Armor, May-June 1996 Edition - The United States Army | Fort … · This new electronic aspect of...

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONActing Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 01559

If you haven’t seen it already, you might like to look atthe first iteration of “Issues in ARMOR.” Hop into yournet cruiser and go to:

http://www.awwg.org/~dave/armormag/cover.htm

(To get there you obviously must have access to theInternet.)

The Spring 1996 edition concentrates on a topic thathas generated a lot of interest during the last year or soinside ARMOR. We’ve chosen to show all of the mate-rial on how the new technology is going to affect theways we fight, the ways we train to fight, and how itshould affect those fighting and training strategies.We’ve included a variety of articles, several letters tothe editor, and a “Commander’s Hatch” column, andwoven them into a logical presentation that every practi-tioner of armored warfare should find engaging. Thereare 14 pieces of material to date. We start with LTCHertling’s vision on what warfare in a fully digitized unitmight be like in a battle taking place in 2008, (ARMOR,Jan/Feb 95), and ending with a letter to the editor from1Lt Besherse that appears in this very issue.

However, the story thread shouldn’t end with the lastletter by the Lieutenant. We envision a dynamic sitewhere an interested armorphile can read through thestring of relevant materials and see the development ofthought — at least published thought — on an issueaffecting the armor community. Then, if he wants to, thatreader will have the opportunity to send in his own com-ments on what he has just read. If he chooses, he canadd his own comments, via e-mail, to the discussion, tobe posted by the “Issues in ARMOR” administrator.

This new electronic aspect of the magazine will neverreplace the copy you have in your hands. It is, however,going to help us show the development of an issue, thediscussion of all the facets, and allow for participation ina different way. It will be a good tool for students atvarious Army schools, for we will have done some ofthe legwork in getting together in one place relevantthought on the issue topic. Research papers and staffstudies may get faster running starts if the studentchooses to use the “Issues” topic.

All of the material present at an “Issues in ARMOR”first posting will come from the pages of ARMOR. Whatis posted later will most likely be a mixture of publishedand unpublished materials. In this way, the site be-comes much more than a neat place to go to in orderto find ARMOR magazine things. We wouldn’t go to allof the trouble if our efforts were easily replicated byyou merely digging through that box in your basementor driving across post to the library to get that one arti-cle needed for your OPD/NCOPD.

When you go the Fort Knox Doctrine home page(http://members.aol.com/awwg/knoxdoc.htm), you’ll find“Issues in ARMOR” linked to it. You won’t see a repro-duction of the magazine, so don’t be disappointed.Most of the illustrations and photographs in the articlesare missing unless they were key to meaning such asmaps, diagrams, and charts. Maybe as system hard-ware gets faster, we’ll add all the artwork back into thepresentation, but to keep users from getting too frus-trated as slow loading graphics appear on their pages,we’ll omit the non-essential ones for now. True, pic-tures tell a thousand words, but words do contain thepersuasive arguments.

If, as you cruise, you have substantive comments toadd to the discussion, please send them to the e-mailaddress indicated. We have set up a dedicated mailboxto handle whatever volume of electronic mail we re-ceive. We’ll screen it, consider adding it to the presen-tation at the next update, consider publishing it in theletters to the editor section, and give you a response ifone is necessary. As you read and think of improve-ments, let us know.

“Issues in ARMOR” is dynamic and meant to changeas our knowledge of how to use the Internet grows.This column will never replace the magazine, but it willsupplement some of the discussions that run throughits pages. We want to encourage professional discus-sion in the armored force. Let us know how you like it,if you like it, whether it is useful, and what improve-ments you would want us to consider making.

Enjoy the ride. —TAB

Stand To

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-96-3

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG LON E. MAGGART

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

May-June 1996. Vol. CV No.3

Features

6 The Armor Center and School Functional Organization

9 BOSNIA REPORT: Task Force Eagle's Armor and Cavalry Operations in Bosnia by Colonel Charles Lehner, Ret.

11 The M1A2: Current and Future Program Plans by Wes Glasgow, Colonel Christopher Cardine, and David Latson

16 M1A2 Update: Training and Doctrine Observations From Saudi Arabian NET Training on the M1 A2 Major Kevin D. Poling

21 Training Ammunition for Force XXI by Major Steve Thorson and Major Bruce Held

26 A Study in Armored Exploitation The Battle of the Slim River: Malaya, 7 January 1942 by Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton

32 Company C, 194th Tank Battalion in the Philippines, 1941·42 by Burton Anderson

37 Javelins and Skirmishers on the Battlefield by Major James K. Morningstar

41 Maneuvering the Enemy by Captain Charles D. Starbird

42 ARMOR and AOAC Are Going on the Internet

43 Tactical Employment of the Heavy Mortar Platoon by Captain Matt Sebenoler

51 Book Essay: New Biography Offers Fresh Insights on Patton

Back A Thicker Ballistic Shell For Combat Vehicle Crewman's Helmet Cover

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 5 Commander's Hatch 8 Driver's Seat

50 Software Review 52 Books

Second·class official mail postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Poslmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, AnN: ATZK·ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121·5210.

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.

USPS 467·970

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Directory - Points of Contact DSN - 464-XXXX Commercial - (502) 624-XXXX

ARMOR Editorial Offices

Edltor-in-Chief LTC Terry A. Blakely E-Mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens

Editorial Assistant Vivian Oertle

Production Assistant Mary Hager E-Mail: [email protected]

Staff Illustrator Mr. Jody Harmon

u.s. Army Armor School

2249

2249

2610

2610

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Chief of Staff, Armor School (ATSB-CS) COL Paul E. Lenze 1050 E-Mail: [email protected]

Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) CSM Gerald D. Utterback 5405 E·Mail: [email protected]

16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) COL Don Elder 7848 E-Mail: ELDER@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL

1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB·BAZ) COL Fred A. Treyz III 6843 E-Mail: [email protected]

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or printed out double-spaced in near-letter-quality printer mode. We also accept stories on 3'1, or 5'1.-inch floppy disks in Multi Mate, WordS tar, Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, Ami Pro, XyWrite, Microsoft Word for Windows, and ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter and include a double-spaced printout). Tape captions to any illustrations submitted.

SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue. We

will not print articles that have been submitted to. and accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only olle Army journal at a time.

GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We can accept electronic graphics and photo files in most formats except Harvard Graphics. Compressed formats - .jpg and .gif take up the least disk space. We prefer PC Paintbrush (.pcx). If you use Powerpoint Cppt), please save each illustration as a separate file. Try to avoid the use of color and shading, but if you must use shading to illustrate your point, send us an unshaded version of the illustration along with a printout of your shaded version. (We have

u.s. Army Armor Center

Commanding General MG Lon E. Maggart E-Mail: [email protected]

Deputy Commanding General BG Clayton E. Melton E-Mail: [email protected]

Chief of Staff COL Jerry L. Veach E-Mail: [email protected]

Command Sergeant Major CSM Ronnie W. Davis E-Mail: POSTCSM@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL

Directorate of Force Development COL Edward A. Bryla E-Mail: [email protected]

(ATZK-CG) 2121

(ATZK-DCG) 7555

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Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD) COL G. Patrick Ritter 8247 E-Mail: [email protected]

NCO Academy CSM Kevin P. Garvey E-Mail: [email protected]

TRADOC System Manager for Abrams and Armored Gun System COL John F. Kalb E·Mail: [email protected]

Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab COL Gary Krueger E-Mail: [email protected]

Office, Chief of Armor Aubrey Henley E·Mail: HENLEYA@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL FAX 7585

Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) LTC Randall Williams E-Mail: [email protected]

(ATZK-NC) 5150

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found that when we convert tiles to a format we can use, the shading gets lost or distorted.) If you have any questions concerning electronic art submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above.

MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR: ATfN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox., KY 40121-5210.

PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS/ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN A WARDS: Report delivery problems or changes of address to Connie Bright or Susanne Lane, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox., KY 40121, or call (502) 942-8624, FAX (502) 942-6219.

UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or changes of address to Mary Hager, DSN 464-2610; commercial: (502) 624-2610. Requests to be added to the free distribution list should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, training, organiZations, and equipment of the Armor Force.

ARMOR - May-June 1996

Tank Qualification — A Leadership Right of Passage

Dear Sir:

CSM Dudley raises a long-brewing, but Ifeel underexamined, controversy within thearmor/cavalry community (Letter to the Edi-tor, “Ratings Should Be Tied to Tank Quali-fication,” Jan-Feb 96). We indeed havemoved away from the concept that leadersshould/must qualify their prime mover —tank or Bradley. Unlike Dudley, however, Ibelieve that qualification should not be di-rectly used in rating an individual. Rather,in an indirect fashion, qualification is an in-dicator of leadership.

Qualifying one’s vehicle speaks to two di-mensions of a tank/Bradley commander’scapabilities — technical competence andleadership.

Officer/NCO vehicle commanders requiresome base level technical knowledge. Ouryoung soldiers respond to technically com-petent leaders who know their business. Aleader who is worried or unable to qualifywill spawn additional “bolos.” Should lead-ers be as much a “tanker” as the sectionleader or master gunner? No. Our platoonleaders/troop and company command-ers/battalion and squadron commandershave other irons in the fire. Should theyrecognize proper gunnery techniques (ormore importantly, improper/unsafe ac-tions)? Obviously.

Confidence is contagious. Winning andqualification breed further success. Leadingby example is a staple of successful units.

Gunnery Table VIII is a training event.Unsuccessful engagement should be re-trained until task standards are met. How-ever, we must carefully analyze whetherunqualified leaders have what it takes tocare for our soldiers/units. As Dudley soclearly states, “...if he cannot train his crewand fight his tank, he just might not beable... [to] mentor other tank commandersto train their crews and fight their tanks.”Our livelihood is the tank. We are privi-leged to possess the finest technologicalequipment manned by the most highly edu-cated and motivated soldiers of any mod-ern army. We should demand that leadersmeet certain gates in order to maximizethese capabilities.

MAJ DAVID G. MACLEANXO to the J4/7, USCENTCOM

Museum Seeks to AcquireOwnership of Patton Statue

Dear Sir:

Visitors to the Fort Knox Patton Museumof Cavalry and Armor find the two most

popular exhibits in the Patton section to bethe pistols carried by General George S.Patton, Jr., and the life-sized, one-of-a-kind,hand-carved wooden statue of GeneralPatton. Except for the helmet and a fewother accouterments, this statue wascarved out of a single piece of basswoodwith such intricate detail that it appearsamazingly lifelike.

The statue’s owner who originally pro-vided it to the museum on indefinite loan in1984, has elected to put the statue up forsale. Faced with losing this irreplaceablepiece of art, the Cavalry-Armor Foundation,Patton Museum Development Fund — theprivate organization that for thirty-plusyears has raised funds to support the multi-phased campaign responsible for buildingthe Patton Museum complex — enteredinto an agreement with the owner to pur-chase the statue and an associated paint-ing for $150,000, payable in installmentsending in December 1996. While the Armysupports the museum with some operatingfunds, private funds must pay for this ex-hibit.

The first installment of $25,000 has beenmade and, to date, a little more than one-third of the money has been raised, muchfrom Patton family members. The drive isnow turning to tankers, cavalrymen, veter-ans, and other patriotic Americans to keepthe statue where it belongs — in the mu-seum honoring the man who even todayrepresents mounted warfare.

The Cavalry-Armor Foundation is askingfor the support of dedicated, loyal citizens,corporations, and organizations to bringthis worthwhile cause to a successful com-pletion. Contributions may be made in anyamount to: Save the Patton Statue Fund,P.O. Box 25, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

OWSLEY C. COSTLOWCOL (Ret.), Armor

President, Cavalry-Armor Foundation

Master Gunner School Is Not for Dilettantes

Dear Sir:

SGM Spurling’s letter in the January-Feb-ruary issue was absolutely on the mark.

The Army spends a great deal of moneyto send tankers to Master Gunner Schooland give them an in-depth education intothe “why’s” of tank gunnery. Anyone canget the how’s” by opening up an operator’smanual and spending some time in thetank. Understanding why tanks work theway they do gives meat and substance tothe procedures that we use, and to thecredibility of master gunners.

For that reason, if you volunteer to go toMaster Gunner School, be prepared for

some pretty intensive studying and devo-tion to the art and science of tank gunneryfor the rest of your career. Once you areknown as a master gunner, you will foreverbe called upon to assist the commander in“Matters Relating to Tank Gunnery.”

That doesn’t mean that you will never seea leadership position again, but it doesmean that your assignments will vary fromthe technical aspects of gunnery planningand management, to the intensive leader-ship challenges of platoon sergeant, firstsergeant, command sergeant major, andyes, Sergeant Major of the Army. (Con-gratulations to SMA McKinney, a mastergunner!)

Remember, Department of the Armydoesn’t select you to attend the MasterGunner Course. You volunteer. And you’dbetter be prepared to perform as needed,when told, on short notice, for the rest ofyour career. You won’t get proficiency pay,and you won’t wear a patch. If you’re notprepared to do that, then you’re probablynot prepared for the intensive curriculumand will only contribute to the course attri-tion rate. Stay home.

MSG TERRY BALLINGERCombat Developer

Directorate of Force DevelopmentsFort Knox, Ky.

Seeks WSRO Participants

Dear Sir:

I am a former armor officer, a member ofthe Armor Association, and an amateurmilitary historian. I am researching Opera-tion Desert Storm, and am writing to askfor assistance from your readers with re-gard to one aspect of this operation.

Unlike previous wars, the Army plannedto replenish battlefield casualties usingpreexisting combat arms platoons fromunits that had not deployed. Each such pla-toon deployed as a complete unit, with ve-hicles and equipment, personnel, and pla-toon leadership. This program was called“Weapons System Replacement Opera-tions,” or WSRO for short. Enough tankplatoons were deployed to fill two tanksbattalions: it does not appear that anyscout platoons participated.

The Army is doing nothing to memorializethe participation of these units. I am tryingto document the units that participated, andwould like to hear from ARMOR readerswho have information or documents thatdiscuss the WSRO program in general, oridentify any of the platoons that partici-pated.

THOMAS D. DINACKUS4719 Major Court

Alexandria, VA 22312

ARMOR — May-June 1996 3

Why Would the Force XXICommander Want to Intervene?

Dear Sir:

Is auftragstaktik really dead with ForceXXI? I must concede the most salient pointof both CPT Bateman’s article and CPTBrown’s letter (ARMOR, Jan-Feb 96): bat-talion commanders have the ability to di-rectly control movement — right down tothe individual tank — on the Force XXI bat-tlefield. Indeed, at all levels of training, anofficer is taught that he must take care ofand preserve his force. This thought alonemight lead some battalion and above com-manders to look into the microscope andreach down several echelons. But will theywant to?

Going back to the basics, I remember be-ing told that the Army found long ago it iseasiest to directly command and controlonly 3-5 people. Tank commanders leadthree other tankers; platoon leaders threeother tanks; company commanders oneXO, one 1SG, and three platoon leaders;and so on. Much more and a leader’s abil-ity to effectively control his element is di-minished. This is not necessarily becausehe does not have enough informationabout these subordinates’ actions. Rather,it is just as likely that his subordinates pre-sent him with more information than he canprocess. At the battalion level, its leader ingarrison is burdened with commanding fivesubordinate commanders, an XO, and of-tentimes giving direct guidance to four co-ordinating staff officers and receiving inputfrom such personal staff as the commandsergeant major and chaplain. Organized forcombat, the commander also picks up sev-eral attachments. In the fight, at a bareminimum, he actively communicates withfour or more company commanders, his S3and XO, and, oftentimes, with his staff orattachment leaders. I believe the com-mander’s desire to have these subordi-nates achieve his intent is enough work, nomatter how much intelligence he sees onhis screens.

Another Force XXI characteristic workingagainst micromanagement is increased bat-tlespace. As I offered in the Jan-Feb 96 is-sue, a company in the defense can coverwhat used to be a battalion sector; a battal-ion, that of a brigade. Companies in the of-fense can maneuver in as wide a zone asstill allows the force to mass fires whennecessary. Although the commander cansee his entire force during any mission onhis three user-friendly screens, units mightbe so dispersed prior to the fight that at-tempting to control individual platoons be-comes too difficult a task.

While I believe CPT Bateman and CPTBrown’s submissions must serve as awarning to the force, I truly hope they areboth wrong. I also hope the inability to ef-fectively apply direct control past that fifthman and the burden of observing quantita-

tively increased battlespace keeps auftrag-staktik alive in Force XXI.

CPT MICHAEL L. PRYORHQ/1-156 ArmorLouisiana ARNG

Drawing Lessons from Combat:The Desert Is Different

Dear Sir:

I agree with Major R.D. Hooker (Letters,Jan-Feb 96) when he states that we“should be very careful” about applying thelessons learned in desert combat to all op-erational scenarios. My intent — and ap-parently I did not stress this adequately —was to apply the lessons of Desert Shield/Storm to preparing for possible future op-erations in desert or other open terrain. Ifully recognize that tanks and light infantrycan, indeed do, work well together in manykinds of terrain, as evidenced by MajorHooker’s description of the 3-325 AirborneBattalion Combat Team at the CMTC.

The above-mentioned CMTC rotation wasnoteworthy in three areas:

(1) The impressive toll inflicted on theOPFOR,

(2) The fact that 3-325 controlled twotank and two Bradley platoons,

(3) The omission of casualty figures for3-325 ABCT.

If it had been a real combat mission, withthe ABCT airdropped into an operationalarea, the (Abrams?) tanks and BradleyFighting Vehicles — because they are notcapable of LVAD delivery — would nothave been there to provide support. Whateffect would the absence of the armoredvehicles have had on the damage/casual-ties inflicted/sustained by 3-325 in theCMTC exercises?

In desert ops, dismounted infantry are atan extreme disadvantage in firepower andtact ica l mobi l i ty when fac ing an ar-mored/mechanized opponent. Even MajorHooker admits this, when he says, “weknow that we can fight heavy forces suc-cessfully in all but the most open kinds ofterrain.” I submit that a smaller force,equipped with light tanks and airbornefighting vehicles would be far more usefuland effective in such open terrain thanwould a much larger number of dismountedinfantrymen and TOW-HMMWVs.

In the desert and other open terrain, I stillfirmly believe that parachute infantry shouldhave the same degree of mobility and pro-tection as the light tanks with which theywill operate. This is not a “veiled call” formechanization — I’m stating it straight out.However, because of limited airlift capabil-ity, it is probably not practical to mechanizeevery airborne battalion, nor is it even de-sirable to do so, as there will always beplenty of scenarios where mechanizedforces are not needed.

It would be unwise to rigidly apply thelessons of desert war to all situations, butneither should we ignore what was learnedin Southwest Asia. Shouldn’t we deploy aforce best suited to the mission, enemy,and terrain, rather than simply opting forthe greatest number of parachutes that canbe dropped?

STANLEY C. CRISTSan Diego, Calif.

Information Technology and the Armored Force

Dear Sir:

Over the past few years, there has beenmuch talk about applying information tech-nology (GPS, IVIS, Paladin, etc.) to the ar-mored force and other elements of theArmy. Ironically, it has only been recently,as we create digitally-linked brigades, thatthere has been any significant discussionabout the impact of this new technology onour standard operating procedures, tactics,training, and so on. In the pages of Janu-ary-February 1996 edition of ARMOR, wehave seen both exhortations from the com-mander of the Armor Center to increase thetools in our virtual toolbag and another arti-cle in the continuing series of thoughtpieces from officers in the field (such asCPT Bateman’s article on the death ofauftragstaktik) about the possible implica-tions of digitization.

Indeed, it appears that we are goingwhere no Army has gone before. Wherecan we turn for guidance? What do thesechanges mean? How can we harnessthese new technologies and ride, as ourcavalry predecessors did, into the un-known?

There are current, real-life examples wecan draw from. Would you believe me if Isaid there is an industry that has beengrappling with information technology is-sues for 15 years? Look around. In modernoffice buildings world-wide, people in theprivate sector deal with the implications ofinformation technology everyday. Fax ma-chines, LANs, WANs, cell phones, pagers,the World Wide Web, laptop computers,email, FTP, TCP/IP, teleconferencing, client-server technology, (and the list goes on!)have made the old fashioned, pencil-and-paper way of doing business just as obso-lete as acetate and alcohol markers are tothe digitized force. As a graduate student ininformation systems (also known as com-puters, by non-technical types), an analystat an information technology consultingfirm, and part-time cavalry scout platoonleader, I’ve had the opportunity to observethese changes firsthand and consider theirimpact on soldiering in the not-so-distantfuture. Although World Wide Web home

4 ARMOR — May-June 1996

Continued on Page 47

The U.S. is moving rapidly towards atime when nothing will be as it oncewas. New organizations with leap-ahead technology that can be tailoredand deployed quickly to meet a widevariety of contingencies are soon to betested by the EXFOR at the NTC. The4th Infantry Division and the 1st Cav-alry Division now have digital systemsthat provide a relevant, common viewof the battlefield and, for the first timeever, the capability to take the initiativeeven before the enemy can move out ofhis assembly areas.

A modernization strategy is underwaythat will give the mounted force of thenext century a Future Main Battle Tank(FMBT) that will have no competitorson the battlefield, Command and Con-trol Vehicles (C2V) from which staffscan operate on the move, and FutureScout Vehicles loaded with sophisti-cated surveillance and reporting equip-ment that will allow our reconnaissanceforces to confirm what advanced targetacquisition systems have discovered.

Even our garrison operations will bedifferent. Army support processes willbe more efficient, with the focus on thecustomer, not on the process. Informa-tion will move through fiber optics andto multiple locations as we begin usingdistance-learning techniques. Trainingwill be structured and tailored to meetthe specific needs of each unit. Train-ing programs will permit units to usevirtual and constructive simulations to

achieve competence before advancingto live training. Change is upon us, andwe must deal with it.

This is a particularly stressful time forthe Army and the mounted force. Thereis much uncertainty, seemingly toomany tasks to accomplish with notenough people and money, and there isthe constant infusion of new technol-ogy with which we all must cope.While often infuriating and frustrating,the corporate Army seems to be fo-cused on the future when the problemsof today are consuming us. We allknow that we must go through the pre-sent to get to the future, but thereseems to be no clear path to follow.

Some of us have been there before. Inthe middle Sixties, when the Army pri-ority was in Vietnam, those who servedin Europe knew about running a tankbattalion with twelve officers — onelieutenant colonel, two warrants, andnine lieutenants. Company command-ers were second lieutenants, staff ser-geants were platoon leaders, and ifyour company was lucky, you had asergeant first class as a first sergeant.

In those days, the missions were thesame as before the drawdown for Viet-nam. Monthly alerts required units toclear their kasernes and be on the roadto the border within two hours. Aninety percent operational readinessrate was still the standard, even thoughgetting parts was a problem. In someunits, tanks were put into administra-

tive storage because there weren’tenough crewmen to man them. Eachofficer had twenty-five or thirty addi-tional duties: trial and defense counsel,vector control officer, ammunition offi-cer and pay officer (when we actuallyhanded over cash to each soldier at payday) and others. We all worked hardand spent long hours making up for theshortages in manpower, parts, and dol-lars. In the midst of these hard days,however, we all realized that thingswould get better.

We are at a similar crossroad today,with one possible exception: barring alarge-scale war of some kind, endstrength and budgets probably will notincrease as the United States seeksways to move more efficiently into thenext century. We will have to find waysto accommodate the change brought onby new weapons, new technology, neworganizations, and new missions, withinexisting manpower and budget con-straints. We have no other alternative.We must accommodate change or be-come irrelevant. We will have to dealwith the world as it is, not as we wishit to be.

It seems to me we have two choices indealing with change. We can gird our-selves against defeat, or we can planfor victory. To gird against defeat is notto change. It is a wish for things to beother than they are. It is remembering

COMMANDER’S HATCH

Plan For Success or Gird Against Defeat

MG Lon E. Maggart Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center


Continued on Page 6

The Armor Center and School Functional Organization

FORT KNOX

In order to accommodate change and prepare for the future, the Armor Center and School has completed a fundamental reorganization of functions. The directory on the opposite page describes both the organization and a telephone point of contact from a functional viewpoint.

Commander's Hatch (continued from Page 5)

how good times were in the past. It is embodied in that phrase, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Girding against defeat is to take the risks. It is reliance on hope as a method that, somehow, if we just stick to the ways that made us successful in the past, everything will work out for the future. Girding against defeat is admitting failure.

Planning for success, on the other hand, is to deal with the world as it is. No amount of wishing will get us a larger budget, more people, or fewer deployments. It is taking the long-range view, setting the conditions for future success today. It is building a strategic plan and carefully managing finances even beyond the POM years. It is making a plan, gaining consensus that the plan is about right, and then following the plan. It is making bold organizational and process changes to achieve efficiencies, if such measures are necessary. It is a realization that planning for success is a mindset that says, "If things can be done better, then why not?"

Planning for success also applies in the management of our careers. Officers who are not picked for resident CGSC are girding against defeat if they

6

don't enroll themselves in the correspondence course. Failure to achieve MEL 4 status is a sure-fire way to miss the next promotion. Failure to get branch-qualified is another quick route to missing the promotion list. Annor officers who homestead, or accept the same kind of jobs repetitively, or who take easy jobs, are girding against defeat. None of us can afford to stay in jobs we are comfortable with and still grow intellectually or experientially.

There is no question that our Annor Branch is the best in the business. They also work very hard to make sure each of you gets a fair shot at branch qualification and schools. However, Annor Branch does not decide the priority against which officers are assigned. They assign officers and NCOs based on where they can best meet the needs of the Anny in a changing environment. Your job is to work to your full potential in whatever duty you are assigned.

There are a couple of other things you can do to help yourself. Get the photographs in your file updated. Keep in touch with Annor Branch. Let them know your address, phone number, and what you would prefer for your next

job, and tell them how it will enable your professional growth. The assignment officers at Annor Branch will do their best to match your desires with the needs of the Anny. Spend a little time to truly evaluate your strengths and weaknesses so that you can help determine for yourself how you need to continue to grow professionally and intellectually. Seek employment in those jobs that will help you progress. Write letters to the commanders of units where you are about to be assigned, so they know you are coming and what you would like to do. Keep current on what is happening in the branch and in the Anny at large. Get yourself enrolled in courses, especially CGSC if you haven't been selected to attend the resident course. Look for ways to contribute.

Finally, you need to know that your leaders are working to make the Anny school and assignments systems match the demands that are being made on you and your families. And we will get it about right. In the meantime, try to look at change as a challenge, not as an impediment. These are precisely the times for Annor and Cavalry soldiers. Intellect, innovation, creativity, perseverance, and courage will win the day.


-

U.S. Army Armor Center and School DSN 464-

Commercial (502) 624-

Office of the Commanding General 4-2121

• Chief of Staff, USAARMC ................................................. 4-110 I

• Annor Center CSM ............................................................. 4-4952.

• Secretary of the General Staff ............................................ .4-1102

• Planning Group ................................................................... 4-2886

Armor Awards and Activities • Editor, Annor Magazine ........ 4-2249 • Draper Award ........................ .4-1439 • Kouma Award ............... 4-1736/4462 • Franks Award ....................... ..4-8878 • SI. George/Joan 0' Arcl

Noble Patron of Annor. ...... 942-8624 • AnnorTrainerUpdate ........... .4-1315 • Annor Conference .................. 4-8878 • Annor Association ............. 942-8624

Armor Course Management • Anny Training Requirement and

Resources System (ATRRS) .. 4-3585

• Training Requirement Analysis System (TRAS)

Officer ............................... .4-2004 Enlisted .............................. 4-2096

• Inti Students (lMSO) ............. .4-3055

Armor Proponent • Issues/Policy .......................... 4-5155

• Excellence in Annor Mgmt. .. 4-5155

• Annor Hotline .................... 4-TANK

• Annor Hotloop ............. .4-4913/3446

Armor Research and Reference • Annor School Library .. .4-6820/623I

• Patton Museum ..................... .4-3812

• Annor Magazine .................... 4-2249

• Cultural Resource Mgr. .......... 4-1495

• Annor TV Branch .................. 4-3932

• Anny Research Institute .... .4-3450/6928 (Annored Force Research Unit)

Doctrine • Director, TnglDoctrine Dev .. .4-8247 • Crew/Gunnery ....................... .4-1736

• PL T/COITM ......................... ..4-3228

• BNITFIBDE ........................... 4-2328

• Cavalry ................................. ..4-6235

• CS/CSS .................................. .4-5108

Force Development • Director, Force Development.. ....... .4-5050

Future Annor Systems ...... .4-8994/6152

Future Tank Systems ........ .4-441211250

Cay and Scout Issues ........ .4-880218668

• Battle Cmd and C41... ........... .4-149111323

• Science, Technology, and Programs ....................... ..4-8064/1587

• Annor Organizations ............. 4-4526/6714

• Intell and Threat Sys ............ .4-756317686

• Force Designl Documentation ....................... 4-628213914

Foreign Military Sales/Asst • Foreign Military Sales

Training Office (FMSTO) ...... 4-559I

Initial Entry Training • CDR, 1st Annor Tng Bde ................. .4-6843

• Basic Combat Training ............. 4-1646/5053

• Advanced Individual Tng 45163 Series AI-Qurain (M IA2 CrewlMaint Tng) One Station Unit Training (OSUT) 19K Recovery Training ASI H8 .............................................. .4-791 0

• OSUT 190 ......................................... 4-1012

Liaison Activities • British LO ............................. .4-6451

• Canadian LO ......................... .4-7047

• French LO ............................. .4-6148

• Gennan LO ........................... .4-7045

• Italian LO ............................... 4-6253

• OSACG-ARNG ..................... 4-1315

• Air Force LO .......................... 4-3150

• Marine Corps Detachment CDR ....................................... 4-5950

Mounted Maneuver Battle Lab

Office of the Deputy Commanding General 4-7555

• Chief of Staff, USAARMS ............................. .4-1050 Annor School CSM ........................................ .4-7091 Operations ....................................................... .4-8879 Advanced Warfighting Working Group ......... .4-7699

Officer/Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Instruction

• CDR, 16th Cay Regt... ............................ .4-7848

• Commandant, NCO Academy ................ .4-5150

• Annor Officer Basic (AOB) Course Scout Platoon Leader Course (SPLC) ..... .4-6654

• Annor Officer Advanced Course (AOAC) ..... .4-5855

• Pre Command Course (PCC) ................... 4-5014

• CA V Leader Course ................................. 4-3154

• BN Motor Officer Course ........................ 4-511O

• Sr. Officer Logistic Mgmt Course .......... .4-7133

• Master Gunner ........................................ .4-8530

• Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) ... 4-4117

• PLT Gunnery Trainer (PGT) ................... .4-1571

• MIAI Tank Cdrs Course ......................... 4-2540

• MIA2 Tank Cdrs Course ......................... 4-6504

• Primary Leadership Dev Course (PLDC)4-4354

• Basic NCO Course (BNCOC) ................. .4-6580

• Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC) .......... 4-8563

Training Development • Director, TngIDoctrine Dev .. .4-8247

• Chief, Tng Div ....................... 4-1978

• Systems ................................. .4-5656

• Task Analysis ........................ .4-8568

• Training Strategies ................. 4-2505

• Force XXI Tng Program ........ 4-6806

• Course Design ....................... .4-4913

Correspondence Course ................. ..4-7468

Distributed Leaming ............ 4-49 13/3446

• Training Evaluations .............. 4-3446

TRADOC System Managers • TSM Tank! AGS ..................... 4-7955

• TSM Force XXI

4th ID Support ...... .... 4-662118224

1st CD Support ......... 4-8980/3287

FXXI Training Program .................... 4-6806/8756

• Close Combat Tactical Trainer Project Office .. , ......... 4-1600

Unit Training Support • Chief .............................................................. 4-7809 • SIMNET Observer/Controller Team

• Mounted Battlespace FXXI Experiments ...... 4-2339

• Mounted Warfare Test Bed ........................ 942-1092

• Force XXI User Laboratory .......................... .4-1974

(y{arthogs) ........................................................ 4-7558

• Office of the Special Assistant to the Commanding General, Army National Guard (OSACG-ARNG) .............................................. 4-1315

SGM Spurling was absolutely right inhis letter to the editor in the January-February 1996 issue of ARMOR —“Once a Master Gunner, Always aMaster Gunner.” There are 292 mastergunner positions in the Army, in gradesof SFC through SGM, with six of thosepositions in the grade of SGM. Thisnumber will increase to 303 in FY 97,with the number of SGM positions re-maining the same. Once you have beenaccepted as a master gunner, you havethe responsibility to maintain your pro-ficiency, regardless of your assign-ments. You are the best of the best, thecommander’s top gun, and are respon-sible to train soldiers in the most effi-cient way to deal death and destructionon the battlefield. Getting to be a mas-ter gunner hasn’t been easy or cheap.

