Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1965

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1965

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UNITE

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Col George P Seneff Jr.

5

COMMANDANT U S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMaj Gen John J . Tolson III

ASST COMDT U S ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCol George W. Putnam Jr.

EDITORIAL STAFF

Capt Richard C AnglinFred M . MontgomeryRichard K TierneyWilliam H SmithDiana G. Williams

GRAPHICART SUPPORT

H G . linnH A. PickelD. l. CrowleyA. lofe

USABAAR EDUCATION AND LITERATURE DIV

Pierce l. WigginWilliam E CarterTed KontosCharles Mabius

RMY VI TION

1GESJJULY 1965 VOLUME 11

CONTENTS

Divarty Fullback, Col William A Beck er

Battlefield Artillery Airmobility Concepts ,Capt David L. Johnson and Lt James H . Fitzgerald

New Kind of War, Maj Frederick L. Clapp

Set the Right Example, Maj Ja ck J . Nelson

Crash and Carry

Research in Motion, Richard K. T i erney

Out of the Valley at :40 , Capt T h om as O . Kuypers

Capt Horatio Frozzleforth, ASO, Pi er ce Wiggin

The Accident and Cause Factors, Capt D. V . Wood

Tilt, Barney Roth

A Pilot Worth His Salt

Crash Sense

New Heights

Annual Awards

NUMBER 7

8

12

20

22

24

29

32

38

40

44

48

Back Cover

The mISSIon of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of an operationalfunctional nature concerning safety and aircraft acddent prevention, training, maintenance, operations,research and development, aviation medicine, and other related data.

The DIGEST is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly under the supervisof the Commandant, U. S. Army Aviation School. Views expressed herein are not neceslarily thoseDepartment of the Army or the U. S. Army Aviation School. Photos are U. S. Army unlen otherwspecified. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the DIGEST and to the author, unotherwise indicated.

Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct communica.tioll i _ thized to: EditorinChie: , U.s. Army Aviation D ~ e s t Fort Rucker A IabaTIW

Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Headquarters, Department of theArmy, 29 December 1964.

Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlined in AR 320 March 62, and DA Circular 31057, 14 March 63. Complete DA Form 124 and send directly toAG Publications Center, 2800 Eastem Boulevard, Baltimore, Md. For any change in distribution requments, merely initiate a revised DA Form 124.

National Guard snd Army Reserve units submit requirements through their state adjutants general andU. S. Army Corps commanders respectively.

For those not eligible for official distribution or who desire penonal copies of the DIGEST, paid subscriptions, 84.50 domestic and 5.50 overseas, are available from the Superintendent of Documents, UGovernment Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 20310.


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the ro ket unit c n be loc ted behind the sup-ported unit out o range o enemy cannon fire

nd still ccomplish its missionsA FULLBACK with power,diversity, and agility hasea rned a letter with the l I th AirAssault Division and ProjectTEAM (Test Evaluation ofAirmobility) .

The fullback is the 11 th s divarty (division artillery) which inmaneuvers last year demonstratedsome of the most impressive combat effectiveness ever seen on themaneuver battlefield.

The 11th s divarty boasts Agility in the form of three

airmobile 105 mm howitzer battalions which are swiftly transported about the battlefield byArmy helicopters and CV-2s andcan rain murderous firepower onthe enemy wherever the Sky Soldiers engage him.

Diversity in its aerial rocket

battalion whose armed UH-IBhelicopters can take to the air todeliver suppressive fires or to ripapart more distant enemy formations.

Power in its Li ttle John missile battalion which is movedabout by Arm y helicopters andCV-2s and can deliver the awesome and crushing nuclear warhead as its maximum punch.

Though thousands of wordshave been written about mobilityand firepower, they still add up toone basic formula: the rightamount of firepower mixed withthe proper amount of mobilityequals superior combat effectiveness. The unknowns are the propel amoun s of firepower and mo-

Col Becker s commanding officer11th Air Assault Division Artil-lery Fort Benning Ga.

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bility to mix in given situations.While perfect formulas are beingsought throughout the entire l I thAir Assault Division, the resultsachieved might best be understood by taking a look at the divarty, where the division s greatestfirepower is concentrated and married to new concepts of mobility.

HOWITZER BATIALIONSDuring Air Assault maneuvers

in 1964, divarty had only six ofthe new M-I02, lightweight 105mm howitzers which were assignedto the 6th Battalion, Sist Artillery. The other two battalions hadthe heavier M-IOIAI 105 mmhowitzers, but it is hoped they willsoon receive the lighter guns.

Unlike the M-IOIAI 105, the3,000-pound M-I02s can be movedb y sling load with the UH-IDequipped with 4S-foot blades.During maneuvers, the M-I02 battery was quickly and easily moveddistances up to 30 kilometers inthis manner.

Two UH -IDs can move a sec-tion consisting of one gun, itsseven man crew, and a smallamount of ammunition. However,three Ds are preferred , since athree-man fire direction centerand enough ammunition for ini

tial fire missions must also bemoved.When greater distances are in

volved, the CH-47A Chinook helicopter can be used. One CH-47easily moves an entire section ofeither M-I02s or M-IOIAls. During maneuvers last year, a battalion was moved 100 kilometers inless than 1Y hours by CH-47s (including loading and unloading).

When CH 4 7s are used to movethe howitzers, . divarty prefers tocarry the guns internally and slingload the ammunition.

Currently no aircraft are organic to the howitzer (or LittleJohn) battalions. UH-IDs andCH-47s are requested from the division s aviation group throughdivarty.

Divarty s howitzer battalions depend primarily on mobility forsecurity. Batteries are positionedin areas where access routes available to eriemy ground forces arefew or nonexistent. Additionalprotection is obtained from smallarms organic to the battalions andother combat units in the division.

It was determined in maneuversthat a howitzer battalion (oncethe helicopters arrived) could bemoved in 10 minutes plus flyingtiine. (The air assault howitzerbattalion could move a distance of40 . miles, occupy a position, andbegin firing in about the sameamount of time it takes a towed105 howitzer battalion in a ROADdivision to accomplish the samewith a move of 10 miles.)

ROCKET BAITAllON

Divatty's aerial rocket battalionrepresents a first for the Army.

Never before have weapons aircraft been designated specificallyfor u ~as artillery pieces. Each aircraft is ih effect a self-propelled,airmobile artillery piece capableof firing from one area, immediately flying to another area, andfiring again.

The rocket battalion is authorized 39 UH-IBs-three in Headquarters Headquarters Battery

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and 2 each in the three firing batteries. HQ HQ battery aircraftare armed with the M-6 kit (twol\1-60C 7.62 mm machineguns oneach side of the aircraft) and areused for command control, liai

son, and reconnaissance. Hueys inthe firing batteries are used forfire support and are armed withthe XM-3 kit (24 2.75 folding finrocket tubes mounted on each sideof the aircraft) . A Mark 8 reflectorsight provides the Hueys (withXM-3s) a direct fire accuracy of] 0-15 mils from 1,000-2,000 metersfor both deflection and range dispersion.

Currently, the rocket battalionis capable of providing only directfire support. However, it is hopedthat an indirect fire capability canbe developed with a rocket such asthe 4.5 . Anny evaluations in this

field are underway. The indirectfire capability would provide sustained fires day and night, and inall extremes of weather. Also,when the enemy forces excessivestand-off for direct fires, the ironcould still get on the target.

Thanks to its speed and range,the rocket unit can be located behind the supported unit o u t orange of enemy c nnon fire and

Flying comm nd post s easily quickly moved from one helicopter to nother

JULY 1965

still be able to accomplish its missions. Mobility also allows it to belocated in areas extremely difficultfor enemy ground units to penetrate.

During 1964 maneuvers, en-

emy ground units twice attackedthe rocket battalion while it waspositioned in the support role. Inone case, the enemy attack cameunder cover of heavy morning fog,but was still repulsed. in the second case, the enemy force attackedin the afternoon and was destroyed in a counterattack. Assoon as an enemy attack hits the

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battalion's outposts, the Hueystake to the air and launch counterattacks from one or more directions.

The rocket battalion also provides the infantryman with a bigassist. For yeats the Army hasbeen trying to cut the time gapbetween artillery preparation fireand the assa ul ting infan tiyman' sarrival at the objective area. Inconventional situations the footsoldier has to travel at least 100yards to the objective after preparatory fire ceases. The time lagallows the enemy to get out of hisfoxhole and effectively defendagainst the attack:

In the ll'lh, the infantryman

rides in VR-IDs along with therocket-armed VH-IBs and setsdown on or near the objective assoon as the prepara tory fire ceases.I t must be remembered that thistactic can l?e used only in specifictypes of missions, such as whenthe advantages of s h o ~ karid surprise can be exploited. The l I thdoes not use this tactic against extremely heavy-armed and defended positions.

In a typical mission the assaultihg units begin moving to the objective area after the Air Forcehas s e u n ~ dlocal air superiority.The aerial rocket battalion usually moves up with the lift battalion (Hueys carrying troops)and wi th the M 6 armed H ueys.At H hour plus 2 ~ i n u t e sthe M-6armed Hueys attack the objectivearea, and at H plus I minute theaerial rocket battalion's VH-IBsbombard the objective with abouthalf their rockets. The last roundgoes off 5 to 10 seconds before theinfantry arrives in VR-IDs.

The Hueys (armed with M-6s)and the artillery ships orbit inthe objective area and move backinto action against specific targetswhen so instructed by a fire support coordinator located with theassault force. The latter also con-trols fire support froin the howitz-

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er battalions and the Little Johnbattalion.

