Aristotle's Non-Substantial Particluars - Herbert Granger

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Canadian Journal of Philosophy

A Defense of the Traditional Position concerning Aristotle's Non-Substantial ParticularsAuthor(s): Herbert GrangerSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), pp. 593-606Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231172 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYVolume X, Number 4, December 1980

A Defense of the TraditionalPosition Concerning Aristotle'sNon-substantial Particulars

HERBERTGRANGER, University of South Dakota

In this paper I shall defend the traditional claim that Aristotle's non-substantial particulars discussed in the second chapter of the Categoriesare unsharable particulars against G. E. L. Owen's claim that they aresharable universals. I shall proceed by presenting first a sketch of thetraditional position that makes explicit why it holds that non-substantialparticulars are unsharable particulars.1 Secondly, I shall sketch Owen'sposition and recount how it differs in certain important respects from

1 My reconstruction of the traditional position is based on the following sources:W. D. Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 1949): 23-24, 24, n. 1 (hereaftercited as Arist.); J. R. Jones, "Are the Qualities of Particular Things Universal orParticular?" Philosophical Review 58 (1949): 152-156, 162-163;G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas andFrege (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961): 8-10; R. E. Allen, "Individual Propertiesin Aristotle's Categories," Phronesis 14 (1969): 31-32; Ignacio Angelelli, Studieson Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1967):12-15. Angelelli's account is especially important because it reflects the opinionof scholars from late antiquity to the present.

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the traditional position.2 Thirdly, I shall present some of my own con-siderations that I believe support the traditional position at the expenseof Owen's position. Finally, I shall offer what I take to be the primaryreason Aristotle was committed to the existence of such odd items asnon-substantial particulars.

The Traditional PositionIn the second chapter of the Categories Aristotle divides the "thingsthere are" into four classes: those that are said of a subject but are notfound in a subject, for example, "man"; those that are in a subject butnot said of a subject, for example, "a certain knowledge-of-grammar"and "a certain white"; those that are in a subject and said of a subject,for example, "knowledge"; those that are neither said of nor in a sub-ject, for example, "a certain man" and "a certain horse." In this samechapter Aristotlealso maintains that things not said of a subject are each"particular" (atomon) and "one in number." These characterizationsapply not only to "a certain man" and "a certain horse" but also to "acertain white" and "a certain knowledge-of-grammar."The traditional position takes these four types of items to berepresentative of the items found in all ten of the Aristotelian categories.By considering other remarks found in the Categories (iii, 2a14-19,2b7ff., 3b20-23, 11a24-25, 14a21-22), the traditional position holds thatitems said of a subject, both those in as well as those not in a subject, arethe genera and species of the items of which they are said: animal,knowledge and color are genera; man, white and knowledge-of-grammarare species. (LaterIshall take up a more detailed discussion ofAristotle's genus-species relation; pp. 599-602). Genera and species areregarded as universal: items common to or shared by many thingsbecause they are said of many things (cf. Cat. 3b17-18, On Int. 17a39-40).Items not said of a subject, both those in as well as those not in a subject- a certain man, a certain horse, a certain white and a certainknowledge-of-grammar - are all regarded as unsharable particularsthatserve as instances or specimens of their species. Although Aristotlesometimes uses atomon to mean infima species (e.g., Met. Ill 998b29,V 1018b6), in the second chapter of the Categories it is taken to mean"unsharable particular instance of a kind" or simply "particular"

