Armenia: Post-Election AssessmentRichard Giragosian
Director
Regional Studies Center Yerevan, Armenia
26 February 2013
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Political Assessment
1. Pre-Election Context & Campaign
2. The Election
3. Election Reaction
4. Opposition: Momentum & Initiative
5. Role Play & Scenario Analysis Exercise
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General Observations• Competition of election: limited choice, little
voice, even less debate
• Conduct of the vote: widespread local & regional level violations; protest vote swings to opposition; acceptable voter turnout
• Competence and capacity: CEC handling of challenges and complaints as a test
• Confidence: legitimacy of results questioned; need to gain/earn public trust
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Lack of Real Competition• Generally, the presidential election was the
country’s least competitive election, with an absence of any one viable challenger to incumbent President Sarkisian
• But the lack of real competition was an accurate reflection of the current political reality
• Opposition was fairly weak due to three factors: open division between prominent opposition figures & inability to unite; lack of true grassroots-based political parties; pronounced lack of democracy within the parties themselves
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Personality over Policy
• As with past political campaigns (both presidential and parliamentary), the campaign was dominated by a contest of personality, rather than any real competition of ideology or a competing choice of policies
• The campaign was also marked by a primitive and low level of political discourse, with little debate and even less of a choice between competing visions or strategic alternatives
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Amateur Politics• A related criticism of the campaign was the
affirmation that politics in Armenia is still more of a hobby, and not a profession, with little in terms of campaign tactics and even less political strategy; no clear message or theme, and no campaign planning of events or issues
• In this way, it was not a political campaign as commonly accepted; the use of “boycotts & hunger strikes” are not political tactics, usually used in politics only as last resort, not first resort
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Specific Trends
• Un-level playing field; advantage of incumbency; use, misuse and abuse of administrative resources
• Inflated and inaccurate voter list• Media coverage more open and balanced;
but much less to cover• Widespread voting irregularities• Another “missed opportunity” for Armenian
democracy
Lack of Real Competition
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This was the campaign highlight?
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The Election: 18 February
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“Harry Potter’s Disappearing Ink”
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The Party Machine
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The Election Outcome• Sarkisian’s re-election was largely
expected (58.6 %)
• Turnout was greater than expected (60%)
• Votes for Raffi Hovhannisian (36.75%) more than expected; votes for Hrant Bagratian (2.15%) less than expected
• Voting violations & irregularities
• “Prosperous Armenia” campaigns for Sarkisian; passive Kocharian
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The Broader SignificanceUnresolved March 2008 Lingers
The Post-Election SituationCan the opposition sustain the momentum?
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Reaction: 19 February Yerevan
• Thousands turn out to protest election results
• Hovhannisian emerges as undisputed leader of the opposition
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Yerevan 20 February
• Hovhannisian declares launch of “prolonged struggle”
• Nikol Pashinian unofficially endorses & anoints Hovhannisian, but warns of need for clarity and strategy
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21 February: Meeting
• Hovhannisian walks to meet President Sarkisian
• Risky move, legitimizes Sarkisian
• But also elevates the civility of political culture & challenges Sarkisian
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21 February: Meeting
• Hovhannisian as new type of challenger
• Sarkisian disarmed and confused by Hovhannisian’s smile
• First-ever opposition maturity puzzles Sarkisian- has never faced such a non-confrontational rival
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21 February: Meeting
• Risky move by not reporting on meeting, triggers concern over secret deal
• Hovhannisian promises details in next day rally
• But Hovhannisian gains upper hand, demonstrates willingness to engage
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Yerevan 22 February
• Pressure and opposition momentum only builds
• Over 8000 protestors• Forges new tactical
alliances as ARF and Nikol Pashinian lend support
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Yerevan 22 FebruaryAlliances
• Most important tactic is in securing Pashinian, as endorsement
• But Pashinian may also emerge later to rescue and carry on the broader stuggle
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Gyumri: 23 February
• Smart tactics by Hovhannisian to leverage his base of support and broaden his momentum
• Exploits his divisive win (+70%) in Gyumri & Vanadzor, second- and third-largest cities
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23 February“Agents of Change”
• Former President Levon Ter-Petrosian (LTP) rejects election results, declares Hovhannisian winner
• Hovhannisian recognized as LTP-style “agent of change”
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25 February: Student ProtestsHelp to Sustain the Momentum
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Political Ghosts & Corpses• Situation affirms the
decline of Prosperous Armenia Party and confirms demise of former President Kocharian
• Even subsequent Prosperous Armenia party statement is to little, too late, failed attempt to show political relevance
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Context of Confrontation:Less apathy, even less fear
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Opposition Tactics & Strategy
26-28 February: • “road show” to 21
cities & towns• Return for Yerevan
rally & March 1st rallyMost significant as first-
ever opposition strategy to engage regions beyond the capital Yerevan
The Government’s Response• To date, the government
has neither understood nor addressed the deep level of discontent
• Government’s response has largely been passive and inactive, but no over-reaction either
• Momentum & initiative remains firmly with opposition (so far)
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Trends & Forecast
• Lingering discontent
• Can the opposition strategize?
• Do the authorities understand?
• The government’s response?
• Start of a political transition
• Emerging leaders & new contenders
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Role Play & Scenario Analysis
• Role play exercise: the characters:– Main players: Sarkisian & Hovhannisian– Others: Pashinian & Ter-Petrosyan– Parties: ANC, ARF and Prosperous Armenia– Other? Kocharian? More??
• Scenario analysis: Strategic goals? Tactics: what next? How?