The battalion's VH-IBs usuallyattack from two or more directions in ei ther a spread or a trailformation. They generally moveto the assault area in a heavy rightor left echelon formation. Theyaccomplish about 30-40 percent of

their own target acqulsltIOn, therest being detected by divartyLOH and FOs (forward observers) , Mohawks, and the cavalrysquadron.

During an assault, the rocketships have adequate loitering timein the objective area. When oneelement funs low on fuel or am-

In 1962 the Army Tactical Mo- get acquisition, reconnaissance,bility Requirements Board, better and surveillance missions.known as the Howze Board, RSOP (reconnaissance, seleccalled for f resh and even un- tion and occupation of position)orthQdox concepts that would has become a new challenge tosubstantially increase Armymo the airmobile artilleryman. Nobili ty. During the last two years longer does a relatively largethe 11th Air Assault Division party go forward on the ground(Test) and the 10th Air Transport to select and prepare a new posiBrigade developed and tested tion area. Rather, because of thesome of these concepts. . , speed of operations the battery

Of significance is the 11th Air commander often makes oneAssault Division Arti llery's de- pass over a suitable area in apendence on Army aircraft as ,it Huey or OH-13 provided by theevolved tactics and techniques aviation battery and makes a defor employment of airmobile ar- cision lion the spot. Securitytillery. parties fly in ahead 6f the bat-

The divarty's lO?-mm howitzer teries, and survey teams accomand Little John battalions are plish necessary surveys in shorttransportable by Army aircraft or- periods of t ime thanks to heliganic to or immediately available copters.to the division. The primary Arti llery tactics are shaping upweapons of the aer ;tal rocket ar- to be somewhat different fromtill.ery battalion are self-propelled those considered conventional inflying artillery pieces UH 1 Bs the past. In support of assaultsmounted , with XM-3 rocket sys- by the infantry, direct aerial arterns. The division arti llery also til lery firepower, with its inherenthas an organic aviation battery quick reaction, close-in effectiveequipped with helicopters for tar- ness and selectivity of fires, is


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munition, another moves up froma reserve area and replaces it inorbit.

The commander's flying command post consists simply of amap board set inside and hookedto the door of a Huey. The mapboard can be easily and quicklyremoved and set up in another

concentrated in preparatory andsuppressive fires until initial objectives are secured. '

The aerial rocket artillery battalion plays a big role in reinforcing the ground artillery. o-gether, they provide continuousday-night, all-weather support.Artillery units accompany the infantry in operation in enemy rearareas. Airmobility reduces artil-

JULY 1965

aircraft if the need arises. TwoPRC-25 radios are used alongwith the aircraft s organic radioequipment. The battalion S-3 officer, an S-2 sergeant, and a crewchief operate the map board. Thebattalion commander and anotherheadquarters officer sit up frontwhere they are hooked in with the

lery security problems. In othersituations ground artillery unitsmay be lifted into enemy territory to position as an island offirepower secured by ir assaultinfantry to deliver intensive fireon important targets. The force isthen withdrawn by Army air.

Aerial and ground artilleryunits are complementary andmust be closely integrated forproper results. Their mission isthe same as always: to supportthe infantry in attaining its objective. To support the flying infantry properly, the artillery mustalso fly.

We feel that some fresh, andperhaps unorthodox, strides havebeen taken by the 11th Air As-sault Division Artillery in the useof Army aircraft for battlefieldmobility. While we have learnedmuch; further development oftechniques is a must. We continually seek new techniques forgreater mobility and more punch.

L t Col Monroe KirkpatrickAsst Fire Support

Coordinator11th Air Assault

Division Artillery

divarty net and can still controlthe battalion ~ n dprovide fire direction information.

During maneuvers, the aerialrocket battalion proved to be effective against enemy air de~ e n s e s .In fact, by employing lowlevel flight tactics, the battalionsuccessfully attacked some air d e ~fense units without being detected.

When the aerial rocket b a t ~ a l -ion is in forward p o ~ i t i o nammunition is generally brought in byCH-47. When it is possible to establislt ground supply routes withthe division base, 2V2-ton truckshelp the logistical effort. Otherwise supply is handled entirely byaircraft.

During 1964 maneQvers, the

battalion successfully provideqsupport along a division front of80- 120 kilometers and accomplished strikes 60-1 00 kilometersdeep into enemy territory. Sincethe battalion operated at onlytwo-thirds strength in aircraft, itsfull potential was not realized.

LITTLE JO N BAITAUONLike the aerial rocket battalion,

the Little John battalion also provides general support, but it isunique in that i t can pack the

Sunday punch - t h e nuclear warhead.

During maneuvers, the LittleJohn battalion successfully covered the entire division front withits 12 firing sections. On occasion,the battalion penetrated 25 kilometers into enemy territory to firemissions.

Usually the Little Jqhn ismoved by the CH-47, which can

haul an entire section. Like theh ~ w i t z e rsections, they als


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Little John s flownto predeterminedlaunch site y CH47

Divarty s air transportable Sunday Punch - the Little John

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a jeep. The two-Huey load wastried after 1964 maneuvers andproved successful. I t is expectedthat in the future this latter method will be used when Hueys areneeded.

One UH-ID with 48-foot blade shas lifted the missile, its launcherwindset, and crew of four. This

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amounted to about 2,500 poundsplus minimum personnel to firethe missile.

In a typical mission, the LittleJohn is flown to a predeterminedlaunch site where it takes the crewabout 5 minutes to set up, fire,

and get out. Little Johnis

employed when a big punch is needed-i.e., against targets howitzersor aerial rockets cannot handle.

Security is derived primarilyfrom speed and deception. Aircraft transporting the Little Johncan make a number of stops in thevicinity of the predeterminedlaunch area to confuse the enemyabout the missile's exact location.To attack the Little John section,the enemy must detect, locate,and mount an attack-all in 5minutes. These prerequisites tothe enemy attack are offset by thesection's ability to scoot, shoot,and scoot.

WEATHER FACTORSThe agility, diversity and power

of the th's versatile fullbackare only slightly hindered by adverse weather. Divarty has provedin maneuvers that it can operateat 200 feet and Y mile visibilitywith little loss in capability. Italso has proved effective while operating in heavy rain. The onlyweather conditions that haveslowed divarty to date are eitherextremely heavy fog and/or turbulence, or low visibility at night.Even then, the ground systemscan, with ground vehicles, move toget their jobs done where targetsare out of range of present positions.

What the future holds for theth's divarty with its airmobileLittle Johns, howitzers, and rockets is uncertain. But the th'sdivarty has left its mark. A s tepa big step - has been taken towarddeveloping a new order of agileartillery support for the infantryman as he seeks to domina te thebattlefield.

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Battlefield

irlllobilityCaptain David L Johnson nd Lieutenant James H Fitzgerald

ECAUSE OF the speed withwhich an ainnobile operation

takes place and the great distanceswhich can be spanned by an air-mobile force the problems of pro-viding effective artillery support

are immensely compounded.Exercise Air Assault II demon-strated that wheeled vehicles canno longer tow howi tzers to a firingposition without departing severalhours before any artillery sup-ported attack. Surface movementhas several disaqvantages: detec-tion is simple; firing positionsmust be limited to the friendly

side of the FEBA; further terrainwill at times preclude use of thebest tactical firing position. The

o s ~injurious limitation of move-ment by wheeled vehicles is thatthe reaction time from briefing to

H-hour must include the timees-

sential to move to the firing posi-t ion- in some cases several hours.

At first view it might well seemthat these restrictions can be best

Capt Johnson and Lt Fitzgeraldare assigned to ComPany C 227thAssault Helicopter Battalion FtBenning Ga.



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rtillery

Concepts

circumvented by parachute delivery. A paradro.p wo.uld no.t limitreactio.n time, no.r wo.uld it limitthe lo.cation of firing po.sitio.ns inrespect to. the FEBA; nevertheless,it does present fresh drawbacks.First, a large dro.p zo.ne must beclo.se to. the desired firing positio.ns o.r vehicles must be includedin the heavy dro.p. Then we againh ave the limitatio.ns of vehicularmo.vement. Seco.nd, derigging -theequipment takes valuable time.Third o.nce tqe guns are initiali ydro.pped we lo.se the flexibility

upo.n which the airmo.bile co.ncepthinges. We are limited anew bytime, terrain anti distance in anysubsequent mDve.

During Air Assauit the practicability o.f UH-IDs 48-fo.o.t roto.r disc) slinging the M-I02 h -itzer was examined by Co.mpanyC, 227th Assault Helico.pter Battalio.n, in co.njunctio.n with Battery A, 6th Battalio.n, 81st Artillery. These experiments in battlefield artillery airrno.bility wereco.nducted in three phases alongthe guide lines established below.

INITI L LI ISONU pDn receipt o.f. w-arning o.rders

indicating the possibility Df mo.vemen t o.f M -102 ho.wi tzers it is wellto. dispatch at o.nce a liaison o.fficerto. the supported unit. Alth9ughtime and distance may require

JULY 1965

LI ISON OFFICER CHECKUST

1. Repo.rt to. the battaliDn o.f SUppo.rted unit for n t ~ lbriefirtg.

2. Upo.n receipt o.f briefing:Acquire weather repo.rt to. include wind directio.n, wind

speed and density altitude.Ensure that equipment to. be lifted is within weight limita

tio.ns.

:

1::. .

1

: : i : s ~ ~ ; ~ ~ t ~ ; ; ~ t ; ; ; ; ~ ; ;~ : : r : : ~ : : I io : i I.;:, Relay info.rmatio.n to. co.mpany o.peratio.ns fo.r planning.

