications, particularly pros ti (relative) predications. For example, at Categories 4b11–1383 Aristotle claims that “in fact neither statement nor belief is ever changed at all by anything, so since nothing comes-to-be in them, they are not able to receive contraries.” statements are completely unchangeable in every way and unable to receive contraries. Nevertheless, statements have truth values, so presumably true and false are not genuine contraries. As for truth, it is because of a change in socrates, the pragma, that ‘socrates is sitting’ becomes true then false.84

knowledge is a relative, albeit an atypical relative one, insofar as it is of some-thing (“knowledge is called knowledge of [what is] knowable” [Cat. 6b34 and following]). Additionally Aristotle thinks the relation between knowledge and the “knowable” is asymmetrical insofar as there is no knowledge without a know-able, but not vice versa (Cat. 7b29–31), presumably because “in some way [tropon tina] knowledge is measured by [metreitai] the knowable” (Met. i.6, 1057a11–12; see also Met. i.1, 1053a31–53b8; and i.6, 1057a7–8 and following). since knowl-edge involves truth, a case might be made for thinking that truth is a relative and thereby relational.85

There are at least two relevant ways to construe the claim that knowledge is of a knowable: (1) the content of knowledge is true of the knowable; and (2) the true content of knowledge is of (or “about”) the knowable. (1) garners some support

81 Moreover, in whatever way the pragma is the cause, ‘pragma’ refers in pertinent contexts to either the subject or universal, though in light of the B–principles this option is not mutually exclusive (see Cat. 4b8–10, 12b12–16).

82 Cf. irwin, First Principles, 269 and sec. 2. 83 see also 4a10–11.84 see too De An. 428b8–9, though see ross’s note, De Anima, 287–88.85 see Crivelli, Truth, 138; but cf. ross, Metaphysics, 284, 297–98.


from places where Aristotle mentions the impossibility of opposite expressions being true of the same subject at the same time (see De Int. 21b17–20; Met. G.4, 1007b18–20; K.5, 1062a23–35). However, there is no suggestion in these contexts of a specific relation that characterizes truth, merely that truth depends on the world. Moreover, Aristotle sometimes treats the ‘of’ (‘kata’ plus genitive) in ‘being true of something’ analogously to “belongs to” or “holds of” something, and so ‘being true of’ perhaps involves a different use of ‘true.’ Aristotle could also mean being true ‘of’ something (‘kata’ plus gen.) in the sense of “with regard to” some-thing, which echoes the use of the ‘legein’ plus the accusative in Tdf (“to state with respect to” something), which is non-committal about relation (see sec. 3.1 above).

The possibility that truth is “measured by” what it is true of suggests more strongly some type of relation. However, in the Metaphysics passages, for example, it is knowledge and perception, and not true statements or truth itself, that Aristo-tle describes as “measured by” something, so reading a correspondence relation into these passages is difficult. The point seems to be only that, contra Protagoras, there is a priority of the independent object over the content of the cognitive state, and so it favors reading (2), which squares nicely with the semantic view: knowledge and perception are of something, something that “measures” them in the sense that the contents of knowledge and perception ultimately originate in the pathêma that is a likeness of the pragma. Additionally, in the case of knowledge and perception, strictly speaking Aristotle thinks that each is of the universal (for instance, perception is of the universal; knowledge knows the essence), and for incomposites he treats truth differently.

in light of the above considerations, even if truth were a “relative” in some sense, that does not entail that truth is anything more than dependent on the world. True and false operate differently from other predicates, including relatives. One might call them second-order,86 and non-relational.

4 . c o n c l u s i o n

Back to Tdf. in the context of G, Aristotle is engaged in dialectic. Aristotle ap-peals to a formula for truth that expresses minimal conditions for a statement or thought to be true or false.87 since Aristotle need not initially specify semantic or ontological conditions, Tdf by itself is general enough to be non-question-begging and so acceptable to those dialectically engaged. But his position is that there are substantive ontological and semantic conditions that are necessary for the possi-bility of truth itself. in this respect, his strategy is similar to Plato’s strategy against the lovers of sights and sounds in Republic V.88 The lovers need not (and do not) commit themselves to Forms, only to the claim that knowledge is set over that which is in every way, while belief is set over that which is and is not. Only later does Plato reveal what “that which is in every way” must really be about.