2 G. E. L. Owen, "Inherence," Phronesis 10(1965): 97-105.

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because in this context it is applied to what are clearly items of that type,a man and a horse, and also elsewhere is definitely used to mean "par-ticular" (e.g., Top. VI 144b3, Met. Ill 995b27-31). "One in number," asa gloss on atomon, is taken to mean "numerically distinct" in the sensein which each particular instance of an individuative kind - that is, akind whose instances are countable unsharable particulars or in-dividuals - is taken to be numberically distinct from all other instancesof that kind.Ineach category, then, the following schema is thought to be found:genera, species, the particular instances of species. In the category ofsubstance is found, for example, the universal item, the genus animal;this is said of the universal item, the infima species man, that, in turn, issaid of its unsharable instances, particular men. In the non-substantialcategory of quality, the universal item, the genus color, is said of theuniversal item, the infima species white; the latter, it is presumed, is, inturn, said of "a certain white"; this is taken to be a specimen of the in-fima species white and, like the specimens of the infima species man, istaken to be an unsharable particular.From this sketch it is easy to see why the traditional position holdsthat "a certain white" is an unsharable particular. For it proceeds bymaintaining that in one important respect the substantial and the non-substantial categories share the same sort of structure composed ofitems that in many important ways share the same character. Thetraditional position sees clearly in the case of the substantial categorythat a genus-species schema holds in which genera and species areuniversal while specimens of the species, such as a certain man and acertain horse, can be nothing other than unsharable particulars. Indeed,since Aristotle restricts substances to individuative kinds, everyspecimen of a substantial species would be an unsharable particular.3

3 This claim is based on the following considerations. (1) Aristotle often uses theparticular instances of individuative kinds, such as man, horse, bronze ball (orsphere) and bronze statue, as paradigmatic illustrations of substances (cf., e.g.,Cat. 1b4-5, 27-28, 2b1M4, 3b15, Top. I 103b29-31, On the Gen. of ani. IV767b30-34, Met. XII 1069a30-31, VII, VIM, passim). (2) Only the instances ofindividuative kinds would seem to meet the criterion of being "a certain this"{tode ti) required of substances (e.g., Met. VII 1029a 28). For, among otherreasons, it is difficult to see how such a phrase could be used to refer to anythingbut a discrete particular: cf. J. A. Smith, "TODE TI in Aristotle," The ClassicalReview 35 (1921): 19. (3) Aristotle explictly denies that masses, such as earth,fire and air, are substances (Met. VII 1040b5-10, cf. 992a6-8). On occasion hedoes, however, speak as if masses were substances (Top. I 103a 14 ff., IV 120b38,Met. VII 1028b10-11, V 1017b10-11; compare Met. V 1016a4 with b8-9, Phys.I 185b9-11, V 227a 10ff.). But at least on two of these occasions he is recountingthe various philosophical, and even perhaps the non-philosophical, views

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Now, the traditional position also knows that the same expressions -"said of a subject," "not said of a subject," "genus," "species," "a cer-tain ," "particular," "one in number" - are employed by Aristotleto talk about items in both sorts of categories, and since it assumes theseexpressions are used univocally, it concludes that genera, species andinstances of species are basically of the same nature in both sorts ofcategories. Accordingly, it holds that the items falling under non-substantial infimae species are, like the items falling under substantial in-fimae species, unsharable particulars.My account of why the traditional position holds that non-substantialparticulars are unsharable ignores the notion of "being in a subject"and so also J. L. Ackrill's analysis of that notion, which he uses in sup-port of the traditional position.4 I ignore it because I do not think it playsa major role in the traditional position's decision to treat non-substantialparticulars as unsharable and, unlike Ackrill, because I think it fails tosupport the traditional position.5 In his paper, "Inherence," Owenproceeds in his criticism of the traditional position primarily against

regarding substance (Met. VII 1028b10-11/ V 1017610-11, cf. VII 1040b5 ff.).Accordingly, each time he speaks of masses as substances he might not be ex-pressing his own judgment. Yet even if it is not true that Aristotle always restrictssubstances to individuative kinds, and that at some point he also believes masskinds should be counted as substances, he still seems to treat them as if theywere individuative kinds. This is revealed, I believe, in Topics 1.7 where he dis-cusses how water from the same spring should be regarded as the same inspecies. There Aristotle treats water from a particular spring as a species and allthe water from that spring as the same in species. He also seems to treat thewater from the spring as if it were composed of numerous amounts of water,each enclosed in some way - perhaps in buckets. According to Aristotle, theseamounts of water, like any items said to be the same in species, form a "family"and "resemble" one another (Top. I 103a18-19); thus, like particular men, theyare to be regarded properly as instances of the same species and so the same inspecies. He goes on to make the same point about water in general. Clearly,Aristotle is treating the mass kind water as if it were an individuative kind: as if itwere a kind having instances that are distinct and countable particulars capableof being grouped together through their resemblance to one another.