Remain with battalio.n until all plans have been made.

3. Repo.rt to. the battery to. be lifted.Check pickup zo.ne fo.r size and avenues o.f appro.ach and

departure in co.njunctio.n with wind direction.Sho.w gun crews exactly where to. positio.n guns fo.r pickup.

f required tell gun crews what articles must be remo.vedfro.m guns to. reduce the lift weight to meet aircraft capabilities.

Brief aircraft guides and ho.o.kup inen to. include:a. Standard signals.

Stress impo.rtarice Df clear and co.ncise signals.Ensure that the guides have the IDad 5 feet abDve the

I gro.und befDre giving the departure signal. IIb . Sling lo.ad aircraft ho.o.kup and takeDff sequence..c. Lo.catio.n o.f aircraft that each guide and ho.Dkup man

will proceed to. after ho.o.kup is acco.mplished.Make diagram o.f pickup ZDne to. include co.lo.r co.ding.

4. Return to. the lifting unit.Brief flight leader and aircraft crews including: ,

Individual aircraft assignment to. lifts by co.lo.r cDde.Call sign o.f each sling lo.ad aircraft and lead tro.o.p aircraft.

5. Repo.rt to. battery to. be lifted and check the setup o.f thepickup zo.ne.

Stand by to. relay changes to. inbo.und aircraft. f o.ther thano.riginal briefing include:

Field elevatiDnLanding azimuthWind directio.n and wind velo.cityLandirig fo.rmatio.nAny changes to. plan

Be prepared to. co.mmunicate with aircraft o.n clear frequencyusing a headset in the event ho.Dkup pro.blems develo.p.

Ensure the tro.o.p ships precede the sling ships into. the landing zo.ne.

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using helicoptors greatly reduces reaction time forthe employment o f howitzers increases artillery

flexibility allows more selectite .firing positions

him to fly it is better that hetravel by ground vehicle with satisfactory radio equipment, permitting him to remain in continuouscontact with his parent unit. Heshould prepare a checklist for thisspecific mission see example .

Immediately upon arrival at thesupported unit he should makeevery effort to determine the minimum essential planning information, e.g., approximate takeofftime, general location of pickupzone and landing zone. With thisguidance the supporting unit commander can plan fuel loads basedupon travel distance and othermissions to be flown.

While initial liaison is but thefirst step, it must be rememberedthat continuous liaison is the keyto success. I t is vitally importantthat the liaison officer remain withthe supported unit throughout the

planning to assist and advise.

M1 2 HOWITZERS IN

LAZY FIRING POSITION

Cf

More important he must ensuretha t plans are thorough and aboveall logical and safe for UH-ID operation. I t cannot be assumed thatplanners, albeit rated personnel,can properly prepare this missionwithout flying experience in a lifthelicopter company.

MISSION PLANNINGA rtillery Battalion

As pointed out, the mission iscoplanned by the artillery commander and the lift company liaison officer.

Although not mandatory, it isespecially desirable that the pickup and landing zones be reconnoitered by the liaison officer todetermine adequacy of size, besttakeoff direction, and best layoutof the fields for pickup and dropoff. Illustration below typifies theideal pickup and landing layout.

The principle considerations in

TAKEOFF

AND LANDING

DIRECTION

D

Cf p POSITION OFTROOP LIFTHELICOPTERS

Ideal layout for both pickup and landing zones

planning the placement of howitzers for pickup are: maximumspacing to minimize the effect ofrotor wash upon each separate aircraft during hookup and takeoff;crew pickup sites behind the gunlift helicopters to preClude interference.

The good plan designa tes eachhowitzer to be lifted by number,letter, or better yet by color. Thela tter method used during Air As-sault II was very satisfactory. Eachground . signal man, gUiding anapproaching helicopter for pickup, wears a colored vest or othersuitable garment appropriate tohis field piece.

Helicopter Company

Since the primary plans are prepared at the artillery unit, planning at the lift unit is usually limited to routine matters commonto any lift mission-radio frequen

cies, formations to be flown, etc.The weight of the M-I02 howitz

er requires that the fuel load bereduced to a maximum of 800pounds. Based upon the distancesbetween the pickup and landingzones and fuel availability afterdeparture from the landing lonethe fuel load should be reduced tothe minimum required to complete the rriission with an adequate reserve.

Al though the M -102 howi tzerweight can be reduced to 3,041pounds by removing the basepla te- i t weighs 99 pounds-thisshould be done only as a last resort. Removal is time consuming,as is replacement in the landingzone, since the base piate must arrive first and the gun then beplaced upon it. By removing themuzzle brake, hammer, crowbar

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and four securing stakes andleaving the base plate attachedweight can be reduced to 3,025pounds i necessary.

Gross weight assuming 800pounds of fuel is:

Basic weight 4,905 pounds

Crew2 aviators) 400 pounds

Fuel 800 poundsOil 24 poundsM-I02 3,025 poundsTOTAL 9,154 poundsMaximum gross weight ofUH-ID (48-foot rotor disc)is 9,500 pounds.

PICKUP ZONE PROCEDURE

The lia ison officer should arrivein the pickup zone well beforehookup time. He will either supervise briefing of the ground signalmen or, better still, personallyconduct the briefing. He shouldensure that the guns and theircrews are stationed as planned andthen make radio contact with thelifting aircraft. Use of a headset will assure his hearing all transmissions over the noise of hovering helicopters.

The lead helicopter will make

its approach to the first howitzerto be lifted. The remaining howitzer lift helicopters land to reduce rotor wash, unless the pickup zone is large enough to permiteach to hover free of turbulence.Each aircraft is directed over itsrespective weapon as the preceding helicopter departs. Spare aircraft, one each for howitzer liftand crew lift, should be positioned to make their inclusion inthe lift, if required as smooth aspossible.

Although simultaneous liftoffand drop off is desirable, it is notalways possible because of pickupand landing zone restrictions.

As the last howitzer is beinglifted the crew lift ships shouldarrive for the gun crews, including the ground signalmen.

When time or a fluid tactical

JULY 1965

UH lDs with 48 foot rotor disc were used to carry compl eteM 102s in experiments conduct ed during Air Assault II

situation preclude prior landingzone selection, another helicopter-preferably a UH-IB gun shipfrom the lift battal ion-may beused to select the landing zone.Then it joins the lift helicopters

en route and leads them inbound.L NDING ZONE

PROCEDURES

Since the sling load aircraft willhave to be flown at 60 knots orless while the crew-carrying helicopters travel at least 80 knots, thegun crews and ground signalmenwill arrive first. The signalmenshould position themselves to direct the sling load aircraft to predetermined sites. Helicopters withslung M-I02 howitzers, after maintaining departure sequence, willdrop off their loads singly anddepart in formation with thecrew-carrying aircraft.

Throughout these various stagesthe liaison officer s role predetermines success or failure. From theinitial planning phase to dropoff of the howitzers and crews, he

must stay abreast of developmentsand choose the proper course ofaction.

During the initial experiments ,30 minutes were required to getfour M-I02 howitzers on their way

to the landing zone - firing position. This time was further increased by the fact that the gunwas broken down into two piecesand then had to be reassembled atthe landing zone . Single aircraftpickup and takeoff was used ad ding additional minutes. As techniques were perfected two moreguns were added and time spentin the pickup and landing zoneswas reduced to five minutes ineach case. This reduction in timewas achieved through improvedpilot technique , intact weaponlift, and simultaneous lift by allaircraft.

Through use of the helicopterthe greatly reduced reaction timefor the employment of howitzersincreases artillery flexibility andallows more selective firing positions in almost any type terrain.


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ew

fWar

aior Frederick L lapp

T HE CURRENT opinion of some senior politi- :al and military people concerning Vietnamappears to leave the United States with a choice oftwo possible courses of action in Southeast Asia.Either we get out completely or we commit addi-

tional U. S. troops and fight.Should the decision be taken to fight the firstlogical question is Fight with what?

The French had 500 000 conventional troops inthat area and lost. Unfortunately 11 years later wehave nothing but like conventional forces availablefor immediate employment.

We have failed to prepare adequately for thenew kind of war the communists have been fight-

ing and winning since 1945. Consequently we findourselves prepared to cinderize an enemy within a

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t ctics must be design

enemy s i n t e l l

is movement weaknes

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counter the

v nt ge nd exploit

matter of hours, but not for dealing with a fewthousand half-equipped irregulars and their com-munist cadres in underdeveloped areas of the world.

In effect , the balance of terror which existsbetween East and West introduces basic changes tothe character of today's battlefield. We call thesechanges guerrilla war. Regretfully, we have notchosen to tailor enough new organizations and tac-tics to meet this present and growing threat.

The long list of unsuccessful operations con-ducted against guerrilla activities is a product ofthe inflexibility of many military leaders as well astheir intransigent attitude concerning the abandonment of conventional tactics. This military ar-teriosclerosis has existed down through the ages andis most evident toward the end of each epic periodin the style of warfare, symbolized by a major tran-sition of the conventional warfare of the day.

I do not suggest t t conventional infantry andarmor organizations are not

needed, or that conventionalground tactics are obsolete. What I do

suggest is that both conventional units and

tactics are inadequate against guerrilla forces.Past military policy of most nations has been theemployment of large conventional armies to destroya guerrilla enemy. There are two major problemsto this solution. One, it's enormously expensive;two, it doesn't work, i.e., China, Indochina, Algeria,Cuba.

