Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1958

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1958

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FEBRU RY 958

THE UNITE ST TESRMY VI TION S HOOL

FORT RUCKER ALABAMA


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EDITORIAL STAFFCapt Theodore E. VaskoLt John E. ArmstrongWilliam E. VanceJohn S Maltrotti

U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLBrig Gen Bogardus S. Cairns

CommandantCol John J. TolsonAssistant Commandant

SCHOOL STAFFCol William H. ByrneFlight SwrgeonCol William R. TuckDirector of InstructionCol Jay D. VanderpoolCombat Development OfficeCol Edward N. DahlstromSecl efaryLt Col James L. TownsendCO, US 4AVNS Regiment

DEPARTMENTSLt Col Howard 1 LukensFixed WingLt Col Harry J. KernMaintenanceLt Col Raymond E. JohnsonRotary WingLt Col Thomas W. AndersonTacticsLt Col Thomas J. SabistonPublicati01UJ andNon-Resident Instruction

The U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is an official publication of the Department of theArmy published monthly under the supervision of the Commandant. U. S. Army AviationSchool.The mission of the U S. ARMY AVIATIONDIGEST is to provide information of an operational or functional nature concerning safety andaircraft accident prevention. training. maintenance. operations. research and development. aviation medicine. and other related data.Manuscripts. photographs. and other illustrationspertaining to the above subjects of interest to personnel concerned with Army Aviation are invited.Direct communication is authorized to: Editor-inChief. U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST. U. S.Army Aviation School. Fort Rucker. Alabama.Unless otherwise indicated. material in the U. S.ARMY AVIATION DIGEST may be reprinted provided credit is give to the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST and to the author.The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of theRudget. 15 March 1956.Unless spel'ified all photographs used are U. S.Army.

DISTRIBUTION:Active Army:SA. OSD. JCS. CofSA. DCSPER.ACSI. DCSOPS. DCSLOG. CMH,CINFO. Technical Stf DA. USCONARCUSA Arty Bd. USA Armor Bd. USAInf Bd. USA Air Def Bd. USA Abn

Elct Bd. USA Avn Bd. US ARADCOM.OS Maj Comd. MDW. Armies. Corps,Div, Brig, Ft Camps (CONUS). SvcColleges, Br Svc Sch. Specl Sch(CONUS) AFSC, NWC, USA Ar t yMsl Cen, Mil Dist.NG: State AG.USAR: None.

For explanation of abbreviations used,see AR 320-50.


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UNITED ST TESRMY VI TION

DIGESTVolume 4 February, 1958

RTICLESOn Blaming the Pilot.Major Oliver StewartAircraft Maintenance SupervisionLieutenant John W. McKinney, rmorWhat To Do Until the Ground ArrivesLieutenant Vaughn R. West, TCOtter On FireM/Sgt W. X. BeatenNight Attack

Lieutenant Charles D Kingsley, EDEP RTMENTS

Straight and LevelNotes from the PentagonBrigadier General Ernest F. Easterbrook, USPuzzlerMemo from Flight Surgeon.Senior Aviator of the MonthGray Hair Department .

COVER

Number 2

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12

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315222425

Captain James Bowman of the U. S. Army Aviation Board, Fort Rucker,Alabama, is shown with a Cessna Seneca piston-engine helicopter shortly afterhis record-breaking flight in the machine during which he established newworld altitude records. The record-breaking 30,335 feet set records, in twoweight categories and a separate flight to 28,200 established a third helicopterweight class record. These new world altitude records top previous records of26,931 feet established by Jean Boulet of France, flying an AlloU ette helicopterin 1955. The Army thus returns the helicopter world altitude record to theUnited States where i t was; set earlier by U. S. Army Major Hubert D. Gaddisin 1949.


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TO: EditorIn reference to the Puzzler in theSeptember 1957 issue of the U. S.Army Aviation Digest, the pilots ofthis unit have a question.We discussed the problem presented and, incidentally, found it veryinteresting and thought-stimulating.However, we are not clear as to whythe pedals would be soft and unresponsive in settling with power.

ROBERT J. MACLENNAN, Capt,MSCArmy Medical Aviation BranchBrooke Army Medical CenterFort Sam Houston, TexasWe think the word "soft" is super

flUDUS in describing the feel Df theanti-tDrque pedals in this helicDpter.They are always SDft when DperatingnDrmally. The authDr made nO mentiDn Df IDW RPM, sO we must assumea nDrmal Dperating range. In dDinga little armchair flying we think, fDrinstance, in demDnstrating settlingwith pDwer that in near perfect CDn-ditiDns the tail rDtDr wDuld remainin "clean" air away from the disturbed air caused by the main rDtDrin vertical descent. In that cDnditiDnthere is nO reasDn why the anti-tDrquepedals shDuld be any less effectivethan in any Dther high pDwer setting.HDwever, in the hYPDthetical situatiDn the anDnymDus authDr placed thepilDt, we feel the unrespDnsiveness Dfthe anti-torque pedals cDuld be CDm-paredi to the sudden and unpredictablemovements you encounter while hovering crDsswind Dn a gusty day. Tomaintain a near constant heading immediate corrections are necessary.The effectiveness of the anti-torquesystem has not lessened, Dnly lag ofthe human reflex.

TO: EditorIn reference to an article appearingin Volume 3, Number 9, September1957, "Small Heliport", I take exception to the determination of the

cause of this accident. I maintain thatsupervisory error was the primarycause and not just a contributing factor. RegUlations were not followedand directives were breached by supervisory personnel. The pilot relied onthe markings which were made available for his utilization. Had themarkings been in the proper place,the accident would not have occurred.For a simile: f the ILS approachto an airport is misalined by 45 anda pilot follows his best alinement indication (the needle in the aircraftILS instrument) and bangs into asmokestack in the clouds (IMC), priorto reaching minimum altitude, this isnot poor pilot judgment, but supervisory error. Same situation: the pilotwas guided into the accident, andLt B's efficiency report should not re flect that he uses poor judgment.This accident could have been prevented by supervisory personnel be-coming acquainted with their re sponsibilities and following currentdirectives. Let their efficiency reportsreflect the judgment consideration.JACK W. DUFFYMajor USAAvia tion OfficerMilitary Assistance Advisory GroupFederal Republic of GermanyHDoray for Major Duffy Letterslike his give us assurance that TheGray Hair Department is being read.Wish more of you readers would drDPus a line from time to time. We entirely agree with MajDr Duffy thatthis accident cDuld have been prevented if supervisory persDnnel hadfDllowed current directives about thepla.eing of helipads. The majDr causefactDr w s supervisory errDr. However, this does not relieve the pilot

of the responsibility Df avoiding otherobjects. There is one big differencebetween the pilot making an ILS inthe clouds and the pilot parking hishelicopter. The pilot in the clDuds can'tsee and must rely on other indications; the pilot parking hi s helicoptercan see and should rely most of ll onhis judgment.


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Notes from the PentagonArmy lectronics

Brigadier General Ernest F Easterbrook, USDirector of Army Aviation, ODCSOPSl SUBJECT THAT is near anddear to all Army A viators isthe communications and navigation equipment installed in Armyaircraft. This is considered areal problem by many, and rightfully so, with the situation ag

gravated by the requirement tofly both the common and tacticalsystems. A few of the factorsgiving rise to this problem arethe conversion from VHF toUHF communications by themilitary, the gradual elimination of LF 4 course ranges infavor of VOR, and special electronic configurations for aircraftin overseas areas.First let's consider the conversion to UHF communications.In 1953 the Services made thedecision to adopt UHF for airground and air-air radio communications in lieu of VHF foruse in the common system. Thiswas brought about by continuedpressure for the military to useanother frequency band, andleave the VHF frequencies forcivilian use. The transition toUHF communications has laggedbecause equipment, both airborne and ground, was not available in sufficient quantities, andbecause a considerable amountof VHF equipment was alreadyon hand. t was only reasonablethat we get some use out of ourmillions of dollars invested inthis equipment. Now the transition is moving fairly rapidlyall C and military radio facilities and towers have UHFcommunications.Incidentally, th equipment

used by civil facilities is furnished by the military. t isplanned that C radio faCilities will at first have at leasttwo UHF channels, the emergency 243.0 mc and a commonfrequency 255.4 mc. Towers havethe emergency frequency andthe common tower frequency257.8 mc. As more equipmentbecomes available, a third andclear frequency will be put inservice at both towers and radiofacilities. In some cases, in busyareas, a fourth frequency willbe commissioned. This meansthat as you proceed from oneradio facility to another, a different frequency can be used,especially when the commonchannel becomes crowded. Theclear channel will give almostinstantaneous communicationswithout having to line up andwait your turn to talk, as is thecase when only common channels are used.