4 According to Ackrill, what is in a subject must be inseparable from that subjectand so it must be shared by no other subject; consequently, as an unsharableitem it is to be properly regarded as an unsharable particular. Since a certainwhite is in a subject, it must, then, be an unsharable particular: J. L. Ackrill,Aristotle's 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963):74-75.5 I agree with Owen, against Ackrill, that at Categories 2a36-b3 Aristotle maintainsthat universals may be in a subject: Owen, "Inherence," pp. 100-101; cf. Jones,

p. 155.

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Ackrill's remarks concerning "being in a subject." But at the outset ofhis examination he sketches a position that serves as a counter to my in-terpretation of the traditional position: a difference between thecategories with regardto the genus-species schema.6 It is Owen's com-mitment to this difference that is my concern and not his criticism ofAckrill.

Owen's PositionOwen proceeds by introducing the Categories' four-fold distinctionamong things. Even though he does not explicitly hold that there aregenera and species in both types of categories, Owen does speak as ifhe adheres to such a position;7thus to this extent he seems to agree withthe traditional position that the categories share the same sort of struc-ture. But he differs from the traditional position concerning specimensfalling under the species. Owen maintains that the genera and thespecies in both substantial and non-substantial categories are universalssaid of what falls under them: the genus animal is said of the speciesman and man of a certain man; the genus color is said of the specieswhite and white of a certain white. But he differs from the traditionalposition in that only a certain man is regarded as an unsharable par-ticular instance of a kind and that a certain white is considered asharable - that is, universal- instance of the kind white: a certain whiteis a completely determinate shade of white such as Delia Robbia white.He concedes that they are both particulars (or "individuals"), and hetreats atomon as a univocal expression just as the traditional positiondoes. But according to him that they are particulars "just" means thatthey or their names are not said of anything further in their owncategories. A certain man is an ultimate subject not said of anything fur-ther in the category of substance; a certain white as a completelydeterminate shade of white is an ultimate subject not said of anythingfurther in the category of quality: as a completely determinate shade ofwhite it is not the determinable of some further shade of white. A certainman - Socrates - and a cetain white - Delia Robbia white - are

6 Owen, "Inherence/' pp. 98-99.

7 Although Owen never uses the expression "genus/' and he uses the expression"species" only once, his single use of the latter clearly reveals he holds thatspecies are found in every category: Owen, "Inherence," p. 99.

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specimens of their universal kinds: man are white; but they are not bothparticulars in the sense that they are equally unsharable instances ofkinds. Delia Robbia white, in contrast with Socrates, is shared by all theitems that are that shade of white.

Defense of the Traditional PositionUnder Owen's interpretation the substantial and the non-substantialcategories seem to retain their identity of structure with regard to thegenus-species schema, since he speaks as if there were genera andspecies in both types of categories. Under his interpretation both sortsof categories also retain a common nature to the extent that specimensof infimae species in both sorts of categories remain instances of kindsthat are "particulars"in the same way, although not all of them remainunsharable particulars.Yet his position does more to undercut their ap-parent identity of structure than he might imagine or even wish. Forwith his interpretation of "a certain white" as "a completely deter-minate shade of white" he has replaced the genus-species schema inthe non-substantial categories with the determinable-determinateschema. In other words, his account suggests that the two sorts ofcategories have profoundly different structures: the category of sub-stance is composed of a genus-species schema; each of the nonsubstan-tial categories is composed of a determinable-determinate schema.Before Icontinue with my interpretation I need to make a few remarksabout these two sorts of schemata8 and to take up a discussion ofAristotle'sgenus-species relation.An analysis of kinds yields a genus-species hierarchy: animal standsto man as genus to species. An analysis of characteristics yields a deter-minable-determinate hierarchy:color stands to white as a determinablestands to a determinate. A species and a determinate are more specificthan their respective genus and determinable: to characterize an item asa man rather than an animal is to give a more specific characterizationof it;to characterize an item as white ratherthan possessing a color is togive a more specific characterization of it. As items that are more specificthan their respective genus and determinable, they are also more