I think the position of a conventional force fight-ing a guerrilla can best be compared to the unhappyposition of a man trying to swat a bumblebee with asledge hammer. As the man swings the hammer heexpends a tremendously disproportionate amountof energy in relation to that expended by the bee.If, in the unlikelihood, the man should hit the bee,the result is a giant overkill resulting in an insignifi-cant and easily replaced loss. Meanwhile if the bee

Joseph P. Kutger, rregula r Watfare n Transition

The views and opmlOns expressed herein are thewriter s and are not to be considered as an officialexpression o the Department o Defense

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New Kind o War

stings the man often enough, theresult is fatal. Shades of Indochina.

Accepting the fact that presentmilitary methods have sometimesproved ineffective against guerrillaforces, we must attempt to determine why, and make those tactical and organizational changesnecessary to correct this situation.

A review of guerrilla methodsof operation reveals the enemy smost significant advantage is his superior combatintelligence. Conventional military units cannothelp but provide considerable combat intelligenceto a guerrilla enemy. Basically, this dilemma allows

the enemy to attack at the most opportune timesand places for hi m . As a result, our actions e c o ~ ereactions to those of the enemy, and our tactICSbecome defensive by nature.

O u r practice of garrisoning, coupled with theintel l igence advantage enjoyed by the guerri l la ,affords the enemy ample opportunity to movewith impunity outside of those l imited areaswhich we occupy. In essence, a very large armycan only physically occupy a relatively small actualarea. Consequently, the guerrilla, by always knowing the locations of our forces, wins by default allthe area outside of that physically under the gunsof our troops.

Further study of the guerrilla indicates his greatest weakness is his essential need for freedom ofmovement. The guerrilla s seemingly promiscuous,unpredictable and illogical method of fighting leadsus to overlook the fact that, like ourselves, the guerrilla is governed by the same principles of war asenunciated by von Clausewitz. In addition, theguerrilla must concern himself with communitysecurity, community support. propaganda, enemyproximity, part and full -time functions, .o:ganizatIOn, etc. To sa tisfy these numerous req ulsltes, the

guerrilla must be free to move extensively.Any organization, o r tactics, which we might de -velop to effectively deal with the guerri l la threa tmust be designed to counter the enemy s intelli-gence advantage and exploit his movement weak-ness. A chess player knows that when confrontedwith a threat that cannot be parried, the best courseof action is to subject his opponent to a like threat.

Maj Clapp is with the Contract Instrument i v i s i o n ~Dept of Rotary Wing Tng Ft Rucker Ala.

14

Conventional units and tactics are inadequate against guerrilla forc

Thus any advantage is neutralized. f we apply thesame principle to guerrilla war we can see that ourorganization must be highly mobile. It must belarge enough to protect itself, but small enough todeceive the enemy as to its location. In such a deception our organization would successfully neutralize the enemy s intelligence advantage and standa fair chance of capitalizing on his movement weakness. I will later describe in more detail how suchobjectives might be realized.

A basic organization which could meet theseobjectives would consist of 59 officers and men. Ichoose to call this organization an Infantry Aviation

Destroyer Troop.t

is divided into a destroyer ele-

in developing dest oyer tactics we must exploit our advantage of



17/52

ment and a support element. The destroyer elementconsists of 44 officers and men and is equipped withfive UH-I helicopters two of which are armed.

ObvIously the helicopter is the only availablemeans of providing the high degree of mobilityessential to the success of a destroyer troop. Ailtroop tactics are designed around the helicopter.Therefore, to a destroyer troop the helicopter is asmuch a combat vehicle as a tank is to an armor unit.C o n s e q ~ e n t l yhelicopters must be TOE to destroyertroops Just as tanks are TOE to armor units.. The success of a destroyer troop would depend ingreat part on the troop s ability to react or movequickly. f this capability is to be realized ~ r p

d firepowe

JULY 1965

leaders must thoroughly understand not only thecapabilities and limitations of the infantry soldierbut also the capabilities and limitations of the helicopter which make the exercise possible. With theexception of five maintenance men, all enlistedpersonnel in the destroyer element of a troop are

regular infantry soldiers. Troop officers are bothinfantrymen and aviators. While in the air theofficers are pilots. Upon landing they turn the aircraft over to their WO copilots and lead the groundtroops in whatever operation is at hand.

We now t u rn our attention to logistics. Owingto difficult terrain and relative lack of rOads,rai lroads and airfields in the underdevelopedareas of the world, overland supply methods areout of the question. f a destroyer troop is to havethe sustaining capability and great mobility essentialto its success all resupply must be by air. For thispurpose I have included a support element as anintegral part of a destroyer troop. The support element consists of 5 officers and men and is equippedwith two CH-37 or CH-47 helicopters. One machineis equipped t handle POL only. The second shipwould carryall other needed supplies.

The support element leader would be directlyanswerable to the destroyer troop commander. Thetroop commander would always be with the destroyer element of the troop. A typical resupplyoperation would have the support element rendezvous at a time and place directed by the troopcommander. The destroyer element would reach therendezvous first to secure the area. Upon arriving,the support element would effect the necessaryresupply. However, coordination would be suchthat neither element would remain in the resupplyarea more than one hour.

As can be readily seen the support element mustoperate from a secure logistical base. The Idealsupply base would be a small aircraft carrier locatedoff shore from the area of operation. A carrier isequipped with maintenance shops could carry floataircraft, and would stock necessary levels of POLand other classes of supplies. f the logistical baseis located on land, i t would have to be a t an air

base, and security would be more difficult. Whenoperating from a land base Air Force cargo shipswould wholesale supplies into the base and the

t roop s u p p o r t e l e m e n twould retail supplies to thetroop in the field.

Maintenance is always a matter of concern whentalking about helicopters. I visualize organizationalmaintenance being accomplished by rotating, oneat a time ships in the field with float machines atthe supply base. Higher echelon maintenance would

5


18/52

To avoid deep involvement with an enemy force o superiorstrength a troop comlnander would spend a major part oj-hls time planning how he intends to run rather than fight.

Prolonged fire fights would be avoided.

be performed by supporting maihtenance teams.However, it would be the troop commander's responsibility to evacuate disabled ships to the supplybase area for repair. This would be done by directing the support element leader to bring forward areplacement ship and air evacuate the disabledmachine wi th one of his cargo helicopters.

For evident reasons reliable communications areessential to the destroyer concept. The troop de

stroyer element would be equipped with considerable taCtical radio equipment. Each helicopter wouldhave total FM and UHF coverage. In addition,two of the helico 'pters would he equipped with

single ~ i e hand radios for long rangecommunication.

In developing destroyer tactics we must exploitthose major areas in which we enjoy an advantageove,r the enemy. The two most significant areas aremobility and air-power. From these we derive anumber of additional advantages.

Techniques have been developed that enable usto land and reload personnel from a helicopter,even though the helicopter cannot land due todense vegetation or other ground obstacles. (SeeDIGEST Up and Out, Sep 63 and HeliportConstruction in Latin America, Jul 63.) Usingthese techniques, a destroyer troop is capable ofconducting an itinerant type occupation of avery large area. Because of its mobility, a singletroop can reasonably be assigned an area as largeas 2,500 square kilometers. In such an event wewould enjoy a degree of economy of force heretofore undreamed of. Even in an area as large as 50by 50 kilometers, a troop would never be more than

30 minutes from any point within its assigned area.Over a period of 10 to 5 hours a troop could landn ~ temporarily occupy multiple locations through-

out such ari area.Unquestionably, the majority of troop landings

and depar tures would he seen and reported to theenemy by local natives. Such reports should tax theenemy's communication system and alarm his intelligence people. For example, the enemy mightreceive word that five helicopters larided at pointA at 1100 hours and departed the same area at

6

1300 hours. From such a report he would have noway of knowing i all troops departed with the helicopters or if the area were still occupied.

A series of such landings over a wide area wouldraise in the mind of the guerrilla at least the possibility of enemy forces at heretofore safe iocations.This should cause the enemy, like ourselves, to conduct much of his ground movement in constantanticipation of possible ambush.

Normally, the helicopters would remain immedi-ately with the troop while on the ground. Whenpersonnel are intentionally left in an area, or thehelicopter cannot land due to terrain, primary andalternate pickup areas would be designat ed beforehand. Except after dark helicopter ground time inanyone location would be limited to less than 3

f logistical base for destroyer unit was land based Air Force Hed elivery of supplies into the base


19/52

New ind o ar

hours. At night the time might be extended to asmuch as 6 hours.

Upon occupying a given location, a troop wouldestablish a perimeter defense. Using claymoremines, kill zones would be se t up along trails, roads,canals or other likely avenues of enemy movement.

f there were nationals in the vicinity they would bequestioned for intelligence information. f the oc-cupied area were near a road or canal, wagons orboats could be stopped and checked for contraband.Wpen enemy forces are encountered, a troop com-mander would follow one of several possible coursesof action.

I t i s unlikely that a troop would be surprised onthe ground by an enemy force. In addition to lis-tening posts about their perimeter, a troop wouldbe equipped with sen try radar. According to arecent publication, a company has developed a sen-try radar that weighs only 8 pounds. Such a deviceshould be perfect for destroyer troop purposes. Fornight operation infrareq. equipment would beava ilable.

d m ke wholesale

The size of a detected enemy force would ~ v et ~ e g r e a ~ e s tbearing on what action the troop com-mander might take. f the enemy force is small, hewould attempt to destroy it. If however, the enemyforce is of company o r battal ion strength, he willrun. A destroyer troop is not equipped for sustained

fire fights. Fifty percent of an infantryman's fire-power is artillery. Since a destroyer troop wouldhave no available artillery, supporting fire mustcome from some other source. This brings into playour second major advantage, airpower. .