86 Wheeler (unpublished manuscript). 87 Crivelli (Truth, 260) lists nine assumptions that the definition of truth relies on. 88 And perhaps more importantly, the Protagoreans and Heracliteans in the Theaetetus.


As Aristotle understands it, Tdf is robust. On my interpretation, his view is this:

Tdf-i: For to state of that universal P which is in the case of some subject s that P is not in the case of s is false, and to state of that P which is in the case of s that it is in the case of s and of that P which is not in the case of s that it is not of s is true.

This conception brings him closer to Plato. Plato is a realist, too. Aristotle prefers to keep his being immanent, but in some sense form takes on ontological primacy. My view is that even after Aristotle’s central ontology, psychology, and semantics are in place, his particular conception of truth remains free of the hallmarks of the correspondence theory of truth and retains a minimalist character.89

There are reasons for thinking Aristotle would not have appealed to such characteristic features. statements have a particular syntactical structure, and their components acquire semantic content from functioning as symbols for the components of thoughts, though statements themselves can be legitimate bearers of meaning and truth via their functional dependency on thought. The components of thought are likenesses of universals accessed via a complicated perceptual mechanism. But for Aristotle complex thoughts (unlike thoughts of incomposites like essences where truth is something like contact [or identity] with no possibility of falsehood) are functionally and structurally unlike the world in that they exhibit intentionality and syntactic ordering. As silent speech, their structure is manifest in language (insofar as it is a natural product of our rational capacity). so, truth does not involve or require a specific relation of likeness, iso-morphism, or agreement between truthbearers and truthmakers because of the unique structural nature of thoughts and statements. Moreover, Aristotle does not treat the truth predicate as expressing a causal or truthmaking relation between noetic/linguistic and ontic items. Nor does Aristotle require that there be some fact or state of affairs that obtains to function as truthmaker. Aristotle’s conception of truth merely requires that some universal be instantiated (or not) in the case of a subject, and given Aristotle’s shift in conception of primary substance by the time of the Metaphysics, combination at the ontic level looks quite different from what it did in the Categories. But throughout, truthmaking resides in the immanent universal, the primary locus of being and meaning for Aristotle.

At De Interpretatione 18a39–b2, Aristotle claims, “For if it is true to say that [it] is white or [it] is not white, [it is] necessary that [it] is white or not white, and if [it] is white or not white, then it was true to say or deny this.” Aristotle’s concep-tion of truth looks like this:

TA–schema: ‘s is P’ is true ↔ s is P.

TA–schema(n): ‘s is not P’ is true ↔ s is not P.

By Tdf Aristotle need only mean that stating with respect to some property P that is in the case some subject s that P is in the case of s, is what amounts to truth. since Aristotle conceives of the world in terms of immanent universals, the TA–schema would amount to

89 Though not narrowly deflationary or disquotational; cf. Wheeler, “Truth”; see Alston, Truth, chs. 1–2.

219aristotle ’ s co n cepti o n o f tr u thTA–schema*: ‘s is P’ is true ↔ the universal P is in the case of s.

TA–schema(n)*: ‘s is not P’ is true ↔ the universal P is not in the case of s.90

Yet TA* does not define truth in terms of the universal. Aristotle has semantic rea-

sons for thinking a truthmaker involves a universal. Does this conception of truth require correspondence? some are inclined to think so. That is fine, as long as one understands in what respect.91

b i b l i o g r a p h y a n d a b b r e v i a t i o n s

Alston, William. A Realist Conception of Truth. ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. [Truth]Ammonius. On Aristotle’s On interpretation 1–8. Translated by David Blank. ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-

versity Press, 1996. [On Int.]Anagnostopoulos, Georgios, ed. A Companion to Aristotle. West sussex: Wiley- Blackwell, 2009.Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione. Translated with notes and glossary by J. l. Ackrill. 1963.

reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. [Cat and De Int.]–––––. Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. [CWA]–––––. De Anima. Translated with introduction and notes by r. D. Hicks. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1907. [De Anima]–––––. De Anima. Greek text edited with an introduction and commentary by W. D. ross. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1961. [De An.]–––––. De Anima: Books II and III. Translated with introduction and notes by D. W. Hamlyn. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1993. [DA II–III]–––––. Metaphysics. Greek text edited with an introduction and commentary by W. D. ross. 2 vols. 1924.

reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. [Meta.]–––––. Metaphysics: Books G, D, E. 2nd ed. Translated with notes by Christopher kirwan. Oxford: Clar-

endon Press, 1993. [Metaphysics]–––––. Metaphysics: Books Z and H. Translated with a commentary by David Bostock. Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1994.–––––. Posterior Analytics. 2nd ed. Translated with commentary by Jonathan Barnes. Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1993. [APo.]–––––. Topics: Books I and VIII. Translated with commentary by robin smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1997.