To be selected, you had to have beenan experienced tank commander. Thatexperience did not come from just theOSUT training you received at FortKnox. It came from studying on yourown and the maintenance and gunnerytraining you received at unit level.

Then you were screened by the chainof command and personally inter-viewed to determine if your were theright soldier for the job. Finally, youarrived at Fort Knox to be trained.Eleven weeks and $28,128 trainingdollars later, you picked up the addi-tional skill identifier (ASI) of mastergunner. This marked the point wherethe responsibility for remaining currentshifted from the schoolhouse to you.

It would be a shame to squander theconsiderable time and money investedin your training. In these days of de-creasing dollars, the Army must de-pend on those already trained to fillcritical positions throughout the force.You must take the time to study theAbrams tank gunnery manual, FM 17-12-1-1/2, and the Abrams technicalmanuals. Stay in touch with new tankdevelopments, training devices, andsimulators through ARMOR or PMMagazine, just to name a couple. Themaster gunner branch at Fort Knox willalways assist you by providing updatedinformation on gunnery-related skills

while you are detailed outside the mas-ter gunner arena. If a new piece ofequipment is fielded, you can return toFort Knox for the necessary upgradetraining. The opportunities are there; allthat is necessary is your willingness toaccept them.

In short, when you accepted the ASIof master gunner you accepted the life-long commitment SGM Spurling de-scribed. There is no badge or extramoney, but there is the satisfaction ofknowing you taught soldiers to survivein combat. That is the essence of whatwe as noncommissioned officers dobest, and master gunners have the addi-tional training to do it better. No onetwisted your arm to become a mastergunner; it also helped you get pro-moted. The least you can do is staycurrent. The Army saw something spe-cial in you to train you as a mastergunner. It is imperative that you main-tain that cutting edge. Remember, oncea master gunner, always a master gun-ner!

CSM Ronnie W. Davis Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Once a Master Gunner,Always a Master Gunner


The purpose of this article is to exam-ine the capabilities and limitations ofarmor and cavalry in Bosnia within theNATO alliance. This article is focusedon Task Force Eagle, including attach-ments from other countries. In additionto the U.S. 1st Armored Division (mi-nus the 3rd Bde), the task force in-cludes a Swedish battalion (SWEBAT),a Russian airborne brigade, and a Turk-ish battalion.

Armored Vehicles Available

Armor within TF Eagle includes awide variety of equipment, includingU.S. M1A1 Abrams tanks, M2 and M3Bradley infantry and cavalry fightingvehicles, M113 APCs, M-109A6 155mm(Paladin) howitzers; Russian BTR-808x8 wheeled troop carriers and BMD-2airborne assault vehicles; Danish Leop-ard 1A3 tanks (attached to SWEBAT);Swedish BV-206S armored articulatedall terrain APCs, Pbv-302 APCs; andFinnish SISU XA-180 6x6 APCs.

Terrain and Road Net

Fundamental to any discussion of ar-mor and cavalry operations is a com-plete understanding of the terrain androad network in which they must oper-ate. The former Yugoslavia is predomi-nately a mountainous and hilly country.Elevations range from almost 2,900meters above sea level at the highestpeak in the northwest to sea level onthe Adriatic coast. The former Yugosla-via can be divided into the followingthree landform divisions: the northern

plains, the interior highlands, and theAdriatic coastal region.

The northern plains total about 20percent of the land area. This landformcomprises the river valleys of the mid-dle and lower Drava, the lower andmiddle Sava, the lower Tisa, and themiddle Danube. It is bordered in thesouth and west by the interior high-lands and continues north into Hungaryand Romania.

Terrain and Weather Effects

The mountains, steep hills, and roughkarst topography that cover 70 to 80percent of the country have a profoundeffect on military activities. Cross-country movement of wheeled andtracked vehicles is almost impossible inthese areas. In the northern plains andin the valleys adjacent to dissected hillsin the east, movement is feasible all ormost of the year. Vehicular movement,in general, would be easier in summerand autumn than it would be in winterand early spring when the ground issoft and wet.

Most of the roads in the former Yugo-slavia’s highway system are asphaltsurfaced, have numerous bridges, andtraverse rough terrain. City streets, aswell as more remote area roads, typi-cally have uneven or broken surfacesof cobblestone, tar, or gravel. Currentconditions of these roads are poor forthe most part. By 1989, the highwaysystem totaled 123,000 km of roads.Included are the 871 km major high-way (Route 1), 73,527 km of asphalt-

surfaced roads, 33,663 km of mac-adam-surfaced roads, and 15,133 km ofearthen roads. Most areas of the coun-try are accessible via modern asphaltedroads. All the primary routes have nu-merous bridges that cross small to largestreams. In some of the mountainousareas, bridges are easily washed out.These significant obstacles are difficultor impossible to bypass because ofrough terrain.

Preparation For Trip to Bosnia

In October 1995, I visited LTG JohnAbrams, CG, V Corps, in Heidelberg,Germany, and briefed him on recentevents in Korea regarding the 2d Infan-try Division, which he commandedprior to assuming command of VCorps. While in Korea, GeneralAbrams directed a staff study on thelimitations of High Mobility Multipur-pose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) inmountainous terrain. The 2d ID staffconcluded that it needed about 200 BV-206S (armored version of the U.S.Army’s M973A1 small unit support ve-hicle) to replace HMMWVs in scoutplatoons of maneuver battalions, lightinfantry battalions, a signal battalion,an MI battalion, and an air defense bat-talion.

I suggested to General Abrams thatBV-206S vehicles might also be usefulin Bosnia’s mountainous terrain. In No-vember, I was asked by the V CorpsForce Modernization Officer, LTC RonBaynes, to formulate an organizationaland operational (O&O) plan for em-ploying BV-206S vehicles in the 1st

BOSNIAREPORTTask Force Eagle’sArmor and CavalryOperations in Bosnia

by Colonel Charles Lehner, Ret.LT Parnell and SFC Frederickson of B Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cav with newlyacquired M973A1 SUSV. The Swedish articulated vehicle and the RussianBMD-2, both under 8 tons, are well suited to Bosnia’s limited road net.


Armored Division for their upcomingdeployment to Bosnia. I was told bythe Swedish Embassy in Washingtonthat only 17 BV-206S vehicles couldbe made available to meet the deploy-ment of TF Eagle in December orJanuary. I felt that all 17 BV-206S ve-hicles should be in one provisional cav-alry troop so that a single commanderwould be responsible for training,maintenance, and logistic support. Thisdid not preclude detaching scoutsquads or sections to other units asneeded. I suggested that the cavalrytroop be manned by the crews of sometanks left behind in Germany. TheO&O concept was prepared and coor-dinated in December, with BG James P.(Pat) O’Neal, 1st AD ADC-Support inBad Kreuznach; COL John Batiste,Cdr, 2d Bde in Baumholder; and LTCTony Harriman, Cdr, 3d Squadron, 4thCavalry in Schweinfurt, whose squad-ron was detached from the 3d InfantryDivision and attached to the 2d Bri-gade of the 1st AD for TF Eagle. TheO&O plan was well received and BGO’Neal said that all 17 BV-206S vehi-cles could be employed by the 2d Bri-gade, the unit assigned to cover themountainous terrain south and east ofTuzla. However, when MG Nash, CG,1st AD, reviewed the plan, he felt thathe could not justify the expense ofbuying 17 BV-206S vehicles fromSweden; instead, he decided to requisi-tion 20 M973A1 SUSVs (unarmoredversions of the BV-206S) from U.S.Army stocks in Italy.

These visits with the 1st Armored Di-vision enabled me to understand TFEagle’s upcoming mission in Bosniaand review the extensive training andpreparation prior to deployment. I alsoconducted extensive research with theelements of the Swedish brigade, whohave been operating in Bosnia andMacedonia for the past few years.Colonel Jan-G Isberg, former com-mander of the 1st Nordic Battalion,stated in his report dated February 15,1994: “We were entirely dependent onthe BV-206 to supply the positions, pa-trol the borders and to reconnoiter pa-trol tracks and locations for additionalpositions. All our BV-206 were ex-

posed to heavy strain, both in stonyand very rocky terrain in valleys andalong steep mountainsides, where othertypes of vehicles could not pass at anytime of the year. The BV-206 came upto all expectations. Thanks to them wewere able to keep the operation run-ning, and at no time we had to de-crease our ambitions with the missionin spite of the extremely difficult ter-rain.”

Operations in Bosnia

The entire area of TF Eagle was pre-viously the responsibility of the Swed-ish battalion, which now is responsiblefor only the NW sector of TF Eagle(see map, above). I stayed with theSwedes from 14 to 19 March 1996 andwas accompanied in my travels byMAJ Claes Wolgast, Deputy Chief ofStaff SWEBAT, and LT ChristofReychman, interpreter. I was impressedby the professional capabilities of theSwedes and their extensive knowledgeof Bosnia.

As the Germans found out in WorldWar II, TF Eagle also knows that Bos-nia is not ideal “tank country.” How-ever, the decision to send the 1st Ar-mored Division to Bosnia, rather thanan infantry or mechanized infantry di-

vision, has had a profound effect. Theawesome presence of a reinforced ar-mored division can leave little doubt inthe minds of the Serbians, Croatians,and Bosnians that the United States andits NATO allies mean business in im-plementing the Dayton Agreement. Aplatoon of Abrams tanks and Bradleyfighting vehicles at a checkpoint is astrong reminder of the hundreds morethat are also quite visible in the campsof the 1st Armored Division. There aresome areas of Bosnia that are more likeclassic “tank country,” such as the criti-cal Posavina corridor in the 1st Bri-gade’s sector. However, mud can be areal problem even in this relatively flatarea.

M1A1 tanks with mine rollers haveproved their worth in clearing roads ofdeadly antitank mines. Mine rollertanks could have prevented the seriousaccident which happened to the Danishtank company in the Swedish sector.This was a unique mine encounter inwhich three TMM-1 antitank mines,connected with detonating cord, wentoff simultaneously under a Leopard-1tank. The bottom photo on Page 45shows a road wheel arm sheared off byone of the mines.



The M1A2 main battle tank, the latestproduct-improved version of theArmy’s premier ground combat system,is at the forefront of the Army’s mod-ernization efforts. Such planning is im-perative, especially in today’s era of di-minished funding for research and de-velopment of completely new systems.This reality, and the uncertain state ofthe Threat, means that the M1-seriestanks may very well equip the majorityof the Army’s armor and armored cav-alry units well into the 21st century.

The perception of a reduced foreigntank threat makes it difficult to justify acompletely new tank system anytimesoon. Thus, a prudent course in light ofthis situation — and given likely up-grades of foreign tanks with currenttechnology and their sales to potentialthreat nations — is to plan for uncer-tainty and maximize options by up-grading the existing M1 fleet. This willboth improve a known high capabilityand leverage the soldier’s trust and fa-miliarity with a proven operational sys-tem.

This article provides a view of theM1 modernization program by sketch-ing its progress, giving an overview ofthe M1A2 (the vehicle currently beingfielded), detailing plans for a bold Sys-tem Enhancement Program (SEP)product improvement, and providingforecasts for even further upgrades, alldesigned to integrate the latest tech-nologies. The chief goal is to ensurethe M1 overmatches all possible threatvehicles, thereby maximizing our sol-diers’ chances for victory in the future.

Progress

The M1 tank, entered service in theearly 1980s, the first successful U.S.tank development program since thelate 1950s. It represented a dramaticadvance over the M60-series tankswhich, throughout the 1960s and 70s,had been seriously overmatched byThreat vehicles like the Soviet T-64and T-72. Although durable, lethal, andbattle-proven in the Arab-Israeli Warsof 1967 and 1973, the M60 was vul-nerable to antitank guided missiles(ATGM) — including those carried by

infantrymen — as well as conventionaltank and antitank gun kinetic energy(KE) threats.

During M1 Abrams development, thepredominant design priority was crewsurvivability. The design countered theThreat by providing the soldier withsignificant improvements in armor pro-tection, crew survivability, fire control,and mobility. Its most significant singleenhancement, special armor that waseffective against both KE and chemicalenergy (CE) rounds, provided excellentprotection against many Threat directfire weapons at various angles and


The M1A2:Current and Future Program Plans

by Wes Glasgow, Colonel Christopher Cardine, and David Latson

Figure 1

ranges. Throughout the program, thedevelopment of the armor package hasproceeded apart from the tank itself,and later incremental improvements inarmor and suspension were added tothe last few vehicles of the M1 produc-tion run, which became known as theImproved M1 or simply the IPM1.

The first major vehicle block productupgrade, the M1A1, added a morepowerful weapon system, the 120mmM256 smoothbore cannon, again im-proved the armor package, added anon-board positive pressure NBC sys-tem, and included a more durable track.The M1A1, produced in greater quanti-ties than any other variant of the M1series, equips the majority of thefielded U.S. armor and armored cavalryunits. It is the tank equipping the armorunits that deployed to the NATOpeacekeeping mission in Bosnia.

The second major block product up-grade, designated the M1A2, representsa significant technological shift (Fig.1). It incorporates a massive investmentin digitization in its on-board systems,all aimed at improving the reliability,fightability, and operational capabilityof the tank. Reliability is improvedthrough the use of integrated circuitsand greater reliance on built-in diag-

nostic capabilities. Operations and fight-ability are enhanced through advancesin battle management, fire control, sur-vivability, maintainability, and support-ability. The M1A2 is beginning itsfielding now, and will principally equipthe highest priority armored unitsworldwide.

M1A2 Highlights

The M1A2 represents a major techno-logical advance, due to its extensiveuse of digital electronics and micro-processor control. The core electronicarchitecture of the system is the back-bone of the tank. The system utilizes ahigh-speed MIL-STD-1553B data buswith a sophisticated system integrationpackage for transmitting digital infor-mation and commands throughout thetank. Electronic sensors and systemsimprove driving, target identification,and information flow between the com-puter-driven subsystems and the crew,as well as with the Inter-Vehicular In-formation System (IVIS) that linkstanks and other combat elements. Thecommander, gunner, and driver havenew displays. The scope of thesechanges is remarkable when one real-izes that, in the previous generation

M1A1, the Army has a tank that isabout 10% digital and 90% analog.With the M1A2, the proportion is re-versed, with 90% being digital andonly about 10% analog.

Lethality and fightability are im-proved with enhancements to target ac-quisition and fire control. The Com-mander’s Independent Thermal Viewer(CITV) gives him a 360-degree, all-weather, day-night, target surveillancesystem that allows the commander andgunner to act as a “hunter-killer” team.The commander searches for targetswhile the gunner engages a completelyseparate target. When the gunner firesthe weapon, the commander can then“hand-off” a new target to the gunnerwith the push of a button. This capabil-ity greatly enhances the potential le-thality of the system and measurablyimproves the engagement speed of thetank, getting multiple, accurate roundsdown range. This is often the mostcritical factor in tank survivability onthe battlefield.

The IVIS capability dramatically im-proves command and control in battlesituations. The IVIS processes key in-formation at the commander’s controlthrough an integrated, gridded mappingsystem of the area of operations. The


Figure 2

IVIS displays the locations of enemyand friendly vehicles, displays selectedtransmitted reports, and provides cur-rent status and diagnostics of key sys-tems. These features alleviate sometiresome administrative tasks, whileenabling vehicle and force commandersto better understand the battlefield situ-ation. Knowledge of the precise statusof friendly and enemy units will sig-nificantly aid the commander’s abilityto make rapid and correct tactical deci-sions.

IVIS is augmented by a PositionNavigation (POS/NAV) system which,through the Commander’s and Driver’sIntegrated Displays (CID and DID),displays vehicle position and headingreferences to both the commander anddriver. The CID reduces the com-mander’s previously burdensome andtime-consuming navigational tasks andgreatly improves overall situationalawareness. For the driver, this capabil-ity enables him to move from point topoint on the battlefield without con-stant direction from the commander,while the system’s all-weather capabil-ity allows him to concentrate on correcttactical movements without constantreference to maps or key terrain fea-tures.

Improved weapons sights and stationsalso enhance survivability. The gun-ner’s sight includes azimuth stabiliza-tion. The dual-axis stabilization greatlyenhances target acquisition and targettracking functions, especially while onthe move. The Commander’s Inde-pendent Thermal Viewer increases hisfield of view to a nearly continuous360 degrees to aid in target detection.Improved sight armor enhances surviv-ability of these critical components.Other survivability advances includeredundancy of electronic processors inthe hull and turret and the dual redun-dant 1553 and 485 data/utility busses.

Supportability enhancements stemprincipally from the high commonalityof components in the core electronicssystem. The extensive collection ofSimplified Test Equipment (STE) re-quired for the M1A1’s on-vehicle diag-nostics has been eliminated by built-intest and diagnostics capabilities. Thesoftware not only enables the crew todetermine and isolate faults, but canautomatically reconfigure the hardwareto give the crew the highest level of re-sidual functionality possible in light ofthe fault conditions. The crew and me-

chanics can initiate fault isolation teststo isolate faulty Line Replaceable Units(LRUs) so as to permit rapid repair bycomponent replacement, and restora-tion to battle-ready condition.

Additional improvements have beenadded for special purposes and/or insupport of export/joint vehicle pro-grams. For example, a Mine ClearingBlade System can provide rapid and in-dependent breach of simple minefields.For export to the Kingdom of SaudiArabia and Kuwait, the tanks includeslight modifications to their core elec-tronics to interface with compatible in-tercom and radio systems in thosearmed forces. Additionally, the Saudiand Kuwaiti M1A2s are dual-languagecapable and display all information ineither English or Arabic.

The M1A2 represents a major successas an acquisition program, especially sowith respect to the major improvementin digitization. What other program, es-pecially one as revolutionary as theM1A2, can boast of a Milestone II de-cision in December 1988 with a firstprototype delivered in 1992, an InitialOperational Test and Experimentation(IOTE) in 1993, a MS III decision inApril 1994, and a First Unit Equippedin 1995? These accomplishments areespecially significant since the tank isthe flagship ground digital platformand has also been represented in nearlyevery Army Warfighting Experiment(AWE) to date.

Overall, the M1A2 improvementsprovide a radical change in capabilityand present a unique opportunity. Thedigital capability enhances the vehicle’sperformance on the battlefield to per-mit it to overmatch any known compa-rable tank, both operationally with re-spect to situational awareness, and tac-tically with respect to lethality and per-formance. However, the potentiality forfuture growth holds even greater prom-ise. The M1A2 user community andproject office will begin to exploit thispotential capability through implemen-tation of the M1A2 System Enhance-ment Program (SEP).

M1A2 SEP Overview

The M1A2 SEP was a direct out-growth of discussions and plans at theM1A2 Milestone III review in April1994 to keep the M1A2 in step with aheavy emphasis on digitization experi-

ments under the AWE or Force XXI.These concepts are designed to moldArmy doctrine and modernization to-ward the vision of a future digitizedbattlefield. Additionally, the constantadvance of both microprocessor andmemory capacity require regular com-puter hardware upgrades.

The SEP improvements focus onmodifications to the computer core thatare necessary to accept Army com-mand and control software and operat-ing standards, also known as the Com-mon Operating Environment (COE).Yet they will have minimal impact onintra-vehicle software and standardswhich run individual vehicle compo-nents. These intra-vehicle systemsshould infrequently require new soft-ware code, certainly less often than theCommand and Control or COE soft-ware. The improvements involve bothextensive hardware and software en-hancements (see Figure 2).

The most significant hardware im-provements include the second-genera-tion Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)in both sights, the Enhanced PositionLocating Reporting System (EPLRS), aGlobal Positioning System (GPS) toenhance the positioning and navigation(POS/NAV) system, an integrated un-der-armor power/cooling system tomitigate power consumption and elec-tronics heat, enhanced memory anddisplay components, and interfaces forthe separately developed BattlefieldCombat Identification System (BCIS),and Multi-Purpose Integrated ChemicalAgent Detector (MICAD).

The major objective, however, is toprovide for the assimilation of futureelectronic upgrades, including the Army’sobjective digitized command and con-trol software COE. The SEP programwill prepare for the acceptance of theForce XXI Battle Command Brigadeand Below (FBCB2) software by incor-porating better data processors, morememory capacity, better soldier-ma-chine interfaces with adequate backuppower, and cooling capability. The SEPallows for acceptance of that portion ofthe COE that affects inter-vehicle or in-ter-platform operations. The operationsthat affect only the activities within theinternal vehicle systems can be carriedon separately. This concept, a form ofdistributed architecture, is a critical fea-ture in holding cost and complexitydown. It means that software develop-ment of internal systems which, once


proven, will remain relatively robust.The architecture will be less affected, ifat all, by different versions of inter-ve-hicle software, which will frequentlychange as new functionality and coor-dination is desired between vehiclesand combat elements of the force.

The Under Armor Auxiliary PowerUnit (UAAPU) is a key SEP compo-nent because of the power requirementsof digitization. When the main engineis shut down, these new functions willrequire more power than can be sus-tained for long using on-board batter-ies. The UAAPU will provide electricalpower during silent watch and will re-charge the vehicle batteries with theengine shut down. The system canbleed air to the NBC overpressure sys-tem and will reduce the main engineoperating hours and associated highfuel consumption. This will yield sav-ings in operations costs and reduce en-gine wear and fuel consumption whileincreasing net operational range. It alsoprovides power for the electronicscooling unit which reduces heat in thecrew compartment, thus increasingelectronic module reliability.

The second-generation FLIR systemenhances the capability and reliabilityof the M1A2 in night and reduced visi-bility. In addition to improved visibility,the SEP/second-generation FLIR willupgrade and replace current hardwareand software.

The current plan is to produce andtest prototype tanks with SEP equip-ment installed. Upon approval, the en-tire fleet of 1,079 M1A2s will be fitted

with the SEP equipment. A productionEngineering Change Proposal (ECP)will be implemented for those tanksproduced after FY 1999. Beginning in2000, the retrofitting of already fieldedM1A2s via a Modification Work Order(MWO) will start (see Figure 3).

The M1A2 SEP program does not ex-haust the planned improvements thatare available to keep the M1A2 cur-rent. Pre-Planned Product Improve-ments (P3I) further enhance the tank,but loom farther out on the horizonpast the final application of the SEPimprovements. However, there is cur-rently no funding in the Abrams pro-gram for product improvements beyondthe SEP ).

Most of the additional improvementsinvolve more advanced technologies,such as: digital processing of the sec-ond-generation FLIR sensor data foradvanced functions (auto target track-ing, target recognition, cueing, etc.),embedded training, helmet-mountedheads-up displays, and an integratedcombat protection systems designed toautomatically counter incoming threatprojectiles and missiles.

Several of these refinements and tech-nologies may mature early and befunded as a future P3I ECP/MWOwithin the production run of the M1A2.The key is that the bulk of the electri-cal and computational power and inter-face requirements will have alreadybeen built into the tank as a part of theSEP improvements and can helpsmooth the integration of these items.

The M1A2 P3I program will remainin a good position to maximize thedigitization developments that are theoutgrowth of the Army WarfightingExperiments. The key is an architecturethat is rapidly adaptable to changing re-quirements, Threat capabilities, andemerging technologies. The M1A2 isjust such a system, and is designed toleverage and interface with the othermembers of the combined arms team.As the foremost digital platform, theM1A2 will continue to lead the digiti-zation effort through application oftechnology and will practically demon-strate which digital revolutionary con-cepts are doable.

The Future

The M1A2 will be the Army’s pre-mier combat fighting vehicle throughthe foreseeable future. It is, and will re-main, the only digital weapons plat-form that can survive on the closecombat battlefield. Funding realitiesand the force structure, however, willdictate that not all units will receive theM1A2, nor will it be beneficial to doso, since many units will remain in theforce structure that are not digitized orare equipped with a range of less inte-grated digital appliqué elements. Unitsbelow Force Package I will predomi-nantly continue to be equipped with theM1A1; however, even some M1s willremain. Figure 4 shows this situation.

Once systems are fielded, however,the story does not end. The Abrams In-tegrated Management XXI (AIM XXI)


Figure 3

program is designed to maximize effi-ciencies through teaming of govern-ment and industry agencies to performintensive management based upon theircore competencies. The team willevaluate every facet of the program tosustain the fleet at minimal costs, whileseizing opportunities to reduce man-agement overhead and attaining opera-tions and support cost reductionsthrough component and process re-en-gineering.

The story of digitization will ulti-mately be developed by soldiers whowill live, breathe and function digitallyon the battlefield, both in warfightingexperiments and day-to-day operation.The daunting challenge is to providethe facilities to undertake and supportthat capability so that the soldier canstretch his imagination to take digitaldoctrine and tactics to the highest lev-els of performance and, over time, de-velop the real potential of this newtechnology.

The tactical level of war in the digitalenvironment promises a tremendouspayoff in speed, battlefield dynamics,and flexibility. This promise is achiev-able only by freeing the soldier of rou-tine, non-critical tasks and allowinghim to focus on the tasks that are criti-cal for success.

The digital applications and subsys-tems on the M1A2 are true pathfindersin these areas. The soldier will deter-mine the true worth and utility of digit-ized operations and will find the things

no one has thought of before. Those re-sults may lead Army efforts in com-pletely new and uncharted directions.

The M1A2 program is ready to makethose adjustments with a dynamic ar-chitecture that is structured for change.

Figure 4


Wes Glasgow is employed asa military equipment analyst andtechnical writer with CamberCorporation, headquarterd inHuntsville, Ala., with offices inWarren, Mich. He served in theU.S. Army from 1973-1993 as afield artillery officer with troopassignments at Ft. Riley, Ft. Sill,Germany, and Korea. He trainedas a research, development,and acquisition specialist withassignments as an operationaltester at Ft. Sill and materiel de-veloper at the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and ArmamentsCommand in Warren, Mich.

Colonel Christopher V. Cardinewas commissioned in armor af-ter graduation from the U.S.Military Academy in 1971. Hiscareer assignments include cav-alry platoon leader and troopXO, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry,3d ID; BMO, tank companycommander, and operations offi-cer, 2-77 Armor, 9th ID; Test Of-ficer and Product Manager for

Automatic Test Equipment, Pro-ject Manager’s Office, BradleyFighting Vehicles; staff officer,G3 Operations, V Corps; squad-ron XO, 3d Squadron, 11thACR; a member of the Ar-mor/Anti-Armor and HeavyForces Modernization SpecialTask Forces, the Pentagon;commander, 3-68 Armor, 4th ID;and Product Manager of theM2/M3 Bradley Fighting VehicleSystem. He is currently servingas Project Manager, AbramsTank System.

David M. Latson holds a BS inmechanical engineering fromMichigan State University. Hehas worked for the governmentas a mechanical engineer, R&DSystems; Chief, Tech. Manage-ment Division, Project Manager,M113 FOV; and Chief, Tech.Management Division, ProgramManager, Light Combat Vehi-cles. He is currently Deputy Pro-gram Manager, Abrams TankSystems.

Fort Hood is not alone in fielding theM1A2 main battle tank. Since Octoberof 1994, selected units of the RoyalSaudi Land Forces (RSLF) ArmorCorps have fielded the M1A2 tank andexecuted New Equipment Training(NET). Observations from this effortand lessons learned from NET offersome valuable insights for our armyinto the warfighting capabilities of theM1A2. My general intent is to sharethese observations in hopes that a com-parison of these findings with the FortHood effort will produce a synthesis ofideas, not only to enrich the NET proc-ess in both locations, but also to en-hance post-NET training. In addition, Iwill offer some viewpoints on thelarger issues of training, doctrine, anddigitization as it affects the U.S. Army,predicated upon my training observa-tions.

Articles in ARMOR throughout 1995have also addressed the issues of digiti-zation and the capabilities of theM1A2, much to the authors’ credit. Myspecific purpose, however, is to focuson the tank’s warfighting capability asit affects the individual crewmembers,especially the tank commander. I be-lieve this type of analysis is prudentbecause of the increased demandsplaced upon the M1A2 tank com-mander (TC) in comparison to his re-sponsibilities in earlier tanks. Learningto use the M1A2’s Intervehicular Infor-mation System (IVIS) is just one of theincreased tasks the TC must learn tofight and win with his tank. How theindividual tank commander optimizesthe gunnery capabilities of the M1A2will go far in allowing him to take ad-vantage of the IVIS. One thing has notchanged with the advent of the M1A2:effective gunnery is still a must. It does

no good to be situationally aware ofyour battlespace if you cannot employyour tank effectively by putting “steelon target.” The two must go hand-in-hand, but fighting the vehicle must notbe lost in the maze of networks anddownlinks. We must be fully aware ofthe demands digitization places on thetank commander (and the unit leader),vis-a-vis his ability to fight his individ-ual vehicle (and unit).