8 My account is based on the following sources: W. E. Johnson, Logic, Part I(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1921): chapt. xi; Arthur N. Prior,"Determinables, Determinates and Determinants," Part I, Mind 58 (1949): 1-20;John R. Searle, "Determinables and the Notion of Resemblance," Proceedingsof the Aristotelian Society, Supp\.Vo\. 33, (1959): 141-158.

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specific forms of their respective genus and determinable. As such theyentail their genus and determinable but are not entailed by them. Thismuch the two relations have in common, yet they differ in some veryimportant respects.A species such as man is analyzable into a complex of a genus(animal) and a differentia (let us say, rational)or differentiae. The genusand the differentia are logically independent; they do not entail oneanother: an analysis of one does not reveal the other. Man is differen-tiated within its genus through the addition of a differentia to the genus;it is marked off as a more specific form of animal and distinguished fromother animal species through the addition of an element to the genusthat is logically independent of the genus. Nothing of this sort holds inthe case of the determinable-determinate relation. The determinatewhite is not a complex composed of color and some element logicallydistinct from color. It is a simple marked off within color without the aidof elements logically independent of color. What holds in the case ofthe relationship between white and color holds also in the case of therelationship between a shade of white and white: Delia Robbia white isa determinate of the determinable white as white is a determinate of thedeterminable color. Furthermore,an ontological type asymmetry holdsbetween the specimens of infimae species and their infimae species andgenera, and this has no parallel in the case of completely determinateitems and their determinables. With respect to individuative species thespecimens are unsharable countable particulars,while the species andgenera are universals. Even in the case of mass species the specimens,although not countable particulars, are not sharable items like univer-sal. Yet with regard to a completely determinate shade of white, whichcan be viewed as a specimen of white roughly analogous to the waySocrates is viewed as a specimen of man, no such asymmetry holds.Delia Robbia white, white and color are all equally universal in charac-ter.

As I noted in my account of the traditional position, Aristotle'sanalysis of kinds and characteristics - that is, substances and non-substances - yields hierarchies composed of items traditionally ren-dered by the expressions, "genus" and "species." There is evidencefrom the Categories and especially from the Topics to suggest verystrongly that in an early period in his thinking Aristotle's genus-speciesrelation is indeed genuine. Since it is generally agreed that theCategories and the Topics are early works written around the sametime,9 I believe I am justified in appealing to the Topics to support the

9 There is general agreement concerning an early date for the Topics: Pamela M.Huby, "The Date of Aristotle's Topics and its treatment of the Theory of Ideas/'

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claim that the Categories' genus-species relation is genuine. In thefollowing Ishall present the evidence supporting this claim.Within an Aristotelian genus-species hierarchy a species is morespecific than its genus, for Aristotle holds that when characterizing aparticularman it is "more informative" to give the species "man" thanthe genus "animal" (Cat. 2b7 ff.). An Aristotelian species is a morespecific form of its genus because it is a kind falling under its genus andknowledge of it entails knowledge of its genus.10 Moreover, knowledgeof the genus does not entail knowledge of the species.11 Aristotle treatsthe species as a complex composed of itsgenus and another element (orset of elements) traditionally rendered by the expression "differentia"(e.g., Top. VI 141b26 ff.), and he also treats the species as differentiatedwithin itsgenus through the addition of the differentia to the genus.12As