90 Cf. künne, Truth, 100. 91 i presented a paper on Plato’s conception of truth to an audience at the 24th Annual Workshop

in Ancient Philosophy at Florida state University. During the discussion, Gisela striker wondered why i had not looked to Aristotle for possible clues about Plato’s project. This struck me as a good idea, and my initial thoughts on the matter were eventually included in “A ‘Conception’ of Truth in Plato’s Sophist,” published in the JHP. The present article develops section 6 of that article. i have had some help along the way. sections 2 and 3 were honed at two wonderful NeH summer seminars, “Aristotle on Meaning and Thought” and “Aristotle on Truth and Meaning,” directed by Deborah Modrak and Mark Wheeler. i am deeply indebted to them, as well as David Charles at the first seminar, for taking time to discuss these ideas with me, and to the participants in those seminars for their questions. i read versions of this paper at the second Annual Workshop in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Alaska Anchorage, and at two society for Ancient Greek Philosophy sessions, one at Fordham University, the other in conjunction with the 2011 Pacific APA conference. i am grateful to audiences at each of those events, and to John Mouracade and Mark Wheeler for inviting me to the first two, respectively. i presented the penultimate draft of section 3 to a seminar on Aristotle on truth and meaning at Har-vard. i am grateful to those who attended for their questions, and particularly rusty Jones for inviting me and commenting on the paper. My thanks to the Harvard Philosophy Department for the financial support. Finally, i would like to thank two of my former students, Doug Owings and Jeremy Wyatt, who provided extensive comments along the way, and my colleagues Bill roche and Jeannine Gailey, as well as the two anonymous referees for the Journal for their thoughtful criticisms and suggestions.

220 journal of the h istory o f phi lo so phy 51 :2 apr i l 2013Armstrong, D. M. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. [Truthmakers]Bäck, Allan. Aristotle’s Theory of Predication. leiden: Brill, 2000.Barnes, Jonathan. Truth, Etc. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Belardi, Walter. “riconsiderando la secunda frase del De interpretation.” Studi e saggi linguistici 21 (1981):

79–83. [“riconsiderando”]Blackburn, simon. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.Bolton, robert. “Aristotle on the signification of Names.” in Language and Reality inGreek Philosophy: Proceedings of the Greek Philosophical Society 1984/5, 153–62. Athens: Greek Philosophi-

cal society, 1985.–––––. “essentialism and semantic Theory in Aristotle: Posterior Analytics ii 7–10.” Philosophical Review

85 (1976): 514–44. [“semantic Theory”]Brentano, Franz. “On the Concept of Truth.” in The True and the Evident, 3–25. london: routledge,

1966.–––––. On the Several Senses of Being in Aristoteles. Translated by r. George. Berkeley: University of Cali-

fornia Press, 1975. [Senses of Being]Brown, lesley. “Being in the Sophist.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4 (1986): 49–70.–––––. “The Verb ‘to be’ in Greek Philosophy: some remarks.” in everson, Language, 212–36. [“Verb

‘to be’”]Butler, Travis, and eric rubenstein. “Aristotle on Nous of simples.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34

(2004): 327–53.Campbell, richard. Truth and Historicity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.Carson, scott. “Aristotle on Meaning and reference.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 20 (2003): 319–37.Caston, Victor. “Aristotle and the Problem of intentionality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

58 (1998): 429–98. [“intentionality”]–––––. “Aristotle on the Conditions of Thought.” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient

Philosophy 14 (1998): 202–12. [“Conditions of Thought”]–––––. “Phantasia and Thought.” in Anagnostopoulos, A Companion to Aristotle, 323– 26. [“Phantasia”]–––––. “The spirit and the letter: Aristotle on Perception.” in Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient

Thought, edited by ricardo salles, 245–320. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. [“spirit and letter”] –––––. “Why Aristotle Needs imagination.” Phronesis 49 (1996): 20–55. [“imagination”]Charles, David. Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. [Meaning]–––––. “Aristotle on Names and Their signification.” in everson, Language, 37–73. Cornford, Francis MacDonald. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and sophist of Plato. india-

napolis and New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1957. First published by kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1935. [Plato’s Theory of Knowledge]

Crivelli, Paolo. “Aristotle on signification and Truth.” in Anagnostopoulos, Companion to Aristotle, 81–100. [“signification”]

–––––. Aristotle on Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. [Truth] –––––. “Plato’s Philosophy of language.” in The Oxford Handbook of Plato, edited by Gail Fine, 218–42.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.Dancy, russell M. “Aristotle and existence.” Synthese 54 (1983): 409–42. [“existence”] –––––. “Hintikka, Aristotle, and existence.” in The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka, edited by randall Auxier

and lewis Hahn, 311–28. Chicago: Open Court, 2006. [“Hintikka”]–––––. Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle. Dordrecht: reidel,1975. [Sense and Contradiction]David, Marian. Correspondence and Disquotation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. [Correspondence]Davidson, Donald. “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 263–78.

[“Folly”]–––––. Truth and Predication. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2005.De rijk, lambert Marie. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology, vol. 1. leiden: Brill, 2002.Di Mattei, steven. “rereading Aristotle’s De interpretatione 16a3–8: Verbal Propositions as symbols of

the Process of reasoning.” Ancient Philosophy 26 (2006): 1–21. [“symbols”]everson, steven, ed. Companions to Ancient Thought 3: Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1994. [Language]Frede, Dorthea. “The Cognitive role of Phantasia in Aristotle.” in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, edited

by Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg rorty, 279–96. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. [“Phantasia”]

Frede, Michael. “The Unity of General and special Metaphysics: Aristotle’s Conception of Metaphys-ics.” in Michael Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 81–95. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. [“Unity”]

221aristotle ’ s co n cepti o n o f tr u thGaskin, richard. “Bradley’s regress, the Copula, and the Unity of the Proposition.” Philosophical

Quarterly 45 (1995): 161–80. [“Unity”]–––––. The Unity of the Proposition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. [Proposition]Gottlieb, Paula. “The Principle of Non-Contradiction and Protagoras.” Proceedings of the Boston Area

Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1994): 183–209. [“Non- Contradiction”]Halper, edward. One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Books Alpha–Delta. las Vegas: Parmenides

Publishing, 2009. [Alpha–Delta]–––––. One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: The Central Books. Columbus: The Ohio state University

Press, 1989. [Central Books]Hankinson, r. J. “Avant nous le déluge: Aristotle’s Notion of intellectual Grasp.” in Episteme, etc.: Essays

in Honour of Jonathan Barnes, edited by Ben Morison and katerina ierodiakonou, 30–59. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [“Avant nous le déluge”]

Hestir, Blake. “A ‘Conception’ of Truth in Plato’s Sophist.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2003): 1–24. [“Plato’s Sophist”]

Hintikka, Jaakko. “The Varieties of Being in Aristotle.” in The Logic of Being: Historical Studies, edited by simo knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka, 81–114. Dordrecht: reidel, 1986. [“Varieties of Being”]

irwin, Terrence. “Aristotle’s Conception of signification.” in schofield and Nussbaum, Language and Logos, 241–66. [“signification”]

–––––. Aristotle’s First Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. [First Principles]kahn, Charles. “The Greek Verb ‘To Be’ and the Concept of Being.” Foundations of Language 2 (1966):

245–65. [“Concept of Being”]–––––. “A return to the Theory of the Verb Be, and the Concept of Being.” Ancient Philosophy 24

(2004): 381–405. [“return”]–––––. “some Philosophical Uses of ‘to be’ in Plato.” Phronesis 26 (1981): 105–34. [“Uses of to be”]–––––. The Verb ‘Be’ in Ancient Greek. Dordrecht: reidel, 1973. [Verb ‘Be’]kretzmann, Norman. “Aristotle on spoken sound Conventional by Nature.” in Ancient Logic and Its

Modern Interpretations, edited by J. Corcoran, 3–21. Dordrecht: reidel, 1974. [“spoken sound”]künne, Wolfgang. Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. [Truth]labarrière, Jean-louis. “imagination humaine et imagination animale chez Aristote.” Phronesis 29

(1984): 17–49. [“imagination humaine”]lewis, Frank. “Predication, Things, and kinds in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.” Phronesis 56 (2011): 350–87.