RSLF New Equipment Training

Let me briefly explain the four-phaseNET process for RSLF armor units.Phase I is taught at the Armor Institutehere in Tabuk, where an individual of-ficer or soldier, totally unfamiliar withthe M1A2, is taught the basics of thetank. Individual instruction is taught infour courses, which are essentially across between AIT and the tank certifi-cation courses at Fort Knox. Officer,Tank Commander, Gunner/Loader, andDriver constitute the four courses,ranging in length from twelve weeksfor the driver’s course to nineteenweeks for the officer’s. Tank com-manders and officers receive driving,gunnery, and tactics instruction, whilethe gunner/loaders and drivers receiveinstruction only in their respective posi-tions. Cross-training for the latter indi-viduals occurs in units. All students,except drivers, fire six rounds for fa-miliarization fire prior to graduating tothe next phase. In addition, a host oftraining devices supports the instruc-tion, with students utilizing the im-proved-VIGS (Video Disk GunnerySimulator), the Crew-Station Trainer(CST), and the Tank Driver Trainer(TDT). The M1A2 PCOFT is also on

hand for training, both in UCOFT andPCOFT modes.1

Once a series of courses is complete,the students from all four courses forma company-sized unit within the tankbattalion structure in order to executePhase II. Prior to the start of instruc-tion, the newly formed crews fall in onand inventory their tanks and corre-sponding equipment. During ten weeks,instructors re-evaluate these crews onthe TCGST, and the crews methodi-cally proceed from Combat Table Ithrough Combat Table VIIA/B, in ac-cordance with ST 17-12-1-A2, “M1A2Tank Gunnery.” During all tables,crews receive feedback from tank crewevaluators (TCEs) and AARs in orderto gauge their progress. In addition,“jump” radios are used for both dry-and live-fire exercises. The unit con-ducts a weekly maintenance day, wherethe unit chain of command highlightsboth PMCS execution and training. Re-sults from Phase II are extremelypromising, with RSLF crews demon-strating their abilities to consistently hittargets. If properly prepared, the M1A2will not miss.

At the completion of NET gunnery,the unit enters Phase III for five weeksof platoon tactical instruction. The con-centration centers upon introduction ofthe four-tank platoon concept, with as-sociated formations and drills, as wellas use of the IVIS capability.2 Platoonsexecute both day and night training ex-ercises, with the AAR concept heavilyemphasized. At the end of Phase III,the company conducts a three-weeksemi-annual service, which serves totrain crews, the chain of command, andorganizational mechanics in the con-duct of this important event.


M1A2 Update:Training and Doctrine ObservationsFrom Saudi ArabianNET Training on the M1A2

by Major Kevin D. PolingRSLF units spend four weeks on the range during Phase II of New Equip-ment Training. Using a round-robin approach, units rotate through primetraining, concurrent training, and maintenance/range support.

The completion of Phase III marksthe official end of NET, but then thebattalion embarks upon an eighteen-month sustainment training phase in or-der to build upon the foundation ofNET. The unit will conduct collectivetraining exercises through battalionlevel, as well as two sustainment gun-neries, the first culminating in CT VIII,while the second culminates in CT XII.There is also a heavy emphasis on stafftraining to support the battalion’s ramp-up toward full combat readiness.

M1A2 Crew Commentary

This process reveals some interestingpoints about the M1A2 crew and theresponsibilities of each member. In es-sence, the gunner, driver, and loaderpositions are evolutionary in naturewith regards to their present capabili-ties. The M1A2 certainly providesthese crewmembers with advantagesand advances in technology that im-prove their abilities to perform individ-ual and crew tasks better than any tankin the world. The driver possesses in-creased capabilities to monitor thetank’s maintenance status through theDriver’s Integrated Display (DID),while the POSNAV system allows thedriver to both drive and navigate thetank simultaneously. The gunner enjoyssimilar advantages in engaging targetswith a computerized fire-control sys-tem that has faster response times andimproved ballistic sighting over pre-vious M1-series tanks. The loader hasincreased responsibilities in assistingthe tank commander with the commu-nication system, to include IVIS. Thebottom line, however, is that the gunnerstills engages targets, the driver stilldrives the tank, and the loader stillloads the rounds. From a theoreticalstandpoint, much has not changed,which leads me to label these crew-member positions as evolutionary.

The tank commander position, how-ever, is another case altogether. The ad-ditional capabilities afforded by theM1A2, specifically the CITV and IVIS,truly make the M1A2 tank com-mander’s position revolutionary in na-

ture. The tank commander can acquireand determine range to targets inde-pendently of the gunner, using theCITV, while dramatically reducing tar-get hand-off times to the gunner byutilizing the target designate button onthe Commander’s Control Handle As-sembly (CCHA). The TC can monitorhis battlespace, receive orders, integrateforce multipliers into the operation, andreport his tank’s status more rapidlythan ever before possible because ofthe IVIS. This also applies to individu-als who are both tank commanders andunit leaders. The combination of thesetwo categories, improved gunnery ca-pabilities, and digitization truly makethe TC a more powerful warrior thanhas ever been seen at his level.

How the tank commander exploits theadvantages of the CITV and the IVIS,while not degrading his ability to fightthe tank, will go far in determininghow he, as both vehicle commanderand unit leader, can effectively domi-nate his battlespace. As observed dur-ing training on the range and in theM1A2 UCOFT, the TC can get so ab-sorbed in one area (i.e., CITV andfighting the tank) that he loses focus onthe other (i.e., IVIS), thus negating itsadvantages. We must learn to use bothsimultaneously in order to maximizetheir potential, given the particular bat-tlefield situation. A vignette from DE-SERT STORM serves to illustrate mypoint. The situation occurred on 27February 1991, with the 2nd Brigade,1st Armored Division attacking justshort of “Medina Ridge.” The unit wasequipped, of course, with the M1A1.

Sergeant First Class JohnScaglione led D/1-35 AR towithin 800 meters of the Iraqi

lines. His platoon leader hadfallen back in the formation andScaglione had taken over thepoint position. He reluctantlystopped while two other tanks inhis platoon fell back to cross-level main-gun ammunition.While this 20-minute operationwas going on, Iraqi artillery andmortars began to fall behind themin the wadi.

In spite of increasingly accuratefire, Scaglione refused to sinkinto his hatch and forfeit his all-around vision. His platoon wasisolated...and he could not affordto miss anything. He stood in theturret keeping a steady watchthrough binoculars while his gun-ner continued to swing the turretand its thermal sights back andforth. Suddenly, Scaglione wasjust able to make out the gun-tubeof a T-72 as it rose over the topof a berm...He slipped down ontohis thermal sights and twisted hisoverride hard left, slewing theturret around. He laid his crosshairs just right and below themuzzle of the T-72. His gunnerfired almost instantly...blastedthrough a berm, and unerringlyfound the steel body of the T-72.Again Scaglione popped out ofthe turret and continued to scan.In quick succession, his crew dis-covered and killed three morethreatening T-72s before anycould get off a shot.3

How would SFC Scaglione havefought this engagement with anM1A2? Certainly, the CITV wouldhave allowed him to scan a muchwider sector than that of the gunner.


During NET and in home station preparation for qualification gunnery, units use their localtraining areas extensively. In preparing to execute Tank Tables I-IV, target silhouettes,snake boards, and boresight panels are available.

Target hand-off would have been mucheasier with the target designate func-tion, and the IVIS would have allowedhim to not only report the situation, butalso to initiate a call for fire. The situ-ation seems to be very straight-forward.I believe the troubling aspect of thewhole matter, however, centers aroundwhere SFC Scaglione actually foughtthe M1A1....out of the hatch. To takefull advantage of the M1A2 capabili-ties, he would have had to be down in-side on the CITV, which would forfeithis peripheral vision: a factor central tohis success in actually acquiring the T-72s. Only SFC Scaglione knows if theCITV capability would have helped ordelayed his efforts in acquiring the tar-gets. In addition, if SFC Scaglione hadbeen using the IVIS in our M1A2 sce-nario and not scanning, would the en-gagement have played out differently?

This vignette raises some importantissues in regard to fighting the M1A2,especially on the offense. Does the TCfight out of the hatch or down inside,and how much time does he dedicate toIVIS (read digitization) in fighting thetank? Suggestions for a “heads-up” dis-play or some other technological solu-tion to the this problem should activelybe pursued in order to make the M1A2capabilities as user-friendly as possible.I contend, however, that there is also atraining solution, both in units and dur-ing institutional education. At the tankcommander and unit leader level, weshould use the “applicatory method” ofteaching, by which I mean these indi-viduals should be continuously chal-lenged with problem-solving exercisesinvolving the M1A2 to develop theirthought-process, rather than “school so-lutions” to be memorized. Given a par-ticular situation, the TC might chooseto fight out of the hatch, but in doingso, his thought-process and rationalemust be scrutinized.4 In this way, wecan further develop leaders who are si-tuationally aware of both their bat-tlespace and how best to fight theM1A2, given a particular circumstance.I believe, in general, that the decisionsthat optimize the use of the CITV andIVIS are the best solutions, but each in-dividual TC and unit leader must makethat call based upon the situation pre-sented to him.5

M1A2 Training Observations

To fully dominate one’s battlespace inthe way described above, the M1A2tank commander must first acquire the

necessary technical skills to fight thetank; in essence, he must learn how toeffectively acquire and engage targets.

I believe that the tank commanderwho cannot master the host of technicalskills in Combat Table I of ST 17-12-1-A2, as basic and simple as that sounds,will fail miserably in his ability to fightthe tank. In addition, without masteryof those skills as a foundation, the in-dependent capability to use IVIS anddigital technology is flawed at best.

Observations from the M1A2UCOFT reveal rather quickly whichtank commanders have mastered CT Iskills and which ones have not. Thefirst exercise of the UCOFT sustain-ment program is #932110, which inUCOFT language means: Target Acqui-sition (TA) Level 1, Reticle Aim (RA)Level 9, and System Management(SM) Level 3. In English, that meansthe following: day unlimited visibility;stationary own vehicle; short-range,multiple, stationary targets; and a fullyoperational system using the GPS. Themultiple targets do not come in thestandard five groups of two, like theM1A1 matrix (10 total per exercise),but come in five groups of two orthree, at random, and with a minimum13 targets per exercise.6 The crew willnot meet the standards of this basic ex-ercise without the TC’s mastery of theCITV in search mode and target desig-nate function on the CCHA because thetargets appear across a wide front. Try-ing to fight the tank and negotiate thematrix as he would with an M1A1 (i.e.TC staying on the GPS extension) is arecipe for failure. The tank commandermust use the CITV, and he and thegunner must have the target hand-offprocedures mastered in order to ad-vance in the matrix. Successful execu-tion of Combat Table I will give thesetwo a solid foundation in which to ex-cel, not only in the UCOFT, but alsoduring progression through the gunnerytables.

What makes Combat Table I, a verybasic and simple sounding exercise, soimportant to the tank commander andcrew proficiency? The reason involvesthe very complex skills that a TC mustmaster in order to successfully fight theM1A2 and the different nature of thoseskills in building and sustaining crewproficiency. CT I still has the basictracking and manipulation exercises us-ing a snake-board for the gunner andTC to negotiate, with the TC now hav-ing two sights — the GPSE and theCITV. Gun-laying is still a part of this

table and the TC must master this skillas before, even with the addition of thetarget designate function on the M1A2.This separate gun-laying skill is stillnecessary and required because the TCwill at times need to fight the tank inCITV/GPS Gun Line-of-Sight (LOS)mode, meaning the CITV does not op-erate independent of the main gun andthe CCHA acts as a normal TC over-ride. In addition to these tasks, the TCmust sustain his normal range determi-nation skills and then learn to use thestadia reticle capability of the CITV.Most importantly, CT I challenges thetank commander on a variety of targetdesignate, target hand-off to the gunner,and switchology exercises designed totake full advantage of the M1A2’s ca-pabilities. These skills constitute theheart of the tank commander’s techni-cal skills in fighting the M1A2, andprovide that solid crew foundation forsuccess in the UCOFT and on CT VIII,as well as taking advantage of the digi-tization capabilities of the tank. Ofcourse, the CT I tasks must also be per-formed under closed hatch and NBCconditions as well.

I have already described the impor-tance of these skills to success in theUCOFT, but there exists a great benefitto qualification on CT VIII as well. Sixof the ten engagements on CT VIII in-volve at least three targets, and one ofthese six actually has four targets.7

Also, the total number of CT VIII tar-gets increases from 18 to 25, progress-ing from the M1A1 to the M1A2. Atank commander who cannot effec-tively employ the CITV and target des-ignate functions of the M1A2 will notqualify. In addition, because of the tankcommander’s need to search for othertargets, he can no longer afford thetime necessary to check the gunner’slay or sense target effect from theGPSE. These functions will restsquarely on the shoulders of the gun-ner, and increase the importance ofboth the target hand-off and engage-ment termination drills between thegunner and TC. Switchology remains asignificant element of this mix also, be-cause four of those latter six engage-ments on CT VIII involve both maingun and troop targets. Successful crewexecution of the UCOFT and CT VIIImust be grounded in the basics of CT I,which constitutes one of the least re-source-intensive training events avail-able to units. I want to also reempha-size my central premise here: tankcommanders and unit leaders will notbe able to optimize the advantages of


digitization if they do not possess theskills required to effectively fight theM1A2. Even though it is a simple con-cept, unit leaders avoid executingCombat Table I to standard at theirown peril.

Before analyzing some larger issuesof digitization as they concern theM1A2 and the U.S. Army, I want to re-late one additional training observationdrawn from the RSLF NET experience.This area concerns tank fighting posi-tions and the ability to use the targetdesignate function. Currently, RSLFunits are using a temporary range forfiring. It includes full, dug-in fightingpositions and offers the tank the threestandard modes of positioning: hide,turret-down, and hull-down. When thetank is in the turret-down position, theTC can only target designate to targetswithin the limits of the fighting posi-tion walls before moving to a hull-down to engage. If the target falls out-side this sector, the TC cannot targetdesignate for fear of putting the gun-tube into the wall of the battle position.In this situation, the tank must firstcome to a hull-down position beforethe TC can target designate for thegunner.

This sequencing is important becauseof the contrasting manner in which thecrew would normally train and executea target engagement drill. Both in theUCOFT and on standard main-gunranges, the tank commander can targetdesignate in the turret-down positionwithout fear of gun-tube interference.This capability gives the crew an addi-tional few seconds in which to acquirethe target and start their engagementdrill before exposing their tank to theenemy. Units should train accordinglyin preparation for any training eventwhere dug-in fighting positions will bethe norm. If using the standard fightingposition, the front should face as closeas possible to the tank’s primary sectorof fire so the target designate functioncan be used in the turret-down position.Sounds simplistic, but experience herehas shown that the crew must be pre-pared to handle this type of situation inorder to minimize exposure to the en-emy. The Armor Center should studywhether an alternate fighting positiondesign is warranted, given this statedlimitation.

Doctrinal Considerations

Having examined some of the com-plexities of the tank commander’s job

in actually fighting his tank, and by ex-tension, a platoon or company if he isalso a leader, I want to propose someideas involving the overlap of digitiza-tion upon these fighting requirements.The tank commander is faced, un-doubtedly, with an immense challengeto integrate the IVIS capability with thenormal modes of fighting the tank. 1LTRobert S. Krenzel, Jr., offered some ex-tremely valuable insights into this proc-ess in his ARMOR article entitled, “TheArmor Lieutenant and the M1A2.”8 Healso recognized the enormous workloadplaced upon the TC, and offered hiscredible solutions to these challenges.One solution 1LT Krenzel proposed inorder to reduce the reporting load viaIVIS for the company chain of com-mand, especially in the offense, in-volved the company XO playing amuch larger role in the company’s useof digitization and reporting informa-tion to higher headquarters. Although abold proposal, I feel this particular so-lution places too much burden on theXO, relying on him to have an almostpicture-perfect view of the battlefield,and also takes a gun tube out of thefight. This solution also leans toward abest-case scenario, one which a unitSOP should generally avoid. Althoughthe XO possesses the increased capa-bilities of the M1A2 as an individualTC, there exists another answer.

I would offer an alternative solution,and one that maintains the XO’s impor-tant role as battle captain, as well as of-fering the promise of increased influ-ence in assisting the commander tofight the battle. I propose that the com-pany XO be placed in an improvedcommand and control vehicle (C2V),modeled after the role played by theground cavalry troop XO, who cur-rently rides in an M577. Placing theXO in this improved C2 vehicle offersseveral distinct advantages over himcontinuing to ride in a tank, both fromthe perspective of current digital re-porting requirements and for an expan-sion of the company/team’s missionprofile on the future battlefield. I makea basic assumption in offering this al-ternative: a C2 vehicle is a better plat-form than the tank for the XO to opti-mize the advantages of current and fu-ture digital technology.

From the perspective of digital report-ing, an XO operating from a C2 vehi-cle can efficiently send unit digital re-ports higher, while also possessing thecapability to rapidly convert voice in-formation from company traffic into a

digital format. Use of digital reportingcould therefore be enhanced in thismanner, both horizontally and verti-cally across the battalion/task force, re-gardless of how the individual platoonswere reporting the information.9 Im-provements to the digital protocolscould enhance the unit XO’s ability toshare digital information with battalionand sister units (through their C2V-equipped XO), giving those unitstimely access to vital information whileallowing the individual commanders tofight the battle as required. The sameadvantages apply to reports flowing tothe company, where the XO canquickly disseminate this information.Current cavalry troop XOs function inthis manner, reporting information andthe situation both vertically and hori-zontally to keep other units informed,as well as receiving reports, freeing thecommander to focus on the battle.

By using this approach, we allow theXO to better relieve that burden fromhis unit’s leaders and permit them tofocus on the battle. The XO can do thisbest from an improved C2 vehicle.Some will say this capability is unnec-essary in tank companies or across thebattalion because improvements in thedigitization area will overshadow thissolution. I am not positive this is en-tirely the case. In addition, the C2V-equipped XO can function as a force-multiplier for the company/team of thefuture, as the unit’s mission-profile andbattlespace expand. Recently, MGMaggart, the Chief of Armor, suggestedthat the Force XXI brigade would haveto dominate the same battlespace as aCold War division.10 It is then fairlylogical to deduce that future battalionsand companies would have to dominatethe same battlespace as current bri-gades and battalions, respectively. Ifour companies operate over increasedareas, the expansion of their commandand control capabilities will be a must.The improved C2 vehicle at the com-pany-level, with the XO on board,meets that need.

Colonel Christopher V. Cardine, thecurrent Project Manager-Abrams, wrotea report entitled, “Digitization of theBattlefield,” in which he foretold anexpansion of the battlefield capabilitiesof a company-sized element due todigitization.11 In Colonel Cardine’s sce-nario, a small company/team is giventhe mission of destroying a company-sized defensive position 50 kms awayin order to establish a brigade passagepoint and pass the brigade through.


This company/team is reinforced withthe following assets: a scout section;mortar, engineer, and air defensesquads; and a logistics package. In ad-dition, an M109A6 Paladin platoon, ascout-weapons team with RAH-66 Co-manche and AH-64D Apache helicop-ters, and two F-15E Strike Eagles arein direct support of the operation. Allthese elements are digitally linked, giv-ing the commander at this level un-precedented access to combined armscapabilities in order to accomplish hismission. At the center of the team, ca-pable of assisting the commander in in-tegrating these various assets, stands animproved C2 vehicle.12

In Colonel Cardine’s scenario, thecompany/team successfully accom-plished its mission by integrating thesevarious resources and utilizing the ad-vantages of digitization. As he con-cludes, “...mass was accomplished bythe synchronization and concentrationof fires on the enemy. Decisive victorywas achieved by both individual crewsand commanders employing digitizedsystems to outpace the decision cyclesof their respective opponents.”13 Theuse of a C2 vehicle at the company-level was crucial to mission accom-plishment, and seems a wise commandand control investment if companies ofthe future are to operate successfullyover greater distances and with ex-panded mission profiles.

As another example, digitization andremote sensors will give future com-manders a much clearer picture of theenemy situation and their own bat-tlespace, allowing them to effectivelyuse the company/team in ways onlynow being realized. In similar fashionto the Cardine scenario, a com-pany/team could be sent on a deep mis-sion, not to engage enemy combatforces, but to bypass them in order todefeat the enemy through disruption ofhis command and control, artillery, andlogistics elements.

The company raid could become anextremely viable mission in which toutilize the advantages of a digitizedforce and the company’s ability to inte-grate various combined arms assetsinto the operation. Major O. T. Ed-wards spoke of new and different waysin which to utilize the digitized force.14

I believe the company raid and deep at-tack could become significant missionsin the future mission profile of thecompany/team.

Conclusion

Digitization offers the Army the po-tential to integrate various combinedarms capabilities at unit levels neverbefore seriously considered. The M1A2tank stands at the center of this capabil-ity. In designing upgrades to our digitalforces and equipment, we must neverforget the effects these improvementshave on the individual soldier and hiscapacity for fighting on the battlefield.The M1A2 tank commander’s job iscertainly an example of the complexityfaced by soldiers in integrating digitialtechnology with the basics of fightingin his particular position. Observationsfrom RSLF NET conclusively showthat, in order for the tank commanderto optimize the digital capability of hisequipment, he must first master thefighting complexities of the tank. I be-lieve this example serves as a modelfor other battlefield positions as weoverlay the demands of digitizationupon the already complex nature ofwarfighting. We should not forget thisimportant concept as we train andequip our future army.

Notes

1Instruction is currently performed by a com-bination of RSLF cadre and U.S. instructorsfrom Mansour General Dynamics, Ltd.(MGDL). Future plans have the RSLF assum-ing primary instruction for both Phases I and II,with MGDL providing technical assistance.

2The RSLF is changing from the three-tankplatoon, ten-tank company to the four-tank pla-toon, fourteen-tank company in its M1A2 bat-talions. Each battalion has three line companiesand two HQ’s tanks.

3BG Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA, Certain Vic-tory — The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, (Wash-ington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 1994), p. 294.

4For an analysis of this teaching methodol-ogy, see Michael Duncan Wyly’s article enti-tled, “Teaching Maneuver Warfare,” ManeuverWarfare — An Anthology, Richard D. Hooker,Jr., Editor, (Novato, Calif; Presidio Press,1993), pp. 248-269.

5ST 71-2-2 (Revised Draft), Tactics andTechniques for the Digitized Task Force, (FortKnox, Ky.: U.S. Army Armor School, January1995). See pp. 1-6 and 4-16 for digital limita-tions in the offense.

6Exercise #942210, which is fired at long-range targets and at night (TA-2, RA-10, SM-4), actually presents EIGHTEEN targets to thecrew. They are broken down into two groups ofthree, and three groups of four, for eighteen to-tal targets for this exercise.

7ST 17-12-1-A2 w/change 1, M1A2 TankGunnery, (Fort Knox, Ky.: U.S. Army ArmorSchool, June 1995). See Chapter Two for acomplete description of the combat tables. CT Istarts on p. 2-5.

81LT Robert S. Krenzel, Jr., “The ArmorLieutenant and the M1A2,” ARMOR, July-Au-gust 1995, pp. 15-22.

9Tank commanders and platoon leaders muststill decide when to use digital or voice report-ing, based upon the situation. No matter whatvehicle the XO rides in, the M1A2 companystill must execute a solid and disciplined report-ing SOP to facilitate internal command andcontrol.

10Sean D. Naylor, “Three Options for FourStarts — Army Weighs Choices to Decide Di-rection of the Future Division,” Army Times,October 16, 1995 (56th Year, No. 12), p. 12.

11Colonel Chrisopher V. Cardine, “Digitiza-tion of the Battlefield,” USAWC Strategic Re-search Report, (U.S. Army War College, Car-lisle Barracks, Pa.: May 1994).

12Ibid., p. 27.13Ibid., p. 35.14Major O.T. Edwards III, “Digital Battlefield

Training and Tactical Insights of a User,” AR-MOR, May-June 1995, p. 13.


Major Kevin D. Poling is a1984 Distinguished MilitaryGraduate of the University ofNotre Dame, where he earneda BA in International Relations.As a lieutenant, he served astank platoon leader, tank com-pany XO, battalion adjutant,and battalion S3 Air in 1-35 Ar-mor, 2d Bde/1st AD, in Er-langen, Germany. Assigned tothe 3d ACR, he served as asst.regimental S3, 2d Sqdn S4,and commanded H Company,2/3 ACR during Desert Shieldand Desert Storm. He wasmost recently the Armor TeamChief at Readiness Group Dix(AC/RC), Fort Dix, N.J. He is agraduate of AOBC, AOAC,Scout Commander’s Certifica-tion Course, Cavalry Leader’sCourse, and CAS3, and holdsan MA in American Historyfrom Rutgers University. He iscurrently Chief, M1A2 FieldingDivision, Abrams ManagementTeam, Tabuk, Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia.

Tank gunnery training in M1A1 andM1A2 units is currently accomplishedwith only two kinds of main gun train-ing ammunition; M865 Target Practice,Cone Stabilized, Discarding Sabot-Tracer (TPCSDS-T) and M831 HighExplosive, Antitank-Target Practice-Tracer (HEAT-TP-T).1 Until recently,this has been adequate, only becauseSabot and HEAT were the only servicerounds available. This situation has al-ready changed and will continue tochange for the foreseeable future.Changes in the threats faced by the Ar-mor Force, the development of newdoctrine, and the introduction of new120mm round types means that tankgunnery tables that include only M865training sabot rounds and M831 train-ing HEAT rounds should not be consid-ered adequate.

While enemy tanks have never beenthe only threat that U.S. tanks havefaced, our doctrine has emphasizedthem as the predominant one. This em-phasis resulted from our preoccupationwith a Soviet tank threat in Europe andour historical perspective, stretchingback to the Second World War, of howto fight battles in a European Theaterof Operations. However, the collapse ofthe Soviet Union has nearly eliminatedany threat of a large-scale, tank-led in-vasion of Western Europe. While thenumber of tanks in the world has notreally diminished, the raison d’être forthe U.S. Army to maintain a large forceof main battle tanks armed with onlyarmor defeating main gun rounds hasevaporated. Technological changes arealso causing readjustments in assess-ments of threats to U.S. tanks. The in-troduction, some years back, of thelong-range antitank missile and the an-titank helicopter have placed newthreats on the battlefield that a tankunit must be prepared to meet and de-fend against. Neither sabot nor tradi-tional HEAT ammunition is particularlyeffective against these threats. Newer,

more sophisticated smart tank muni-tions will also change the way ourtanks are organized and equipped tofight. Enemy smart munitions —whether fired from a stealthy, high mo-bility platform, a mortar 5 kilometersaway, or by a guerrilla from a secondstory window — will demand an agil-ity of response that a tank equippedwith only HEAT and sabot cannot pro-vide.

In addition to the changes in thethreat we face, and partially as a resultof those changes, the Armor Force isreassessing its doctrine to take advan-tage of new technological capabilities.Desert Storm showed us the enticingpossibilities available when you canoutsee and outshoot your opponent.This capability is the direct result ofthe range advantage provided by ourtanks, ammunition, and training. In ad-dition, information technologies aredriving the change towards a ForceXXI doctrine. For the Armor Force,this new doctrine will extend bat-tlespace in range and dimension. Inother words, the tank of Force XXImust be able to see and shoot at ex-tended range, to shoot at targets in theair, and to shoot at dug-in targets andthose behind shelter in protected posi-tions. The Force XXI tanker must alsodo this at a greatly elevated operationaltempo. Target engagement decisionsmust be made instantaneously, and firstshots must count. Anything less willbring defeat in the coming age of elec-tronic decision-making and autono-mous, guided munitions.

Finally, the basic load of tomorrow’stank will be very different than thatcarried today. In fact, the first round ofammunition for the Force XXI Ar-mored Fleet, the M830A1 (MPAT)High Explosive Antitank-Multi-Pur-pose-Tracer (HEAT-MP-T), has alreadybeen fielded. The M830A1 is highlyeffective against armored vehicles,

bunkers, and other ground targets. Im-portantly, it also provides Americantankers with the world’s first tankround with an effective antihelicoptercapability, allowing American tankersto extend their battlespace into the thirddimension. Other advanced tank roundsare currently being developed. TheSmart, Target Activated, Fire and For-get (STAFF) round, currently in devel-opment, will provide us with anautonomously guided main gun roundthat flies over its target and fires down,denying our foes, for the first time, theprotection afforded by digging in. Fi-nally, the M829A3 Armor Piercing, FinStabilized, Discarding Sabot (APFSDS)kinetic energy round will provide un-precedented penetration capability atextended ranges.

New doctrine, new capabilities of thetank, and new ammunition will only goso far. To make the Armor Force as ef-fective as possible, the quality of thetanker must remain high. The key thatproduces high quality tankers is, ofcourse, high quality training. For theindividual tank crew, the epitome ofhigh quality training is realistic gun-nery that stresses and improves themen and machines that make the Ar-mor Force. For gunnery to be realistic,scenarios must replicate, to the extentsafely possible, scenarios dictated byour doctrine and the threat. One of theissues that must be addressed for realis-tic training in the future is training am-munition. For the M1A1 and M1A2,our current inventory of training am-munition is ill equipped to address thetraining needs of the Force XXI tanker.There is currently no training round forthe fielded M830A1. No training roundis planned for STAFF, so gunnery ta-bles will not include some of theunique features that will distinguishSTAFF engagements. Finally, while wehave a good KE training round in theM865, long-range engagements are justnot in its repertoire. This deficiency in


Training Ammunitionfor Force XXI

by Major Steve Thorson and Major Bruce Held

realistic training ammunition for to-morrow’s tankers must be addressedsoon with the development of a newgeneration of training ammunition andthe ranges to support it.

Training Round Limitations

Training ammunition has unique lim-iting requirements. These limitationsare driven by three competing factors.First, the ammunition must have ashort maximum range. Second, withinthe limits of the maximum range, itmust be as realistic as possible. Finally,and the ‘Catch 22’ in designing trainingammunition, is that it must be rela-tively inexpensive so that enough maybe procured to train the force.

A modern KE round will fly over 40kilometers if fired at maximum eleva-tion from level ground. The long rangeresults from the desire to maximizemuzzle velocity and minimize the aero-dynamic drag on the round so that itsstriking velocity maximizes targetpenetration. At most, if not all, trainingareas, a 40 kilometer range will cause around to overfly the impact area.Therefore, the range of training ammu-nition must be limited. In most cases, arange limitation of 8 kilometers is im-posed on training ammunition. In otherwords, a round of training ammunitionmust hit the ground within 8 kilome-ters, 100 percent of the time, even iffired at maximum elevation. With cur-rent training ammunition, this rangeconstraint is achieved by making pro-jectiles with high-drag shapes. TheM865, for example, uses a high-dragcone for stabilization, instead of thelow-drag fins that are used on serviceKE. This allows the M865 to belaunched with a high muzzle velocity.Its high drag slows it down rapidly; itloses more than 30 meters/second ofvelocity for every 100 meters traveled.Unfortunately, high-drag projectilestend to lose accuracy as they lose ve-locity. Thus, it is difficult to turn high-drag projectiles into long range trainingrounds.

