Army Aviation Digest - Dec 1977

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UNITE ST TES RMY DECEM ER 977l TION GEST

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UNITED RMY VI TION.........,, 1GESJMG James C Smith

COMMANDERU.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER

A major activity of theU.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

COL Keith J. RynottCOMMANDER

U.S. ARMY AGENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETYA major activity of the

Inspector General of the U.S. Army

Richard KTierneyEDITOR

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

ABOUT THE COVEROur thanks to Gary Buchanan ofthe Training Aids Branch , Direc-torate of Training Developments,Ft. Rucker, for this month s cover

art

8 DECEMBER 1977 VOLUME 23 NUMBE1976 1974 Air Cavalry Hardware Of The Future,

19 5 I 1973 1975 COL George W. Shallcross .........................................................Just Another Demonstration, CW2 Darrell Wiebesick .......1967 Short, Violent Warfare, CW3 Chuck Tidey ...........................New Approach To Human-Error Accidents ...................

The Indispensable Scout, BG David K. Doyle ......................EPMS Corner: Returning From Overseas Duty,

SFC Douglas E. Allen ..................................................................Nebraska National Guard, CPT Robert B. Robeson .........Just Thunder ..............................................................................Air Traffic and Airspace Officers EducationalSeminar .....................................................................................OPMS Corner: ACIP And Aviation Personnel Update

MAJ Thomas M. Walker ............................................................MSAW At Fort Rucker, PFC Mike Ball .................................What Do You Do? Why Do You Do It?, CPT Charles

K. Griffin and CW4 John C. Moodt .............................................Molting Season: The Cobra Gets New Fangs,Joe Ruggerio ................................................................................

Radar Myth Conceptions .......................................................Views From Readers .................................................................A Fine Line ...................................................................................Pearl ................................................................................................A TC Action Line .......................................................................Army s First Air To Air Symposium ........ .Inside Back

The mission of the u RMY VI TION DIGEST is to provide information of anoperationai.functionnature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention. training. maintenance. operations. reseaand development. aviation medicine and other related data.

The DIGEST is an official Departmentof the Army periodical published monthly under the supervisiothe Commanding General. U.S. Army Aviation Center. Views expres sed herein are not necessarily thosethe Department of the Army nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army un less otherwspecified. Material may e reprinted provided credit is given to the DIGEST and to the author. unlotherwise indicated.Article . photos . and item s of interes t on Army aviation are invited. Direct communication is authorito : Editor. U S RMY VI TION DIGEST Fort Rucker. AL 36362.This pUblication has been approved by The Adjutant General. Headquarters . Departmentofthe ArmyDecember 1975. in accordance with AR 3101.ActivE' Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint di .tribution system as outlined in AR 31CompletE' DA Form 125 and send directly to CDR. AG Publications Center. 2800 Eastern BoulevBaltimore. MD 2l220. For any change in distribution requirements. initiate a re vised DA Form 125.National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also s hould submit DA FormOther National Guard units should submit requests through their state adjutant general.Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the DIGEST can ordermagazine from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S . Government Pr inting Office. Washington . DC 20Annual ub cription rates are 15 .70 domestic and 19 .65 overseas.


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:a-IR C V L Y B RDW RE

OF TBE FUTURECOL George W. Shallcross

TRADOC System ManagerAdvanced Scout Hel icopter

Ft . Rucke r, ALThe author reviews a typical air cavalry combat operation in Vietnam. Remarks onemployment, tactics and techniques of that operation introduce a discussion ofthe us s of projected technology to assist the air cavalry combat leader of thefuture. Emphasis is placed on improved equipment rather than tactics ortechniques . The article is restrictive in nature and does not attempt to cover theentire spectrum of research and development projects but only an extrapolationof those items directly related to the events taking place in the opening review.Although this article is authored by the TRADOC System Manager for the ASH, itin no way necessarily reflects positions of any Department of Defense agencies.L R PILOT : Taking f i re ing the incoming enemy fire , the suIts of the Cobra strike , con-Taking f ire scouts returned fire to the tinued to conduct reconnais-

Cobra pilot: Inbound ." enemy, or in the direction from sance , and maybe received fireThose who were involved in air which fire occurred . Simultane- again, probably in that order.cavalry operations in Vietnam ously , the observer threw a f the nemy contact was sigwell remember the electrifying smoke grenade to identify the nificant and the threat was greatexclamations from the light ob- enemy position while the scout enough to justify troop in erservation helicopter (LOR) pilots pilots made an abrupt maneuver tions , the AMC , in coordination(scouts) and the deliberate mat- away from the area. They knew with the ground commander,ter of fact statement - which that 17-pound rockets were about could make the decision to insertwas the expected response to let to smash into their location. troops and develop the situation .scout pilots know that help was Cobra pilot : Inbound. The The scouts again were with on the way - from the AR-l Cobras, already inbound, fired a drawn and the Cobras containedCobra gunships. mixture of weapon systems to the enemy while the AMC

The feeling of closeness and include high explosives , antiper- alerted the troop lift helicopterscomradeship that was estab- sonnel and 2 millimeter (mm) by radio and ordered them tolished between gunship and scout cannon. load their troops and get air pilots is not measurable . It grew After the firing passes , the borne . The AMC gave the lifton the Vietnam battlefields and scouts who had been directed to helicopter leader a coded transexists in Army aviation today , hold in a secure area were or- mission indicating the location ofstrong and healthy. It is an in- dered by the air mission com- the contact and general informa-ta ngi ble asset that is counted mander (AMC) to return to the bon about the area , including anon in the development of air as - enemy position. approximate inbound heading tosa ult operations. To understand Because they remained low a landing zone (LZ).the meaning of this rapport be- level , target orientation was dif- Meanwhile the scouts were retween scouts and guns , let us re- ficult. Further , because they re- connoitering for a suitable LZ forturn to the initial alarm of taking turned over a different flight the lift helicopters and markedfi re and the subsequent events path route , the scouts had to be the LZ at the appropriate timethat took place. guided similar to a ground- with smoke for identification.

LOR pilot: Taking f ire Tak- controlled approach to reenter The Cobras rendezvoused withE p : s e e i n g or hear- the area. They assessed the re- the lift helicopters and escorte:


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them to the LZ . The Cobras thenconducted firing pas es on suspected or known enemy locationsto protect the precarious troopinsertion , especially during thevulnerable time while the troopswere offloading.The AMC was able to conductcombat operations in Vietnamthis way but the AMC wouldneed help to conduct the sametype operations in a higher levelof combat intensity. There is aneed in future combat for great-er use of technology to assistthe air cavalry combat com-mander in controlling or direct-ing combat assets. There also isa need to improve the capabil-ity to seek and destroy enemyforces. For example , in conditions of poor visibility or dark-ness , the significant reconnaissance capability of the scouts isnegated.Even the best trained obser vers cannot function well atnight without the use of night vi-sion aids. During periods of poorvisibility or rain , scouts cannotsee well enough to fly as a teamand gunships cannot maintainthe effective visual contact thatis necessary to protect them . Soobviously, a need exists to more

effectively exploit those intangible assets - the teamwork ,courage and skill between scoutand guns that is inherent in allair cavalry units.With these thoughts in mindle t s return to the LOR andCobra pilots in a combat situa-tion and project it into a futureair cavalry combat action extending the technology of todayinto equipment of the future . TheLOR pilots become scouts andthe Cobra pilots become attackhelicopter pilots. Do not considerthis scenario with idealistic con-ceptions , but with a realisticprobability that a limitednumber of current or projectedresearch and development proj-ects will materializeThe scouts in this projected action mayor may not be takingfire as they contact the enemybecause the tactics employeddiffer from those used in thepast. Improved range target acquisition /designation sy temscombined with advanced weap-ons standoff capability will alsohave tactical impact on the possibility and severity of takingfire. The simplistic wagon wheelreconnaissance tactic with theoverwatch protection of the

scouts by the gunships will longha v been replaced by the tactical space controller TASAC)and scout/attack helicopter mixconcept. This concept greatly increases the responsibility of thescouts so that scouts will becomethe keystone of aerial em ployment of the combined armsteam. The TASACs will be re-sponsible for conducting and orchestrating the battle in their respective area of operations .

The TASACs will not onlyemploy the air cavalry and at tack helicopter teams in antiar-mor roles , but th y also willsupport with the ground com-mander by applying destruc-tive /suppressive artillery firesand tactical air support. The roleof scouts will have reversedfrom the Vietnam era and willcontrol the actions of the attackhelicopters. The scouts will havethe responsibility of employingthe elements of the destruc-tion/killer tams by selecting thekill zone for their teams and establishing and maintaining contact with enemy forces . This willbe accomplished by acquiringand handing off targets to the attack helicopters and distributingfire within each team.

The air cavalry scout of the future will operate day and night outside the effective range of enemy weapons

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Scout pilot: Taking f ire Tak-ing f i re As the T ASACs andscouts employ their tactical as-sets they will be flying in highlymaneuverable helicopters con-structed primarily of compositemateriels and high strengthmetals.