Classical Quarterly 12 (1962): 72-80; in n. 1 on p. 72 Huby lists several scholarswho regard the Topics as early. Some scholars, however, have doubted theauthenticity of the Categories, and have argued that it was written by one ofAristotle's students: e.g., E. Duprel, "Aristote et le Traits des Categories,"Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 22 (1909): 230-251. For excellent dis-cussions of the various arguments against its authenticity and also excellent de-fences of its authenticity and early date, see: Isaac Husik, "On the Categories ofAristotle," Philosophical Review 13 (1904): 514-528; "The Authenticity ofAristotle's Categories," The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939): 427-431; L. M. DeRijk, "The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories," Mnemosyne 4 (1951): 129-157.Ross always believed that chapters 1-9 of the Categories were authentic andearly (Arist., pp. 9-10), and he was convinced by Husik's arguments, which hedid not discover until well after their publication, that 10-13 also belonged to theCategories and that 14-15 were at least by Aristotle: "The Authenticity ofAristotle's Categories," The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939): 431-433. A few ofthe numerous, more recent scholars who also believe that the Categories isauthentic and early include: Joseph Owens, "Aristotle on Categories," Reviewof Metaphysics 14 (1960-61): 73-90; Ackrill, p. 69; G. E. L. Owen, "The Platonismof Aristotle," Proceedings of the British Academy 50 (1965): 1 25-1 50.

10 This applies explicitly to both substantial and non-substantial items; e.g.: "Thus...'animal' is the genus of 'raven', and so is 'bird'. Whenever therefore we say thatthe raven is a bird, we also say that it is a certain kind of animal, so that both thegenera are predicated of it" (Top. I 107a23-26); "...the man who said 'X is aman' has also said that it is an animal and that it is animate..." {Top. II 1 12a1 7-19);"...whoever employs the term 'virtue' employs the term 'good', seeing that virtueis a certain kind of good..." (Top. VI 142b16-17, cf. IV 124b15-21). Translationsof the passages from the Topics are from the Oxford translation.

11 "...if the genus. ..be known it does not follow of necessity that the species isknown as well..." (Top. VI 141b32-33, cf. 143a26-28).12 "For the genus ought to divide the object from things in general, and thedifferentia from any of the things contained in the same genus" (Top. VI140a27-29); "...for a specific differentia, if added to the genus, always makes a

species..." (Top. VI 143b8-9).

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in an authentic genus-differentia relation, Aristotle's genus and differen-tia are also treated as logically independent of one another.13 Aristotle'sgenus-differentia analysis, just as his genus-species analysis, applies toboth kinds and characteristics (Top. IV, VI, passim): for example, thegenus of the kind man is "animal" while its differentia is sometimes saidto be "biped" (cf., e.g., Cat. 3a23, Top. VI 141b31-32); the genus of the

13 Several passages support this Interpretation; the most Important of them is foundin Aristotle's discussion of the claim that the genus and differentia are prior inintelligibility to the species: "They [i.e., genus and differentia] are also more in-telligible; for if the species be known, the genus and differentia must of necessitybe known as well (for any one who knows what a man is knows also what'animal' and 'walking' are), whereas if the genus or the differentia be known itdoes not follow of necessity that the species is known as well: thus the species isless intelligible" {Top. VI 141b29-34). It is clear from this passage that sinceknowledge of the genus alone or the differentia alone does not yield knowledgeof the species - a combination of genus and differentia - genus and differentiamust be logically independent of one another; if this were not the case, know-ledge of one of them would introduce knowledge of the other and so also thespecies. Aristotle also suggests that the genus and differentia are logically inde-pendent when he holds that they are not to be "predicated" in name and de-finition of one another (Top. VI 144a28-b3; cf. IV 122b20 ff., 121a1M2,V 132b35 ff.). The genus should not be predicated of the differentia because,among other reasons, this would be to treat the differentia as a "species" fallingunder the genus. This would seem to mean that the differentia is logically inde-pendent of the genus, for if it were logically dependent on its genus, so that ananalysis of it would introduce its genus - an analysis of biped, for instance,would introduce animal: whatever is a biped is also an animal - then it wouldclearly be in danger of assimilation with the class of items that are the species ofthe genus - biped, like man, would appear to be a kind of animal - and thedistinction between species and differentia would be destroyed. Similar con-siderations would seem to hold in the case of the differentia's being predicatedof the genus, although Aristotle does not actually maintain that if this were done,the genus would be treated as a species of the differentia. Much the same pointconcerning the genus-differentia relation seems to be made when Aristotle saysthe differentia cannot be "inside" the genus nor the genus "inside" thedifferentia, for this too would be to treat the differentia as a species of the genusand the genus as a species of the differentia (cf. Top. IV 122b18-20, 123a1-2).Furthermore, the mere fact that Aristotle insists so often that a definition of aspecies must be composed of two distinct elements, a genus and a differentia(e.g., Top. I 103b15-16, VI 141b25-27, VII 153a15-18), supports the claim forlogical independence, for if the genus and differentia were not independent,one of them alone would surely be sufficient to define the species. There are,however, a few passages from the Categories and the Topics that conflict withmy interpretation of Aristotle's genus-differentia relation {Cat. 1b16-20, Top.I 107b19-26, VI 144b12-30). These, I believe, can be accounted for as lateradditions that reflect a change of mind on Aristotle's part concerning the natureof his genus-differentia relation. For a more complete discussion of the issuesraised in this footnote and the nature of Aristotle's genus-species relation, seemy paper, "Aristotle and the Genus-Species Relation," The Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, 18 (1980), 37-50.