While range limitation is a primaryrequirement, there are other safety-re-lated constraints on training ammuni-tion design. Combined Arms, Live FireExercises (CALFEX) and platoon-leveltank tables place several firing plat-forms on the training range at the sametime. This creates obvious opportunitiesfor fratricide. The M865, even with

only a steel core, can damage anAbrams, and possibly hurt the crew, ifthe round strikes the tank’s most likelyimpact point, the sides or rear, at closerange. It will penetrate almost everypoint on a Bradley, likely resulting inthe destruction of the vehicle and deathor serious injury to the crew. Idealtraining ammunition would, therefore,be nonpenetrating to prevent suchtragedies. Also, most training rangesare not equipped to handle explosiverounds. Their destructiveness woulddestroy targets and target devices. Theinevitable duds would leave explosiveslying around in areas that must remainaccessible. This makes development oftraining ammunition difficult forrounds that use explosive effects or donot have to strike their targets (STAFFand M830A1) to be effective. Finally,ricochets of the round or its fragmentscreate a safety hazard that the ammuni-tion developer must keep in mind.

For maximum training value, trainingammunition must appear to replicatethe performance of service ammuni-tion. This requirement often competeswith the safety requirements discussedabove. For example, development of atraining round for the M830A1 thatcould be fired in a ground-to-air train-ing scenario will be difficult. Even as-suming that a ‘hovering helicopter’ tar-get could be effectively placed on atraining range, simulating the proximityengagement of the M830A1 againstthis target would be difficult withoutsome sort of explosive round.

In addition to simulating the target ef-fects of the service ammunition, train-ing ammunition should have the look,feel, and handling of the correspondingservice ammunition, so that the loadergets the most realistic training experi-ence. If a round of service ammunitionweighs almost 50 pounds and is over40 inches long, the loader will get afalse sense of handling ease if the train-ing round only weighs 40 pounds andis less than 35 inches long.

Ideally, the ballistics of the trainingammunition will also be the same asthe service ammunition. This allowsthe same ammunition subdesignation(AMMO SUBDES) to be used. Againthough, safety constraints, primarily therange restriction, make this difficult toachieve. As a case in point, the M865’sballistics are radically different thanthose of any of the M829 family ofservice KE.

As a final requirement, training am-munition must be inexpensive. A tankis allocated 78 M865s and 22 M831sfor annual gunnery training. At ap-proximately $646 for M865 and $697for M831, the annual main gun ammu-nition costs for a battalion are alreadynearly $4,000,000. In these times oftight budgets, expensive training am-munition could cause a reduction in thenumber of rounds that each tank crewgets to fire. That could be a worse det-riment to training than having trainingammunition ill-suited to current serviceammunition and doctrine.

Training Round Concepts

MPAT Trainer. The MPAT trainerround is the next logical step in a con-tinuous effort to provide soldiers withthe best possible gunnery training ex-perience. The current M831 performswell as a training round for the M830,but it just won’t provide an accuratetraining experience for the M830’s re-placement, the M830A1 MPAT. TheM831 and M830A1 just look, feel, andfly too differently. The M865 cannot beused realistically as a training round forMPAT either, since neither the gunnernor loader would change anything be-tween SABOT and MPAT engage-ments. M865 would remain indexedand the loader could pull any round hewanted, since they would all be thesame. Because the need for an MPATtraining round is so clear, the processof getting it to the field was initiatedsome time ago. The Operational Re-quirements Document (ORD) for thisround is now being staffed and fiveconcepts have been examined as poten-tial candidates. Three were eliminatedbecause they could not meet minimaloperational, safety, or reliability re-quirements. The remaining two con-cepts were promising enough to pur-sue. Unfortunately, neither concept willbe capable of ground-to-air engage-ments, and this means that the UnitConduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) islikely to remain the primary trainingtool for these engagement types.

The first MPAT training round con-cept attempts to simulate an M830A1,in appearance only, by the applicationof a visual modification (VISMOD) tothe existing M865 KE training car-tridge. This is accomplished by usingthe entire M865 and attaching one oftwo plastic nose cap designs. Option 1


is a simple nose cap design that at-taches to, and covers only the spike ofthe M865. Option 2 is a larger designthat, like the first option, attaches to thespike of the M865, but extends to thesabot, making the cartridge a more re-alistic portrayal of an M830A1. Bothdesign configurations retain the M865’strajectory since the nose cap adapterseparates from the projectile whenfired.

The VISMOD concept was ultimatelyrejected for a variety of reasons. Mostimportantly, it did not meet the look,touch, and feel operational require-ments. The overall appearance witheither nose cap is marginal at best. TheVISMOD concept also failed the op-erational requirement that the MPATtrainer cartridge weight be within 4 lbs.of the M830A1. In fact, the VISMODtrainer is 12 lbs. lighter than the serviceMPAT round, and the weight distribu-tion is significantly different than theM830A1. With VISMOD attached, thecartridge is also 3 inches shorter thanthe M830A1. All the physical differ-ences between the M830A1 and theVISMOD cartridge mean that theloader cannot achieve an accurate train-ing experience with this concept.

The second concept, a full develop-mental MPAT Trainer program (dubbedthe XM1002 MPAT Trainer), meets theoperational requirements and was se-lected to become the future replace-ment to the M831 HEAT traininground. Unlike the VISMOD proposal,the XM1002 will pass the ‘look, touchand feel’ test. Its exterior configurationand dimensions replicate the M830A1exactly, to include a movable Air/Ground fuse cap. The cartridge weightis just 2 lbs. lighter than the serviceround, and importantly, the weight dis-tribution of the training cartridge isright on the mark. In an effort to re-duce the expense and lead time associ-ated with new developmental pro-grams, the XM1002 will use commonM830A1 components, specifically, thepropulsion system and the sabot. A sig-nificant reduction in system cost is alsoexpected by reutilizing propellant fromdemilitarized M829s.

Planning for future performance im-provements to the MPAT Trainershould also begin now. As mentionedabove, the current MPAT Trainer con-cept still does not include a ground-airmode. Future improvements to theround and training ranges must enable

tankers to engage air targets. Currentand emerging technology should enableammunition developers to achieve thissignificant performance improvementcheaply and in the near term. Most im-portantly, this added capability wouldprovide tank crews a more accuratetraining experience.

Long Range KE Trainer. See, Hit,Kill. In Desert Storm, U.S. tankerswere engaging targets at the limits ofthe ability of the tank’s sights and wellbeyond what they were used to firingin training. Long range gunnery willcontinue to be the norm in combat.Force XXI doctrine stresses the exten-sion of battlespace. Newer, higher fi-delity target acquisition technologiesare being fielded with the M1A2 andimprovements in gun, ammunition, andfire control are making even longerrange engagements possible. Thismeans that there is a growing need topursue a tank training ammunition de-velopment program that will allow sol-diers to “train the way they are ex-pected to fight” in the future. Unfortu-nately, the current M865 KE Trainerwill not accommodate long range gun-nery requirements. Its probability of hit(Ph) at ranges beyond 2 kilometers isjust not acceptable.

Developing a long range gunnerytraining capability is not a simple mat-ter. Nearly all multi-purpose rangecomplexes (MPRC) are limited by an 8kilometer range fan. Although somecan extend another 2-4 kilometers, onlythe National Training Center (NTC)can currently accommodate the needsof long range gunnery training. A ma-jor MPRC upgrade directed at expand-ing the range limits of MPRCsthroughout the U.S. Army would beprohibitively expensive, even if possi-ble. However, there are MPRCs thatcannot be expanded beyond their cur-rent range limitations, so they would beleft out of the upgrade. Another optionwould limit long range tank gunnerytraining to a unit’s annual NTC rota-tion. Although possible, it would prob-ably provide only familiarization,rather than adequate long-range gun-nery training, plus, it would leave theOCONUS units unable to even famil-iarize at the longer ranges. The UCOFTcan fill some of the void, but can neverfully satisfy the requirement. The bestway to fulfill a long range gunnerytraining requirement is to develop along range KE trainer that will performto specified requirements, yet be safe to

fire at all MPRCs as they currently ex-ist.

Anticipating the need for extendedrange training ammunition, tank am-munition developers are currently ex-amining the possibilities for future longrange training round candidates. A sim-ple improvement to the current M865KE trainer may seem to be the obvioussolution. In fact, the M866 Long RangeKE Trainer was produced several yearsago and is an extremely accurateround. It combines the penetrator of anM865 with fins replacing the M865’stail cone. The max range of the M866is typical of finned KE rounds, how-ever, and its use would be restricted tothe tank gunnery range at the NTC.

Another concept is known as theM865E2. The M865E2 was bornthrough the M829 reclamation pro-gram, the goal of which was to convertM829 APFSDS-T cartridges (Tactical)to new TPFSDS-T cartridges (Train-ing). The M829’s depleted uranium(DU) core was replaced, but most otherM829 components are reused. As anadded benefit, the M865E2 is muchcloser to the look, touch, and feel ofservice KE than is standard M865. Aversion of the M865E2 has been de-signed for long range firing and is stillin development. Like the M866 how-ever, the M865E2 (Interim Long RangeTraining Cartridge Version) will prob-ably not be range-limited to 8 kilome-ters.

This brings us back to the basic ques-tion: How can we design a 120mm KEtrainer cartridge that performs at ex-tended range, but falls to earth within 8kilometers? Currently, the only choiceseems to be to design-in a ‘braking’system. A number of concepts with thisfeature have been suggested and exam-ined. The most promising of these arebeing considered as possible alterna-tives to the M865E2 and are describedbelow. As always, safety remains thenumber one design constraint, and thereliability of the ‘braking’ system is thekey safety factor for all the concepts.

In the Propellant-Nose-Breakup2 con-cept, the body segment of the projectilerod is split down the center. The bot-tom of the split rod penetrator is heldtogether by a solid metal base and fin.The tip of the penetrator is held to-gether by a heat sensitive nose cap.The idea takes advantage of aerody-namic heating of the nose cone duringthe projectile flight. At a specific range,


the nose cone gets hot enough to causepropellant imbedded in the nose cap toignite. Once ignited, the shear pins thathold the nose cap together fail; the pro-jectile breaks up; and the pieces tumblequickly to the earth. Currently, thisconcept is the most mature of therange-limited, long-range traininground concepts and was demonstratedsome years ago. Reliability remains aconcern, however. Two problems occurif the nose propellant fails to ignite.First, the penetrator will not break upand the round could overfly the impactarea. Second, the nose cap will containan unburned propellant and wouldprobably require handling by EOD per-sonnel.

The Boosted-High-Drag-Projectile3

concept is a projectile with an alumi-num body and a steel nose. Aerody-namic stability and high drag isachieved with a straked cone,4 ratherthan fins. Extended range is achievedby the using a small, solid propellantrocket engine to offset the high dragduring the first few kilometers of flight.This feature is invisible to the tankcrew, and the round is launched nor-mally. Following the launch, the rocketengine ignites for approximately 2.1seconds and burns to 3 kilometers. At 3kilometers range, the rocket engineburns out and the high drag cone slowsdown the projectile enough to cause itto hit the ground within 8 kilometers.Essentially, this is a fail-safe cartridge.If the rocket engine fails, the round’srange is limited by the tail cone in thesame way as an M865. Unfortunately,this training round could also containunburned propellant material (therocket motor). A round whose motorfailed would have to be handled byEOD personnel.

The Ablative-Nose-Projectile5 conceptwas validated at the same time as thePropellant-Nose-Breakup concept. Thisconcept integrates a standard trainingprojectile body, a 5- or 6-bladed fin anda nose cone of ablative material.6 Aero-dynamic heating generated during theflight of the round causes the nose coneto ablate away during flight, thuschanging its shape and aerodynamiccharacteristics. At some design range,the nose cone is ablated to a level thatits changed aerodynamics destabilizethe projectile. As stability is lost and


drag increases, the round starts tum-bling and falls to earth. Performancereliability is less of a concern, but isstill a consideration. The round mustfunction properly. If not, the projectilewill travel well beyond the 8 kilometerrange limitation.

The Ablative-Fin-Projectile concept7

is similar to the Ablative-Nose-Projec-tile concept. It also integrates a stand-ard training projectile body, spike nose,and a 5- or 6-bladed fin. Instead of thenose being made of ablative material,one or more of the fin blades is madeof this material. Again, the aerody-namic heating generated during flightcauses ablation of material, but thistime at the fin. The fins retain their sta-bilizing capability to the maximum de-sired engagement range. Beyond thisrange though, one or more fin blades isablated enough to cause the projectileto lose stability and tumble to the earthwithin the 8 kilometer range limitation.

The Low Drag/High Drag Fin Con-cept (Drogue Flap)8 integrates a stand-ard training projectile body, spike nose,5-bladed fin, and a ‘braking’ system.The braking system is made up of fivesets of pin holders, pins, and drag flaps.They are attached to and hidden at thebase of the projectile, but forward ofthe fin. When the drag flaps deploy,they provide a high level of aerody-namic drag in a manner similar to theair brakes on aircraft. With the flapsfolded, the round is nearly as aerody-namic as service sabot, so it can havethe same level of accuracy. The dragflaps are designed to deploy at a speci-fied range. This range is set so that it isbeyond the maximum engagementrange of the training exercise, but shortenough to give the flaps time to dragthe projectile down inside the 8 kilo-

meter range limitation. Performance re-liability is a concern in any conceptthat requires the round to actively dosomething, and the Drogue Flap con-cept is no exception. If the ‘brakes’ donot function properly, the round willtravel beyond the 8 kilometer rangelimitation.

STAFF Trainer. Development of aSTAFF training round is not being con-sidered at this point. Instead, the plan isto train STAFF engagements only in asimulation environment. This decisionis based primarily on the perceived costof a STAFF training round, but it couldhave an adverse impact on the trainingof tank crews. The STAFF is easily themost radical of the new rounds beingfully developed for the Force XXI tankfleet. It can be used to engage verylong range targets, targets in defilade,maneuvering targets, and flying targets.Since there will probably only be a fewSTAFFs in the basic load, decidingwhich round to use becomes a criticalskill for the tank commander. The gun-ner and loader must also be welltrained in its use. With only a few ofthese high cost, high payoff rounds, thetank crew must insure that they are notwasted because of inadequate training.The best and most realistic training forSTAFF can only occur on a gunneryrange.

There are ways to get around the po-tentially high cost of a STAFF traininground. One method is to avoid makingthe training round a non-explosivecopy of a real STAFF. Instead, by tyingthe training range and the round to-gether, the overall cost of the round canbe greatly reduced. To minimize thecost of the training round itself, theflight body of the round could be re-duced to an inert slug. Folding fins are

required on the actual STAFF in orderto rotate the explosively formed pene-trator (EFP) to its correct orientation inrelation to the target. A slug round doesnot have an EFP, hence does not needthe complex and costly control mecha-nisms and folding fins of the realSTAFF. Inexpensive, static fins, similarto those on the M831, would probablysuffice for flight stability of the slug. Interms of training, this is okay since thetank crew only sees the actual STAFFfrom the adapter forward and the tailand fins of a real STAFF are hiddenfrom the crew in the cartridge case.The training STAFF would not need tocarry the expensive electronics of thereal round either. On a gunnery rangeroles can be reversed and the target cansense the STAFF, instead of vice versa.A directional sensing device, such as aradar or sky screen, could be placed ina protected position just behind the tar-get. It is possible to make such a de-vice ‘look’ into the space above the tar-get and sense if a STAFF traininground flies over the target and throughthe basket from which an EFP could besuccessfully launched. When a success-ful engagement is sensed at the target,a flash/bang device (such as a Hoffmandevice) would be activated at the tar-get.9 This would simulate the launchingof an EFP so the tank crew could sensethe engagement and be scored accord-ingly.

This training round concept has anumber of advantages. First is cost. Aslug round, as described above, shouldcost approximately the same as currenttraining rounds. Some additional costfor the sensing and flash/bang deviceswill be incurred, but this should besmall over the life of the device. Thiskind of training round and its associ-ated target equipment could also beused on all current tank ranges that al-low main gun firing. Finally, and mostimportantly, use of this training schemewould simulate a STAFF engagementto the tank crew. The tank commanderwould issue a fire command and callfor STAFF. The gunner would indexSTAFF, identify the target, and an-nounce the range. The loader would setthe range switch (could be a dummy)and load the round. The gunner wouldfire the round. The round now only hasto fly over the target. The round issensed as it overflies the target, and if



For the most part, the story of Japa-nese armored employment in the Pa-cific war was a dismal tale of smallunits employed in static or infantrysupport roles. The Malayan campaignis the one instance in WWII where theJapanese used armor effectively in anexploitation role. The best examplefrom this campaign occurred in the bat-tle of the Slim River on January 7th,1942. Although overlooked by mostU.S. Army students of armored war-fare, it holds some important lessons inexploitation, improvisation, and juniorleader initiative.

The British defeat in Malaya has beenthe subject of much misconception, thegreatest being that it came about due tothe superior jungle fighting ability ofthe Japanese. In fact, little fighting wasdone more than a few kilometers fromtrafficable roads. The battle for Malayawas a battle for the maneuver corridorsthrough the Malayan mountains andjungle. These corridors were from 50meters to several kilometers wide, andwere cultivated with rubber tree planta-tions as well as other agriculture.Towns dotted the main roads and rail-roads that ran down the length of thecorridors. Although certainly lush withvegetation, the corridors could not trulybe classified as jungle. Significantly,the rubber plantations had numerousside roads that connected with the mainroad and allowed parallel trafficability.

By January 5th, 1942, the Britishwere in full retreat from northern Ma-laya. They had suffered through amonth of disastrous engagements,forced out of position after position by

Japanese envelopments. On more thanone occasion, the roadbound Britishunits had to attack through Japaneseroadblocks to be able to retreat. Thisunbroken string of disasters had left itsmark on all the British units engaged,particularly the 11th Indian Division,which had done much of the fighting.The men who were to occupy the de-fenses at Slim River were punchdrunkwith fatigue and suffering the low mo-rale of constant defeat.

The Japanese, on the other hand,were on a roll. Although fewer in ag-gregate numbers, they were able tomore effectively mass their combatpower along the maneuver corridors.Their tactics were simple but effective.Their advance guard, a reinforced bat-talion of combined arms elements, in-cluding infantry (often mounted on bi-cycles), armor, and engineers wouldadvance down the maneuver corridoruntil they made contact. If not able toimmediately fight through, the Japa-nese would launch battalion- or regi-mental-sized infantry envelopments toget behind the British positions, cuttheir lines of communications, and at-tack them on their unprotected flanks.The key to the Japanese success wastheir ability to sustain momentum andkeep the pressure on the British.

By January 4th, the 12th and 28thBrigades of the 11th Indian Divisionmoved into positions forward of Trolakand extending in depth back to the vi-cinity of the Slim River bridge. The di-vision commander, General Paris,hoped to forestall the previous effectsof shallow Japanese envelopments by

placing his troops in depth. To quotehim:

“In this country, there is one and onlyone tactical feature that matters — theroads. I am sure the answer is to holdthe roads in real depth.”1

This statement is not as unreasonableas it may first appear.

Although the Japanese logistical tailwas considerably shorter than that ofthe British, it still had to use the roadsystem to sustain its force. GeneralParis reasoned that any Japanese at-tempt to conduct a short envelopmentthrough the jungle, as previously expe-rienced, could be counterattacked bythe brigade in depth. The maneuvercorridor did not present much morethan a single battalion’s frontage, evenconsidering outposts and security ele-ments placed up to a kilometer into thejungle on either side. Instead of tryingto extend their forces into the bush toconfront the Japanese while they wereinfiltrating, the British would commit

A Study In Armored ExploitationThe Battle of the Slim River: Malaya, 7 January 1942

by Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton


reserves to counterattack them whenthey appeared. This would keep theirforces mobile along the road system.

The 12th Brigade took up forwardpositions with its battalions arrayed indepth, beginning in the vicinity of milepost 60 and extending back to milepost 64 (see map, following page). Twobattalions of the Indian Army occupiedthe forward positions; the 4/19th Hy-derabad occupied the initial outpost po-sition and the 5/2nd Punjabi occupiedthe main defense about a mile back.

A third British battalion, the Argyland Sutherland Highlanders, was posi-tioned in the vicinity of Trolak village,where the jungle began to open outonto an estate road. The brigade re-serve, the 5/14th Punjabis, was posi-tioned at Kampong Slim with the mis-sion of being prepared to move to ablocking position one mile south ofTrolak near mile post 65. The 28th Bri-gade’s positions were south of the 12thalong the maneuver corridor, and werearrayed as single battalions in depth,

much like the 12th Brigade. However,on the early morning of January 7th,the brigade had still not occupied thepositions, having been instructed byGeneral Paris to rest and reorganize.2

The British infantry units had 12.7-mmantitank rifles and 40-mm antitankguns. The AT rifles were only margin-ally effective. The AT guns wouldpenetrate any Japanese tank with ease.

A key to the defensive scheme wouldbe the defenses and obstacles along themain road. The British should have hadenough time to construct defenses thatwould have precluded a quick Japanesebreakthrough. The British were also inthe process of preparing to demolishnumerous bridges along the main road.However, several factors were to con-spire against them.

The first factor was fatigue. Theirforces were tired, to the point wherethey didn’t do a good terrain analysiswhen setting in their defense. Therewere many sections of the old highwayrunning parallel to the newer sections

that had been straightened. These oldsections ran beside the main roadthrough the jungle and were excellentavenues of approach. There were alsonumerous side roads through the rubberplantations, and many of these roadswere overlooked. Others were noted,but did not have sufficient forces allo-cated to them.

Secondly, the British units had all suf-fered numerous casualties. Many oftheir formations were under new andmore junior leadership. These leaderswere trying to cope with the monumen-tal task of reorganizing their strickenunits while conducting defensivepreparations, and they were sufferingfrom fatigue as much as (if not moreso) than their troops.

Another critical British deficiencywas communications equipment. The11th Indian Division had lost a greatdeal of its signal equipment in themonth-long retreat prior to the SlimRiver battle. As a result, there was notsufficient communications equipment


to lay commo wire between the bri-gades. This lack of communications,combined with fatigue, also preventedthe British artillery from laying in andregistering its batteries to support theinfantry positions. Lastly, the Japanesehad complete mastery of the air. Thisprecluded the British from moving uptheir supplies in daylight and severelylimited the extent of their defensivepreparation.

All of these factors combined to robthe British of their opportunity to builda cohesive defense. They had sufficientbarrier material, in the form of mines,concrete blocks, and barbed wire toconstruct an effective obstacle systemin depth, but at the time of the Japa-nese attack, only a fraction of it hadbeen brought forward. In the locationwhere the Japanese actually brokethrough, there were only 40 AT minesand a few concrete blocks emplacedwhen the Japanese attacked.3

On the afternoon of the 5th, the Brit-ish 5/16th (the covering force) with-drew, and soon afterward the advanceguard of the Japanese 42nd Regiment,5th Infantry Division, made contactwith the forward elements of the Hy-derabad battalion. The Japanese probedthe Hyderabads’ forward positions andwere repulsed. The Japanese advancedguard commander, Colonel Ando, de-cided to wait for tanks and other sup-porting troops. The 6th of January wasspent by the Japanese reconnoiteringthe British defenses and preparing fortheir usual infiltration along the Britishflanks.

Major Shimada, the commander ofthe Japanese tank unit attached to the42nd Infantry (a company plus of 17medium and 3 light tanks from the or-ganic tank battalion of the Japanese 5thInfantry Division) implored ColonelAndo to be allowed to attack straightdown the road. Ando was at first skep-tical, but finally acquiesced, reasoningthat if the tank attack failed, the infil-tration could still continue.4 The Japa-nese tank company, with an attachedinfantry company and engineer platoonin trucks, was set to begin the assault at0330 the next morning.

The Japanese attack began with artil-lery and mortar concentrations fallingon the 4/19th Hyderabad’s forward po-sitions, while at the same time infantryunits assaulted the forward positions ofthe Hyderabads, and engineers clearedthe first antitank obstacles along theroad. At approximately 0400, the Japa-

nese armored column started forward,crewmembers initially ground-guidingtheir vehicles through the British obsta-cle.

The Hyderabads had no antitankguns, but did manage to call artilleryfire on the Japanese, which knockedout one tank. The rest of the Japanesecolumn swept through the breach andcontinued down the road to the nextbattalion position. Behind them, the re-mainder of the 3rd Battalion, 42nd In-fantry, completed the destruction of theHyderabad battalion, leaving only dis-

organized and bypassed elements to bemopped up later.

The Japanese column moved on. By0430, it had reached the main defen-sive belt of the 5/2nd Punjabi battalion.The lead tank hit a mine and was dis-abled, and the remainder of the columnstacked up behind the disabled vehiclealmost bumper to bumper. The Pun-jabis attempted to knock out the Japa-nese tanks with Molotov cocktails and12.7-mm antitank rifles, but werelargely stopped by a heavy volume offire from the Japanese tanks and infan-


try. At this point, the Japanese foundone of the unguarded loop roads thatparalleled the main road and took it,bypassing the Punjabi defenses andtaking them in the flank. The Punjabis’defense collapsed into a series of smallunits fighting where they stood or try-ing to escape. The Japanese armor con-tinued on, leaving the tireless 3d Bat-talion, 42nd Infantry, and other ele-ments of the Japanese advance guard tocomplete the destruction of the Pun-jabis.

Unfortunately for the British, this wasthe last prepared defensive positionfacing the Japanese. The Punjabis hademplaced only a single small mine-field. In spite of this, they somehowmanaged to hold the Japanese for al-most an hour, taking heavy casualtiesfrom the tanks’ fire, before the Japa-nese found another loop road and wereoff again. It was about 0600; the Japa-nese were exploiting like broken-fieldrunners. Almost 1,000 British and In-dian soldiers were dead, prisoners orfugitives in small groups heading southalong the edge of the jungle.

Tragically for the British, no word ofthe fiasco had reached either the re-maining battalions of the 12th Brigade(the Argyls and the 5/14th Punjabis) orthe 28th Brigade. The Japanese ar-mored juggernaut, (about 16 tanksstrong at this point), with what re-mained of the accompanying infantryand engineers, continued south at a fastpace.

The next unit they encountered wasthe unsuspecting Argyl and SutherlandHighlanders, who had established tworoadblocks in their defensive sector.The speed of Japanese movement, andthe abysmal nature of British commu-nications, caught the Argyls unawareand unprepared. The Japanese columnburst through the first blocking positionalmost before the Argyls could offerany resistance. The fight at the secondroadblock took only a little longer, withthe Japanese destroying several Britisharmored cars before continuing on. Theremainder of the Argyl battalion wasengulfed by the follow-on Japanese in-fantry in much the same manner as theother battalions.

To their credit, the Argyls fought fe-rociously in small groups and held theJapanese infantry longer than any ofthe other battalions. This, in turn, in-creased the distance between the Japa-nese armored column and the follow-on infantry. Had the 28th Brigade beenin a better defensive posture, this might

have made a difference. As it was, theArgyls’ sacrifice was in vain.

The Japanese tankers took full advan-tage of the confusion in the British de-fense to continue their advance downthe main road towards the Slim Riverbridge. Upon reaching Trolak, theyscattered the engineers who were pre-paring the bridge for demolition. Thelead tank platoon leader, LieutenantWatanabe, personally dismounted fromhis command tank and slashed thedemolition electrical wires with hissword.5 The lieutenant and his com-pany commander sensed that they hadthe momentum in this drive and that itwas urgent to keep the pressure on thedisorganized British. The Japanesetanks and the few remaining infantryand engineers that had somehow stayedwith them raced ahead. It was approxi-mately 0730. South of Trolak, the Japa-nese armor encountered the 5/14thPunjabis, who were moving along theroad in march column towards theirdesignated blocking position. The tanksliterally raced through the surprisedbattalion, machine-gunning a largenumber of the Punjabis before theycould even get off the road. In only afew minutes, the 12th Brigade’s reserveceased to exist as an effective unit. TheJapanese armor continued its un-checked advance along the main road.

The British had lost track of the bat-tle. General Paris was not informed ofthe breakthrough until 0630.6 He im-mediately ordered the 28th Brigade tooccupy its defensive positions and todetach its antitank battery forward tothe 12th Brigade. Unfortunately, thebattery met the Japanese while movingup the road and was destroyed before itcould unlimber its guns and engage theenemy. Thus, one of the few units inthe 28th Brigade that was capable ofstopping the Japanese armor was elimi-nated at the outset of that brigade’sfight. Incredibly, the 28th Brigade hadnot received word of the completepenetration of the 12th Brigade. TheJapanese armor slammed into the 28thBrigade while it was moving to its de-fensive positions and swept it aside in aseries of short bloody encounters. Likethe 5/14th Punjabis, the 2/1st Gurkhaswere surprised in march column on theroad while moving to their defensivepositions and suffered severe casualtiesbefore they could get out of the way ofthe Japanese armor. The other battal-ions of the 28th Brigade, 2/9th and2/2nd Ghurkas, tried to engage theJapanese armor, but with no antitank

obstacles and only a few 12.7-mm ATrifles, they were quickly bypassed.

The Japanese armor continued tomove down the road, shooting uptransport columns and disruptingdemolition efforts on the road and atthree lesser bridges. The Japanese tankshad by now completely outrun their ac-companying infantry and engineers.The follow-on infantry battalions con-tinued to fight through the disorganizeddefenses bypassed by the armor. TheJapanese tanks next shot up two artil-lery batteries of the 137th Field Regi-ment before reaching the Slim Riverbridge at approximately 0830. The anti-aircraft defenses of the bridge consistedof 40-mm Bofors antiaircraft guns.These engaged the Japanese tanks butwere ineffective — their shells wouldnot penetrate. Their crews took manycasualties from Japanese return fire.The antiaircraft gunners and the engi-neers preparing demolitions on theSlim River bridge scattered. LieutenantWatanabe (who was wounded by thistime) directed the machine gun fire ofhis tank against the wires to the bridgedemolition and succeeded in severingthem. The Japanese force (by this timeconsisting of about a dozen tanks) lefttwo of their number to guard the bridgeand continued south along the mainroad. Finally, after continuing for twomore miles, the Japanese ran into an-other British artillery battalion, the155th Field Regiment. This artilleryunit deployed its 4.5-inch howitzers inthe direct fire mode and engaged theJapanese over open sights at less than200 meters. The lead Japanese tank(commanded by Lieutenant Watanabe)was destroyed and the entire crewkilled. Other Japanese tanks were dam-aged. Checked at last, the Japanesetankers returned to the Slim Riverbridge to guard their valuable prize.The Japanese infantry accompanyingthe tanks, not less than a company instrength, arrived a few hours later. Themain body of the 42nd Infantry Regi-ment did not link up with the armoredunit until almost midnight. The Japa-nese had lost about eight tanks, someof which were recoverable. Their infan-try losses had been moderate, but re-placable. Their morale was sky high.