The composite materiel con-struction of the scout will serve adual purpose which not only willallow a lighter, stronger aircraft,but also a ceramic metal combi-nation will provide protection forthe crewmembers and key flightand engine components.

The aircraft will be poweredby a lightweight , high lift-toweight-ratio engine that willallow immediate response toflight controls. The aircraft willbe designed to permit maneuvers restricted only by humanlimitations. t will be an adverseweather aircraft with instrumentation visually displayed on thewindshield or canopy for nightand instrument navigation.

One of the assets the futurescout will have is a night visionScouts will designate targets for destruction to mis-sile carrying attack helicopters the attack helicop-ter acquires the designated target and launches atank killing missile

DECEMBER 977

capability. The continued de-velopment of equipment , such asthe target acquisition and desig-nation system , will give thescout s crewmembers the abilityto detect the enemy at night aswell as day .This improved system can op-erate in total darkness . Since itdetects differences in temperature , i t identifies both camouflaged personnel and equipmentin daylight. t also will be an in-tegral part of the pilots visor .But of greater importance to thescout pilots will be the capabilityto see through light haze or fog.Although the scouts may haveimproved detection capability anenemy may still take them under

ire without being seen. Receiv-ing fire from an unseen enemywill continue to be hazardous.But future scouts will beequipped with detector-sensorequipment that will determinefrom which direction the fire iscoming and also its caliber.This sensor equipment will eincorporated with advanced de-velopment of the target acquisi-tion and designation system.Using a laser ranging and tracking system , the scout will detectthe position from which the fir-ing is originating and illuminatethe position with laser. This willafford inbound attack helicoptersa greater capability for an accu-rate first-round hi t . Attack

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High performance tactical air support is fully integrated into the ground battlehelicopter will be able to usepinpoint rather than area typeordnance. thus destroying morenemy targets with Ie ammunition and providing greater protection for the scouts.The beauty of th e la ser detector sensing equipment isthat it will be op rated automatically. The targ t can be illuminated even though the scoutsmay be flying away from theenemy 's firing position.

Attack helicopter pilot n- ound As the attack helicopters are inbound and aimingtheir weapon systems at thlaser designated targets , thepilots will feel a sense of confidence with the knowledge thatimproved fusing and weapons effects will rain greater lethalityon their targets. The additionalimproved accuracy will givetheir ordnance r markable killassurance.

Assisting the attack helicopters will be the much improvedforward looking infrared system(FLIR) , an integral part of theweapon systems . t will beminiaturized and much more eff ctive than today's prototypes .

The viewing screens of boththe pilot and copilot will be farclearer and sharper than currenttelevision and have extendedrange and an improved amplifi-

cation capability. Attack helicopter crewmembers will be able toob erve accurately their strikesand adjust accordingly.Coupled to the attack helicopter FLIR system will be a receiver for the Persi tent La erPainters that the scouts will useto mark and forget targets.The r flected laser energy willbe picked up by both specialtracker in the aircraft and laserseekers mounted in the ordnanceof th attack helicopter. Thisordnance will employ a fire and-forget mi ile with awarhead mix of high explosives,an titank, antipersonnel flechette .In this scenario the detectorsen or on the scout will identifythe type of fire being received.Thi information will be transmitted to the selective effectsarmament subsystem in the attack h licopt r, which in turnautomatically selects the specificwarheads to counter enemy fire.By using the e advance int chnology , the attack helicopters will have greater standoffcapability because they will onlyhave to turn inbound to thetarget , tabilize , fire and break.

f during combat operationsthe need arises to insert troopsthe TASAC will direct the scoutsto reconnointer a landing zone.

After making their clearingsweep , they will drop in the LZa recoverable portable transmitter that incorporates an om-nidirectional and distancmea uring device that simul taneously transmit azimuth anddistance to the r cei ver in thetroop lift helicopter.B fore the lift helicopters receiv signals from th LZ, theTASAC will have alerted themthat their services are requiredby the simple pu h of a transmitter switch which in turn will illuminate a light on the lifthelicopter con ole. The TASACwill have selected various precoded bits of information such asinbound head ing to th LZ; winddirection and velocity; wh theror not the lift helicopters will bepermitt d to fire their protectiveweapon during the insertion;and the direction of egre fromthe LZA lighted interpreter on thlead lift helicopter s console willindicate the coded information ,and the troop insertion may bemade without extensiv radiotraffic. f the portable miniaturtran mitter was damaged whendropped into the LZ, the scoutsalso can identify the LZ by theuse of a hand-held laser designator. The laser-detector sensormounted on th scout also mayb used to indicate to the TASACtheir po ition during period ofinactivity plus possible ship tohip communications.All in all , once th scout recei ve fire or identify targets,there will be no requirement forradio transmissions during subsequent fire support , LZ reconnaissance or troop ins rtions.Command and control will bemore responsive with fewertransmissions, and coordinationwith artillery support or tacticalair will be simplified.The portable transmitterdropped to mark the LZ and guidethe troop lift helicopter also will

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assist tactical air support. Thisd vice will eliminate the necessary target identification normally r quired from the TASACto identify the target and distinguish betwe n friendly andenemy forces.

The concept of thi procedurewill e to simply tran mit to thetactical air support assets onwhich fr quency the transmitteris operating and indicate th radial bearing and range of theenemy from the transmitter .Tactical air support pilots mayexpend their ordnanc withoutadditional target information.The k y to succ ss will be speedand coordination eff cted by welltrain d, dedicated air cavalryand attack helicopt r teams.To add effectiveness to aerialfire upport of th future, attackhelicopters also will be armedwith antiper onn and antimateriel weapons. Each attackhelicopter will carry a mix ofweapon and weapons ystems,allowing for greater flexibilityengaging targ ts. There will be aturr t mount d 3 mm gunload d with mixed ammunitionand a rocket system evolvingfrom 2.75 inch rocket that willinclude armor piercing , highexplo ives , flechettes , and an illumination round . Ammunitionwill be conserved bec a use theproper ordnance will have beenselected for th type target engaged.A po sible rotor concept thatcould be common to all type ofair cavalry aircraft will be theadvancing blade concept (ABC)using rigid rotor principles. Theconstruction of future h licoptersfrom high strength compositemat riel will permit th use ofthis concept without sacrificingany of the pure helicoptercapabilities and yet permit highspeeds when required.

The rigid rotor will provideimproved maneuverability re quired by the scouts , allow great-DECEMBER 1977

The TASACs employ destructive/suppressive Artillery fires to support the ground commanderer gun platform stability for theattack h licopters and permit lifthelicopters the rapid reactionspeed necessary for troop reinforcements or in ertions.

The advancing blade conceptdesign envision a coaxial.counter-rotating rotor which willeli minate the pres nt tail rotorconfiguration and all of its associated weight and parts. Although the ABC ystem willweigh more than a conventionalhelicopter rotor system, th improvement in efficiency and performance will more than makeup for the additional weight.Another possible rotor concept,a quantum jump in rotort chnology, is the hingel ss bearingless rotor (w hich also is arigid rotor). This advanced sy -tem permits the am manuvercapability as the ABC. However ,the smaller rotor hub reducesradar reflectivity and the lack ofhinges and bearings cutsmaintenance requirements tenfold. Blade construction permitsthe incorporation of specifiedweights which by increasingstored energy will eliminate thedead man zone in the event ofengine failure.Also common to future aircavalry aircraft will be an advanced integrally designed infrared suppression capability;

ballistic tolerance; and radar re flectivity reduction. Avionic re pair and improved modularmaintenance repair will be conducted at the refueling andrearming point.In Vi tnam, after the couts reported r ceiving fire, the guns hips turned inbound and tookseveral seconds to stabilize,sight and fir their ordnanc .With the advancement infriendly a well as enemytechnology, targets will have tobe identified more rapidly andtaken unde r fir and /or destroyed in much less time thanin the pa t. This several secondluxury can no longer be af forded. Aerial fire support willrequire immediate responsivene s, and training for this responsivenes will have to be anintegral part of the weaponsystem and t am effort.The human-machine interfaceis a must, and the air cavalry ofthe future will be ready for thechallenge.The future air cavalry trooper- forming a major part of thetrike forces - may take thetime, after bringing an enemycontact situation to a succe sfulconclusion, to reflect and say asthe Cavalry veterans of Vietnamoften did: Yes, sir; thi Cav isall right

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t t ~US VSCW arrell Wiebesick

HEN YOU ARE a member of the Armyunique helicopter air crash rescue unit demon-stration missions are a way of life. This demon-stration was to turn out quite differently from therest Five people would come face to face withdeath in one of the most unusual emergenciesever experienced by an Army flight crew.I wa assigned as copilot for the mission andthat da y n May tarted out like hundreds of dayU.S. RMY VI TION DIGEST


