T he Germans proved to be a thorn in the side of the Province of Gaul even after the "chastisement" of Ariovistus by Caesar. Germans would raid across the Rhine and return with whatever booty they could carry. With Gaul stripped of legions by the civil wars, militia did what they could, but they couldn't be everywhere. Once Augustus had stabilized the Roman world following the civil wars, he undertook to do something about it. With typical Roman reasoning, he decided that to protect Gaul from the Germans- it was necessary to subjugate Germania. Augustus sent his stepson Nero Claudius Drusus to push the Roman frontier to the Elbe river. Drusus was enormously popular and effective. He undertook four successful campaigns in Germania from 12 BC-9 BC, earning his cognomen, Germanicus. He died following a fall from his horse. At the same time, his brother Tiberius (the future emperor) in the south pushed to the Danube river. The objective of the two campaigns was to establish an Elbe/Danube frontier, which would be one third shorter than the Rhine/ Danube defensive line. The major problem with the subjugation of Germania was that

unlike Gaul, the countryside couldn't supply the legions. More primitive than the Gauls, the Germans had only small non permanent villages and could move entire tribes around at will. Having no extensive agriculture, they lived primarily off their herds of cattle. It was impossible for the Romans to occupy a central position and project force to pacify the surrounding areas, because there were no central positions to occupy. Nor could the country-side support the legions as Gaul did during Caesar's campaigns. Legions could maintain themselves with supply trains, but these were vulnerable to attack in the dark forests. During this period, the legions would stay in Germania only for the campaign season, withdrawing to the Rhine forts or into Gaul for the winter. Nonetheless, the campaigns of Germanicus and Tiberius accomplished Augustus' main objective of protecting Gaul, and things settled down for the better part for two decades. Publius Quinctilius Varus was given the governorship of Germania. He had previously been governor of Syria, and was known as the governor who "arrived a poor man in a rich province, and left a poor country

as a rich man." He considered the best way to subjugate the Germans was through administration of law, not the sword. Unfortunately, his view of justice was to manipulate the law to weaken the Germans (while enriching himself and his cronies, of course). He earned hatred and contempt from the Germans even as they paid the heavy tribute. A certain Arminius, son of Sigimer and a 27-year-old Prince of the Cherusci tribe, had learned much by serving with the Roman armies as an auxiliary. He was given Roman citizenship and Equestrian rank, and often dined with Governor Varus. While his brother Flavus gravitated towards Roman life, Arminius contrived to free his homeland through the downfall of the Roman invaders with the aid of other tribes, including the Marsi, Bructeri and Chatti.

Teutoburger Wald Intending to lure Varus out of camp into difficult terrain during the summer of AD 9, news was brought that a distant tribe had rebelled against Rome. With the Cherusci at his side as auxiliares, Varus marched towards the Weser River, bringing his entire supply train plus non-combatants and camp followers. In addition to the

would see no major Roman threat for five years.

Campaign of AD 14 After the death of Augustus, Tiberius ordered a campaign of revenge. We don't know whether this was another attempt to establish Roman hegemony, or simply to erase the stain of defeat with victory. In command of the Rhine Army was a 30-year-old proconsul with impressive family connections. Germanicus Caesar was the grandson of Marc Antony, son of Drusus Germanicus, nephew and adopted son of Emperor Tiberius, brother of the future Emperor Claudius, father of the future Emperor Caligula, and grandfather of the future Emperor Nero. Tiberius helped his young son by assigning Aulus Caecina Severus as his second in command. Caecina was a capable officer with forty years of experience campaigning against the Germans, Pannonians and Parthians. Germanicus conducted his first action in the fall of AD 14. With an army of four legions, 1,500 cavalry, and some 10,000 auxiliares, he stealthily crossed into the territory of the Marsi, who seem to have been off-guard after five years of Roman inactivity. Dividing this army into four columns, he took the Marsi completely by surprise and burned a swath fifty miles wide through the heart of their territory. A large part of the tribe and their herds were slaughtered. Germanicus reunited his force and retired for the winter, beating off skirmishes from other tribes who had come to the assistance of the Marsi. He had revived the morale of the army and now prepared them for the serious campaigns ahead.

Campaign of AD 15 In the following spring, he divided his reinforced army into two columns, one under himself and the other under Caecina Severus. Germanicus struck at and ravaged the lands of the

Chatti, while Caecina tied down the Cherusci to prevent them from fully engaging. The Chatti chose not to engage Germanicus, instead evacuating what they could save, and melting into the forests. To divert Roman attention, Arminius attacked and besieged the stronghold of Segestes, the same pro-Roman Cherusci noble who had warned Varus. Segestes appealed to Germanicus, who

abandoned the hunt of the elusive Chatti, and marched to relieve Segestes. Arminius retired into the forests once again and gathered warriors from several tribes. The Romans captured Arminius' pregnant wife, Thusnelda, who happened to be Segestes' daughter. Segestes and his household were allowed to settle in Ravenna, with Thusnelda practically a prisoner, and the son

