Armor, March-April 1996 Edition - Fort Benning · 2018-11-27 · March-April 1996, Vol. CV No.2...

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONActing Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 01270

A couple of months ago, a private, semi-authoritativenewspaper that often supplements official news channelsran an op-ed piece that bothered me. The columnist de-cried the choice of the First Armored Division as the maincombat unit for our component of the NATO Implementa-tion Force (IFOR). He said that it was the wrong force forthe job; it was too heavy. The implications of that piecestill upset me months later. Why? It is another tired addi-tion to that flabby body of military analysis that peri-odically picks its head up out of the sand and says thattanks, and heavy operations in general, are dead. Theseanalysts are often the same guys who still think the newsmedia lost Vietnam, that the USAF destroyed all of Iraq’stanks, and that the force structure can never have toomany special forces. This brand of military soothsayingunsettles me; I refuse to buy into it, and more importantly,I’m certain that some of our future adversaries won’t havesubscribed either. I urge you to resist this, and any otherattack, on heavy units.

In nearly every conflict where our leaders have commit-ted ground forces larger than a Special Forces “A” Team,armor has been a consideration, and sometimes evenused. Recall those few, ancient, yet still trustworthy, M551Sheridans snuck so cleverly into Panama in C-5 Galaxybellies, satisfyingly seen blasting to the underworld partsof the corrupt dictator’s command structure. How can weforget the too-late introduction of a heavy force into theSomalia mission, or the debate on whether to deploy it ornot, a debate that some say helped bring down the SEC-DEF? Veterans of that deployment suggest that life im-proved — i.e., became safer — after the introduction ofthe armored task force. Of course, Desert Storm and De-sert Shield were operations we had trained for at the Na-tional Training Center and during many home stationtraining events. They were naturally heavy affairs.

Does anyone think that potential future hot spots won’thave tanks involved? Yes, much of Korea is heavily urban-ized, but we expect those M1A1s to figure heavily intoour assured success in any future conflict there. SouthwestAsia is still a cauldron of seething, centuries-old emotionswhere lots of well armed people still have imaginedscores to settle. Our successes in 1991 demonstrated therelevance of tanks in that environment quite ably.

There are few substitutes for the many positive qualitiesa tank brings to your side of an argument. That gets mecloser to the Bosnian situation. Yes, the road net abovethe valley floors is not impressive, and yes, tanks thatweigh nearly 70 tons will tear them to pieces, earning theire of the farmers and townspeople we are there helpingto make safer. But send no tanks initially? Don’t I hearthe ghosts of policymakers for Somalia and Vietnam stilladvising that there is no viable armored threat, or thatthere is no trafficable terrain in those places as well?Hindsight shows that those people were thinking “in thebox,” and that they missed the value that armor was toplay and should have played if used early.

Isn’t a large part of the Bosnian mission one of deter-ring once bitter-foes from reigniting the hatreds that sawthem kill their neighbors, and if that deterrence shouldfail, convince them to separate with whatever force needsapplying, all the while minimizing our own casualties?That sounds like a job an armored task force can accom-plish well. There is a reason why people — soldiers andcivilians alike — stop to watch columns of Abrams andBradleys roll by; they are awesome, fear-evoking mon-sters. Big machines. Lots of big guns. World-class sol-diers and world-class reputations. That is why you sendan armored division to Bosnia, not an airmobile one, andnot a light one. I can’t imagine that Mom and Dad wantus to take their sons into danger without overpoweringforce if it’s available. Force protection isn’t some lip serv-ice buzzword that commanders gurgle out during theirrisk assessments. Our tanks offer a lot of force protectionfor their crews and for everyone else in the force. It is awhole lot easier to dial down your force and make itlighter as conditions improve than to piecemeal the forcein a reactive mode.

The next time you read a column or hear an interviewby some self-appointed military expert who foresees theend of armor and heavy operations, call the guy to task.We know him to be wrong. Life is a whole lot differentlooking across the DMZ or through a gunner’s primarysight than through a Beltway office window.

— TAB

Stand To

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-96-2

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG LON E. MAGGART

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRt-DOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

March-April 1996, Vol. CV No.2

Features

6 The Saudi Arabian National Guard Motorized Brigades by Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton

12 Scouting at 52° Below, An Introduction to the Arctic Cavalry by Captain Keith Sharples and First Lieutenant Ken Dobert

17 Introducing the SolargizerTM : Solar Technology for Lead-Acid Batteries by Paul Hornback

19 Fighting to the Finish, The Role of South Viet Nam's III Armor Brigade and III Corps Assault Force in the War's Final Days by Tran Quang Khoi, Brigadier General, ARVN

26 The Three to Six Second Advantage: Tank Combat in Restricted Terrain by Staff Sergeant Stephen Krivitsky

34 The Field Trains Command Post - Organizing for Success by Captain Kevin P. Banks

37 Now, Make a FIST ... Converting the M3 Bradley for Use as a FIST Vehicle by Captain Thomas A. Crowson and Staff Sergeant Marty J. Peterson

40 The Guard Unit Armory Device Full Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (GUARDFIST -1) by First Lieutenant Stephen J. Snyder

44 Patton Museum Courts a New Generation by John Rickey

46 The Fort Knox Navy by Captain Matthew D. Morton

51 Deaths of Three Drivers in Six Months Spurs Change in TM, and a Search for Answers From the Field

52 Armor Conference Tentative Agenda

53 Comment on the Company Team Manual

Back The Tank and Scout Platoon MTPs Cover

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 4 Commander's Hatch 5 Driver's Seat

49 Books

2

DIRECTORY - Points of Contact

ARMOR Editorial Offices

Editor-in-Chief LTC Terry A. Blakely 2249 E-Mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens 2249

Editorial Assistant Vivian Oertle 2610

Production Assistant Mary Hager 2610 E-Mail: [email protected]

Staff Illustrator Mr. Jody Hannon 2610

PHONE INFORMATION: Phone extensions for points of contact are listed at right of name. (Note: Fort Knox Defense Switch Network (DSN) prefix is 464. Commercial prefix is Area Code 502-624-XXXX).

MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR: ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

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PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS/ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: Report delivery problems or changes of address to Connie Bright or Susanne Lane, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 40121 or call (502) 942-8624, FAX (502) 942-6219.

UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or changes of address to Mary Hager, DSN 464-2610; commercial: (502) 624-2610. Requests to be added to the free aistribution list should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force.

U.s. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL

Commandant (ATZK-CG) MG Lon E. Maggart 2121 E-Mail: [email protected]

Assistant Commandant COL Clayton E. Melton

(ATSB-AC) 7555

E-Mail: [email protected]

Director of the Armor School COL Paul E. Lenze

(ATSB-DAS) 1050


Chief of Staff COL Jerry L. Veach

(ATZK-CS) 1101


Command Sergeant Major CSM Ronnie W. Davis 4952 E-Mail: [email protected]

Armor School Sergeant Major CSM Jeffery L. Richardson 5405 E-Mail: [email protected]

16th Cavalry Regiment COL Don Elder

(ATSB-SBZ) 7848


1st Armor Training Brigade COL Fred A. Treyz III

(ATSB-BAZ) 6843


Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) COL Edward A. Bryla 5050 E-Mail: [email protected]

NCO Academy CSM John E. Barnett

(ATZK-NC) 5150


TRADOC System Manager for Abrams and Armored Gun System COL John F. Kalb

(ATZK-TS) 7955


Mounted Battlespace Battle Lab COL G. Patrick Ritter

(ATZK-MW) 2139


Office, Mounted Battlespace Integration (ATZK-AR) COL Gary Krueger 7809 E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585

Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) LTC Randall Williams

(ATZK-SA) 1315


ARMOR - March-April 1996

Crusader Mobility Systems

Dear Sir:

We would like to thank you for your arti-cle on the Crusader System which ap-peared in the Nov/Dec 95 issue of AR-MOR. It stated the case for modernizingthe capabilities of the current U.S. self-pro-pelled artillery force very well. Team Cru-sader (The Project Management Office,U.S. Army Field Artillery School and Con-tractors) is dedicated to providing the verybest system for not only the Field Artillery,but for the Army and the U.S. taxpayer aswell.

Toward this end, we conducted thoroughstudies and analyses prior to Milestone I toassess a variety of Crusader design ap-proaches and alternatives. Among the alter-natives considered were systems employ-ing multiple variations of the M1A1 Abramschassis, including the unmodified chassis,and the chassis with both minor and majormodifications. Based on our analysis, wefound that the design constraints imposedby the unmodified Abrams chassis compro-mised the overall design, resulting in a sys-tem incapable of meeting many of theuser’s most critical requirements. Modifica-tions to the Abrams chassis alleviatedsome constraints and allowed for improvedsystem performance, but it was still wellshort of user requirements.

In addition, our analyses provided severalimportant pieces of information, some ofwhich are outlined below.

•Replacing the Abrams torsion bar sus-pension with hydropneumatic suspen-sion units (HSU) requires significantstructural modifications within the lowerhull; this has been verified during testsof an Abrams chassis modified to ac-cept HSUs.

•Designs using the Abrams chassis can-not be reconciled with the user’s com-bat loaded weight requirement of 55tons. The basic Abrams hull structure(without armor boxes) carries a signifi-cant weight penalty due to the thicknessresulting from the Abrams survivabilityrequirement, a requirement which is notshared by the Crusader. The AGT-1500power pack carries a fuel consumptionpenalty, particularly at idle which is asignificant self-propelled howitzer oper-ating mode.

•Extensive redesign of v irtually allAbrams auxiliary systems, including fuel(tanks and lines), hydraulics, and cool-ing, is required for an Abrams hull-based howitzer application.

•New driver and crew stations are re-quired to accommodate Crusader-unique crew requirements and opera-tions/employment techniques.

With respect to the author’s concept, weare obliged to note that the space claimsfor the AGT-1500 power pack necessitate

transverse power pack mounting to fitwithin the allocated space, an approach re-quiring significant engineering developmentat a considerable cost.

We acknowledge the benefits of com-monality and plan to capitalize on existingcommercial and combat vehicle systems(including the Abrams) whenever it is pru-dent to do so. Studies performed by theProgram Executive Officer for ArmoredSystems Modernization (ASM) duringAFAS/FARV Concept Exploration/Develop-ment revealed that component commonal-ity offers the greatest cost and logisticalcontributions. Even if the Crusader chassisis not common with existing combat vehi-cles, many of its major components can be,including the track, road wheels, roadwheel hubs/bearings, and drive sprockets,to name just a few.

In conclusion, although we have con-ducted extensive studies, including usingthe Abrams hull as a common chassis forCrusader, the concept of using this pro-posal introduces unacceptable operationalperformance deficiencies that become sig-nificant to overcome. Meanwhile, we wel-come any fresh insights and cordially ex-tend an invitation to Dr. Sharoni and Mr.Bacon to contact the Crusader ProjectManager’s Office if they wish to discuss thematter further.

MICHAEL K. ASADALTC, Armor

Product ManagerCrusader Mobility Systems

ROBERT D. FREEMANLTC, Field Artillery

Cannon Branch Chief,TRADOC Systems Manager-Cannon

M1 Chassis AFAS Would HaveToo Many Limitations

Dear Sir:

As a former active duty field artillery offi-cer, I was assigned to the Gunnery Depart-ment of the Field Artillery School (USA-FAS), and have monitored the progress ofthe Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS)with much interest. Therefore, I was glad tosee that the future of this program has cap-tured the attention of the armor communityas revealed in the article, “The CommonChassis Revisited: Should the Next Howit-zer Be Built on the M1 Tank Chassis?”.However, my opposition to several of thepoints made in the article, has moved meto write in response.

In my opinion, the article’s authors arepossibly trying to further their own personalagenda at the expense of future readinessin the artillery branch. Their main pointsseems to be that, due to the expense andhard research involved in developing thetechnology which makes up the AFAS sys-

tem, we should instead settle for a “jury-rigged” weapon made up of componentswhich are readily available now. While I doagree that some of the AFAS technology(such as the Regenerative Liquid Propel-lant Gun, RLPG) needs more time to “ma-ture).” I also feel that the risk involved ininvesting in the development of the pro-gram, is outweighed by the possible bene-fits it will bring. Even the authors agree thatAFAS will serve as a “technology carrier”which could produce innovations used infuture combat vehicles.

In principle, I agree with the authors onthe concept of a common chassis, and thebenefits derived from commonality amongcombat vehicles in our future heavy units.However, I do not beliieve that the M1chassis is the vehicle that will carry thearmy in the future “Force 2000.” The M1 isa remarkable, battle-tested system, but it isnow reaching the limits of its potential fordevelopment. The authors admit that theM1 should be out of active service around2020-2025. Between now and then, thecurrent M109A6 “Paladin” howitzer systemshould be able to adequately support anM1A2-equipped force. The Paladin is morethan equal to the task and will be fullyfielded soon. To settle for an M1-basedAFAS as a quick fix would be selling our-selves short in the long run.

I believe that investing in the develop-ment of an entirely new chassis for theAFAS and FARV could provide a candidatefuture armored family of vehicles for 2020and beyond. In times such as now, whenR&D funding is scarce, we need to cooper-ate as branches for the good of the entireforce. AFAS is one of the few weapons pro-grams that still has avid support from thecongressional defense policy makers. Withthe support of the infantry and armor com-munity, the Crusader program may prove tobe the best possible “testbed” for the devel-opment of the next generation tank or in-fantry fighting vehicle.

The authors’ support for the 155mm L52cannon coupled with the Modular ArtilleryCharge System (MACS) as the armamentfor the AFAS shows the nearsightedness oftheir thinking. I feel that this strategy is bet-ter suited to an armament upgrade of theM109A6 Paladin. We should commit our-selves to developing Regenerative LiquidPropellant technology. Bringing this systemto maturity would allow us to set a futurestandard. It would also be the greatest in-novation in cannon technology since the in-troduction of smokeless powder. In the in-terim, the AFAS developers have alreadyident if ied the need to procure the“Unicharge” system as a backup to aug-ment the RLPG.

While my main opposition to the pro-posed M1 AFAS is based on the philoso-phy behind its development, I have alsonoted some technical problems with the de-

ARMOR — March-April 1996 3

LETTERS

Continued on Page 47

The Army is recognized around theworld for its exceptional leader devel-opment programs. No other army has asystem equal to ours. We have madegreat strides in counseling our subordi-nates to help them improve their per-formance. We are indeed very good.But the fact is, turbulence in the Armyhas created the need for a more per-sonal approach to taking care of peo-ple.

The knowledge, skill, and experientialrequirements placed on leaders todaymay well exceed the capacity of ourformal education system to develop fu-ture leaders capable of dealing with thecomplex problems they will face.

As the Army grows smaller, we re-quire our soldiers to perform increas-ingly more complex tasks, often in jobsfor which they have insufficient experi-ence or training. We ask our soldiers towork more efficiently and to producequality work in diverse areas, like digi-tal operations and experimentation onfuture force structures, on which pre-cious little precedence exists.

It is up to all of us to give our subor-dinate leaders the best possible chancefor success. Clearly, one of the easiestways to do this is through mentoring.The personal mentorship between sen-ior and junior leaders is essential infilling the information gap. Mentorshipprovides another avenue to help moti-vate, educate, and guide quality peopleto higher levels of performance.

Mentoring may be the critical missingkey to help compress the learningcurve of young leaders. In today’sworld, there is much to know and solittle time to learn it that mentoringmay be the best way to ensure profes-sional development and survival on thebattlefield. The mentor can help hissubordinates sort through informationoverload and surface what is really im-portant.

Mentorship has a self-perpetuating ef-fect as well. Leaders who have beenwell mentored tend to become greatmentors themselves. The bond of trustand confidence that results from amentoring relationship lasts a lifetime.Mentoring provides a unique opportu-nity for young, upcoming leaders tohave a permanent, personal linkagewith experienced senior officers whohave demonstrated professional compe-tence, outstanding leadership, and intel-lectual ability.

The best mentoring comes from apersonal commitment between the sen-ior and junior, rather than through sometype of assignment process. Mentoringmay well occur outside of normal com-mand relationships or branches. In fact,mutual trust and confidence must existbetween the mentor and those whomhe mentors long before a permanentmentoring relationship begins.

Mentoring may take several forms. Itmay be strictly related to branch issues,advanced warfighting concepts, or

through intellectual engagement. Thesubjects that can be discussed are un-limited, ranging from officership totheoretical constructs. It is up to thementor to decide which areas are ripefor exploration and for those mentoredto seek information which meets theirspecific needs.

Mentoring can be transformational forboth the mentor and those mentored.Each learns from the other as theywork together over the course of time.For the mentor, it is a way to influencethe progress of bright, young leaders.Collective wisdom gained from yearsof experience is passed from senior tojunior leaders as a bridge between thepast and the future. The mentor getsthe pleasure of watching young leadersgrow and progress far beyond the levelthat could have been achieved other-wise. Those who are mentored learn,grow, and mature.

The mentor also gains access to whatsubordinates are thinking and insighton what is working well and what isn’t.The mentor will gain invaluable andhonest feedback from those who makethe organization work. The mentor canuse those who are mentored to help im-part new ideas and ways of doing busi-ness throughout the organization andbeyond. Mentoring provides both secu-rity and courage to those mentored. Se-curity occurs because there is someone

COMMANDER’S HATCH

Mentoring — A Critical Element in Leadership Development

MG Lon E. Maggart Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

4 ARMOR — March-April 1996

Continued on Page 11

Creativity — your vision of how todo things better, more efficiently, foroptimum effectiveness — enhances ouropportunity to improve the Army andits ability to fight and win tomorrow’sbattles.

Fort Knox’s Directorate of Force De-velopment, previously the Directorateof Combat Development, has one over-riding mission — to modernize theforce as we enter the information age.They also provide combat developmentinterface for the armored force with in-dustry, other government agencies, andallied nations.

One of the key programs managed bythe directorate that directly impacts ar-mor soldiers is the Soldier Enhance-ment Program (SEP). The program is aCongressionally-funded initiative thatbegan in 1989 to increase the combateffectiveness of soldiers. Some of theseitems are already in use. They includelighter, more comfortable load-bearingequipment, field gear, survivabilityitems, communication equipment, andnavigation aids. The intent of the SEPis to quickly field (within 2-3 years)promising developmental and commer-cial off-the-shelf items. The programbypasses many of the steps in the cur-rent acquisition process.

For efficiency, the program is dividedinto categories and between propo-nents:

•• Dismounted Soldiers: The UnitedStates Army Infantry School(USAIS)

•• Combat Crews (Ground): A join ef-fort between The United StatesArmy Armor School (USAARMS),and The United States Army Infan-try School (USAIS)

•• Combat Crews (Air): The UnitedStates Army Aviation School(USAVNS)

•• Other Soldiers: Combined ArmsSupport Command (CASCOM)

These organizations are responsible forthe identification, idea generation,documentation, and development ofmaterials needed to eliminate battle-field deficiencies.

SEP is a team effort that begins withthe Army’s most valuable asset, the in-dividual soldier. The program solicitssuggestions from individual soldiers,commanders, and other combat devel-opment organizations. These sugges-tions are evaluated and documented.Those selected are taken through a se-ries of steps which indicate either off-the-shelf procurement or contract de-velopment. To meet a crisis or rapiddeployment situation, SEP can recom-mend emergency procurement, surgeproduction, or special modifications ofcurrent equipment. Once the item isprocured and field tests are conducted,the item is issued to soldiers in thefield.

Some programs initiated under SEPare: The ambidextrous shoulder holster(ASH), a shoulder holster, usable byboth right- and left-handed soldiers; thethellie suit, a camouflage-pattern suitthat suppresses the thermal signature of

the wearer; the mounted crewmen boot,an all-weather, safety combat boot de-signed specifically for mounted warri-ors; and the mounted crewman com-partmented equipment bag (MCCEB),a water-resistant compartmented bag tostore and secure equipment as a sup-plement to the duffel bag and ALICErucksack. These ideas weren’t devel-oped in a secret laboratory or an Army“think tank.” They came from individ-ual soldiers, like yourself looking for abetter way to do business.

The Soldier Support Branch of theDirectorate of Force Developmentmanages SEP for Fort Knox. If youwish to submit material you can do soeither by calling DSN 464-4794 orcommercial (502) 624-4794. The E-mail address is [email protected], or write to: Com-mander, USAARMC, ATTN: ATZK-FDS (SGT Ainsworth), Fort Knox, KY40121-5000.

Your proposal should contain: theitem’s description, objective, applica-tion, possible commercial source ofprocurement, whether the proposal willreplace an existing item, and if the itemis used by a sister service. Finally, in-clude your name, rank, organization,and telephone number. SEP was devel-oped to harvest the wealth of knowl-edge of the force. Your participation inthe program will enhance our ability toimprove equipment and increase thesurvivability of our Army. The pro-gram is in place; now all we need isyour imagination to make it a success!

CSM Ronnie W. Davis Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Creativity —The Soldier’s Vision


Wheeled armored organizations aregaining new interest throughout theworld as technology allows wheeledvehicles to mount larger guns and per-form a more diverse range of missions.Cheaper production and maintenancecosts make them attractive to many na-tions seeking more “bang for theirbuck.” Additionally, although not suitedto all terrains, wheeled armor is sur-prisingly adaptable.

Among the most dynamic and inno-vative wheeled armored organizationsin the world today are the motorizedbrigades of the Saudi Arabian NationalGuard (or SANG). These two brigades(expanding to three) are the epitome ofa robust force structure built aroundspecific mission requirements, yet it isstill very adaptable to other roles andmissions.

The mission of the motorized bri-gades is to provide internal securitywithin the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,particularly for the oil fields in theEastern Province. They provide quickreaction forces to the guard mounts andlight vehicle-borne patrols that providethe actual site security. In addition, thebrigades’ internal security mission re-quires them to be able to quickly moveanywhere in the kingdom to conduct afull spectrum of internal security opera-tions. Lastly, in time of war, the bri-gades will fight alongside the MODA(Ministery of Defense and Aviation)forces in defense of the kingdom.

A key consideration in the design ofthe TO&E for the SANG motorizedbrigades was self-deployability. SaudiArabia does not have the rail infra-structure to transport armored unitsquickly within its borders. It does,however, possess a modern road infra-structure supported by many improveddirt tracks into the hinterlands.

Wheeled vehicle mobility is quite goodthroughout the country. It followed thatin this particular case, a wheeled ar-mored organization had several key ad-vantages over a tracked one. Wheeledarmored vehicles would not requireheavy equipment transporters, insteadbeing able to self deploy along the na-tion’s highways. In addition, most ofSaudi Arabia’s deserts are hard-packedsand, as opposed to dunes. A wheeledarmored force can travel over 90 per-cent of Saudi terrain with only theworst dunes or most inaccessiblemountain regions being untrafficable.

Motorized Brigade Organization

Currently there are two motorized bri-gades in SANG. The Imam Moham-med Bin Saud Brigade (IMBSB) is inRiyadh, and the King Abdul Aziz Bri-gade (KAAB) is stationed in Al Hofufin the Eastern Province south of Dam-mam. They are identical in organiza-tion and almost identical in equipment,the major difference being in the anti-tank platoons of the line companies andin the artillery battalions’ cannon sys-tems (M102 vs M198).

Each of the brigades has over 5,000soldiers and is organized as a combinedarms command with four maneuverbattalions — the IMBSB with the 1st,2nd, 3rd, and 4th Combined Arms Bat-talions (CABs), and the KAAB withthe 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th. Each brigadehas an artillery battalion, the 1st SANGartillery battalion with the IMBSB withM102 105mm howitzers and the 2ndwith the KAAB has 155mm M198towed howitzers. There is no auto-mated fire direction system likeTACFlRE; however, all missions areplotted using the Back Up ComputerSystem (BUCS) with a manual com-

puter and check computer. Each bri-gade also has an organic air defensebattery with four platoons of four Vul-can 20mm antiaircraft systems and anewly-formed Stinger platoon. The CSand CSS units organic to each brigadeinclude a reinforced company (really asmall battalion) of combat engineerswith heavy equipment, a signal com-pany, an MP company, and a robust lo-gistical support battalion that is capableof supporting the brigade on sustainedoperations in a desert environment.

The key differences between the bri-gades (besides artillery systems) is thenumber and type of weapons systemsin the antitank platoons of the linecompanies. The IMBSB line compa-nies have only two TOW systems; inthe KAAB, they have six. In addition,the 90mm guns in the KAAB are themore powerful Cockerill type. TheIMBSB 90mm are of the less capableMecar variety. These differences makethe KAAB the most potent of the twobrigades. In summary, the motorizedbrigade organization resembles that ofa light cavalry unit with a large numberof dismountable infantry, over 200 perbattalion.

A Family of V 150s

The first SANG motorized battalionsbegan fielding in the mid- to late-1970s. The family of vehicles chosenfor the motorized brigades was theCadillac Gage V150. It was versatile,robust mechanically, fast (50-60 mphacross open desert), and easy to main-tain. The SANG operated 10 variantsof the V150, to include:

- Armored Personnel Carrier- 90mm Cockerill cannon turret- 90mm Mecar cannon turret


The Saudi Arabian National GuardMotorized BrigadesWheeled Armor Plays a Big RoleIn the Kingdom’s Internal Security Mission

by Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton

- 20mm Oerlikon cannon turret- Dual Machine Gun Turret (.50

cal/7.62)- TOW 1 (pedestal version)- 81mm Mortar- Vulcan Air Defense system- Recovery- Command- Ambulance

With the exception of the turretedsystems, the TOW vehicle and the am-bulance, all of the V150s carry an M2.50 cal MG. The Saudi rifle squadscarry FN/FAL rifles and FN 7.62 MGs.For antitank weapons, they have CarlGustavs and later added Armor Pierc-ing Infantry Light Arm Systems(APILAS). Radios were British RA-CAL, both HF and FM (which causedmany interoperability problems withU.S. forces during the Gulf War.)

Tactical Employment Concept

The motorized brigades are capableof performing many of the Mission Es-sential Task List (METL) tasks of anarmored cavalry regiment. The basicMETL of the SANG motorized bri-gades includes the following tasks:

- Screen- Delay- Attack- Defend

It was recognized that the brigadesdid not have the armor or firepower tostand head-to-head with armor units(i.e., perform “No penetration” guardmissions). However, at the same time itwas felt that the speed and mobility ofthe organization, along with its TOWand light cannon systems, would makeit valuable in a cavalry role. The bri-gades could screen an extremely widesector due to the large number of vehi-cles and the four battalion organization.Employed correctly, the SANG motor-

ized brigades are more than adequateto strip off an enemy’s screening or re-connaissance elements, halt an advanceguard, and force an enemy to deploymain body elements from march to bat-tle formations. The speed of the V150swould then allow the SANG elementsto conduct a quick withdrawal to thenext delay position. Additionally, in fa-vorable circumstances (i.e., augmented

with tanks), the brigades could alsoconduct conventional attack and defendmissions.

Active Employment

During the Gulf War, the KAAB wasthe first coalition unit to confront theIraqis on the southern Kuwaiti border.


Fig. 1.Saudi Arabian National Guard Motorized Brigade

Fig. 2.Combined Arms Battalion

Receiving the deployment order on 4August, the KAAB closed the borderand took up screening positions on 6-7August. For over two weeks, theKAAB was the only element screeningbetween the Iraqis and the coalitionunits building up to the south. TheIMBSB was held in reserve at Riyadhfor the duration of the war.

The KAAB’s baptism of fire came inthe battle for Khafji from 29 Jan-1 Feb1991. During this time frame, a seriesof battles took place from the pointwhere the heel of Kuwait turns north,to Khafji on the Arabian Gulf (see Map1). While the U.S. Marines correctlyreceive the credit for stopping two ofthe Iraqi thrusts into Saudi Arabia, theactual battle of Khafji itself was almostentirely an Arab battle.