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iolent

L OOKING BACK over the lastdecade (1967-1977 ) it appearsthat there is a n w trend de veloping in regard s to the lengthand ferociousness of the warsbeing fought around the world.In 1967 , Israel and most of theArab countries fought a veryshort - 7-day - and quite violent war. The brunt of the fighting in this war was carried bythe armored units on both sides.The war was brought to an endthrough the political interventionof the so-called super powers -the United States and the SovietUnion - who oddly enough ,were also the major suppliers ofthe antagonists.The next war was in 1968 andthough it wasn t as violent in na-

ture it was quite short in duration . This war , or perhaps conflict is a better word , was theSoviet Union s occupation ofCzechoslovakia. Once again , ththrust of the in vading Sovi tforces was conducted by it armored units.October 1973 brought with itanother Arab -Israeli war. Thisone lasted a bit longer than the1967 confrontation . Here again ,armored units were the workhorses and also the decisiveelement in the fighting. As theywere in the 1967 war , the majorsuppliers of armaments were theUnited States to the Israeliforces and the Soviet Union tothe Arab forces. This war alsowas brought to a peaceful set-

a

tl ment by the political intervention of the two super powers.In 1974 , this trend of shortusually violent wars , beingbrought to an end by political intervention by outside forcesbegan to change somewhat. Inearly 1975 , the armies of NorthVietnam struck out boldlyagainst the South Vietnameseforces. By April of 1975, theNorth Vietnamese Army, led byits armored units , had overrunSouth Vietnam and the SouthVietnamese government fell. The

change in the trend here is -there was a decisive militaryvictory which resulted in achange of government for theconquered country.In 1976 this same trend con-

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CW huck TideyAvionics Laboratory

U S Army Electronics CommandFort Monmouth NJ

tinued in Angola. Here the bulkof the fighting was terminated injust a couple of months and likeSoutheast Asia in 1974 the warwas brought to an end via a decisive military victory.I'm bringing all of this up, notto give you a quick history lessonconcerning the wars foughtaround the world during the lastdecade, but rather to make youaware of the trend of recentlyfought wars towards being shortin duration. These wars havelasted anywhere from 1 week to2 months, and are very violent innature. Though I've not goneinto detail in the above descriptions of the various wars, itlhould be noted that in almost allhe wars it was a combined-DECEMBER 1977

arms-team army that battledanother combined-arms-teamarmy. Also, in almost all of thesewars, armored units spear-headed the attacks..So where does all of this leaveus? Well, let's take a quick look.Two of the U.S. Army's Big Fiveprocurement projects (the XM-1main battle tank and the AH-64advanced attack helicopter) aredesigned to give us a decisive edgeon the battlefield should the needever arise for us to again go intocombat. Improved night visionequipment like the night visiongoggles (AN/PVS-5) and the forward looking infrared (FLIR) arebeing procured for our ground andaviation personnel so that we canfight these first battle type wars

on an around the clock basis. Tocomplement this equipment, however, we must have an Army thatis fully prepared to go into combatat any time. And that is the majorpoint of this entire article: Are you- nd yourun t really prepared to gointo combat on just a couple ofhours notice?At first: probably out of espritde corps, I'm sure most of youanswer yes. You and your unitare combat ready right now Butthink about it are you reallyready? Are you persQnally ingood physical condition (have you,run your 1 2 or 4 miles today?);are your shots up-to-date; howabout your teeth, do you needdental work? When was the lasttime you qualified on a rangewith your weapon; or how aboutyour family, are they mentally,physically and financially prepared to operate without you fora sustained period of time?And how about your unit? Doyou have the personnel on handto accomplish your unit's mission or are you simply holding ahandful of unfilled requisitions?Is your unit's authorized stockage (ASL) and prescribed loadlist (PLL) in good shape for immediate deployment, or doesyour supply troop just show youthat it has been requisitioned butnothing has been done about itsince? Are your motor vehiclesand/or aircraft ready to go intocombat on a sustained basis andon short notices? Are all of yourassigned personnel qualified andcurrent in the job to which theyare assigned? f not, what isbeing done about it?

Only you and the people inyour unit know the answers tothese questions. But rememberthis - your superiors and, infact, the rest of the world mayone day soon find out the trueanswers to these questions because the next war may wellturn out to be a come as youare affair.


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NEW ADDroacl,1011ul lal,-l:rror_ _

THE PURPOSE OF this article is to point outsome of the recurring deficiencies noted in aircraft accident reports (DA Form 2397 series -Technical Report of U. S. Army Aircraft Accident). Since the majority of these deficiencies involve the human-error investigation, we will beginwith a brief review of the human-error problemand a new approach we hope will be successful inattacking it.Formerly, pilot error was approached in thecontext of specific types of accidents such as hardlandings, midair collisions, and blade strikes. Thistype of approach considered the situation in whichthe accident occurred instead of the causes thatbrought it about. As a result, causes that arecommon to different types of accidents were overlooked. Preconceived types of accidents tended tofoster preconceived notions of what happened andwhy it happened. In summary, this approach fostered the tendency to describe and account for accidents rather than to discover their causes andcures.In developing a new approach, it was necessary10

AceidE1,15, a &L

. . .-;. . I . If . tI\.. ; . :.; ~ : ... . ; - '.

to get back to basics by first defining the problem.Figure 1 presents a functional definition of thehuman-error accident. Items one through twelveare the basic elements of the aviation system.When one or more of these elements is out of tolerance, an overload (item 13 is placed on man ssystem role (item 14) in that he must continue toperform his normal tasks while correcting or adjusting for the abnormal system condition. Whenthis overload exceeds his ability to cope with it oroccurs at a critical time, he makes errors (item15 in his normal tasks in handling the abnormalsystem condition. Most of these errors slip bywithout causing an accident (item 16). But whenevents or circumstances operate unfavorably, theerror leads to an accident (item 17).It should be emphasized that the overloadplaced on the man s system role: May originate with the man through hispsychological (item 11) and physiological (item 12limitations, e.g., inat tention, fatigue . May be imposed on the man through out-oftolerance conditions among the other aviation sys-U.S, ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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f ~ ~U B V Btem elements (items 1 through 10 ), e.g. , impropermaintenance causing an overload in the form ofengine failure . May be both originated by the man and imposed on him , e.g., impaired performance due tofatigue which resulted from a supervisory requirement to exceed flight-time limitations .The new approach views human-error accidentsas the result of man 's system role being overloaded by inadequacies of the man , other systemelements or both.With the model developed , the next step is totransform it into an approach to the investigation,analysis , and prevention of aircraft accidentscaused by human error. Table 1 presents the outline of an approach that asks each accident investigation board to answer: What has happened ,What caused or allowed it to happen , and What todo about it (3W ) with respect to man , machine ,and environmental causes of accidents. t can beseen that TEIR is the acronym for the 3W approach to the investigation , analysis , and prevention of human-error accidents. The elements ofTEIR are defined and discussed as follows:

1 Task error (TE) - job performance deviatingfrom that required by the operational situation .Required performance includes that stipulatedby (a ) school training , (b) on-the-job training , (c)

1 2 3 Desi,n andSchaal Unit supply oftraining training equipmentor vehic:le

7 .' 8 9Procedures Procedures Unit levelfo, normal for emergency super visi onconditions conditions13

Army-w ide regulations and guidelines, (d) standing operating procedures , and (e) commonly accepted practices . An error is assigned only whenit is judged that a person of normal or reasonablecompetence could have performed the task correctly in the existing operational situation.2. System inadequacy (I) - an element of theArmy aviation system that did not operate as intended or designed. A system inadequacy is assigned only when it is judged to have caused , allowed, or contributed to the occurrence of a taskerror. More than one system inadequacy may beassigned to a given task error.3. Remedial measure (R) - act ion required tocorrect or reduce the operational impact of a system inadequacy. A remedial measure is assignedwhen it is judged appropriate for the system inadequacy. The remedial measure may be directedat any command level for implementation and isnot to be restricted by current technology orbudgetary , personnel, and equipment resources.More than one remedial measure may be recommended for a given system inadequacy.With the approach developed, the next step wasto translate it into procedures for investigatingand reporting human error as a cause of aircraftaccidents. This was accomplished and the procedures were officially implemented with their pub-

4 5 6Maintenance Facilities Environmentand servi ces

10 11 12Highe, cO, %\ln.d TranSitory Transitory

5 \ p e v h i psychologica.l phy ,1010,1col, totes states

SYltem Imposed IverloadC )divlduol'srole in system16 15 17No accident Errors individual could not or Accidentdid not correct

igure*The words man , he , his and him used herein refer both to ma le and fema le ,