The airborne equipment usedto cover the UHF band (225-399.9 mc) in all Army aircraftexcept the light observation airplane and the reconnaissancehelicopter is the AN ARC-55with 1750 channels. This radiois too heavy (55 pounds) for ouraircraft but it is the best military set available. t is considered interim equipment and will bereplaced by the AN/ ARC-51which will have the same capabilities but weigh only about30 pounds. Eventually we willuse the ARC-51 in all Army aircraft requiring UHF radios. TheAN ARC-60 UHF radio is used


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U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGESTnow in the light observation airplane and reconnaissance helicopter pending availability ofthe AN/ ARC-51. The AN/ARC-60 has only 20 channels andweighs 28 pounds.

Next, let's consider the U. S.common traffic control systemversus the tactical system, andthe equipment associated witheach. Because of the expense involved in maintaining two civilnavigation systems, most of theLF 4 course ranges are beingdecommissioned. Nearly all ofthe ranges that will be retainedare located in the western states.The increasing number of VORstations results in more VORintersections being used as fixes.This makes a dual omni installation ideal, and we are gettingthis in the new L-23D. The factremains, however, that manyArmy aircraft flying the civilairways will have only one omnireceiver. For instrument flying,a good, reliable ADF is also amust. Although the f 0 u rcourse ranges are being eliminated, m n y non directionalhomers and compass locatorswill remain-particularly in theletdown and approach areas.On maneuvers, tactical exercises, or in actual combat, lowfrequency navigation and FMcommunications are used. In thecase of navigation, the sameADF as in the civil system canbe used; but the omni receiversare not compatible with theArmy system and should be removed to save weight. (Thiscan be done locally by taking outthe Black Box without disturbing the wiring.) FM will beused for communication; however, if a secondary means ofcommunication is required in

the tactical Army Air Trafficand Control System, UHF willbe used.The European air traffic control system is different fromeither our United States civil ortactical systems in that communications are VHF and covera very wide frequency spread.The navigation system is basically low frequency. This meansthat the electronic package inEuropean aircraft is differentfrom that used in the U. S civilsystem or the Army tactical system.The Army is working on ameans of finding its way aroundthe battlefield under conditionsof darkness and poor visibility.The goal is to navigate to andland at a spot within enemy territory without benefit of enemy

cooperation and with minimuminterference. It is assumed thatan enemy would be somewhat reluctant to permit us to make areconnaissance of his area andinstall terminal navigation aids.To increase our chances of survival, we must take advantageof natural obstacles such as hillsand valleys, and this practicallyeliminates line-of-sight navigation systems if ground basedequipment is used. In fact, anyground based aid can be neutralized in a hurry if the enemyso desires. Systems that arestrictly self-contained still present a problem of accuracy,weight, and cost.All the answers to these tactical problems are not known, soyou aviators should kick thisaround and submit your suggestions. Ideas should be forwardedthrough normal channels, ofcourse, to avoid duplication andassure valid consideration. '


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Maior Oliver Stewart

T H T CLASSICAL BALLAD: Shewas poor but she was honest, contains the lines: It's therich wot gets the pleasure; it'sthe poor wot gets the blame.The song writer concludes witht h e philosophical comment:Isn't it a bleedin' shame? Inmany airplane accidents thepilot gets the blame while mosteverybody else is exonerated.The words pilot error occurrepeatedly in the conclusions ofinvestigating committees andthe basic assumption is that, ifall regulations have been complied with in the building of theairplane and if all the bits ofpaper have been correctly filledin before the departure, the onlyperson who can be at fault whenthings go wrong is the pilot.

NEVER TURN BACK In the early days of aviation

the commonest accident was associated with a failing engineon takeoff. Instructors used todrill into pupils the precept:Never turn back on a failingR eprinted f rom HAWKER SIDDELE Y REVIEW , L ono n E ngland.Ma jor Oliver S tewart MC , AFC,is th e E ditor of AERONAUTICS , andhas been fly ing since 1915, winninghis Mi litary Cross with seven con-firmed victories in single seat fightersof W orld War I and in 1924 wasawarded the A ir F orce Cross f 1racing victories at Or fordn ess, S u f -folk , and Martlesham Heat h. V iewsexpressed in this article are not neces-sarily those of the Depar tm en t of theA rmy or of the U. S. A rmy A viationS chool . -The Editor

engine. o straight on; it's saferto hit the side of a house thanto try to turn back. But pilotsdid try to turn back and, theaircraft of those days having aslender margin between flyingspeed and stalling speed, the consequence was normally a stalland spin into the ground. Andthe instructor would tear hishair as the remains of the pilotwere being carried away: Thesilly so-and-so, he would rave,I told him never to turn backon a failing engine. And theverdict was then duly inscribed:An error of judgment on thepart of the pilot.

The possibility that there wasalso an error of judgment on thepart of those who had failed tobuild adequate trustworthinessinto the engine was not considered. The possibility that thoseresponsible for the stalling char-acteristics of the airplane mighthave a share in the blame wasnot raised. The pilot, through hisinability to overcome the naturalinstinct to turn back to the air-port when the engine failed, washeld to be the cause of theaccident.

SUPREME COMM NDIn those days there was someexcuse for this attitude. Engineand airplane designers werestruggling with imperfectly understood problems. Moreover thepilot was pretty much alone inthe operation ;Qf a _comparatively' simple aircrat. He alone was


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U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Februaryentitled to check the fuel levels,the functioning of the controlsand the condition of any partof the airframe and engine.When he took off there was nokind controller in the tower totell him if the way was clear.He had to look around and peerinto the sky and make sure thatit was clear and that no othermachine was approaching toland.There was, then conceivablythis measure of justifidition forthe custom of putting everything down to the pilot. But thecustom continues without thejustification.

The pilot is no longer the soleperson involved in the operationof the flight. Thousands ofpeople through written or spokenmediums are in some way directly or indirectly involved. He isbombarded with documents. Heis stuffed with detailed information. He must rely on airtraffic controllers for the properinformation. He must rely ondesigners and manufacturersfor the trustworthiness of hisplane. He must rely on the government for the propriety ofregulations. While the safety ofall aircraft components have increased, so have their complexity, and they are by no meansperfect. An error a failing anyplace along the line becomes thepilot s problem although not amistake of his own doing. Underthese circumstances, it is surelytime to give up the custom ofattributing accidents to pilot error unless there is powerful supporting evidence.I would like to discuss in general terms two comparatively recent accidents. n both there wasa heavy death toll and I shall

not refer to individuals by nameor to the aircraft by name.Nevertheless, some may recognize the occasions. The reasonI have selected these two accidents is that they fall into clearly established categories: thefirst being concerned with engine failure at takeoff and thesecond with the weather.THEORY AND PR CTICE

Four-engined aircraft deriveadditional safety in relation totheir ability to fly on three engines. Their three-engine performance is measured and loadings are laid down which will stillpermit the aircraft to climbafter the failure of anyone engine. That is the theory. Thepractice is not always the same.The rate of climb in three engines at full load may be smalland it will be affected by temperature by turbulence, by trimand even by the age of the aircraft. t will, of course, be affected also by whether the propeller of the defective engine isfeathered.Imagine, now, a four-enginedaircraft fully loaded with passengers, taking off in a gustywind of medium strength - 37kilometers an hour. The wind isacross the runway and as theaircraft becomes airborne oneengine in an outer position fails.n theory the pilot should havebeen able-with feathered propt o climb slowly. But, under thebest conditions, the climb ratewould have been marginal. nother words small contributoryfactors-the amount of turbulence in the crosswind and eventhe form of the gusts-mighthave wiped out that margin. temerged that the propeller had


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1958 ON BLAMING THE PILOT 7not been feathered; but whetherthat was because the captainwas still hoping to obtain somepower from the engine or because there was a failure of thefeathering mechanism or because the pilot made an error ofjudgment is not known orknowable. The destruction oncrash was too great to enable thepoint to be decided and no onein the airplane lived to give evidence. But the court of inquiryrejected the first two possiblities and chose the third: piloterror.