The Iraqi attack on Khafji began onthe late evening of the 29th of Januarywhen an (estimated) brigade-sized ele-ment of Iraqis crossed the border northof Khafji. The Iraqi forces that attackedand occupied Khafji were from the 5thMechanized Infantry Division, a for-mation that had been in reserve behindthe Iraqi forward defensive belts. Thedivision passed through the defensivebelts and split into two columns, onemoving towards Wafra, the otherheaded due south for Khafji. By 0130on the 30th, observation posts north ofKhafji reported they were under enemyattack and began to withdraw. By 0300,Khafji was in Iraqi hands. But un-known to the Iraqis, two USMC recon-naissance teams had gone to ground in

the town and were reporting on Iraqimovements.

At approximately 1500 on the 30th ofJanuary, the KAAB was given the or-der from the Eastern Division to detacha battalion and contain the enemy inKhafji. At 1600, the 7th CAB wasgiven the mission. For the purposes ofthis attack, two Qatari tank companieswith French AMX-30s were attached tothe battalion. The battalion commander

(LTC Matar) was given little intelli-gence and no time to conduct any re-connaissance. The battalion moved outshortly after 1700 and was accompa-nied by the U.S. battalion advisor, LTCTaylor, and his assistant, MSG Middle-ton.

When the 7th Battalion reached thegas station three kilometers south ofKhafji, they encountered elements ofthe 3-3 Marines (see Map 2). At aboutthis time, the 7th Battalion had its mis-sion changed by the Eastern Divisionfrom screening south of the town to re-taking Khafji.

The scheme of maneuver developedby LTC Matar involved attack alongthe road with two companies abreastwith a third in reserve. The lead com-panies would be accompanied by theQatari armor. The scheme of maneuverwas drawn up with only very rudimen-tary knowledge of the positions andstrength of the enemy. In spite of thereporting by the Marine observerteams, there was still considerable con-fusion as to the Iraqi strength in thetown. At this point, most of the Coali-tion forces were still under the impres-sion that the Iraqis in Khafji were onlyin reinforced company or battalion mi-


Fig. 3.Motorized Company

Fig. 4.Combined Arms Battalion(CAB LAV Organization)

nus strength. As it turned out, elementsof three Iraqi battalions reached thetown.

Prior to the attack on Khafji, furtherdelays were experienced trying to clearprep fires with the supporting USMCartillery. At 2300, the battalion beganmoving forward towards Khafji fromits positions south of the town.

As they advanced towards Khafji, the7th Battalion was met by intense directfire from the town. LTC Taylor, a vet-eran of infantry combat in Vietnam de-scribed the volume of enemy fire as“flabbergasting.” The initial Saudi at-tack was halted outside of Khafji withthe National Guard companies and at-tached Qatari tanks exchanging firewith the Iraqis for over two hours. Fi-nally at 0320, the 7th CAB commanderordered a withdrawal to behind the Na-tional Guard barracks compound adja-cent to Khafji, temporarily breaking di-rect fire contact with the enemy, al-though intermittent tracer fire couldstill be seen coming from Khafji.

After the initial setback, the Brigadeordered 6th and 8th CAB each tocross-attach one company to the 7thCAB and ordered the 7th CAB to at-tack again at 0730. The 7th CAB attackwas to be coordinated with an attackby the 5th CAB and a MODA tank bat-talion that would take place to thenorthwest of the town. It was decidedthat the 7th CAB would attack thesoutheastern part of Khafji with threecompanies, keeping the two attachedcompanies in reserve. The MODAforces were to take the southwesternpart of Khafji. From there, the Saudiswould work their way south to north tosecure the town.

By 0830, the attack had commencedwith 7th CAB driving into the south-east portion of town, meeting heavybut largely inaccurate fire. Most of theSaudi fatalities that occurred in this at-tack were from two catastrophicallydestroyed V150s. The 7th CAB com-mander committed his reserve of twoattached companies to attack along the

southwestern part of town. The battal-ion made good progress and knockedout numerous Iraqi vehicles in thestreets of Khafji. At 1000, the remain-der of the 8th CAB under LTC Hamudwas ordered by brigade to begin mov-ing immediately to Khafji, along withseveral attached antitank platoons fromthe 6th CAB. Meanwhile, at 1000, the5th CAB under LTC Naif had movedto engage and destroy an Iraqi com-pany along the main road north ofKhafji, knocking out 13 tanks andAPCs and capturing six more, alongwith 116 prisoners, for the loss of twoKIA and five WIA. After destroying allof the Iraqi forces in view and securingtheir prisoners, the 5th CAB withdrewabout four kilometers to positions tothe northwest of the SANG compound.This withdrawal was perhaps the mostserious tactical error on the part of theSANG during the battle because theroad from Khafji was vulnerable to be-ing cut. Had the 5th CAB movedastride the road in a blocking position,they could have cut off all of the Iraqisin Khafji. Because of this failure, a fewIraqi vehicles managed to escape, al-though more could have taken advan-tage of this failure to block the roadthan did.

The attack in the town continued withthe attached company of the 8th CABmaking contact with and relieving theMarine observer teams at 1200. The re-mainder of the 8th CAB reached Khafjiaround 1330, linked up with the 7thCAB, and took over the northeast sec-tor of the town. The attack continuedwith the two SANG battalions clearingmost of the southern portion of thetown. Around 1830 (dusk), the attackwas discontinued with 7th CAB with-drawing to the SANG compound to re-arm and the 8th CAB remaining inplace within the town.

At this point, Iraqi remnants — ap-proximately two companies and 20AFVs — were still in the northeast partof the town. However, no attempt wasmade by the Iraqis to break out thenight of the 31st, in spite of the factthat the road was not blocked.

The next morning (1 Feb), the attackwas resumed at 0730 with the 7th and8th CABs (+) attacking abreast, in-itially with the 8th CAB, then shiftingsouth to clear the southern half of


Map 1

Khafji and the Gulf Coast

Khafji. The 7th CAB advanced to thenorth to eliminate pockets of Iraqi re-sistance in northern Khafji and near thewater desalinization plant. Iraqi resis-tance was sporadic, with most Iraqisoldiers surrendering upon being en-gaged. All remaining Iraqi armored ve-hicles in the town were destroyed orcaptured and the few remaining Iraqisoldiers who were not taken prisonerbecame fugitives among Khafji’s de-serted buildings. Meanwhile, the 5thCAB and MODA forces moved to thenorth and west of the town but neveractually succeeded in cutting the road.Several Iraqi vehicles attempting to es-cape were destroyed either by SaudiTOWs or USMC attack helos. Later inthe afternoon, the 7th CAB shifted tothe west and the 8th CAB moved northabreast of the 7th to occupy positionsforward of the desalinization plant. By1500, the battle for Khafji was over,and the Saudis were consolidating tothe north of the town.

The coalition casualties consisted ofseven V150s of various types and twoQatari AMX-30s (which were sub-sequently recovered). Most of theV150s were knocked out by RPG-7fire in the close-range fighting insidethe town of Khafji, although one of thetwo that was a catastrophic kill was hitby a 100mm main gun round from aT-55. Two of the destroyed V150s werecatastrophic kills with 100 percentcrew casualties. The others were aban-doned by their crews after being dis-abled. Some of these were burned outafter being abandoned. A few Saudi ve-hicles were hit by 12.7mm MG fire,but none were disabled. Saudi forcessuffered 18 dead and 50 wounded inthe battle with most of the dead com-ing from the two killed V150s.

Iraqi casualties were much heavier,the author personally having counted81 burned out hulks in and aroundKhafji. Most of these vehicles wereChinese Type 63 APCs or T-55/59tanks. Some of the tanks had Iraqi-manufactured add-on armor. In additionthere was one MTLB and a pair of SP122s, as well as a half dozen soft-skinned wheeled vehicles among theenemy wrecks. A dozen of the type 63APCs were taken intact. The enemylost approximately 60 dead and 400(+)prisoners. The most effective direct fireantiarmor weapons against the Iraqi ar-

mor were TOW 1 missiles and 90mmCockerill guns of the Saudi V150s andthe 105mm guns of the Qatari AMX-30s. By far the most Iraqi armored ve-hicle kills were to air and groundlaunched TOW missiles, although sur-prisingly, several T-55s had to be re-en-gaged several times before they werecompletely destroyed. The TOW waseffective in all cases against the Type63 APC, with numerous spectacularcatastrophic kills (several of which hadroadwheels flung over 100 feet into theair). The 105mm of the Qatari tankswas successful against all armor en-countered. No evidence of 90mmCockerill hits on Iraqi T-55s could befound but the Cockerill gun was effec-tive against the Chinese Type 63 APCwith several catastrophic kills and nu-merous penetrations. In addition, someof the Type 63 APCs were knocked outby shoulder-fired Carl Gustavs (most

after they had been abandoned). MostIraqi vehicles in the town evidencednumerous .50 cal MG strikes, but therewas no way of determining if the dam-age had any impact on the cause of thevehicles’ demise. The Iraqi armor atKhafji was also engaged effectively byUSMC AH1s and high performanceaircraft (USAF, USMC) as well as155mm field artillery.

The SANG motorized brigade organi-zation had proven that it could perse-vere in a stand-up fight with armoredopponents. The cross-attachment ofQatari tanks and the massive expendi-ture of TOW missiles, as well as allother classes of munitions, literallysmothered the Iraqi forces with fire.Significantly, much of the fighting wasat close quarters within the town itself,where supporting arms did not play ascritical a role. The Saudis commented


Map 2

with whom to check signals. Couragecomes from knowledge.

The mentor provides focus for thenatural curiosity of young leaders tolearn and explore the various compo-nents of soldiering. The mentor servesas a guide to help young leaders gainthe most from beneficial experienceswhile helping them avoid the pitfalls.The mentor can teach the art forms es-sential to the application of advancedtactics, battle command, and a thou-sand other equally important topics.The mentor can expose young officersto expert knowledge on the subtletiesof operational art and strategic thought.And perhaps most importantly, the

mentor can model the values and war-fighting spirit so important for themounted force and the Army.

Mentoring brings for both parties ex-hilaration and exhaustion. There is nogreater satisfaction than teaching orlearning something new and useful.However, considerable energy must beextended to challenge and teach even asmall group of bright, young leaders;for those mentored, there is an expecta-tion of performance to a higher stand-ard.

Mentoring offers unparalleled oppor-tunities now to build the mounted forceof the future. If you are a battalion

commander and are not mentoring sev-eral promising young officers, you arebehind the power curve already. Men-toring may be the single easiest way todevelop our young leaders. But to doso, each of you must be willing tocommit the time necessary to do itright, and to set the conditions so thatyour young leaders will seek you outas their mentor.

Mentoring is critical for growing fu-ture mounted warfighters. It is up to usto provide the guidance and inspirationto give them the tools to do in the 21stCentury what we did in Desert Storm.

ON THE WAY!

Commander’s Hatch (Continued from Page 4)


on the maneuverability of the V150versus that of the Iraqi T-55s and type63 APCs.

For the remainder of the war, theKing Abdul Aziz Brigade securedKhafji and conducted artillery raidsacross the border. During the coalitionoffensive, its engineers breached theborder berm and the first Iraqi obstaclebelt to allow the other brigades of theEastern Coalition division to passthrough. The KAAB’s FA battalion wascross-attached to division control, andthe brigade itself was given the missionof MSR improvement and security insouthern Kuwait.

The Future LAV 25s

SANG is currently in the process ofreequipping its motorized brigades withLAV variants. The variants includedare the basic LAV 25, the LAV recov-ery, command and control, ambulance,AT (with the Emerson turret), air de-fense, and 120mm turreted mortar sys-tem. The SANG is also funding the de-velopment of the LAV 105 with a softrecoil 105mm tank gun.

The organization of the motorizedbrigades will be identical in terms ofnumber and types of units. LAVs willgenerally replace V150s in the CS and

CSS units. The difference in the neworganization will be in the battalions.Each combined arms battalion willconsist of three LAV 25 companies,one LAV AT company, and one LAV105 company. The scout platoon willhave LAV 25s, and the battalion heavymortar platoon will consist of two sec-tions of three LAV 120mm mortarseach. The switch to single-system com-panies reflects SANG’s recognition ofthe superiority of this type of organiza-tion following studies conducted in thelate 1980s, when the replacement forthe V150 was being sought. This deci-sion was cemented by SANG experi-ence in the Gulf War (the multi-systemcompany being too cumbersome, espe-cially in the employment of companymortar platoons).

Summary

Uniquely adapted for sustained opera-tions in the harsh desert environment ofSaudi Arabia, the SANG motorizedbrigade organization (both present andfuture) represents an innovative ap-proach to what can be accomplishedwith wheeled armor. By itself, an ex-tremely potent internal security force,the SANG motorized brigades, whenemployed in conjunction with theRoyal Saudi Land Forces, represent the

concept of a wheeled cavalry regimentin its most mature form. The SANGmotorized brigades offer tremendouscapability in terms of troops employedand the cost of the units to field andmaintain. They represent a very suc-cessful example of sound force struc-ture decision-making on the part of theSaudi government.

Lieutenant Colonel Martin N.Stanton received his Infantrycommission in 1978 from Flor-ida Tech. He served as a com-pany XO with 1st Infantry Train-ing Brigade at Ft. Benning; rifleand TOW platoon leader with 1-9 Infantry in Korea; assistantG3 staff officer with 9th ID, andcommander, D Company, 2-2Infantry, both at Ft. Lewis,Wash. He served as companyand S3 observer/controller atthe NTC at Ft. Irwin; senior bri-gade advisor, 2d Saudi NationalGuard Mech Brigade, Hofuf,Saudi Arabia; and as S3, 2-87Infantry, Ft. Drum, N.Y. Hiscombat service includes theGulf War in 1991 and Somalia,1992-93. A graduate of the Col-lege of Naval Command andStaff at Newport, R.I., he is cur-rently assistant J5 Policy,USCENTCOM.

With the downsizing of the U.S. mili-tary, it is interesting to note the activa-tion of a truly unique — perhaps themost unique — American cavalry unit.

On 16 June 1994, A Troop, 4thSquadron, 9th Cavalry (recently re-flagged as E Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17thCavalry), was activated at Fort Wain-wright, Alaska, as the cavalry troop forthe newly formed 1st Brigade, 6th In-fantry Division (Light).

Echo Troop, “Arctic Recon,” enjoysthe distinction of being the only sepa-rate light cavalry troop and the onlyArctic-trained and equipped cavalryunit in the U.S. Army. Because ETroop is the first ground cavalry to op-erate at Fort Wainwright in many years,the armor and cavalry communitieshave little familiarity with the type ofenvironment and organization.

The deactivation of the 6th InfantryDivision (Light) and its accompanying4-9 Reconnaissance Squadron created aneed for a new cavalry unit in Alaska.The 1st Brigade, 6th ID (Light), despiteits misleading name, is a separate in-fantry brigade (SIB), aligned adminis-tratively under the 10th Mountain Divi-sion. Headquartered at Fort Wain-wright, Alaska, the brigade actuallyfalls under the control of the UnitedStates Army, Alaska (USARAK) andthe United States Army, Pacific(USARPAC). It is a completely self-sufficient, rapid deployment force ofthree light infantry battalions, (one ofwhich is airborne), one field artillery

battalion, and a support battalion. The1st Brigade is the largest SIB in theU.S. Army, and has its own military in-telligence company, engineer company,signal company (MSE), long-range sur-veillance detachment (LRSD), head-quarters and headquarters company(HHC), and of course, its own groundcavalry troop. (Fig. 1)

Until its deactivation in June 1994,the 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry was thedivisional cavalry (reconnaissance)squadron for the 6th Infantry Division(Light) and consisted of a headquartersand headquarters troop (HHT) and twoair cavalry troops equipped with OH-58 and AH-1 helicopters. The groundcavalry troop, which the squadron wasauthorized, was a round-out unit fromthe Army Reserves, stationed in Madi-son, Wisconsin. With the an-nouncement of the deactivation of the4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry, an immedi-ate need arose for an active dutyground troop to be organized at FortWainwright to support the SIB.

Troop Organization and EquipmentThe current Modified Table of Or-

ganization (MTOE) for the arctic cav-alry is based on the ground troop of thereconnaissance squadron with addi-tional support sections, to include mess,medical, fuel, cargo and maintenanceassets. The troop’s authorized strengthis six officers and 93 enlisted, includ-ing an Arctic MTOE authorization ofthree mechanics for Arctic vehicles andequipment.

The troop’s platoon organization (Fig.2) is significantly different from thescout platoons outlined in FM 17-98,The Scout Platoon. Because E Troop isbased on the light infantry division’sreconnaissance squadron ground troop,there are some interesting charac-teristics not found in other cavalrytroops. One difference is the use of sixHigh Mobility Multipurpose WheeledVehicles (HMMWV) instead of ten ineach scout platoon. Organizationallyand, to a lesser extent, tactically, theArctic cavalry platoons most closelyresemble the six-vehicle Cavalry Fight-ing Vehicle platoon. Other charac-teristics include the absence of mortarsat the troop level, the presence of aneight-HMMWV cargo section, and theArctic MTOE authorization of 14Small Unit Support Vehicles (SUSVs).

There are two platoons of six hard-topped HMMWVs each. The scouts comeequipped with M1025 HMMWVsarmed with MK19 grenade launchers,M60 machine guns, and .50 caliber


Scouting at

52° BelowAn Introduction

to the

Arctic Cavalry

by Captain Keith Sharples and First Lieutenant Ken Dobert

machine guns. Each vehicle carries acrew of three soldiers (driver, gunner,and TC), as well as M-16A2s, night vi-sion devices, GPS, NBC equipment,and dual-net secure radios. The pla-toons normally operate in two sectionsof three vehicles each under the controlof the platoon leader or platoon ser-geant (Fig. 3).

The two antitank platoons provideoverwatch for the scout platoons. TheseTOW platoons consist of four M966hard-topped HMMWVs each and arearmed with the M220A2 TOW missilesystem. Each M966 carries a crew ofthree soldiers (driver, gunner, and TC),as well as two M-16A2s, a 9mm, nightvision devices, GPS, NBC equipmentand dual-net secure radios. Both TOWplatoons also have four M998 cargoHMMWVs to transport soldiers’ gear,Arctic equipment, and ammunition.

The terrain in Alaska is often notsuited to operation of the TOW missile.Trees and close terrain limits the sys-tem’s utility. By removing the MissileGuidance System (MGS) tray and add-ing the proper mount, the TOW vehi-cles can mount the MK19, M2 .50 cal,or M60 machine guns. This is alsoquite handy for contingencies wherethe threat may not have a significantarmored vehicle capability. In thesesituations, the TOW systems are storedin the cargo HMMWVs for availabilityin case the threat or terrain changes(Fig. 4).

The headquarters platoon (Fig. 5)provides complete organizational level

support of the troop in the field. Theheadquarters platoon consists of medic,mess, maintenance, fuel, cargo, andheadquarters sections. The medic sec-tion consists of two M996 HMMWVambulances and five soldiers, two E5sand three E1-4s, one of whom is acombat medic.

The mess section is two M35A2trucks and an MKT field kitchen, alongwith four soldiers, (one E6, one E5,and two E1-4 cooks). The maintenancesection consists of seven mechanicsand a one-man fuel section. The troopis authorized one E7 motor sergeant,one E5 light wheeled vehicle me-chanic, one E5 equipment recordsclerk, one E4 signal specialist, one E4

recovery vehicle operator, one E3 pe-troleum handler, and two E3 lightwheeled vehicle mechanics. Addition-ally, the Arctic MTOE authorizes oneE5, one E4 and one E3 light wheeledvehicle mechanic.

Some reconnaissance squadrons cross-level TOW systems and scouts to makefour mixed platoons of five vehicleseach. It was decided to retain theMTOE platoon construction to facili-tate training on the TOW and MK19swith the option of cross-leveling vehi-cles and crews after the initial equip-ment train-up. Retaining the basic or-ganization was necessary due to thegeneral lack of operator familiarizationwith the weapons systems.


Graphics by SGT Sean Daugherty

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Instead of mortars, the reconnaissancesquadron support comes from the gun-ships of the air cavalry troops. Today,in the separate cavalry troop, indirectfire support is picked up by the troop’sMK19s and by field artillery support-ing the brigade. This means that thetroop requires greater priorities of firethan might otherwise be necessary. Thetroop is also supported by a fire sup-port team (FIST) of four soldiersmounted in an M966 HMMWV.

What makes the troop particularlyunique is its second set of tactical vehi-cles, 14 Swedish manufactured Small

Unit Support Vehicles (SUSV). TheSUSV provides excellent over-snowmobility in extreme conditions. Thesesnow tractors can move through deepsnow, mud, and muskeg with little dif-ficulty. (Muskeg is a phenomenonwhere water accumulates above thelayers of permafrost in the soil. Thiscreates an uneven almost bog-like sur-face which requires experience and a

good vehicle to avoid getting stuck.) Itis almost impossible to get a SUSVstuck. The SUSV, like the basicHMMWV, lacks armor protection, sothese vehicles are used in a “battletaxi” manner, delivering scouts to aconcealed position from which theycan begin their dismounted reconnais-sance or unload weapons for groundmounting.

The SUSV is not equipped withmounts for firing weapons off the vehi-cle. All weapons must, therefore, bedismounted onto tripods and fired fromthe ground.

Arctic Operations

Stealth, firepower,and mobility are thethree key capabilitiesthat the separate cav-alry troop providesthe SIB (L). By beingpart of a rapid deploy-ment brigade, ETroop must be pre-pared to deploy toand fight in any envi-ronment, not only theArctic. The brigade’sparticipation in manytraining exercisesthroughout the Pacificregion offers the troopdiverse training op-

portunities outside of Alaska.

The brigade regularly participates inexercises Cobra Gold (Thailand), Bali-katan (Philippines), and Tandem Thrust(conducted throughout the PacificTheater), as well as rotations to theJoint Readiness Training Center(JRTC) and the National Training Cen-ter (NTC).

The troop’s unique organization, sup-ported unit, and area of operations re-quire the troop to perform some opera-tions which might not be common tomost cavalry units. These include airmobile and air load operations, cordonand search, convoy security, and escorttasks under the general heading of op-erations other than war. The majority ofthe Arctic cavalry’s tasks, however, aretypical cavalry tasks with only minormodification for over-snow movementand operation out of SUSVs in thewinter.

Because of the inability to fire theTOW, MK19, .50 Cal, or M60 machinegun from the SUSV, it is necessary todismount TOW/MK19 crews in over-watch positions and to set weaponssystems up using tripods. This is com-plicated by the fact that the Alaskan in-terior averages over 70 inches of snowevery year. All dismounted movementmust be conducted on snowshoes orcross-country skis. Heavy loads aretransported on vehicles or towed intoposition on Akio sleds, which arepulled by three soldiers wearing snow-shoes. The TOW launchers and othercrew-served weapons must be dug intothe snow so that they do not sink fur-ther upon firing. The MK19 and .50cal. machine guns can be fired off ofthe tripod mounted on the Akio Sleds.The M60 machine gun can be fired offof an Akio sled or a snowshoe.

Mobility in the Arctic is challengingat best. During the winter months,mounted movement is restricted toSUSVs. In the long summer days, off-road mobility is complicated by mus-keg. Wheeled vehicular traffic is con-fined to roads and trails. The SUSVsare also brought to the field during thespring and summer exercises to helprecover mired vehicles.


Fig. 3 Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Arctic Light Training

Fort Wainwright, including the ad-joining Yukon Training Area, offers thelargest Arctic training area in theworld, with 916,000 acres. An addi-tional 670,000 acres for firing, testing,and training are available 100 milessoutheast, a short drive by Alaskanstandards, at Fort Greely. These areasoffer a variety of training environ-ments, from open tundra, to highmountains, rivers, glaciers, hills, andthick forests.

Because of the extreme conditionsunder which units in the Alaskan inte-rior must operate, training must be, andis, tough and realistic. Winter lasts gen-erally from October to March whiletemperatures around Fort Wainwrighthover near -20 degrees Fahrenheit formost of the winter and can dip down to-50 degrees Fahrenheit. These figuresdo not include wind chill. These are theweather conditions in which the Arcticcavalry specializes. The rationale is

that if the enemy is preoccupied withtrying to stay warm, he will be less in-tent on his local security. Lowered se-curity, of course, makes it easier toconduct reconnaissance or close withand destroy the enemy.

Training and proper equipment makeoperation in the Arctic possible and thesoldiers have the equipment, vehicles,and clothing necessary to survive andoperate in this harsh environment. Mili-tary vehicles are equipped with Arcticheaters which augment the standardheaters. Winterization kits are also nec-essary to keep engines and batteriesfrom freezing in the extreme condi-tions. For the individual soldier, theArmy’s Extended Cold Weather Cloth-ing System (ECWCS) combines stateof the art fabrics, Gore-tex andpolypropylene, into a clothing systemthat insulates and repels the elementseven in the harshest conditions.

Activation of the troop created atraining and experience gap, with onlya few members experienced in extreme

cold weather conditions. After activa-tion, it became necessary to develop arigorous training program to preparefor the onslaught of winter. The AirForce Arctic Survival Training School,taught at Eielson Air Force Base,Alaska, helped provide some of thetroop’s leadership with winter survivalskills. The Army’s Northern WarfareTraining Center provided the mostvaluable training. The entire troop at-tended the three-week Infantry Com-pany Course during November and De-cember of 1994, learning the basics ofoversnow movement (snowshoe, ski-joring, Akio sled pulling, downhill andcross country skiing), and Arctic sur-vival skills (snow cave shelters, tentand stove drills, fire building, and otherfield-craft). This course is taught atFort Greely, Alaska, by some of theArmy’s top cold weather instructorsand culminates in a three-day tacticalfield problem under extreme Arcticconditions. Temperatures during thecourse reached a low of -52 degreesFahrenheit. The troop became the first

Fig. 6


non-infantry unit to complete the de-manding three-week course. Workingclosely with light infantry and other as-sets in the brigade requires an emphasison light fighter skills. The troop con-ducts regular and extensive dismountedpatrolling, quarterly 20km tactical ruckmarches, aerial insertions, and sling-load training. In addition, there is astrenuous PT program that involvesstretching and calisthenics outdoors inwinter temperatures down to 30 de-grees below zero, as well as snowshoemarches and cross-country skiing tokeep physical training exciting.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Because the SIB possesses its ownLRSD, ground cavalry troop, militarypolice, chemical reconnaissance,ground surveillance radar, and battalionscout platoons it is equipped with a

wide range of reconnaissanceand security assets. This al-lows the brigade to select theorganization which bestmeets the needs of the mis-sion.

The cavalry is an excellentchoice for screen operationsrequiring quick, lateral (mov-ing flank screens) or ex-tended movements againstenemy operating dismountedor using light armor vehicles.The troop’s scout platoonscan screen an area from threeto five kilometers wide, de-pending on the terrain. Inconjunction with the LRSD,battalion scouts, GSR, andground cavalry, the brigadecan create an excellent secu-rity zone possessing depth,firepower, and covering bothmounted and dismountedavenues of advance. TheLRSD, cavalry scouts, andTOW platoons operating outof hide positions can create ahunter-killer team offeringstealth and punch.

Because of the firepower ofthe separate light cavalrytroop, it can be used to bringoverwhelming force quicklyto bear on the enemy. Itmakes an excellent counterat-tack, reserve, or reactionforce against a lightly ar-mored threat where vehicularmobility is not a constraint.The cavalry also provides

firepower and mobility for convoy es-cort missions and quick reaction forcescovering the movement of friendlyconvoys or patrols.

Other possible uses for the cavalrytroop include airmobile operationswhich drop the cavalry behind enemylines, with or without vehicles, to con-duct deep reconnaissance of multiplelocations and raids against rear supportareas. Cavalry platoons can operate at-tached to infantry battalions or as partof the troop. Platoons can secure PZs,LZs, and key road intersections to sup-port battalion or brigade movements.

Conclusion

E Troop, 3-17 Cavalry is a uniqueunit with a unique mission. The troopgives the separate infantry brigade (L)an organization capable of stealth, mo-

bility, and firepower under the harshestof conditions. The troop can fight andwin in the most inhospitable area of theworld. The troop also gives cavalryscouts and armor (cavalry) officers in-terested in a once-in-a-life time chal-lenge a new test with the “Arctic Re-con!”