DECEMBER 1977 11


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NEW APPROACH TO HUMAN ERROR ACCIDENTSlication in Army Regulation 95 5 , Aircraft Accident Prevention, Investigation , and Reporting ,dated 1 July 1975 , with changes 1 and 2.The 3W approach for investigating and reporting human error is outlined in paragraph 11 2 , AR95 5 , and is designed to be used as an approach byArmy accident investigation boards to aid them ingetting the type of information needed. The problem is that most accident investigation boards arenot conducting this investigation. It appears thatmany investigation boards are using old reportsas examples . Many board members may not haveeven read chapter 11 , thinking that it applies onlyto human factor mishaps. It is clear that revisionsto AR 95 5 are needed and as a result USAAAVS iscurrently working on a new regulation which wille a complete manual on aircraft mishap investigation.Since the majority of the mishap report findingsare not in the format outlined in paragraph 14 4b ,AR 95 5 , USAAA VS must attempt to construct the3W findings from the evidence presented in thereport. A recent study of 85 mishaps indicated thiscould be done only 67 percent of the time.One of the biggest problems USAAAVS encounters when required to conduct the 3W analysis islack of and inconsistent information on the DA2397 forms.Sometimes , many spaces are not filled in on the2397 1 (the accident report summary). Some of

the blocks, such as block 22 , are very importantwhen trying to determine the task errors. In addition , those items checked in block 23 , whether itbe human error (personnel) , materiel failure/malfunction , environmental , weather , or other relatedfactors , should be in total agreement and totallyexplained in the rest of the report. For example , ifthe 2397 1 shows that there was a definite or suspected personnel cause factor , the 2397 2 (Findings and Recommendations ) should contain theindividual 's duty position , the task he was performing , the error made in performing the task ,the document that specifies how the task shoulde performed , and what caused or allowed the error. f materiel factor is checked on the 2397 1 ,

then the 2397 2 should identify the part (to includeNSN) and the type of failure , how that failure affected the individual 's or machine 's performanceand , most importantly , what caused the part tofail.DA Form 2397 3 has four basic parts - the history of the flight ; the background investigation,the crash scene Investigation , and the analysis .This may seem rather redundant , but each part isdifferent. The form is set up this way to guide theaccident investigation board , as much as possible,through the mishap to ensure that areas whichshould be investigated are not overlooked . Again,the analysis part of the narrative should be in

total agreement with the dash 1 and dash 2. WhileTABLE 1. The 3W Approach to Aviation ~ i d e n t Analysis and Prevention

2

ACCIDENTCAUSEFACTORSMAN

MACHINE

ENVIRONMENT

WHATHAPPENEDTaskTError

Failureor malfunctionEnvi ronment' seffect onman/machineperformance

WHATCAUSED IT

inadequaciesof systemnadequaci esof systemnadequaci esof system

WHATTO DOABOUT ITf emedies

REmedies

REmedies-

ACRONYMTEIR

FIRE

EIRE



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there is bound to be some conflicting evidencegathered by the board, the analysis is the area inwhich the board should discuss conflicting evidence in drawing hypotheses of what they feelhappened in the mishap.Another problem is with the 2397 4 (WitnessStatement . Unfortunately, not enough witnesstranscripts are contained in the reports. Althoughthe regulation does not specifically require them ,USAAA VS finds that the majority of the information for system inadequacies can be obtained fromthese statements. f the board simply has individuals write out statements and does not actuallyask questions , a great deal of needed informationis lost. The board should have formal sessions andmake thorough witness transcripts of their discussions with the individuals.The majority of the evidence for the 3Wanalysis in regard to materiel and maintenance isreported on the 2397 7 and 7A. The board shouldinclude as much information as possible on theseforms. AR 95 5 states that if a part is suspected tohave failed , it should be submitted to CorpusChristi Army Depot (CCAD) to determine why itfailed. Most accident investigation boards do nothave the expertise to determine why a part failed .Therefore , when a part fails or is suspected tohave failed , the board should contact USAAA VSfor a control number and send the part to CCADfor a teardown analysis . Occasionally, boardsmake the mistake of handling the part under theEIR program as outlined in TM 38-750 . When thisoccurs , USAAA VS seldom receives a teardownanalysis which is needed to determine why thepart failed. There is always the possibility that amaintenance error was committed which contributed to a part failing. When a materiel failure isinvolved , the board should thoroughly investigateunit maintenance to determine what the maintenance procedures are , and whether it was possiblethat a maintenance error was committed.A great deal of improvement is needed in reporting the 2397-9 form concerningpsychophysiological and environmental factors asit consists primarily of categorical type factors.First , the board should review the factors to determine if any of them were involved in the mishap. f any of these factors are checked, theyshould be explained in block 9 of the form; otherwise the categorical information will be practi-cally useless in developing accident preventionremedies. Once this is accomplished , there issome additional information WhICh should be entered in block 9 as outlined in chapter 11 , AR 95 5.DECEMBER 1977

The majority of the board 's information regardingthe human error investigation and analysis shouldbe recorded on the 9. Chapter 11 states that , oncethe analysis is accomplished and recorded , the information in block 9 of 2397 9 can be translatedinto findings and recommendations appropriatefor the 2397 2 . In other words , it should all tie to-gether - the dash 1, 2, and 9.Another form which is occasionally completedincorrectly or not at all is the 2397 17 which contains environmental data. Occasionally, a 2397 17will have a command factor or training factorchecked off, but will not be mentioned anywhereelse in the report. Again , all these forms shouldtie together . f the board feels that an error wascommitted or that a part failed because of an environmental factor which is checked on the dash17 , then these factors should be explained in theother parts of the 2397 series.Many boards place the requirement of conducting a human factors investigation totally onthe flight surgeon. Although chapter 11 states thatthe flight surgeon is probably the best qualifiedindividual to conduct the investigation, this maynot always be the case , as the majority of the errors made by individuals are caused by systemproblems not related to the individual. In otherwords, they are related to an individual 's training,supervision , inadequate written procedures fornormal and emergency operating conditions , environmental factors , etc . These are areas in whichthe flight surgeon mayor may not be knowledgeable. Even in the area of psychophysiologicalproblems, the flight surgeon may need help. Prac-tically every aviator has experienced these trans-itory problems at one time or another. Therefore,who better than aviators should be able to recognize such problems as overconfidence , inattention,and lack of or poor judgment in others?The key to reducing human error mishaps isbetter investigation and reporting on what causespeople to make errors. The standard remedy ofInforming personnel of the facts and cir-cumstances of past mishaps has been disappointing at best. However, what else can we do untilwe know more about what causes these errors?The 3W approach to accident investigation willensure that we find out this most important W... What.For more information on this subject contactCW2 Reginald C. Murrell Directorate for TR A;USAAAVS AUTOVON 558-3493/ 4812 , commercial205-255-3493 / 4812.

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Thendispensablecout

Brigadier General David K DoyleAssistant Commandant U.S. Army Armor School

t . Knox KYThe DIGEST thanks ARMOR magazine for permission to print this article

C IRCLE THE wagons The Scouts - an element of our force we have assumed as a given; onewe have seen as expanding in significance underconcepts such as the active defense - are underattack .The attack comes from both inside and outsidethe ~ r y and ranges from: Those who would eliminate the scouts at battalion level and substitute a smaller consolidatedplatoon at brigade level devoted primarily to traffic control duties. To those who would amalgamate the groundscouts with the infantry because they both ride towar in the same vehicle. To those analysts who challenge the necessityfor establishing , maintaining or employing anyground or air scouts at any level.Just as the attacks are varied , so are the basesof the attacks. They range from a simple forcereduction exercise to a rationalization that theThreat will be of such magnitude that no one or noelement must be specially dedicated to find them- they 'll find us.

f you've been in the business of either fightingor figuring out how to fight an armored force , afirst reaction to all of this is - bull What makesthe conditions of future battlefields so different orthe requirements of the battle commander so different that he will need a lesser capability to seethan his predecessors?In 1974 , the Cavalry Scout Ad hoc Committee(CSAC) at the Armor Center completed a studywhich looked at ground cavalry and formed thebasis for standardizing the organization andequipment of the Armored Cavalry Platoon; significantly increased its combat power and theability of the platoon to perform dismounted reconnaissance by increasing the size of the scout

team from three to five . In arriving at its recommendations , which were subsequently approvedfor implementation, the study reviewed our reconnaissance and security needs and the organizational responses to those needs since World WarII , looked to the future and concluded: f cavalry organizations were cut out of theArmy 's force structure, commanders would stillbe required to dedicate elements of their force toperform reconnaissance, security , and economyof-force missions - which could cause a one-thirdreduction in the size of their combat power. There is an increasing need for men and unitsspecially and uniquely trained , organized , andequipped to perform reconnaissance and securityoperations.By all standards , we thought the mail wasanswered in 1974 in an objective, rational manner.This was complemented on the air side with theAviation Requirements for the Combat Structureof the Army (ARCSA Ill which was approved inFebruary 1977 and layed out the mix of air cavalryand attack helicopters in our various organizations.So why the fresh onslaught? Frankly, I don tthink it has a thing to do with past study efforts -merely a new set of distractors in the transmitonly position. So we' ll go back to the boards to

address one more time: Do units on future battlefields need to conductreconnaissance , security , and economy-of-forcemissions? f so , what should be the mix of air andground cavalry units and do you best performthese missions with specially trained elements or ,should we pull tank and infantry units from themain force on an ad hoc basis to accomplish thesame thing?With that as background, let 's make sure we 're