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of Arminius raised in Roman ways. The loss of his wife and child enraged Arminius, but he remained cold and calculating in his hatred of Rome. In the meantime, Caecina again ravaged the Marsi. Hit twice in a row, this tribe was effectively knocked out of the war and adopted a low profile for several years. This ended the spring campaign. For the summer, Germanicus united the two columns and advanced towards the territory of the Bructeri. On the way, they came to Varus' final camp, which was a haunting and pitiable scene. Whitening bones were scattered unburied on the ground. Skulls were nailed to tree trunks where captives had been executed six years earlier. Surviving veterans of the battle pointed out where the Eagles had been captured, and where Varus fell. Germanicus spoke quietly of the dead, and buried the bones in a great funeral mound, his piety stoking the fury of his legions for revenge. The Romans moved onward, attempting to engage Arminius, who continued to fall back. The Germanic prince showed a flair for guerilla action, striking at supply groups and flankers, then retiring as the main force came to their aid. He might very well have worn down a weaker or less capable opponent. At one point

Arminius lured the Roman cavalry forward and ambushed them with hidden troops. They were nearly wiped out, but as Germanicus rushed forward with the legions, Arminius broke off the action once again. It appears that Germanicus was frustrated in his attempts to pin down and ravage the Bructeri by Arminius' hit and run warfare. The supply problems steadily worsened as baggage trains from Gaul had to struggle through the dense forests, always vulnerable to sudden attack. Towards the end of the campaign season, he went with half of the army by ship down river to the North Sea bases. Caecina returned via the old "long bridges" built some years earlier by one of the Ahenobarbi. Caecina stopped to repair them. During construction work in swampy terrain, Arminius struck and inflicted some losses. Caecina managed to hold off the Germans and get his men into camp. Arminius urged that the Germans wait until the Romans made a run for it, chasing them down the same way they defeated Varus. His uncle Inguiomerus argued for storming the camp to take the booty undamaged, and because the Romans were already demoralized. Arminius lost at the council and the Germans attacked the camp. The canny Caecina Severus sortied just as the Germans were coming over the walls and routed them with his swift and violent counterattack. Inguiomerus was wounded and the Germans driven off with heavy losses. This victory was counterbalanced by a storm at sea which scattered and caused heavy damage to Germanicus' part of the army. Many of the ships landed on German shores. Most of the men were sent back, and some were ransomed. A few ships even blew to Britain, but these men were returned to the Romans by the Brittannic chiefs. Germanicus retired to winter quarters,

plotting ways to cancel these setbacks in the next season.

Campaign of AD 16 Despite the threat of storms, Germanicus realized that the supply problem outweighed the dangers of traveling upriver by ship. He ordered construction of a thousand transports, to carry the entire army and its supplies, and to act as a mobile city and depot. His plan was to strike deep into German territory, at the supposedly "safe" Cherusci and Chatti. If he could cripple their ability to wage war, even temporarily, he could then return west and finish off the Bructeri and Marsi without their combining with their allies. The Roman army traveled via the Drusus canal (built by his father, linking the Waal River near present-day Arnhem to the Rhine), then to the Frisian coast, and up the Weser River. The Roman host landed upriver deep in the heart of Cherusci territory. This time it appears, Arminius planned or was forced to fight. Idistaviso There are many questions and contradictions concerning the Battle of Idistaviso. We aren't sure of the exact location, but there is a fairly detailed description of the field in Tacitus. The strength of the Roman army is given as 28,000 men in eight legions, of which four of the legions were only "detachments." In addition, the Romans fielded supposedly some 30,000 auxiliares, plus 6,000 "heavy" cavalry and more than 1,000 mounted archers. However, these numbers ignore the relatively heavy losses of the previous year, especially among the cavalry. Germanicus did not replace those men, limiting himself to more horses (cavalry and pack) and supplies. The manpower estimates also do not take into account forces left as garrisons at the Roman forts, or in the lands of supposedly allied German tribes, such as the Chauci (no doubt to encourage them to remain allied). Lastly, a

significant portion of the cavalry plus some light infantry were a good distance to the north, keeping the Angrivarii docile. The German numbers are even more unreliable, simply stated as 40-50,000 tribesmen, including "some" cavalry. Delbriick argues that the Battle of Idistaviso never took place, but was made up for propaganda purposes to cover the Roman failure to conquer Germania up to the Elbe. He points out that militarily it made no sense for Arminius to engage the superior Roman army. This may be true, but I believe by concentrating strictly on the military issue, Delbriick ignores the political aspect. Generals rarely have the complete freedom of action to think in purely military terms while disregarding political considerations. All we know of the German campaigns are from Roman sources. It must have been difficult for Arminius to convince the Germanic tribes with all their warrior traditions to instead evade and let the Romans raid and devastate at will, engaging only in guerrilla warfare. After two years of such evasion, which many might have considered cowardly, it is very possible that aggressive chieftains finally forced the issue. Perhaps, Arminius had to make a stand or lose his authority. We've already seen that Arminius had been overruled once, at Caecina Severus' camp. It wouldn't be the first time a political decision rather than a military one brought about a losing battle, nor would it be the last. Assuming that the battle did take place as described in Tacitus, it appears that Arminius picked a spot to minimize Roman advantages. The Germans deployed in a narrow spot between the Weser River on their left (to the east), a small plain and some heights in the center, and forest on their right. The narrowness of the spot kept the Romans from deploying to their