Captain Keith A. Sharples is a1985 Distinguished MilitaryGraduate of Indiana University,where he received his Armorcommission and a BS in Busi-ness. He served with C Com-pany, 1-35 Armor, FRG, as anM60A3 tank platoon leader andan M1A1 tank company XO; asa doctrinal writer, U.S. Army Ar-mor School, Ft. Knox; with theSpecial Forces Center trainingEgyptian Armor Crews in Cairoon the M1A1 during OperationDesert Shield; and as com-mander, D Trp, 5-15 Cavalry,and later as the squadron S3.He organized, activated, andcommanded A Troop, 4-9 Cav-alry (Arctic Recon) at Ft. Wain-wright. He currently serves asthe Armor Liason to the 2d Bde,38th ID, Indiana National Guard.He holds a Masters of PublicAdministration Degree fromWestern Kentucky University.His military schooling includesthe Armor Basic and AdvancedCourses, Cavalry Leader, ScoutCommander Certification, JuniorMaintenance Officer, Airborne,Air Assault, Arctic Light Individ-ual Training, and the Air ForceArctic Survival Courses.

First Lieutenant Ken Dobert isa former TOW platoon leaderand is currently assigned as XOof E Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17thCavalry. He is a graduate of theArmor Officers Basic Course,Scout Platoon Leader Course,BNCOC, and the Basic RussianCourse. He served as squadleader, cryptanalysis sectionleader, platoon sergeant, and in-structor at the Ministry of De-fense and Aviation, Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia.

Above, troops en-gage enemy dis-mounts in a train-ing exercise.

At left, a scoutHMMWV on patrol.

Below, a SUSVloads aboard a C-130 during North-ern Edge ’95.

THE PROBLEM: Dead or low bat-teries caused by sulfate accumulationon the battery plates.

THE CAUSE: During the normalcharge and discharge cycles of leadacid batteries, sulfate molecules con-tained in the electrolyte solution moveback and forth between the acid andlead battery plates. Unfortunately, notall sulfate molecules that attach to thelead plates are released. This results insulfate accumulation on the lead platescausing electron flow (electric current)to be reduced. After deep discharge, se-vere sulfate build-up occurs, whichpractically eliminates electron flow.The final result is dead batteries. Main-tenance personnel must then take spe-cific gravity readings, which are gener-ally low, to determine how many bat-teries have dead cells and require re-placement. A battery in this condition isnormally discarded since normal charg-ing/recharging procedures do little toregain battery capacity. The problemhere is not a “failed” battery, the prob-lem is sulfate build-up. In fact, sulfatedbatteries are the largest single cause ofbattery replacement in the armor fleet!

THE SOLUTION: Armor units canextend battery life four to five times byinstalling a battery conditioning devicecalled the Solargizer on their vehi-cles. The Solargizer , in effect, pre-vents sulfate accumulation through theapplication of pulsed power technol-ogy, thereby maintaining peak batteryperformance. The Solargizer is de-signed for use on 12, 24, and 36 voltelectrical systems employing lead acidbatteries. A single unit consists of asmall solar panel (5.5" x 4.5" x0.125"), a circuit box (2.25" x 2.25" x1.5"), and 25 feet of wire to connectthe two together. The circuit box isequipped with two output wires whichare attached to the vehicle’s batteryposts. As the name implies, the Solar-gizer uses solar energy to generate ahigh frequency, low amperage, pulsat-ing electrical current which is passed tothe vehicle’s batteries. One cautionthough, the Solargizer is only a bat-tery conditioning device, it is not a bat-tery charger! Its primary function is to

prevent sulfate build-up on a lead acidbattery’s plates, thereby enabling thebattery to accept a full charge, eitherfrom the vehicle’s charging system orfrom a stand-alone charging unit. In-stallation and continual use of the So-largizer will provide the followingbenefits:

• Battery life extension by avoiding orreversing sulfate accumulation.

• Battery efficiency improvement tonear 100% capacity.

• Battery charge lost due to unavoid-able normal internal bat-tery discharge will bereplaced.

An additional not insig-nificant benefit of the So-largizer , as reported inthe Fort Hood BatteryManagement Task ForceFinal Report dated 30September 1994, is:

“... a critical advantageof the Solargizer (butone that cannot be mone-tarily measured) is the im-proved confidence in, andimproved readiness of, theequipment.”

PROCUREMENT INFORMA-TION: The Defense Logistics Agency(DLA) currently has a contract withPulseTech Products Corporation forprocurement of the Solargizer . Mr.Joe Franklin, the DLA Item Manager,reports that units requesting a Solar-gizer will have them shipped directlyfrom PulseTech Products Corporationonce DLA forwards the unit’s request.The Solargizer is a Class IX item, sobattery budget money (OMA funds) areacceptable for its purchase. Every two12 volt batteries connected in series


Item NSNPrice/FOB

Destination

24 Volt Solargizer

1-9 6130-01-392-8347 $131.64

10-99 6130-01-417-0968 $116.30

100-999 6130-01-417-9073 $105.63

1000-4999 6130-01-417-9079 $94.96

5000 or more 6130-01-417-9291 $89.63

Lexan Frame 6130-01-396-4074 $167.00

Figure 1. Logistics Information

Introducing the Solargizer :Solar Technology for Lead-Acid Batteries

by Paul Hornback

The 24-volt Solargizers are seen here mounted on the Bradley hull.

and forming a 24 volt system requiresa 24 volt Solargizer . An Abrams tankrequires three 24 volt Solargizerunits to continually condition the tank’ssix 12 volt batteries. Also developedfor the Abrams Tank is a Lexan Frame(17.5" x 9.5" x 0.5") which conven-iently holds all three solar panels andprovides added protection against foottraffic and heavy objects. The preced-ing table depicts NSNs and item costbased on specific quantities. Additionalordering information can be obtainedfrom Mr. Franklin at DSN 695-6148 orCommercial (804) 279-6148.

BACKGROUND DATA: In Novem-ber 1993, LTG Funk chartered the FortHood Battery Management Task Force(BMTF). The primary goal of the taskforce was to institute a broad-basedprogram that would reduce Fort Hood’sbattery consumption by 50% and asso-ciated disposal cost by 30%. The Solar-gizer was a commercially availabletechnology recommended by theBMTF to help achieve this goal. Anoperational evaluation at Fort Hood,using M1A1s from the 3-66 ArmorBattalion (2AD), indicated the Solar-gizer increases performance in vehi-cle lead acid batteries, makes the bat-teries last longer, and is durable enoughto withstand an armor unit’s rigorousoperational environment. The BMTFFinal Report estimated that the current6TL lead acid battery life of one yearcould be extended to a minimum offive years.

MAINTENANCE INFORMA-TION: The Solargizer requires mini-mal Preventive Maintenance (PM) withthe only PM procedure being to cleanoff the top surface of the solar panelsor the Lexan Frame (if installed) to re-move accumulated dirt, dust, and mud.Troubleshooting can easily be accom-plished using a voltmeter to measurethe no-load voltage at the battery termi-nal connection point to ensure the So-largizer is providing a high voltage,low amperage current to the platform’sbatteries. Recommended mounting lo-cations for the solar panels on theAbrams, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, andHigh Mobility Multipurpose WheeledVehicle (HMMWV) are as follows:

Abrams. The three solar panels areplaced in the Lexan Frame andmounted on the back deck next to thebattery box.

Bradley. Two solar panels aremounted on the non-skid surface areajust behind the driver’s hatch but aheadof the periscope (conditions hull batter-ies). One solar panel is mounted on theright side of the turret just below theantenna mount (conditions turret batter-ies).

HMMWV. One solar panel ismounted on the inside left lower cornerof the passenger windscreen.

For a detailed list of installation in-structions for the Abrams, Bradley, andHMMWV, contact the author or Mr.

Roy Holley, III CorpsScientific Advisor, DSN737-7145 or Commercial(817) 287-7145.

SUMMARY: Based oninformation obtainedfrom operational evalu-ations and early use byarmor/mechanized infan-try units, the Solargizerperforms as advertised.However, will the unitsave money? The table inFigure 2 depicts the asso-ciated battery costs for anAbrams (without the So-largizer) and the pro-jected costs with threeSolargizer units in-stalled (includes a LexanFrame).

Cost data presented covers a five yearperiod and is based on the 6TL batterycost of $65.00 (six 6TL batteries @$65.00/battery is $390), the one year6TL battery life, the estimated five year(minimum) extended battery life result-ing from Solargizer use, the initialSolargizer cost (three Solargizerunits @ $105.63 each is $316.89, as-sumes a quantity discount for 174 unitsto equip an armor battalion), and theLexan Frame ($167.00 each). Mainte-nance costs were excluded in order toprovide the units “pure” dollar savings(i.e., in-pocket, hard currency savings).

Installation of the Solargizer on anAbrams tank nets a savings of $1076over a five-year period. On a muchlarger scale, a battalion of 58 tankscould save approximately $62,400 overa five year period with an initial invest-ment of only $28,065. Obviously, theSolargizer is a cost effective measurewhich would provide a substantialbenefit to the armor fleet.


ItemCurrentAbrams

Abrams with Solargizer

Battery Cost

1st Year $390.00* 0

2d Year $390.00* 0

3d Year $390.00* 0

4th Year $390.00* 0

5th Year $390.00* $390.00*

3 Solargizers 0 $316.89

Lexan Frame 0 $167.00

Total 5-Year Cost $1950.00 $873.89

*Cost to replace all 6 vehicle batteries

Figure 2. Five-Year Battery Cost Data

Paul Hornback is a generalengineer with the federal gov-ernment. He is presently as-signed to the HQ TRADOCCombat Development Engi-neering Division, Fort KnoxField Office, which providesengineering support to the Di-rectorate of Force Develop-ment, Fort Knox, Ky. He holdsa Bachelor of Science degreein Mechanical Engineeringfrom the University of Louis-ville and is currenly completinga Masters of Science degreein Industrial Engineering. Hismilitary experience comesfrom a six-year tour as a UH-1N helicopter pilot in the U.S.Marine Corps, where he at-tained the rank of Captain.

Solargizer and transformer

During the final days of the Viet NamWar, I commanded the ARVN III Ar-mor Brigade and III Corps AssaultTask Force (ATF) throughout III CorpsTactical Zone and in defense of theCity of Bien Hoa against the finalCommunist offensive in South VietNam. For twenty years since the fall ofSouth Viet Nam on 30 April 1975, Ihave read many articles by both Com-munist and Free-World writers. Manyof them are ambiguous or inexact, es-pecially when referring to actions eastof and in Bien Hoa. Some even distortthe truth and wound the honor of IIIArmor Brigade/III Corps ATF, so Ihave an obligation to both the livingand the dead to correct the record so asnot to be ungrateful to the heroes whowillingly followed me and fought tothe very last minute of the war.

The Early Days From 1970 on, there were four armor

brigades, one per corps. Each head-quarters was highly mobile, track-mounted, packed with radio gear, andmanned by a carefully selected, battle-tested staff. Designed to control up tosix maneuver battalions (a division hasnine) the brigades had no organic unitsbut were “task organized” by theircorps commanders according to themission at hand: sometimes with asmany as 18 battalions!

III Armor Brigade headquarters wasactivated in November 1970 and, afterintensive training with a U.S. advisoryteam headed by LTC C.M. Crawford,with MAJ Racine, CPT Waer, and oth-ers, was declared combat ready and as-signed to III Corps for employment inJanuary 1971. Task-organized with the15th and 18th Armored Cavalry Squad-rons and a variety of infantry, artillery,and supporting units, it was the coreand frame of LTG Do Cao Tri’s IIICorps ATF, established to meet battle-field demands in Cambodia. The ATFwas the corps’ combined-arms reserve.When reinforced for violent combat, itsstrength and capability were equivalentto a mechanized division. It operated

either alone or with the ARVN’s 5th,18th, or 25th Infantry Divisions. Wher-ever there was heavy combat in the IIICorps Tactical Zone, the ATF was al-ways present.

The Task Force crossed swords manytimes with the North VietnameseArmy’s (NVA) 5th, 7th, and 9th Infan-try Divisions, both in Cambodia andViet Nam. It rescued from destruction the5th Ranger TF at Chlong and Dambein February and March 1971, the 8thRegimental Combat Team (RCT) of the5th Infantry Division at Snoul in June1971, and the 30th Ranger Battalion atAlpha Base, six km east of Krek plan-tation, in November 1971 (Map 1).

The tragic death of General Do CaoTri in a helicopter crash in February1971 marked the turning point of thewar in South Viet Nam. LTG NguyenVan Minh, succeeding General Tri asIII Corps Commander, made mistakeafter mistake from the very start. Heand I differed on many points regard-ing the conduct of operations in Cam-bodia. Because of his weakness, wesuffered many setbacks and, little bylittle, lost the initiative to the enemy.Often, I could not help arguing withhim, and our relationship became moreand more tense. After the victory nearKrek in November 1971, I made up mymind to apply for admission to the U.S.Army’s Command and General StaffCollege at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

From 1972 to 1973, I went to theU.S. to complete my advanced militaryeducation. Shortly after my departure,General Minh dispersed the resourcesof the III Armor Brigade and com-pletely disbanded the III Corps ATF.When the battle of An Loc — BinhLong broke out violently during thesummer of 1972, the Armor units of IIICorps were completely paralyzed.

When I returned to Viet Nam in 1973,LTG Pham Quoc Thuan had replacedGeneral Minh. He insisted that I rejoinIII Armor Brigade. I resumed com-mand of the brigade on 7 November1973 and suggested to the new corps

Fighting to the FinishThe Role of South Viet Nam’s III Armor Brigadeand III Corps Assault Force in the War’s Final Days

by Tran Quang Khoi, Brigadier General, ARVN


Foreword Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi

graduated from the Vietnamese Na-tional Military Academy at Da Lat in1952, the French Cavalry School atSaumur in 1955, and the U.S. ArmyArmor School at Fort Knox in 1959.As senior advisor to the VietnameseChief of Armor, I first met him in1966 when he deployed the ARVN 5thCavalry to Xuan Loc. I accompaniedhim on several operations to recon-noiter for the impending arrival of theU.S. 11th ACR. In May of 1966, heprovided his 1/5 tank troop (M41A3)for airlift to Da Nang (“When TanksTook Wings,” ARMOR, May-June1994). In early 1970, his combined-arms Task Force 318 spearheaded theU.S./VN incursion into Cambodia,earning his Corps CG the sobriquet“The Patton of the Parrot’s Beak.” InNovember 1970, he organized andtrained III Armor Bde and com-manded it in Cambodia, both beforeand after attending the U.S. ArmyCommand & General Staff College atFort Leavenworth in 1972-3. In 1971-72, I frequently met him in places likeAn Loc and Loc Ninh as his brigaderaced between flash points in Cambo-dia. Released from “Re-educationCamp” after 17 years, he now residesin Springfield, VA.

He is one of the finest Armor lead-ers I ever met; bold and daring, butnot foolhardy, he knew full well howto use mobility and firepower to pro-duce shock even in terrain like VietNam’s. He also had the imaginationand flexibility to task-organize in sucha way as to get the most from hisavailable assets. Had Khoi been atank battalion commander in ThirdArmy during World War II, GeneralPatton would have acknowledged twopeers: Creighton Abrams and TranQuang Khoi.

RAYMOND R. BATTREALLCOL, Armor (Ret)

BG Khoi

commander that III Corps ATF be rees-tablished according to General Tri’smodel. He gave me complete authorityfor this task. I reassembled dispersedarmor units and, with the new M48medium tanks of 22d Armor and M548tracked cargo carriers to transport fueland ammunition, I changed the compo-sition of Armor units and improved themobility of 105mm towed artilleryunits.

• The 15th and 18th Armored Cav-alry Squadrons had had their M41A3light tank troops reassigned during myabsence. They had five M113-equippedArmored Cavalry Assault Troops(ACATs) when I returned. I shiftedmen and equipment to squeeze a sixthACAT out of available resources.

• The recently fielded M48 tank bat-talion (22d Armor) was identical to theU.S. tank battalion of that time: three17-tank companies plus three commandtanks for a total of 54. I reduced theirplatoons from five tanks to three (eas-ier for a platoon leader to control)which, with two command tanks, madeeleven per company. I was then able toactivate a fourth tank company which,with three battalion-level commandtanks, gave a total of 47, with seven ofthe original tanks left over as a supplyreserve.

• Reinforcements from III Corpswere 33d Ranger Group, 46th ArtilleryBattalion (155mm towed), 61st Artil-lery Battalion (105mm towed), and302d Engineer Battalion.

• The 105mm towed artillery battal-ion was converted to “self-propelled”by mounting the howitzers on M548tracked cargo carriers. Each M548 wasmodified by adding two removableramps for the 105s to mount and dis-mount. Each 105 crew was trained tomount and dismount its howitzer andfire as quickly as possible. The resultwas a unit almost as effective as a trulyself-propelled battalion.

• III Corps ATF was organized intothree sub task forces, 315, 318, and


MAP 1At top right, detail map shows IIICorps attack on the 7th NVA InfantryDivision just over the Cambodian bor-der.

MAP 2At lower right, area map identifies ma-jor III Corps/III ATF sectors of opera-tion.

322, based on the 15th and 18th Cav-alry and 22d Armor. Each had twoACATs, one M48 medium tank com-pany, one Ranger battalion, one track-mounted 105 battery, and one engineerplatoon.

Under III Corps ATF control was the33d Ranger Group HQ, with its ownreconnaissance company and 105 bat-tery, an M48 tank company, the 46thArtillery Battalion (155mm towed), the302d Engineer Battalion (-), and a lo-gistics company from 3d Log Com-mand. (Fig. 1)

In addition to intensive combat train-ing, the troops were also educated onthe ideas of Communism so they couldunderstand the enemy and his tactics.When all were well prepared bothphysically and mentally, I reported theATF to the corps commander as com-bat ready. On 2 April 1974, III CorpsATF took the enemy by surprise on theborder between Cu Chi and TrangBang Districts, relieving enemy pres-sure on Bo Cap and Cha Ray outposts(Map 3). TF 315 inflicted heavy losseson the Viet Cong Tay Son Battalion.

Near the end of March 1974, the 83dRanger Battalion at Duc Hue Base nearthe Cambodian border was surroundedby the NVA 5th Division. A valiant,month-long effort by the ARVN 25thDivision — attacking, as expected, fromeast to west inside Viet Nam — failedto break the siege. Even aerial resupplyand medevac missions were cut off,and the situation appeared almost hope-less. LTG Thuan asked me for a plan.My plan (Map 4), to take the enemyfrom the rear in a cross-border attack,shocked him. He feared that a new in-cursion into Cambodia would causeproblems with the United Nations. I in-sisted, however, that this was the onlyhope for success, so he took the plan toPresident Thieu for approval.

The actual operation consisted of twophases:

• Deception. On 22 April III ATFmoved from Go Dau Ha to Lai Thieuin Binh Duong Province.

• Attack. III ATF returned to Go DauHa under blackout conditions on thenight of 28 April. Tanks crossed theriver at midnight on rubberrafts provided by the 302dEngineers. The ATF crossedthe border and occupied at-tack positions by 0300 onthe 29th. TF 315 made themain attack and TF 318 the

secondary. TF 322 in reserve followedTF 315. The mission was accomplishedby 1 May.

This relief of the 83d Ranger Battal-ion at Duc Hue proved to be the lastmajor ARVN offensive of the war. Se-vere constraints on ammunition, fuel,and flying hours caused by lack of


FIG. 1

MAP 3

MAP 4

promised U.S. support allowedno new initiatives. Nevertheless,the NVA 5th Division was neveragain a threat.

From late May until November,the ATF supported the 18th andlater the 5th Infantry Divisions intheir struggle to retake An Dien,Base 82, and Rach Bap in theIron Triangle.

On 30 October, LTG Du QuocDong replaced General Thuan asIII Corps commander. Commu-nist forces became stronger andstronger, and more and more ag-gressive. Their attacks all overthe country flagrantly violatedthe Paris Peace Agreement. InJanuary 1975, Phuoc Long Prov-ince fell into their hands; GeneralDong resigned; and LTG NguyenVan Toan, the Chief of Armor, tookcommand of III Corps. Toan, who hadcommanded II Corps during the Com-munist Easter Offensive of 1972,promptly set about making his over-worked regular divisions more mobileby assigning all fixed posts to RegionalForces. He also launched periodicspoiling attacks in an attempt to keepthe enemy off balance.

As part of these efforts, III Corps ATFencircled northern Binh Duong Prov-ince in February and destroyed the VCPhu Loi Battalion headquarters. It alsorelieved enemy pressure at Go Dau Ha,Khiem Hanh, and Dau Tieng in March,and on the 25th retook Truong Mit, vir-tually destroying the NVA 271st Regi-ment in the process.

But, especially for 14 days and nightsfrom 11 to 25 April 1975, III CorpsATF reinforced by the 8th Regiment ofthe 5th Infantry Division fought andstopped a ferocious NVA corps ad-vance near the junction of NationalRoutes 1 and 20 as part of the epic bat-tle of Xuan Loc, the war’s bloodiest.(See NVA General Van Tien Dung’sbook, The Great Spring Victory.) At theend of this time, I was forced to usetwo CBU-55 bombs from Bien Hoa AirBase to rescue the 18th Division’s 52dInfantry. We then supported its with-drawal to Long Binh Base.

Events developed at a chaotic pace inlate April. I and II Corps had disinte-grated, all NVA fighting divisions weremoving south, and pressure east of

Bien Hoa worsened with each passingday. I was invited to join a coup tooverthrow President Thieu but refusedstrongly and publicly declared againstit. Bien Hoa Air Base was neutralizedby enemy artillery fires and shut down.On 20 April, BG Le Minh Dao’s 18thDivision finally abandoned its magnifi-cent defense of Xuan Loc and with-drew to Long Binh. On the 21st, Presi-dent Thieu resigned. From the front on22 April, I wrote to General CharlesTimmes, Assistant to the U.S. Ambas-sador in Saigon, “...I have been engag-ing with NVA divisions in the vicinityof Dau Giay, Xuan Loc while Congressdebates whether or not to give furthermilitary assistance of 300 million dol-lars to the ARVN. I think the situationis almost hopeless. Even if Congressapproves the funding now, it is too late.Nevertheless, I and my fellow soldiershave decided to stay and fight until thevery end. My only request is that youwould help my family migrate to a safelocation....”

III Armor Bde and III Corps ATFThe Last Five Daysof the Viet Nam War

After five days of recuperation, the18th Infantry Division was ordered tomove east on 25 April and replace IIICorps ATF on the front line at HungLoc-Dau Giay. The ATF returned to itsbase in Bien Hoa for equipment main-tenance and rest. The 8th Infantry

Regiment returned to its parentunit. That evening, the enemyseized the ARVN Armor Schoolat Long Thanh. On corps order, Iimmediately sent TF 322 and aMarine Battalion to meet the en-emy. They engaged heavily witha strong enemy force supportedby tanks, destroying 12 T54tanks and forcing the enemy towithdraw by midnight. This vic-tory raised the morale and fight-ing spirit of all combat units inBien Hoa. After inspecting thebattlefield, LTG Toan promised a1.2 million piastre reward(100,000 piastres per tank) tothose who had contributed to thedestruction of the T54s. Fromnow on, the ATF became IIICorps reserve.

On 29 April, III Corps ATF wasreinforced by the 2d Marine Brigadeand 4th Airborne Brigade. At noon,General Toan held an urgent confer-ence at 18th Infantry Division Head-quarters in Long Binh. Only GeneralToan, General Le Minh Dao, and my-self were present. Dao was ordered todefend Long Binh and control the BienHoa highway. My ATF was to defendthe City of Bien Hoa with all Regionaland Popular Forces in the area undermy control. At that time Cu Chi hadbeen lost; the 25th Infantry Divisionhad been overrun; and its commander,BG Ly Tong Ba, had been captured.General Toan withheld that informationfrom us, as he was preparing to desert.Dao and I later learned the truth whenwe met Ba in a Communist concentra-tion camp.

As the meeting concluded, COLHieu, commander of the 18th Divi-sion’s 43d Regiment, burst into theroom to report in an emotional tonethat the enemy was attacking TrangBom and his regiment was retreating toLong Binh. General Dao’s facial ex-pression changed as he heard the news.General Toan reacted furiously andscreamed his orders: Hieu was to takehis regiment and return to Trang Bom.He pretended to accept the order, sa-luted, and left. I knew, however, thatthe 18th Division could not sustain thefront at Trang Bom. It was alreadyweakened by the fighting at Xuan Loc,had had only five days to recuperate,and the inevitable would happen intime.


BG Khoi, then a colonel, briefs LTG Do Cao Tri in early 1970.

General Toan stood up, shook myhand and Dao’s, and said, “I wish youboth the best of luck in combat. I willfly back to JGS to request support foryou.” He then turned to me and said,“As for the 1.2 million piastres, I willsend someone to deliver the money toyour headquarters.” These were his lastwords to me before he deserted.

As soon as I returned to my head-quarters, I held a meeting with my unitcommanders. Everyone was present ex-cept the Bien Hoa sector commanderand his assistant. They had deserted afew days earlier.

These were my orders as of 1300hours, 29 April 1975:

• The City of Bien Hoa is now un-der martial law. Curfew will be at 1500hours.

• Each Regional and Popular Forceunit is to stay at its assigned post. Nomovement is permitted.

• The Police Force is responsible forthe internal safety of the City.

• Absolutely no one is to enter orleave the City.

To defend Bien Hoa I organized thefollowing (Map 5):

• TF 322 defend the northern sectorfrom the airfield to III Corps headquar-ters.

• 2d Marine Brigade protect IIICorps headquarters with one battalion.

Brigade (-) defend the southern sectorsouth of National Route 1.

• 4th Airborne Brigade secure thenew Bien Hoa highway and railroadbridges. Establish blocking positions onall routes of approach.

• TF 315 defend the eastern sectorfrom the intersection of Bien HoaHighway and National Route 1 to LoThan (near Camp Ngo Van Sang).

• TF 318 assemble between the maingate of Bien Hoa Air Base and the newBien Hoa Highway bridge as a reserve.Screen the western sector along theBien Hoa River.

• Artillery support: Fire support plan.

• ATF Headquarters positioned inthe garden of the Corps Commander’sPalace.

Around 1500 hours, while I was hav-ing lunch with my staff in the palace,General Toan’s helicopter landed nextto mine in the garden. His pilot, MAJCo, reported that he had flown GeneralToan and his aides to Vung Tau (Cap St.Jacques) where they were met by LTGHoang Xuan Lam and BG Phan HoaHiep. The generals and their aides thenbooked a fishing boat to rendezvouswith the U.S. fleet at sea. This didn’tsurprise me. MAJ Co then asked if hecould stay and work for me. I agreed.

At 1700 hours, I rode in an escortedjeep to inspect inside and outside thecity. The people were absent from the

streets, and the shops were closed.Everything seemed to be in order.

At around 1800 hours, the enemybegan to infiltrate from the north.They were met by TF 322. ARanger unit of TF 315 also en-gaged them near Camp Ngo VanSang. The enemy hugged close toour positions, and both sides ex-changed continuous fire at a dis-tance of 15-20 meters. Even so,our men fought courageously andconfidently. There was no incidentof desertion within the ATF. Understrong fire support from Armorunits, the enemy was pushed back.

At 2000 hours, I called CampPhu Dong near Saigon. This wasthe location of Armor Command,where III Corps headquarters hadsettled a couple of days ago. Therewas an answer, but no one had theauthority to receive my report. I

then called the Operations Center ofthe Joint General Staff without avail.Finally, I was forced simply to wait im-patiently for further orders fromSaigon. I wondered if the new Presi-dent and commander-in-chief had a so-lution to this national disaster and if hehad any further mission for us.

Around 2200 hours, I was called byLTG Nguyen Huu Co. He was a formerchief of the Joint General Staff andMinister of Defense in 1965. Becauseof his political differences with then-Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, he hadbeen forced to resign in 1966. He said,“I am General Co. Right now I amstanding next to the President. We wantto know your current situation in BienHoa.” I replied, “I am defending BienHoa. Le Minh Dao is defending LongBinh. Nguyen Van Toan has deserted.The airfield has been seized by the en-emy. Heavy enemy pressure is comingfrom the north and northeast.”