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all on the same frequency as to our needs andwhat we expect the heart of all cavalry units - thescout - to accomplish.The Requirements. The commander must beable to 'see ' the battlefield .... The first step inwinning is seeing the battlefield. " These state-

ments from FM 100 5 , " Operations, are reinforced in both How-to-Fight manuals, 71 -1, and71-2, the bibles for team and task force tactics ,and in statement after statement taken fromcommanders working the maneuver battlefield inpreparation for future requirements. They speakan indisputable truth , a notion certainly not newDECEMBER 1977

f the commander can ' t " see" the battlefield -before and during the battle - the day , the battle ,maybe even the war is lost.Paramount among the commander's sources of" eyes and ears" today are air and ground cavalryorganizations whose principle missions are reconnaissance, security , and employment in aneconomy-of-force role. In all cavalry units - thecorps ' armored cavalry regiment or air cavalrycombat brigade , the division's armored cavalrysquadron with its air cavalry troop, and the maneuver battalion's scout platoon - the SCOUT isthe man who does the seeing. He is the number

15


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one source of real t ime 24-hours-a-day, anyweather, combat information. And real t ime accurate information can ' t be overemphasized becausethat's what the commander must have so he canmake timely, crucial , and correct decisions thatspell the difference between the winning and defeat.

The M{ssion. In each of the cavalry 's missions,the men who man the organizations are requiredto operate over extended frontages and atrelatively-extreme distances from the main force .In order to cover the area assigned. cavalry andscout platoons are habitually deployed as squadsor even teams. In a screening mission, it is notuncommon for teams of a squad to be separatedby considerable distances in order to performtheir assigned tasks and report their findings .This situation, which is more the norm than theunusual , establishes a considerable degree of in-dependance n operations. In turn, it necessitatesthat ll SCOlit possess to a high degree the samerequisite. skiils to accomplish the mission.The SCOUT's mission is to gather and reportinformation on terrain features , enemy strength,and enemy disposition ... This mission statement fails , however, to fully describe what a scoutdoes. He 'performs his duties mounted and dismounted , alone or with one or two other scouts.He must be a skilled observer who knows what heis looking for and how to find it. The scout mustbe expert at mounted and dismounted map reading and land navigation. He mans observationposts and conducts patrols. He's got to be especially skilled in the intricacies of communication,employing communications-electronics operationinstructions (CEOI's) and operating all of the various organic communications equipment. Thescout must conduct route reconnaissance, classifybridges, and evaluate potential fording sites. Hemust be able to calculate demolition chargesneeded to destroy bridges and other structures,place the charges , and detonate them. Scoutsmust be able to employ every reconnaissancetechnique, from stealth to recon by fire ; andmost importantly, he must also understand the relationship between the air scout and himself.When performing any of his missions , the scoutmust be able to fight. We made our decision rightafter World War II that we would go for heavyversus light snoop-and-poop reconnaissance elements not only to enable our reconnaissanceforces to fight for information, but also to accomplish critical economy-of-force missions. Inpast years, the scout was given a .30- or .50-caliber machinegun. Today , the scout has beengiven a significant boost in capability with the addition of TOW and Dragon antiarmor weapons

~

systems; and as we look toward future organization , he will have not only TOW, but also ahighly-accurate , long-range, light cannon to accomplish his missions. With the introduction ofthese weapons , we have also made the scout's lifemore complex; therefore , we owe it to him to puthis weapons into perspective as he seeks toemploy them on his varied missions , and mostimportantly, we must ensure that we train him upto the weapon's capabilities .The scout also is expected to work with , committo action or control, a wide variety of assetsavailable not only within his platoon and troop , butalso to senior commanders - scout and attackhelicopters , indirect artillery and mortar fires , scatterable mines , and tactical air support, to cite a few.The responsibility inherent in these performancerequirements is heightened by the fact that thescout 's mission is oriented on the battlefield needsof the larger force; corps, division, brigade andbattalion. This condition requires that scouts besufficiently trained and skilled so that commanders from lieutenant colonel to lieutenantgeneral can be confident of the reliability and accuracy of their performance.

Now let 's look at the issue of rolling scouts into theinfantry , and detailing infantry to performscouting missions. There is similarity in the tasksthat each are expected to perform. At the basic soldier level, there is a 45 percent commonality of taskstaught. Taken to the extreme , a similar comparison of tasks can be made between the scout andthe Hawk-missile crewman. But this type of comparison distorts the dissimilar emphasis placed intasks considered essential for the accomplishmentof the basic scout mission: reconnaissance , indirectfire, communications,vehicle operation andmaintenance , demolition and land navigation .Commonality of tasks decreases and the differencein training emphasis continues as one follows theprogression of the scout and infantryman up throughthe skill levels , which are nothing more than a reflection of the organizations to which they belong,and their missions and methods of operation. Scoutsfight to see, while infantrymen see to fight.

Individual Characteristics. The SCOUT we'vebeen describing is not a lieutenant; rather, heranges from the old trooper, tacticallyexperienced noncommissioned (NCO) to theyoung PFC or Specialist Four. No matter what hisage or experience, he must be a man for all seasons.

So what kind of a man do we need for a Scout?First of all, understand that the average new recruit joining the 5th Cavalry Squadron at FortKnox is between 18 19 years old, has a GT of 100u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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plus , and joined because he wanted adventure ,likes the outdoors , or just plain wanted to respondto a John Wayne call of Scouts Out. Now here ' s what we ' re looking for : self reliance, independence , boldness and aggressiveness. He must have physical and mental stamina ,exceptional initiative and inquisitiveness. Thescout must be totally flexible in reaction to his

environment and frequent , unexpected events. Hemust be trained to perform the high-risk missionas a routine requirement. He must feel at easeoperating over extended distances , at a rapidpace , and be willing to , in fact , seek the kind ofindependent operations that will be expected ofhim by his unit. Although all of the foregoing areintangibles , they are nevertheless vitally important. And if the recruits don ' t have these characteristics when we get them , we must foster andbuild these characteristics in those men qualifiedto be trained as scouts .We've talked about tne scout, what we demandof him , how he must operate , what training hemust have and what it s that makes him different.But here is one more important ingredient in makinga scout - the intangible catalyst that binds it alltogether. That key element is the el n and espritof cavalry. Some get squeamish because these

cannot be quantified - but the great battle captains have never hesitated to capitalize on orexploit such intangibles . In fact , we would be professionally remiss i we did not nurture in thescout the special skill , loyalty and dedication ofthe cavalry - because cavalry is a state of mindfor all who serve from the senior leaders to themost junior scouts.Wrapping up. Whether in the role of the commander who must fight the main battle , or thestaffer trying to scope the needs of the battleforce , we must ensure that we collectively stateour case; but more importantly prove our casethrough proper training and employment of thescout. Anyone that understands the principle ofeconomy-of-force , our limited - by realisticnecessity - resources , and the requirement toconcentrate the combat power required to obtainthe decision at the time and place must understand the need for a trained , dedicated scout. Hedoesn't cost us any more. By paycheck, he should,but he doesn' t. There is no wasted combat power.In fact , cavalry gives us a lot for our money. Indoing what it is supposed to do , it is much , muchcheaper and will become more so than tank andmechanized task forces as the new cavalry organization is implemented. At the heart of it all is- the SCOUT.

BG DAVID K DOYLE enlisted in the Army in 1951, rising to the rank of sergeant beforeattending Officer Condidate School at Fort Knox. Upon graduation from OCS in 1952, he wascommissioned in Armor. Brigadier General Doyle has been a training officer, reconnaissanceand tank platoon leader company executive officer, battalion intelligence officer, companycommander assistant operations officer and assistant G-3 plans officer. After attendance atthe Command and General Staff College in 1965, Brigadie r General Doyle commanded the 3dSquadron of the 11 th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam. In 1971, he attended the NationalWar College and later commanded the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in 1973. Brigadier GeneralDoyle was assigned as the Deputy Commanding General of Fort Knox in 1976 and is presentlythe Assistant Commandant USAARMS

DECEMBER 1977 17


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Enlisted Personnel Management System