Summary

The Japanese had won a smashingvictory. In the space of about sevenhours, with a single company of obso-lete tanks supported by infantry and en-


gineers, and followed by an infantryregiment (-), they had almost com-pletely destroyed an entire British divi-sion. By the afternoon of the 7th ofJanuary, the British units the Japanesearmor had bypassed were a jumble ofdisorganized fugitives. In the bestshape were the infantry battalions ofthe 28th Brigade, who could retreatacross an adjacent railroad bridge. Inthe worst shape were the men of the12th Brigade; literally all of them wereeither killed, taken prisoner, or movingin fugitive groups trying to infiltrateback.

The losses to the Argyl and Suther-land Highlanders were especially tragicto the British, as they had repeatedlyproven themselves to be the besttrained battalion in Malaya. Had theynot been surprised by the Japanese ar-mor, they could conceivably have heldthe Japanese advance long enough forthe 28th Brigade to have reached itspositions and unlimbered its antitankguns. The battle probably could nothave been salvaged, but at least a moreorderly retreat would have been possi-ble, followed by the demolition of theSlim River bridge. As it was, less thanone hundred men of this battalion man-aged to reach British lines. The magni-tude of the disaster is reflected in thenumber of survivors from each brigade.Only 400 men of the four battalions in12th Brigade managed to break out andrejoin the retreating British army. The28th Brigade did slightly better, withapproximately 700 men, but this unitwas also clearly decimated. All in all,the British lost two brigades in theSlim River battle, along with most oftwo battalions of artillery, as well astransportation, signal, engineer, andother supporting units. Those Britishand Indian soldiers and units that es-caped, escaped on foot. Not a singlevehicle was retrieved from north of theSlim River.

The remainder of the Japanese pursuitof the British down the Malay penin-sula retained the same flavor as theSlim River actions — relentless, ag-gressive Japanese pursuit of tired Brit-ish units who had suffered too manylosses in personnel and equipment andwho could never keep the Japanesefrom operating inside their decision cy-cle. The Japanese did meet a series ofreverses when they encountered freshAustralian troops of the 8th AustralianInfantry Division. A cautionary note onheadlong armored exploitation wassounded just 11 days later near thesmall town of Bakri. The Japanese at-

tempted to repeat their SlimRiver success by sending alight tank company to attackdown the main road. TheAustralians defending the an-titank obstacle on the roadcoolly waited for the Japa-nese to begin negotiating theobstacles and then quicklyknocked out nine Japanesetanks with antitank gun fire.The accompanying infantrywas also temporarily stoppedby the Australians, sufferingnumerous casualties. TheJapanese formula from SlimRiver was unchanged. Thedefenders however, werefresh troops who had had theopportunity to emplace theirdefense properly. Unfortu-nately for the Australians, therest of the British forceswere simply too depletedfrom their earlier defeats tooffer an effective resistance.As a result, they were com-pelled to retreat to the islandof Singapore with the rest ofthe British army, abandoningMalaya to the Japanese on30 January. Singapore wouldsurrender two weeks later.

Lessons Learned

• Armored exploitationand exploitation in general issomething to be seized upon.Had the Japanese halted toregroup, or waited for addi-tional forces after havingpenetrated the 12th Brigadenear Trolak, the 28th Brigadewould have had enough timeto go into a hasty defense.The experience of the Japa-nese tank company that wasshot up by the Australians while tryingto repeat the events of January 7thshows what would have happened tothe Japanese on that day had the Brit-ish been able to get their antitank gunsinto action. The Japanese decision topress on was taken by junior officersand supported by their commander,who didn’t wait for a perfect sitrep.The Japanese knew that they had theBritish disorganized, and that they hadto just keep hitting them.

• Like the OPFOR at the JRTC, theJapanese were able to avoid British de-fenses and sustain their momentum bypushing their mass down side trails thatwere poorly defended or undefended.

They sacrificed frontage to do this, andon several occasions had a mass of ve-hicles stacked up in column while onlythe first few in line could fight. Hadthe British been able to accurately massartillery on them, they could haveslowed their advance. However, theBritish often didn’t know the Japanesearmor was there until it burst uponthem out of the side roads. The mo-mentum of the Japanese advance didnot allow the British to track the battleeffectively. The lesson here is that ar-mor units cannot be wedded to wideavenues of approach. By assuming riskon the side roads, the Japanese wereable to bypass British defenses and sur-prise the British units.

Japanese Armor at Slim River

The Japanese used two types of tanks at theSlim River battle. The main medium tank usedwas the Type 94, which was the most commonJapanese medium tank throughout the early partof the Pacific war. The light tanks used wereType 95s, which were encountered by Alliedforces throughout the entire war.

The Type 94 was an older design that was firstintroduced in 1934. Weighing 15 tons, its armorwas only 17mm at its thickest. The tank had anadvertised maximum speed of 28 mph, although20 mph or less was the norm due to its beingrelatively underpowered. The 57-mm gun was agood infantry support weapon; however, therewas no coaxial machine gun — the turret ma-chine gun faced out of the turret rear. In addi-tion, there was a hull machine gun. The Type 94did carry a large amount of ammunition: 100 57-mm rounds and 2,800 rounds of machine gunammunition. It was cramped for its crew of fivemen, and visibility from it was poor. There wasno radio to communicate with other vehicles,communication being done by flags or shoutedorders. The Type 94 had an unrefueled range of100 miles. (See illustration on pp. 26-27.)

The Type 95 light tank was a slightly newerdesign that had some of the same problems ofthe Type 94 as well as many of its own. The10-ton tank had even thinner armor than theType 94 (14mm). It was slightly faster than theType 94 and could achieve its maximum speedof 25(+) mph. It was armed with a 37-mm gun,as well as two machine guns in a similar ar-rangement to the Type 94. However, the three-man crew could not operate all the weapons atonce. The commander was particularly over-taxed, having to load and fire the main gun orturret machine gun, as well as command thetank. The Type 95 also had an operational radiusof about 100 miles.

Source: Defeat In Malaya: Arthur Swinson, pp. 70, 71.


• Hand-in-hand with this is the les-son that “tankable terrain” is any placea tank can physically go. The Britishhad dismissed Malaya as terrain un-suited for armored operations.7 Thenarrow frontages confronting themmade even the limited number of Japa-nese tanks available decisive. In a nar-row maneuver corridor, an armoredunit does not have to be of divisionalstrength to have a critical impact on theoutcome of the battle.

• The Japanese exploited their suc-cess by rushing units after their ar-mored column as quickly as possible.Had they not done so, the armor, withits small complement of accompanyinginfantry and engineers, would havebeen overwhelmed and destroyed byregrouping British units. By followinghot on the heels of the armor, the Japa-nese denied the British the opportunityto regroup.

• The Japanese proved again thevalue of a large volume of suppressivefire. Several times, the Japanese col-umn was stacked up amongst the Brit-ish defenses. The extremely high vol-ume of fire placed on the British by thetanks and their accompanying infantryallowed them to survive this exposureuntil the obstacles could be reduced ora bypass found.

• The experience of the British inbeing unable to set in an adequatehasty defense is a stark example of thestrain of retrograde operations underpressure. The unpreparedness of theBritish defenses was due largely to fa-tigue and the requirements of recon-solidation after a month of continuousfighting. There were sufficient minesand barrier materials, as well as anti-tank weapons and artillery, availablefor the British defensive scheme of ma-neuver. Anyone who shrugs off theBritish in this case study as just anotherunit that failed their defensive prepphase at the NTC is missing the point.What confronted the leaders up anddown the chain of command in thosetwo brigades was about as bad as itgets. They were planning a hasty de-fense in unfamiliar terrain while reor-ganizing units that were at about 66percent strength from combat losses (ahigh percentage of those losses wereleadership personnel). They hadn’tslept for two days, and were under con-stant air attack. Leaders at all levelsshould contemplate that, and thinkabout how they’d overcome those con-ditions.

• A final lesson is an oft-repeatedone in armored warfare. Ultimately, itisn’t the machines; it’s the men whodrive them. The Japanese tanks wereobsolescent, even by the standards ofthe day. The mediums could barelytravel 18 mph and had very thin armorthat could be penetrated with ease byBritish antitank guns. The light tankswere literally three-man tin cans, withthe commander also acting as theloader and the gunner. The Japanesetank machine guns were magazine-fed,as opposed to belt-fed, and the visibil-ity from the vehicles was poor. All inall, they were not ideal weapons ofwar. However, they were driven bycrews who were well trained in theiruse, understood their capabilities, andwho possessed a ferocious will to com-bat the enemy. This factor bears con-sideration in today’s world. When wasthe last time one of us shrugged off anenemy armed with T55s?

Conclusion

Although not involving nearly asmany tanks as the great battles inEurope and Africa, the Japanese attackand exploitation at the Slim River wasone of the most decisive uses of armorin WWII. Lieutenant Watanabe andMajor Shimada and their men certainlybelong in the ranks of the great tankersof WWII. Their exploit was equal tothe best of the Americans of the 4thArmored Division, Rybalko’s TankGuards, or Hermann Balck’s 11thPanzers. Although the vehicles theyused were little better than tin cans,their offensive spirit and willingness torelentlessly pursue an off-balance en-emy was in the best traditions of thecombat arm of decision.

Notes

1Falk, Stanley, Seventy Days To Singapore,G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1973, p. 148.

2Percival, Arthur LTG, The War in Malaya,Byrne and Spotteswoode Publishers, London,1949, p. 203.

3Kirby, Woodburn S., Singapore — TheChain of Disaster, Macmillan Co., 1971, p.177.

4Allen, Louis, Singapore — 1941-1942, Asso-ciated University Press, p. 149.

5Tsjui, Manaboru, Singapore, The JapaneseVersion, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 172.

6Palit, P.K. Brigadier, The Campaign in Ma-laya, The English Book Store Press, NewDelhi, 1960, p. 59.

7Swinson, Arthur, Defeat in Malaya, Ballan-tine Books, 1969, p. 41.

Bibliography

Allen, Louis, Singapore 1941-1942, AssociatedUniversity Press

Falk, Stanley, Seventy Days to Singapore, G.P.Putnam and Sons, 1973

Hall, Timothy, The Fall of Singapore, Mandi-ran Books, Australia, 1983

Kirby, Woodburn S., Singapore, The Chain ofDisaster, Macmillan Co., 1971

Owen, Frank, The Fall of Singapore, PanBooks, London, 1960

Palit, P.K. Brigadier, The Campaign in Malaya,The English Book Store Press, New Delhi,1960

Percival, Arthur, Lieutenant General, The Cam-paign in Malaya, Byrne and SpotteswoodePublishers, London, 1949

Stinson, Arthur, Defeat In Malaya, The Fall ofSingapore, Ballantine Books, 1969

Tsjui, Manasoburu, Singapore, The JapaneseVersion, Oxford University Press, 1960

Wigmore, Lionel, The Japanese Thrust: Can-berra, Australian War Memorial, 1957


Lieutenant Colonel MartinN. Stanton received his infan-try commission in 1978 fromFlorida Tech. He served as acompany XO with 1st InfantryTraining Brigade at Ft. Ben-ning; rifle and TOW platoonleader with 1-9 Infantry in Ko-rea; assistant G3 staff officerwith 9th ID, and commander,D Company, 2-2 Infantry,both at Ft. Lewis, Wash. Heserved as company and S3observer/controller at theNTC at Ft. Irwin; senior bri-gade advisor, 2d Saudi Na-tional Guard Mech Brigade,Hofuf, Saudi Arabia, and asS3, 2-87 Infantry, Ft. Drum,N.Y. His combat service in-cludes the Gulf War in 1991and Somalia, 1992-93. Agraduate of the College ofNaval Command and Staff atNewport, R.I., he is currentlyassistant J5 Policy, USCENT-COM.

Company C was a California Na-tional Guard outfit that traced its rootsto Troop C, 1st Squadron of the Cali-fornia Cavalry, organized in Salinas,California in 1895. After WWI, theArmy converted one company in eachof the 18 National Guard Divisions to atank company, and in 1924, the SalinasGuard company became the 40th TankCompany in the 40th Infantry Division.The company was first equipped withFrench design Renault tanks left overfrom WWI.

The spectacular success of the Ger-man Panzer Divisions in the fall ofFrance and Belgium caused the Armyto form four tank battalions, from the18 scattered National Guard tank com-panies, numbered 191, 192, 193, and194. On September 8, 1940, the old40th Tank Company became CompanyC, 194th Tank Battalion and wasalerted for possible call-up. It didn’ttake the Army long to decide to inductvarious National Guard units into fed-eral service, and on February 10, 1941,Company C was federalized and or-

dered to Fort Lewis, Washington, fortraining. At Fort Lewis, the Salinascompany joined with Company A fromBrainerd, Minnesota, and Company B,from St. Joseph, Missouri, to form the194th Tank Battalion with Major E.B.Miller as commanding officer.

At Fort Lewis, it seemed that every-thing that could go wrong, did gowrong, from lack of uniforms to short-ages of tanks and equipment. In addi-tion, the Regular Army general at FortLewis viewed “latter day” soldiers withcontempt, which made life even moredifficult. In spite of all this, the 194thwas rated among the best tank battal-ions in the Army and was shipped outfrom San Francisco on September 8,1941, with 54 new Stuart M3 lighttanks, bound for Manila. The unit hadthe distinction of being the first U.S.armored unit overseas in what was tobecome WWII.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, theshortage of supplies, especially gaso-line and spare parts, hampered the bat-

talion’s training exercises, even thoughthere were adequate supplies in thequartermaster warehouses in Manila. Itwas so bad that a request for spareparts often took 30 days to navigate theArmy red tape. More critical was thefact that live ammunition wasn’t issueduntil December 2, and the 37-mm tankguns had never been fired. The 37-mmHE ammo was never shipped to thePhilippines; Ordnance finally impro-vised some HE ammo during the cam-paign.

On November 20, the 192nd TankBattalion arrived in Manila and Com-pany D, which was on board, was as-signed to the 194th to replace Com-pany B (from St. Joseph, Missouri)which had been detached at Fort Lewisand sent to Alaska. Colonel R.N.Weaver, a Regular Army officer, wasplaced in command of the ProvisionalTank Group, consisting of the 192ndand 194th Tank Battalions, which wasunder the direct control of the U.S.Army Forces Far East (MacArthur),bypassing MG Wainwright, the ground


Company C, 194th Tank Bnin the Philippines,1941-42

A California National GuardTank Battalion, Federalized in 1941,Arrives In the South PacificAs War Breaks Out

by Burton Anderson

The author wishes to thank the following Company CBataan survivors for their input into this article: CWO EroSaccone, USA, Ret.; Frank I. Muther; Leon A. Elliott; RoyL. Diaz; Thomas J. Hicks, and Glenn D. Brokaw.

forces commander. This split commandstructure was to cause many problemsin the defense of Luzon.

When the Japanese struck Clark FieldDecember 8, 1941, the day after PearlHarbor, Company C tankers were indefensive positions around the perime-ter of the field. They had just finishedlunch and were cleaning their mess kitswhen they saw an approaching forma-tion of bombers and assumed theywere U.S. bombers until the bombsstarted falling. The attacking force con-sisted of 53 bombers followed by 34fighters. C Company soldiers ran totheir tanks and half-tracks and com-menced firing in spite of the bombsfalling all around them. The enemybombers smashed the neat rows of B-17s and P-40s lined up on the runwayand then the fighters strafed everythingthat was left. At the end of the raidsome 40 minutes later, half the U.S.Far Eastern Air Force was destroyed.In all, 55 men were killed and over 100wounded, but miraculously, CompanyC suffered no casualties even thoughits soldiers were firing from exposedpositions.

The fighters flew so low that itseemed a shotgun could bring onedown. At that point, a “green” RegularArmy lieutenant grabbed a private firstclass’s arm and yelled that shooting atthe planes would give away their posi-tion — as if it mattered at that point.The GIs blazed away with everythingthey had, and Private Earl G. Smith ofCompany C was credited with downingone of the nine enemy fighters shotdown that day.

After the raid, the company spent thenight loading machine gun belts fromSpringfield rifle clips because they hadfired all their belted ammo. The nextday, the company was split off from thebattalion and bivouacked two milesnortheast of Clark Field. It remainedthere until December 12, when it wasdetached from the 194th and ordered tojoin the South Luzon Force under thecommand of Brigadier General AlbertM. Jones. They marched south at night,about 40 miles, and then made a day-light dash to Muntinlupa and on to Ta-gatay Ridge on the 14th. The companyremained in this area from the 14th tothe 24th and conducted reconnaissancepatrols, hunting presumed fifth colum-nists who were flashing mirrors by dayand setting off flares at night near ourammo dumps. No one was ever cap-tured, but after C Company shot upsome suspected native huts, the suspi-cious activities ceased.

The Japanese landed 7,000 troops atLamon Bay at 0200 on December 24and proceeded inland in the directionof Lucban. Meanwhile, Company Cmoved into position on Christmas Eveto assist the Filipino 1st Infantry Regi-ment. During Christmas Day, BrigadierGeneral Jones personally conducted areconnaissance down a narrow road to-ward the enemy, escorted by a Com-pany C halftrack manned by SergeantKeith Lewis, Sergeant Leon Elliott, Pri-vate First Class Jim Hicks, Private Wil-liam Hennessey, and Private FredYeager. They were reconnoitering northof Piis, Luzon, when they came underfire from an enemy advance guard. Thehalftrack, in attempting to turn around,fell into a ditch, but the crew was ableto remove their guns and provide cov-ering fire as they retreated, enablingGeneral Jones and his driver to escapeunharmed. For this action, GeneralJones recommended the crew for theDistinguished Service Cross, but no ac-tion was taken until April 1946, andthen the recommendation was denied.

Instead, the five crew members wereawarded the Silver Star, but by then,only Sergeant Leon Elliott was still alive.

On December 26, the 2nd platoonwas ordered by a Filipino major tomove down a narrow mountain trail,firing as they went to impress the Fili-pino troops. The platoon leader, Lieu-tenant Needham, protested the orderand suggested they do a reconnaissancefirst to see what was out in front, butthe major assured him that the enemyonly possessed small arms and orderedthe platoon to carry out the mission.The tankers set out and promptly raninto an antitank gun and some con-cealed field pieces. The lead tank washit, mortally wounding LieutenantNeedham and Private First ClassRobert Bales. Staff Sergeant Emil S.Morello, in the second tank, drovearound the disabled tank and ran overthe antitank gun. Sergeant Morello’stank was also hit, wounding PrivateEddie DiBenedetti, who was hit in theneck by a flying rivet. (This incident


The Japanese Landingsin Southern Luzon

prompted the War Department tochange from riveted to welded con-struction in new tank production.) An-other tank, commanded by SergeantGlenn Brokaw, was hit and PrivatesFirst Class Jim Hicks, McLeod, andSeifort were killed and Brokaw seri-ously wounded. (Ironically, Hicks hadvolunteered to drive Brokaw’s tankwhen the regular driver became ill.)

In all, five tanks were hit and immo-bilized. Sergeant Morello and fourwounded stayed buttoned up insidetheir tanks, not daring to move becausethe Japanese had camped for the nightalongside the tanks, unaware that any-one inside was alive. In the morning,the enemy left, and Sergeant Morellobegan tending the casualties. He gath-ered up five wounded, and they es-caped through coconut groves and ricepaddies.

With the help of Filipino guides theyhired, Sergeant Morello and thewounded soldiers all showed up in Ma-nila five days later after fleeing throughenemy territory. He left DiBenedetti ina Catholic Hospital in Manila and, withthe other wounded, made his way byBanca to Corregidor. Later, during Feb-ruary, Sergeant Morello was able to re-join the company on Bataan. For thisaction, Sergeant Morello was awardedthe Silver Star.

The action described above resultedin the loss of an entire platoon of tanksand five soldiers, and was a grim les-son about the consequences when re-connaissance is ignored and tanks aresent out on a mission, essentially blind.

Manila was declared an open city onDecember 24, and, on the 25th, Gen-eral MacArthur ordered the implemen-tation of Orange Plan-3, which pro-vided for the withdrawal of all Philip-pine and U.S. forces into Bataan as alast defensive position. In compliancewith the order, Company C withdrewfrom South Luzon on December 29,acting as a rear guard for GeneralJones’s troops. They moved to TagatayRidge on the 31st and made a sleepless100-mile night dash to Bocaue wherethey rejoined the rest of the 194th TankBattalion.

On the march North, the troops wereto bypass Manila because it had beendeclared an open city; however, therear guard, led by First Sergeant Ero“Ben” Saccone, was unsure of theroute around the city. They decided togo through central Manila (the onlymaps they had were Atlantic Richfieldservice station maps) and it didn’t seemto matter that the city was off limits.

In the dark, one of Company C’stanks hit the Jose Rizall statue whiletrying to avoid hordes of fleeing civil-ians. The tank threw a track on impactand bent an idler. The crew worked allnight trying to repair it, but by day-light, they saw it was hopeless. Theydisabled the tank and tried to hitch aride with some Filipino troops in BrenGun carriers. None would stop until thetankers leveled their .45 cal Thompsonsubmachine guns at the convoy. Thenthey got a lift; they were the last ar-mored troops out of Manila.

From Bocaue, the company headedfor the Calumpit Bridge over the Pam-panga River on Route 3. This was a vi-tal structure, since all traffic fleeingManila toward Bataan had to pass overthis bridge. It was here that C Com-pany witnessed 100-150 empty Filipinotrucks in headlong flight from Manila,where there were ample supplies in thewarehouses. Had these supplies beenmoved while there was still time, theU.S. and Filipino forces on Bataancould have conceivably held out longerand with far less suffering. Also, hadthese supplies been moved prior to theoutbreak of hostilities, as called for inOrange Plan-3, the troops wouldn’thave nearly starved to death. Perhapsthe inaction was due to General Mac-Arthur’s belief that war would notbreak out until April 1942.

All the South Luzon forces wereacross the Calumpit Bridge by 0230January 1, followed by C Company inthe rear guard. Then the bridge wasblown up. From there, the tanks movedthrough San Fernando at the criticaljunction of Route 3 and Route 7 fromNorth Luzon. Again, the tankersformed successive road blocks onRoute 7 during the next three days.

At 1600 on January 5, Captain FredMoffitt, commanding officer, C Com-pany, leading two tanks and twohalftracks, assisted by four self-pro-pelled 75-mm guns and the 31st Infan-try, ambushed 750-800 enemy troops.Our forces inflicted 50 percent casual-ties on the Japanese and left the townof Lubao in flames. Had they notstopped the enemy troops there, our re-treat into Bataan would have been cutoff.

Moving toward Bataan on January 6,another night battle took place near Re-mulus. Captain Moffitt’s halftrack tooka direct hit from an enemy shell thattook off Private William Hennessey’sleft foot and wounded Private FirstClass Walter Martella. Both died oftheir wounds, Martella within a few

days due to gas gangrene, and Hen-nessey at Camp O’Donnell after thesurrender on Bataan. In the same battle,Staff Sergeant Carl F. Abbott scored adirect hit on an enemy tank before histank was hit and disabled; however, heescaped injury and the tank was re-trieved the next day.

The withdrawal toward Bataan con-tinued, and by January 7th, CompanyC was at the Culo River, guarding theleft flank of the Layac Bridge, whichwas the gateway to Bataan. As soon asall forces were across, the tankers with-drew and the bridge was blown up,temporarily sealing off the Bataan Pen-insula. The blowing of bridges had be-come of critical importance, and thecommanding officer of the 194th hadto give his personal order before abridge could be demolished. This ordercame about because of the loss of sixtanks by the 192nd at the Agno Riverin Northern Luzon, when panicky Fili-pino troops blew a bridge and strandedthe tanks on the enemy side.

The withdrawal into Bataan to a biv-ouac south of the Abucay Main BattleLine afforded the troops a slight lullfrom battle. They had been in actionfor 30 consecutive days and were ex-hausted. To add to their misery, MGWainwright ordered the food ration cutin half, to only 30 ounces per man perday. In the first month of combat,Company C had lost seven tanks andsix men killed in action. The losses ne-cessitated reorganizing the companyinto three platoons of three tanks each,plus one command tank (prewarstrength was five tanks to a platoonplus the CO and XO tanks, for a totalof seventeen). The remaining tankswere long past the 400-hour scheduledmaintenance and had been run so hardthe rubber track plates had been worndown to the metal. Fortunately, somereplacement parts were available fromthe Service Command Area in southernBataan.

The next significant action involvinga platoon of C Company was afterGeneral Wainwright sent three tanks toBagac, on the west coast of Bataan.The following day, they were orderedto advance north to reopen the coastalhighway to Moron. The tanks weremoving in advance of the main bodyand as they rounded a curve, the leadtank (Staff Sergeant Frank Muther) wasfired on at point-blank range by an an-titank gun. Incredibly, the round wentright over the turret, and in returningfire, the tank knocked out the enemygun. Two tanks following 600 yardsback hit land mines placed by the Japa-


nese after the lead tank went by. Thisuse of land mines was a favorite tacticof the Japanese. Muther’s tank wasable to turn around and withdraw pastthe disabled tanks, and the platoon gotout without any personnel casualties.The disabled tanks were towed out thenext day and used for spare parts.

This incident was another case wherean order to send tanks out alone, aheadof infantry, nearly became a suicidemission. Throughout the campaign,tanks were not used properly. The gen-erals regarded them as mobile pillboxes. They also tended to send only aplatoon when a full company wasneeded. Conflicting orders from theProvisional Tank Group Commander(Colonel Weaver) and General Wain-wright kept the tank battalion com-manders in constant turmoil, and oftenthey had to rely on their own judgment.The tanks were often assigned piece-meal to various units by Tank Group orby Wainwright’s ground commanders,thereby losing the advantage of com-bined arms protection. In addition, fewsenior officers had any experience withtanks, and they did not know how toemploy armor to the best advantage.

By the middle of January, lack offood and medicine caused malaria,dengue (dengue fever), and dysentery,which took a heavy toll on the mal-nourished troops. Especially criticalwas a shortage of quinine to treat avirulent form of malaria prevalent onthe Bataan Peninsula. The constanthordes of flies and mosquitoes madetheir problems worse. The troops hadnot received any mail since the warstarted. Occasionally, they could getsome news via short-wave radio fromSan Francisco, but otherwise listened toTokyo Rose for entertainment.

On January 26th, C/194 covered thewithdrawal from the Abucay Main Bat-tle Line toward the next defensive posi-tion at the Pilar-Bagac Road. (The onlysatisfactory road across Bataan.) AsCompany C was moving across an areacalled Hacienda Flats, the U.S. forcesinflicted at least 1,500 casualties. TheJapanese retaliated with a heavy bomb-ing attack. A dud bomb went thoughthe fender of Muther’s tank but didn’texplode. Another tank stalled on abridge and had to be pushed over theside to prevent a roadblock. CaptainMoffitt was wounded in the leg by aflying timber while crossing a bridgejust as it was blown up.

By February 8, the U.S. and Philip-pine forces had fought the enemy to astandstill in spite of their supply, dis-

ease, and malnutrition problems. Therewas a lull in infantry action, but theJapanese kept up the relentless shellingand bombing of our lines. Company Cwas on the east coast of Bataan andused mainly for beach defense, to wardoff any attempt by the enemy to invadeBataan from Manila Bay. During anaerial attack near Lamao, a .50 cal ma-chine gunner from C Company hit aJapanese plane that was last seensmoking and diving toward ManilaBay, a fact confirmed by Sergeant Le-wis. The company was split up intovarious beach positions, and some ofthe locations were near enough to Japa-nese lines that 14-inch mortar fire fromU.S. guns on Corregidor landed un-comfortably close to our tanks.

By the middle of March, the food ra-tion was cut again, down to 15 ouncesper man per day. The troops subsistedmainly on rice, supplemented by any-thing they could scrounge, includingworms, snakes, monkeys, and an occa-sional native caribou. General Wain-wright, an old cavalry man, had to or-der the slaughter of 250 horses and 42mules from his beloved 26th CavalryRegiment to ward off starvation. Inspite of the extra meat, the Bataanforces were in dire straits, with onefourth of the troops in the hospital withdisabilities associated with disease andmalnutrition.

Toward the end of March, the Japa-nese resumed their offensive after be-ing reinforced by Imperial Marines re-leased after the fall of Singapore. OnApril 3, the enemy began an all-out of-fensive, accompanied by constantbombing and shelling. Major GeneralEdward P. King (in command afterWainwright moved to Corregidor)made one last effort to stop the enemyacross Southern Bataan.

Four tanks from the 2nd platoon weresent from Lamao, on April 6, overmountain trails to the vicinity of MountSamat in south central Bataan. Thetanks were to support the Philippine45th and 57th Infantry, PhilippineScouts, who were opposing the enemycoming down Trail 29. On the morningof April 7, the Filipinos were in head-long flight, and the tanks moved downTrail 8 to try and stem the tide. At thejunction of Trail 6, the lead tank en-countered antitank fire, which blasted itoff the trail, knocking out the tankcommander. Corporal Ray Peoplestook over command, and with the othertanks covered the withdrawal under in-tense enemy fire. The retreat was mademore difficult by the hundreds oftroops and vehicles clogging the trail.

The platoon managed to regain itsstarting point without further casualties.However, Sergeant Morello’s tank,which suffered an engine lockup, hadto be towed to the shop at Cabcaben.

Meanwhile, the 3rd platoon, under thecommand of First Sergeant “Ben” Sac-cone, with two tanks and two half-tracks, was ordered to attempt an en-veloping maneuver by moving to thewest coast of Bataan via the coast roadto Mariveles and on to the Pilar-BagacRoad. They were in the vicinity ofMount Samat where they encounteredfierce resistance at an enemy roadblock. (It was virtually impossible forthe tanks to get off the trails because ofthe thick jungle and trees. This was aconstant problem during the entirecampaign. The platoon was out of ra-dio contact with battalion headquartersand was unable to assess the situation,so it reversed its march and made itback to Mariveles, where it rejoinedthe remnants of the company. Thesetwo actions were the last for CompanyC, which by April 8 had been in com-bat for four months, lost ten tanks, andhad six men killed in action.