A few minutes passed, then GeneralCo said, “The President wants to knowwhether you can defend Bien Hoa until0800 tomorrow so that negotiation withthe other side can take place.” I repliedwithout hesitation, “Yes, I can do that.”At the other end of the line I heardGeneral Co’s voice reporting to thepresident. Finally he said to me, “Gen-eral Khoi, this is your order from thepresident: Defend the City of Bien Hoauntil 0800 hours, 30 April 1975. I wishyou good luck.” I responded, “Yes, sir.”


MAP 5

Around 2345 hours, the enemyopened heavy artillery fire on the city.Then a regimental-size combined ar-mor-infantry force attacked along Na-tional Route 1 from Ho Nai to the IIICorps headquarters. TF 315, underLTC Do Duc Thao, engaged them andbroke their attack. Many T-54 tankswere destroyed, and the enemy re-treated.

At 0200 hours, 30 April, BG Dao ofthe 18th Infantry Division called me onthe radio and said, “I have been over-whelmed and Long Binh is lost.” Iasked, “Where are you now? Do youneed any help?” He replied, “I am atthe National Military Cemetery and re-treating toward Thu Duc.” I felt verysorry for Dao. During the last twoyears, he and I had worked very hardtogether, always on the move andagainst time. We had been together atall the battlefields in III Corps TacticalZone because my ATF was Corps Mo-bile Force 1 and Dao’s 18th Divisionwas Corps Mobile Force 2, accordingto General Do Cao Tri’s SOP. Whenwe were together in prison, the Com-munists kept a close watch on both ofus because we had caused the mostdamage to their forces and were con-sidered the two most anti-Communist“fanatics.”

Around 0300 hours, the enemy bom-barded Bien Hoa again. This time theirfire was stronger and more accurate. Iguessed their intention was to controlBien Hoa at all costs after seizing LongBinh. I was preparing to engage in thisdecisive battle with my entire force;but surprisingly, TF 315 stopped theirfrontal attack, enveloped their leftflank, and inflicted serious casualtiesupon them. They were forced to retreatto the Bien Hoa Highway, and the cityreturned to calm.

At exactly 0800 hours, 30 April, Itried to call General Co or the JGSheadquarters in Saigon, but to no avail.I then held a conference with all myunit commanders to exchange informa-tion concerning the internal and exter-nal situation of the city. The enemy hadretreated, leaving only minor guerrillaactivity outside the city. Inside, it wascalm. Everyone stayed indoors in com-pliance with the curfew, and the streetswere deserted. The night before, I hadhelped the city police with additionalmanpower to prevent any outbreak

from the jail. I was so happy to see thatour troops’ morale was still high. Theyhad plenty of courage and discipline.There was no rioting, looting, raping,or other activity in the streets. The citywas under complete control. Also, thenight before, a group of disbanded 18thDivision soldiers had tried to enter un-der curfew. I had ordered them drivenout because their presence might havecaused major security problems to thecivilians and loss of morale and disci-pline among our troops leading tochain-reaction disintegration, as hadoccurred last month in the CentralHighlands.

Now it was 0830. I concluded thatBien Hoa was no longer the enemy’sobjective; he was concentrating all hisforces to attack Saigon. We had nocommunications with any higher head-quarters, so I decided to pull out ofBien Hoa and march to rescue the capi-tal. All the unit commanders presentsupported my decision. I immediatelyissued an operations order. III CorpsATF was to move toward Saigon asfollows (Map 6):

a. 4th Airborne Bde, LTC Lo:

• Move on the right side of the BienHoa-Saigon railroad.

• At the outskirts of Saigon, deploy tothe right of the railroad and awaitfurther orders.

b. 2d Marine Bde, LTC Lien:

• Move on the left side of the BienHoa-Saigon railroad.

• At the outskirts of Saigon, deploy onthe left side of the railroad and awaitfurther orders.

c. III Corps ATF:

• Remain in position for support untilthe Airborne and Marine troops havesafely crossed the new Bien HoaBridge.

• Using the Korean Highway as theaxis of advance, move toward Saigonin the following formation:

(1) TF 315, LTC Do Duc Thao:

- Lead the column

- Deploy on the near side ofthe Binh Trieu bridge andawait further orders.

(2) TF 322, LTC Nguyen VanLien:

- Follow TF 315

- Deploy behind TF 315 at theBinh Trieu bridge and awaitfurther orders.

(3) III Corps ATF and units underdirect control:

- Follow TF 322

- Deploy behind TF 322 at theBinh Trieu bridge and awaitfurther orders.

(4) TF 318, LTC Nguyen DucDuong:

MAP 6


- Rear guard

- Deploy behind ATF Hq atthe Binh Trieu bridge andawait further orders.

Before boarding my helicopter, I in-spected my troops for the last time.They were departing the City of BienHoa in an organized formation. Eachman was neatly dressed, of dignifiedbearing, with a look of self-confidenceand resignation on his face, showing nofear. They looked just as proud as theyhad in earlier times when we fought inCambodia under General Do Cao Tri. Ilooked at my watch: it was 0900.

I boarded General Toan’s helicopter,piloted by MAJ Co. My own helicop-ter, piloted by CPT Tan, followed. Weflew over Bien Hoa at low altitude andsaw that the city was still calm and ap-parently in good order. My forces movedsteadily toward Saigon, destroying allenemy blocking positions in their path.

Then an anxious thought came tomind: what would happen if our forcesapproaching Saigon were mistaken forthe enemy and fired upon? Withoutcommunications, this was a great riskto my men. While I was pondering asolution to this problem, MAJ Co inter-

rupted and asked, “Sir, if you wish toflee the country, I can help you.” I re-plied, “What about you?” He said, “Af-ter flying you out there, I will return tomy family in Bien Hoa.” I responded,“Thanks very much for your concern,but I have decided to stay with mymen.”

We flew at high altitude toward theArmor Command and III Corps head-quarters in Camp Phu Dong. Far below,I saw a huge concentration of enemyguns, tanks, and troop-carrying trucksstretched out along Bien Hoa Highwayand Route 13, like two long snakescrawling into the Capital. We landed atCamp Phu Dong, and I dashed insidelooking for an officer on duty. Peoplewere pacing back and forth anxiously,and I didn’t meet anyone in authorityexcept a young lieutenant wearing IIICorps insignia. I told him that I neededto use the telephone to contact theCapital Military District to inform themthat my troops were approaching andshould not be fired upon.

I made countless attempts to contactCMD, but it was hopeless. I then triedcalling the JGS Operations Center, alsowithout success. In the meantime, Iheard volleys of enemy artillery fire

coming from the direction of Tan SonNhut Air Base. At that moment my Ar-mor units arrived at the Binh Trieubridge.

Then I heard the President’s voice onthe radio ordering all Republic of VietNam Armed Forces to cease fire andsurrender. It was 1025 hours, 30 April1975 by my watch. This was the end. Iwas most sorry for the outcome of thewar, but I had done my best. I let mytroops execute the President’s final or-der for themselves: I had nothing moreto say. But deep in my heart, I silentlythanked all of them for their courage,sacrifice, and dedication until the verylast minute of the war. Together, wehad fulfilled our obligation and oath ofallegiance.

Conclusion

I was, of course, arrested by theCommunists and held captive in vari-ous concentration camps for 17 years.After my release in 1992, I came to theU.S. as a political refugee in 1993.

During the early years of captivity, Iwas interrogated intensively. The Com-munists were puzzled by the effective-ness of III Armor Brigade/III CorpsATF. They studied our organization andoperations and made me write a com-position entitled “How could III ArmorBrigade/III Corps ATF fight unfailinglyagainst the Revolutionary Forces dur-ing the Spring Offensive?” They toldme that III Corps ATF had been theonly ARVN unit to confront them suc-cessfully until the last minute of thewar.

Later on, we were transferred fromthe management of the CommunistMinistry of Defense to that of the Min-istry of Interior. They investigated ourpast military activities and wereshocked by our exploits, which they re-garded as war crimes. They accusedme of prolonging the war for yearsand, along with the other commandinggenerals, I was selected to be prose-cuted as a war criminal. Happily, theU.S., the UN, and the international me-dia intervened on our behalf.

I shall never repent having done whatI did, nor complain about the conse-quences of my captivity. If history wereto repeat itself, I would choose thesame path. By so doing, I know fromexperience that I would lose everythingbut HONOR.

Above, ARVN cav-alry conduct recon-naissance overswampy terrainnear Cu Chi.

At left, an ARVNM41 light tank,used by III Corps/IIIATF until replacedby M48s. Thoughtto lack firepower,the M41’s 75-mmgun proved quiteadequate againstNVA T54s whenthey appeared onthe battlefield.


U.S. Army tank crew training, tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP) anddoctrinal manuals focus on open ter-rain. Tank crew training, from UCOFTto CALFEXes,2 is specifically designedfor open terrain. Many potential battle-fields, however, are located in areaswith mountainous terrain. Many of ourpotential enemies — primarily SecondWave3 military forces — will leveragethe terrain to make up for their trainingand technological disadvantages. A warin Korea, or in the Balkans, will findthe enemy using infantry and second-generation tank and antitank weaponsystems to ambush American tankers inrestricted terrain.

If the U.S. Army fights in restrictedterrain, force protection will be a majorissue. Tanks and mechanized infantryprovide a force with mobility, fire-power, and enhanced protection; how-ever, there is never enough dismountedinfantry or artillery. In restricted terrain,an armored combined arms force is theweapon of choice for quick, decisivevictory that produces a minimum offriendly casualties. Our Abrams tanksupplies this with its excellent armorprotection, mobility, and tough, battle-winning platform.

Commanding a tank in restricted ter-rain is much more demanding than inopen terrain. In restricted terrain, asmart enemy in concealed positionswill use the folds in the ground to am-bush the attacking tanks at point-blankranges. To defeat the ambusher, tankcrews must wrest the initiative from thedefender and fire first. This is a verychallenging task. This challenge wasdramatically evident during the KoreanWar (1950-1953), when superb tankersdemonstrated “on numerous occasionsthat they could operate effectively interrain that doctrinally was consideredcompletely unsuitable for tanks.”4

Tank commanding in restricted ter-rain, therefore, requires superb tankcommanders with highly trained crews.Superb tank commanders use skill andenhanced battlefield situation aware-ness to gain a decisive time advantageto win in the defile — a “three-to-sixsecond advantage.” The three-to-six-second advantage is the ability to fireon an enemy ambusher at close range,in a defile, before he fires at you.5 Togain this advantage, the tank com-mander must build a high performingtank crew, master the critical crewtasks, and perform training that pre-

pares the crew to win the close-range,direct-fire fight.

Build a High Performing Crew

In the past, most tank crewmen per-formed single-skill tasks. The driverdrove. The loader loaded. The gunneraimed the gun. Only the tank com-mander had to master multiple-skilltasks. The tank commander was ex-pected to acquire the target, guide thetank, talk on the radio, and decide howto fight the tank. This delegation oftasks works well in open terrain, wherethe tank commander has more time toreact to enemy threats, and when theengagement ranges allowed more timeto acquire, designate, and destroy tar-gets.

In restricted terrain, a tank com-mander has less time to react to enemyactions. To react successfully underthese conditions, the tank crew mustshare some of the multiple skill tasksthat were once the sole role of the tankcommander. This requires tank crew-men who know much more aboutfighting the tank as a whole. It requires


The Three to Six Second Advantage:Tank Combat in Restricted Terrain

by Staff Sergeant Stephen KrivitskyDragon Force Master Gunner

“Terrain is not neutral — it either helps or hinders each of the op-posed forces. Commanders must develop an eye for terrain; they mustrecognize its limitations and possibilities for protecting friendly forcesand putting the enemy at a disadvantage. Successful commanders un-derstand terrain and how it affects operations. They are able to graspthe potential capabilities and limitations of the space in which theyoperate.”1

FM 100-5

a team that can anticipate the enemy’smoves.

The tank commander is responsiblefor training his crew in these multipleskill tasks. To develop the crew into ahigh-performing team, every crew-member must work together to accom-plish the common goal.6 The tank com-mander must build two high-perform-ing teams: the tank commander/gunnerteam and the tank crew team.7 As ateam builder, the tank commander mustteach his crew. He is responsible forthe crew and teaches them how to op-erate the tank as a team. The goal ofthis training is to create a high per-forming team where each crewmemberis a part of mission success. The ex-change of information in the tank re-sembles the actions of a pilot, co-pilot,navigator, and bombardier of an attackbomber.8

Not every tank commander will havethe skill or the experience to build ahigh performing tank crew. Platoon ser-geants, company master gunners, pla-toon leaders, and company command-ers must reinforce the training effort bymentoring weak tank commanders inmultiple-task skills. There are as many

methods to produce high performingtank crews as there are combat situ-ations. The key is to address the issueand plan to grow crews that can func-tion as more than the sum of their parts.

The multiple-task skills of the tankcrew fighting in restrictive terrain cen-ter on battlefield situational awareness.The situational awareness of the tankcrew in restrictive terrain combat mustoccur faster than in open terrain com-bat. Effective weapons employment isa crew task that requires a high degreeof interaction and drill. Each memberof the crew — loader, driver, gunner,and tank commander — apply a collec-tive battlefield situation awareness toemploy the tank’s firepower on theclose-range engagements typical offighting in restricted terrain.

The driver must be more than a pas-sive extension of the tank’s movement;he must master the battlespace to thetank’s front. To accomplish this, thedriver must know where he is goingand know how to get there. The drivermust be trained to use a route chart ef-fectively and efficiently.9

The loader’s tasks involve scanning,reporting position location, employing

the loader’s machine gun and, finally,loading the main gun. When traveling,the loader must be trained to constantlycover his crew search sector of respon-sibility,10 while at the same time keep-ing track of the vehicle’s exact positionusing a global positioning satellite re-ceiver device (PLGR or SLGR).

The gunner, while primarily responsi-ble for identifying, engaging, and de-stroying enemy elements with the maingun and coaxial machine gun, mustcontinually keep the tank commanderabreast of the fire control system status.This includes manually indexing battle-sight ranges (to be discussed in depthlater), tracking ammunition expendi-tures, creating sketch cards, etc.Equally important, the gunner mustmaintain a high state of situationalawareness, for he is the coupling be-tween the tank commander and the firecontrol system. This requires him tomaintain positive control of his orienta-tion on the battlefield and, therefore,the gun tube orientation. His ability totrack the vehicle’s progress keeps themain gun oriented effectively to gainan advantage. This translates to goingto a gun fight with your weapon al-


ready drawn and, for the most part, ac-curately aimed and armed.

The tank commander must master si-tuational awareness. His ability to see,anticipate, and react to expected enemysituations is decisive. Anticipating thekeyhole shot requires an acute under-standing of the ground and effectivemap reconnaissance. The tank com-mander must be a technical expert inhis navigational abilities — map read-ing, PLGR use, terrain association onthe move, and terrain interpretation.Terrain interpretation develops the pos-sible ambush site, keyhole position, in-tervisibility line, or kill sack without avisual reconnaissance of the area. Thetank commander primes the crew forsuccess by clearly relating checkpoints,phase lines, likely enemy keyhole posi-tions, engagement areas, and the axisof advance/route. From these interpre-tations, a picture of the possible key-hole positions can be clearly made. Hemust inform the crew, prior to move-ment, of areas of interest, suspected en-emy locations, difficult maneuver sites,restricted areas, and expected engage-ment areas. Guided by the tank com-mander, the driver, loader, and gunnerare fused into a team that maximizesinformation concerning the tank’s bat-tlespace.

The quality of the tank crew is, inlarge measure, dependent on the tankcommander. The tank commander mustnot only be in command of his vehiclebut must also command the situation.His leadership, skill, determination, anddrive are the linchpins for gaining thethree-to-six second advantage. Trainingfocused on techniques for winning inrestricted terrain must be arduous, real-istic, demanding, and conducted at afrequency that will achieve a 3-6 sec-ond advantage over the defender in thedefile fight.

The Crew’s Critical T asks

FM 17-12-1-1, Tank Gunnery, estab-lishes that Abrams Tank Crews musthave “a thorough knowledge of theirtank’s functional capabilities, the tech-niques of acquiring targets, and the ef-fective use of all crew-served weapons.In addition, U.S. tank crews must de-velop and sustain tactical crew skillsthat will allow them to maneuver effec-tively and survive on the battlefield.”11

Speed and accuracy of engagementsdepend on crew proficiency in the criti-cal tasks listed below:

Acquire Targets in Restricted Ter-rain: Target acquisition is the criticalcrew task in restricted terrain combat.12

Short engagement ranges make targetacquisition the single most critical fac-tor in gaining the three-to-six secondadvantage. Target acquisition is thetimely detection, location, and identifi-cation of targets in sufficient detail topermit accurate attack by either directfire or supporting fire. The entire crewmust practice search techniques fromtheir crew positions: rapid scan, slowscan, and detailed search.

Collectively, the crew must mastertarget acquisition.13 The crew must in-stinctively perform all elements of thetarget acquisition process to achieve thethree-to-six-second-advantage. The tar-get acquisition process has six essentialprogressive and interdependent steps:crew search, detection, location, identi-fication, classification, and confirma-tion, all of which must be mastered byeach member of the crew.14

Crew search, or observation, is the actof carefully viewing or watching thearea of operations, using search andscan techniques and sectors of observa-tion, to acquire targets. Each crewmanmust be responsible for his assignedarea of observation and be able to per-form all types of visual searches. Thecrew must master the rapid scan, slowscan, and detailed search techniques.

Detection of objects with potentialmilitary significance on the battlefieldis an important way to get an edge in adefile fight. The crews must master theability to identify the current or recentpresence of vehicles or personnel bythe telltale indicators or clues left bythe enemy. These clues include emptyfoxholes, hot spots, recent fires, trackmarks on the ground, dust clouds, ex-haust smoke, ATGM residue, loose ordisturbed dirt, etc. The crew’s aware-ness of these items will alert them tobattlefield hazards (ambush, obstacles)or enemy emplacements.

The crew must be able to locate thepotential enemy by looking and listen-ing. The crews must be highly skilledat putting the weapon systems to bearagainst the suspected enemy locationusing the TC override, traverse method,reference point method, clock method,sector method, or EA system method(to be detailed later).

The tank crew must be able to iden-tify the vehicle or position as friend orfoe, rapidly and correctly,15 and sub-

sequently classify the target as mostdangerous, dangerous, or least danger-ous. The most dangerous is the threatvehicle that has the ability to kill you,and is preparing to do so; the danger-ous threat is one that has the ability tokill you, but for whatever reason is notprepared to engage; the least dangerousis the threat that does not possess theability to kill you, but has the means tocall someone who can. Once complete,the tank commander must confirm thetarget for destruction as a threat andmost dangerous of the present threatvehicles.

In restricted terrain, a smart enemydefends the defile against an armoredpenetration by reinforcing his defensewith the terrain. Keyhole positions an-chor his defense. A keyhole position isa defensive position that allows for sin-gle or multiple flank or rear shots at theenemy during limited windows of op-portunity, without directly giving awaythe firing position. It is as if the enemywas firing at you through a keyhole asyou passed down a hallway. Keyholepositions are typically found in defiles.

Each member of the crew, not just thetank commander, works as part of ateam to anticipate and identify enemykeyhole positions. Once anticipated,the crew prepares to engage and de-stroy the enemy, orienting the maingun in the direction of the anticipatedkeyhole position. Gun tube orientationis instrumental in gaining the three-to-six second advantage. If the situationpermits, the tank should advance andexecute reconnaissance by fire,16 using7.62-mm machine guns and .50-calibermachine guns to suppress the keyholeshot with fire as the tank approaches.

Graphics and Overlays: The crewmust have a basic, thorough under-standing of all common graphics usedby their unit and their SOP. The pri-mary training references for this areFM 17-15, Oct. 1987, Chapter 2, andFM 101-5-1, Chapter 2. Each crewmanmust have the ability to interpret allgraphics given to the tank commanderand understand their meaning and cor-relation to the mission. Understandingmilitary graphics and overlays is a fun-damental factor in situational aware-ness and mission accomplishment.

PLGR (AN/PSN-11, PrecisionLightweight Global Positioning Sys-tem Receiver): Each member of thecrew should master the PLGR. ThePLGR gives each tank crew the abilityto determine an accurate 10-digit grid


coordinate, check time, rate of move-ment, direction of movement, and navi-gational waypoints. The ability of eachcrewman to use this equipment accu-rately and efficiently directly correlatesto battlefield situational awareness.

To keep the number of tasks percrewman manageable, the PLGRshould be located in the loader’s posi-tion. The loader must be trained to plotway points, track movement, locatecurrent position, and update the PLGRas the tank commander demands. Oncethe loader has mastered this, the tankcommander can receive updates with-out losing his situational awarenessthrough the defile, on the road march,or when maneuvering cross country.Simply put, this time-saving measureallows the tank commander freedom toconcentrate on the movement of his ve-hicle, tracking the map with the terrain,and the rapid employment of his directfires from all weapon systems. It helpsthe crew to perform quickly as a team.

The placement of the PLGR in theloader’s position, to the right of theAM-1780 VRC, allows for easy accessand allows the crew to go into protec-tive posture quickly. The external an-tenna cable should be run through theturret to allow for this.17 With this abil-ity, information can quickly get to thetank commander, gunner, and drivervia intercom to provide an accurate as-sessment of the tank’s location and di-rection of travel.

Route Chart: This is a navigationalaid to the tank commander, and is usedby the driver, gunner, and tank com-mander. The route chart is a sketchcard of the area he will be travelingthrough, along with key points such asterrain features, man-made objects, gridlines, engagement areas, and cardinaldirections. The route chart must list allcritical checkpoints and phase lines asoutlined during the troop-leading pro-cedures following the OPORD.

Through a thorough map reconnais-sance, and using the graphics issuedfrom the OPORD and the driver’sodometer, the driver maintains his situ-ational awareness through all phases ofthe operation using the route chart.18

The route chart (see FM 17-15, p. 2-38) breaks up the route or operationinto legs or segments, each with aunique direction or distance. Each legincludes major terrain features, andmanmade objects or other identifiablefeatures along the route to aid in deter-mining current location. The curve line

distance of each leg is measured to thenearest 100 meters. The route chart willalso contain the general azimuth ofeach leg of the operation. The loader— utilizing the PLGR — will keep thedriver up to date on all changes. Thedriver will use the odometer to keeptrack of the distance traveled on a par-ticular segment of the route. The driverreviews the written description of theroute to help prevent navigational er-rors. The driver should announce theseoccasions/locations to the crew, identi-fying them through use of his odometeras necessary to continually keep thecrew informed of their progression. Asthe loader announces way points(check points and phase lines), thedriver can verify the vehicle’s currentlocation and direction of travel fromhis route chart and can anticipate thetank entering impending engagementareas. Without this knowledge from theloader, the driver’s orientation is de-graded, and he cannot actively antici-pate the evolving situation. Theseevents, such as entering engagementareas or the center battle area of a de-file, key the driver to identify hulldown positions, covered routes, alter-nate positions and other tactical areasof interest. The gunner should alsohave a route card with similar informa-tion to enhance his battlefield situationawareness and tactical orientation.

Battlecarry: Most Threat armieshave purchased Russian manufacturedarmored personnel carriers [APCs],tanks, and artillery.19 At close range, allcurrent Threat tanks and APCs can bedestroyed with a 120-mm High Explo-sive Antitank (HEAT) round. Utilizingthe Sabot round in the defile, where ve-hicles will typically be in column,places lead vehicles in danger of beingstruck with discarding components.These sabot pedals separating from thepenetrator may cause injury to friendlysoldiers or damage friendly vehicles. Atclose range, faced with split-second tar-get identification, the HEAT round isthe round of choice. It is also the pre-ferred round against bunkers and anti-tank positions. The commander mustmake a conscious decision to employHEAT as his element’s battlecarry am-munition.

Battlesight Ranges: When fightingin the defile, engagement ranges maybe anywhere from 25 meters to 1000meters. This makes it difficult for thecrew to fight the tank when the tank totarget range is less than 200 meters.20 Acommon occurrence is that the target is

so close, the computer cannot deter-mine an accurate ballistic solution,causing confusion in the turret. UsingMETT-T, the commander should deter-mine defile battlesight ranges.21 Cur-rently, most armored units use 900 me-ters for HEAT and 500 meters for thecoax machine gun (7.62mm, M240)battlesight ranges. During the defilefight, when ranges to targets may be asclose as 25 meters, these standardranges may cause the crew to miss thetarget using battlesight techniques cur-rently in SOP.22 A specific battlesightrange for the defile fight should beused by the tank commander upon en-tering a defile. This range for HEAT-MP-T, for instance, should be 400 me-ters.23 Another range must be deter-mined for coax. For instance, a battle-sight range of 300 meters allows acrew to engage troop and troop like tar-gets accurately from 25 to 400 me-ters.24 These defile battlesight rangesare significant additions to the crews’gunnery techniques and require prac-tice to integrate into their tactical op-erations. These battlesight rangechanges will be directed by the tankcommander upon entering the defileidentified by the loader, the driver, andthe tank commander’s collective situ-ational awareness.

Indexing the defile-specific battlesightrange is simple. The tank commandertells the gunner to index the defile bat-tlesight ranges (HEAT and coax) whenthe vehicle is nearing a defile deter-mined during the map recon with theoperational graphics. The crew worksas a team to check and re-check currentposition and upcoming named areas ofinterest such as engagement areas ordefiles:

“We just passed Check Point 4,” saysthe loader over the intercom.

“Hey, then we should be entering EAColorado in 300 meters,” the driversays.

“OK, gunner, Colorado is a narrowdefile, index defile battlesight ranges!Loader, let me know when we hitCheck Point 5,” commands SSG Tank-sley.

“Ranges indexed, HEAT indexed,main gun armed, give me battlesight,”CPL Gunn replies.

“WILCO,” says the TC as he de-presses the battlesight button. “Dumpyour trash,) he says, telling the gunnerto dump his lead.


“Check Point 5 in 100 meters!” Theloader scans his crew search sector,checks the waypoint, and announcesdirection of travel to the crew: “Azi-muth 046 degrees, Northeast.”

Collectively, the crew should beworking together, aided by a shared si-tuational awareness. This will getsmoother with training and repetition.The example above reflects actions inthe tank while on the move. It occursprior to entering the defile, and onlyshows a portion of what has been al-ready been covered in this article. Thesecond phase of training for the defilefight applies all the individual and crewcritical tasks through mounted training.

Lay the Main Gun: The tank com-mander must master the ability to accu-rately and instinctively place the gun-ner on target (or anticipated keyholeposition) using the override, and ensuresmooth transition back to the gunner’scontrol. This is clearly a critical skillwhen focusing on the three-to-six sec-ond advantage. The three-to-six-sec-ond-advantage is based upon the ap-proximate time it takes for the enemyto identify you as the target, lay hisweapon on you, and fire. A basic ruleof armored combat is that the first tofire is the first to kill. The three-to-six-second-advantage is, literally then, amatter of life and death. The words ofField Marshal Erwin Rommel concern-ing this issue are as true today as theywere in WWII: “the day goes to theside that is the first to plaster its oppo-nents with fire. The man who lies lowand awaits developments usuallycomes off second best.”25

When fighting the defile fight, firingfirst is a decisive advantage to the at-tacking tank, section, platoon, andcompany. If the lead tank is destroyedor disabled, and the defile blocked, anentire task force attack can be slowedor stopped. The smooth transition ofcontrol from TC to gunner includeshaving the 3X reticle encompassing thetarget or the area of interest. This task,although part of the Tank Crew Gun-nery Skills Test (TCGST),26 must hap-pen within two seconds, on the move,rather than six seconds stationary. Atthe same time, the tank commandermust execute a “Battlesight Drill,”where he indexes the battlesight rangeusing the MANUAL RANGE BAT-TLE SIGHT button once he releasescontrol of the override. The speed atwhich he does this allows the gunner

the maximum time to engage and de-stroy the target or anticipated target.