Returning FromOverseas uty

SFC Douglas E llenviation Ca reer dvisor

U S rmy Military Personnel Cen te r

I YOU ARE assigned overseas and desire service school training enroute to your new assignment your request should be submitted in time toarrive at Military Personnel Center MILPERCEN) before your return assignment is made.Soldiers about to return from overseas whohave severe family problems should take earlyaction before date eligible for return from overseas DEROS) to request a compassionate reassignment, rather than waiting until they are dueat the new duty station before requesting diver sion. Normally it takes 9 months from the time aninstallation submits a requisition until a Soldierarrives onstation to fill the position. It is unfair tochange your assignment at the time you are dueto arrive . Another Soldier may have to move onshort notice to fill the vacancy or the commandermay have to wait another 9 months for a re-placement.I f you are on leave en route to your new assignment, and a situation arises which causes you toneed a change of assignment, immediately contact the nearest U. S. Army military personnel of-fice and request assistance. They will be able toadvise you about any documentation you will needto request a change of assignment.Personnel serving overseas who are eligible tosubmit an application for retirement may requestattachment at a particular location other thantheir scheduled assignment for the purpose of retirement.Each requisition has a priority of fill designatorbased on the mission and strength status of the installation or unit submitting it. The priority of arequistion is important and must be taken into

consideration. It is possible that an installationwhere you desired to be assigned has vacanciesfor your grade and military occupational specialtyMOS) but you may be assigned to another installation needing your grade and MOS because it hasa higher priority .After computer nominations are made , your assignment manager reviews each nominationbased on information available in the enlistedmaster file , which is updated by the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System SIDPERS).Additionally, for personnel with a career management individual file all information availabletherein is considered in rejecting or accepting thenominations .The goal of the assignment manager is to getthe right Soldier to the right place at the righttime.The aviation assignment team in Transporta-tion/Aviation/Maintenance Branch, Enlisted Per-sonnel Directorate, is supervised by Mrs. WilmaChance. The assignment managers are:Mr. Dale Martin 67W , 67ZMrs. Libby Saunders 67V , 68B , 68D , 68F, 68G , 68HMr. Donald Todaro 67G , 67U , 67X , 67YMrs. Cheryl Sanker 67NMrs. Fran Rawlings 71P, 68J, 68K , 68MMrs. Eva Witt 9 E , 9 H , 93J

As you depart the Continental United StatesCONUS) on an overseas assignment you must becurious about where you will be assigned uponyour return I f the overseas assignment is to ashort tour area - and you are an E5 or above - ontinuedo page 3

; U.S. RMY VI TION DIGEST


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~ I E I Q ) Y g~ n I L I L n ~ C G~ I Q ) IT1ILIENEBRASKANATIONALGUARD

Captain Robert B RobesonFlight Line FacilityLincoln ebraska

Y ES SIR SPORTS fans there we were,blasting along over the rice paddies at 120knots, green tracers the size of basketballshosing-us-down from all sides. I tweaked back onthe cyclic, the vertical speed indicator (VSI)zipped past 2,000 feet per minute and theneedle buried itself in the peg. Then it happened- engine failure over bad guy country ...We've all heard the story before, in varyingdegrees. The chatter in the dining facility of anyaviation unit is much the same, no matter wherein the military world you go. Recruits become theconstant prey of veterans' tales. The talk is ofsmoke, fire and tenacious tactical approaches,and no one - not even the veterans themselves- often remember how much of it is truth orexaggeration.Yet, framed within the war stories, hangar talkand tales of the worst mission ever, they all havethe common knowledge that flying is, sometimes,far less glamorous than outsiders believe - andoften a lot more dangerous.Maybe that's what makes the 24th MedicalCompany (Air Ambulance) and its personnel sounique in Nebraskan history. Their service to thepeople of Nebraska has been dedicated andlong. They've shared the fears, sweat and totaldedication before the final pride of ac-complishment has been realized.Nebraska, as many may have already noted, isone of the largest and finest forced landing areasyou could ever ask for this side of the SaharaDesert. But there are other things about thisgreat expanse of acreage that the Great Aviatorin the Sky could improve. Summer temperaturesthat soar above 110 degrees; winds whichsweep across the open prairie in excess of 50miles per hour; and winters where temperaturesoutside the hangar are 60 degrees below zero(wind-chill factors included); would be goodplaces to start. Such weather phenomena makepreflighting on the ramp almost as hazardous asnot preflighting.On occasion, National Guard personnel of thisNation have not been given proper recognitionfor their efforts. (We've all heard the BoyScout and weekend warrior labels.) Thepeople of the 24th Medical Company are nodifferent from other Army people stationedthroughout the world. Every ime National Guardpilots fly, they face the challenge - and savorthe rewards - of meeting the elements withtheir skill and judgment, just like anyone else.Like most aviators sometime in their careers,they've survived hazardous conditions and oftenhave been shown weather they didn't want tosee.


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Trying to find a pilot without Southeast Asianexperience, in this unit at Lincoln, is about aslikely as picking out someone at a University ofNebraska football game who's not wearing red.Eighty-nine percent of them have returned fromthe trials of combat with pride in themselves forwhat they've endured and a more professionalrespect for the sky above and the hard groundbelow. They've been out on the l ine whereoften there's no visible means of support. That'sexperience money can't buy, no matter at whichend of the military spectrum your viewpointoriginates.Another noteworthy and illuminating featureof this organization is that in breaking downtotal, per pilot, flight hours at the flight facility,the mean point exceeds 1,900 hours. That maynot be a record of any kind, but as one personsaid, I t ain't a bad average. This experiencelevel is what catches you r eye from the verystart. Some of them seem to have been flyingsince the USS MAINE sank in Havana Harbor.Aviation in Nebraska began a long time ago. Itwas in 1913 that the Nebraska National Guardbegan development of an aviation section. Theofficers and personnel of the Signal Corps atFremont (about 50 miles northeast of Lincoln),built a biplane from spare parts they'dscrounged from various sources.Then, at the end of 1967, planning began forOperation Sky-Aid - another chapter in thepioneering history of Nebraska. Properly calledNebraska's Air Ambulance and HighwayAssistance Project, Operation Sky-Aid was thefirst such experiment authorized by the U.S.Department of Transportation's Office of SafetyDemonstration Projects. At that time, i t was theonly project of its kind in the United States. It allbegan with a $7,500 grant.Sky-Aid was a 14-month study, beginningJanuary 1968, and undertaken jointly by theNebraska State Patrol, University of NebraskaCollege of Medicine, and the 24th MedicalCompany. The objectives of this demonstrationproject were: To field test under civilian conditions therole a helicopter might play in providingemergency service under the most diversifiedcombination of circumstances possible To provide operating data pertinent tohelicopter operations, i.e. weather, night flying,safety, communications and maintenance.Nebraska's Sky-Aid experience predated themodel concept of what was to become AM ES (AirMedical Evacuation Systems). AMES in turn,evolved into the Military Assistance to Safety

A UH l ir mbul nce is re dyto lift off the p d

and Traffic (MAST) project where militarymedical evacuation helicopters provideassistance to civilian medical emergencies at amoment's notice.MAST now has been expanded to a nationaleffort from its early beginnings in 1969 and1970 when five test sites (three Army and twoAir Force) were selected to respond to highwayaccidents. (See MAST Is, November 1973DIGEST.)Those early missions out of Lincoln were flownin two Korean War vintage UH-19C Chickasawhelicopters that the State of Nebraska purchased as surplus for $50 each.The first mission was flown 6 March 1968 andthe crew consisted of two pilots from the 24thMedical Company, a physician and a safetypatrol officer.The objective of the study was not only tolearn if the use of air ambulance helicopters wasfeasible for highway medical emergencies, butalso to assist in search and rescue, civildisturbances, fire surveillance and assistance to

disaster areas.The 24th has a number of firsts to its credit.In 1968 it won the Eisenhower Trophy emblematic of being the best unit in Nebraska. In1971 it received The Outstanding ReserveComponent Aviation Unit Award (1970-1971)from the Army Aviation Association of America(AAAA). This award is given to an aviation unit.which has made an outstanding contribution orinnovation in the use of Army aviation above itsnormal mission. One of its major contributions


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came during the national disaster blizzardand resulting flood early in 1971. Unithelicopters flew 1,256 sorties, including medicalevacuation flights and the evacuation ofnumerous farmers. They carried 431,840pounds of cargo and flew 392 hours.Another milestone was reached when one ofits crewchiefs became the first female to attendand be graduated from the Army's aviationmaintenance training at the U.S. Army AviationCenter, Fort Rucker, Al.Another facet of the unit's mission entails aneonatal medical evacuation service for infants

in need of immediate care. This communitycooperation began in early 1970 when a Lincolnpediatrician, with the assistance of the StateAviation Officer, asked Nebraska's AdjutantGeneral to assist St. E zabeth Hospital in offering this service. He agreed, and the jointoperation was born. Since most Nebraskahospitals are not equipped for neonatal intensive care, Lincoln has become the centeraround which these flights revolve. To date,evacuation crews have maintained a 100 percent success rate in transporting infants to St.Elizabeth's Hospital.What is the civilian population reaction tothese weekend warriors ? A letter from theparents of one of these neonatal patients tellsthe story quite well. Their daughter was 2pounds and 2 ounces at birth. A medicalevacuation crew flew her to the hospital inLincoln. ...Without the services of the ArmyGuard I'm sure that we would not have Stacy