General King, on April 8, acknow-ledged that the situation was criticaland that further resistance would resultin the massacre of his troops, including6,000 sick and wounded and 40,000refugees. The troops still on the linewere less than 25 percent effective andcouldn’t last for more than a day. Con-sequently, he ordered the troops tocease fire and to destroy their equip-ment when the code word “Blast” wasgiven. This occurred at 0700 April 9,1942, and hostilities on Bataan ceased.As it turned out, the U.S. and Philip-pine troops were doomed from the startof the war by the lack of air power,supplies, and reinforcements. However,due to the heroic efforts of units likeC/194th Tank Battalion, the Japaneseadvance was critically slowed.

General Homma had expected to takethe Philippines in three months, but in-stead it took five, and the U.S. gainedprecious time needed to go on the of-fensive in the Pacific.

Company C, 194th Tank Battalionwas officially inactivated April 2, 1946,in the Philippines, and the chapterclosed on a courageous outfit. Thecombat and prisoner of war ordeal hadtaken a heavy toll on the company andout of 105 men who left Salinas, Feb-ruary 18, 1941, only 47 returned. Dur-ing the time the company was in com-bat, it earned three Presidential UnitCitations (Defense of the Philippines,


it flies through the correct basket, aflash/bang is activated and detected bythe crew.

Conclusion

New doctrine and technology ischanging the way the Armor Force willfight its future battles; therefore, theneed for new training ammunition isreal. New service ammunition hasbeen, or will be, introduced into theArmy that has no counterpart in thetraining world. If we are to remain trueto the credo that we train the way wefight, the Armor Force’s training toolsneed adjustment. The best tank, ammu-nition, and war fighting doctrine in theworld must continue to be comple-mented by the world’s best training,and that requires new training ammuni-tion.10

Notes

1The M831 is currently being replaced by theM831A1. For the tank crew, the difference isinvisible.

2Armaments Research, Development and En-gineer Center (ARDEC) concept. The Propel-lant-Nose-Breakup Concept is a variant of the105mm XM797.

3The Boosted-High-Drag-Projectile Conceptwas developed within the Weapons TechnologyDirectorate of the Army Research Laboratory.

4Aerodynamic strakes are raised bands of ma-terial that extend along a surface. In this case,think of them as long, very low fins that extendthe length of the tail cone.

5The Ablative-Nose-Projectile Concept is theoriginal 105mm XM797 concept that was de-veloped by ARDEC in the late 1970s and testedin the early 1980s.

6Ablation is a process of burning away a sur-face. Ablative materials are formulated to ab-sorb heat energy by controlled burning away ofthe surface material.

7ARDEC concept.8The Low Drag/High Drag Fin Concept

(Drogue Flap) was developed within the Weap-ons Technology Directorate of the Army Re-search Laboratory.

9The authors would like to thank Mr. MarkFrank of ARDEC for some simplifying sugges-tions to this concept.

10The authors would like to thank the peoplewho read drafts of this article and made manyhelpful suggestions. In particular, Mr. Ed Fen-nell and Phil Donadio of ARDEC, Mr. DonGuziewicz and MAJ Dave Gallop of PMTMAS, and Mr. Al Pomey and SFC RobertHorner of the Armor Center.


Major Steve Thorson earnedhis commission in Armor in1981 from the Officer Candi-date School, Ft. Benning, Ga.He served as a tank platoonleader, support platoon leader,and battalion S4 in 1-35 Armor,Erlangen, Germany, and laterassigned as BMO, and com-mander, Co C and HHC, 1-34Armor, Ft. Riley, Kan. Heserved as a force design ana-lyst at the Force Design Direc-torate, Combat Developments,Combined Arms Center, Ft.Leavenworth, Kan. He wasnext assigned to the IG Office,HQ, USAREUR, Heidelberg,Germany. He is currently anAcquisition Corps Officer at theOffice of the PM, TMAS, Picat-inny Arsenal, N.J. He holds aBA degree from John Jay Col-lege of Criminal Justice, NewYork City, and an MA in Man-agement from Webster Univer-sity, St. Louis, Mo. He is agraduate of AOB, QMOAC,MAMC, AOAC, and CGSC.

Major Bruce J. Held wascommissioned from the U.S.Military Academy in 1980. Heserved with the 32d Armor atFt. Carson, Colo., and with the2d Armored Cavalry Regimentin Bamberg, Germany. He hasalso served in the Army Re-search Laboratory as an ArmorTechnology Manager and iscurrently assigned to the Officeof the Project Manager for TankMain Armament Systems. Heearned an MS in aerospaceengineering from Stanford Uni-versity and a law degree fromthe University of MarylandSchool of Law. His militaryeducation includes MIOBC,AOAC, MAMC, and CGSC.

Force XXI TrainingAmmunition(Continued from Page 25)

Luzon, and Bataan) and the PhilippinePresidential Unit Citation for servicefrom December 7, 1941 to May 10,1942. In Company C, there were sixSilver Stars awarded to tankers, and theentire company received the BronzeStar. Unfortunately, this didn’t happenuntil well after the war, and by then,many medals were given posthu-mously. It took tireless effort by mensuch as Chief Warrant Officer Ero“Ben” Saccone to enable these men toreceive their well-merited medals.

In 1947, Salinas again had a tankcompany when the Headquarters Com-pany, 1st Battalion, 149th Armor wasactivated. Since that time, the companyhas been assigned to various units. Atpresent, it is Headquarters and Head-quarters Company, 1st Battalion, 149thArmor. Its unofficial motto is “Remem-ber the Road to Bataan,” a lasting trib-ute to the men of Company C, 194thTank Battalion.

Selected Source Material

Ashton, Paul, Bataan Diary, Privately Printed,1984.

Miller, E.B. Colonel, Bataan Uncensored, HartPublishing Inc., Long Prairie, Minn., 1949.

Morris, Eric, Corregidor, The End of the Line,Stein and Day, New York, 1981.

U.S. Army, Operations of the Provisional TankGroup, United States Army Forces in the FarEast 1941-1942.

Burton Anderson served asan ensign aboard the heavycruiser USS Pensacola duringWWII and during the Bikiniatom bomb tests in 1946. Hegraduated from the Universityof California at Berkeley in1949 and joined a firm in thelettuce business. He retired in1985 after spending 36 yearswith the company, rising fromranch manager to executive.Currently, he is an independentagricultural consultant and isstaff historian for the CoastalGrower magazine. He haswritten numerous articles onagriculture and Salinas Valleyhistory.

The arrival of the JAVELIN fire-and-forget antitank missile can allow thecombat units of the United States Armyto maximize the effect of direct fires intactical depth on the battlefield by em-ploying skirmishers. Throughout his-tory, successful armies have adoptedforward-deployed missile systems asskirmishers to effectively harass, delay,and disrupt enemy formations. Cyclictrends in tactics and technology havecaused us to replace skirmishers in cur-rent doctrine with indirect artillery, butwith the advent of smart missiles forground combat we should reinstate theskirmishers to their historically properplace on the battlefield.

Armies as old as the early Greekscame to dominate their opponents withtactics that included skirmishers. Theywould open battle with javelin throwersor slingers hurling volleys of missilesto break the enemy’s formation. Theirarmies combined the effect of accuratemissile fire followed by the superbshock effect of the phalanx of heavyinfantry. By 352 B.C., Philip of Mace-donia built the world’s finest combinedarms army, with lines of heavy infantryphalanxes flanked by groups of heavycavalry. “The extreme end of the rightwing consisted of light cavalry andsometimes archers and slingers whowere ready to move out as a screen ofharassers and skirmishers to open theaction. When these were driven backby the advance of the enemy, they ranto the rear through lanes opened forthem by members of the phalanx.”Philip’s son, Alexander, inherited thisarmy and with it conquered the knownworld.

The Romans also relied on skirmish-ers. Vegetius tells us, “The most activeand best disciplined men were selectedfor this service; and as their numberwas not very great, they easily retiredin case of a repulse through the inter-vals of the legion, without thus occa-sioning the least disorder in the line.”Vegetius goes on to say that, if the skir-mishers repulsed the enemy, theywould pursue. The heavy infantry

would never pursue because it wouldbreak their disciplined formations.

When the shock action of heavy cav-alry dominated the battlefield, skir-mishers adopted the bow and crossbow.At Crécy in 1346, French skirmishersopened battle with the English. TheFrench employed Genoese crossbow-men who shot one bolt per minute attargets up to 350 yards away. The Eng-lish longbowmen, whose range wasonly 280 yards, answered with 10 ar-rows per minute. The thousands oflongbow arrows released that daybroke the French skirmish line andcavalry charges. Like latter day indirectartillery, the high-angled fire of thelongbow seemed to displace the shotsfrom the skirmishers.

The advent of gunpowder increasedthe role of skirmishers. In the early1700s, Field Marshal Maurice de Saxedescribed his very successful tacticswhen he wrote:

“In attacking infantry, the light-armed foot are to be dispersedalong the front, at the distance ofa hundred, one hundred fifty, or

two hundred paces in advance.They should begin firing when theenemy is about three hundredpaces off, without a word of com-mand and at will, until the enemyapproaches within fifty paces. Atthis distance, every captain is toorder a retreat, taking care to re-tire slowly towards his regiment,keeping up his fire from time totime, until he arrives at his bat-talion, which should be startingto move.”

He dismissed the notion that his skir-mishers were endangered when out-numbered by the enemy, saying, “Canthey fire against seventy men scatteredalong the front of my regiment? Itwould be like firing at a handful offleas.” His time and distance calcula-tions convinced him that his skirmish-ers would each get off thirty wellaimed shots at the advancing enemy.(Imagine thirty accurate antitank mis-siles launched by each skirmisher to-day!) Skirmishers eroded the enemyboth physically and morally by target-ing their leadership in the front ranks.This led the field marshal to conclude,


BACK TO THE FUTURE:

Javelins and Skirmishers on the Battlefield

by Major James K. Morningstar

“I contend that a single shot from oneof these irregulars is worth ten fromany other.”

Skirmishers became more widelyused as accurate rifles became avail-able in the latter half of the eighteenthcentury. The British army resistedadopting skirmishers until GeneralBraddock’s force ran into them in theFrench and Indian War. They then es-tablished a “light” company in eachfoot regiment to cover advances andperform other special missions. TheFrench abandoned linear tactics alto-gether, along with military organiza-tion, as a result of the Revolution. Theycovered the dense formations of thelevée en masse with “clouds of skir-mishers,” a habit Napoleon would re-tain even after he restored discipline tothe army. Throughout the AmericanCivil War both sides employed skir-mishers as an essential element of theirbattlefield tactics.

Skirmishers fell out of favor as artil-lery and mechanization began to domi-nate the battlefield. The deadly effectof artillery and machine guns effec-tively transformed the infantry attack.No longer would soldiers form into thetightly packed masses which were sovulnerable to the skirmishers. By WorldWar II, the battlefield was dominatedby indirect artillery, the shock power ofarmored tanks, air power, and amor-phous groupings of infantry. Onceagain, skirmishers lost their place onthe battlefield.

Shadows of things past still emergein the present on today’s battlefield. Inthe past, massed infantry would be ex-posed to the slings and arrows of theenemy before closing to destroy theother side’s massed infantry. Today,massed armored vehicles are attrittedby indirect fires before closing to de-stroy the other side’s massed armoredvehicles. Artillery has displaced skir-mishers as the dominant forward mis-

sile weapon, with one important differ-ence: the skirmisher aimed for particu-lar targets. Artillery most often usesforward observers and spotters to directartillery into a general area.

Skirmishers of the Civil War wouldaim and rapidly fire specifically at thelead horsemen of the attacking cavalryformation. Killing those leaders couldhave two effects. First, an obvious lossin cohesion would follow. Second,other leaders might be more reluctantto step forward. This is how enemyformations and intentions were brokenby skirmishers.

Indirect artillery on its own cannot re-produce the effects of skirmishers. Twodisplays of artillery used against an op-posing force (OPFOR) at the NationalTraining Center (NTC) illustrate thispoint. In the first case I notionally ap-ply artillery against an OPFOR forma-tion depicted as it actually looked onan attack in the fall of 1994. The con-ditions are ideal for artillery as the OP-FOR attacks through constricting ter-rain in column formation with a leadForward Security Element (FSE) fol-lowed by the Advance Guard MainBody (AGMB). In this example, I usetwo notional artillery battalions that aretimely, perfectly accurate, and neverlose a gun.


BATTALION 2

BATTALION 1

M109A1 RANGE = 23 KMs

FSE

FSE in column enters1st Artillery Battalion’srange at 0705 hrs.Crosses point of firesfor six minutes. Battalion 1 fires

192 rounds on FSE.Equals 1 T-80 and5 BMPS killed.

MO

RN

ING

ST

AR

Figure 1. The initial artillery strike in a perfect world.

BATTALION 1

BATTALION 2

M109A1 RANGE = 23 KMs

Battalion 1 startsmove 0711. Set 0744.

AGMB

FSE

Main body in columnenters Battalion 2’srange at 0733 hrs.Crosses point of firesfor six minutes.

Battalion 2 fires192 rounds on AGMB.Equals 1 T-80 and5 BMPS killed.

MO

RN

ING

STA

R

Figure 2. The continuing use of artillery in a perfect world.

In Figure 1, the first artillery battalionengages the enemy FSE as it enters thebattalion’s maximum range. The FSE,consisting of three T-80 tanks andseven BMP armored personnel carriers,takes 6 minutes to cross a point on theground. If the 24-gun battalion fires onthe FSE for 6 minutes, 192 rounds landon the FSE (3 rounds per tube for thefirst minute, 1 round per tube per min-ute for the next 5 minutes). By thestandards set at the NTC, that translatesinto enemy losses of about one T-80tank and five BMPs.

The minute it completes its fires, thebattalion does a doctrinal survivabilitymove to avoid enemy counterbatteryfires. It takes a good battalion, underideal conditions, about 15 minutes tobreak down, 3 minutes to move theminimum of 1 kilometer, and another15 minutes to set up again. Add to thisthe 7 minutes the battalion will need toobtain its next target and we cannot ex-pect to have the first artillery battalionavailable to fire again for forty min-utes. While the M109A6 Paladin-equipped battalion reduces the timethreshholds for all operations, the se-quence of events remains the same.

Although we could use the second ar-tillery battalion to continue pounding

the FSE, we wait to fire on the AGMB.If we did engage the FSE, calculatingas we did above, we would kill aboutone T-80, three BMPs and four AT-5anti-tank systems. This battalion wouldthen have to conduct a survivabilitymove and may not be ready when theAGMB arrives. As it turns out, the FSEwas scattered over nearly eight kilome-

ters following our first strike and doesnot offer much of a target.

Meanwhile, in Figure 2, we see thatthe enemy AGMB enters the second ar-tillery battalion’s range at 0733 hours.If we calculate fires as above, the sec-ond artillery battalion would destroyone T-80 and five BMPs. We acceptthe risk of keeping the second battalionfrom moving until the first battalion isset to fire at 0740 hours. In the sevenminutes from 0733 to 0740 hours thesecond battalion fires only an addi-tional 48 rounds, enough to kill per-haps 2 BMPs if they could adjust fireson the moving target. Before the en-emy enters the close engagement arearange, the first battalion gets one moreshot at the main body. Results: onemore T-80 and five BMPs. Total enemylosses are: FSE lost one T-80 and threeBMPs; the AGMB lost two T-80s and12 BMPs. That leaves in these unitsabout 10 T-80s and 28 BMPs rapidlyconcentrating on a point in our defen-sive line.

This scenario assumes perfect condi-tions for the artillery. The enemy at-tacks in columns right into our targets,we never miss, and we avoid counter-battery fires. Our survivability moveswere only one kilometer, allowing us torecycle our artillery very quickly. Inthis perfect world we destroy about 23percent of the enemy’s tanks and 35percent of his personnel carriers. In re-ality, ten to fifteen percent would be


M1A1

BRADLEY

T-80

BMP

MAIN DEFENSE

FORWARD DEPLOYED COMPANY TEAM

MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION

TIME: 0620

MO

RN

ING

STA

R

Figure 3. A forward deployed company team ready for the FSE is surprised by an entiremotorized rifle battalion.

M1A1BRADLEY

T-80

BMP

MAIN DEFENSE

FORWARD DEPLOYED COMPANY TEAM ** SKIRMISHERS**

MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT

Lost 1 tank, 7 BMPs,and 1 AT-5 to Arty

Lost 2 tanks, 11 BMPs,and 2 BRDMs to co/tm

TIME: 0720

DEAD VEHICLES

MO

RN

ING

ST

AR

Figure 4. The Team skirmish line greatly increases enemy losses. Between 0620 and0720, the entire enemy regiment advances only 9 kilometers.

very good. That is why, time and timeagain, we see brigade commanderswho told their fire support planners todelay, disrupt, or worse, destroy the en-emy disappointed at battles end.

Compare the results above with whathappened in another battle at the NTCin the fall of 1994. A brigade in the de-fense had expected the enemy to attackwith an FSE followed by a AGMB(Figure 3). They decided to place onecompany team forward of their maindefenses as a screen line to engage anddestroy the FSE and then fall back to areserve position. The enemy, however,decided not to use an FSE; they ledwith a whole battalion.

As shown in Figure 4 the companyteam engaged the enemy battalion as itemerged from the passes. By the timethey realized they had their sights seton something big, it was too late to fallback. The brigade’s artillery had a bet-ter than average deep fight and killedone tank, one AT-5, and seven BMPs,which equates to about 8 percent of theenemy’s tanks and 16 percent of hisother systems. The forward-deployedcompany did even better, killing twotanks, two BRDMs, and 11 BMPs andraised the total enemy casualties to 23percent of his tanks and 43 percent ofhis other combat systems. Rememberalso that part of the artillery’s successresulted from the enemy’s delay on tar-geted areas while his lead elementstried to deal with the forward-deployedcompany team. The forward companyteam was an ad-hoc skirmish line.

Imagine if the team employed abovehad been trained to execute as trueskirmishers with fire-and-forget weap-ons. They could have planned to fireand fall back along the enemy flank insuccessive positions all the way back tofriendly lines. What would be the com-pounded effects of targeting enemylead, command, and engineering vehi-cles? How can such actions be tied intoour indirect fire plan, obstacle plans,and close air support?

One of the problems preventing theproper employment of skirmishers hasbeen the lack of proper weapons sys-tems to do the job. The wire-guidedmissiles require crews to visually trackthe missile into their target and they aretoo cumbersome for the skirmish role.

When a BRDM fired a SAGGER atmy company in the Gulf War, at leastsix tanks saw the flame of the missile’slaunch and fired at the BRDM beforeits missile reached us. Add the techni-cal limitations of firing wire-guidedmissiles over trees, water, or snow andsuch missiles are impractical for use byskirmishers. Laser designators are vul-nerable to tracking difficulties, too un-wieldy for run-and-gun tactics, and re-quire coordination for munitions. Cur-rent tanks are potential skirmishers butare better designed for shock weaponroles. Recent technological advancesnow offer a perfect solution for armingskirmishers.

The new breed of smart missiles areabout to fundamentally change groundbattle systems, organization, and tac-tics. One such missile, the JAVELIN,offers us the opportunity to gain tacti-cal depth by adopting skirmishers. TheJAVELIN utilizes an infrared seekerthat takes only 10 seconds to cooldown and can defeat smoke and fog.The missile flies 2,000 meters, thenuses a top-attack flight path to strikethe thin top armor of an enemy tankwith a tandem warhead that also de-feats reactive armor. Unlike wire-guided missiles, the JAVELIN can befired over trees, water, and power lines.The fire-and-forget technology meansthe gunners no longer have to track themissile optically, so they can quicklymove, set up, and engage with reducedrisk of observation. It enables rapid di-rect firing against selected targets inenemy formations, thus increasing ourability to disrupt the enemy. With thelatest communication and battlefieldawareness technology, the effect ofskirmishers directed by an informedcommander can be like that of a scal-pel in the hands of a surgeon.

Half a century ago it was common forbig ships to carry big guns and close towithin sight of each other to duel. Nowsmart missiles reach out and touch en-emy ships. Fighter pilots who flew intothe teeth of enemy formations to bringdown bombers now release missilesfrom standoff ranges. Before long, it ispossible that skirmish lines with smartmissiles can similarly change armoredwarfare. These weapons and tactics area critical step in the “smart weapon”revolution. Skirmishers can make ashot from such a weapon, to paraphraseMarshal Saxe, “worth at least ten fromany other.”

“The new breed of smart mis-siles are about to fundamentallychange ground battle systems,organization, and tactics.”


Major James K. Morningstar isa graduate of the U.S. MilitaryAcademy and Kansas StateUniversity. He has served in avariety of armor positions, in-cluding tank platoon leader andcompany executive officer in the1-33 Armor Battalion in Ger-many, S4 in 1/4 Cavalry at Ft.Riley, and company commanderof Delta Company, 3-37 Armorin the Gulf War. Before his cur-rent assignment, he spent threeyears as a brigade operationstrainer/observer controller withthe Bronco team at the NationalTraining Center at Ft. Irwin. Heis currently assigned as theArmy Liaison to the Com-mander of U.S. Navy SecondFleet (Atlantic) on board theUSS Mt. Whitney somewhere inthe Atlantic Ocean.

The dream is always the same... I amsitting through the after-action reviewat the end of a lost battle. Though mostof my staff is half asleep, somehow Iam still awake, probably because I amstill angry.

They cheated! The OPFOR had somany unfair advantages. They seemedto know just where to attack us. TheOCs probably told them what our planwas. It couldn’t possibly have been myfault...

The senior observer/controller is tell-ing us that we are a bunch of losers.That’s some AAR technique this guyhas: “Beating the OPFOR at the Na-tional Training Center is tough to do.Losers at the NTC criticize the advan-tages that the OPFOR has, includingfamiliarity with the terrain and numeri-cal superiority. They claim foremostthat the ‘real’ enemy is not as good asthe OPFOR, which is probably true.Our experiences in Southwest Asiaseemed to uphold this idea. But it isalso possible that we are cheating our-selves, that someday we could fight awell-trained, well-disciplined enemywith good equipment on his homeground. Hopefully, we would do betterthan most units do at the NTC.”

I hate this guy already.

He starts to lecture us, and suddenlyhis face changes and he looks just likemy old AOAC instructor (which is al-lowed to happen in dreams, I guess).His voice assumes that sleep-inducingtone that I remember from many tacticsclasses years ago.

“Sun Tzu wrote, ‘All warfare is basedon deception.’ Current Army doctrinerecognizes surprise as a principle of

war, but our operational manuals givelittle guidance on how to achieve it.Another wise man once said that acommander can lose a battle, but onlyhis soldiers can win it. Solid executionof the commander’s intent is usuallythe most critical factor in the outcomeof any battle. Unfortunately, all toooften at the NTC the commander doeslose the battle, despite the valiant ef-forts of his troops. A study of general-ship illustrates a quality found in greatcommanders that our doctrine does notattempt to cultivate; for lack of a betterterm, I will call it the ability to ‘ma-neuver the enemy.’

“FM 100-5 defines maneuver as thecombination of fire and movement toobtain a ‘positional advantage’ over anenemy. Normally, we think of maneu-ver in terms of moving our forces togain that positional advantage in orderto destroy the enemy or accomplish ourmission. Unfortunately, the enemy’sability to move his forces often thwartsour attempts to outmaneuver him. Thismay seem like an obvious point, butmany commanders fail to take the en-emy’s free will into account when theyare planning their schemes of maneu-ver. Sometimes the commander is ledastray by his staff. Intelligence officers(S2s) are trained to predict the enemy’scourses of action based on informationthat is often sketchy at best. Sometimesthe enemy’s movements are oriented ona specific terrain objective, but manytimes the enemy is only concernedwith destroying our forces. The predic-tion that the enemy will come down acertain avenue of approach can lead thecommander to take risk elsewhere. Theenemy will then move his forces to ex-ploit those weaknesses which his recon

elements identify. The S2 who onlylooks at terrain and ignores dispositionof friendly forces in his analysis of en-emy courses of action is setting hiscommander and the entire unit up forfailure.”

Looking two seats to my right, I seemy S2 weeping uncontrollably. To myleft, my S3 is shaking his head andmuttering “We should have wargamedit,” over and over. Finally I have some-one else to blame. I am about to rise upand defend myself when the OC speaksagain:

“One way to impede the enemy’sfreedom to maneuver is to destroy hisrecon. If he doesn’t know where youare, he cannot exploit your weaknesses.The OPFOR relies heavily on recon.One good technique that you used todeny his recon was positioning a largecounter-recon force forward. Althoughthis was a complicated operation, yoursoldiers executed it very well, and itcould have forced the enemy to choosea course of action without complete in-formation. Unfortunately, it was impos-sible to know if you had destroyed allof his recon elements, and if you didget them all, he could have just sentout some more. That is exactly whathappened — one dismounted reconteam called in all of your positions andobstacles. Thus, recon denial is only apartial solution to the problem of ma-neuvering the enemy.”

Now I know for sure that this is adream because an OC almost told usthat we did something right. Suddenly,his uniform changes, melting away in aflash of light. As my eyes readjust, hisface changes again and I am staring atNapoleon! He starts in French, but


ManeuveringThe Enemy

by Captain Charles D. Starbird

changes to English in mid-sentence, " ... so another way to influence the enemy's maneuver is to employ a deception plan. Current U.S. maneuver doctrine promotes the use of deception mainly in the role of force protection prior to battle. Deception at the strategic and operational levels is emphasized over tactical deception. Planners at brigade and task force level seem to see deception as an unneccessary complication and usually only plan it to support other deception plans from higher. Nevertheless, a successful deception plan can 'maneuver the enemy' to a position of disadvantage, allowing friendly forces to maneuver to destroy him. The key is to influence the enemy's decision-making process, convincing him to choose the course of action you want him to choose. One way to accomplish this is to portray strength where you don't want him to go by using obstacles, fake battle positions, false radio traffic, and denial of recon. At the same time, portray weakness where you do want him to go by allowing his recon and lead elements initial success there. This is exactly the tactic that I used in 1805 at Austerlitz to defeat a much-larger enemy force. Read about it sometime!"

I hate reading history, but I make a note to do a little research. I vaguely recall studying that battle in school Napoleon tricked Alexander into ex-

posing a flank, effectively maneuvering his enemy to a poor position and then annihilating him. Maybe with some more guidance, my staff could have created a deception plan. I decide to try it next time.

In the blink of a very tired eye, Napoleon becomes General George S. Patton. He looks a lot like George C. Scott. He continues with great vigor: "The last key to maneuvering the enemy is retaining flexibility. The deception plan must be combined with the flexibility to react if the enemy chooses a different course of action than the one you intend him to. A quick, lethal reserve is essential in order to mass your combat power at the critical place and time. You must plan all of the possible contingencies and identify the decision points for them. The reserve must rehearse and be prepared to execute all of them. Do not leave your reserve with the mission to destroy 'leakers' though the defense; the reserve is meant to be committed to the main fight. Remember, the enemy will mass his combat power, to include artillery and air assets, at one point to penetrate your defense. You must, either make him choose the point you want, or be flexible enough to get to the point he chooses with enough combat power to win. Covering all of the possible avenues is not enough; you must decisively defeat his main effort!"

Captain Charles Dodd Starbird is the assistant brigade engineer for the 2d Brigade, 1 st Cavalry Division. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course. His past assignments include platoon leader, assault and obstacle platoon leader, company executive officer, and battalion maintenance officer in the 4th Engineer Battalion, 4th Infantry Division.

Suddenly, he vanishes. The generator outside dies, and the AAR van goes dark.

I am shaken awake by my executive officer, "Nap's over, Sir. We have an intel update for you. Looks like they're attacking a little earlier than we expected. The S3 is waiting for you behind Alpha Team. Your crew has the tank cranked. Good luck, Sir."

The sun is coming up as I ride out over the desert toward the artillery fire already pounding my main effort team. Rubbing my eyes as the sand blows into my face, I wonder what I was dreaming about. Four phrases keep buzzing through my head: maneuver the enemy!... deny recon!... use deception!... retain flexibility! I have no idea why they keep coming to mind, but it must have been a really bad nightmare

I feel like I didn't sleep at alL

ARMOR and AOAC Are Going on the Internet By the time this issue is in your hands, you will prob

ably be able to access "Issues in Armor," a forum based on continuing discussion and debate of issues raised in this magazine.

It is expected that the issue selected will change several times a year. The first discussion reprints letters, articles, and comments on the effect the new !VIS system will have on command and control, a debate that continues in this issue's Letters column.

Browsers will be able to add their comments to the forum, which will be edited by the Armor home page administrator, thus furthering the discussion.

Some changes are currently being made improve the server's capacity, but as we go to press, the current address is:

http://www.awwg.orgl-davelarmormaglcover.htrn

42

The Armor Officer Advance Course is on the Internet. Incoming officers can review course content prior to arriving at Fort Knox, and can contact the AOAC cadre for further information or to ask specific questions about upcoming classes.

Some of the subjects covered include AOAC reading requirements, student-taught classes, book review format, scoring system, decision paper format, physical training, and the AOAC welcoming letter.

The AOAC home page is tied into the Fort Knox home page and can be found by using search engines for Fort Knox on the World Wide Web. The AOAC home page address is:

http://l47.238.100.10Illarmschlaoac I pg.htrnl

The cadre e-mail address is: [email protected]


A wave of apprehension washes overme. I sit in my office as the new battal-ion mortar platoon leader and think,“What the hell do I do now?” Allaround me, infantrymen prepare for theday’s event: EIB training. I feel veryalone. What happened to the casualdays in the motor pool, doing impor-tant things like changing track and per-forming grease gun maintenance? Whatdo you mean the gut truck doesn’t stophere?

I feel like a fish out of water, but Ihave a plan. I lean back in my chair,clear my throat and say, “Hey platoonsergeant, how about showing me yourFM 7-90?” He slowly lifts his head tomeet my eye, takes a drag from hiscigarette, chokes down at least a pint ofthe blackest coffee I have ever seenfrom a mug the size of a small mopbucket and says, “What’s that...Sir?”

What had I gotten myself into thistime?

Eventually, wedged behind a book-shelf, I found the manual I was lookingfor — FM 7-90, Tactical Employmentof Mortars. I began to read.

Later that month, I attended InfantryMortar Platoon Officers Course andlearned everything I ever wanted toknow about the 4.2-inch mortar. I wasnow an expert, in the Army’s opinion.All I had to do now was prove it tosomebody.

In all fairness to the reader, I will be-gin by giving you the doctrinal solu-tion, FM 7-90, on how one should em-ploy a mortar platoon. Then, I will pro-ceed to tell you why little of thisworks, based on my experiences as amortar platoon leader before, during,and after Desert Storm. I will also pro-vide a tactical alternative to doctrinethat proved very effective in combat.