Using H F radio, Air Force or Nqvy t a c t i c a ~aircould be caped in on the target. Smoke, marker dyeand radio would be used to direct ai r strikes. Propercoordination with tactical air s ~ o u l dre duce timelag between r e q u ~ s tan d strike to an hour or less.

T o avoid d e ~ pinvolvement w i t ~an enemy forceof superior strength, a troqp commander wouldspend a major part of his time planning how heintends to run, rather than fight. This is a considera-ble departur.e from normal infantry tactics.

According to C&GS d o c t ~ i n eT h e most effec-tive means of destroying a hostile guerri l la forceis to conduct a c o n t i n u o u ~aggressive offense. Adestroyer troop coulq a ~ c o m p l i s hthis e n ~ but notby engaging in prolonged fire fights. Tactics dictatethat a troop's limited strength and firepower beemployed only to the extent necessary to effect dis-engagemen t and gain necessary time to bring thesuperior firepower of tactical qir iI1to play . T o d ootherwise would allow the enemy free use of hIS

su perior ground power and would sacrifice the

isabled aircraft would be sent to supply basearea for repairs

17


20/52

echniques and t r aining have enabled units to embark ordisembark from hovering helicopters

troop's mobility and airpower advantages. For thesame reason a single troop would not be expected,nor should it attempt t take or hold anything.

Beyond the few principles mentioned, there areno basic rules applicable to destroyer tactics. Theversatility of the helicopter makes possible an al-most unlimited number of tactical combinations.Each engagemen t will vary in some degree fromprevious engagements. How and to what extent willdepend on the situation and the terrain.

t is possible, but not probable, that ~ t roopmight be deceived into landing in the middle ofan enemy force. f this should happen, we are goingto have casualties. In such a case, however , wewould not expect to lose the entire troop. Onlythe personnel in one helicopter, supported by twoarmed ships , would be la nded until a recon of thearea was completed.

I have limited my discussion to a description ofa single destroyer troop. This is because the trooprepresents the smallest unit capable of sustainedindependent action . Obviously, realization of thefull potential of the destroyer concept will requirethe formation of larger organizations, such assquadrons and group s.

A squadron would be comprised of five troops.Each troop would be capable of independent orconcerted actions. For the ,first time im m edi t e con-centration and dispersal of a tactical force, over awide area, would become a reality. The tacticalcombinations open to a squadron greatly exceed

those of a single troop.Here care must be exercised to avoid conventional

thinking in terms of preparatory fires and assaultlines. In a guerrilla war the minuet as describedby Mao Tse-tung is much the better squadron tactic.

A group would consist of three squadrons plusauxiliary rocket and machinegun fire support troops.Once again the area of influe nce and tactical possi -bilities are greatly multiplied.

Due to the te r ra in in the underdeveloped areasof the world, a single destroyer group couldmore adversely affect guerri l la force :s t ~ ncould

thousands of conventional soldiers in an area o fequal size.I don't know if the destroyer concept will work,

and neither does anyone else. The only way to findout is to try it. This should be done at troop level.Any attempt at a higher level would cost too muchmoney and would be confusing due to the largernumbers involved. A single troop would cost nothing and would involve only 59 people. We alreadyhave the necessary equipment, and the personnelwould require no additional special schooling.



21/52

f personnel are intentionally left in an areaterrain prev ents landi ng primary and secondarypickup a reas mo designat ed b eforehand

Six weekswould be

ample time for unittraining.

The personnel are already trained infan trymen , andtheir only requirement would be to learn the tech -nique of using the helicopter in the conduct of aninfantryman's job.

After six weeks ' t raining, the t roop could besent to Vietnam. Within 9 0 days wewould either have a proved concept , o rwe would know something else thatdoesn' t work. In the former event development of squadron and g roup sizeunits would be relatively simple.

For years we have talked about a nuclear battle -

field consisting of undefined, fluid fronts and vastareas of no man's land. Theoretically, this battle-field s occupied by small, highly mobile, hardhitting forces capable of independent or concertedaction. f we take away the nuclear weapons, theguerrilla area of today closely resembles the nuclearbattlefield of tomorrow. Regretfully, we have yet todevelop the small, highly mobile, hard-hitting forcerecognized as essential to success on such a battlefield.

Many capabilities of Army Aviation have ad-vantageously been molded to the support of con -ventional organizations and tactics. However, owingto the necessary size and relative immobility ofconventional forces, much of our Army air poten-tial remains undeveloped.

Unlike present doctrine, the destroyer conceptconsists of independent troops divorced of any con-nections with a parent conventional unit.

Today the Army s confronted with a pressingneed for organizations and tactics that will, in theeyes of the enemy, render guerrilla wars as equallyunpromising as thermonuclear or conventional war.In my opinion a merging of infantry and aviationcapabilities can quickly and economically satisfythis purpose.

Frankly, I don ' t th ink we have too much t ime.Even i f present methods were successful, theUnited States cannot afford to t rain and equipa modern Army for all the potential Vietnamsin the Free World.

The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America arealready in ferment. From the Communist point ofview they offer excellent settings for future Warsof Liberation.

General MacArthur said, There s no substitutefor victory. Let's hope we must never settle for less.

JULY 196519


22/52

/

= 0 .- .' . . ... ., _ ..__. _ ..~ I. - . .. - - \'.:::..::..r.-;

- _..--- -

Set the Right xample

H w MANY TIMES haveyou, as an Army Aviator or

crew chief, or for that matter as afather or older brother, been in aposition to set an example forothers? Just a couple of momentsthought will, undoubtedly, bringto mind several instances thathave taken place over the recentpast. A bit more memory rustlingwill probably bring to mind otherinstances where your impressionon others led to their later actingin ways that would be far fromacceptable to you.

20

Major Jack J elson

Let s take a few for instances.Recall the time when you re

quired all of your section to be ata specified location at a definite

time and then-you showed uplate? (Probably with good reason- or was it really?)

How about the time you hadthe young lieutenant on his firstIFR copilot mission and you werea bit slipshod in your preflightplanning because you d made thisparticular flight so many timesbefore?

Remember the day you heldforth on inflight hazards duringa hangar flying session and cautioned all within earshot about

how useless was the sky above you?Then the crewchief wi th you a fewda ys later witnessed you go outand pull a bit of derring-do-outside of an approved contour flyingarea. You can bet he spread theword .

Can you think of times you veta lked, lectured and, by example,operated an aircraft so that you

U. S . ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/52

did not fly over livestock, dust offthe Sunday Gallery at the ramp,hover too close to a pitched tent,maintain a rou te that was toobumpy for a passenger you knewwas queasy in flight, asked theVIP passenger if he d mind a fewextra steps to avoid hovering tooclose to his reception party?

I t shouldn t be very difficult at

Maj Nelson is with TEe groupProject TEAM t Benning) Ga.

all for most of us to relive someof the foregoing. Fortunately mostof us have developed a habit ofconsideration for others, and in-stances wherein we commit oromit actions that set a guide forothers to go astray, because theylook up to us, are infrequent.

The greater one s flying experi-ence and rank, the more far-reaching are the examples set.This is true whether the exampleis good or bad and whether thereis one witness or many. Unfortunately the human temperamentis such that poor examples seemto receive more publicity, and asa result, are followed more thanare the good. A Chinese proverb

says that one picture is worthmore than ten thousand words.(Confucius said it and psychia-trists have proved it.) So of allthe ten thousand word speeches,essays and admonitions, each can,at a given time, be completelyblanked out for some by onethoughtless example.

Knowledge of one s capabilitiesand limitations in all aspects ismost desirable in a military leaderand, even more so, i f that leader

is involved with aircraft.

Disciplined man

How about taking a few mo-ments every now and then and re-calling your activities when in oraround aircraft? Think of somepeople who may have been awareof you and your actions. See if youcan t recall subsequent actionsthey may have taken as a result ofwhat they observed you doing.You ll probably recall more goodexamples than bad-bu t why haveto recall any bad ones?

More awareness of the effect anypersonal example may triggershould be an unconscious part ofeveryday living. I m not trying tosay think long, hard and widebefore doing everything, but I amsaying that knowing what oneshould

do and performing i t inthe manner in which it should bedone will, invariably, set a goodexample and one you can beproud of if others emulate it.

Pref ligh ts, t e c h n i q u e s proce-dures, dress, language and otheracts are, for the most part, habit.I f the habits are good, it followsthat acts, and examples resultingtherefrom, will be good.

Take about 120 seconds and seeif your examples always measured

up to your standards.

g :. _ - - - r

JULY 1965 21


24/52

rash and arryE HAD CLEARED ourwheels when she sputtered

and went down, related an ArmyAviator in the Republic of Vietnam. It 's a weird feeling, headded, to be flying along smoothly, then suddenly find yourselfheading nose-down into a ricepaddy.

Shortly after clearing the runway the U-IA Otter had gone intoa nosedive and headed for the

marshy ground, the victim of acracked cylinder block. A professional bit of flying brought theplane under control long enoughto make a safe landing. Now a

new problem had arisen: how toget the Otter from its resting placeand prevent it from falling intothe destructive hands of the enemy.

In the Republic of Vietnamemergency crash and carry servicefor damaged aircraft is providedby three Mojave Tow Companies, using the rugged, versatileCH-37 Mojave as a tow wrecker.These Army Aviation units makedaily flights throughout the 700-

mile long republic.Operating almost continually inhostile territory, the crews haverescued nearly every type of ai rcraft engaged in helping the Viet-

namese thwart the Viet CongoMissions into the lush, mattedjungles or into rugged mountainous terrain mean one thing for therecovery crews: doing their jobpromptly and getting away frompossible VC attacks. Time is theirwatchword and their guide.