home with us now ... today ... at four and one-halfmonths, she now weighs nine pounds.Another letter, this time from a physicianpracticing in a remote area of the state, gives hisfeelings about the circumstances that required apatient's emergency evacuation. His condition(dissecting aortic aneurysm) was so unstablethat he certainly would not have survivedwithout the help of the National Guard .... Itmakes me a great deal more comfortablepracticing medicine in a rural area such as thiswhen I know that a service of this kind isavailable for extreme emergencies.One-third of the 24th's medics are veterans ofthe Vietnam conflict. They've all received ex-tensive emergency medical training and havetreated every imaginable traumatic injury. Oneeven has a Ph.D. degree and is a professor at theUniversity of Nebraska in Lincoln. Another was aNaval corpsman who attended PresidentLyndon Johnson at Bethesda, MD. For what it'sworth, a third medic even has his commercialfixed wing, multiengine, instrument and instructor pilot ratings.The pilots are a potpourri of motivated individuals. Two of them are working on Ph.Ds.(Nearly 25 percent of the unit's 220 memberscurrently are attending college or vocationalschool, and that doesn't include many who'vealready been graduated). There are threedentists, a lawyer and a number of airline pilotsand cropdusters thrown in. One law studentcommutes more than 500 miles (one way) fromWyoming each drill. Another flies his plane infrom Iowa. Even the Nebraska State AeronauticsDirector (a governor-appointed position) fliesfor this unit. Only when you look at this companyfrom such a perspective can you see just howvast and deep the civilian and military talent is.What about its safety record? Since August1970 the flight facility has more than 30,000accident-free hours of flying time to its credit.Coordination, cooperation and communicationbetween the State Aviation Officer and his staff,pilots, crewchiefs and the experience of thefulltime maintenance people at the facility arethe reasons for this enviable record. It takesteamwork to accomplish missions and goals.Pride and professionalism aren't extinct inLincoln.And the 24th maintains a constant state ofreadiness, ready for deployment at a moment'snotice. The unit recently completed its 1977active training period at Camp Ripley, MN, andreceived a C 1 rating (highest possible) fromevaluators. The unit consistently scored high

t

j.


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marks in nap-of-the-earth (NOE) and masscasualty evacuation techniques under simulatedmid- to high intensity battlefield conditions.During the remainder of the year the 24thmaintains its combat ready posture by trainingon two newly established NOE courses nearLincoln. The courses were constructed incooperation with the Nebraska AdjutantGenera I's office.More than 200 farmers were contacted individually to obtain written permission for thecourses to intersect their land. Even thoughpermission was granted, care must be takenwhen flying over the land because of livestockwhich are often in the area. One or two upsetfarmers because of one careless flight couldresult in the loss of an entire NOE course. This isanother of the many variables unique toNational Guard aviation units.Other training programs include masscasualty situations (including NOE type flights)with the 82nd Field Hospital (USAR) in Omahaduring the year; a nd formal classes (includingtelevision tapes) on NOE and flying in the midto high intensity battlefield situation during thewinter months when weather conditions restrictactual NOE work in the Lincoln area.The unit's equipment is good and its memberswork hard to keep it that way. In regard to theaircraft situation, many of the pilots still believeof their medical evacuation birds whatShakespeare said about the maturingCleopatra: Age cannot wither her, nor customstale her infinite variety. And, like all aviationpeople, the personnel of this unit have anunquenchable desire to think well of themselves.Most of the pilots have recovered completelyfrom the young god syndrome - thinkingthey're immortal. They're dedicated and caringpeople to whom aircraft still are symbols ofhuman nobility, and to whom the rush of air pasta cockpit and the whumping of blades isalmost the breath of life itself.If there's a glaring example of deficiencyanywhere among the members of the 24th, it isprobably in the fact that their aircraft commanders (like all aircraft commanders) don'tsweat. When you've survived chunks of ironplaying around your ears, been bounced aroundthe sky in a blizzard like a volleyball with an airleak, and confronted tornadoes and otherrushing, mighty winds - intent on makingaerial shish kebab out of you if you don't keepahead of the aircraft, or the weather - there'snot much left to get excited about. They've experienced most of the genuine, certifiable

hairies many pilots are unfortunate enough tohave known.Yet, there's another side to these people.Their interest and involvement in the community (since it really IS their community) runsdeep. A number of programs have beendeveloped by the flight facility to enhance theabilities and understanding of area young peoplein the field of aviation .The inquisitive nature ofkids and their fascination with anything that flies(remember?) can be seen through letters sentto the flight facility from elementary schoolchildren who have just observed a helicopterdemonstration at close range for the first time.Here's one from an observant little boy:Thank you very much for everything The bestthing I liked was climbing in the big helicopter. Iwas surprised to see how clean it was. And thenfrom a little girl's viewpoint: it was fun seeingyou fly It was so nice of you to spend all thattime on us when you could have been working.Oh well, you can't win 'em all.Unit crewmembers have to schedule theirlives around meeting flight minimums, instrument checkouts and NOE course work justlike everybody else. Their mission is the same asany active duty medical unit - to save lives andalleviate human suffering. They use their flyingtalent for those they live, play and work with -affirming life, inspiring, helping and encouraging.They fly precisely, proficiently and professionally. Is i t necessary to pick the rose apartto see what makes it grow? Not really. Theresults are all that really matter in the finalanalysis.

he 24th s medics are able to handle any medical evacuationsituation due to their extensive experience and aining


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As everyone knows, work which doesn't reflecta deep inner wish is mere drudgery, asinescapable and unpleasant as taxes. On theother hand, work which you can put your heartinto, which provides expression for your realtalents and abilties, is both satisfying andrewarding. For the men and women of the 24thMedical Company, flying and medical evacuationprovide this expression. From the very beginning, they've always had a sleeves-rolled-upapproach to their mission.One other insight into their devotion is thefact that about 20 individuals from the flightfacility have been decorated for their efforts inlifesaving missions, in connection with floods,blizzards, tornadoes, neonatal and othertraumatic injury evacuations.The day-to-day professional performance ofthis unit, through the years, proves that theNational Guard can be counted upon to assumethe increased role dictated by very real

reductions in the active Army. It's taken a lot ofeffort by every officer, noncommissioned officerand enlisted person in the unit, but withdedication and teamwork, they are prepared toaccomplish any mission assigned. This is whatthe One Army Team concept is all about.F lee Bailey, in The Defense Never Rests,' iexpressed his feelings about responsibility andwhat he would do to make young people intomen and women. I would teach them all to fly. Iwould send them up when the weather wasrough, when the planes were in tough shape,when the birds were walking. The ones whosurvived would understand the meaning of'alone'.The personnel of Nebraska's Air AmbulanceCompany, and the flight facility in lincoln, knowall about that. They've been there before, andthey are ready, willing and able for any

eventualities in the future - whatever they maybe

Since most ebraska hospitals are not equipped for neonatal intensive care the unitis willing to cooperate with local hospitals in vital medevoc similar to that shown


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ELL , THE FIRST I heard it , like I said, it must have circled around. I don'tknow which way it came from , but I know it came across the ridge. Wheneverhe started around through here , he came up through the field behind the house. Hewas treetop level; he went . around the ridge, and ... I don 't know if he landed overthere ... but whenever he came back ... he was still treetop level ... .I came through the house and looked out the back door. He was just going acrossthe low ridge over here . That 's when I saw him just going into the fog . After I sawhim go into the fog , I thought to myself, 'Well, why s he headed right straight to thehigh top of that mountain? ' because I knew as much as I've seen them fly aroundhere that they always head right for the gap ....I came back through the house and went out in the yard and about that time itsounded like thunder. ust thunder, you know; and my mother asked me what hap-pened. I told her I didn't know unless it was that helicopter. Then about that time it


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JUST THUN ERthundered, and I told her, 'Well, I guess it wasjust thunder.' I didn't know anymore about it untilthey came out here ....