Doctrinally, the mortar platoon breaksdown into six squads of four men each;

two fire direction centers, also withfour men each; and a headquarters sec-tion with four men. Each squad ridesinto battle on an M106A2 Mortar Car-rier, with a driver, ammo bearer, assis-tant gunner, and gunner. Each fire di-rection center rides in an M577 Com-mand Post, with a driver, check com-puter operator, chief computer operator,and section sergeant. The headquarterssection is the platoon leader and pla-toon sergeant, who each have aHMMWV, and their respective drivers.A simple math check tells you that theplatoon has 35 enlisted soldiers andone officer. Uncle Sam, however,thinks you only need 34 enlisted. Thefirst organizational problem was to finda driver for the platoon leader. Noproblem! Just take an ammo bearerfrom one of the gun tracks and driveon. But remember, one of your squadsis now short a man.

The general concept of mortar em-ployment is actually quite simple. Theplatoon operates as split sections. Eachsection will have three squads (threetubes), a fire direction center, a sectionsergeant, and either the platoon leaderor platoon sergeant. The platoon leaderis usually with alpha section, and theplatoon sergeant is with bravo.

The purpose of this two-section ap-proach is two-fold. First, splitting theplatoon into two separate elements in-creases its survival chances, which al-lows the platoon to provide indirect firefor the battalion even if one section isdestroyed. Second, it allows the pla-toon to accomplish its mission of pro-viding responsive, accurate indirectfires to the battalion as these sectionsmove by either alternate or successivebounds. After a section completes abound, the platoon leader or platoonsergeant is responsible for ensuring thatthe section is properly laid. The platoonleader or platoon sergeant then leavesto recon the next position and prepare

it for the next bound. The four-man firedirection team processes mission datain the M577 and sends this data to theguns via land line. That’s basically it.

Of course, mortar platoons don’t al-ways operate in split-section configura-tion. They can act as separate sectionsas I’ve just discussed, as a whole pla-toon, or even as individual guns. Thesituation will dictate the employmenttechnique. The important thing to re-member here is that all this stuff isdoctrine, and, as we all know, some-times doctrine doesn’t provide the bestsolution.

After reading FM 7-90, attending IM-POC, shooting a few live fires, andpassing a platoon ARTEP, I felt prettygood about my platoon’s ability to per-form in combat if necessary. About amonth later, we got a chance to proveit. Deploying to Operation DesertStorm woke me from my false sense ofsecurity and demonstrated that I hadsome serious problems. I wasn’t as surethat all the pieces of the pie fit togetherproperly within the platoon anymore,and I needed to evaluate its configura-tion.

According to the book, we were do-ing everything right, but my platoonsergeant and I agreed that we needed tomake some changes. My platoon ser-geant had served in combat during Vi-etnam and this experience proved in-valuable to our reorganization process.“The first problem we got,” he said, “isthat all our eggs are in one basket.” Ittook a full five minutes of verbal ex-change between us before I finally real-ized what he was talking about.

Doctrine calls for three of the mostimportant individuals in the platoon toride in the same vehicle — the chiefcomputer, the check computer, and thesection sergeant. He was telling me thatwe should split this group up on sepa-rate vehicles to maximize the surviv-

Tactical Employment Of the Heavy Mortar Platoon

by Captain Matt Sebenoler


ability of the fire direction center andthe platoon’s combat effectiveness. Allthis accomplished initially was to cre-ate more problems. We deployed toSaudi Arabia with many unansweredquestions.

We arrived in Saudi Arabia, got ourequipment from the port, and deployedto the desert. I understood the conceptof separating the key personnel withinthe platoon to enhance its survivability,but I had trouble with one small sub-ject. Where does everyone ride? Thisseemed like such a simple questionwhile cruising the training areas at FortRiley. Now, when the stakes werehigher, this question became very diffi-cult to solve. The problem, ironically, isthe platoon leader and the platoon ser-geant. Doctrinally, we accomplishedour individual tasks while riding in ourassigned vehicles: the two HMMWVs.The two section sergeants were thetrack commanders of the M577s andthe computer operators also rode onthese command tracks. During DesertStorm, my battalion commander re-stricted all HMMWVs to the fieldtrains, effectively leaving us two vehi-cles short. Now I had to reconfigurethe platoon’s fire direction centers, es-tablish new load plans for its equip-ment, and find a place to ride.

The platoon leader and platoon ser-geant became the track commanders ofthe two M577 command posts. It wassimply the only place where one couldmaintain control of the unit and talk tohigher at the same time (more aboutthis later). I moved the section ser-geants to the lead gun track, where hetook control of that track while the pla-toon maneuvered; the squad leader wasstill responsible for the gun and his sol-diers during fire missions. Being in thefirst track allowed the section sergeantto quickly lay the section to fire be-cause he was right there with them. Hehad the M-2 aiming circle with him onthe track, allowing him to dismountand begin to orient the circle before thedust had settled. To finish our reorgani-zation, I sent the check computer op-erator to one of the wing tracks. Hehad a mortar ballistic computer withhim, and would act as the backup com-puter operator in case the chief com-puter operator was killed or wounded.The chief computer operator stayedwith me in the command post, and as-sisted me in tracking the battle betweenfire missions. I was happy with this so-lution. I believed that the combat effec-tiveness of the platoon greatly in-

creased with this new configuration.There remained one problem, however.If the command post was destroyed,how would I talk to higher? The onlyvehicles that had dual and green net(secure) capability were the M577s andthe HMMWVs. Somehow, I needed tocome up with some extra radios and acouple of Vinsons. Figuring that whom-ever got stuck driving my HMMWV inthe field trains wouldn’t need to talk toanyone, I stripped its commo system. Itook this tangle of cables back to myplatoon and managed to coerce a handy31V communicator into installing it inone of my gun tracks. This track nowhad dual net green capabilily, andwould act as my jump track if neces-sary.

Fully reconfigured now and preparedfor battle, confidence was high as wecrossed into Iraqi territory on the firstday of the ground war. This confidencequickly abated, however, as the taskforce slowly but surely crept awayfrom us. The fully loaded M106A2scould not handle the rapid pace of thetanks and Bradleys, and we wereforced, once again, to modify doctrine.Instead of using alternate or successivebounds — otherwise common doctrinalmovement techniques for a heavy mor-tar platoon — we displaced as a pla-toon and only stopped when requiredto shoot a mission. Although this actionreduced the responsiveness of mortarfires, I felt that it was better than nothaving any mortars at all.

At this stage, we finally had it figuredout. Our SOP went something like this:We traveled in a vee formation as farforward (usually behind the lead com-pany/team) as possible. The M577 wasin the center of the vee, providing com-mand and control, and the com-pany/team to our front provided uswith frontal security. Upon receipt of afire mission, I would orient the M577to the approximate center of sector andstop. The computer operator immedi-ately began to initialize the MBC andthe M-16 plotting board. Noticing myhand and arm signals, the section ser-geant would orient his track along theapproximate center of sector and stop.He would then dismount, grab the aim-ing circle and emplace it. The othertwo tracks had positioned themselvesby this time and the squad leaders pre-pared their mortars for firing. Theammo bearers quickly emplaced theaiming poles for their sights, ran to theback of the track, grabbed a loose endof wire from the DR-8 and sprinted to

the command post to hook up for wirecommunications. The other computeroperator had completed initializing hiscomputer and co-located with the com-mand post to act as check computer. Atthe peak of their proficiency duringDesert Storm, this entire operation tookless than two minutes for the platoon tocomplete.

As we all know, doctrine is simply aguideline. The SOPs and configurationsI’ve discussed here are certainly not thebest or only solutions to the manyproblems we encountered during thewar with Iraq. They may not even beright! The key is that, right or wrong,good or bad, they worked in that spe-cific situation. We knew our doctrine,but consciously deviated from it be-cause the battlefield’s conditions mademodification necessary. We, as theleaders of today’s Army, owe it to oursoldiers to give them every opportunityto succeed and win in combat. This re-sponsibility sometimes calls on us tomake some hard decisions. It would benice to believe that every decision youmight be called upon to make wasneatly laid out for you in some fieldmanual. Of course, they are not. Oursoldiers’ lives and mission success de-pend directly on our ability as dynamicleaders to adapt existing doctrine to thespecifics of each new battlefield and,ultimately, to the accomplishment ofthe commander’s intent.


Captain Matthew Sebenolerwrote this article based onhis experiences in combatwhile acting as task forcemortar platoon leader for 3dBattalion, 37th Armor, 2d Bri-gade, 1st Infantry Division.He was commissioned in1988 from the U.S. MilitaryAcademy. A graduate of theAOAC, AOBC, IMPOC,BMOC, SERE, Air Assault,and Ranger Courses, heserved as a tank platoonleader, mortar platoon leader,tank company XO, and S3air for 3-37 Armor at Ft.Riley, Kan. After AOAC, heserved as the S3 air and CCompany commander, 2dBattalion, 67th Armor, 1st Ar-mored Division.

Another accident that could havebeen prevented with a mine roller tankinvolved a Swedish Pbv-302 APCwhich struck a single TMA-3 antitankmine (6.5kg explosive) in the zone ofseparation. Unfortunately, two Swedishinfantrymen lost their legs in this acci-dent.

However, mine rollers off-road areanother story. SFC Michael A. Tucker,2nd Platoon, B Troop, 1st Squadron,4th Cavalry, reported that the mine roll-ers bog down in off-road areas wherethe soil is more likely to be soft ormuddy.

The use of tanks and APCs in moun-tainous areas is very limited. M1 tanksand M2 or M3 Bradley fighting vehi-cles are simply too heavy and too wideto operate effectively in the mountain-

ous Bosnian terrain. LT GraehmeParnell and his lead scout, SFCFrederickson, 1st Platoon, B Troop, 1stSquadron (formerly 3d Squadron), 4thCavalry, reported that much of themountainous road net in the 2d Brigadesector is inadequate to support M1A1tanks and M3 Bradley CFVs. Many ofthese mountainous roads are barelywide enough for the CFVs — SFCFrederickson noted that an M3 CFVcollapsed the shoulder of the road atone location, which damaged the road-way, prohibiting further passage. LTParnell also reported that most of thebridges on these mountain roads areconstructed with local timber and are

barely strong enoughor wide enough forpassage by CFVs. An-other example citedwas an “S” turn whichcould only be trav-ersed with a CFV go-ing downhill. Theyalso reported that onone narrow road asmoke grenade launch-er was ripped off whilethe vehicle hugged theside of the cliff toavoid falling off theroadway.

LT Parnell reported another notewor-thy incident in which some vehicles ofthe 501st MI Battalion were attemptingto go to a snow-covered hilltop in the

B Troop sector. Theywere unable to getsome of theirHMMWVs up thehill, despite equippingthem with tire chains.Six of the HMMWVshad to be towed byLT Parnell’s M3CFVs to get to thetop. MAJ MacFar-land, XO 1/4 Cav,also reported an inci-dent with a HMMWVdescending Mt. Vis,east of Tuzla; the ve-hicle overturned on asnow-covered road andcrushed the driver.

The mobility situ-ation has improved bythe mid-March arrivalof M973A1 vehiclesfor use in the 2d Bri-gade’s sector. Had

M973A1 vehicles been issued earlier,the accident on Mt. Vis could probablyhave been avoided.

After conducting a patrol with anM973A1 SUSV, LT Parnell reportedhis findings in the letter dated March21, 1996. In his summary, LT Parnellstated, “The BV-206S is an ideal ve-hicle for Operation Joint Endeavor.It provides adequate protection andfirepower for the peace enforcementmission. However, it should be usedin conjunction with tanks and Brad-leys to convey the overwhelmingfirepower image. Most importantly,it provides the mobility needed to

access secondary roads, cross MLC<30 bridges, and climb snow coveredmountains...”

In spite of these problems, the job ofpatrolling the zone of separation is be-ing accomplished remarkably well, es-pecially with air cavalry in conjunctionwith ground cavalry. The two air cav-alry troops in each cavalry squadron(1/1 Cav and 1/4 Cav) are performingvery well in covering those areas of thezone of separation which are not easilyreached by each squadron’s threeground cavalry troops. LTC GregStone, CO, 1st squadron, 1st Cavalry,reported that both air cavalry andground cavalry troops are doing a su-perb job in the 1st Brigade’s sector.The OH-58D (Kiowa Warrior), with itsmast-mounted thermal imaging system,can patrol the zone day and night. Thefirepower of the armed OH-58D, alongwith the awesome firepower of the 4thBrigade’s AH-64 Apache helicopters, isalso an effective deterrent.

Lighter combat vehicles in TF Eaglehave been more successful in adaptingto the limited mountainous road nets.For example, the Finnish SISU 6x6wheeled APC being used by the SWE-

Bosnia (Continued from Page 10)

Mine damage to Danish Leopard I.

The author, with Swedish Army LT Christof Reychman, his inter-preter, standing in front of a Finnish SISU 6x6 wheeled APC. Thev-shape of the vehicle’s hull bottom deflects mine blast effectively.

Russian Army LT Alexander Woistinov, a BMD-2 platoon leader,with his vehicle, which at less than 8 tons effectively negotiatesthe Bosnian road network. The Russians also employ 8-wheeledBTR-80 APCs for patrols.


BAT, and the Russian BTR-80 are do-ing a good job in patrolling the roadsin the zone of separation. The SISUhas also demonstrated better survivabil-ity when striking an antitank mine. TheSISU’s “V” shaped bottom apparentlydeflects the blast toward the sides. Inone mine encounter in SWEBAT’s sec-tor, the crewmen were not seriously in-jured. Moreover, these wheeled APCsare less likely to tear up the roads,compared to tracked APCs.

The lighter tracked vehicles of theSWEBAT and Russian airborne battal-ion are also well suited for Bosnia’slimited road nets. The Russian BMD-2and the Swedish BV-206S, weighingless than 8 tons each, are able to nego-tiate the narrow roads and smallbridges and have better cross-countrymobility. The demonstrated perform-ance of these two lightweight trackedvehicles are worth remembering whenconsidering the future scout vehicle(FSV), which has emerged as TRA-DOC’s highest priority vehicle require-ment. Lessons learned from Bosniawill undoubtedly have an impact on thedevelopment of the FSV.

The Future

Based on what I saw in Bosnia, I ammore convinced than ever that wheeledscout vehicles, such as HMMWVs, bereplaced with light tracked vehicles inthe scout platoons of the maneuver bat-talions. The same is true for theHMMWVs of the division MI, air de-fense, and signal battalions. As men-tioned above, this same conclusion hasbeen reached by the 2d Infantry Divi-sion in Korea, which also must operatein mountainous terrain. HMMWVssometimes can’t get to where they needto be — on high ground to performtheir missions. Most would agree thathaving to tow HMMWVs to mountain-tops to do their job is unacceptable.

As illustrated in my article in AR-MOR’s July-August 1994 issue, an ar-ticulated vehicle such as the BV-206Sis the right way to go for a future scoutvehicle. LTG Timmons, CG, EighthArmy and CofS USFK, has requestedfunds for the Naval Research Labora-tory (NRL) to assemble scout and com-mand and control variants of the BV-206S for assessment by the 2d ID inKorea, prior to acquiring the largernumber of BV-206S vehicles that theirstaff study indicates they need.

The scout and battle command vari-ants of the BV-206S envisioned havethe same external configuration so thatthe command variant will not stand outas a “signature vehicle.” NRL, devel-oper of the U.S. Army’s AirborneCommand and Control System(A2C2S), intends to include the A2C2SC41 suite in the BV-206S, which willallow the commander to operate eitherfrom his UH-60 Blackhawk or from hisBV-206S battle command vehicle,which can take him to a mountaintopto “see the battlefield” with the 2d-gen-eration FLIR, and function with hiscommand group from a single vehicle.

The scout version of the BV-206Swill also have the same 2d-generationFLIR and abundant communicationscapability using the same Joint CombatInformation Terminal (JCIT) asA2C2S. The BV-206S is capable of be-ing carried internally in CH-47 andCH-53 helicopters, which will enablethe scout to be employed deep (up to100 km beyond the FLOT as requiredin the FSV mission need statement).The scout version would reduce theworkstations in the rear car, from 5 to 1or 2, to enable carrying up to three re-mote sentries, the imagery of whichcan be monitored from the remaining

Proposed battle com-mand variant of theBV-206S, an armoredversion of the Army’sM973A1. Schematicof command and con-trol architecture isseen below.


page design isn’t much like a zone recon,at a conceptual level there are many les-sons the Army can learn (for free!) from theexperience of private industry in the verydifficult time it’s had at maximizing the ef-fectiveness of expensive new technology.

Very generally speaking, below are a fewof the many “lessons learned” and other is-sues I’ve identified from private businessesas they apply to the armored force of to-morrow:

Information is a strategic and tacticalresource. Remember the discount airline,People Express? American Airlines putthem out of business with the help of itsticketing and aircraft routing computer sys-tem. American was able to use its informa-tion system to undercut People Express onkey routes while recouping losses on oth-ers. Likewise, the digitized battlefield com-mander of the near future must be able touse “strategic” information about the enemy— obtained by satellites, JSTARS, scouts,or contact reports — to effect the battle atkey tactical points. His ability to use infor-mation effectively and thereby “win” the in-formation war will give him a decisive ad-vantage over the enemy.

Data overload vs. just enough of theright information. Although data (raw factsor figures) is nice, information (data withcontext and meaning) is what we’re after.The solution is to identify the core of whatindividuals need to know to do their jobs

effectively and then make sure those peo-ple get it. Although my commander todaywould say that we platoon leaders don’t re-port enough, the future commander mayencounter information overload from havingso many data sources (as mentionedabove) trying to send him information all atonce. Although something like IVIS can en-able us to pass reports more efficiently, thequestion is, are we really passing the rightinformation? For example, can we do bet-ter than the SPOTREP? Does it convey theright information? If we’re not telling com-manders or subordinates what they need toknow in a format they can use, we’re justfilling the air with bogus FM waves moreefficiently than we did before.

E-mail and the demise of middle man-agement. E-mail (or electronic mail, for theunconnected) is the latest implementationof the “asynchronous communication” con-cept. “Asynchronous communication”means that the sender and the receiverdon’t have to talk to each other at thesame time to communicate. E-mail, as themodern version of this concept, enablesupper level management to communicateinexpensively and instantaneously withtheir employees. Likewise, an employeecan reply directly, without having to gothrough layers of bureaucracy. The combi-nation of quick communication and a bettereducated workforce has resulted in the po-sition of “manager” becoming irrelevant in

many companies. The effect of this phe-nomenon has been to “flatten” organiza-tional hierarchies, thereby enabling quickerresponse to changing situations. If battalioncommanders, by virtue of the informationthey have available, become more situ-ationally aware (as CPT Bateman sug-gests) than company commanders, thenwhat would we need the company com-mander for? If we can’t come up with agood answer, then maybe the companycommander position would go the sameway as that of the private industry middlemanager. Likewise, if we were able to “plugin” platoon leaders to the same informationsources and train them accordingly, wewould reduce the role of CPT Bateman’sbattalion commander to the simple positionof report-passer. Since all of that can beautomated with information technology too,what would we need battalion commandersfor? In this new scenario, platoons wouldbe enabled to operate in the finest tradi-t ions of auftragstaktik while being evenmore responsive than before to the distantcommand control cell of your choice (bri-gade, division....?). At the macro level, wecan apply the same concept. Corps andMACOMs would also become irrelevant, asDA would have situational awareness ofbrigades deployed world-wide. The bottomline is that information technology will getus to the point where the layers of com-mand and control that we rely on today tomake decisions and pass information will


LETTERS (Continued from Page 4)

workstation(s). JCIT can also receiveimagery from OH-58D scout and AH-64 attack helicopters. Some of thoseoperating in Bosnia are equipped withthis feature and are operating in theater.

The U.S. Marine Corps also has aneed for a helicopter-transportable fu-ture combat vehicle (FCV). LTG Zinni,CG, I Marine Expeditionary Force(MEF) recently sent a letter to LTGTimmons, CG, Eighth Army, statingthat when the 2d ID validates theirneed for BV-206S vehicles, that the IMEF would also need the BV-206S fortheir reinforcing mission in Korea.

Summary

Task Force Eagle is doing an excel-lent job in its peacekeeping mission inBosnia. I was very much impressedwith the cooperative spirit and profes-sionalism demonstrated by all U.S. and

allied units that I visited. Thetroops are highly motivated andtheir morale is high. GEN Joul-wan, SACEUR, said in a recentarticle: “With Russia and otherswilling to participate in IFOR, wehave a real opportunity to helpachieve a lasting peace in the Bal-kans, and thereby take one stepcloser to a stable and democraticEurope.”

Bibliography

Bosnia Country Handbook, Peace Imple-mentation Force, DoD Publication1540-16-96, December 1995.

Joulwan, GEN George A: “European Se-curity,” Army Aviation Magazine, Feb-ruary 29, 1996, pp. 6-11.

Lehner, COL (Ret.) Charles R.: “LightEnough to Get There, Heavy Enough toWin,” ARMOR, July-August 1994, pp.10-14.

Colonel Charles Lehner, (USA Ret.)commanded tank and armored cav-alry troops in Korea, Germany, andCONUS, and was operations officerof the 2d Armored Division’s aviationbattalion. He also served as Chief,Weapons Technology and ConceptsDivision, Tactical Technology Office,Defense Advanced Research Pro-jects Agency. He holds a B.S in Me-chanical Engineering from the USMA,and an M.S. in electronics engineer-ing from Georgia Tech. After his re-tirement from the Army, he has beendirector of combat vehicle develop-ment for AAI Corporation, a consult-ant to Sandia National Laboratoriesand the Draper Laboratory, and iscurrently a consultant for the NavalResearch Laboratory, working on C3Iarchitecture and the Army AirborneCommand and Control System con-tract for the Army’s Project Manager,Advanced Engineering Concepts.

no longer enhance, but hinder, combat ef-fectiveness.

Greater efficiency and effectiveness gains(read as combat effectiveness) are ob-tained by reworking old procedures ratherthan by “paving a cowpath with silicon.”One of the most expensive lessons privatebusinesses have learned is that, if youautomate procedures which don’t work orare only moderately effective, all you’ve gotafterwards is automation which doesn’t getthe job done either. To date, we have digit-ized a battalion plus support elements, butthe orders process, tactics, and proceduresare not substantially different than theywere decades ago. We will see the gainswe expect to see ONLY when we make in-formation technology support the way wewant to fight tomorrow, instead of applyinginformation technology to the way we fighttoday.

If there’s one thing I’ve learned in theArmy, school, or the workplace, it’s thevalue of asking the right questions. In manyrespects, the Armor community has notframed the Force XXI debate properly. In-stead of asking, “what do we do with thistechnology?” the question should be, “howdo we want to accomplish the mission, andwhat information technology do we need todo that?”

In closing, consider a historical exampleof the application of a new technology. Be-tween World War I and II, the cavalryschool conducted field exercises wherehouse-mounted cavalrymen would betrucked, horses and all, to battle. Howeverwhen the battle was joined, it was antici-pated that the trucks would be abandonedand the cavalryman would ride his mountinto combat, as cavalrymen had for centu-ries. Today we realize the futility of attempt-ing to turbocharge horses. Let’s not makethe same mistake and attempt to plate ourtanks with silicon.

1LT ANDREW D. GOLDINA/1-158 Cav (Recon)

Maryland ARNG

Auftragstaktik Is Not Dead

Dear Sir:

As a future company or troop com-mander, I read CPT Robert L. Bateman’sarticle (Jan-Feb 96) with some concern un-til I realized that the situation he is describ-ing exists now, in the non-digital chain ofcommand. The challenge of granting com-pany- and platoon-level leaders the author-ity to execute the mission is a leadershipquestion for the battalion or squadron com-mander and has little or nothing to do withdigitization. The Auftragstaktik concept im-plies centralized planning, decentralizedexecution. The digital battlefield shortensthe planning cycle and optimizes decentral-ized execution.

Digital communication allows us to bringinitiative, agility, depth, synchronization,

and versatility to an increasingly lethal andempty battlefield. Digitization shortens ourdecision cycle, but does not fundamentallychange our culture.

The concern CPT Bateman is expressingis valid since the way we fight will change,based on the information available to ForceXXI commanders. Where the commanderpositions him or herself on the battlefieldhas been the subject of debate in profes-sional military circles since before Alexan-der the Great. Digitization just adds anotherfactor to the commander’s planning proc-ess. What we may find in the InformationAge is that, just as there are virtual com-munities, there will also be virtual locationson the battlefield. CPT Bateman is right —the commander will be able to “see” moreof the battlefield from a purpose-built com-mand vehicle than from a HMMWV orBradley on the frontline. What we mustchange is the paradigm that the com-mander must be forward with his troops tobest command. The commander, as al-ways, must position himself where he canbest visualize the battlefield and COM-MAND.

Leaders must always balance directivewith informative communication. This istrue from platoon leader through generalofficer. In response to CPT Bateman’s ex-amples, why is the battalion commander onthe platoon net, anyway? The battalioncommander, instead of saying “Platoon X,orient left and destroy enemy forces there,”should say, “Company Y, there is an enemyforce on Platoon X’s left flank; destroy it.”The company commander learns that hisbattalion headquarters is doing its job, pro-viding him with information and a mission.The soldiers (over time) learn that, eventhough to them the battlefield looks empty,someone at battalion is watching out fortheir safety and making the RIGHT deci-sions at the right time. Besides, the com-pany commander is then free to maneverhis platoons to accomplish the mission, andthe platoon leaders are free to maneuversections and teams. AUFTRAGSTAKTIK!

1LT KEITH E. BESHERSEAssistant S32-17 Cavalry

Ft. Campbell, Ky.

Do We Still Test Station 5A?

Dear Sir:

When was the last time that anyone in anarmor battalion heard, “The purpose of thistest is to evaluate your ability to clear themain gun, and remove, disassemble, as-semble, install, perform a function check,and conduct a firing circuit check on theM256 breechblock.”

Can’t remember? Why is that? Well, aninformal poll, conducted on Ft. Knox, indi-cated one reason. The breechblock or as-sociated parts get damaged or lost duringthe test, rendering the vehicle non-missioncapable for an extended period of time.

The three most common parts that getdamaged are the firing pin, the plunger,and the extractor shaft.

The firing pin is usually broken duringlowering of the breechblock or installing thebreechblock. If the crewman doesn’t re-move the firing mechanism prior to lower-ing the breechblock from the breechmount, the firing pin will be snapped off.This also occurs if he installs the firingmechanism when the breechblock is on thefloor prior to installing it back into themount. It is also broken if it is set on theledge of the turret, causing it to fall on tothe floor.

How can this be prevented? One way isto ensure that the crewman and evaluatorare properly trained and made aware ofcritical points in the test that may result indamage to the equipment. Another way isto add a warning box prior to step W in the-10 indicating that the firing mechanismmust be removed prior to doing step W.Also a warning box prior to step A indicat-ing that the firing mechanism should not bein place. As far as preventing it from falling,placing it in the flashlight holder at the TC’sstation is one of a few solutions.

The plunger gets stuck up in the breechmount or shoots out into the turret, rollingunder the turret sub floor.

What causes th is? Somet imes theplunger gets burred or damaged duringroutine maintenance when using a screw-driver to push it up into the breech mount.It slips off, causing it to burr so that it willnot release from its slot when trying to re-move it during step S of the -10. Use thefabricated plunger tool instead of thescrewdriver. PS Magazine has the instruc-tion for fabricating a plunger tool.

The extractor shaft gets bent against the7.62 ammunition stowage box and radiorack while the crewman attempts to loweror raise the main gun because he fails tocompletely remove the extractor shaft fromthe breech mount. Generally, when thecrewman installs the shaft and finds that itis not aligned properly, he attempts tolower or raise the main gun without remov-ing the shaft, causing the shaft to get bentagainst the 7.62 ammunition stowage boxand radio rack. This can be prevented bysimply reading the cautions in the -10 priorto step T and by adding that same cautionprior to step G.

Does breaking or damaging any of theseparts warrant a reason for not testing thisstation? A firing pin costs $11.58, a plungercosts $10.20, and an extractor shaft costs$223.00. They take, on average, anywherefrom 21 days to 90 days to come in. Eachduty station varies in the amount of time ittakes to receive parts. The cost of the partis not significant enough to stop us fromtraining or testing this station. However, theamount of time the vehicle is down await-ing parts could have an impact on this. Asoldier is trained to clear, disassemble, as-semble, perform a function check, and loadhis individual weapon. The tank crewshould keep the same standard when


maintaining their main gun. It is the price ofour profession.

CPT RICHARD R. ROULEAUHHT, 3/16 Cav, Ft. Knox, Ky.

SGT CARL L. WANDREIC Trp, 4/16 Cav, Ft. Knox, Ky.

Maneuver Warfare:Just “Buzz Words?”

Dear Sir:

I just finished reading Captain Vander-griff’s article, “The Exploitation from theDieulouard Bridgehead,” in the September-October 1995 edition. I found the whole ar-ticle interesting, but I agreed with very fewof Captain Vandergriff’s conclusions. My fo-cus of disagreement can be summed up intwo small words: “buzz words.”

I would like to find, somewhere, a cleardefinition of “Maneuver Warfare,” and, yes,I have read the book. So far as I can find,it appears to be gettin’ there fastest withthe mostest, attacking the bad guys wherethey ain’t, and supporting the guys that dothe best. All of these make simple commonsense. Unfortunately, the advocates of “Ma-neuver Warfare” can’t stop there — theyseem to feel that by a suitable applicationof buzz words and other adjectives, theycan both supply a coherent doctrine andcure the common cold.

History is not, despite what we like tothink, perfect 20/20 hindsight. There can belittle doubt that the exploitation from theDieulouard Bridgehead was a successfuloperation. I submit that the reasons thatthe operation was successful are becauseof combat-hardened men, a weakened en-emy, and outstanding leadership. We mightfault General Eisenhower or General Pat-ton, but we were not there, and Mondaymorning quarterbacking will not change thefact that we won that war.

I am all for a stable manning system thatpromotes excellence and weeds out incom-petence. I am all for keeping doctrine up todate with technology. I have never been,am not now, and will never be in favor ofreplacing successful doctrine with buzzwords and euphemisms.

SFC MATT STANCHFIELDB/1-163 IN, MTARNG

Butte, Mont.

DMA Seeks Input from Field

Dear Sir:

I am a cartographer with the DefenseMapping Agency (DMA) here in St. Louis.

Recently, my newly-formed team com-pleted team training. As a result of this ef-fort, we are is seeking input from the usersof DMA products so that we might improvethose products. Being in dialogue with our

customers would give us an improvedsense of purpose.

I am seeking comments from your read-ers. Already, one soldier has told me thathe uses a magic marker to mark the gridvalues on 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 scaleTLM maps to make them easier to see.