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characteristics, white and black, is "color" while their differentiae arerespectively "piercing" and "compressing."14 As regards the on-tological type asymmetry found between genus and species and theirspecimens, it was noted in my account of the traditional position thatthe genera and species of substances and non-substances are universalswhile the specimens of substances are clearly unsharable particulars;this latter point, however, as it applies to non-substantial specimens isjust what is at issue. At any event, the considerations offered here makean extremely good case for the claim that Aristotle's genus-speciesrelation, as it is found in his very early thought and so his thought in theCategories, is genuine and that it applies indifferently to the substantialand non-substantial categories.15 1return now to my criticism of Owen'sinterpretation.Since Owen does not regard "a certain white" as an unsharable par-ticular instance of white but as a completely determinate shade of whitethat itself does not serve as a determinable of some further determinateshade of white and as a sharable universal, it seems that he has clearlyreplaced the genus-species schema in the non-substantial categorieswith the determinable-determinate schema. Since he does not treat theschema of the category of substance as other than a genus-speciesschema, he seems, then, to hold, at least implicitly, that the schemata ofthe substantial and non-substantial categories are not identical. Of cour-se, in one respect Owen must hold that they are not identical simplybecause he holds that a certain man and a certain white are differenttypes of items and so there must be different types of schemata in the

14 Top. VII 153a36-b1, I 107b29-31, cf. Met. X 1057b8-1 1; the qualities of "justice"and "injustice" are composed of the differing genera "virtue" and "vice" but ofthe same differentia "of the soul" {Top. VII 153b6-1 0); the relative "knowledge"must have relative differentiae {Top. VI 145a13-15); the quality of "virtue" iscomposed of the genus "state" and the differentia "good" {Top. VI 144a9-16);"astonishment" is made up for the genus "wonderment" and the differentia"excess" while "conviction" of the genus "conception" and the differentia"vehemence" {Top. IV 126b13-19).

15 Of course, Aristotle need not have held to the view that non-substantial itemsare susceptible to a genus-species analysis to the end of his life. I think it reason-ably evident that in chapters four and five of Metaphysics VII Aristotle gives ananalysis of non-substantial items that cannot be construed in terms of the genus-species schema: non-substantial items are said to contain the substantial subjectof which they are predicated as an "additional" element in their nature, and forthat reason they are not definable or at least not in the way substantial items aredefinable. But this consideration need not detain me, for I am obliged only toargue that at one period Aristotle did apply a genus-species analysis to the non-substantial categories and that there is good reason to believe that the Categorieswas written in that period.