NOT PROVENVery properly the British AirLine Pilots Association protest-ed. But their protests were ofno avail. Now the point I make

here is that there might havebeen a pilot error; but that itwas not proved. The court wentthe way of so many courts andwhen the evidence was insufficient to point inescapably to asingle cause turned to the pilot.Being dead the pilot had no effective means of replying to thecharge.N ow let me take a case inwhich the pilot lived. Here theinterest lies in the fact thathad he not lived the chancesare that the accident would havebeen attributed to pilot error.For there was no sign of thefailure or malfunctioning of anyimportant component in the air-craft or in its four engines.Everything was in order and examination of the wreckage confirmed that everything had remained in order. t was becausethe pilot and the copilot sur-vived and were able to relatethe remarkable series of eventswhich led to the crash that the

court was able to find that theaccident was due to unexampledand unpredicted weather conditions.As the aircraft was beingmade ready to leave stormswere raging in the area but noneof them was near the airport andthe closest line squall was givenas several hundred kilometersaway. The aircraft captain notedthe squalls and took the greatestcare to obtain the latest weatherinformation. But it was all inagreement that there were nostorms close to the airport orliable to interrupt the flight farless to endanger it. In order toavoid turbulence from the overhang of any of the storms thepilot discussed with other members of his crew the advisabilityof slightly adjusting the courseto be flown.

NORM L T KEOFFAt takeoff the conditions weresatisfactory although stormswith lightning could be seen inthe far distance. The aircraftwas watched from the tower asit made a normal taking-off run.Rain was then falling but visibility was still reasonably good.As the aircraft disappearedfrom the view of the watchersin the tower they saw a redglow in the direction it hadtaken. They instantly set intrain rescue and fire-fightingaction. Although heavy groundhad to be covered beyond theend of the runway rescue teamswere in action within 10 min-utes.The story which the survivingmembers of the crew relatedlater was this: The takeoff hadbeen normal and the aircrafthad become airborne and had


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8 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Februarystarted a normal rate of climb atnormal airspeed. The point hadbeen reached when the captainhad retracted the gear and giventhe order for a reduction inpower. All checks had been madeand had shown that everythingwas functioning efficiently. Thepilot then noticed that, in spiteof the settings for steady climb,the aircraft was beginning tolose height. A rapid recheckshowed nothing wrong and thepilot said that it was with hor-ror that he noticed this suddenchange.

He called for full power andwas given it at once, althoughthe propellers were not adjustedto enable full revolutions to beobtained. With full power theaircraft still lost height. Thefirst officer looked out and sawthat it was near the ground, flying with the fuselage apparentlyabout level. The captain lookedout to see the top of a tree aheadand the airplane so near theground that a sharp turn wouldhave put one wing tip into theground. He took the most dras-tic evasive action possible, buta wing tip struck the tree andthe aircraft was brought to theground where it immediatelycaught fire.

As the aircraft touched, itbroke, and it was partly thisthat enabled a few people tosurvive the accident. The usualprocedure of investigation wasfollowed. In addition witnesseswere obtained who were able tospeak of the weather at andaround the point of impact atthe time. The picture that eventually emerged was of a stormcell with the most violent windfluctuation, and this ' produced,gusts and a wind g r d i ~ n t which

were in fact the cause of theaccident.AGE OLD CONTROVERSYThis accident is particularlyinteresting because of the lightit sheds on the age-old controversy about the effects of thewind upon an aircraft. Theoretically, as we are repeatedly reminded, when an aircraft is inthe air it is of the air and consequently it should be unaffectedso far as its flying speed is concerned by wind changes. In practice, as most pilots know, anaircraft in the air can be affected by wind movements. That iswhy the downwind turn used tobe a dangerous maneuver withaircraft having small margins ofspeed like the early machines.

I o not regard myself as competent to offer explanations forthese things. ' Some say that theinertia of the aircraft has something to do with it, and certainlythe wind gradient has somethingto do with it. At any rate in theaccident of which I am speakingit was the considered view ofthe court, after a painstaking inquiry, that the aircraft had beenbrought down by a sudden windchange which caused the air-craft to be flying into wind atone instant and to be flyingdownwind the next and whichwas accompanied by a downgust.Note here that, had the pilotnot lived, there would have beenmany people other than themembers of the court of inquirywho might have been skepticalof a weather explanation. Notealso that the into wind anddownwind controversy h sbeen going on since the beginning of aviation. It wa's l mly be-


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1958 ON BLAMING THE PILOTcause the evidence was so com-plete and so telling that it waspossible to state positively whatcaused that accident. The temp-tation to put the blame on thepilot, had the whole story notbeen discoverable, would havebeen strong.

SCAPEGOATDuring the course of the yearsI have seen many accidents andI have collected data on manyothers. When I was the air cor-respondent to the old orningPost I was sometimes dispatchedto places where aircraft hadcrashed, but that was rather toreport all the horrible details,than to obtain exact and inter-

s t i n g technical information.Nevertheless it was borne inupon me that the pilot was beingmade the scapegoat too often.

In the accidents branch at theAir Ministry we have had manyhighly competent and impartialofficials who have always triedto state the truth without fearor favor. But the pilot errorjudgment is, one might almostsay, traditional. I believe weshould, in the future, be morecareful before we accept it. Per-haps it is sometimes given partlybecause we do not like to see anyaccident unexplained. t seemsto be a reflection upon aviationitself when an aircraft crashesand no cause can be found. Yet itwould be fairer to the pilots ifit were to be admitted that some-times the evidence is not suf-ficient to enable any cause to bestated with absolute certainty.

Finally, I would like to urgethat the greatest frankness beadopted in the treatment of airaccidents. There is good reason

in the criticisms sometimes di-rected against the daily news-papers for the lurid manner inwhich they treat air accidents.But they treat other kinds ofaccidents in the same way, sopresumably it is the way thegreat reading public likes. Andto go to the other extreme isequally undesirable. I have nevermanaged to look upon an air ac-cident as something that oughtnot to be written about or dis-cussed. There is nothing shame-ful about an air accident, wheth-er the fault be with the designer,the manufacturer, the serviceengineer, the controllers, thepilot or anyone else. All thesepeople try their best to preventaccidents, and even if one ofthem is eventually blamed, itis not the kind of blame whichimplies any dereliction of duty.No human being can alwaysavoid making mistakes, and anair accident is sometimes simplythe expression of a mistake. Solet us not react to the horrortreatment of air accidents bytrying to hush them up. Theyare often of the most absorbingtechnical and human interest;they deserve the fullest and thefreest discussion.

NEW OUTLOOK PLE SEMy plea, then, is not that weshould treat air accidents asthey were acts of God, nor yetas if they were matters unfit foropen discussion, but that we

should look upon them as sourcesof new information. And aboveall I would ask that, before weconclude that the pilot has madean error, we should be carefulto examine all the possibilitieswith equal attention and equalopenmindedness.