Once a t the si te of a downedaircraft the crews follow a prescribed plan for recovery. Sentrieskeep a sharp eye on the surround

ing countryside for Viet CongoThe crews realize their vulnerability and know that each extraminute on the ground increasesthe possibility of an t t c k

Left Rice paddy emergencylanding area gives up Otter sMojave lifts it for return trip torepair base

Mojave lowers Otte? to ground ataircraft repair facility where itwill be fixed to fly again


25/52

Right: Huey B s guided into Zduring aircraft 1ecovery operation.Excess parts stripped from theA IE Sky raider will be loadedabQard the Huey to lighten loadfor CH 737.

Below: Mojave pilot receivesdirections to hoist Skyraider forreturn to base area

ULY 965 3


26/52

BEFORE LONG Army Avia-

tors m 'ay receive air condi-t i o n e ~ flight helmets. Develop-men t of a cooler helmet is partof an intensive program at NatickLaboratories aimed at improvingthe soldier's equipment and com-fort-and thus his 'combat effec-tiveness.

An Af1l1 Y Materiel Commandfield agency at Natick , Mass., thelabs have extensive facilities forresearch, design, d e v e l o p m ~ p . t ,im-provement, and conduct qf engi-neering tests on equipment andsupplies. In addition to the hel-met, projects of vital interest toArmy Aviation p e ~ s o n Q e lincludedevelopment of armor protection,clothing, POL handling equipment, ' shelters, survival gear, andparachutes. '

4

A coole r fligh t helmet is one

item Army Aviation personnelcertainly would welcome. Unfortunately, such a helmet will notbe available next w ~ e k . However, NLABS engineers are re-searching three approaches thatmay lead to the development of a

cool helmet: Ventilating the helmet by

scooping up ambient air outsidethe aircraft and letting it flowthrough the helmet and outthrough perforations.

Controlling the rate of evap-o r a t i ~ nby directing a stream ofdry air through the perforatedhelmet. A problem was encountered using high airflows, whichproduce an undesirable whiningsOllnd as air is forced through thehelmet.

Providing thermoelectric cool-ing surfaces within the helmet.

These could be operated by bat-

teries or the aircraft's electricalsystem. Weight artd cost problemshave been encol ntered.

Cooling the helmet is part of anoverall NLABS research programon human environmental protec-tion. Natick personnel are re-searching and acquiring newknowledge about fabric character-istics, the heat produced by man,and heat factors in cockpits. Thisinformation 'vill be used to de -velop clothing and equipment

items to allow more comfortableskin temperatures in both tem-perature extremes.

The Army has moved alongrapidly developing a new nylonhelmet that offers greater ballisticprotection fOf the head (see DI-GEST, May 1965). The helmetwas expected to be submitted fortype classififation about 1 July.



27/52

But the new helmet is still not

completely satisfactory. Since thestapdard visor shatters easily, anunbreakable, shatter-proof visor,made of polycarbonate, is beingdevelopeq and should be readyfpr production by the first pf theyear. The new visor withstandsblows from heel or hammer without s h t ~ e r i n gand 9ffers ' m ~ c hgreater resistance to flying projectiles.

Initially, production problemshad to be overcome to turn out avisor optically a c c e p t a b l ~to Armymedical authorities . These probleins now appear to have beensolved and 'other branches of thearmed services and N S ~ are interested in this development. Financially, the new visor ' representsa considerable saving since it isexpected to cost a b ~ > U t $1.00 ascompared to $4.00 f o ~the old one.

JULY 1965

PERSONNEL RMOR

Protecting Army Aviation personnel against s m ~ l larms fire hasbecome a 'matter of increasingconcern. W4ile NLABS h a ~beenseeking personnel aqnor protection that can be 'used as universally as possible, it ~ a s now directed special e f f o r ~ stoward armorprotection for aircrewnien n theRepublic of Vietnam.. NLABS personnel are developing individual body armor to protect H uey pilots, crewchiefs andgunners (fig. 1) against .30 caliberarmor piercing rounds ar 100yards.

Tpe chest and b a ~ kare protected by a vest, with ' the armors ~ a g g e r e din two layers ' to offsetthe s ~ a m s .The v ~ s thas a quickrelease device for fast' removal.A r m ~and l ~ g sare 'p,rotected byarticul(: .tirig arrpof: that can bes t ~ a p p e dQntp the liinbs. All together, this armor w e i g ~ s80po u 'nds. A technologist of NLABSrecently v i s i ~ e dVietnam to evaluate the aqnor o n c e p t ~ .

Several modifications of thetorso shit;ld ~ n d other body armorare being ~ r i e din efforts tp lightenit and make it more flexible. TheeI1d products ;re expected ' to bei s ~ u e das i t e ~ sof personal equipment and should be available ona ' limited basis in ;:tbout orie year.

P R CHUTES

The Airdrop ~ l g i n e e r . i n gDivision at the labs i ~ working ot anunderarm life preserver to be attached to t ~ e emergency chest orback style p a r a c h u ~ eharnesses.

Currently, vest type life preseryersare used with separate harnt;ssesthat must be worn under the para-chute harness. .

The new preserver LPU 31 P)weighs about 6 o u n c e ~and zipsonto the parachute harness (fig.2-3) .

NLABS also has come up witha hard-shell container for the 5-

foot and the 22-inch drogues onthe Martin-Baker s e a ~parachute.The container fits in the head boxof the ejection seat (fig. 4) andenables maiI1tenance personnel toremove the drogues in the container.

Currently, it is necessary to repack t h ~drogues every 90 days ator near the aircraft by removingthe plexiglass hood or by goingthrough the time cpnsuming process of taking the entire seat out.

When repacking in or near theaircraft, the drogues are subjectedto damage from oil, dirt; andsharp edges. Also, they ~ r e oftenrepacked by personnel not fullyqualified to perform m a i n ~ e n a n c eon them.

The drogue containers make itpossible to ~ e t up a ' time-savinge x c h ~ n g esystem which w ~ l lenableimmediate r e p l a c e ~ e l twith r ~ -packed droglle ' c o n t a i n e r ~ .Thedrogue c o n t a i n ~ rneeding repacking is easily removed and carriedto a suitable area where qualifiedp a c k e r ~are located.

An engineering ~ a n g eproposal(ECP) is now being processed,

and M a r t i n - ~ a k e rseats equipped

with drogHe containers shoulq 'bea v a i l a b ~ ethis month.

SURVIV L KITS

One of the most personal formsof personnel p ~ o t e c t i Q n - s u r v ikits - is developed at NLABS.Standarq Army Aviation survivalkits Hot Climate, Cold C l i m a ~ eand Overwater) w ~ r etype c l a ~ s i -f i ~ din N v e m b ~ r1962. The Mohawk Hot Weather and Overwaterkits were type classified ' in January1965 while the Col


28/52

Research in otion

Figure 1. Proposed armament for doorgunn ers crewchiefs and pilots of UH-1s.

Wheels on leg piece do not turn butfacilitate movemen t. P r otection forarms not shown

PSK-2 kit and the SEEK 1.NLABS clothing research for

Army Aviation personnel will belimited until approval of a smalldevelopment requirement (SDR)for a clothing system for ArmyAviation crew members. The SDRnow is at Combat DevelopmentsCommand headquarters, Fort Belvoir, Va. t originated at the U. S.Army Combat Developments Comm a n d A via t i on Agency, For tRucker, Ala., from a study thatrecommended both add i t ion a 1items of clothing and replacementsfor those considered unsatisfactory.

To meet an interim require-ment for a fire-resistant flight coverall, the Navy has offered their

26

khaki coveralls (fig. 5) for Armyuse. NLABS and the Combat Developments Command have determined these coveralls adequateto meet the interim requirementfor Army Aviatiol1 and will beginactions to get them type c l a s s i ~ e d

for Army ~ s e .A similar situation exists for

gloves. Until the clothing SDRresults in an Army flying glQve,Army Aviation personnel cano r d e r an Air Force glove(FSN 8415-268-8305) through normal supply channels.

A need also exists for lightweight, cold weather boots thatwill allow the Army Aviator the

feel of foot controls. NLABSresearchers are evaluating variousmaterials and insulations in hopeof coming up with a cold weatl1erboot that will serve all the Army'sneeds.

To facilitate the Army's effortsto research and develop the specialclothing and e q u ~ p m e n tneededby Army Aviators, NLABS hascompleted an anthropometric sur-

vey of Army Aviators. After a 10pe n ent sampling taken at random, it was found that the averageA r ~ yAviators are older, taller,and heavier than average AirForce or Army 'personnel (fig. 6) .

PO

Natick L a b o r a t o r i ~ sis responsible for research and developmentof POL equipment and systemsfor packaging, transferring anddispel1sing of ' POL for the fieldarmy.

In search of much lighter weightequipment to facilitate handling,improve mobility, and increaseefficiency of operation, containersmade of ul tra l i g h t w ~ i g h tfilmspave been under investigation.One such film is known as Tedlar

a rugged material extremely resistant to m o s ~corrosive materials,including petroleum products.

Using e d l ~ l rof i l thickness,a 3,000 gallon static ' containerweighing 35 ' pounds empty (including meta: h a r d ~ a r ewas developed (fig . 7). Also" a 2 milthick 1 0 0 0 ~ g a l l o nTedlar container weighing 15 p ~ U n d swas

Figure 2. ew underarm life preserverzips onto parachute harnessFigure 3. Infi.ated underarm preserver

u. S. ~ M YAVIATION DIGEST


29/52

Figure 4. Removable containers for Martin-Bake? seat parachute drogues

commercially produced. When fullthe container withstood the stressof a 200-pound man walking onit. t is conceivable that this exploratory development work willlead to a large pillow containerwhich can be delivered to forwardareas in a suitcase.