Are there any ideas out there from oneperson or a small group which allow themto outperform others? These new ways, ifadopted by all, could result in everyone be-ing more successful. New ideas might saveus $$$ or you lives.

If your readers would like to learn moreabout DMA products, e-mail: [email protected] for a DMA Corporate Report. Ican be reached at [email protected].

BILL CARLSONDefense Mapping Agency

St. Louis, Mo.

New Systems Will AnticipateLogistics and Maintenance Needs

Dear Sir:

I read with interest the article, “Regener-ating Combat Power at the National Train-ing Center,” published in the January-Feb-ruary 1996 issue. We in the OrdnanceCorps agree with the maintenance prob-lems encountered by units not only duringrotations at the NTC, but in any training orfield environment.

I believe it is important to outline to theArmor community that the Ordnance Corpsis addressing these problems by leveragingtechnology, a long-term, definitive solutionto the maintenance problems we are expe-riencing. Several concepts are already inthe works to overcome many of the specificmaintenance challenges presented in thearticle. While these enablers are being de-veloped, you can rest assured that the Ord-nance Corps will continue to work diligentlyand intelligently to maintain readiness forArmor.

Currently, we are developing diagnos-tic/prognostic modules and sensors to cap-ture and report maintenance problems.This concept, being worked with commer-cial manufacturers, will also anticipate re-pair part needs and provide an automatedlink to the appropriate support personnelfor action. We will use laptop computers toextract this data, then analyze, trou-bleshoot, order, and transfer data via vari-ous automated communications systems.This has shown very real potential for cre-ating a total anticipatory and situationally-aware logistical and maintenance environ-ment.

We are also developing interactive modu-lar test and diagnostic/prognostic equip-ment which can be carried and operated bya single person. This equipment can beused for both troubleshooting and trainingat all levels of maintenance. The sameequipment will be used in both field and

garrison locations, with information trans-mitted via satellite or Internet. This technol-ogy is available today and is currently be-ing tested or scheduled for testing.

Another example of our initiatives to im-prove customer support is a device knownas the Digital Diagnostic and PrognosticSystem (DDAP). Th is system, be ingworked with the Mounted Battle Lab, is es-sentially a small sensor mounted on tankengines to collect, store, and analyze tur-bine performance. The DDAP can alertmaintainers to potential, pending cata-strophic failures, and also (via SINCGARS)provide real-time ammo and fuel status tologistical support activities.

All of these systems will not only provideconsiderable savings in manpower andmonetary resources, they will also improveour ability to anticipate battlefield logisticaland maintenance requirements. Th ismeans increased readiness for the sup-ported armor unit.

The Ordnance Corps also has, in theearly stages of development, a StandardMaintenance System (SMS). This will re-place the current non-interactive system(SAMS/ULLS). Electronic Technical Manu-als are being produced on CD ROM, elimi-nating the need to maintain bulky, papertechnical manuals. With the addition of thecapability to interact with the current ULLS-G system, the soldier can order his repairparts from the same system.

As players in the Combined Arms Sup-port Command ongoing initiatives in Battle-field Distribution and Velocity Management,we are working to significantly improve or-der ship time, asset visibility, and the rapiddelivery of critical Class IX repair parts.

These are exciting times as we move intothe 21st Century. We must leverage tech-nology to improve our maintenance andsupply processes. While this will not solveall of our maintenance problems, and obvi-ously won’t solve our problems of todayright away, we firmly believe that thesetypes of enablers will make us more effi-cient and effective in serving our soldiersand meeting the demands of the maneuvercommanders. The result is increased com-bat power.

ROBERT D. SHADLEYBG, USA

Chief of Ordnance

Armor/Cav Gunnery/TrainingDoctrine Answers

Any question pertaining to Armor/Cavgunnery/training doctrine should be ad-dressed to: Gunnery Training and Doc-trine Branch, Ft. Knox, Ky., DSN 464-1736/5807/5765, Commercial: (502)624-1736/5807/5765, FAX: (502) 624-5708; e-mai l : [email protected].


While thermal sighting systems have in-creased our ability to acquire and kill targetson today’s battlefield, these systems havealso presented us with a unique trainingchallenge. How do we train our soldiers topositively identify combat vehicles usingthermal sights?

Now, there is a solution, the Combat Vehi-cle Identification TIS Training Package, de-veloped by E-OIR Measurements Inc. andthe United States Army Communications-Electronics Command, Night Vision andElectronic Sensors Directorate. This superbthermal software-based identification trainerteaches a soldier to understand the basicprinciples of thermal signatures and how torecognize the signatures of fielded U.S.,NATO, and former Soviet Union armoredand wheeled vehicles. It is ideal for use atthe company level, and is easily integratedinto a unit’s gunnery program. Ultimately, itwill help reduce the risk of fratricide on thenext battlefield.

In my opinion, this a company com-mander’s and master gunner’s dream cometrue. The software presents 30 vehicles,both wheeled and tracked, including the T-80, BMP-1, M1A1, and HMMWV, to name afew. All of these vehicles can be viewed inboth daylight and thermal modes, fromranges of 500 to 3000 meters, and fromthree different aspects (frontal, right front,and left rear). As we all know, thermal iden-tification of vehicles is difficult, and often-times cannot be successful because ofrange, camouflage, and climatic conditions.However, teaching our soldiers to under-stand thermal signatures and thermal cuesimproves the chances of positive identifica-tion on the next battlefield. This programprovides the closest representation of ther-malized targets that I have seen. Undoubt-edly, using an actual vehicle with TIS is bet-ter, but this is the next best thing.

As I began to use the system, I wasquickly humbled. My vehicle identificationskills were immediately put to the test. Thiswas not just some neat computer game;this was a serious training tool. My learningcurve was steep. After a few hours, I wasable to identify, or at least classify, targetvehicles at 2000 and even 3000 meters.Those “green hazy images” started to makesense, and my thermal identification skillssteadily improved. It didn’t take me long todetermine that this was a training tool thatcould benefit all armored soldiers.

The Combat Vehicle Identification Trainingpackage is a DOS-based program that re-

quires a 386 or higher CPU, super VGA dis-play, and at least four megabytes of RAM.Additionally, the user has the flexibility tochoose from three different installation op-tions. The first is the complete package, andrequires 34 megabytes of hard disk space.The second bypasses the Signature Under-standing Module and requires only 17megabytes. The third option installs the Sig-nature Understanding Module as a stand-alone package and requires only 11 mega-bytes of hard disk space. However, to fullyutilize the strengths of the program, I rec-ommend installing the entire package ifspace permits.

The training is separated into six modules.After gaining familiarity with the program,and based on a soldier’s particular trainingneeds, he is able to directly access a mod-ule without having to progress sequentiallythrough all of the training. The following is asynopsis of the training modules:

Sensor Description - This module givesthe user a brief explanation about the TISand allows for practicing thermal focusingskills.

Signature Understanding - This moduleprovides the fundamentals of thermal signa-tures. The computer displays vehicles atclose ranges, from the front, right front, andleft rear, as viewed through the TIS. This al-lows the soldier to better understand thecommon thermal cues that allow him topositively identify a vehicle. At the bottom ofthe screen, a dialogue box displays addi-tional information about the vehicle, such asdistinct thermal and visual cues and vehiclearmament.

The Training Module - This module is thecore of the training package and probablythe most valuable. The soldier can compareand contrast up to three different vehicles atonce. These vehicles appear at variousranges and from three different aspects,both in daylight and in thermal mode. Forinstance, an M1, a Leopard 2, and a Chief-tain can all be viewed together from a fron-tal aspect at 500 meters. Additionally, a dia-logue box again appears at the bottom ofthe screen and displays pertinent charac-teristics of each vehicle.

Self Testing - This module allows usersto test themselves. Targets appear at dif-ferent ranges, and from different aspects.The user must select the target classifica-tion, either tracked or wheeled, the aspectfrom which the vehicle is being viewed, andvehicle nomenclature. The observer is al-lowed 15 seconds to respond. A correct

answer allows the observer to continue, butan incorrect answer is identified with abeep, and his wrong choice is identifiedalongside the correct answer. The dialoguebox again appears to allow for a more de-tailed comparison.

Test Generation - This module enablesthe user or instructor to choose the test de-sired. Users can pick from several test vari-ations, including randomly generated tests,or they can develop their own test. For in-stance, a master gunner could generate aspecific test that would focus on a specifictraining objective, such as only tanks atranges of 1500 meters or greater.

Scored Testing - This module provides aformal test and records and reports theuser’s results. No feedback is given duringthis test, and there are no computer-im-posed time constraints. Upon completion ofthe test, a formal report is printed that dis-plays the correct response adjacent to theuser’s response. A summary breaks downthe results and scores the test according totarget classification, target identification,and target aspect.

The Combat Vehicle Identification TISTraining Package is an outstanding thermalidentification trainer. It answers our need forthermal signature identification training, isuser-friendly, and most importantly, is oursfor the asking. To receive a copy of this soft-ware, provide a written request on unit let-terhead with your intended use for the soft-ware to:

Director, NVESD10221 Burbeck Road, Suite 430ATTN: VISPD-O’KaneFt. Belvoir, VA 22060-8060

You may also FAX your request to: (703)704-1753, ATTN: B. O’Kane. Distribution islimited to DOD components and DOD con-tractors.


Software Review

The Combat Vehicle Identification TIS Training Package:A Thermal Identification Trainer That’s On Target!

Captain Robert S. Hughes is a 1986Graduate of Fordham University ROTC. Hehas served as platoon leader and XO, DTrp, 2-10 Cav, Ft. Knox, Ky.; Senior ClassAdvisor, AOB 14-91, Ft. Knox, Ky.; andCommander, A Co, 1-37 Armor, FRG. He iscurrently Armor Advisor to 2-163d Cav,Montana Army National Guard.

Patton: A Genius for War, by CarlD’Este. Harper Collins Publishers, NewYork. 1995, 992 pp. with maps, bibliog-raphy, and notes. $35.

For more than half a century after hisdeath, General George S. Patton Jr. re-mains one of the most colorful, com-plex, charismatic, and controversial fig-ures in the annals of military history.The author focuses on a general whowas — in all his moods: cantankerous,charming, arrogant, sensitive, and hum-ble — a military genius who spent hisentire life in preparation for what hepassionately believed was his destiny,to lead a great army triumphantly inbattle.

Patton’s outlandish public image wasa contrived, self-centered ploy whichhid the true character of a man of manycontradictions. He was extremely relig-ious, but his profanity was legendary.Moreover, he believed that God had or-dained him to achieve honor and vic-tory on the battlefield, just as his ances-tors, whom he worshipped, had done.Life-long preparation, intelligence, andan intense desire to achieve his destinyprovided Patton with an extraordinaryknowledge of history, war, and the pro-fession of arms. This separated himfrom his contemporaries, none ofwhom could match his record in com-bat.

Patton has been perceived as thebrash, profane, impetuous show-offwho wore ivory-handled pistols andloved war so much he was nicknamed“Old Blood and Guts,” a name he ab-horred. The author, a military historian,penetrates the perceived image held bythe general public, as well as the onecultivated by Patton. Although short onfresh discoveries, no other narrative ac-count of the general’s life has filled inthe gaps left by other studies as fully asthis superbly crafted work. This schol-arly tome reflects extensive research inits detailed bibliography and meticu-lously documented array of primaryand secondary sources.

D’Este describes the ancestors whohaunted Patton’s mind, some real, someimagined, the models on whom hewould seek to pattern his life. He wasimmersed in ancestor worship. Born toa patrician California family with a

strong military heritage, Patton trainedfor greatness with resolute determina-tion. Unfortunately, he had to struggleduring his entire life to overcome dys-lexia. Tutored at home, the youngstercould not read until age eleven, theyear he attended a formal school forthe first time. The disfunctional readingaspect of dyslexia is only part of thedisorder. There is a strong tendency toboast, and to undergo mood swings andfeelings of inferiority, which may bothhelp to account for his erratic behaviorand contribute to his overwhelming de-sire to achieve. While a struggling ca-det at West Point, he wrote his parents,“I would be willing to live in torture,die tomorrow, if for one day I could bereally great.” He devoted a lifetime ofpainful study to the effort.

D’Este recounts Patton’s exploits un-der General Pershing’s command, bothin Mexico and in World War I, and cul-minates with his unparalleled but con-troversial World War II campaigns. Healso explores some of Patton’s less dis-tinguished adventures. Patton’s impetu-ous drive to succeed against perceivedobstacles had occasional setbacks. Hisslapping of two soldiers after accusingthem of cowardice in the Sicilian cam-paign, and his politically troubling re-marks about the Soviet Union, then anally, nearly resulted in his relief. Fortu-nately, his faults were exceeded by hismatchless ability. “Patton is indispensa-ble,” said Eisenhower.

Patton justified such confidence —from Normandy, through the Battle ofthe Bulge, and on to Germany’s defeat— by his remarkable willingness totake risks and to make crucial life-and-death decisions no one else would havedared to make. He seemed to have asixth sense of what had to be done inthe heat of battle.

To a far greater extent than earlierbiographers, the author explores a sideof Patton that few outside the circle ofhis close friends and immediate familyeven knew existed. Contrary to thepublic perception, a lack of compassionwas not a part of Patton’s personality.He was deeply affected by the carnageof war. He was an emotional and oftenhumble man who could weep one min-ute and turn the air blue with hisswearing the next. He was an intellec-

tual who could quote scripture andverse for hours at a time, a voraciousreader with a prodigious memory. Pat-ton’s prolific writings included scoresof essays, poems, notes, lectures, anddiaries. To his family, he was a spell-binding storyteller whose tales wereusually based on the lives of ancientheroes.

D’Este correctly emphasizes theArmy’s perfunctory investigation ofPatton’s fatal automobile accident, call-ing the failure to thoroughly investigateincomprehensible and inexcusable. De-spite its significant strengths, theauthor’s argument concerning the acci-dent would have benefitted from con-sulting with Horace Woodring, Patton’sdriver, who is still alive, and Robert L.Thompson, the driver of the 2-1/2-tontruck, who died in June, 1994. Woo-dring’s account of the accident has re-mained essentially unchanged for thepast 50 years. Thompson did not “dropout of sight,” as some said, but re-turned home like thousands of othersoldiers. Eyewitness accounts of two ofthe four participants in the accidentwould have produced a more completeportrait of the accident.

This outstanding biography succeedsin what the author attempted to do. AGenius for War is a discerning workthat refuses to allow faults and failingsto obscure the strengths of the mostunique American soldier of this, or anyother, century.

Denver FugateRadcliff, Kentucky

(The reviewer’s article on the acci-dent that led to Patton’s death ap-peared in the November-December1995 issue of ARMOR. - Ed.)

BOOK ESSAY

New Biography OffersFresh Insights on Patton

Patton in 1944


The M4 Sherman at War: The Euro-pean Theatre, 1942-1945 by Steven J.Zaloga (70 pages, $13.95).

D-Day Tank Warfare: ArmoredCombat in the Normandy Campaign,June-August 1944 (72 pages, $13.95)

Tank Warfare in Korea, 1950-53 bySteven J. Zaloga and George Balin (72pages, $9.95).

Concord Publications Company, HongKong.

These three booklets written by Steven J.Zaloga and George Balin cover the photo-graphic history of the tanks that engaged inarmored combat in the European Theaterof Operations during World War II and inthe Korean War half a decade later. Thebooklets are aimed at military modelersand include detailed diagrams and photosof famous tanks, such as Hauptmann Mi-chael Wittman’s Tiger I, presumably so thatthose with the talent can build their ownversions. In this regard, the works havemore appeal to the military buff than themilitary professional. On a different level,however, these booklets are valuable in ex-amining the life cycle of a tank. By perus-ing the photos and captions that fill theseworks, one can see the adaptations andimprovisations that armored crewmen inWorld War II and Korea had to make in or-der to survive in the harsh environment ofcombat. Of all the tanks in these wars, noother was more extensively modified —both officially and unofficially — than theM4 Sherman.

Few tanks in the history of armored war-fare have proved as versatile as the Sher-man. The United States produced moreSherman tanks — 49,234 in all — duringWorld War II than any other tank producedby any other nation. Because of the rela-tively late start of American rearmament,the War Department’s decision to producethe M4 had far-reaching consequences.Simply put, the Army had to live with theSherman, since its successor did not ap-pear on the battlefields of Europe until1945, and then only in small numbers. Thetechnological characteristics of the M4 tanksignificantly influenced Allied operations inAfrica, Sicily, Italy, France, Germany, and inthe next war in Korea. The appearance ofsuperior German tanks — the Mark V Pan-ther and the Mark VI Tiger — forced U.S.units to respond with ad hoc measures toensure their survival and accomplish theirmissions. Engagements with more powerfulenemy vehicles forced units to adjust theirtactics, techniques, and procedures in or-der to survive.

The M4 Sherman evolved over time as aresult of product improvements intended tocorrect the deficiencies of the tank. TheOrdnance Department could have done

more to correct the greatest weakness ofthe Sherman — the low muzzle velocity ofits main gun — but the Army did not realizethe changing nature of tank combat untilthe huge losses in Normandy forced theArmy’s leadership to face the stark realityof modern armored warfare. In the ensuingbattles of France and Germany, weight ofnumbers and the application of a soundcombined arms doctrine enabled the Ar-mored Force to prevail over the panzers ofthe Wehrmacht, despite the Sherman’slimitations.

Armored crewmen were the first to realizeits problems and did what they could to fixthem. In one booklet, there is a wonderfulphoto of Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. rebuk-ing a tank crew for adding sand bagsaround their vehicle. Patton believed theextra weight led to premature enginebreakdowns. Tank crews who had to fightthe poorly armored tank widely ignoredPatton’s orders on the subject. Other crewsadded logs; at least one encased the turretin cement!

When designed in 1941, the M4 Shermanwas a logical and appropriate choice toexecute U.S. Army mechanized doctrine asit then existed. The experiences of WorldWar II in Europe convinced the Army’sleadership that American antiarmor doctrinewas wrong and that tanks had to fight othertanks on the battlefield. That change in atti-tude altered the design parameters of fu-ture armored vehicles; the primary missionof American tanks after World War II was toengage and destroy enemy tanks.

If anyone had lingering doubts about theessential role of the tank in battle, the Ko-rean War dispelled them. The T-34/85tanks of the North Korean People’s Army(NKPA) outmatched American M24 lighttanks and the 2.36-inch rocket launcher inthe first month of the war. Not until M26Pershing and M46 Patton tanks and alarger 3.5-inch rocket launcher appeareddid the forces of the United Nations gainarmored supremacy in Korea. Interestinglyenough, over half of the tanks used byU.N. forces were World War II-vintageM4A3E8 Shermans, which proved compa-rable to the T-34/85 in combat. The keywas the superior training of American tank-ers compared to their North Korean coun-terparts.

The M4 Sherman was obsolescent by theend of World War II, but the tank proved tobe an adequate — and adaptable — com-bat vehicle if the crewmen who operated itwere well-trained. “In spite of the flaws andshortcomings of our equipment and ourtraining,” wrote Brigadier General AnthonyF. Daskevich to the author a few years ago,“the soldiers made the equipment do thejob — sometimes by changing the equip-ment, sometimes by applying new and dif-ferent techniques to fit the situation athand, and sometimes in learning how to

work together on the battlefield, taking ad-vantage of all weapons systems in con-cert.” The lesson for today is clear. In anera of declining budgets, the U.S. Armymust once again return to its roots andlearn how to adapt the equipment on handto accomplish its assigned missions. TheM1-series Abrams tank is here to stay forsome time to come. The Armored Forcemust wring the most out of its capabilities,for its replacement is nowhere on the hori-zon. We as an Army have become toocomfortable with the proverbial technologi-cal “silver bullet.” What these photographichistories remind us is that it has not alwaysbeen that way. The greatest strength of theAmerican soldier is his ability to learn andadapt.

MAJ PETER R. MANSOOR, Ph.D.Operations Officer

1/11th ACRFt. Irwin, Calif.

Strategy and Tactics of the Sal-vadoran FMLN Guerrillas: Last Battleof the Cold War, Blueprint for FutureConflicts by José Angel Moroni Bra-camonte and David E. Spencer. Praeg-er Publishers, 88 Post Road, Westport,Conn. 1995. 216 pages. $59.95.

The regular military forces of El Salvadordefeated an externally supplied communistinsurgency in 1992 after approximately 12years of conflict. Strategy and Tactics ofthe Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas addressesthis successful employment of conventionalforces to combat and defeat a disciplined,motivated, and logistically sound insur-gency.

This work details tactics, techniques, andprocedures employed by FMLN forces. Re-production of FMLN mission orders andanalysis of both successful and unsuccess-ful tactical engagements provide a thor-ough depiction of guerrilla actions. FMLNafter-action review procedures and lessonslearned are also evaluated.

As military professionals, it is critical thatwe seek out threat evaluations beyond na-tional military experiences. For many po-tential threats, neither Soviet-style conven-tional techniques nor unconventional war-fare tactics will be viable. Forces through-out the world continue to evolve doctrinecompatible with their unique social, opera-tional, manning, and logistical circum-stances. Threat studies from the Gulf War,the Cold War, and the Vietnam War are notall-encompassing.

American military forces remain commit-ted to operations other than war, and suchcommitments may increase in the future.There are many potential threats today,and the more styles of warfare we make


BOOKS

ourselves familiar with, the more rapid ourevaluation of the next threats we face.

The hardbound price of this book will pre-vent its inclusion in most personal libraries:Instead, consider urging post library sys-tems to acquire and stock works of thisgenre. Strategy and Tactics of the Sal-vadoran FMLN Guerrillas reads well, andthe translations of military terms, concepts,and conclusions from Spanish into Englishare well executed.

If the authors are correct in their assess-ment of the Salvadoran insurgency as a“blueprint for future conflicts,” then thisbook can provide us both the schematicsand marginal notations of that blueprint.Regardless of the prescience of Messrs.Bracamonte and Spencer, it is worthwhileto have a threat doctrinal and operationalmodel for someone besides the Group ofSoviet Forces in Germany. If you are un-able to read this work, find a work of thesame type and read that.

KEVIN M. RIEDERS1LT, Armor

2d U.S. CavalryFt. Polk, La.

Dark Moon: Eighth Army SpecialOperations in the Korean War by EdEvanhoe, Naval Institute Press, An-napolis, 1995. 193 pages. $25.95.

Within “The Forgotten War” of Korea(June 1950-July 1953), few people todayremember the epic battles of the PusanPerimeter, Inchon, or the Chosin Reservoir.Fewer still know anything at all about thebrazen special operations conducted by theU.S. Eighth Army behind enemy lines inNorth Korea during that brutal conflict.

Ed Evanhoe’s first book, Dark Moon, dra-matically reveals the bittersweet Americanand South Korean special operations andpartisan efforts from 1950 to 1953. As aKorean War veteran and career intelligenceoperative specializing in Far East opera-tions, Evanhoe is well-suited to tell this re-markable cloak and dagger tale. This is thesixth book in the Naval Institute’s SpecialWarfare Series.

Shortly after thousands of North Koreantroops stormed across the border intoSouth Korea in June 1950, it was quicklyapparent that American intelligence effortswere sadly and tragically lacking. Little co-operation existed among the impotent intel-ligence agencies, as agency jealousy andrivalry thwarted effective organization andcollection. The State Department, the mili-tary, and the newly-formed CIA all pointedfingers at each other and clamored for asolution.

In response, within the U.S. Eighth Army,a disparate collection of colorful and imagi-

native individuals surfaced, providing thenucleus of talent and guts that launchedthe special operations side of intelligencegathering. Although supported by severalCIA agents, British SAS officers, and a Ma-rine, most of the Eighth Army’s special op-erations work was performed by U.S. ArmyRangers and Airborne soldiers, as well asvolunteer South Korean soldiers and anti-communist partisans. Initially because ofserious military setbacks, lack of logisticalresources, and myopic vision, higher head-quarters could not devote much manpoweror equipment to special operations. Asusual, the necessary resources werebegged, borrowed, and scrounged. Cap-tured Japanese and Russian weapons andammunition, obsolete radios, even GermanSS uniforms, and hijacked boats outfittedthe early special operations. Soon, how-ever, the new leader of this resourcefulgroup, Colonel John H. McGee, could be-gin to train and field spies, saboteurs, as-sassins, raiding parties, and guerrilla units.

Using partisan-controlled islands off theeast and west coasts of North Korea, thespecial operations group mounted numer-ous intelligence missions into North Korea.Later in the war, airborne operations wereadded to insert spies and saboteurs intocentral North Korea. Evanhoe’s unabashedaccounts of these operations are riveting intheir action and suspense. With their mot-ley collection of weapons, equipment, andcharacters, McGee’s men fight the NorthKoreans and Red Chinese in their ownbackyard, destroying trains, ambushing un-suspecting enemy units, assassinatingcommunist officials, blowing up bridges andtunnels, and creating rear area havoc.

Several missions, done as pranks, with-out command approval, also produced far-reaching results. Frogs painted fluorescentorange, airdropped into North Korea, con-vinced the communists that the Americanswere using bacteriological warfare. A large,somewhat unconventional explosion inWonsan harbor had the communists (andmost of the Free World) believing thatsomeone had detonated an atomic bomb.Best of all, an anticommunist partisan unitwearing German SS uniforms resulted in aRussian complaint that Germany had en-tered the war!

This is not all a success story, however,as betrayal, incompetence, tragic acci-dents, enemy counter-guerrilla operations,bad weather, and Murphy’s Law conspiredto disrupt missions and cost valuable lives.The dedication, valor, and sacrifice of theAmericans, British, and South Koreans isstunning and truly serves as a tribute to thespirit of adventure of all those involved inspecial operations.

Evanhoe’s narrative is crisp and vivid withjust the right balance of fact and detail, andis well-supported by maps and photos. This

is a superb story of triumph and tragedy inAmerica’s “Forgotten War.”

COL WILLIAM D. BUSHNELLUSMC, Retired

Harpswell, Maine

Hell On Wheels: The 2d ArmoredDivision by Donald E. Houston,Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1995.466 pp. $14.95.

Originally published in 1977, this secondpaperback edition of Donald E. Houston’sHell On Wheels is a welcome addition tothe plethora of books published to com-memorate the 50th anniversary of the endof World War II. Houston’s history of the 2dArmored Division is a first-rate account ofthe division from the day it was activateduntil the summer of 1945, when it was noti-fied for return to the United States. Mr.Houston’s work is carefully researched andbalanced. Houston tells the story well anddraws conclusions. Accordingly, Hell OnWheels is no slapdash narrative, long onhyperbole, and short on analysis.

Houston’s discussion of the division’searly history is of particular interest, notonly because George S. Patton served asthe division’s first commander, but becauseof the rapid expansion, ongoing modern-ization, and continuing experimentationwhich characterized the early months of the2d Armored Division’s history. Those wereexciting and turbulent days as the divisionlearned to operate new equipment, experi-mented with new tactics, and assimilatedhordes of new soldiers, all while conductingcollective training to prepare for war. Thoseof us who complain of shortages and toomuch to do would do well to read earlychapters of Hell On Wheels. The 2d Ar-mored Division’s role in the Louisiana Ma-neuvers is of direct interest for serving sol-diers. Through the eyes of soldiers whoserved fifty years ago, we are able to gaininsight into the contemporary Army’s ex-periments with Force XXI.

The combat history of one of the Army’spremier World War II divisions extendsfrom North Africa, to Sicily, the NormandyBreakout, Aachen, the Bulge, and finallythe culminating battles of the war in theWest. Houston tells the story clearly andshows a division whose soldiers make mis-takes, but learn from them. Houston ablyweaves first-person accounts into the fabricof his narrative while remaining sufficientlyremoved to criticize when appropriate. It isthis technique that assures the validity andimportance of Hell On Wheels. Mr. Hous-ton’s work will remain useful for the casualreader, the serious historian, and the serv-ing soldier.

COL GREGORY FONTENOTCdr, 1st Bde, 1st AD


The current Combat Vehicle Crewman’s (CVC) hel-met does many things well, allowing tank crewman totalk to each other on the vehicle intercom system andto other members of their unit through the vehicle ra-dio system, but it does not provide ballistic protectionfrom small arms fire and shell fragments.

Desert Storm established the need for this in-creased ballistic protection. In response, the Director-ate of Force Development at the Armor Center hasdeveloped an improved ballistic shell for the helmet.It will provide the same level of ballistic protection asthe current Kevlar helmet, and is identical to thestandard CVC helmet shell, with the exception of itsthickness and an increase in weight from 1.5 lbs to2.5 lbs.

The initial fielding plan for this new shell calls for afully funded Army buy of approximately 40,000 shells.The first 2,500 will be stored for contingency pur-poses, and those remaining will be issued, throughsupporting central issue facilities, to units in accord-ance with a Department of the Army priority se-quence. The first unit to receive this improved ballis-tic shell will be the 82d Airborne. If you would like acopy of the complete fielding plan, contact us here atthe Directorate of Force Development. The fielding ofthis shell is scheduled to start in May 1996 and willtake approximately two years to complete. Upon

completion of initial fielding, remaining units withoutthe increased ballistic shell may request them usingorganizational funds. The National Stock Numbers touse when ordering this new shell are: 8470-01-389-3815 for small to medium and 8470-01-389-3821 forlarge size.

* * *

As a result of the article: “Dangers of Wearing Syn-thetic Underwear” in the January-February issue ofARMOR, we received several calls asking for Na-tional Stock Numbers (NSNs) for 100% cotton coldweather underwear. The NSNs are listed below. Toprevent being issued a substitute that may be madeof a synthetic fiber, you must use an advice code of2b on your requisition.

Drawers, 100% cotton, cold weather, color natural:

8415-01-051-1176 . . . . . . X-Small8415-00-782-3226 . . . . . . . Small8415-00-782-3227 . . . . . . Medium8415-00-782-3228 . . . . . . . Large8415-00-782-3229 . . . . . . X-Large

Undershirt, 100% cotton, cold weather, color natu-ral:

8415-01-051-1176 . . . . . . X-Small8415-00-270-2012 . . . . . . . Small8415-00-270-2013 . . . . . . Medium8415-00-270-2014 . . . . . . . Large8415-00-270-2015 . . . . . . X-Large

Currently there is a short stockage of the 100% cot-ton underwear available at the depot. However, acontract has been awarded for more 100% cotton un-derwear, scheduled to be delivered to the depot inMarch 1996. If you have any additional questions orneed any other information on this or the increasedballistic protection CVC shell, call Mr. Larry Hasty atthe Directorate of Force Development, DSN 464-3662, or commercial (502) 624-3662.

A Thicker Ballistic Shell For Combat Vehicle Crewman’s Helmet

PIN: 074669-000

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