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ircraft MaintenanceSupervision

Lieutenant John W McKinney Armor

T HE ESTABLISHMENT OF P ~ O P ~ RMAINTENANCE superVISIOn In

Army Aviation should be one ofour most important considerations. Too often new aviatorshave been given the responsibility of supervising maintenanceof a unit's aircraft when theyhave had no flight experienceother than that received inschool and no maintenance experience at all.In the past decade Army A viation has grown from a few hun-dred simple Grasshopper typeaircraft to over four thousandcomplicated machines costingmillions of the taxpayers' dollars. Still the new aviator isbeing given the tremendous responsibility of supervising thecare of these machines.As an example, one lieutenantwent to a unit after graduationfrom flight school and was immediately made maintenance officer. The majority of his me-Lieutenant John W. McKinney ispresently attending the AssociateArmor Officer Advanced Course the

U. S. Army Armored School Ft.Knox, Ky. At the time he wrote thisarticle he was instructing in theShawnee in the Department of RotaryWing Training, U. S. Army AviationSchool. Views expressed in this articleare the author s and are not neces-sarily those of the Department of theArmy or of the U. S. Army AviationSchool.-The Editor

chanics were new. They knewvery little about maintenancesystems, so the officer and mechanics all had to start from thebeginning and learn together.For a period of two months ormore only 25 of the unit's air-craft were in operation, not because of the lack of interest andpotential ability but simply lackof experienced personnel in asupervisory capacity. Think ofthe lost time and the bad namegiven to that aviation unit andArmy Aviation as a whole because of the lack of propersupervision.I do not advocate that allpilots or all maintenance officersshould attend the Transporta-tion Corps Aircraft Maintenance Officers Course. [Firstclass of the organizational main-tenance officers course was initiated at the U. S. Army Aviation School on 3 November1957. Interested officers shouldmake application through normal channels. - The Editor]That, of course, is desired as anultimate goal. But what can theunit commander do to improvethe lot of our maintenance aswell as increase the overall ability of the Army Aviator in hisjob of supporting his unit?First, include in the unit train-ing program classes in mainte-nance to include technical order


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AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION 11systems and files, aircraft formsand records, and aircraft maintenance inspections. These classes could be given by an experienced maintenance officer orby non-corns in the unit whohave special training in the different phases to be given. A general schedule similar to the oneoffered below could be used.1. Technical orders andtechnical order filing 4 hours2. Aircraft forms andrecords 6 hours3. Supply and supply procedures (how to orderparts and what tolook for) _ 6 hours4 Transportation aircraft maintenancecompany functions 2 hours5 Aircraft special andperiodic maintenance 2 hours

per typeaircraftThese general categories canbe either shortened or lengthened to fit the experience level ofthe mechanics.

Then, assign the most experienced pilot in the unit as maintenance officer, and use the newaviator as assistant, therebyhaving an on-the job trainingcycle for all pilots. This will givethe aviator a basic knowledgeof the work and reports involvedin maintenance.Once the aviator has learnedthe principles of maintenance,he should go to the flight lineand actually supervise periodicinspections of the aircraft. Howmuch do you know about the particular aircraft you fly daily? Doyou know how to look for itemslisted in the preflight inspectionor what you look for? Do youknow if the new mechanic is performing his job properly? Theseare questions only you can answer, and the answer may befood for thought.We want to make each individual conscious of maintenance.We want him to have a workingknowledge of the tools we usein our day-to-day work. As a resuIt, each aviator will have moreconfidence in his machine and inhimself.

THAT NEW ALPHABET AGAINALPHA said, BRAVOl CHARLIE, it is a good idea. Let's spendthe weekend at the DELTA. We can listen to the ECHO, dance theFOXTROT and play GOLF at the HOTEL INDIA. We had bettertake JULIETT with us or she will get in trouble. She would fly

thousands of KILOs right now, even to LIMA, to see MIKE inspite of the fact that he left her in NOVEMBER, and OSCAR, herPAPA, took off for QUEBEC while she and ROMEO were at theSIERRA doing the TANGO.Okay, but we had better get out of UNIFORM and tell VICTORto get us some decent WHISKEY. That triple XRAY stuff theyserve would turn any normal YANKEE into a ZULU.U. S. Naval Institute, Dec. 1957


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What To Do Until the Groundrrives

Lieutenant Vaughn R West TC

AVIATION HAZARDS ARE DE-CREASING at a rapid rate.Technological advances in thedesign and construction of flyingand ground equipment ndsteady improvements in flighttechnique have brought it about.Insurance companies in both theUnited States and Europe evenoffer air travel insurance at thesame low rate as that offered torailroad passengers.

All this is well and good butit concerns aviation in general.Although we in the Army haveadvanced with and at times ledthe rest of the field, the scope ofArmy Aviation's mission directly eliminates, to a large extent,those safety factors habituallypracticed by airline pilots. We,Lieutenant Vaughn R. West is aight instructor in the Department ofRotary Wing Training, U. S. A rmyA viation School. H e is dual qualifiedand has logged more than 1 000 hoursof flight time. Views ex pressed in thisarticle are the author s and are notne cessarily those of the Departmentof the Army or of the U. S. A rmyAviation School.-The Editor

in the Army, enjoy no unionizedregulation of working hours. Wedo not have the freedom of say-ing, even if we wanted to, Iresign. The job is too danger-ous. Instead, Army Aviatorsthrive on danger. We live withit. We even invent dangers. Wedo this because we are prepar-ing for the ultimate dangers ofwartime.This is not to say that we disregard safety. Conversely, wemust learn to fly safely whileperforming the most perilous oftasks. Whereas the safety ofpersonnel and equipment are notgenerally of primary concern incombat, they are most certainlyprized in peacetime training.And so, one of the most basicpreparations an Army Aviatormust make concerns his mentalattitude toward normal in-flightemergency situations. Disregarding the additional psychological pressures of flying jn combat, let us discuss one particularcomponent of human behavior:motivation. Motivation is that


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WHAT TO O UNTIL THE GROUND ARRIVES 13impulse which makes a man perform a specific act at a specifictime. Since there is no knownway of accurately predictingthat a given person will be inspired to perform the same acteach time he is subjected to agiven stimulus, we must continually strive to improve ourmethods of obtaining trained reactions until a foolproof formulais found.If our self-imposed training isgood enough, if our thoughtsconscientious enough, we maysomeday be fortunate enough toreminisce about the time, as thispilot did, when he said, Mayday, mayday, mayday. The pilotwho transmitted those threewords in a hurried but normalvoice had his mind engaged inhigh gear and was following aprocedure he had practiced manytimes before. He continued withhis identification and positionjust as though he were askingfor landing instructions.N ow for the setting: his altitude was about 500 feet; it wasa moonless night and his enginehad just quit.

Naturally this unexpected silence jolted him. Naturally, hewasn't completely calm. But theimportant point is that he hadjust as naturally entered autorotation, headed the helicopterinto the wind, effected a minimum rate descent, while at thesame time he had transmittedan emergency call.Thirty or forty seconds laterhe was safely on the ground,surrounded by tall corn, with nodamage to anything but cornand nerves. After turning thebattery switch off and vacatingthe helicopter, the pilot suddenly realized his nerves were a bit

jangled-he had trouble lighting a cigarette because his handswere shaking. And so he wondered, It 's all over and I'msafe, so why am I nervous now?

In recounting the incident, hecould tell you that he vividly remembered trying to see throughthe darkness to select a landingsite while he was estimating andtransmitting his approximateposition. He recalled swerving tothe right to miss an unusuallydark area that he surmisedwould be trees. And upon realizing he would be landing in a fieldof tall com, he remembers telling himself to keep the nosehigher than usual, thus reducing forward speed and lesseningchances of breaking the cockpitbubble. Those are things hevividly remembers.He could not remember checking rotor rpm and airspeed orturning the fuel selector off orthe magneto switch off or thelanding light on. And he couldnot tell you exactly what he hadtransmitted. But he obviouslydid all those things. Whycouldn't he call to mind everylittle detail of this most unusualincident?

The answer lies in the factthat he was prepared because hehad practiced simulations of thisparticular emergency m n ytimes in the past. His full andundivided attention was allowedto be focused on one thing andone thing only: the landing. Andyet, look at all the other veryimportant tasks he accomplished during the approach, probably without even full consciousness of doing them. And it'sthose extra little things donequickly and efficiently whileunder pressure that distinguish


16/36

14 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGESTthe Army pilot from the Sundayflier. It's that preparedness forsurprises that takes the kick outof surprises.Some people might say thatpast experience is the best thingto have when confronted withan emergency. They think thatbecause of their experience theywill be able to feel their waydown to a safe landing. Butwhen a split-second decisionmust be made, what advantagehas experience over a premeditated reaction or a trained reflexfor that particular stimulus?None whatsoever if the pilotcan conduct hinlself along a pre-planned course of action. If hecan quickly, with confidence andpurpose, direct his thinking toward actions he knows are correct, he will never panic. Andtherein lies the answer to thequestion of why the pilot did notget nervous during his dead-engine descent. How could he getnervous when he was so busyconcentrating on things he WASCONFIDENT had to be done?