Fighting in 3X vs. 10X: When fight-ing the defile and other types of re-stricted terrain, it is not uncommon toengage targets at ranges far less thannormal battlesight ranges. Because ofthis, the gunner must be able to engagetargets in three power (3X) using day(GPS) or thermal (TIS) channels. Al-though this is never used in open ter-rain, it saves critical time in restrictedterrain. The gunner must be fully capa-ble of engaging targets at extremelyclose range without moving to 10X.This allows the gunner to scan furtherin azimuth and elevation, find the tar-gets, and kill them when the targets arebetween 25 meters and 400 meters.When engaging troop or troop-like tar-gets at ranges between 25 and 400 me-ters, the gunner, firing in 3X, has theagility to observe burst on target, de-stroy a target, identify a subsequent tar-get, observe burst on target, and adjustto another troop target without movingback and forth between power selec-tions. His ability to engage in this man-ner is a critical task.

In 3X, the gunner could easily iden-tify and engage all troop targets whiletracking others in the area. This alsoholds true for enemy light armor. Thegunner will be able to easily identifythe enemy light armor in 3X at rangesout to 400 meters and, also in 3X, en-gage and destroy the same. The targetwill appear large enough in the 3Xsight picture in TIS and the GPS daychannel at ranges less than 400 metersto lay with killing precision. If the tar-get is at a greater distance, the gunnercan instinctively move to 10X, lase,and blaze.

Recon by Fire: To conserve maingun ammunition, tank machine gunsshould be used for reconnaissance byfire to cause a hidden enemy in a key-hole position to react. The loader orgunner should fire a single burst fromtheir M240 machine guns (20 to 30rounds) while constantly observing forenemy movement, enemy return fire, orthe flash of rounds striking metal. Thegunner should conduct his recon by firein 3X, allowing him further scanningof the suspected enemy emplacement.The tank commander should not per-form recon by fire with the caliber .50unless absolutely necessary. Whenloaded for combat, the caliber .50 hasonly 100 rounds readily available, andthe rounds are typically Armor Piercing

Incendiary with Tracer (API-T). Theserounds create a flash that could be mis-taken for the rounds striking a threatvehicle, and cause the unnecessary ex-penditure of a main gun round.

Reconnaissance by fire is used whenother means of enemy detection havebeen unsuccessful or are not available.It is best employed with tanks in sec-tion. One tank can fire on a suspectedenemy position or suspicious area tocause the enemy to react and compro-mise his position at the time of ourchoosing, not his.27 The second tankcan then engage and destroy the enemyfrom a different location. Each crewmust be prepared to perform this criti-cal task with their vehicle alone, or intandem with their wingman.

Engagement Area System: An en-gagement area is an area in which thecommander intends to trap and destroyan enemy force with the massed firesof all available weapons. Engagementareas are routinely identified by a targetreference point in the center of the traparea, or by prominent terrain featuresaround the area. Although engagementareas may also be divided into sectorsof fire, it is important to understandthat enemy defensive systems will fo-cus on avenues of approach. Engage-ment areas and sectors of fire are notintended to restrict fires or cause opera-tions to become static or fixed; they areused only as a tool to mass fires.28

Engagement areas offer unique con-trol opportunities in offensive and de-fensive fighting in restrictive terrain.The nature of restrictive terrain lendsitself to designation by quadrant. Thequadrant method of fire control is themost suitable and easily understood ofthe many engagement area systems forfire control in narrow defiles.

Most defiles can naturally be dividedinto quadrants based on intervisibilitylines. Generally, these intervisibilitylines can be identified during the mapreconnaissance. Designating these por-tions of compartmentalized terrain asengagement areas breaks the battle intobite-sized chunks. Using engagementareas that are 1-3 kilometers long, thissystem employs cardinal directions asfloating Target Reference Points(TRPs). These floating TRPs offermore precision to pass information tofollow-on forces than the direction oftravel or clock methods. For a tankcommander to continually identifyTRPs while on the offense is increas-ingly more complex as the mission


continues. A successfully tested EAsystem uses cardinal directions as“floating” Target Reference Points.This method breaks down the engage-ment area into nine (9) sub-areas, muchlike a tic-tac-toe board, subsequentlynamed after their cardinal direction[north, northeast, east, southeast, etc.]and “center,” respectively.

In addition, the altitude of the terrainis designated. Each mountain or hill isexplained as either ALPHA [valley],BRAVO [ascending terrain], or CHAR-LIE [military crest to topographicalcrest] terrain.

This EA technique is exactly suitedfor controlling direct fires in a defile.Phase lines outlining each engagementarea are designated along visible por-tions of compartmentalized terrain.This helps the tank crew understand themission, relate the actions to acquisi-tion reports from other vehicles, andapply immediate and accurate targetacquisition and massing of fires. Speedand accuracy of reporting improveswith practice. An example of a stand-ardized engagement area system usingthe quadrant method is shown

Spot Reporting: Each section, pla-toon, company and task force needs aclearly articulated method of massingdirect fires. Tank commanders must beable to report enemy locations clearlyand rapidly. One method, developed forthe restricted terrain of Korea, employsthe refined version of the quadrantmethod of direct fire control describedabove.29 Using this engagement areasystem, a tank can relay critical battle-field information to every tank on hisradio net, and subsequently higher nets.

A standard spot report using this sys-tem offers quick and discernible infor-mation for the entire platoon, company,or task force to mass direct fires:

“CONTACT, TANK, ENGAGEMENTAREA KANSAS, EAST, ALPHA.”

This method allows follow on tanksto quickly identify the enemy, antici-pate the direction and location of key-hole shots and mass direct fires. Mas-tering the EA system and spot reportsby the tank commander and crew is acritical multiple-skill task which incor-porates all we have discussed thus far.

Call for Fire: In a defile fight, sup-pression saves lives and buys the tankcrew time. Accurate artillery or mortarfire, suppressing enemy keyhole posi-tions, historically makes a 30 percentdifference in the casualties of the at-tacking force in the defile fight. Thelead tank attacking down a defile iskey to the indirect fire suppressiontask. The tank commander should callfor fire based on known enemy loca-tions or anticipated keyhole positions.Once a target is identified and the TCcalls for fire, he can adjust fire usingthe loader’s PLGR, the Gunner’s LaserRange Finder (LRF), and his map.With an accurate grid location and di-rection relayed to him by the loader[read off his PLGR], the TC lases tothe target to determine the range. Fromthese three known data points [location,direction, and range], he determines theenemy’s location. The tank commandercan then call for, or adjust, fire on thetarget.

Camouflage and Light Discipline:Camouflage and light discipline30 are

combat skills that pay high dividendswhen fighting in restricted terrain. Thetank’s crew must make all attempts tocamouflage the vehicle to blend withthe surroundings. A moving tank, wellcamouflaged, is harder to see than atank that is not camouflaged and couldprovide a few minutes of indecision onthe part of an ambusher. This is dra-matically evident when one considersthat there are no right angles in nature.The crew must actively distort the out-line of the vehicle and its organicequipment to deny the enemy any pos-sibility of detection. The entire vehicleshould be camouflaged, causing the en-emy to misinterpret the actual outlineand appearance of the vehicle. Obscur-ing the right angles of the Abrams tankmay be accomplished with shrubbery,bushes, branches and even sod duringthe spring and summer months. Blend-ing the overall color of the vehicle withthe surroundings is completed usingsnow, mud, off-colored burlap sand-bags, or whitewash, depending on theseason.

Most Threat armies are equipped withpassive, light intensification sights andnight vision devices. Light discipline,therefore, is an important survival task.Light discipline can be enforced byturning off all interior lights and tapingover master power, driver’s instrumentpanel and control panel lights. Cover-ing the lights with tape will signifi-cantly reduce light emitted from the ve-hicle’s periscopes, yet still allow foridentification of crucial fire control,automotive, and vehicle status informa-tion.

Training for the Defile Fight

To win in restricted terrain requiresfrequent training, as most tank crewskills are highly perishable. Personnelturbulence exacerbates the challenge ofmaintaining a high level of training onthe functional capabilities of the tank.To train at a high frequency, most train-ing will have to be conducted in themotor pool and in local training areas.The tank crew’s mastery of technicaland tactical subjects, the link to reach-ing the objective at the other side of thedefile, will require study, drill, andrepetition.

Training for the defile fight requiresuse of the basic and intermediate Tacti-cal Tables, as found in FM 17-12-1,November 1986.31 The Tactical Tables


Figure 1

best suited for the defile fight, whichshould be completed concurrently withthe gunnery training program, are listedin Table 1.

Tank gunnery tables train armor unitsto hit targets; tank tactical tables usegunnery skills and Multiple IntegratedLaser Engagement Systems (MILES)to train armor units to fight on the realbattlefield. In free-play force-on-forceengagements, the tank crew learns torespond rapidly to OPFOR activity inorder to destroy the opponent. Tacticaltables train crews, sections (tank withwingman), and platoons at the basic(crew), intermediate (section/wing-man), and advanced (platoon) levels of24-hour combat operations. Engage-ments should be conducted both in theday and at night. The focus of thistraining should be to win the defilefight — teaching the critical crew tasksin the process.

A high frequency of training in localtraining areas is a requirement to mas-ter these tactical tables, so the avail-ability of local training areas is a pre-requisite. Every effort should be madeto develop local training areas to theirmaximum potential. Training areas forthe defile fight are often available be-cause they represent the areas leastsuitable for “open terrain” operationsby platoon-sized tank and mechanizedunits. In many cases, these defiles rep-resent unwanted training land. This un-wanted land, deemed incapable of ar-mored maneuver on large scale, is ex-actly the kind of terrain that armoredforces will have to move through andfight in on some of the potential battle-fields of Korea or the Balkans.

The tactical tables in FM 17-12-1w/C3 contain detailed information onmost of the critical tasks listed pre-viously. Units must develop specifictask, conditions and standards to em-ploy the PLGR, Route Chart, and en-gagement area system. Use of “jumpradios,” during these training eventswill allow for detailed information forafter-action reviews (AARs) and willenhance learning.

The goal of this training is a tankcrew that functions as a team, passescritical information quickly and clearly,and controls the tank’s battlespace. Theflow of information from crewmemberto crewmember is a combat multiplierand a major goal of this training.Crews must learn to anticipate the en-emy, and engage and destroy the en-

emy before being ambushed. An enemyin an ambush position with a keyholeshot has a very limited field of view.His success involves firing before be-ing seen. Increasing the situationalawareness of the attacking tank crew isan integral part in gaining the 3-6 sec-ond advantage and getting the jump onthe defender who is waiting in ambush.

Conclusion

In restricted terrain, an armored forcemay be reduced to a frontage of onetank. During the Korean War, the U.S.Army found that “armor remained anindispensable part of ground combat,regardless of any limiting conditionsunder which it had to operate.”32 “Openterrain” tactics, successful in desert-liketerrain, will not work in restrictive ter-rain. If armor leaders are sent to Bos-nia, or fight again in the mountains ofKorea, the ability of tank crews to fightthrough and penetrate defended defilesin restricted terrain will be decisive.This requires a different approach totank commanding and crew responsi-bilities. The crew must work togetherto defeat the defender. Their collectiveskills are at a premium in restricted ter-rain. They must learn to obtain and ex-press critical combat informationwithin their tank and with adjacenttanks in new ways. The end result iscreating an unmistakable advantage.

In Korea, we call this advantage the“3 - 6 second advantage”.33 If the tankcrew is prepared, anticipates the de-fending threat, and aims his weaponsystems at the anticipated keyhole posi-tion, the enemy can be suppressed orkilled before he can identify, aim, andengage the attacking tank. This is atough challenge, requiring thoughtful,focused training. Gaining the 3-6 sec-ond advantage over an enemy waitingin ambush takes an integrated crew ef-fort to nullify the defender’s terrain ad-vantage.

To be ready for tomorrow’s battle-fields, U.S. Army armor crewmen must“grasp the potential capabilities andlimitations of the space in which theyoperate.”34

Notes

1Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Opera-tions, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, June 1994), p. 14-4.

2UCOFT stands for Unit Conduct of FireTrainer and is the primary simulator for trainingAbrams tank crews. CALFEXes is an acronymthat stands for Combined Arms Live-Fire Exer-cises. A CALFEX usually involves a companyor higher formation conducting a live-fire en-gagement training exercise.

3The concepts of Alvin and Heide Toffler, asfound in their book War and Anti-War. FirstWave occurred during the agricultural revolu-tion, characterized by hand-to-hand combat; theSecond Wave as the Industrial Revolution, rep-resented by wars of mass destruction as in


Tactical Table Task

A Negotiate a route using terrain for cover and concealmentNavigate from one point to another pointAnalyze terrain using the Five Military Aspects of TerrainDetect a target and give crew acquisition report

B (B7) React to Indirect Fire(B8) Evade Antitank Guided Missile (ATGM)

C (C1) Engage Simultaneous Targets(C3) Engage OPFOR Tanks(C4) Engage OPFOR Security Element(C5) React to Ambush(C6) Engage Sniper

D (D1) Coordinate Between Crews(D2) Execute Herringbone

E (E1) Execute Action Drill(E2) Execute Contact Drill(E3) React to Indirect Fire

F (F1) Engage Multiple Targets(F2) Engage Multiple Machine Gun Targets(F3) React to Ambush/Recon By Fire(F4) Engage Enemy Tank Platoon(F5) Engage Patrol and Sapper

Table 1

WWI and WWII; and the Third Wave, the on-going information revolution, is knowledge-based warfare as evidenced in Operation DesertStorm.

4David A. Niedringhaus, “U.S. Army Armorin Limited War: Armor Employment Tech-niques in Korea and Vietnam,” Masters DegreeThesis: Ohio State University: 1987, p. 27. “In-itial assessments of armor performance and use-fulness in Korea concluded that armor remainedan indispensable part of ground combat, regard-less of any limiting conditions under which ithad to operate.” p. 54.

5The three-to-six second advantage is definedby the author as the approximate time it takesfor the enemy to identify you as the target, layhis weapon system on you, and fire. A basicrule of combat is that the first to fire is the firstto kill.

6Kenneth Blanchard, et al., define high per-forming teams as teams with the followingcharacteristics: Purpose, Empowerment, Rela-tionships and Communications, Flexibility, Op-timal Performance, Recognition and Apprecia-tion and Morale. See The One Minute ManagerBuilds High Performing Teams, (New York:William Morrow and Company, 1990), p. 21.

7In addition, superb tank commanders mustsupport the growth of three teams: the tankcommander/platoon leader team; the platoonleader/platoon sergeant team; and the platoonleader/company commander team.

8The building blocks for all tank-related train-ing are contained in three manuals: TM 9-2350-264-10 (Technical Manual, M1A1 Abrams), FM17-12-1-1 (Tank Gunnery), and FM 17-15(Tank Platoon).

9Department of the Army, FM 17-15, TheTank Platoon, (U.S. Army Armor Center,ATTN: ATZK-DC, Fort Knox, Ky., 9 March1993), p. 2-50.

10Department of the Army, FM 17-12-1-1,Tank Gunnery (Abrams), (U.S. Army ArmorCenter, ATTN: ATZK-DC, Fort Knox, Ky.,March 1993) pp. 6-2 through 6-5.

11FM 17-12-1-1, p. 1-1.12FM 17-12-1-1, p. 6-1. This manual de-

scribes Target Acquisition as “a process that isa series of progressive and interdependent stepsor actions by which a tank crew acquires enemytargets for destruction. It is a continuing re-quirement for all tank crewmembers, whether inthe offense or defense, moving or stationary.The six steps in the target acquisition processare Crew Search, Detection, Location, Identifi-cation, Classification, and Confirmation.”

13FM 17-12-1-1, Chapter 6. “Speed and accu-racy of engagement depend on crew proficiencyin target acquisition and gunnery; yet target ac-quisition is one of the hardest gunnery tasks totrain effectively.”

14FM 17-12-1-1, Chapter 6, describes in detailthe Target Acquisition Process. The trainingprocess for target acquisition begins with an in-depth understanding of FM 17-12-1-1, Chapter6, by all crewmembers. It must become secondnature to the crew through repetitive training.

15Typically referred to as “IFFN,” IdentifyFriend, Foe, Neutral.

16FM 17-12-1-1, p. 9-10. To conserve maingun ammunition, use tank-mounted machineguns in reconnaissance by fire to cause a hid-den enemy to react. Fire a single burst (20 to 30rounds with the M240 or 10 to 15 rounds withthe caliber .50) while constantly observing forenemy movement, return fire, or the flash ofrounds striking metal.”

17The external antenna cable can be run fromthe inside of the turret to the external antennaeasily following the power cable to the left orright Grenade Launcher. Some modificationmay be required with the use of some siliconeto ensure a secure, sealed outlet to the externalantenna. This procedure will not interfere withoperation of the Smoke Grenade Launchers orthe Over-Pressurization System.

18FM 17-15, Oct. 87, pp. 2-38, 2-39.19Currently, there are approximately 35 coun-

tries that still utilize either the T54/55 or T62 astheir Main Battle Tank.

20FM 17-12-1-1, p. 2-7. The ballistic com-puter provides only ballistic solutions for rangesbetween 200 and 4000 meters for main gun am-munition. No ballistic solution will be createdfor ranges between 4000 and 7990 meters (+/-10m). Laser returns under 200 meters and over8000 meters will be displayed as flashing zeros.When the gun select switch is set to COAX, theTC can use the Manual Range Battlesight but-ton to select ranges down to 25 meters.

21FM 17-12-1-1, p. 8-1. Unit SOP will setbattlecarry ranges based on the commander’sanalysis of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, andtime (METT-T) available.

22Department of the Army, FT 120-D-2, Fir-ing Tables, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 15 April 1994), pp. 42and 43, (HEAT-MP-T, M830), the maximumordinate, or highest part of the projectile trajec-tory to the target, is 1 meter above the gun/tar-get line, 468 meters from the gun. FM 17-12-1-1, p. 7-1, evaluates the average size of Com-monwealth of Independent States (CIS) manu-factured or styled vehicles being 2.3 metershigh, 3.4 meters wide, and 6.7 meters long.When a vehicle is in the defense, creating asubstantially shorter target than 2.3 meters, thefiring tank using battlesight gunnery techniquesat 900 meters will miss the target completely ifthe vehicle is actually between 250 and 600meters.

23FT 120-D-2, pp. 42 and 43, HEAT-MP-T,M830, Max. Ord. for 400 meters is 20 centime-ters, 203 meters out from the gun.

24Department of the Army, FT 7.62-A-2, Fir-ing Tables, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 30 June 1973), p. 18.M80 Ball, battlesight range of 500 meters al-lows for a maximum ordinate of 1 meter at 300meters. A battlesight range of 300 meters has amaximum ordinate of 0 meters (meaning lessthan 50 centimeters) out to 400 meters, which is100 meters past the battlesight range.

25Kenneth Macksey, Rommel: Battles andCampaigns, (New York; Mayflower Books,1979), p. 32.

26FM 17-12-1-1 Chapter 13, Page 13-10 andFM 17-12-1-2, p. A-81. The tank commandermust lay the main gun from the tank com-

mander’s override such that the target appearsin the 3X sight within six seconds.

27FM 17-12-1, Coordinating Draft, Oct. 1990,p. 7-6.

28Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1, Op-erational Terms and Symbols, (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 21 Oc-tober 1985), pp. 1-29 thru 1-30.

29The quadrant method of engagement areasis used by the Dragon Force, 2-72 Armor, inKorea for both defensive and offensive opera-tions. In the offense, units attack into a series ofsequential engagement areas. Each engagementarea is defined by intervisibility lines (usually1000 to 2000 meters long and as wide as thedefile).

30Department of the Army, FM 20-3, Camou-flage, (U.S. Army Engineer School, ATTN:ATSE-TDM-PP, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri65473, 14 Nov 90). This manual explains in de-tail the art of camouflage, its concepts, funda-mentals, principles, and application through allphases of operation.

31Department of the Army, FM 17-12-1 w/C3,Tank Gunnery, M1/M1A1 Abrams, (Washing-ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 3Nov 86), Chapter 12, Tank Tactical Tables,were to be retained because they are to be re-published in the next edition of FM 17-15, TankPlatoon, and are not currently published in FM17-12-1-1/2, Tank Gunnery.

32Niedringhaus, p. 54.33Three to six seconds is the time that an en-

emy requires to identify an attacker, aim, andengage the target.

34FM 100-5, p. 14-4.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Lieu-tenant Colonel John Antal, Com-mander, 2-72 Armor, Tongducheon, Ko-rea, for his encouragement and assis-tance in the preparation and develop-ment of this article.


Staff Sergeant StephenKrivitsky entered the U.S.Army in November 1986. Hehas been assigned to 4-67Armor, Friedberg, Germany;2-8 Cavalry, Fort Hood,Texas; 2-77 Armor, Fort Car-son, Colorado; and currently2-72 Armor in Korea. He hasperformed all crew duties onan M1A1 Abrams and is cur-rently the Battalion MasterGunner for 2-72 Armor.

The role of the Field Trains Com-mand Post (FTCP) is to coordinate taskforce combat service support require-ments with the brigade S4 and forwardsupport battalion.1 Under the control ofthe HHC commander, it serves a criti-cal function in the success of the unit’scombat service support (CSS) plan.Many of today’s military publications,such as ARTEP 71-2-MTP, FM 71-123and FM 71-2, discuss the responsibili-ties of the FTCP, but amazingly, say lit-tle about exactly how these responsi-bilities are best accomplished. It is,therefore, the mission of the HHCcommander and his key personnel(XO, 1SG, S4/S1 NCO) to plan andprepare the FTCP manning and organi-zation to achieve success.

Essential in this planning is develop-ing a command post that is able to si-multaneously track the tactical opera-tions of the task force while maintain-ing an accurate and easy-to-read pic-ture of the companies’ and attachments’logistical status. By tracking the tacti-cal situation, the HHC commander andhis staff are better able to anticipate thechanging logistical situation as demon-strated by the following:

TF CMD NET: “Guidons, this is Sa-ber 6. FRAGO follows...Execution -Team Mech establishes a roadblockalong Hwy 144 vicinity North Churchin order to prevent the passage of con-traband across the zone of separation...Acknowledge, over.” (Based upon thistransmission, the HHC commandermay alert the FSB that they will re-quire additional barrier materials forthe new mission.)

TF CMD NET: “Saber 6, this isGhost 6. SPOT report follows... we arein contact with an AT company that isdefending along the forward slope ofthe hill located at grid ES544323... unitis unknown... time is 1345S... enemy isequipped with AT4s and AT5s, out.”(Here, the FTCP may begin requisi-tioning medical supplies and asking the

brigade S4 to alert Charlie MedicalCompany of the FSB as to the likeli-hood of casualties.)

By staying abreast of the tactical de-velopments, the field trains CP is betterable to provide the responsive supportunits need. At the same time, the FTCPcrew will be receiving reports from the

combat trains command post that detailthe companies’ specific logistical needs,from personnel and major end items(tanks, Bradleys, trucks) to repair partsand food. This is the focus of their ex-istence. Task force SOPs, with estab-lished formats, reporting times, andbrevity codes, will assist in this proc-ess,2 but unless a workable system is in


The Field Trains Command Post —Organizing For Success

by Captain Kevin P. Banks

Fig. 1

place and well rehearsed during peace-time, the FTCP will undoubtedly fail toaccomplish the numerous, critical tasksplaced upon it.

The two parts of any successful com-mand post are the right equipment andthe right people to do the job. Withsome smart planning and early prepara-tion, both can be available in time toconduct the mission proficiently.

Equipment

The first thing needed to establish theFTCP is the actual command post. Al-though the vehicle available for usewill vary from HHC to HHC, anM934/820 5-ton expando van or M577Armored Command Post with TOCExtension, in conjunction with a gener-ator, work best. Both vehicles providethe space and versatility needed fortracking the tactical and logistical situ-ation simultaneously whilemonitoring three nets (TFCMD, TF A/L and FSBCMD), and the generatorprovides the auxiliarypower source necessary topower radios and lightswhen the vehicle’s engine isoff. The expando van offersa much larger operatingspace and is already config-ured for an air conditioner,which will assist greatly inpreventing radios fromoverheating when theweather is extremely hot.The decreased mobility of a

wheeled vehicle will not adversely im-pact FTCP operations because it willbe near the mess section, support pla-toon, and other wheeled elements andthus be on trafficable terrain anyway.

Once a vehicle is chosen, it must beconfigured for use as a multifacetedcommand post. The following setuputilizes an expando van, but is easilyadaptable to the M577.

The first thing to emplace is a two-sided tracking station running length-wise in the center of the van. Tool ta-bles from a local DRMO or fabricatedentirely from lumber by the unit R&UNCO are the most cost effective. Di-rectly in the center, extending to theceiling, will be a piece of plywood thatwill be the basis of the map boards. Onone side will be a map with the OPSand ENEMY SIT TEMP graphics; theother side will have an identical mapwith the CSS graphics. This will allow

the personnel manning the FTCP tohave a clear delineation of tasks andnot interfere with each others’ duties.Cover the table tops with blank reportformats and then top them with acetateso that information received over theradio can be recorded quickly and in areadily accessible location. The areabelow the table top is the radios’ loca-tion, along with any necessary COM-SEC equipment. The TF A/L and FSBCMD nets will be tuned in on the lo-gistics side of the station and TF CMDon the ops side. (Note: The FSB CMDis a redundant source of communica-tion when the FTCP is located in theBSA since it can communicate with theFSB via wire or messenger. In thiscase, the additional radio may be usedas part of the base cluster defense sys-tem or alternate use.) The remainingstorage space and drawers are useablefor manuals, battle tracking supplies,and other miscellaneous items.

In addition to the center workstation(where the majority of the CP’s activitywill occur) the back wall of the ex-pando van offers valuable space. In onecorner is a field desk with switchboard(SB-22). WD-1 commo wire and TA-312 field telephones allow commandand control of the subordinate elements(mess section, support platoon, DSmaintenance...), OPS, and crew-servedweapon positions. The rear wall is use-ful for posting the field trains fire planand daily CP schedule, to include criti-cal LOGPAC actions, report times, andshift changes. The remaining area inthe Expando Van houses the S1’sTACCS computer or other necessaryautomation equipment. A generic ex-ample of how this may look is shownin Fig. 1.


Fig. 2

LOGREP PERS-SUM

Line 3 (Class III Items) Line 1 (Unit)

- Green 90% Line 2 (DTG)

- Amber 75% A. OFF B. WO C. ENL D. TOTAL

- Red 60% Line 3 (Auth - Organic)

- Black <60% Line 4 (Asgnd - Organic)

Line 5 (Class V Items) Line 5 (Attached)

- Green 90% Line 6 (Detached)

- Amber 75% Line 7 (KIA)

- Red 60% Line 8 (WIA)

- Black <60% Line 9 (MIA)

Line 7 (Class VII Items) Line 10 (Noncombat Loss)

a. # M1A1s FMC Line 11 (Total Loss)

b. # M3A2s FMC Line 12 (Total Gains)

c. # M106s FMC Line 13 (Current Strength)

Table 1

The actual forms the FTCP will usefor tracking each teams’ logisticalstatus are a final, major factor to con-sider. The forms for OPS tracking canusually be copied from those used bythe TF TOC or TAC. This will save ef-fort and ensure uniformity. It is likelythat similar logistical reports for track-ing equipment and manning status al-ready exist, probably at the brigade com-bat team level. A careful review of thesereports must be made in conjunctionwith the other key CSS players (S4, BnXO, S1, and BMO) in order to ensurethat they are current, practical, and stand-ard. Examples of two logistics reportsyou may use are shown at Table 1.

In addition to the detailed reports thatare necessary when relaying informa-tion between the FTCP and task force/company combat trains, it is criticalthat the HHC commander has a systemin place that will immediately tell himthe status of the task force’s major enditems and personnel and what actionshave been taken to obtain replacementequipment/soldiers. One technique usedwith success is to have visual depic-tions of each company’s vehicles bynomenclature and bumper number. Asimple marking system indicatingwhether the vehicle is FMC or NMC, acatastrophic kill, or just ‘bent’ and if areplacement requisition has been for-warded to brigade is easily trained tothe FTCP personnel. This method isdepicted in Fig. 2 and can be used justas readily for tracking the status of in-dividual soldiers once the FTCP staffacquires unit crew rosters with battleroster numbers. With a bit of interac-tion in garrison, identical charts can becreated for habitual supporting attach-ments such as engineers.