L i g h t w e i g h t p o l y u r e t h a n ecoated nylon also is being exploredfor self-supporting bulk fuel pillow container applications. Containers using this material will bemuch lighter than the currentlystandard rubber constructions, butprobably about twice the weightof the film containers.

IRMOBILE REFUELINGSYSTEM

In 1962, Army Tactical Mobil

ity Requirements Board (HowzeBoard studies evaluated the concept of converting Army aircraftinto airmobile filling stations. Theimprovised equipment used toprove concept feasibility was tooheavy and of inadequate capacity.However an improved interimairmobile refueling system consisting of a dispensing unit andtwo 5 ~ g a l l o nrubber drums was

JULY 1965

purchased for use in Vietnam.Ten were sent to Vietnam inMarch 1963 and five more weredelivered in September 1963.

Because of the severe weightlimitations in aircraft operations,a qualitative materiel requirement approved in October 1964specifies a 100 gpm system whichwill have 5 perc ent equipmentweight and 95 percent fuel weightto make up 100 percent of ratedaircraft load. In response to thisrequirement, a new and far reaching design has been produced andth e prototype is being assembled

Figure 5. Navy khaki coveralls proposedfor rmy use

Figure 6. nthropometric survey of rmy viators

Army AviatorsAir Force Series*Army Series**

Age

30.2527.924.3

Height (in)

69.569.168.5

* 4,000 officer and enlisted personnel**25,000 officer and enlisted personnel

Weight Ib)

165.8163.7154.8

The fact that the Army fliers were found to be older, taller, andheavier was not surprising. The other two sample groups includedyoung enlisted men which lowered the averages.

27


30/52

Research in Motion

for evaluation (fig. 8 . Prototypesshould be ready now, and typeclassification is scheduled for thefourth quarter of FY 1966.

In addition to converting Armyaircraft into airmobile filling stations, this unit may also be usedto extend the range of the aircraft.The system includes ultra-lightweight (80 lbs) 500-gallon containers, 2Y2-inch lightweight hose

approx imate ly one-tenth theweight of standard hose), andlightweight dispensing units. Onedrive system is an electric drivenunit using a high speed lightweight motor and vane type pumpwhich weighs less than 30 lbs.This unit may provide only 300hours of maintenance-free pumping, but replacement units couldbe readily available at the base.An al terna te approach is a pressure bottle system for quietly dispensing fuel with no need forexternal power source. This pressure system has the advantage ofpushing fuel in high temperatureswhere conventional pumps en

counter vapor problems.

FIN L FILTER

New concepts to provide forfinal filtering of aircraft fuel arebeing explored. In all new andproposed dispensing units of theairmobile refueling system, planscall for the use of nonvented containers to minimize the introduction of dirt and water. Therefore,if only clean fuel is introduced tothis system, gross contaminationwill not be encountered and a

lightweight device such as the

igure 7. ightweight air transportable PO container

fuse-type, go-no-go gaugeeffectively used to act asfilter , preventing passageand water.

can be

a finalof dirt

Go-no-go gauges have been successfully employed with units inVietnam and with the h AirAssault Division. Additional engineering and service tests are nowunderway. This gauge is a mechanical unit that actually filters outdirt and reacts to water by swelling to preclude passage of both. Itis

alimited

capacity filter/separator that weighs approximatelyone-tenth as much as conventionalstandard filter/separators.

The Totamitor is a more sophisticated type of fuel stream monitorwhich continuously measures thecontamination level of fuel beingprocessed. It is being tested forpossible use at the fuel systemsupply point to make sure thefilter/separators are workingproperly.

Only items associated withArmy Aviation were discussed inthis article. Actually the NLABStechnical program covers almostevery conceivable field. Unitsfaced with almost any problem

what to wear, meteorology, geography, pest control, etc.) benefitfrom research conducted at thelabs.

28 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


31/52

A tactical GCA landing technique used by a unit insupport of RVN operations begins with a pilot s

cryptic message

RECEIVED A letter a coupleweeks ago from a fellow avia

tor stationed in the beautiful cityof Hue, Republic of Vietnam. Hetold me about construction toimprove Hue Citadel Airstrip andthe implementation of a regular,full-scale flight following service.

JULY 1965

out f thevalley t :40

Captain Thomas O Kuypers

I knew, nostalgically, that the endof an era in flight operations hadbeen reached in what we referredto as the big north country ofthe Republic.

But to the men who have flownin the area north of Danang andsou th of the DMZ, one of the

treacherous mountain and weathersections of Vietnam, there's a story ,to be told. Although much deserved attention has been givento the H ueys in the del ta area, oneCaribou , one Otter, a slickshipHuey, and two O-IF Bird Dogscarried the burden of Army Avia-

9


32/52

tion support north of Hai VonPass for the 1st Vietnamese ArmyDivision until recently. The twoBird Dogs, one section of the 73dAviation Company stationed atHue, represented the only completely integrated Army Aviationsupport for 1st Division.

We aviators were proud of thatdistinction, and were proud to benicknamed the mountain menand the last remnants of theLafayette Escadrille. Those little0-1 Fs did everything. They airevacuated wounded Vietnamesesoldiers; they were used continuously for artillery adjustment withVietnamese observers; and oneen t e rp r i s ing lieutenant even

30

strapped a couple of pigs to theairplane's bomb shackles to deliveremergency foodstuffs to a SpecialForces outpost located at Tabat.

Radar coverage stopped northof Hai Von Pass. The tall, ruggedrange of mountains, which startsat the edge of the South ChinaSea and continues inland, cuts offHue from the rest of the country.Navigational aids, with the exception of an erratic nondirectional beacon at Hue Phu BaiAirport which left the air promptly at 1600 every day, stopped northof the pass and north of thatpass was concentrated the worstweather (annual rainfall at Huewas 128 inches) and terrain.

Yet the two Bird Dogs consistentlyaveraged 80 to 90 hours flight timeeach per month, even through themonsoons, without modern navaids and without airport facilities.

1 280-foot long airstrip accommodatedOt t e r , C -47s and Ca r ibou for r es uppl ymissions

The puppet emperor, Bao Dai,huilt the airstrip now known asHue Citadel for his private use.He built it in the center of the oldwalled city surrounded by a moatwhose waters were covered withfragrant water lilies. Into thisstrip moved the officers and 'menof the 73d. Once the cattle,chicken, and pigs were herded offthe airfield, it was found to be1,280 feet long with a 520-footoverrun on the northwest end.Marine helicopters from Danang,the Otter and Caribou, and thepilots of Air America's C-47s usedthe airstrip. In fact, the little fieldaveraged 40 combat support sorties per day.

I 'll never forget the air controller, tower operator, and flightfollowing service-a Specialist-4, aVRC-IO FM radio, and a canvascovered % -ton truck which servedas the flight operations building.

During monsoons the krachen,a local weather phenomena, wouldcreep into the mountain valleysand along the seacoast, makingflight operations difficult at best.The stuff lay down like a blanketfor days at a time. We'd hopefullylook to the sky each morning foreven the slightest indication oflifting. Finally when it lifted towhat we thought was at least 500feet, the word was go.

Into the planes we'd go, climbup through the krachen, breakout on top, and fly time, distanceand heading to the Ashau Valleywhere most of the operationsagainst the Viet Cong were takingplace in the 1st's area. After flying240 for 20 minutes we'd startlooking for holes in the cloud layer, and upon spotting one, getunderneath into the valley, proceeding into one of the strips located at Ashau, Tabat, or A'Loui.

Capt K uypers is assigned to the1st Aviation Battalion} 1st Infan-try Division} Fort Riley} Kan



33/52

The ird Dog mission includedreconnaissa71ce surveillanceresupply; artillery adjustment

At anyone of these strips onany given day, the Bird Dogswould accomplish r e c o n n i s s n ~ eand surveillance along the Laotianand North Vietnam borders, resupply, aerial escort, and artilleryadjustment missions. All day we'dfly up and down the valley, overto the Laotian border, or up tothe DMZ: Then along toward sunset the real story of flight operations and flight following wouldbegin. '

The last observation missionwould usua l ly be comple tedaround 1730. By this time the entire Ashau Valley would be covered by clouds which also obscuredthe tops of surrounding mountainpeaks. The light O-IFwould climbou t from a n y o n e of the threevalley strips and head for the center of the valley near Tabat. Here

the encircling climbup throughthe clouds would begIn.

U pan reaching 7,000 feet,enough altitude to clear all peaksin the area, a call was transmittedto the radio operator at Hue:"Hue Citadel, this is Backspin 92,out of t h ~valley at :40, taking llP060 heading to Hue. Listen forme." Sometimes "in the soup,"sometimes "VFR on top," the

JULY 1965

aviator would take up the 060

heading to Hue and again fly forapproximately 20 minutes.

At Hue, flight operations wentinto motion. The radio operatorcarefully noted the time given bythe aviator when he started out ofthe Ashau Valley, and radioed:" Roger, 92, be advised Hue iscarrying 500 to 700 overcast; windnorthwest, estimated 3 to 5 knots."