Every pilot, prior to takeoff,should go through a physicalemergency cockpit procedure toinclude a Mayday call and anengine restart. In helicopterswe don't usually have time for arestart, but the word usuallyis reason enough for practicingthe procedure.

In preparing for mechanicaland structural failures, I believeall pilots should investigate circumstances of accidents causedby such failures, especially thecause. Then we should mentallyformulate a plan of action tofollow, in case it ever happensto us.

For instance, if you were a

passenger in a Hiller or a Bellwhen suddenly the tail rotorAND gear box flew off the ship,you would very probably havean extreme nose-low attitude.Considering you had sufficientaltitude and time and knowingthe only solution to effect a successful landing lay in movingsome weight aft of the centerof gravity, what would you do?Would you sit and wait for theinevitable crash, knowing thatyou both would no doubt bekilled? Or, fantastic as it maysound, could you compel yourselfto climb out of the cockpit andsomehow try to lock yourselfonto the tailboom or sit on theaft crosstube, which is behindthe CG thus supplying the pilotwith an least som control?The guy next to you says don'teven think about things like~ h t Although I'm not suggestIng one should worry or fretabout things like that, I doprefer to THINK of them. Andmeditation, as a ho y wouldbe a distinct asset to ~ y pilotwho directed his meditativethinking along the proper channels. By meditative thinking, Iam speaking of the practice ofconjuring up any and all feasiblein-flight emergencies and thenformulating specific proceduresto follow. After several reviewsthese exercises could be reliedupon as potential reflexes tothose particular crises.And if your imagination runswild and you catch yourself saying, But the possibility of thathappening would be one in amillion, just remind yourselfthat, true or not, there are manypilots either crippled or buriedwho were victims of that onein a million.


17/36

you ARE ON a DVFR flight plan via Red 30 from Tallahassee toJacksonville, Florida, in a Sioux equipped with only a VHFtransmitter and an LF receiver. You filed an estimated takeofftime of 0920 and an estimated time of penetration (of the ADIZ) of1000. Your actual time of departure was 0918 and you penetratedthe ADIZ at 1003. At 1015 you are tracking outbound on the eastleg of Tallahassee range at flight plan altitude of 3,000 feet whenyou encounter scattered cumuliform clouds with bases at about2,500 feet and tops at least 1,000 feet above your cruising altitude.These clouds will require you to make a wide deviation from yourcourse or altitude to remain VFR. Considering the limitations ofyour radio equipment, which course of action would be the mostpractical under the circumstances?Indicate by a V those solutions that you think are correct.o Continue on course to desti- Continue flight by descendingnation holding flight plan al- to an altitude that will pro-titude and course. The cloud vide at least 500 feet verticalcoverage does not constitute clearance from clouds, aftera ceiling; therefore, you will using available radio equip-technically remain VFR.) ment to report the change too Descend to an altitude below the nearest ATCS.1,500 feet actual, therebynullifying your DVFR flightplan, and continue to yourdestination.

o Return to Tallahassee and notify the Air Traffic Communication Station (ATCS)by telephone of your action,then re-file a DVFR flightplan at an altitude that willenable you to stay clear ofthe clouds.

Remain at flight plan altitudend circumnavigate t h eclouds en route, maintainingat least 2,000 feet horizontalclearance and staying within15 miles of the center line ofyour course.

Descend to an altitude whichwill provide at Ieast 500 feetvertical clearance from theclouds and transmit a position report to the nearestATCS.Continue flight by changingaltitude and / or heading asnecessary to remain VFR, reporting this action to thenearest CAA facility uponarrival at destination.o Land at the nearest suitableopen field and telephoneFligh Service to close yourflight plan.

The correct solution to the PUZZLER may be found on page 32.


18/36

oTTERoNFIR

Mj 5gt W X BeatenT HE OTHER DAY I was talkingwith some friends at theArmy Aviation Board and picked up a story which I think youaviators should know about. AsI said I was visiting with theseold buddies when they startedtalking about an Otter fire. Wellof course there s nothing specialabout an aircraft fire; but it swhat happened in the Otterwhile it was burning that makesthe story.This Aviation Board test pilotwas tooling along in this Otteron IFR at 7 000 feet and feelingvery good about the world. Herehe was flying along getting hisinstrument cross-country proficiency time testing his newabsolute altimeter, and makinga n e c e s sa r y administrativeflight all at the same time. Saving money for Uncle Sam andgetting real utilization out of

the Otter.When all the excitement start-ed it seems the pilot had justreported into Greensboro N. C.requesting approach instruc-tions. He was all relaxed andexplaining the new absolute altimeter to his copilot when hisfuel pressure suddenly began todrop. Naturally, he forgot allabout this new-fangled altimeter, and he and the copilotswitched fuel tanks and such.Well all that happened is that


19/36

the fuel pressure kept right ondropping. The pilot got Greensboro back on the horn, declaredan emergency and got clearancefor an immediate approach. Hecould see the ground through ahole in the clouds so he starteddown, telling Greensboro that hewould try to make a straight-inapproach to the field if he couldkeep his engine running.

While the pilot was doing thisyak-yak with Greensboro, therewas a loud KA-BLOOM whichshook the Otter from stem tostern. Flames swept back underthe rudder pedals and blacksmoke poured into the pilot scompartment. The flyboys, ofcourse, got ready to step out ofthe smoke-filled room into clear,sweet-smelling air. They pulledthe emergency fuel and oil shutoff, and yanked on the emergency door release, ready to go.Only nothing happened to thedoor. t stayed right on justlike it had been welded there.After much beating on the win-

dows and going several thousandfeet lower, the copilot, who hasbig elbows, finally knocked awindow out. When the boyscould finally see outside and seethe instruments again, they discovered they were only about800 feet over the ground andjust breaking out of the hole.Right under them was a smallsix-hundred-foot corn patch andby turning and twisting theygot the Otter into the patchwithout mishap. They scrambledout with the aircraft fire extinguisher and managed to put outthe fire.Naturally, these boys weresomewhat shook up and put out.They couldn t understand whyanyone would let an aircraft getinto such shape that the doorwouldn t come off when theemergency door release was pulled. Why, a guy could get killed,the pilot growled.Well, I know you guys knowhow these things go. Everybodygoes around telling everybodyelse that something should bedone about such things. TheAviation Board president put astop to this talk by arming anofficer and some mechanic-typeswith pliers and safety wire telling them to go out on the flightline and release every door onevery aircraft they could findand let him know the results.N ow this, to my thinking, isthe most interesting part of thestory and that which I think isimportant. As you know, I don tbelong to the Aviation Board,but these aircraft they weregoing to go drop the doors onwere mine. So I tagged along to

Views expressed in this article arethe author s and re not necessarilythose of the Department of the Army.

Th e Editor


20/36

8 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGESTbe sure that these Board mechanic-types put my doors backon. First, they hit my threeSeminoles. Was I embarrassedOnly one of the three doors cameoff. Why I don't believe youcould have kicked the other twodoors off.Well, as you can imagine, Ikept very quiet and wanderedoff to the back of the group ofspectators that had gatheredaround. From this group ofSeminoles they went over to mysix Beavers. Believe it or not,none of the Beaver doors cameoff. Naturally, at this. point Islunk off to my office to meditateon the matter and wait for thephone call I knew I would getas soon as myoId man heard ofwhat happened.