Manning

Equally as important as planning outhow you will equip the FTCP is howyou will man it. CSS is an around-the-clock task. The HHC commander must

compose a competent command postcrew which can sustain the operationfrom 0001 to 2400 hours, seven days aweek. This is not a simple task, giventhe limited number of available person-nel. Like the TF TOC and TAC, a dayand night shift rotation allows the fieldtrains command post to provide qualitysupport at any given time. The mini-mum personnel that should compriseeach shift are:

CP OIC: Has overall responsibilityfor FTCP, ensures crew is tracking allTF logistical and tactical activities andforwarding applicable informationhigher, oversees the formation of LOG-PACs, is responsible for security offield trains, and assists the S4 in plan-ning future CSS operations.

CP NCOIC: Assists OIC manage-ment of FTCP crew, oversees the fieldtrains security plan, and guides HHCLOGPAC to TOC, TAC, CTCP andUMCP.

OPS/INTEL NCO: Is responsible fortracking all tactical reports/activities inthe TF over O/I and CMD nets andalerting CSS NCO to any activities thatmay impact significantly on the supplysystem.

CSS NCO: Is responsible for track-ing all logistical reports/activities fromcompany and TF combat trains andforwarding appropriate reports higherwhile disseminating any informationsent down from the FSB or BDE Rear.

RUNNER: Assists in monitoring theswitchboard for all wire communica-tions, serves as messenger to FSB CPand other elements in the BSA, andconducts vehicle/generator maintenance.

A typical manning plan is at Table 2.Notice that there is time to allow per-sonnel to brief their counterparts onany significant activities that have oc-curred and actions ongoing. This periodof double manning allows the crew tocatch up on any maintenance or otheractivities that have not been accom-

plished on schedule. Each soldiershould maintain a log or note system tofacilitate the information exchange.

Conclusion

It was said long ago that “withoutsupplies, neither a general nor a soldieris good for anything.”3 The maxim isstill as true today. If the field trainscommand post is not prepared to fulfillits role in the execution of the taskforce logistical plan, then the unit willquickly find itself without equipmentor personnel. Getting the field trainscommand post organized for its mis-sion is the first step in achieving suc-cess. By using time in garrison to cre-ate a CP equipped to efficiently per-form the myriad of tasks expected of it,the HHC commander will achieve thestandard required during deployments.

Notes

1Headquarters, Department of the Army, Mis-sion Training Plan for the Tank and Mecha-nized Infantry Battalion Task Force, HQDA,Washington, D.C., 1988.

2Headquarters, Department of the Army, Cav-alry Operations, HQDA, Washington, D.C.,1991.

3Clearcus of Sparta, from Cavalry Opera-tions, HQDA, Washington, D.C., 1991.


DAY (0600-2100) NIGHT (1900-0800)

CP OIC: CDR XO

CP NCOIC: 1SG OPS NCO

OPS/INTEL NCO: TRAINING NCO TRAINING CLERK

CSS NCO: S4 NCO S1 NCO

RUNNER: CO’S DRIVER XO’S DRIVER

Table 2

Captain Kevin P. Banks is a1991 graduate of the U.S.Military Academy. After com-pleting the Armor Officer Ba-sic Course, he was assignedas a cavalry platoon leader in1-1 Cavalry, 1AD. After 12months, he was assigned asthe squadron asst. S4 for 11months and then served asthe HHT XO. His militaryschooling includes AOBC,AOAC, Airborne, Air Assault,SPLC, and SCCC. He is cur-rently serving as the execu-tive officer for the DeputyCommanding General of FortKnox.

In the Field Artillery Officer BasicCourse, as well as in the 13F AdvancedIndividual Training, new fire supportersare taught that the greatest killer on themodern-day battlefield is the dread FireSupport Team Vehicle (FISTV), withits eight smoke grenade launchers,mighty M-60, and turret-mountedGround Vehicular Laser Locator Desig-nator (G/VLLD). Perhaps this wasonce true, but with the fast pace ofmodern warfare, the FISTV, as a mo-bile harbinger of death and destruction,is quickly proving itself to be ineffec-tive in meeting current demands.

Nowhere is this more true than in thecavalry. Reconnaissance forces areknown for swift, decisive action on thebattlefield. The FISTV is simply unableto meet the challenge of rapid maneu-ver. Regimental armored cavalry FISTlieutenants and NCOs often joke aboutbeing effective for the first 10 to 15minutes of the battle, then being re-duced to a radio relay station as theywatch the dust trails on the horizon.

Although the 19D scouts are trainedas maneuver shooters, there is no sub-stitute for 13F eyes (or the G/VLLD la-ser) on the target. What is needed is avehicle that provides improved overallcapability for job performance, com-patibility with other vehicles and weap-ons systems in the troop, reliability ofboth weapons and automotive systems,and survivability on the battlefield.

Field Artillery branch has noted thisproblem and is developing a solution:the Bradley FISTV (BFISTV). Unfor-tunately, fielding for this system is sev-eral years away. We need a more im-mediate solution.

Background

In a recent National Training Centerrotation, 3d Squadron, 3d ArmoredCavalry Regiment was beset by prob-lems with the FISTV fleet. Despitedrawing newly rebuilt vehicles, mainte-nance problems abounded, mimickingthose commonly found in the agingfleet at home station.

Those vehicles that did survive themaintenance war quickly found them-selves looking at the rear of the tanksas they thundered past into a battle therelatively immobile FISTs were unableto influence. Attempts at observationplans in the offense were laughable. Ifa FIST did manage to occupy its Ob-servation Post (OP), the rapidly ad-vancing troops were often in the wayby the time the OP was set up andready for missions.

The squadron commander noted thisproblem and decided that a temporary,immediate fix was necessary. Our goalwas to improve the capability, compati-bility, reliability, and survivability ofthe FIST. The solution was to move thetroop executive officers to the supercommand and control environment ofthe M577 and use their M3 Bradleys asplatforms for fire support vehicles.From this base, the FIST teams couldeasily assemble a vehicle which couldmaintain pace with the rest of thetroop, and be maintained by the main-tenance assets within the troop.

In transferring the FIST teams fromthe M981 FISTV to the M3 Bradley,two areas had to be addressed to takeadvantage of the M3 Bradley platform,communications and G/VLLD opera-tions.

Communications

The M3s were originally configuredwith two radios in the turret. Aftersome consideration, the FSOs andFSNCOs decided to leave those radiosin place and mount two more in thecrew compartment. This configurationhas been tested in the command andcontrol vehicles of the regimental andsquadron commanders and S3s. Theconversion requires the removal of the25mm ammunition racks in the leftrear of the vehicle, and installation oftwo SINCGARS radios in their place.The antennae were mounted to the reelmount assembly on the left and rightrear of the vehicle, with cables run intothe crew compartment through theramp seal. For power, we removed theground mount power cable from theFISTV, lengthened it, and installed it inthe M3. While not optimal, another op-tion units wishing to follow our leadmay pursue is to run power from awire spliced into the power cable forthe interior lights.

Although these radios are not con-nected to the intercommunications sys-tem, the RTO has no problems moni-toring both nets, as one is exclusivelydigital to our supporting Field Artilleryunits and the other is the squadron FSEnet, which is primarily a digital net.The two radios in the turret hold thetroop command net and the troop firesupport (mortar) net. The FSO andFSNCO can key both of these netsthrough the CVC, whether riding in thecrew compartment or turret of the vehi-cle. The two crew seats were removedand reinstalled with the backs to the ra-dios, and a Forward Entry Device(FED) stand was fabricated and em-


A Temporary Solution to an Ongoing Problem:

Now, Make a FIST...Converting the M3 Bradley for Use as a FIST Vehicle

by Captain Thomas A. Crowson and Staff Sergeant Marty J. Peterson

G/VLLD installed on Bradley

Above, two views of the G/LVDD pedestal mounted on theBradley turret roof. Radio installation in the crew compart-ment is seen below. At right, construction details of the ped-estal with dimensions. Installed device is seen at upper right.

Construction DetailsAnd Project Views


placed between the seats. This allowedeasy access to the radios and the FEDfor both the FSO and RTO while leav-ing the entire opposite hull wall openfor a situation map.

G/VLLD Operations

We mounted the G/VLLD on a standfabricated from a three-inch section ofpipe with a thick metal plate on eachend bolted in place in front of theBradley Commander’s (BC) hatch. Onthe upper plate, the squadron welderpermanently affixed bolts in a patternto accept the traversing unit (TU) ofthe G/VLLD tripod (see illustration).The TU was then removed from the tri-pod and bolted into place on the pedes-tal with wing nuts, allowing quick in-stallation and removal of the TU andG/VLLD. This pedestal is high enoughto permit the free movement of theG/VLLD, yet low enough to preventforcing the FSNCO to come far out ofdefilade for its operation. The pipeused in the stand must be at least six toeight inches across and thick enough towithstand the constant abuse com-monly associated with movement of atracked vehicle. For G/VLLD power,we fabricated a cable to run from theA4J2 connector on the SINCGARSmount to the EMI filter of theG/VLLD. We routed the cable throughthe antenna mount directly behind theradios, around the BC’s hatch, and intothe G/VLLD. Because power is derivedfrom the same circuit as communica-tions, the FSNCO/BC must ensure allCVCs are unkeyed when firing the la-ser. This has resulted in a new pre-las-ing command of “unkey.” After theBC/FSNCO announced “unkey,” he lis-tens for each crewmember to announce“unkey” followed by his position. Hethen announces “lasing,” unkeys hisCVC, and fires the laser. When fin-ished, the BC/FSNCO keys his CVCand announces “all clear,” allowingcrewmembers to use CVC communica-tions again. Interface between theG/VLLD and FED or Digital MessageDevice (DMD) is accomplishedthrough verbal commands from theFSNCO to the RTO over the vehicularintercom.

M3 Operations

In addition to the normal crew of aFISTV, the troop has supplied us withone E5 and one E4 19D cavalry scout.

The additional NCO not only acts asgunner for the vehicle, but also contrib-utes a measure of expertise in trainingthe fire support personnel in Bradleyoperations. In a field scenario, his pres-ence allows the fire support personnelto focus on the FIST mission while heconcentrates on the gunnery mission.He rides in the turret with the FSNCO,providing an additional set of eyes andaiding the FSNCO/BC in maneuveringthe vehicle. If METT-T allows, thegunner can also ride in the rear of thevehicle, keeping the situation map up-dated and aiding the RTO. This allowsthe FSO to ride in the turret, expandinghis ability to visualize the battlefield.The E4 acts as the driver of theBradley, allowing the 13F slotted forthe driver position of the FISTV to re-main in the howitzer battery with thatvehicle. The RTO and FSO ride in thecrew compartment of the vehicle, pro-viding command and control, as in theFISTV. To carry the numerous accesso-ries required by a FIST team, we re-moved the TOW racks from the rear ofthe vehicle and created a load plansimilar to that of the FISTV. Since theinterior of the M3 is much larger thanthat of the FISTV, storage space hasnot been an issue in the conversion.

Our bottom line goal was to increaseability in compatibility, capability, reli-ability, and survivability, while address-ing issues of communications andG/VLLD operations. The increasedcompatibility with other weapons andautomotive systems in the troop has de-creased supply and maintenance diffi-culties that were the hallmark of theFISTV. In turn, this has increased thereliability of our vehicle, stated both inoperational readiness rate and in actualuse.

By working out of a Bradley, we arenow able to do our job without present-ing a conspicuous target to the enemy,as the Bradley looks like any other ve-hicle on the battlefield. This, coupledwith the upgrade in armor from theM113 to the M3, has greatly improvedour survivability.

Finally, our overall capability has in-creased exponentially. No longer arewe resigned to watching the rear of ve-hicles. We are fully able to keep upwith any vehicle on the battlefield andno longer have to worry about the timerequired to erect the targeting head aswe can now ride with the G/VLLD inplace.

Conclusion

Although most members of the FireSupport Element in 3d Squadron werehesitant to make the switch, the con-version to the Bradley has proven to besurprisingly easy. The crew, with somehelp from the squadron welder, tookonly one week to fabricate and installeverything in the vehicle. In the field,the M3 has provided us with the abilityto maintain contact with the troop, af-forded us additional security, and givenus a more mechanically reliable modeof transportation. Although we lost theTargeting Station Control and Display(TSCD), most of its functions can bereplicated using the FED or DMD in-terfaced with the G/VLLD. We stillhave the ability to lase targets, commu-nicate on all nets, both digitally andvoice, and compute data. The biggestloss was the directional control pro-vided by the gyros of the FISTV, butwe have found that with an M2 com-pass and a SLGR GPS, there is littledegradation of our ability to accuratelyacquire targets. Despite its few draw-backs, the Bradley is proving to be anexcellent interim replacement for theFISTV until the BFISTV is fielded.


Staff Sergeant Marty J. Peter-son, a former Navy AviationBoatswains Mate, Equipment,entered the Army in October,1989. Upon completion of BasicTraining and AIT, he was as-signed to HHS, 6-8 FA, Ft. Ord,Calif., as a fire support special-ist. He is a graduate of PLDC,BNCOC, FED/Forward ObserverCommand Course, and DMDTrainer Course, and is currentlyassigned as FSNCO, K Troop,3-3 ACR.

Captain Thomas A. Crowsonis a 1990 Distinguished MilitaryGraduate of the University ofTexas at El Paso ROTC pro-gram. A graduate of FAOBC,FAOAC, and SPLC, he hasserved as a fire direction officer,howitzer platoon leader, andsupport platoon leader in 1-11ACR and as the fire support of-ficer for K Troop, 3-3 ACR. Heis currently S4 and BMO, 2-17FA, Ft. Sill, Okla.

The tank commander called for thedriver to move out, as the gunnermoved his head to view through hisauxiliary sight. As the view through theauxiliary sight cleared, the gunnercalled out “driver stop!” The drivereased on the brake and the tank com-mander evaluated the range through hisprimary sight extension and waited forthe target to emerge from the treeline itwas traveling behind. Once the targetcleared this obstacle, he issued thecommand, “fire!” The gunner an-nounced “on the way!” and squeezedthe trigger on his cadillacs. Althoughno recoil was felt, one was heardthrough the subwoofer mounted be-neath the breech. Shell obscurationshielded attempts by the crew to senseimpact of the round. The loader safed

the main gun and punched the boxmounted on the ready door, waiting forthe light to indicate a round was avail-able for loading. Once lit, he pushedthe load light on the breech-mountedbox and armed the main gun. Once theobscuration cleared, identification ofthe target showed flames leaping from

the side of the turret. A catastrophic hit!The tank commander called “target,cease fire — driver back up” to com-plete the conduct of fire. Having suc-ceeded in destroying the enemy in an-other engagement, all of the crew tookoff their CVCs, dismounted their tank,and made their way across the armory

The Guard Unit Armory DeviceFull Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (GUARDFIST-1)

by First Lieutenant Stephen J. Snyder

Figure 1.GUARDFIST-1SystemsArchitecture


“Soldiers can only be ready when they are trained for the jobthey are doing and doing the job they are trained for. To en-sure that our Army can perform as the nation deserves andexpects, we must continually ensure that they are assignedwhere their training, knowledge, and experience contribute tothe Army’s readiness.”

- General Creighton W. Abrams - 1973

hall to the soda machine. The tankcommander made a detour to the sideof the vehicle to get a hard copy fromthe printer at the instructor/operator sta-tion on the times to fire and reticle aimof his gunner. As he too headed to thesoda machine, he looked back at thelooming hulk of the M1 sitting in thecorner of the armory and he ponderedon how much tanking had changedsince he first rode on “A5s” and “steeldinosaurs.”

The sleepy post of Camp Shelby,Mississippi was the field test site forthe lastest in virtual-reality, syntheticenvironment-based simulators. CampShelby’s humidity and oppressive heatare known more for wearing out fieldtroops and harboring bird-sized mos-quitoes than for assessing simulators.The post housed technicians, instruc-tor/operators (I/O), and Alabama Na-tional Guardsmen in conducting field-tests on the simulator, now in the handsof some Guard units. The U.S. Army’slatest application of Armor-orientedvirtual-reality-based simulators, theGUARDFIST-11 was field-tested underthe Initial Operational Test and Evalu-ation (IOTE) program. The purpose ofthis IOTE was to (1) assess the trainingeffectiveness of GUARDFIST-1 and(2) assess the possible configurationand funding requirements. The programconsisted of assessing pre- and post-testscores on modified Tank Tables VIIand TTVIII for control and experimen-tal groups. These groups were com-prised of four National Guard tank

companies, scheduled during their two-week Annual Training period.2 Opti-mally, the test would have been con-ducted during the course of one year,however, a less than ideal test was de-signed to simulate approximately oneyear’s use,3 and to obviate delays thathave hampered the program, such assoftware and hardware bugs.

The benchmark targets for assessingthe maintainability and integrity of theGUARDFIST-1 system for the IOTEwere (1) that the system demonstrateda mean-time-between-operational-mis-sion-failures (MTBOMF) equal to orgreater than 170 hours and (2) that thesystem must demonstrate a mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) less than 30 minutes95 percent of the time.

On dimensions of both maintainabil-ity and experimental/control groups dif-ferences benchmark targets wereachieved. The GUARDFIST-1 was su-perior. This is especially importantsince, unlike the Mobile Conduct ofFire Trainer (MCOFT), the GUARD-FIST-1 has many components that mustbe crated and mounted, increasing thechances for system malfunctions. Thesystem also performed well under ad-verse environmental conditions. Onseveral occasions, the huts where thetanks and simulators were locatedbecme balmy from humidity. The vari-ous GUARDFIST-1 systems performedto standard under such conditions. Heatand humidity are more damaging tosuch systems, due to cooling require-

ments of the CPUs and monitors. Up-grading of CPUs to Pentium-classchips will increase the cooling require-ments.

“The GUARDFIST-1 program wasinitiated by a Training Device Require-ments (TDR) in 1987, ...and was de-signed to fill a gunnery training defi-ciency withing NG armor and cavalryunits. Many of these units store the ma-jority of their tanks at installations farfrom their local armories and do nothave access to local training areas andranges. In order to conduct gunnerytraining, they must travel, in somecases, hundreds of miles to use theirequipment and have access to trainingareas. This is costly in terms of bothtraining time lost while traveling andassets required to actually move unitpersonnel. The GUARDFIST-1 is de-signed to allow NG armor units tomore efficiently train their soldiers intank crew gunnery skills at their localarmories.”5 It was also designed so thateach armory could house oneGUARDFIST-1, mounted on a station-ary M1 tank. Current use of MCOFTsfor this purpose are allocated on the ba-sis of one MCOFT per battalion.GUARDFIST-1 would quadruple theuse of virtual-reality-based simulatortraining for NG Armor units.

The GUARDFIST-1 is a full-crew,on-tank trainer, with hookups slaved toeach crew station’s controls. Televisionmonitors are attached to the driver’s,gunner’s, and TC’s optics.6 All cablesand optics are further slaved to a 486-66 microcomputer and driven by aParadox-engine UNIX-based 32-bit op-erating system.7 System componentsconsist of a systems controller, imagegeneration system, audio system, dataacquisition system, system software,8

and the I/O station.

The system controller is the core ofthe trainer, and synchronizes all activi-ties by communicating with the driver,gunner, and tank commander imagegeneration system. During training onthe simulator, the controller reads fromexercise scripts, controls the simula-tion, and monitors the performance ofthe tank crew. In addition, the control-ler follows, analyzes, and grades eachexercise, and provides printed reports.The image generation system providesthe synthetic environment to the TC,gunner and driver’s stations. These im-ages are generated from a polygonaldatabase in real time.

Figure 2. Perspective of M1 Tank with GUARDFIST-1 Appended Training System


The gunner has both the Gunner’sAuxiliary Sight (GAS) and the Gun-ner’s Primary Sight (GPS) to viewfrom, including thermal, while the TChas access to the unity periscope andGunner’s Primary Sight Extension(GPSE) as sights. The driver observesthrough his center vision block fromthe closed-hatch position. The audiosystem provides all sound effects,played from digitized sound files, andbroadcast through JBL speakers andsubwoofers. Audio cues are provided tothe crew through the CVC helmets.The data acquisition system consists ofmechanical linkages and electricalbuffers needed to allow communicationbetween the tank controls and the train-ing device. The I/O station consists of akeyboard to allow control of trainingprograms, two monitors for displayingvisual simulation and status informa-tion, the console which houses thecomputer system,9 and a printer to pro-vide feedback information.

The use of microcomputers instead ofminicomputers or mainframes has sig-nificantly reduced the cost of GUARD-FIST in comparison to its virtualcousin, the COFT. The capabilities ofthe GUARDFIST-1 include:

• Full crew on-tank training.• Simulated European and desert ter-

rain.• Simulated unrestricted tank move-

ment.• Simulated 360-degree turret rotation.• Simulated full main gun and coax

ballistics.• Simulated day and night engage-

ments.• Simulated malfunctions.• Real tank and gunnery sounds.• Detailed crew performance printouts.

GUARDFIST-1 is a tank-appendedtraining device that will be used by ac-tive, reserve, and NG units for collec-tive tank crew training in a simulatedclosed-hatch mode on an M1-seriestank. Aural cues are provided, repre-senting responses to driver input (en-gine speed, steering actions, and trans-mission shifting) and gunner input(weapons firing). During training, thetank is in a dead turret, power-offmode. Visual simulation allows the ve-hicle to move at will through an exer-cise or battle environment, constrainedonly by the physical conditions of thesurrounding terrain (trees, rocks, build-ings, and water).

Training Environment

Training on the GUARDFIST-1 isquite different from training at SIM-NET or on COFTs. Like its virtual real-ity counterparts, GUARDFIST-1 ishampered by the use of electronicsrather than the more solid-feeling hy-draulics. Gunnery in the GUARDFIST-1 is also quite different. GUARDFIST-1 simulates firing individual engage-ments or tank tables, and provides cri-tiques after each engagement. Thesecritiques include exposure time, targetidentification time, time to fire, andreticle aim, as well as fire command er-rors or manipulation errors. However,unlike the COFT, where a series of tenengagements are run before stopping tocritique, the GUARDFIST-1 givesgrades after each engagement. Duringthe field test, this proved distracting tomany crews who were used to firing aseries of engagements before being cri-tiqued. Evaluation after each engage-ment tended to break the rhythm thatthe crew was developing. On the plusside, GUARDFIST-1 has an innovationin the TC’s compartment. A magneticbox mounts above the TC console, andpermits running of the simulator fromthe TC station. This box has togglesthat switch the TC’s unity periscopeview back and forth between the syn-thetic environment view and the viewthat is presented to the instructor/opera-tor. This capability allows the I/O tobetter show the TC results of engage-ments and prepare the TC for sub-sequent engagements. Should an I/Onot be available, a qualified TC can op-erate the trainer from his station.

At the loader’s station, boxes attachto the ready door and the breech tosimulate duties that the loader mustperform. Unfortunately, the loadingtime was taken from standards from the17-12-1-1 for an M1A1 — 7 secondsper load. TC’s and gunners found thisan annoying delay, and loader’s con-tinually complained that loading timeshould be variable, depending on thespeed of each individual loader. Theloader must also move the safety armto the safe position before reloadingeach round. Other than loading, theloader has little to do. He is not pro-vided with a monitor and cannot assistin scanning.

The driver in the GUARDFIST-1must conduct his normal duties, includ-ing moving out to a hull down positionwhen conducting defensive engage-ments. Should the driver move out toolittle or too much, either a berm shotresults or the gun tube ends up pointingat the ground. The only difficulties ex-perienced at the driver’s station werean occasional loss in calibration on theT-handle, which required a few minutesfor the I/O to recalibrate, and no senseof feeling for where the driver was go-ing. This was particularly true whenmoving up during defensive engage-ments.

The quality of the synthetic environ-ment in the GUARDFIST-1 is a signifi-cant improvement over the graphics ofboth SIMNET and COFT, includingthe newer COFT graphics disk. Tanksare no longer box-shaped, but havelines similar to actual BMPs and T-72s.Rounds have two different effects

GUARDFIST-1 Synthetic-Environment Graphics


when hits are scored on targets. Thefirst occurs during a mobility kill. Thetarget will no longer move, but can stillfire. The second type of target strike isa catastrophic hit. When such a hit ismade, the tank flames to signify theammunition cooking-off. In addition,the vehicle remains on the battlefield,adding smoke and flame to the battle-field obscuration. Hits are also possiblethrough tree branches and small berms.Every detail of the synthetic environ-ment is realistic, including toolsheds,bars, and horizons. Target acquisitionunder desert conditions tested the bestof eyes, and made crews adept at look-ing for muzzle flashes to identify loca-tions of targets.

The quality of instruction on theGUARDFIST-1, like most other train-ing, is only as good as the training de-vices and the trainers. GUARDFIST-1instructor/operators were highly qulai-fied to perform their duties. They wereenthused about the capabilities ofGUARDFIST-1 and up to all assignedduties, including correcting systemmalfunctions during training. Since thesame two I/Os worked with each crewduring their entire week of trainingweek of simulator training, a rapportwas developed, and both the crew andthe I/O learned each other’s traininghabits.

The rigor of training of GUARD-FIST-1 was challenging. Each level oftraining in the matrix has both trainingand evaluation modes. Table VIII in thesimulator is known affectionately as the“widow-maker,” due to its level of dif-ficulty. Targets pass behind treelines,buildings, and outcroppings during en-gagements, adding to engagement diffi-culty. While most crews in the experi-mental groups had a chance to fire TTVIII, few were able to qualify, this af-ter almost 20 hours of simulator train-ing. TT IV, a preparatory Tank Tablefor TT VIII, took some crews 10 itera-tions to pass. Crews were well accus-tomed to donning protective masks bythe time they began live fire exerciseson TTs IV, VII, and VIII. Upwards of20 percent of the GUARDFIST-1 train-ing was spent wearing protectivemasks.

Target acquisition for the TC wasdaunting. Targets wre indistinguishablethrough the unity periscope, thereforemaking the job of target identification aGPS and GPSE task. Good crews soonfound that assistance rendered by thedriver was critical to good opening

times. The driver’s view was superiorto the tank commander’s unity peri-scope view. This fact made TCs lesslikely to use the unity periscope to scanand more likely to improve driver/crewinteractions. In GUARDFIST-1, thedriver takes the place of the eyes of theloader during scanning, since the loaderhas no optics or viewscreen.

The only other software glitch inGUARDFIST-1 occurred at the TC’sstation. TC override calibration wassometimes lost, causing the view to ap-pear as though the turret slue drasti-cally when the TC attempted to hand-off control to the gunner. A recalibra-tion quickly corrected such problems.

Use of GUARDFIST-1

At present, the GUARDFIST-1 is notdesigned to replace the COFT or SIM-NET. The capability is being developedto link GUARDFIST-1s together tosimulate platoon gunnery, along thelines of the UCOFT’s Platoon GunneryTrainer (PGT). Its primary role in theimmediate future will be to supplementNG training at armories. Precision gun-nery for tank tables is the strong suitfor the simulator. It is not as yet de-signed to replace the tactics training ofSIMNET, or the introductory and ma-trix training of the COFT. SinceGUARDFIST-1 does not at presentpossess introductory gunner or TC ma-nipulation exercises, its setup is forcrewmembers who already have a firmgrasp of station duties.

The GUARDFIST-1 system wasgranted a low rate initial production(LRIP) of 50 units by the SimulationTraining and Instrumentation Com-mand (STRICOM), with a first unitequipped date scheduled for April1995.

Notes

1The current name, GUARDFIST, is beingchanged to A-FIST (Abrams-FIST) as the pro-gram target spreads to include a Regular Armydimension.

2Details of this report were gleaned from theauthor’s experiences during this experimentaltraining.

3An ideal test would have been to put theGUARDFIST-1 through its paces for a full one-year field-testing.