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two types of categories to account for them. Yet in another respect hemust retain their identity because the uniform lanuage of the Categories- "genus," "species," "said of a subject," "not said of a subject," "acertain ," "particular," "one in number" - used to describe theitems in both sorts of categories suggests that they are of the same typeand are members of the same sort of schema. And there is no directevidence to suggest that the language used is equivocal. Owen himselfrespects this point when he gives an interpretation of atomon thatallows a certain man and a certain white to be "particulars" in the sameway without committing himself to the position that a certain white is anunsharable particular. But Owen needs, then, to go on and do the samewith the cross-categorial expressions, "genus" and "species," (and, forthat matter, the cross-categorial phrase, "one in number"16). For sincehis interpretation seems to entail that there is a determinable-deter-minate relation in each of the non-substantial categories and it does notsuggest that the genus-species relation found in the category of substan-ce is other than genuine - and, as I have pointed out, it does indeedappear to be genuine - and since the two sorts of relations are clearlydifferent, he needs to argue that Aristotle's cross-categorial expressions,"genus" and "species," do not signify what we mean by "genus" and"species" but have univocal meanings when used to describe items inboth sorts of categories and can signify indifferently what we mean by"genus" and "determinable" and "species" and "determinate"respectively. Owen does not do this, nor do I think that he can simplybecause, as I have shown, there is good reason to believe that at least inthe Categories and the Topics Aristotle uses "genus" and "species," re-gardless of which category they are used in, to signify a genuine genus-species relation and so a relation quite distinct from a determinable-de-terminate relation. In view of these considerations, Owen leaves theclear impression that for his interpretation to work "genus" and"species" ought to be equivocal expressions: in the category ofsubstance they ought to mean what we mean by "genus" and"species"; in the non-substantial categries they ought to mean what wemean by "determinable" and "determinate." Owen does not, then,completely respect the univocal character of the language used in thetwo sorts of categories, and so his interpretation does not retain theidentity of structure of the two sorts of categories demanded by thatunivocity of language. On these issues, the traditional position is clearly

16 For a discussion of how "one in number" can be used to support the traditionalposition at Owen's expense, see: Gareth B. Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, "TheOne and the Many," Review of Metaphysics 21 (1968): 640-643.

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superior, for it retainsthe univocity of language and the identity of struc-ture by simply holding that the genus-species relation is found in everycategory and, in addition, that the specimens of infimae species in everycategory are unsharable particulars.That the specimens are unsharable non-universal items is, however,only appropriate and is independent of the issues of univocity oflanguage and identity of structure; for under my interpretation they arespecimens of infimae species in genuine genus-species relations, and, asI have noted, the genus-species relation demands that such specimensbe unsharable. Consequently, once it is granted that the schemata ofthe non-substantial categories are genuine genus-species schemata, thetraditional position regarding non-substantial specimens must beretained for those schemata to continue to be genuine genus-speciesschemata.

The PrimaryReason for Unsharable Non-substantial ParticularsThe considerations offered in this paper support not only the traditionalposition's claim that in the Categories the substantial and non-substantial categories possess the same sort of genus-species structure,but they also suggest the primary reason Aristotle was committed tosuch an identity of structure and why he admitted non-substantial un-sharable particularsinto his ontology. Of course, if such a reason couldbe provided, a very strong defense of the traditional position would alsobe provided; for it can, then, be seen why Aristotle would have thoughtthat there must be such odd items as non-substantial unsharable par-ticulars. Now, the considerations I have offered in this paper clearlyshow that Aristotleemployed the genus-species schema in both types ofcategories around the time the Categories and the Topics were written.They suggest, then, that at this very early stage in his thinking hepossessed only one schema for analyzing both types of categories. Inother words, the primaryreason the two types of categories possess thesame structure and the same sorts of items when they are discussed inthe Categories is that Aristotle had available at that point only the genus-species schema to guide him in his analysis of the various items andtheir relationships within each category. Taking into consideration thissuggestion, I shall now conclude by sketching an account of howAristotle might have come to hold that there are unsharable non-substantial particulars.I assume that Aristotle developed his understanding of thegenus-species schema through an analysis of substantial kinds rather