When these characters camein wiping the grease off theirhands telling me that the showwas over, I grabbed my boysand started in on those doors. Ifound that in the Beavers allof the pins were too long andcouldn't possibly release thedoors. In the Seminoles I discovered that though the pins werethe right length, they had beenimproperly rigged. In the BirdDogs I found pins rusted, rig-ging in wrong, and any numberof things which got me to think-ing about inspections.Well, you know how the Dash6 manual says that these doorsshould be dropped every thirdor up to the sixth periodic, depending on the aircraft. TheAviation Board president alsoread the Dash 6 manuals andsaid that obviously this isn'tfrequent enough. He called ahuddle with the other test agencies and got out UERs on thesedoors calling for an immediate

inspection and a recommendation that all Dash 6 manualsbe revised to include this emergency door release inspectionwith every periodic inspection.N ow this made good sense to meafter looking over all the doorson all of our aircraft.You shouldn't wait for this revised inspection to reach you before you start learning all aboutthese emergency door releases.Learn now how they work, ordon't work, as you will probablyfind out.Now, of course, it ain't mybusiness to tell you how to fly.I do most of my worrying aboutaircraft while they are on theground; you do most of yourworrying about aircraft whilethey are in the air. One of mymechanic-types suggested thatwe put an axe in each aircraftlike they have in the hallwayson big steamships. As I pointedout, this wouldn't work becausethe pilot swinging an axe in thecrowded pilots' compartmentmight whack his copilot on thehead and make matters evenworse. The copilot would probably get mad, or at least get hisfeelings hurt.When you stop to think howlucky these pilots were that theonly corn patch in the countybig enough to land the Otter onjust up and slid in under themwhen they broke out of theclouds and may have saved themfrom getting killed or reallybanged up, why you will lookwith respect at your emergencydoor release handle next timeyou buckle an aircraft on Evenif these aviators had put on twoextra parachutes apiece, theycouldn't have jumped. The doorswouldn't come off


21/36

One Unit s Solution

NIGHT ATTACKLieutenant Charles D. Kingsley E

MOUNTAINOUS maintenanceproblem faced the 521stEngineer Company of StocktonCalifornia. Like a lot of otherhardworking field units, aircraftavailability constantly hauntedthe maintenance officer.A shortage of almost 20 crewchiefs in the maintenance section made a solution seem impossible. Seven types of aircraftassigned aggravated problems insupply maintenance and train-ing of personnel. Pilots requiredthe aircraft for training andproficiency. To make mattersworse the unit usually had oneor two missions going into thenearby mountains which placed

an additional load on the main-tenance section. This requiredmany hours of training to gainpilot proficiency in hill-type operations. It all added up to agargantuan headache.Something had to be done toincrease aircraft availability.Major Charles M Bussey Company Commander of the 521stEngineer Company and CaptainSamuel R. Boyer MaintenanceOfficer worked out a real solution.They drew up a plan for aprogressive maintenance sched

ule that worked. t enabled theperiodic inspection PE) ando th r crippling maintenance521st Engr s night shift mechanics make engine change


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2 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Februaryproblems to be combined withthe daily postflight, thus allowing the crew chiefs to pull allthe required daily work post.flight inspection, inflight discrepancies, etc.), plus a portionof the periodic, without increasing the down time to anygreat extent.Figures for the new schedulewere determined by computingthe average flying time per aircraft using the Aircraft Statusand Inventory Reports for theprevious six-month period. Crewchiefs were then able to planand distribute their daily workload. Previously the aircraft hadbeen nonoperational when a PEwas required.The p was broken down intowork blocks using Air Forcework cards WC-IH-19-6PE,WC-IL-19-6PE, etc.). he s ecards list PE requirements foreach type aircraft.Blocks of the inspection areprogressively performed as flying hours continue toward thenext scheduled PE. When thehours on the aircraft indicate aPE is due, the last work blockis performed.

For example, maintenance onthe Raven is performed progressively in the following manner: the PE is divided into fivework blocks, each to be accomplished within eight flyinghours. Assuming the Raven fliesan average of two and one-halfhours per day, each block isLieutenant Charles D Kingsley isPublic Infor mation Officer for the521st Engineer Company Views expressed in this article are the au-thor s and are not necessarily thoseof Department of the Army or ofthe U S. Army Aviation School.-TheEditor

completed in three nights. Anextra ten hours or a cushionof two hours per block is allowedfor special or tech inspections,time compliance changes, etc.

NI HT PROGR MA night maintenance programwas also organized. A skeletoncrew was on duty during the dayto service aircraft and assist inparking. The rest of the sectionworked at night. By accomplish

ing the majority of the work atnight, when there was a minimum demand, more aircraftwere ready for flight the nextmorning.However, a night maintenanceprogram posed several problems.First, extra meals had to beprovided. Messhall personnelsolved this by serving five mealsa day. Morale suffered too atfirst but after the program wasin effect for a time, mechanicsbegan to enjoy the night work.The resulting longer weekendcould have something to do withthis.)Inaccessibility of supply channels at night also presented amajor problem. This was solvedby having the day crew procurespare parts needed for eachnight's maintenance.

PRODUCTION CONTROLTo a great extent, the success or failure of any maintenance system depends on accurate scheduling. The ProductionControl Officer keeps a record offlying time on each aircraft; records the number and anticipatedhour of the next periodic inspection; requisitions, in advance, time replacement items;and records the number of thework block scheduled for com-


23/36

1958 . NIGHT ATTACK 21pletion for each night. Checking daily, he makes certain thecards to be completed are pulledfrom the file and given to thevarious section chiefs.

The section chiefs, in turn,distribute the cards to the mechanics who are to perform therequired work. When the blockoutlined on the card is completed, the mechanic enters theflying time, date, and his signature on the reverse side of thecard. Production control personnel, after all work blocks havebeen signed, mark off that PEas completed. The aircraft isthen tech inspected and testflown to determine its conditionand any delayed discrepancies.ll of the above inspections

are accomplished With little orno loss of flying time.One disadvantage, however, isthat mechanics tend to take animpersonal approach to the aircraft they're working on. Aneducational program, designedto show the mechanics thattheir work is important and appreciated, would help.

OES SYST M WORKDoes the system work? It hasfor the 521st Engineer Company and is heartily recommended for units with similar problems. Advantages? There areseveral: better forecasting oftime replacements items, moreavailable aircraft and increasedflying time for each aircraft.

Normally, the Army Aviation Maintenance system is based onthe individual crew chief. The editors fe,el that production linemaintenance as described in this article tends to take away theindividual responsibili ty of the crew chief for his specific aircraft.As such it is not recommended as an overall solution to the maintenance problem. Nevertheless, we heartily agree that it is an excellent answer in an abnormal situation.-The Editor

NEW ENGINEUsing only half the parts of aconventional reciprocating engine, the Hermann Cam Enginehas been called a threat to the

jet. Dry weight of the new engine with dual ignition, starter,and generator is listed as 335pounds. Its compact, torpedoshape requires less area for installation. The engine mainshaftruns at half speed, giving pro-

peller speed efficiency withoutreduction gearing. Similar to theturbine in uniform torque, thereare 12 power strokes per shaftrevolution compared to three inconventional engines. Maintenance cost is expected to be reduced.The engine produces 200 corrected BHP at 1305 rpm. (NewsRelease)


24/36

YOU'VE PUT IN A HARD morningof flying. It's eleven o clockand you're heading back in. Naturally, you're a little tired. Butwhat about that impatience youfelt when, on the first try, youcouldn t get the tower for land-ing instruction? Hand shakejust a little when you lit thatlast cigarette? Feel just a triflenervous for no good reason? Geta chest twinge once in awhile?You could be an accident waiting to happenSure, you ve had that samefeeling before and it's neverreally bothered you. But whatif you had a sudden ~ m e r g e n yin the traffic pattern or on theapproach? t might take a fewseconds longer to realize some-thing's wrong. These few sec-onds can be very important.Suppose you round out a littlehigh, the bottom drops out, andyou're two seconds too long com-ing in with the throttle? Oryou're hovering down a lane toyour parking mat when a sud-den gust hits you and you'retwo seconds too long correcting?If you're lucky, you ll be ableto give your version of whathappened to the accident in-vestigator. In any event, youadd to the mounting statistics

proving that most accidents oc-cur in the late hours of morningor afternoon.You're a little indignant aboutthe pilot error cause factor list-ed in the accident report. Afterall, you did all you could to pre-vent the accident happening.But, did you? And was the piloterror really in the aircraft? Orcould it have been early thismorning when you had a cupof coffee and doughnut forbreakfast? Or maybe at noonwhen you had one hamburgerand a coke for a hard afternoon'sflying?