full width, and provided little maneuver room for the Roman cavalry. The Cherusci were by far the largest contingent and occupied the center. Other unnamed tribes (almost certainly including the Chatti) were on the flanks. Germanicus deployed his tribal auxiliaries in front, followed by his skirmishers, then four legions plus his Praetorian Guard. He followed this with the detachments from the other four legions. For purposes of the scenario (to reduce the number of Tribunes/ Legates), we have brigaded the detachments into five legions. In fact, these understrength legions had to be filled out with extra auxiliares (including light infantry and mounted bowmen). This is why they are not all veteran, despite two years of campaigning. The Roman cavalry is a bigger question. Tacitus claims that Lucius Stertenius with the cavalry and some light infantry had been sent North to the lands of the Angrivarii to subdue a revolt. Yet, he has Stertenius present at Idistaviso. It may be that Tacitus meant Stertenius sent the cavalry force North under some other commander, but stayed with the army with the remainder. We've reduced the Roman cavalry numbers to account for some being present, and some with the Angrivarii. Tacitus then goes on to say that the "heavy" cavalry were deployed in the woods, which makes little sense. Perhaps the trees were so widely spaced that there was room to maneuver, or perhaps Germanicus simply had to make do with the terrain at hand, now that the Germans had finally opted to stand and give battle. The battle opened with the Roman army marching up the heights towards the Germans. At this moment the entire German host charged. The German tribes on the right struck the auxiliares but were in turn struck in the flank by the Roman cavalry in the

woods. At the same time, the Germans on the left engaged in fierce combat with the auxiliares but were unable to break through. The two German flanks retreated as Arminius and the Cherusci slammed into the center of the auxiliary line. The Germans broke through and reached the skirmishers, only to be stopped by the steadily advancing regular legions. The Roman cavalry in the woods struck the German flank and rear, beginning the rout. Arminius was wounded during the peak of the action. He managed to escape, possibly with the help of Chauci among the auxiliares who recognized him. The Romans took very light losses, the brunt of the casualties being in the advanced ranks of the auxiliares. Germanicus quickly advanced on some defensive works built by the Angrivarii to mark the Cherusci frontier but occupied by Cherusci. It appears that the Cherusci non-combatants were trying to escape, and the warriors were manning these works to keep the Romans off them. The injured Arminius again fought a pitched battle, in which his uncle Inguiomerus was killed. The Cherusci were overcome and the defensive works battered by Roman siege engines, while slingers and archers kept up a steady fire. With the Cherusci thus "chastised," the Angrivarii and other tribes offered their submission. Germanicus withdrew by river to continue the campaign in territory closer to Gaul. Again, his fleet was struck by storm and scattered along the coast. He recovered from this in time to divide his army and strike again at the Marsi, Bructeri and Chatti. At this point, Germanicus was recalled to Rome by Emperor Tiberius. Tiberius was no fool, and fully realized he could not allow Germanicus to have his army long enough for it to become personally loyal to him, as Caesar's had in the Gallic War.

Despite his protests that the Germanic War wasn't finished, Germanicus was dragged back to Rome and rewarded with a second consulship, being sent to Syria to keep an eye on the Parthians. In AD 19, he died of poisoning, possibly at Tiberius' instigation. The deadly cycle of the cutting down of popular generals by nervous emperors had already begun. The recall of Germanicus marked the end of Roman attempts to conquer Germany. The future witnessed punitive incursions, but never a serious attempt to subjugate the land. The Romans mainly contented themselves with setting the German tribes against one another and defending the Rhine frontier. Arminius engaged in intertribal warfare with the Marcomanni, and was slain some years later by his own kinsmen in a dispute over leadership of the Cherusci. Today Arminius is considered a German national hero with a monument to him unveiled in 1875 at Detmold by Otto Von Bismarck. Leader Counters The four new leaders were provided on the C3i #10 insert. If you do not have that, then use the following substitute leaders. � Arminius: Beorix counter

from Dictator or Ariovistus from CoG.

� Varus: Varus SC from TCW, Varus counter provided in C3i #9 or Labienus from CoG (Charisma=l ).

� Germanicus: Sulla OC counter from Dictator (as is) or the Caesar counter from CoG (Reduce all values by one; no elite initiative; no heroic charisma).

� Caecina Severus: Q. Pedius from TCW or Labienus from CoG.

Sources Hans Delbriick, The Barbarian Invasions. Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars. Tacitus, The Annals of Imperial Rome. John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World.