4The control group did NOT undergo COFTtraining. By standard training, I am referring toConduct of Fire classes, AACs, TCPC, TT IVsubcaliber, and TT VII. Results of the experi-ment could also be due to intercrew differencesin skills. The experiment attempted to goaround this fact by drawing on a sample size of28 experimental and 28 control group crews.Crews were forced to maintain integrity, mean-ing that once the training began, no crewmem-ber could change positions or withdraw fromthe training.

5Taken from page 1-2 of 1994-OT-136OA.6The system at present does not include a

monitor for the CWS. Future add-ons will pro-vide this dimension in gunnery.

7There were delays in training between en-gagements, which consisted in wait times dueto the 486-66 CPU architecture. In addition,each GUARDFIST-1 only had 8 megabytes ofRandom Access Memory (RAM). For such agraphics-intensive use, it is recommmended thata minimum of 32 megabytes of RAM be used(of a 56 nanosecond wait state) and a 100 Pen-tium CPU be integrated. This would reducewait states to approximately one-tenth of thecurrent levels.

8Software was developed according to DOD-STD-2167. Sixty-seven percent of the softwarewas written in C language and 33 percent inADA. The software is compiled and executedon a UNIX-based operating system.

9The console is approximately the same sizeas the COFT’s computer console and is onwheels for ease of movement.


First Lieutenant Stephen(Doc) Snyder was commis-sioned in Armor from ArizonaState University’s ArmyROTC, where he received anMBA and Ph.D. in strategy.His undergraduate degreewas in history from Ship-pensburg University, Pennsyl-vania. He is a graduate ofAOBC, and is Air Assaultqualified. He is currentlyscheduled for Phase 2 ofAOAC and is assigned asXO, B Company, 1st Battal-ion, 131st Armor, AlabamaArmy National Guard. He isan Assistant Professor ofManagement/Management In-formation Systems at the Uni-versity of West Florida.

Nestled in Keyes Park, Fort Knox,overlooking the route Morgan’s Con-federate Cavalry took on its raids intoUnion territory, lies the home of mod-ern day cavalry and armor, the PattonMuseum.

The museum attracts over 300,000visitors a year. Surrounded by lushscenery and an assortment of interna-tional mounted and mobile weaponsystems of the past, the museumreaches out to young and old alike,from 70-year-old sergeants of the past,to 10-year-old lieutenants of the future.

Hosting mock battles or showing offits collection to the viewing public isonly part of its mission. With supportfrom the Cavalry-Armor Foundation,corporate sponsors, volunteers, localtourism agencies, and the donations ofgenerous visitors, the Patton Museumof Armor and Cavalry is our link to thepast, educating armor warriors of thefuture in tactics and leadership.

Never is this link more evident thenwhen present-day warriors host one ofthe many dedication or reunion cere-monies held in the park. When themorning sun burns off the mist shroud-ing the monuments to cavalry and ar-mor, visitors can almost see the silhou-ettes of past warriors felled on thefields of honor, standing alongside thenew mounted warriors honoring theircomrades who have come to pay trib-ute.

“All you have to do to realize the im-portance of our facility is walk outsideinto the memorial park and admire thetributes to armor and cavalry units whohave made this country safe,” said JohnPurdy, director of the museum. “Thou-sands of former armor and cavalry sol-diers have dedicated monuments to

their efforts on this field of remem-brance, and as those veterans dwindlein numbers, it is up to the new genera-tions of mounted warriors to ensuresurvivability of the museum.”

Plans by Purdy and the foundationare more ambitious than just survival.Through its ongoing restoration pro-jects, plans for future site renovationsand additions, and work with state andlocal tourism bureaus to promote theDixie corridor and Fort Knox’s impacton the region, the museum staff hasmaintained high visibility as one ofKentucky’s more popular tourist attrac-tions.

“Visitors will notice a subtle shift inthe museum’s focus over the next fewyears, from a historical message to aneducational focus,” said Purdy. “Therehas been a shift in the demographics ofAmerica since Viet Nam, and the num-ber of families in this country whohave military ties or know someone inuniform has decreased dramaticallysince World War II and Korea. Withouteducating our visitors about the reasonsfor mounted combat and mounted war-fare — how the perception was that ar-mor’s role decreased after World WarII, and how armor proved its worthagain on the Desert Storm battlefields— the necessity for a strong mountedforce could be lost on the general pub-lic. Part of the museum’s role is notonly providing a historical perspective,but the museum staff now filters its ex-hibits for appropriateness and under-standability to an ever-increasing, unfa-miliar audience.

“Fort Knox and the entire mountedcommunity could become isolated ifwe fail in our education mission.”

To combat this possibility, the mu-seum continues to acquire previouslyunobtainable equipment for displays bystrengthening its ties to the interna-tional armor community. Recent addi-tions include a German “Tiger” tank,and an M3 light tank obtained fromAustralia, a tank used in the Philippinesagainst Japanese forces.

“The M3 is part of an exhibit in pro-gress highlighting armor’s first role inWorld War II,” said Purdy. “Some ofthe first armor combat was seen by theArmy National Guard in the with-drawal into Bataan in late 1941 andearly 1942. This combat is almost theforgotten element of early armoredwarfare by U.S. forces, but Ken-tuckians from Harrodsburg are very fa-miliar with those campaigns. Its Com-pany B, 192d Tank Battalion was veryinvolved in providing rear-guard actionduring the withdrawal into Bataan byholding crossroads and bridgeheads.Unlike the later overwhelming use ofactive armor in North Africa and Euro-pean, it was not unusual to have Guardarmored forces on the Pacific frontlines while the Army built its armorforce.

“Just as the Army grew its armor andcavalry force in WWII, we can’t moveforward and grow without the help ofthe new generation of mounted war-fighters,” said Purdy.

As the museum moves forward to ex-amine armor and cavalry since WorldWar II, veterans of that conflict can restassured that there will be no examina-tion without inclusion of their accom-plishments in shaping the force sincetheir service in WWII. Their tactics,doctrine, and legacy have shaped theforce of the future and nowhere is this

Patton Museum Courts a New Generationby John Rickey


more prevalent than in the decisive ar-mor and cavalry victories by theirgrandsons in Desert Storm. Those vet-erans who fought in Desert Storm, bothactive and reserve component soldiers,have experienced the shock and lethal-ity of battle, as their grandfathers didsome 50 years ago!

“Their legacy and stories are the areaswe must focus on in the near-termthrough projects, exhibits, and addi-tions that highlight their overwhelmingsuperiority on the battlefield,” saidPurdy. “This is a large group of veter-ans and current duty-status soldierswhose ties to the museum must be ex-ploited by pride in ownership. Many ofthose soldiers and their families havenever enjoyed the museum, so weknow there is a future audience outthere for us to reach out to and ask toassist and support our efforts.”

One effort in need of support is theacquisition of an M1-series tank tocomplete the Desert Storm exhibit. In-cluded in this exhibit will be elementsof General Franks VII Corps commandand control actions, many of whichhave led to the present use of battlelabsto shape and design control of the bat-tlespace. The museum has a capturedIraqi T-72 tank; it needs some help toobtain the M1.

Whether through donations, highercorporate sponsor participation, or en-dowments, the museum and foundationare examining ways to attract new visi-tors and spur new growth. To competein the future as the cornerstone-show-case of the Army’s technology centerof excellence, the museum and founda-tion has to raise money and its level ofsupport.

“Those are issues the Armor and Cav-alry Foundation are meeting regularlyon as we move into the future,” saidPurdy.

Future long-term projects will includean expansion of the already popular“Cold War” exhibit, featuring actualsegments of the Berlin Wall and famil-iar border posts. There will also be amove towards “interactive videos,”where museum visitors can walkthrough armor and cavalry’s history, aswell as use some early versions of thetraining equipment mounted warriorspracticed on.

These equipment exhibits will chron-icle the Army’s move into expandedsimulation training, virtual reality, andthe digitized communication battlefield,highlighting many of those same sol-diers who fought in, and brought theirideas back from, Desert Storm.

“Those Desert Storm veterans are theones who are shaping Force XXI, byapplying battlefield techniques and en-hanced communications to ensure le-thality and survivability in 21st Cen-tury battlefields,” Purdy said. “If weare unable to attract a core of those De-sert Storm veterans in support of themuseum, I don’t think we’ll be as suc-cessful in highlighting armor and cav-alry’s continued role and necessity fortomorrow’s warfighters. We need themas advocates of the Patton Museum,advocates of the Home of MountedWarfare and Fort Knox, and advocatesof armor and cavalry soldiers past, pre-sent, and future!”

Patton’s Cadillac limousine, above, is one ofmany exhibits focusing on the great armor gen-eral. At left, an ex-Nazi tank destroyer prowlsKeyes Park prior to a July 4 reenactment.Below, an American infantry patrol closes in onthe “Germans,” actually members of a reen-actment group from St. Louis.


John Rickey was the FortKnox Public Affairs Officerwhen this article was written.

Driving around Fort Knox, many ofthe things we pass daily remind us ofthe rich heritage of cavalry and armor.More often than not, we give littlethought to the roles played out on thebattlefields of this century by the silentarmored sentinels that grace our instal-lation. Certainly we would never give asecond thought to a strange-lookingbuilding, let alone a strange-lookingbuilding that isn’t even made out of redbrick. Fort Knox has such a building,one that played a role in the invasionof Sicily and the cross-channel inva-sion of Europe, our own “LandingShip, Tank” building located just off ofEisenhower Avenue in the collection ofWWII-era buildings near Harmon Hall.

The fall of France made it clear that across-channel invasion would be re-quired to defeat the Third Reich. TheBritish Admiralty was quick to submitdesigns to the United States for boatsand ships that would be required forthis invasion, hoping to have them builtunder Lend-Lease. One of the designscalled for a ship that could carry 20tanks and a dozen 21⁄2 ton trucks, hencethe Landing Ship, Tank, or LST. At thetime, 1941, the Navy and its ship de-signers had no experience buildingsuch a ship, and even less interest.1

One reason for this shortfall was themistaken belief that, should events inEurope force the United States to re-turn there, forces would disembark onsecure docks in friendly ports.2

The requirement for tanks to deployonto a hostile shore brought with itmany difficult, implied tasks. One wasthe ability to warm up tank engines be-

fore driving down the ramp into hostilefire. Another was the need for enoughfresh air to keep the crews of those 20tanks alive long enough to drive downthe ramp. This was like starting up 20tanks inside a small garage with thedoor closed, not on a deck in the openair. This quest, determining how toventilate an LST, is how Fort Knox gotits own “navy.”

With preliminary testing conducted atAberdeen Proving Ground, construc-tion of a full scale mock-up began atFort Knox in April, 1942, and wascompleted less than two months later.Testers then tried different types of baf-fles and vents until they decided thatthe best way to ventilate the ship waswith large exhaust fans that cleared theentire tank deck area. This eliminatedthe need for individual hookups to eachvehicle exhaust. The individual hook-ups would have hindered debarkationspeed, reduced ability to perform rou-tine maintenance, and would have to bereplaced after the tanks were off-loaded.3 It also gave the ships a flexi-bility that General Truscott would fullyexploit during the Sicily invasion,when he loaded his LSTs to twice theircapacity, in one case 94 vehicles onone LST.4

After testing, the building became aclassroom, and no further amphibioustraining was conducted.5 Today, itserves as an annex to the Patton Mu-seum. Perhaps a coat of gray paint andsome bow numbers would make it amore befitting tribute to forward-look-ing Army thinkers in the realm of am-phibious operations, men like ColonelsDaniel Noce and Arthur Trudeau, who

formed the 1st Engineer AmphibianBrigade and started working out theproblems of how to assault from thesea. It is also a round-about tribute toGeneral George S. Patton, Jr., who didhis homework on amphibious opera-tions in the mid-1930s with his staffstudy of 19 amphibious landingsthroughout history and his general staffstudy of Gallipoli. It should serve as areminder to us all that history takesmany shapes and forms, not all beingold tanks or red brick buildings.

Notes

1Geoffrey Perret, There’s A War To Be Won,(New York: 1991), p. 182, note, Perret citesJames A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Lo-gistics 1775-1963, (Washington, D.C.: 1966).

2Perret, p. 181.3John Campbell, LTC (Ret.), Fort Knox’s

Dryland Navy, Armor Magazine, July-August1979.

4Perret, p. 188.5Telephone interview with William Goldie,

CPT, U.S. Army (Ret.).

The Fort Knox Navyby Captain Matthew D. Morton

The Fort Knox “LSTBuilding,” at left, wasbuilt to test methods ofventilating the shipsthat would carry tanksand trucks ashore inthe Sicily invasion.The model below, fromthe Patton Museum col-lection, is an LST, theship on which the build-ing was based.


Captain Matthew D. Mortonis a 1991 graduate of theU.S. Military Academy. Hehas served as a tank platoonleader with 2/11 ACR; BMO,3-5 Cav (Mech); and as a ri-fle company XO.

sign. A major drawback is the traverse limi-tations caused by the placement of themain armament. AFAS must have 360-de-gree (6400 mil) traversing capabilities in or-der to be able to support the maneuvercommander on a fluid battlefield of the fu-ture. The M1 AFAS’s 30-degree (531 mil)azimuth limitation would make it less versa-tile than the current Paladin. This limitationseems to be caused by the basic design ofthe M1 chassis, which more than likelycan’t be overcome.

Ammunition resupply of the M1 AFAS bya similarly designed FARV would be diffi-cult. Any resupply operations would be hin-dered by uneven or non-uniform terrain.Both AFAS and FARV would have to havea highly developed hydropneumatic sus-pension system similar to that found on theBofors S-Tank. The suspension systemwould have to be capable of adjusting notjust elevation/depression, but also adjustingvehicle cant. Once again, the amount offlexibility in the design requirements seemsto exceed the M1 chassis modification pa-rameters.

The article raised my interest in aspectsof the design which were not described inany detail. Reading about the “integral ra-tion microwave heater” is fine, but I wouldha ve l iked to read more about theweapon’s fire control system. No mentionwas made of what the weapon’s self-loca-tion capability would be. I assume it wouldbe equivalent to that of the Paladin, but itshould be even more developed (utilizingGPS).

In the final analysis, I feel the M1 chassisAFAS has more limitations than it does ad-vanced capabilities. I welcome the authors’interest in this vital weapons program, but Ialso feel that the plan they have put for-ward does not fit the bill. Some of theirideas have merit and could possibly be in-corporated in AFAS design. However, I feelwe can get a better overall system by con-tinuing research into new technology. Asthe main customers of the fire support sys-tem, infantry and armor commandersshould demand more versatility in this can-non system of the future.

ROBERT W. NEGROCPT, Infantry

NCARNG

M1-based Howitzer Makes Sense

Dear Sir:

Comments on the cover story and kudosto your staff artist, Mr. Jody Harmon, on hisexcellent work. As a Redleg, I have morethan a passing interest on any new howit-zer system and have worried over thespeed limitations of both the Paladin andCrusader systems for some time. The inno-vative design shown using an M1 chassisand the MACS solid propellant for the how-

itzer make a great deal of sense. The ma-terial-handling equipment suggested wouldimprove high-tempo operations greatly. Theconsolidated crew compartments in bothvehicles are logical extentions of the MLRScab design. I’d personally add a 40mm Mk-19 grenade launcher and 7.62mm minigun(perhaps an upside-down AH-1 Cobra chinturret) on the commander’s station and alarge-caliber chain gun at the second posi-tion. I’d also consider placing half the sixnotional antiair missiles on the left side ofthe turret well to allow more tranverse ca-pability (80o off center line on either side)and to allow more flexibility in fire support.I’d also consider using a lightweight panelsystem to provide a stand-off portable over-head and side cover for the vehicles,something that would detonate shapedcharges before contact with actual vehiclearmor.

The RCLR article was excellent. If youmate the 106mm RCLR with a laser range-finder and SACUMS, the maximum effec-tive range can be greatly extended. 1100mis the burn-out of the .50 cal spotter rifletracer round; maximum range of the106mm RCLR is 7700m. Since HEP andHESH rounds are not velocity-dependentfor terminal effect, any items that can ex-tend effective range are welcome. If bee-hive has a time fuze mode, indirect and/orlong range attack becomes more effectiveagainst light infantry and thin-skin vehicles.A hard-shell HMMWV might mount 2, 3, or4 RCLRs (an ONTOStita?) for rapid fire onmultiple targets. I’d consider converting halfthe vehicles in the antiarmor company toRCLR; 2 out of 20 doesn’t sound like nearenough to me, considering likely foes androles for light forces in future conflicts. Ifyou figure that one TOW costs the sameas a gun mount kit, we get more bang forthe buck from RCLRs. Mr. Sparks’ com-ment on the lack of sea-based gunfire sup-port is another subject I’ve worried aboutfor years, and yes, I do have a solution.

With the apparent, final demise of theAGS, the need for the 82d and 2d ACR tohave some mobile firepower is past critical.I suggest the LAV with a 105mm soft recoilcannon, already developed and tested, oreven using the ARES 75mm dual-purposeauto-cannon. The LAV is also amphibious,which is another pet peeve of mine, butmore on that later.

LARRY A. ALTERSITZLTC, FA, USAR

Cdr, Det E (Marksmanship) 1182d Reinforcement Training

Unit, USAR

Don’t Dismiss External Guns

Dear Sir:

I found Don Loughlin’s article on the Ex-ternal Gun Turret to be incredibly naive.

This sort of logic also opposed the machinegun and the airplane.

Contrary to Mr. Loughlin’s claim, the ex-ternal gun has not been extensively tested.Such tests as have been conducted to dateindicate that external gun arrangementscan provide a major gain in survivability ata weight reduction that greatly enhancesdeployment. Such arrangements also ap-pear to be less expensive than the usual,ordinary full-turret schemes. To dismissthose gains because of imagined visionproblems and fanciful mechanical difficul-ties is cavalier in the extreme.

What motive might prompt an attack,such as Mr. Loughlin’s, on any probablesolution to cost, weight, and deploymentchallenges is difficult to understand.

JEFFREY A. BOUCHERU.S. Army, (Ret.)

External Guns Have Real Benefits

Dear Sir:

It was with great dismay that I read Mr.Loughlin’s article on external gun turrets. Ihave never read such a collection of misin-formation, disinformation, sour grapes, anddownright drivel. The author would have usbelieve that external gun turrets have beenextensively tested and rejected, and this issimply not true. It is quite obvious that hehas no experience in a real external gunlow profile turret (not a remote gun as inthe Tank Test Bed). This would explainwhy each one of his numbered points arenot true and have no validity in fact. Theone truth is that every new weapon designor concept has had a host of “authorities”who have condemned the new as bad andpointed the way straight to the status quothat gives us the feeling of security whilewe stagnate.

Warships should be of wood, not iron;sails, not steam; the soldier cannot safelyhandle a self-loading pistol; magazine-fedrepeating rifles will cause the troops towaste ammunition; biplanes are superior tomonoplanes; I won’t be able to see out ofan enclosed cockpit; the guns should be infront of the pilot so he can clear any jams;the M1 will never replace the ’03 Spring-field; submarines are unfair weapons onlyuseful in coastal waters; tanks are expen-sive, unreliable, awkward white elephants;and the aircraft carrier will never replacethe battleship! Do these sound familiar?They should, if you have studied militaryhistory to any extent.

To dismiss the external gun, low profileturret prior to the extensive testing/fieldevaluation that the author erroneously im-plies has already been conducted is to buryour heads in the sand and add ourselves tothat sad list described above. The low pro-file turret concept provides a number ofvery real survival, mobility, and lethality


LETTERS (Continued from Page 3)

benefits, and almost none of the draw-backs attributed to it by the author. I hadthe pleasure to serve as the Marine LiaisonOfficer on the Armored Family of VehiclesTask Force under MG Robert Sunell, an of-ficer that many considered to be the topexpert on armor in the Army. GeneralSunell endorsed the external gun, low pro-file turret concept, and it did become one ofthe designs examined as part of the follow-on ASM program. Far from invalidating theconcept, it was a recognition of the manyadvantages to be gained by adopting it.However, I am sure that the author knowsmuch more about this subject than all ofthose experienced senior officers who ex-amined the competing concepts presentedto the AFV Task Force.

The search for increasing levels of pro-tection while reducing vehicle weight willnot be solved by some new wonder armor(unobtainium) that weighs less and keepsout more. The solution will come from inno-vative design concepts like the low profileturret, autoloaders, composites, hydropneu-matic suspensions, electric drive, heightcontrol, modular armor, low observables,electric guns, and other upcoming tech-nologies that will allow the designer tostrike a workable compromise in the vehi-cle design. We must examine all of thembut not from the viewpoint of “that’s theway we always did it,” for that is the leastsupportable answer. With that thinking, theWright brothers would be little-known bicy-cle repairmen. Let’s not listen to the voiceof the reactionary; let’s look to the future,even if it is unfamiliar and uncertain. Ourforefathers did, and developed the weap-ons we have today, and we owe the futuresoldiers and Marines the same considera-tion.

R.G. DUVALLMAJ, USMC (Ret.)

Digitization Could Exclude Allies

Dear Sir:

I’m coming up on the Net responding toARMOR’s call for SITREPs from the force.I have been tracking the progress of ForceXXI through the numerous articles in ourprofessional journals and concept papers,such as TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXIOperations. It is difficult not to use thecliché of “working in dynamic and excitingtimes,” but certainly there have been fewtimes in history when an Army has had theopportunity to conduct the intellectual staffrides the U.S. Army is doing.

As an exchange student in a foreign staffcollege, I have had a unique opportunity tointeract with many officers, representingmilitary forces from around the world. Manyof their armies are also looking inward asthe decade ends. The end of the century

seems analogous to a danger area, a sym-bolic fold in the ground, in which units haveconducted a short halt to assess the situ-ation, take stock, and attempt to scan asfar forward as their sensors will let them,before launching out into unknown territory.Maybe “halt” is not the best term. We knowthat we can never truly halt on this battle-field.

I can report that there is a great admira-tion of our Army’s boldness of embracingthe Information Age technology. There is nodoubt that as we enter the 21st century, wewill continue to be the premier land force.Our friends recognize this, but I would liketo share some observations of their con-cerns.

Our doctrine recognizes that future opera-tions will, more often than not, be pursuedby some form of coalition. (Most OOTWmissions almost guarantee that we will op-erate with foreign armies). We have alwaysrecognized the challenges of combined op-erations, and I have gained invaluable in-sight into their planning, especially afterOperation Desert Storm. However, newchallenges are emerging. Herein lies one ofthe great concerns. Allied armies currentlydo not have the resources to pursue Infor-mation Age technology, specifically digitiza-tion, to the extent that the U.S. Army is do-ing. Coordination between Allied units,even in the days of compatible communica-tion systems, was always a tough nut tocrack. What will happen when units cannotshare the kind of battlefield information thatdigitization can provide? Perhaps an Alliedunit only a few kilometers away, cannotshare a critical SPOTREP in a timely man-ner. As any potential OPFOR developscourses of action, he will certainly targetthe physical boundary between U.S. andCoalition forces. Boundaries have alwaysbeen vulnerable areas, but due to this in-compatibility of battle command systems,they seem to be even more assailable,both physically and intellectually. Simplyput, there is a concern that Allied forcescould find themselves literally “out of theloop.”

One doctrinal answer to this challengelies in the use of liaison officers. In my ob-servation, we seem to overlook this criticalmission in peace-time training. Honestly,most units can ill afford to put their mostexperienced officers in these positions.Perhaps, during operations, they can’t af-ford not to. Interestingly, many World War IIveterans recall that, often, only the mostcombat-seasoned officers were LNOs.LNOs who knew their jobs permitted greatflexibility in fast-paced operations. I canonly offer that we need to emphasize theimportance of LNOs in combined opera-tions. We must take a hard look at theMTOE. Perhaps one LNO, a HMMWV, andSINCGARS radio is not sufficient. TheForce XXI LNO Team will require a C2

hardware package that ties in with current

battle command systems. This packagecould include a number of appliques or re-motes that an Allied CP could use on amission-by-mission basis.

There is a tough mission ahead. It will bea truly major effort just tying in the battlecommand systems of our sister services,let alone our Allies. However, we must rec-ognize that coalition forces can and will op-erate on our flanks, front, or rear. We canassume that in the near future, they will nothave the resources to field significant num-bers of digital systems and thus, they can-not fully share in our technological advan-tage. Although we may be familiar withtheir doctrine and procedures, disparity ofbattle command systems will pose a signifi-cant challenge to the Force XXI com-mander.

BART HOWARDMAJ, Armor

U.S. Exchange StudentAustralian Army Command

and Staff College

MG Grow Misidentified in Photo

Dear Sir:

I read with great interest “The End of theRide” by Dr. Denver Fugate in the Novem-ber-December 1995 issue. As one whorode with GEN Patton and MG RobertGrow, I wonder if the photo (top) on page11 is accurate.

I knew GEN Patton and MG Grow from1939 on. I consider them the two greatestsoldiers of WWII. I served under GEN Pat-ton in Europe when our division was part ofThird Army. I served under MG Grow from5 May 1942 on.

I do not believe the brigadier generalshown in the photo is really Bob Grow. Hedoes not look like the Bob Grow I knew.Besides, he was promoted to major generalin June 1943 and served in that grade untilhis retirement. If it is General Grow, he waswearing someone else’s helmet.

JOHN J. FLYNT, JR.COL, USA, (Ret.)

6th Armored Division

- Colonel Flynt is correct. Our archivedphoto had a label identifying the general of-ficers as Patton and Grow. While the hel-met on the man standing next to Pattonappears to have only one star, the originalphoto indicates two, although some glaredoes obscure one of the stars. However,the man holding the trophy fowl is MG Er-nest Harmon. We apologize and have rela-beled the photo.

- Ed.


The Devil’s Adjutant: JochenPeiper, Panzer Leader by MichaelReynolds, Sarpedon Publishers, NewYork, 1995. 320 pages. $27.50.

Decisive, ruthless, and fanatical, ColonelJochen Peiper was the consummate pan-zer leader of the German Army in WorldWar II. In the forests of the Ardennes in1944, Peiper reached the high-water markof his remarkable career as he led thespearhead of the German armored attackin the Battle of the Bulge. His tactical ac-complishments are still studied by tankerstoday, but his other battlefield actionsearned him a death sentence at the 1946war crimes trials at Dachau.

Michael Reynolds’ new book, The Devil’sAdjutant, is a journeyman effort to portrayPeiper as a dedicated soldier and a hap-less victim. Reynolds is a retired Britishgeneral officer, a reputed expert on theBattle of the Bulge, and an able writer. Hehas put together a well-crafted and detailedstory, backed by excellent photographs,maps, American and German orders of bat-tle, and other addenda.

Most of the book focuses on Peiper andhis powerful kampfgruppe in December1944, but it is actually his earlier years thatare more interesting. Peiper quit highschool in 1933 to join the “LiebstandarteAdolf Hitler,” the regiment known as Hitler’sbodyguard. Later in the war, the LAH be-came a full division, the 1st SS Panzer Di-vision. Peiper quickly rose through theranks to become an officer, serving as He-inrich Himmler’s adjutant during the Polishcampaign. His service with the infamousHimmler earned Peiper the label of “TheDevil’s Adjutant.” With the LAH, Peiperfought in Holland, France, and Russia, dis-tinguishing himself as an outstanding com-bat leader.

By 1943, the LAH had earned a well-de-served reputation for battlefield proficiencyand courage, as well as a vicious reputa-tion for brutal excess and atrocity. Peiperwas groomed in this environment. Unfortu-nately, Reynolds does not spend muchtime with Peiper during these years, in-stead devoting his efforts to Peiper’s in-volvement in the Ardennes.

In December 1944, Colonel Peiper com-manded Kampfgruppe Peiper, the division’sstrongest regimental task force. Peiper’stask was to lead the 6th Panzer Army’sbreakthrough attack through the Ardennesto the Meuse River. Here, the author re-veals the strength of his research as hepainstak ingly details every aspect ofPeiper’s attack, as well as the franticAmerican countermeasures. The Germanattack was a complete surprise, and it in-itially gained momentum as it smashedweak, unprepared American units.