I t refers to a UH 1 that crashed with ninepersons aboard while on a mission in support of amountain base camp; and they to members ofthe accident investigation board.Briefly, the mission was to transport aggressortroops to three landing zones, then return to thebase camp for an airmobile exercise involvingstudents.Before the first flight , weather conditions andvisibility were good. However, on reaching thefirst landing zone where two passengers disembarked, the weather began to deteriorate rapidly.The mountain peaks to the north became coveredwith clouds and light rain was falling. The pilotdelayed flight for several minutes, then took off,climbing along the contours of the mountain. Wit-nesses at the landing zone observed the aircraftfor about a thousand meters until it disappearedbehind trees. At this time, rainfall became heavyand fog began to roll in. The aircraft never arrived at the second landing zone. The last personto observe the aircraft in flight was the witnesswho watched it disappear into the fog.After the aircraft departed the first landingzone the pilot failed to establish flight followingand no contact was made with any of the occupants until the following morning when one survivor, soaked from the rain and suffering fromvarious injuries and shock, limped down themountain to a house where he summoned help.When local and military personnel reached thecrash site, they found one additional survivor. Theseven remaining occupants had sustained fatal in-juries.While the direct cause of the accident - strikingtrees - is obvious, the conditions which set up theaccident are not as readily apparent. These include practices of omission as well as commissionwhich, over a period of time , prepared the stagefor the accident.To begin with, the type of support mission inwhich the ill-fated aircraft was participating wasa recurrent one, with aircraft drawn from varioussections of the company. In this instance, a flightof six aircraft, without an air mission commander(AMC), was sent to support the base camp. At notime through the entire mission, including the actual search and recovery of survivors and victims, was there a representative of the unit chainof command present. This lack of commandsupervision was a factor in the accident.The presence of an involved leader would haveensured that, according to current policies , procedures and regulations, a flight plan with passenger manifest was filed with base operationsand that an aviation-oriented weather briefing26

was obtained. Further, a command decision wouldhave been required as to whether or not the mission was to continue. As it was , no valid weatherforecast was requested for the local area , no localDD Form 175 was filed, and no passenger manifest prepared . In addition , the decision to continue the mission rested solely in the hands of thepilot-in-command. The lack of command supervision by the aviation element was caused by a requirement for the unit to prepare for a forthcoming Army Training Evaluation Program.Numerous questions arise. Why , for example ,did the pilot-in-command continue flight afterdropping off two personnel at the first LZ? Whywas no flight following contact made? Why did thepilot fly into marginal weather conditions? Whydid he continue to operate under these conditionsrather than execute inadvertent IFR procedures?Were there any other factors that contributed tothis accident or to the injuries sustained by theoccupants?Information obtained during investigation provided considerable insight into these questions.There was no pressure from the rangers to flymissions. Approximately one-third of the pilots



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DECEM ER 977

This mission w s considered bymany of the participating pilots tobe welcome relief from the rigors

nd regimentation ...

27


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JUST THUNDERdid not file DD 175 flight plans while flying in thelocal area, and rarely called for an actualweather briefing. There was a general lack ofconfidence in weather briefings as pilots did notfeel they were accurate . Pilots relied on aircraftweather checks as the best way to get accurateweather information.The pilot involved in the mishap was consideredto be a good pilot as far as flying skills were concerned. Further , he was an excellent instrumentpilot who would not be reluctant to fly IFR. How-ever , there were some misgivings as to his judgment when flying unsupervised. t was known thatthe pilot-in-command had a tendency to fly lowand possibly take more chances than necessary toaccomplish a mission. His supervisors had heardcomplaints concerning his l y i n ~ in the past, butknew of nothing that would indIcate he wasn 't acapable and professional aviator. Nevertheless ,several members of his own unit regarded him asbeing confident in his abilities , possibly overconfident to the point of going beyond his capabilities- his attitude being one of can do , with no tasktoo great for him to handle.

The only briefing prior to a mission came froma mission book that the pilots read in operations. This book contained aircraft and pilots assigned for the mission , frequencies and call signs,and takeoff and reporting times. None of the pilotswho had served as an AMC had been briefed onthe duties of an AMC. No one could recall thehazards of mountain flying being covered in asafety meeting. Mountain weather had also beenneglected during normal weather briefings andthere was no unit SOP covering inadvertent IFR.There was considerable confusion as to what fieldelevation was used at the base camp. Estimationsvaried from 1,600 feet to 1,750 feet (actual elevation , 1,748 feet). Pilots flight followed with thebase operations and used to call when taking offfrom each LZ , but were now calling only ontakeoffs and landings at the base camp. Addi-

8

tional factors revealed during investigation were :Command) Mountain Operations The unit had no formal pilot mountain flyingqualification program. New pilots were orientedprimarily on the specific terrain they would be working in. No briefing was conducted to familiarize pilotswith the various situations unique to mountain op-erations , such as unusual weather phenomena .Maintenance

The flag on the pilot's attitude indicator wouldnot go down and had been shown on DA Form 2408 13as having been wired incorrectly. (This m y havespurred some reluctance on the part of the pilots toenter IMC.) -The transponder circuit breaker would continually disengage , but the cause for this wasnever pursued. The DA Form 2408-13 indicated the AIM altimeter had been removed, while the maintenanceofficer stated there had never been an AIM altimeter installed on this aircraft. The historical file of DA Forms 2408-13 and2408-14 was not being properly monitored and correlated. Several write-ups were dropped withoutany corrective action having been taken.Protective and Survival quipment Five passengers were seated on the floorwearing lapbelts attached, two per cargo ring atsome points (some of which pulled out from thefloor) . The crew chief was wearing a monkeystrap , as far as can be determined , without alapbelt. Helmets were not retained by crew membersduring the crash sequence. No survival equipment was carried by thecrew.

Here are some corrective actions: A member of the formal chain of commandprovide the leadership for the mission , and thatthis leader be thoroughly briefed on his duties byhis next higher leader. . A clearance authority be designated by the airmission commander to ensure that weather hasbeen obtained and is adequate for the flightplanned. Unit brief all crews periodically as to VFRflight requirements in mountains.u.s. ARMY AVIATION IGEST


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Pilots file a flight plan and obtain weather inaccordance with Supplement 1 to AR 95-1. The flight plan include adequate checkpointsto provide positive flight following of all aircraft. Procedures be followed to ensure that aircraftrestricted from flight into IMC are not scheduledfor missions in marginal weather conditions (orworse) . Procedures be followed to ensure faults areaccurately recorded and properly corrected in accordance with TM 38 750 .though the accident happened at

the time the aircraft hit the treesit began much earlier ... when thedecision was made to send theflight up to the base camp with norecognizable leadership ...

All crews carry survival equipment suitable totype of terrain and weather for the planned flight. A formal program e established to orient andqualify each pilot in the unit in mountain operations prior to being released as a pilot-incommand. Mountain operations and mountain weather bea topic of discussion at safety meetings at leastonce a quarter and that contents of the most current meeting be required reading for all newpilots. Special aspects of mountain flying such as un-usual weather phenomena, safety hazards, or anyother conditions that may affect the day's missionbe briefed d ily to all pilots participating in thesemissions. Passenger seats be installed in aircraft whenpassengers are to be transported..Only one lapbelt be attached to each cargo ringdue to tensile strength of rings. Each aviator and c;rewmember have his helmet fitted annually by the flight surgeon during

DECEMBER 1977

his annual flight physical or upon receipt of a newhelmet before being released for flying duty. The monkey harness be removed except forsituations in which the crew chief is required to befree in the passenger compartment.Perhaps the best summation of this accidentcan be expressed in the words of one of the investigators : Though the accident happened at thetime the aircraft hit the trees , it began much earlier at some undetermined time. For this particular mission, it began when the decision was madeto send the flight up to the base camp with no recognizable leadership.This mission was considered by many of theparticipating pilots to be a welcomed relief fromthe rigors and regimentation ... As a result , without any recognizable unit leadership, the crewstook full advantage of the leisure pace. Operatingas individual crews in the leadership void , thecrews rapidly deteriorated as a unit. The flightswere assigned by consensus or volunteered. Inthis environment, the pilot surfaced as the areaexpert ... The casualness of the entire operationled to departure from the base camp without filing a flight plan, a passenger manifest , and asbest as can be determined, without a currentweather forecast. Other pilots stated they wouldnot have gone on the mission because of theweather.The lack of any weather briefing by a competent forecaster or observer was common due tothe lack of good data for the base camp area andthe pilot's mistrust of what is given. This mayormay not be well founded . t is a fact that theweather for that area is difficult to forecast , buton this particular day, the forecast was accurate.As a miminum he would have been advised that itwould be deteriorating with rain, thunderstormsand fog .... As the pilot departed the base camp ,he had little working for him ....Search and rescue operations were hamperedby failure to file a plan of flight and establishradio contact, compounded by the lack of survivaland signal equipment as required by unit SOP.This accident was the result of an accumulationof factors, the primary cause being pilot overconfidence and disregard for sound aviation procedures.Contributing to these primary factors was the lack ofunit leadership and involvement ....

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Returning fromverseas uty

ontinued from page 8you already know about your return assignmentthrough the home base advanced assignment program

quirements include MOS pay grade, special skillidentifiers , additional skill identifiers , securityclearance , etc As you are being considered fornomination to an assignment the computer alsoconsiders your CONUS area of preference Theideal situation occurs when you meet the re-quirements for a requisition and are nominatedfor assignment to your area of preference.You may be able to influence your future assignments simply by keeping your areas of preference updated on your DA Form 2 and your Enlisted Preference Statement, DA Form 2635 .Upon completion of a long tour assignment youwill be slotted against a valid requisition muchthe same as when you were selected for youroverseas assignment. Soldiers planning to separate from military service soon after their return from overseas - andwho do not desire assignment to a CONUS installation away from the area in which they plan tolive after separation - should consider requestingan extension of their foreign service tour in orderto return to CONUS upon expiration term of service ETS). There are no provisions to assign Soldiers at specific locations just because they saythey will not reenlist.

Approximately 4 months before your DEROSyou initially will be considered by the Cap III As-signment system which incorporates a computersystem to assist in selecting the right Soldier foran assignment.The requisitions submitted to your assignmentmanager list requirements that should be met b

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