[“Predication”]–––––. Substance and Predication in Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. [Substance]lynch, Michael. Truth as One and Many. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. –––––. True to Life: Why Truth Matters. Cambridge, MA: MiT Press, 2004.Matthen, Mohan. “Greek Ontology and the ‘is’ of Truth.” Phronesis 28 (1983): 113–35. [“Greek

Ontology”]Matthews, Gareth. “Accidental Unities.” in schofield and Nussbaum, Language and Logos, 223–40.Merricks, Trenton. “Truth and Freedom.” Philosophical Review 118 (2009): 29–57. –––––. Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Millikan, ruth Garrett. On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay about Substance Concepts. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2000. [Clear and Confused Ideas]Modrak, Deborah. Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2001. [Meaning]–––––. Aristotle: The Power of Perception. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987. [Perception]Nuchelmans, Gabriel. Theories of the Proposition. Amsterdam/london: North–Holland Publishing Co.,

1973. Owen, G. e. l. Logic, Science, and Dialectic. edited by Martha Nussbaum. ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 1986. [LSD]Pépin, Jean. “Σύμβολα, Σημεῖα, Ὁμοιώματα: À propos de De Interpretatione i, 16a3–8 et Politique Viii 5,

1340a6–39.” in Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung i, edited by Jurgen Weisner, 22–44. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1985. [“De Int. et Pol.”]

Pitcher, George. Truth. englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964.Plato. Platonis Opera. edited by e. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. s. M. Nicoll, D. B. robinson, and J. C. G.

strachan. 5 vols. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995.Polansky, ronald. Aristotle’s De Anima. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.Polansky, ronald, and Mark kuczewsky, “speech and Thought, symbol and likeness: Aristotle’s De

Interpretatione 16a3–9.” Apeiron 23 (1990): 51–63. [“speech”]Pritzl, kurt. “Being True in Aristotle’s Thinking.” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient

Philosophy 14 (1998): 177–201. [“Being True”]

222 journal of the h istory o f phi lo so phy 51 :2 apr i l 2013ross, W. D. Aristotle. 1923. reprint, london: Methuen, 1948.scheiter, krisanna. “images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle.” Phronesis 57 (2012): 251–78.

[“Phantasia”]schofield, Malcolm, and Martha Nussbaum, eds. Language and Logos. New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1982.shields, Christopher. “intentionality and isomorphism in Aristotle.” Proceedings of the Boston Area Col-

loquium in Ancient Philosophy 11 (1997): 307–30. [“intentionality”]–––––. Order in Multiplicity: Homonomy in the Philosophy of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.

[Homonomy]sorabji, richard. Aristotle on Memory, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.szaif, Jan. “Die Geschichte des Wahrheitsbegriffs in der klassischen Antike.” in Die Geschichte des phi-

losophischen Begriffs der Wahrheit, edited by Markus enders and Jan szaif, 1–32. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006. [“Wahrheitsbegriffs”]

–––––. Platons Begriff der Wahrheit. Freiberg-im-Breisgau: karl Abner, 1996.Tarski, Alfred. Collected Papers, vol. 4. edited by s. r. Givant and r. N. Mckenzie. Basel: Birkhäuser, 1986. Thomas Aquinas. On Interpretation. Translated by J.T. Oesterle. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,

1962. [On Int.]Thorp, John. “Aristotle on Being and Truth.” De Philosophia 3 (1982): 1–9. Walz, Matthew. “The Opening of On Interpretation: Toward a More literal interpretation.” Phronesis

51 (2006): 230–51. [“Opening”]Wedin, Michael. Aristotle’s Theory of Substance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. [Substance]–––––. Mind and Imagination in Aristotle. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988. [Mind]Wheeler, Mark. “A Deflationary reading of Aristotle’s Definitions of Truth and Falsehood at Metaphysics

1011b26–7.” Apeiron 44 (2011): 67–90. [“Truth”]–––––. “semantics in Aristotle’s Organon.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1999): 191–226.

[“semantics”]Whitaker, C. W. A. Aristotle’s De interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1996. [Contradiction]

Date post:	18-Dec-2016
Category:	Documents
Upload:	blake
View:	218 times
Download:	3 times

Aristotle’s Conception of Truth: An Alternative View

Documents