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than that of non-substantial characteristics, and therefore I also assumethat he first used the genus-species schema in the category of substance.I think these assumptions are reasonable, since the genus-speciesschema rightly applies to kinds rather than characteristics and probablycould not have been articulated except through an examination of kin-ds, and because Aristotle seems to use kinds rather than characteristicsas paradigmatic illustrations of genera and species.17 Now, sinceAristotle did not have available a schema other than the genus-speciesschema to guide him in his initial analysis of the categories, when hetook up his examination of the non-substantial categories, he would, ofcourse, have used in his examination the same genus-species schemahe had previously used in his investigation of the category of substance.In this situation it would be very natural for the genus-species schema asit is applied in the category of substance to function as the model for hisanalysis of the non-substantial categories simply because the genus-species schema was first articulated by him in the category of substance.Since Aristotle limited substances to individuative kinds, the genus-

1 7 When Aristotle first introduces the notion of the genus in the Topics, his exampleis "animal" {Top. I 101 b31). In his first discussion of the nature of the genus heuses "animal" as his example of a genus and "man" and "ox" to illustrate thespecies {Top. I 102a31 ff.). In a paragraph summarizing what Aristotle regards assome basic distinctions between genus and differentia, "animal" is his exampleof a genus and "man" his example of a species {Top. IV 128a 20 ff.). D. M.Balme has pointed out that in the logical works Aristotle's "stock" examples ofgenus and species are animal and man: "Genos and Eidos in Aristotle's Biology/'Classical Quarterly 12 (1962): 84; this too suggests that the species and genera ofkinds were his paradigmatic species and genera. Aristotle's genus-species re-lation was obviously developed in terms of the Platonic method of division,since the relationships uncovered by division are similar to genus-speciesrelationships. Plato applies division indifferently to kinds and characteristics (forcharacteristics: Sophist and Statesman, passim; for kinds: Statesman 264A-265D,279C ff., 287E-291C, Sophist 220A), and although in the dialogues characteristicsreceive far more attention from him than do kinds, and so it would appear thathe developed division through an analysis of characteristics, there is reason tobelieve he might have developed division through an analysis of kinds, as onewould have expected. For Plato had a serious interest in the classification ofnatural kinds. A fragment of the Middle Comedy poet Epicrates depicts Plato in-structing young boys in the classification of botanical kinds (Athenaeus 2.59c-f),and this activity would probably not have been selected for ridicule unless itwere well known that Plato was interested in such classifications: cf. Balme, p. 81,W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 4 vols. (Cambridge: CambridgeUniv. Press, 1975), 4: 22-23, G. C. Field, Plato and his Contemporaries: A Studyof Fourth-century Life and Thought, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1967): 38. More-over, Speusippus' clear interest in the classification of natural kinds, which isshown by the fragments from his Similars, reveals at least that there was interestin such a program in the Academy (e.g., Athenaeus 3.86c, 3.105b).

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species schema, when applied in the category of substance, yieldedseries composed not only of genera and infimae species but also clear-cut unsharable particular specimens falling under the infimae species: acertain man, a certain horse. In keeping with the genus-species schemanon-substantial categories would be composed of genera, infimaespecies and unsharable specimens; yet since Aristotle uses the genus-species schema as it is applied in the category of substance as his basicmodel, the specimens in non-substantial categories not only would beunsharable but they would also be particulars - a certain white, a cer-tain knowledge-of-grammar- modeled implicitly on substantial un-sharable particular specimens. Hence an identity of nature with regardto genera, species and specimens of infimae species would beestablished by Aristotle for the two types of categories.18

January 1979

18 I wish to express my gratitude to Alexander Mourelatos, Kenneth Winkler,Fred Miller and an anonymous referee of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy fortheir helpful criticisms of earlier versions of this paper. I presented a version ofthis paper at the 1978 Western Division Meetings of the American PhilosophicalAssociation.

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Aristotle's Non-Substantial Particluars - Herbert Granger

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