As the plane continues its flight,strange things begin to happen atthe Hue airstrip. With microphone in hand, the radio operatorgets out of his v ~ h i c l eloo}< s skyward, and listens. Two other sec-tion' , aviators stop what they'redoing, head for the middle of thestrip, and listen. The little Vietnamese Air Force mechanic stopshis work, runs over to the runway,and l i s tens . The Vietn4mese

guards look lIP to the sky, andthey too listen .Quiet prevails at Hue Citadel as

all listen for the plane from AshauValley. At :57 a distant h lm of anaircraft engine is heard. "92,you're getting closer - keep oncoming - doing fine - you're veering a bit south, try 050 - soundinggood - a bit closer - there -there, you're right over Citadel -

92, you're right over us - bring'er on down '" .

"Roger, Citadel, 92 starting descent."

At 500 fpm and on a heading of045, the aviator in the Bird pogbegins his descent-down throughthe "krachen" -down through thesoup-out over the coastal p la inwithout navaids.

To those oil the ground, thiswas t h ~ longest wait of all. Although each of us had gonethrough this procedure before, al~ h o u g hwe all knew this makeshiftIFR approach scheme worked, italways seemed like a page out ofthe past whenever we accomplished it. Each of us kept his eyeson the sky toward the drone of~ h elittle plane.

A few minutes later came thewelcome call: "Citadel, this is 92,

breaking out at 600-have Hue insight-be landing on 31."The Specialist-4 put another

mark on his board entitled "Number of 'GCA' Approaches." TheVietnamese guards chattered excitedly in the backgrounq. Thetwo aviators looked at ep,ch other,and the t a l l e ~one said, "Remindme to set up the Scotch. Tha twas his fifth eCA " ~

31


34/52

ACCI17EN f R A i E

~ ~ . . : . . . . . .

Frozzleforth stepped from the colonel soffice with an armload of publicationsincluding fresh orders appointing himto the position of aviation safety officer

32 U S RMY AVIATION DIGEST


35/52

ierce Wiggin

C OLONEL SHOtJTWELL Blout was not notedfor long periods of silence. His voice, a matingof bu z z saw a rid jackhammer, could be heard in thefar corners of headquarters during an ordinaryconversation. When he became slightly irked, itreadied across the parade ground, ~ n when he wasriled the whole l post knew it. For those blessed with

some degreeof

deafness,the

state of histemper

could be quickly ,an d _accurately r ead through vari-ous shades of red in his neck arid ears, from low-keyed pink through ripe tomato.

On a ,morning in late May , headquarters wasunusually qui e t. Mrs. Blout had fed her husbandhis favorite breakfast and he arrived in his office inr are good Humor. A cup of bllck coffee steamed onhis desk. Colonel Blout tossed his cap onto a tablebeside the door, crossed the rbom, and sat down.He lifted the cup, sipped, and began to read themorning mail.

Like a crash of thunder, the roaring voice shat-

tered the silence and rattled the windows, ' ' jamison ' 'Capt a in Roland Jamison rose vertically from his

seat in the administration office. Arms flailing, heautorotated downward, bounced from the chair,recovered, raced through the hall into the colonel'soffice, skidded to a halt before the desk, and snappedto attention . "S's's'sir?"

"What in the name of all that's holy are theytrying to do to me?"

"Beg pardon, sir?"The colonel shook the papers in his hand and

JULY 1965

slammed them on the desk. JamIson watched hisears change from deep red to mottled purple. .

"Didn't you see these orders assigning Capt Hora-tio Frozzleforth here?"

"Yes, sir. You know Captain Frozzleforth, sir?""Know him? Everybody in the Army knows him

He's clobbered enough aircr a ft to equip a battalionHe's been thrown out of three Army areas Hislast CO had to invent new numbers to fill out hisefficiency report Know him?" Colonel Bloutgripped his chair arms. His next words werechoked and pleading. "Jamison, what am goingto do with him?"

1s it too late to get the orders changed, sir?""Much too late. These orders were written months

ago. They were onv ni ntly held up in channels.He's due today " ,

"Why not make him aviation safety officer, sir?""Make him WHAT? Have you lost your cotton

picking mind?"

"He'd be right under your thumb, sir, and he didgo through the safety course at USC, even thoughthe dean refused to graduate him. It's in his 201file. Something about buzzing the campus, drivingin restricted areas, and bringing coeds to class.Several instructors resigned while he was there."

"And you'd have me make im our aviation safe-ty officer?"

"Like said, sir, it's the best spot for you to keephim under close control. And who knows? Makinghim a member of your staff and giving him some

33


36/52

responsibility may he just what he needs. t wouldlook real good if you could get a satisfactory per-formance from him after so many other commandershave faiied."

The colonel nodded slowly. "You might be right,but I 'll have to give this some thought. Send in hisfile and bring hini to me as soon as he arrives."

Captain Horatio Frozzleforth, bronzed from 10weeks in the California sun and resplendent inClass A uniform, stepped from the colonel's pfficewith an armload of publications, in luding freshorders appointing him to the position of aviationsafety officer. He w i n k ~at the WAC stenographer,donned his cap at a rakish angle and strolled out tothe red convertible parked before a yellow fire plug:

"Nice of the old boy t layout the welcome matso soon. Bit gruff and some of the things he saidwere a little uncouth, but you can tell right off herecognizes quality. With the world's greatest aviatorfor ASO, his safety problems are over. Wouldn'tsurprise me if he started talking promotion afterI've put a few of my ideas to work Wonderwhy his ears are purpie?" Frozzleforth continuedmusing to qiII'l:self as he drove away. He flipped onthe wiridshield wipers arid kept them going untilthe pink slip under the left wiper dislodged anddrifted away.

After lunch, Frozzleforth changed to fatigues anddrove to the airfield. His left arm sported a yellowbrassard with black ASO letters. He parked theconvertible, stepped out, and walked into the opera-tions shack. The sergeant behind the counter laida magazine aside and stood.

"Afternoon, Sergeant. r Captain Frozzleforth,the new aviation safety officer. Any complaints here?"

"Lieutenant Gordon complained about the treeson the approach end of 36 when he landed at noon.Said he aimost burned his brakes out gettingstopped."

"Hmmm," Frozzleforth raised his clipboard andjotted a note. "Probably needs brushing up on hisshort field work. I'll see to it. Anything else?"

"The emergency generator for the tower andrunway lights is out."

"Have you called the engineers?""Yes, sir. They said it would probably be to-

morrow before they could get to it.""I see. I t sounds as though I 'd better start with an

airfield survey. Get me a jeep and driver please.""Yes, sir." The sergeant walked to an open win-

dow behind his desk and leaned out. "Hey, Mac,bring your jeep around front "

"Oh, Sergeant. I need some night time to make

34

my minimums. See if you can schedule me a V 8 for1800 hours, will you?"

"Sir, we only have one V-8 and that's reservedfor staff flights."

"Quite all right, Sergeant. I 'm a member of thestaff and I 'm sure the colonel will be glad for me

to log a few hours in it. You might give LieutenantGordon a call and ask if he'd like to go along. Icould give him a few pointers on shortfield landings."

{In a U-8) at night} sir?""Tut, tut, Sergeant. Nothing to it for a highly

experienced IP. You're welcome to go along and seefor yourself if you're off duty."

"N thank you, sir "Frozzleforth turned away and strode out to the

waiting jeep. He muttered to himself, "What's thisArmy coming to? No spirit of adventure You'dthink he'd jump at the chance to fly with me "

"Beg pardon, sir?" asked the jeep driver."N othing, driver. Take me around the perimeter.

We're going over this airfield with a fine toothedcomb I can see it's time someone shaped things uparound here "

True to his word, Frozzleforth spent the entireafternoon inspecting the ramps, runways, taxiways,overruns, approach obstacles, and sod areas. Hefilled several pages with terse comments about hisobservations. "Just wait until I get these typed up


37/52

and drop them on the old boy's desk in the morn-ing. He'll soon find he has a real pro on the jobl"

Frozzleforth wheeled his car into the operationsparking lot promptly at 1800 hours. He stepped out,glanced up at the darkening sky, and paced intothe building. "Evening, Sergeant. The U-8 readyfor me?"

"It's ready, sir. Do you think we should give thecolonel a call, just to make sure he doesn't wantto use it?"

"No need to disturb him. We'll be in the localarea if he wants it. Is the lieutenant here?"

"Yes, sir." The sergeant nodded toward the youngaviator at the counter. "Captain Frozzleforth, Lieutenant Gordon."

"How do, Lieutenant. Suppose you nip out andrun through the preflight while I file our clearance."

"Captain, I 'm not U-8 qualified.""Quite all right, Lieutenant. Just get the crew

chief to show you around. I 'd like to get in the airas soon as possible.""Yes, sirl"Frozzleforth watched the young officer hurry out,

then turned and started filling out a local clearanceform. "What's the weather, Sergeant?"

"Ceiling's 5,000 overcast, sir, visibility 1 miles,wind south at 8 knots. It's going to he a dark night,sir."

"Good Nothing like a dark night to test yourmettle I could never understand why so manypeople prefer to fly in field grade weather. TakesaU the sport out of it "

"Yes, sir. Are you really going to practice short-field landings?"

"Absolutelyl Couldn't pick a better time for it.""Good luck, sir ""Not luck, Sergeant. With skill like mine, the

luck is taken out of flying "Frozzleforth signed the clearance and walked ou t

to where the lieutenant and crewchief waited beside the U-8D. "Preflight all done, Lieutenant?"

"Yes, sir. Wouldn' t you like to go over it again?""That won't be necessary. I 'm sure you and the

crewchief covered everything. Let's get aboardl"The young aviator followed Frozzleforth up the

wing and into the cockpit. As they strapped them-selves in, he asked, "Would you like for me to read

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