The point is that your eatinghabits can be the contributingcause behind pilot error. Theflight surgeons use RELATIVEHYPOGLYCEMIA to describethis condition. t means that theblood sugar is too low. The con-trol of blood sugar is entirelydependent upon diet. t appearsto benefit most from a high in-take of proteins. The doctorssay that our blood sugar tendsto remain stable after a high-

The views expressed in this depart-ment are not necessarily those of theDepartment of the Army or of theU. S Army Aviation School.The Editor


25/36

MEMO FROM FLIGHT SURGEON 3protein meal, while a high-carbohydrate meal will result in theproduction of excessive insulin.This excess insulin gives almostthe same reactions as low bloodsugar.Suppose you had a good breakfast or lunch, with plenty of pro-teins. Does this excuse you fromthis condition? The answer isno Although these meals arevery important, you can exhaustyour fuel in the same manneryou exhaust the aircraft's fuel.Starting with full tanks doesn'tguarantee you can't run out.

But what's the answer? Somequalified experts say that thebest answer is more proteins.When you stop for the mid-morning or midafternoon break,take aboard some milk, fruitjuice, and sandwiches (preferably sliced meat or cheese).These same experts say thatdoughnuts and the like won'tsolve the problem. In fact, theysay the best thing about thedoughnut is the hole in the cen-ter.*

US FUL TOOColonel James F. Wells, Chiefof Flight Safety Division,ODCSOPS, feels that nothing is

solved when the label pilot error is pasted on an accident.The modern investigator, hesays, will include a lengthyanalysis of what compelled thepilot to make the error. Here isa sample check list:Was the pilot properly supervised?Was the mission beyond histraining and experience?What was his physical andemotional condition?

Was he required to exceed hiscapabilities in the time avail-able?Did he meet an emergency hehad not been trained to meet?Could his error have been designed out of the aircraft?(That is, prevented by a differ-ent arrangement of controls ora different presentation of in-struments.)Detailed answers to questionslike these will give us the realcause factors. Rather than pasting the mere label "pilot erroron difficult or unexplainableaccidents, we could have a gen-uinely useful tool for the prevention of future accidents.*U. S. Army Board) for Aviation Acci-dent Research.

AUTO ENGINE POWERS COPTERThe Gyrodyne Company hassuccessfully completed a seriesof test flights of the XRON-l

rotorcycle. It is powered by amodified automobile engine built

by Porsche Company of Ger-many.Adaptation of the low cost en-gine in the rotorcycle assureslow production costs. (News Re-lease)


26/36

SENIOR rmy viator

Major Tan B. Jolley is Deputy Director, Department ofRotary Wing Training U. S.Army Aviation School, FortRucker, Ala., and President ofthe Instrument Board. Longidentified with helicopter instru-ment training Major J 0 e yholds one of the earliest instru-ment ratings held by ArmyAviators.A paratrooper in World WarII, Major Jolley was a memberof the 517th Parachute Combat

of

heonth

Team and was wounded in theBattle of the Bulge. He tookliaison pilot training at Sheppard Field, Texas, in 1946, andlater served with the 11th Airborne in Japan.During Korea, Major Jolleyflew 118 front line missions, andfor heroic achievement w sawarded the Distinguished Flying Cross as well as three AirMedals, Oak Leaf Cluster toBronze Star and CommendationRibbon. He also served as AirOfficer to the 7th Armored Division, ROTC instructor at theUniversity of Illinois, and Assistant X Corps Air Officer.A 2-1 aviator with 3,500hours plus in all types of Armyaircraft the major will retire28 February 1958 and to immediate employment as SeniorMilitary Advisor to HumRRo,an agency of George WashingtonUniversitv engaged in ArmyAviation Research at Fort Rucker, Alabama.


27/36

NARMY AVIATOR WITH a gamewarden as his passenger tookoff in a Raven to check wildlifeon the reservation. After anhour of low-level flight the aviator noticed a hawk's nest in atree, which he pointed out to hispassenger and remarked thathere appeared to be a deadhawk lying next to it.The game warden asked himto fly by the nest once more sohe could see it better. The aviator turned the helicopter aroundand flew back with the passenger nearest the tree, maintainingan altitude of 30 feet above thetops of the branches.As the helicopter approachedthe tree the aviator started aturn to the left and after approximately 90 he noticed therpm was dropping. His airspeedwas 20 to 30 knots at this time.He applied right pedal addedfull throttle, and lowered thecollective momentarily to regainthe rpm.No noticeable increase result-ed however and the aircraft began to settle into the trees. Withthe rpm still decreasing he applied full collective to maintain

The Gray Hair Department is pre-pared by the U S. RMY VI -TION DIGEST staff with informationobtained from the files of the U S.rmy Board for viation ccidentRes earch The views expressed in thisdepartment are not necessarily thoseof the Department of the rmy or ofthe U S. rmy viation SchoolThe Editor

sufficient altitude to glide into asmall clearing. He was successful in placing the fuselage with-in the area and as the helicoptersettled below the treetops, themain rotor blades struck somebranches. The Raven dropped tothe ground in a level attitudeand the two men evacuated theaircraft without sustaining anyinjuries.Army Aviators have continually been instructed to avoidbecoming too engrossed with themission when in close proximityto obstacles. This happens moreoften in routine flour sackmissions. The pilot is observingthe target area and fails to seethat tree in front of him.

This accident is only a slight-ly different version. The aviatorbecame too interested in thetree and the hawk's nest andforgot the helicopter. The rpmdropped so low that it was impossible to recover before crash-ing into the trees.

He used quick thinking andgood coordination in getting thehelicopter into the clearing thuspreventing serious injury toeither party. Fly the aircraft andlet the observer perform hisduties. That is what he is thereto do.O T P

At about 1100 the ArmyAviator took off with a passenger in a Bird Dog on a VFR


28/36

6 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Februarycross-country of an estimatedone hour and 15 minutes duration. Four hours and 20 minuteslater he crashed on a mountainside, 6 miles northwest of hisdestination. In between lay aseries of incidents defying belief.As he flew, the aviator noticedthe tops of the mountains werecovered by a cloud layer to suchan extent that a broken condition existed. Mistake one: Heclimbed through a hole to an altitude of 8,000 feet and returnedto his original heading. Duringthis climb the aircraft pickedup some clear ice on the wingstruts and leading edge of thewings.Mistake two: As he nearedhis destination he located anopening in the clouds and letdown, encountering moderate

turbulence with rain and snow.After this descent, he foundhimself in a blind valley. Theturbulence increased and heavyrain and snow were encountered.Again he climbed through ahole and came out on top at12,000 feet.At 1315 two hours aftertakeoff) he attempted to call thenearest communication facilityfor destination weather but wasunable to make contact. Anotheraviator in a Choctaw, flying nearhis point of takeoff, heard thiscall and offered to relay. Theaviator in the Bird Dog statedthat he had encountered weatherand was changing course.Mistake three: He did notgive his location, heading, altitude, or new heading. He wasinstructed through this relay tocontact an LF Range on an-

uriosity ithout aution


29/36

1958 GR Y HAIR DEPARTMENT 27

Series o Serious Errors

other frequency for the desiredinformation. The aviator ac-knowledged the relay. He laterstated he was unable to under-stand the message because ofstatic.At 1318 he tried to contacthis destina ion tower, finallysucceeding at 1329. He declaredhe did not know his position. Hereported his altitude as 12,000feet and was then cleared atthat altitude to an LF Rangenear his destination.After giving the aviator theseinstructions, the tower called

the local GCA unit to start asearch and notified the Air Traf-fic Control Center in that zoneof the situation, requesting theytry to make contact.At 1336 the aviator was givenDF steers until GCA took himunder control. The aviator stated

he was holding a heading of220 and an indicated altitudeof 10,200 feet. GCA had him lo-cated about 25 miles ENE of theairport. He was requested toturn right to 310 0 and maintainaltitude. After its execution theaviator was given another turnto 180 Again he was told tomaintain altitude.The aviator misunderstoodthese directions and thoughtclearance was given to descendto an altitude of 6,500 feet. Afew minutes later the operatorrequested the aviator furnishhis flight conditions. He did notanswer. The operator then askedfor his altitude, which he gaveas 7,200 feet. The operator toldhim to stop his descent at 6,500feet, which gave safe flyingclearance for 25 miles aroundthe airport.