Reynolds provides expert analysis of Ger-man and American forces’ strengths andweaknesses, plans, equipment, intelli-

gence, terrain and weather, as well asleadership and morale factors. Hour byhour, jumping from place to place on thebattlefield, Reynolds moves the reader asthe German attack slows and “friction andthe fog of war” assume more dominanceover the Germans and Americans. Peiperreacts as expected — decisive, resourceful,and imaginative, always focused on his ob-jectives — despite bad weather, unfavor-able terrain, missed opportunities, and anextra helping of bad luck.

Peipe r ’s le adersh ip pushes h iskampfgruppe of tanks, armored infantry,pioneers, and artillery over 100 kilometersin 72 hours, deep behind American lines. Itis during this push that Peiper’s namewould be indelibly linked to the horror ofwar, for it was Peiper’s panzergrenadierswho executed unarmed American POWs at“the Malmedy Massacre.” Peiper would ulti-mately be tried and sentenced to death forthis atrocity.

Peiper survived the war, the trial, andprison, retiring to rural France and trying tolive in obscurity. His remaining years arefilled with controversy, highlighted by theviolent and mysterious circumstances of hisdeath in 1976.

This book is a well-researched account ofone of World War II’s most interesting com-bat leaders. Sadly, it is also a vehicle forthe author to wearily debunk hundreds ofpreviously accepted details and facts re-garding the Battle of the Bulge. The con-stant correction of other authoritativesources is distracting and tiresome. Theauthor’s bias regarding Peiper’s treatmentby the Allies after the war is also an ill-dis-guised (and unconvincing) attempt to por-tray Peiper as an unwitting victim of war’scruelty and injustice. Despite these flaws,however, this is a fascinating story of in-spired courage, battlefield flexibility, andcombat leadership.

WILLIAM D. BUSHNELLCOL (Ret.), USMC

Harpswell, Maine

Ticket to Hell by R. Frank Harwood,Southern International Research Press,P.O. Box 1323, Oxford, Miss. 38655,162 pages. $21.00.

On the surface, this book seemed to offera good story: a biography of a hotdog P-47pilot who grew up in the rural South, wentto flight school, flew close air support forPatton’s Third Army, and was shot downduring an attack on the Mannheim railroadyards during the Battle of the Bulge. Hewas a prisoner of war from December 1944until liberation in April 1945.

Unfortunately, that about covers it. Thebook, which could have told a great dealabout each of these aspects of L. Thomas

Easterling’s life, is amateurishly written andlacks any sort of depth. By the time thereader develops an interest in one phase(his trials as an underclassman in flightschool, his aerial gunnery training, his ex-periences flying close air support in built-upareas of Eastern France and Western Ger-many), the author moves on to somethingelse. The result is an unsatisfied hunger formore of what was just covered but is now amemory.

To make matters worse, the author in-cludes “romantic” interludes (presumablybased on fact) intended to spice up thetale. These do not add to the story. In-stead, they tend to distract while contribut-ing to the amateurish impression of the restof the work.

However, after completing this book andthinking about it, I was struck by an imageof my father and his generation that servedin World War II. This image grew with re-flection, and is the book’s one redeemingstrength. It gives a very strong impressionof the simpler, more straightforward life andtimes of the people who fought in that war.More specifically, it shows the backgroundof a “typical” man who could come from arural, one-horse town, barely finish highschool, and become a pilot in one of thetoughest aircraft of the war. He did nothave a lot of technical training, but didhave a lot of experience driving cars, beingself-reliant, and having suffered hardshipsthrough the Depression. Consequently,when Easterling breaks both legs bailingout of his aircraft over the rail yards inMannheim and suffers through six monthsof captivity with no medical attention, weknow how he manages to maintain the willto survive. More importantly, we knowsomething of what is necessary to developsoldiers of character who could survivesimilar trials in the future.

Consequently, the book would be a goodone to take on a long airplane flight: nottoo much meat, not too long to read, butan interesting picture of another genera-tion’s world and how it prepared them forwar.

FRAME J. BOWERS IIILTC, Aviation

IMA, SARD-Aviation, Pentagon

Savage Peace: Americans at Warin the 1990s by Daniel Bolger,Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1995.420 pages. $27.95.

As American military forces deploy to theformer Yugoslavia, Daniel Bolger’s SavagePeace offers some timely and pertinentconclusions about Operations Other ThanWar (OOTW) that leaders from lieutenantto lieutenant colonel should wrestle with.Bolger’s message here is especially perti-nent for the tank/heavy infantry community:

BOOKS


he concludes they have a real and neces-sary part in operations that have been mis-leadingly labeled as something other thanwar. After an introductory chapter describ-ing how small unit leaders along the DMZin Korea confront situations fraught withperil, even in time of “peace,” the authortakes a quick look at the New World Orderand the United States military’s training toconfront the new challenges. Case studiesillustrating success in OOTW include PRO-VIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq, and theinitial U.S. actions in Somalia as part ofUNITAF. Case studies illustrating failure in-clude the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit’s(MAU) mission in Lebanon, which culmi-nated in the disastrous and tragic bombingof the marine barracks in Beirut, and TaskForce Ranger’s mauling in the streets ofMogadishu during UNISOM II’s undeclaredwar on Muhammed Farah Aidid. Along theway, Bolger derives some fundamentalconclusions concerning the reasons forsuccess, and failure in OOTW.

Savage Peace’s message, that leadersfrom sergeant to lieutenant colonel are onthe cutting edge of all this and their actionscan have strategic implications, is hardlynew, but Bolger’s basic thesis challengesthe fundamental definition inherent inOOTW and may prove to be the book’sgreatest contribution. The author contendsthat these leaders in the field, and theirmilitary and political masters, must realizethat “OOTW are wars pure and simple —to believe otherwise is to court disaster.”Thus, the 24th MAU’s fundamental failure,Bolger argues, was that its leadership didnot believe their mission was military in na-ture, so they didn’t consider standard bat-tlefield tactics applicable. PROVIDE COM-FORT stands as a counterpoint whereinconventional forces, by doing the regularshoot, move, and communicate METL stuff,allowed the engineers, medics, and logisti-cians to do the bulk of the humanitarianwork, and do it well.

Bolger asserts that our opponents haveonly to look at the historical record, fromthe Ia Drang Valley to the desert of South-west Asia, to see the fate of those who tryto fight the United States military in an op-erational and strategic manner that is in-side the tidy box we like to call warfare.Bolger concludes that we must be ready tofight, but outside the box at the operationaland strategic level. However, since Bolger’sOOTW are really wars with a different face,we must still employ a force package pre-pared mentally and structurally to fight inthe traditional style at the tactical level.Thus, OOTW force packages should becombined arms and joint — not just air-power, not just SOF, not just light infantry.

Several warnings fall out of Bolger’sanalysis that are especially pertinent in lightof the debate over potential deployments.One recurrent theme is the interaction be-tween the American military, the media, thepeople, and our politicians. The author

warns that media-driven policy can result incommitment of military forces without dueconsideration of such questions as pur-pose, method, end-state, and level of risk.Bolger contends that “civilian policy makersoften do not think in these terms, and it isup to the military to ask, and keep on ask-ing, these tough questions.” Another, andmore controversial, warning concerns thequest for easy answers to hard problems.The author argues that, much like airpoweradvocates in the ’30s and ’50s, the SpecialOperations community offered Task ForceRanger to policy makers as a quick andeasy solution to the problem posed byAidid in Somalia. Once the element of sur-prise was compromised by media cover-age, this solution was essentially doomedto failure, despite the Task Force’s endeav-ors, which were in keeping with the highesttraditions of American military arms. Tele-vised images of the bodies of Americanservicemen being dragged through thestreets of Mogadishu caused a collapse inthe will of the American people and thePresident and serves as an example tosupport another of Bolger’s conclusions.Since the seemingly omnipresent electronicmedia serve as a direct link between “trig-ger pullers” and policy makers, journalists“play a huge role in giving tactical eventsoperational and strategic significance.” Af-ter pointing out the significance of this rela-tionship, Bolger moves on with little com-ment, even though the situation seems tobode ill given the current adversarial rela-tionship between the American military andour own media.

Bolger’s writing style makes it somewhatdifficult to determine the target audience.Savage Peace is certainly pertinent for anyleader from platoon to battalion level head-ing to Bosnia or another OOTW/war. How-ever, his analysis of larger issues, such asthe integration and implementation of na-tional interests, goals, and objectives,makes it equally valuable reading for mili-tary/civilian policy makers and students atthe war and staff colleges. Unfortunately,the book is replete with glib phrases suchas “the final sanction — one between theeyes,” and “the day of the ninja had come.”While such verbiage may make the mes-sage more appealing to junior officers andNCOs, it runs the risk of alienating thehigher level audience, which would be un-fortunate. Daniel Bolger is one of our fore-most soldier/historians and freely admits heruns the risk of analyzing events so currentthat they hardly merit the label history. Fur-ther examination may refute some of Bol-ger’s conclusions, but he warns that “greatpowers must study small wars to staygreat,” and analysis of these recent warsoffer lessons of immediate utility so the ef-fort cannot be left undone.

STEVE C. HAWLEYMAJ, Infantry

Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.

A Short History of the Civil War byJames L. Stokesbury, William Morrow& Company, Inc., New York, 1995.354 pages, $25.00.

It is with great pleasure that I recommendA Short History of the Civil War as an addi-tion to the professional library of the ar-mor/cavalry corps. This book is extremelyinformative, and yet most enjoyable toread. The author, who is a professor atAcadia University, has seven other books,five of which are A Short History of...’s, tohis credit. The book is indeed a handy,useful reference, as well as an introductionto the American Civil War, for students ofmilitary history. This book will undoubtedlybe used as a text in many colleges anduniversities.

The book opens with the election of Re-publican Abraham Lincoln as president ofthe United States. From there, the authordiscusses the causes and events which ledto Lincoln’s election, the subsequent seces-sion of the Confederacy, and the war itself.He is very logical as he discusses each ofthe war’s five years. For each year, theauthor explains the what, where, when,why, and how events transpired. His an-swers to these questions are clear andconcise, and seem to be accurate. Like-wise, the reader will become very ac-quainted with the men who fought in thiswar. Additionally, the author is careful tostress how society and war are not mutu-ally exclusive, but rather have enormousimpact on each other.

The eleven maps, which are relevant tothe issues being discussed, are under-standable, but lack detail. This is the onlyshortcoming I could find with this text. Anindex is provided and is very complete. Ad-ditionally, he provides a section entitled“Suggestions for Further Reading,” whichincludes commentary.

A Short History of the Civil War does notbore the reader with too much detail;rather, the quick pace grips the reader withanticipation and excitement. I enjoyed read-ing it very much.

ROBERT E. LEVERINGTON, JR.1LT, Armor, CA ARNG

1-149 ArmorSalinas, Calif.

OPERATION DESERT STORM: Al-lied Ground Forces Order of Battleby Thomas D. Dinackus, (Self-Publish-ed), Alexandria, Va., 1995.

The author, a former Armor officer andARMOR contributor, has self-published acomprehensive order of battle listing allU.S. combat arms units, down to the small-est TOE element, and major non-combatarms units. This will meet a need for thosestudents of the conflict that cannot wait for


an official Army or Marine Corps order ofbattle. Another chapter lists the forces thatmade up the Allied coalition.

The book is available from the author for$16 plus $1.75 postage. His address is4719 Major Court, Alexandria, Va. 22312.

ARMOR Staff

Leaders and Battles: The Art ofMilitary Leadership by W.J. Wood,Presidio Press, 1995. 337 pages,maps, bibliography. $15.95.

This is not a new book; it was first pub-lished in 1984 and has just been repub-lished as a paperback. But it is certainlyentertaining and interesting, as well as afirst-rate teaching tool, particularly for thenew student of military history.

The author has three objectives: “The firstis to show Americans that battles can bewon by the minds of leaders, those whoare skilled in the art of leadership. The sec-ond is to demonstrate that the art of lead-ership is embodied in the man, not in someset of abstractions. The third is to establishthat the art must be based on certain attrib-utes which are found in leaders who haveproved themselves in battle.”

To do this, Wood adapted an unusual ap-proach. He selected “certain attributes” —courage, will, intellect, presence, and en-ergy — that he wanted to illustrate. Thenafter obviously prodigious research, heculled incidents in military history to thosefew that typified a particular attribute. Someof these h istorical moments are wellknown: Auerstadt, Ratisbon, Little Big Horn.Others are so obscure — Cempoella, Ilipa,Lungtungpen — that you wonder howWood ever discovered them. The men in-volved are not all great captains; most arejust fine soldiers who happened to have theattributes Wood was seeking, and whorose to the challenge in the stress of battle.But the examples are perfect for his pur-poses.

Then Wood created a novel-like scenariofor each incident. He created dialogue thatwould be similar to what was actually said,and actions that must have taken place,and he put it all together like an historicalnovel. This makes easy and entertainingreading, even while the reader’s mind isabsorbing Wood’s theses. This is the wayhistory ought to be taught, much like theway PS Magazine teaches maintenance.Wood brings “dull history” to life in an excit-ing and fascinating way. A fine book. Get itand enjoy it. And someday in a spirited dis-cussion with your friends, you may findyourself using Wood’s examples to proveyour point!

COL JOHN R. BYERSAlexandria, Va.


Deaths of Three Drivers inSix Months Spurs ChangeIn TM, and a SearchFor Answers From Field

Turret traversing has killedthree armor soldiers in the lastsix months, raising serioussafety issues concerning crewcommunication, coordination,and discipline. In each accident,the tank driver’s head was abovethe hatch when the tank com-mander (TC) traversed the turret.Addit ional ly, “power” wascalled and the TC’s intention torotate the turret was announced.The tragedy in all three acci-dents is the fact that each couldhave been prevented.

The TC told his driver to “stayin the hole” and the driver re-plied “ok.” The driver, however,was not properly seated, eventhough his seat was in its lowestposition. He was killed when theTC rotated the turret and theturret struck the driver’s head.

Lapses in communication di-rectly relate to close calls aswell as serious accidents in allcombat vehicles. TM 9-2350-264-10-1 specifically directs thatCVC helmets will be used anytime a tank is moved. Thisstandard is designed to optimizecrew coordination. No crew-member should ever remove hismeans of communication — it isliterally his lifeline.

The tank driver and loaderwere tasked to transfer ammuni-tion with another tank. To dothis, both soldiers knew they hadto rotate their turret and movethe vehicle 25 meters. Thedriver’s seat was in the full-upposition and neither soldier waswearing a CVC helmet. Theloader traversed the turret,which struck the driver’s head,killing him.

The Abrams tank has a verygood safety record; however, inthose instances when a crewman

gets in the path of its moving ar-mor or equipment, serious acci-dents result. Therefore, to betterprotect Abrams tank drivers fromturret rotation hazards, the fol-lowing change to the TM hasbeen made: When an individualis in the driver’s compartment,turret power is “on,” and theturret or gun is unlocked, thenthe driver’s hatch MUST beCLOSED.

As always, TCs must announce“power” before traversing the tur-ret and they should double-check,if necessary, to ensure everyone(inside and outside the tank) isaware of intended turret move-ments and clear from danger.

Risk management can helpcrews and leaders prevent turret-related accidents. Leaders muststress crew coordination drills,emphasizing the standards printedin the TM. Soldiers should drilluntil performance and familiaritywith equipment is automatic. Theturret is a known hazard to tankcrewmen, but the controls formanaging the turret hazards arealso well known: train to stand-ard, enforce the standard, andperform to standard all the time.

Program Manager, AbramsTanks is looking for recommen-dations from the field for an engi-neering change to help preventdrivers from being injured orkilled in turret traversing acci-dents. Send your suggestions to:

TRADOC System Manager, Abrams TankATTN: ATZK-TSFort Knox, KY 40121-5000

You may also call the new 24-hour-a-day Abrams Field ProgramHotl ine number: 1-800-989-TANK (1-800-989-8265).

•• Contractors displays will beopen from 0800-1700 Mon-day, Tuesday, and Wednes-day, and from 0800-1200 onThursday at Skidgel Hall.

•• POC for general officers billet-ing: Protocol Office, DSN 464-2744/6951, commercial (502)624-2744/6951.

•• Limited on-post billeting maybe available for other person-nel. Contact Mrs. Easter, DSN464-3491, commercial (502)943-1000.

•• POC for equipment displays:DFD, DSN 464-3534/2176,commercial (502) 624-3534/2176.

•• Overall POC for Armor Con-ference, CPT Matt Flom, DSN464-1065/8878, commercial(502) 624-1065/8878.

•• Conference uniform is battledress uniform: banquet is cas-ual; garden party is BDU, cas-ual, or Class B with shortsleeve shirt and open collar.

•• Tickets for social functions willbe sold during registration(estimated cost of socialevents - $60.00).

•• Visit requests for foreign na-tionals must be submittedthrough their embassies intime to allow for normal proc-essing.

•• To preregister for Armor Con-ference, call DCFA, ServicesDivision, (502) 624-4235.

•• 1st Annual Armor Classic GolfScramble - $20.00 entry feecovers greens fees, half acart, club rental, and favorpacket. Prizes galore! Regis-tration begins at 1000; scram-ble starts at 1100. POC: BarryBonifield, (502) 624-1548.

Saturday, 1 June 1300-1900 Armor Trainer Update (ATU) Registration (Gaffey Hall, Bldg 2369)

Sunday, 2 June 0715-0800 ATU Late Registration (Gaffey Hall)0800-0815 Administrative Information (Haszard Auditorium, Gaffey Hall)0815-0830 The Guard in Transition (Haszard Auditorium)0830-0900 The ARNG Armor Force (Haszard Auditorium)0900-0930 Break0930-1000 The Mounted Force in Transition (Haszard Auditorium)1000-1045 Ft. Knox in Transition (Haszard Auditorium)1045-1115 Ft. Knox Scheduling Update1115-1200 ARNG Force XXI Update (Haszard Auditorium)1200-1330 Lunch1330-1430 ARNG Force Structure Update (Haszard Auditorium)1430-1515 ARNG Force Modernization Update (Haszard Auditorium)1515-1535 Break1535-1600 ARNG TADSS Update (Haszard Auditorium)1600-1630 Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) (Haszard Auditorium)1800-2200 Social Event for ATU (Brick Mess)

Monday, 3 June 0800-1700 Armor Conference Early Registration (Brick Mess)0800-0805 ATU Administrative Information (Haszard Auditorium)0805-0905 SATS-TREDS (Haszard Auditorium)0905-0935 Simitar Update (Haszard Auditorium)0935-1000 Total Army School System (Haszard Auditorium)1000-1030 Break1030-1700 Virtual Training Program Demo (MWSTC, Bldg 2020)

Tuesday, 4 June 0800-1700 Registration (Brick Mess)0800-1700 Force XXI Training Program Demo (MWSTC, Bldg 2020)0800-1600 External Scheduling Conference (Skidgel Hall)0800-0845 Brigade and Regiment Commanders’ Meeting (Gaffey II)0845-0930 Honorary Colonels of the Regiment (Gaffey II)1000-1630 1st Annual Armor Classic Golf Scramble (Lindsey Golf Course)1100-1700 Off-line Update (TBD)1700-1830 CG’s Garden Party (Quarters One)1830-2130 Regimental Buffet and Assemblies (Brick Mess)

Wednesday, 5 June 0730-1000 Late Registration (Message Center in Gaffey Hall)0800-1700 Force XXI Training Program Demo (MWSTC, Bldg 2020)0800-0810 Welcome/Admin Announcements (Haszard Auditorium)0810-0840 CG’s Report to the Force/Franks Award (Haszard Auditorium)0840-0940 Presentations (Haszard Auditorium)0940-1000 Break1000-1130 Presentations (Haszard Auditorium)1130-1200 Armor Association Meeting (Haszard Auditorium)1200-1330 Lunch1330-1410 Keynote Speaker (Haszard Auditorium)1410-1530 Presentations (Haszard Auditorium)1530-1550 Break1550-1700 Presentations1830-2230 Cocktails/Armor Association Banquet (Armor Inn)

Thursday, 6 June 0800-1200 Force XXI Training Program Demo (MWSTC, Bldg 2020)0800-0810 Admin Announcements (Haszard Auditorium)0810-0840 CSA Address to the Force (Haszard Auditorium)0840-1010 Presentations (Haszard Auditorium)1010-1040 Cavalry Operations (Haszard Auditorium)1040-1140 Cavalry Panel (Haszard Auditorium)1200-1300 Chief of Armor Luncheon (Brick Mess)

1996 Armor ConferenceTentative Agenda

1 - 6 June 1996

Training the Mounted Force in Transition


Armor Conference

The 1996 Armor Conference, the 1996 Armor Trainer Update (ATU), and the 106th meeting of the United States Armor Association will focus primarily on training and doctrine evolving from our digitization efforts and updates on current and future programs. We are planning a great lineup of speakers to talk about the Mounted Force's move into the 21st Century. We will also have state-of-the-art displays to demonstrate how the Mounted Force will move into the 21st Century.

Armor Trainer Update

The FY96 Armor Trainer Update is scheduled for 1-3 June and will be held in conjunction with the G3/DPTM Fort Knox Scheduling Conference on 3 June and the Armor Conference 4-6 June. Registration will be on 1 June from 1300-1900 with late registration from 0715-0800 on 2 June at Gaffey Hall. This year's ATU will focus on transitioning the Armor force to a digitized force using simulations and evolving technologies. Attendees will have the opportunity to view the newest in simulations, the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), in addition to over 120 other displays.

All personnel planning to attend the FY96 ATU should preregister by contacting MAJ Belew at DSN 464-1960, commercial (502) 624-1960. The fax number extension is 1456. Written requests for information should be sent to: Commander, USAARMC, ATTN: ATZK-SA, Ft Knox, KY 40121-5000.

G3 External Unit Scheduling Conference

The GS/Directorate of Plans, Training. and Mobilization will conduct the 4th Annual External Unit Scheduling Conference on 4 June 1996.

During this conference, we will offer available resources to U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Active Army, and other branches. Our goal is to provide resources that will give the unit commander a wide range of training options and to integrate simulation technology into the mounted force training strategy.

Important Note: Due to this year's Armor Conference taking place in early June 1996, Fort Knox G3/Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization will begin accepting formal requests for shared resources beginning 7 March 1996. However, in order to confirm training and logistical resource requirements, units must still send representation to the 4 June 1996 External Unit Scheduling Conference.

Each year attendance increases, as well as the support and resources we offer. The FY 97 scheduling conference will relocate to the much larger Abrams Auditorium in the Patton Museum. The attendees may also tour the magnificent displays in the Patton Museum. Some of the major resources available, but not limited to external units, are: MWSTC (old SIMNET) and JANUS with observer/controller support, Tank Driver Simulator, Conduct of Fire Trainers, Maintenance Trainers, ranges, and training areas. Plus, in limited quantity, we have the Thru-Site Video and Battalion/Brigade Staff Trainer this year. Fort Knox is continuously adding or upgrading resources to meet external unit training needs. Our most recent addition is another state-of-the-art Table VIII range with more modernization scheduled in the coming years. Resource availability can be identified and scheduled through September 1997.

All Reserve Component units should submit their requests to Commander, U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, ATTN: ATZK-PTE-U, Chief, Coordination Support Branch, Reserve Component Support Division, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000; DSN 464-3137. As in the past, Fort Knox will continue to make every attempt/effort to ensure external units receive the training and resources as scheduled.

Point of contact for resource scheduling during this year's Armor Conference week is Ms. Evans at DSN 464-1288, or Mr. Hornback at DSN 464-3555.

Comment on the Company Team Manual FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company

Team, is currently under revision at the Armor School. The Armor School shares proponency with the Infantry School for this manual, but has primary writing responsibility. We request your thoughts and ideas regarding the concepts, content, and structure in this manual. Current world events and the end of the Cold War are changing the roles and missions of the company team. The Armor School's charter in writing this manual is to provide the user in the field with relevant doctrine, as weIl as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TIP). We are seeking input from current commanders from company through brigade level, preferably those with command experience in the last five to six years. We are looking for input on the following:

• Should the manual be written for just the company commander, or should its audience include other company team elements (XO, ISG, PL, Attachments)?

• Regarding the content of current doctrine, what has changed since the 1988 version?

• Given the structure of current doctrinal manuals, what works and what needs changing in format and presentation of text?

• What issues are not addressed in the current manual?

ARMOR - March-April 1996

• What lessons can be learned from recent combat and training experiences (TIP)?

• Can we include any specific TIP for executing current and future company level missions?

• Should TIP specifically address situations such as operations in built-up areas, or should it be generic, requiring the commander on the ground to adapt it to the situation?

• Should heavyllight operations be addressed as a separate . ? Issue.

• Should we include specific TIP for conventional armor and mechanized forces conducting OOTW operations?

The Armor School would like your comments on these topics for review and potential use in the new manual. Input should be received by 30 April, but will be accepted after that date. There is no standard length or format for submissions. Please keep submissions concise and to the point that you wish to make (no war stories please!). Please include information where we may contact you. Submissions should be sent to: Commander, HQ, 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, ATTN: CPr Grant, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121. E-mail can be sent to [email protected], or phone CPr Grant at DSN 464-6651 or commercial (502) 624-6651 for additional information.

53

mailto:[email protected]

Final Draft

January 1996

us Army ArmO< Cenl8< & ScI'IoOj Fon Knox. Kenlucky .012\ -.5000

ARTEP 11·57_10-MTP

MISSION TRAINING PLAN FOR THE .

. SCOUT PLATOON

Initial Draft

JANUARY 1996

us AAMV AAMOR CENTER & SCHOOL FORT KNOX. KY

The Tank and Scout Platoon MTPs The Platoon Training and Doctrine Division an

nounces the draft completion of tank and scout platoon Mission Training Plans (MTPs): ARTEPs 17-237-10-MTP and 17-57-10-MTP. The tank plaloon MTP is in the final draft stage and is awaiting comments from the force before it is approved and released for DA publication. The scout platoon MTP is released as an initial draft. Both require immediate attention from the force and need to be reviewed and cri tiqued.

Both manuals feature significant improvements. The most notable refinements are changes to the Training and Evaluation Oullines (T&EOs) in Chapter 5, a new, more user-friendly format for the ~crosswalk"

training matrix in Chapter 2, development of a similar crosswalk training matrix between crew and individual training tasks in Appendix C, and a training exercise addressing operations other than war.

These manuals were developed with parallel formats to provide a standard outline for ease of use in all units. Al though they execute different missions, scout and tank platoons perform some of the same tasks, which have been written collectively.

A review from the force is necessary to ensure the manuals provide units with the most up-tO-date training material. Specific comments should be forwarded to the Platoon Training and Doctrine Division on DA Form 2028. Key points need to be addressed , not only to identify problems, but also to develop possible solutions. We need and expect comments since there was such a poor response to the initial draft critique of the tank MTP.

It is the intention of this division to make the MTP as accessible to review as possible. In addition to be-

ing sent directly to battalion-level units, the MTPs can be downloaded electronically to units and individual soldiers via the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWofoJ). Look for the MTPs at the Fort Knox Doctrine home page with the following web URL (address):

http://members.aol.com/awwglknoxdoc.htm

The Fort Knox Doctrine home page is part of the ongoing Internet Information Services Management System (IISMS) project. The IISMS project is being executed at the Armor Center to digitize the doctrine writing process. Other Armor Center manuals will be available on the Fort Knox Doctrine home page beginning in April.

Your comments can be sent by PROFS or mailed to this headquarters. Please include the name and telephone number of your POC with the comments . The mailing address is Commander, 2d Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, ATTN: ATSB-SBB-D (Doctrine Division) , U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox , KY 40121-5200. The PROFs 10 is HILLW or SCHOLESM at KNO l . The E-mail address is:

h il lw@knox-emh l .army.mil

scholes m@knox-emh l .army.mil

Note: The completed publication of FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, was released to the Department of the Army for final printing and will be available for ordering by units on the publishing date of 3 April 1996. This manual was also extensively modified to reflect current doctrine after being staffed throughout the force. most notably to the CTCs. This manual is also available on the Fort Knox Doctrine home page.

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