30/36


31/36

1958 GRAY HAIR. DEPARTMENT 9LES MISER BLES

The -Army Aviator decidedthat the weather was gettingtoo bad and landed his Sioux inthe maintenance and tie-downarea of a TAAM depot. He thendecided to RON and left thehelicopter to find suitable quar-ters for the night

The following day he returnedto the tie-down area and prepared to fly back to his homefield. He started the engine butbefore the clutch had fully engaged the retreating blade flexed downward hitting and severing the tail boom.Investigation revealed thatthe pitch change horns had beenremoved from the helicopterleaving the aviator with nomeans to control the blade pitch

and allowing the excessive down-

ward flexing of the rotor blades.Depot maintenance personnelwere expecting another Sioux atthis time for completion of aTO modification on the rotorhead. Mechanics from the depotshops saw the helicopter in themaintenance area and assumedit was the one due in. They informed the section chief thatthe expected aircraft was onthe field and he told them tostart removing the pitch changehorns. Then he went to the shopoffice for the necessary work order.At the shop office the sectionchief learned that the clerk hadgone to the post theater to at-tend a compulsory training class.Another NCO informed him thathe too should attend the classso the section chief proceeded tothe theater without further con-

Slipshod aintenance Plus qually Poor Preflight


32/36

3 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST February

noperative Compasstact with his mechanics whocompleted the removal and tookthe pitch change horns into theshop for modification. Theseparts were in the shop at thetime the aviator started the engine.

The mechanics stated thatthey attempted to locate thedash two to make an entry,but were unable to locate theform. The Form 781 w s foundin the aircraft. The mechanicshad looked for the new plasticholder and failed to notice thatthe forms of this aircraft wereon a clip board. When the aviator returned to the Sioux therewas no entry showing this removal. He stated that he checked the control rigging but notthe rotor head assembly priorto starting the helicopter. Healso performed a partial preflight which did not includemoving the collective pitch andcyclic control through theirrange of operation.

Although the mechanicserred in their action and failedto place proper signs on the aircraft, this accident could nothave happened had the aviatorperformed n dequ te pre-flight

LOST UT NOT LE STAn Army Aviator was assigned to pick up a Sioux from field

maintenance for a cross-countryflight which would last three tofive days. On his acceptance inspection he noted that the compass had been written up as inoperative a week before and immediately requested a new one.The mechanics he consultedstated that they were unable torepair or replace the compass.The aviator then accepted theaircraft and took off on the firstleg of his cross-country whichproved uneventful.The second leg of the flightwas completed the next day.Minor radio and mechanicaltrouble were experienced butthese were repaired and the air-craft was ready for flight thenext morning.The aviator continued hisjourney that morning filing fora one hour fuel stop en route.As he arrived over a large cityhe decided to circle to the southand pick up a road that led to hisrefueling airport. After leavingthe city he became lost and

flew south of his intendedcourse.Attempting to orient himselfhe saw some radio towers andthought he was on the rightroad. Actually he was on a highway bearing to the left of hisdesired course. After flying onthis course for a few minutesthe engine quit and he entered

an autorotation.Fifty to 75 feet above theground the pilot experienced avery rapid rate of descent whichhe was unable to control. At tenfeet he pulled collective Ditch tocushion the landing. The helicop-


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1958 GRAY HAIR DEPARTMENT 3ter landed hard on initial contact, spreading the landing gear;on the second bounce, the bubblecracked and the landing lightwas torn away. Contacting theground for the third time, thefront portion of the right skidbroke off and the bubble shattered. The Sioux then came torest in an upright attitude afterchanging direction 160 fromthe original heading.The engine quit, after twohours and fifty-five minutes,from fuel starvation. The avia- ladeDamage Costlytor made a slight error in computing the distance to his firstrefueling stop. The right tankof the G model was completelydry and the left tank containedless than one quart of gas. Thisis on pilot error committedby the aviator. If he had landedprior to running out of fuel, theautorotation would not havebeen necessary.His first error, however, wasin accepting the helicopter knowing the compass was inoperative.If this had been corrected, hecould have stayed on course andarrived at his destination before running out of fuel.

His last and most costly errorwas poor pilot technique. He allowed his rotor rpm to drop to apoint where, from 50 feet, hewas unable to control or checkhis rate of descent. Airspeed wasexcessive at the time of groundcontact.It is almost impossible tomaintain directional controlwith low rotor rpm. This, combined with high airspeed at thetime of ground contact, makesrecovery doubtful. Never dive ahelicopter to regain rotor r -a flare is the most expeditiousmeans to increase it.

In addition, the pilot was inexperienced in the Sioux. A recent graduate of the U. S. ArmyAvjation School, his trainingwas almost exclusively in aRaven, and since graduation, hehad spe nt most of his time at adesk. His flying was limited tomonthly minimums.The diversity of errors committed by the aviator indicatesthat he was not properly checkedout in this type aircraft-all ofwhich reflects upon the super-visor.

T CTIC L MISSIONIn connection with a unittraining mission, two Army A viators were assigned to transport an internal cargo of simulated POL 22 sand-filled gascans) in their hoctaw to anauxiliary strip. For tactical reasons, the aviator was directed toplace the cargo under trees located at the south end of thestrip.During the execution of hismission, the Army Aviator madea normal approach, terminatingin a hover at the center of thestrip. He then hovered to a position near the trees and landed,


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32 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGESTfacing in a southwesterly direc-tion. The blade tips at the pointof touchdown were approximate-ly three feet from a large tree.The copilot and crew chiefdismounted immediately to un-load the cargo. The pilot at thistime improperly set the parkingbrakes and while his attentionwas diverted, the Choctaw rolledforward and the rotor bladescontacted branches of the tree.The aviator realized that toshut down at this time wouldcause further damage by allow-ing the blades to droop andstrike heavier branches. Accord-ingly, he raised the helicopter toa hover and moved away fromthe trees. This prevented fur-ther damage to the helicopter.This accident was caused byimproperly set parking brakes,the handle of which is more

readily accessible to the copilotthan the pilot (beneath the left-center of the instrument panel).The aviator was forced toreach across the cockpit to touchthe brake handle; thus, he wasunable to apply the pull neces-sary for a positive grip. If fore-sight had been used, a copilot schecklist, to include all controlsmore available to him than thepilot, would have been a valuableaid in preventing this accident.This system was adopted in thisunit after the accident occurred.Too many times it has beenillustrated that copilots of Armyaircraft have been utilized as asecond crew chief. Copilots arealso good for something besidesnavigator or relief pilot duringlong mission, but many ArmyAviators are guilty of not shar-ing duties with them.

On the basis of the factual information contained in the PUZ-ZLER on page 15, the recommended solution is as follows:

Descend to an altitude which will provide at least 500 feet ver-tical clearance from the clouds and transmit a position report tothe nearest ATCS. (Since the report on leaving an altitudeunder these cir,cumstances is for information purposes, the timefor reporting is of no cons,equence and can be accomplished be-fore or after the descent is commenced.)

NOTE: You are encouraged to submit comments to the Editor in-Chief of the U S. RMY VI TION DIGEST ~ the contents ofthe problem.


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A naval tower and aircraft in the traffic pattern intercepted anurgent message on 250.6 mc: I have a flameout. I am on fire. Fiftymiles east. Going to eject. Send helicopter.

The m'essage was repeated, but no identification of the distressed aircraft was received.SAR instituted far-reaching search procedures that involved 16aircraft and four surface ships, an all ships broadcast, diversionof two passing merchant ships, diversion of two naval vesse s; andchecked airfields from New York to Jacksonville for overdue planes.After six hours of intensive search the effort was discontinued.Estimated fuel and oil cost of this single incident was $3,500.

Aviators are encouraged to call for help when doubt or apprehension oexists as to their safety, in order that the full potential ofthe SAR organization may be used to assist them. But the ap-propriate ground radio link must be advised promptly when assistance is no longer required.

Identification of distressed aircraft is of utmost importance.Every aviator should have in his head the vital information required to make an intelligent and complete distress call; this in-formation is contained in SAR instructions. Knowing just what tosay may save the life of the distressed pilot, as well as a valuableaircraft.

There is absolutely no penalty for alerting the SAR organization when the aviator is doubtful or apprehensive about his situation-even if the situation quickly clears up.


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Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1958

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