Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1976

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USAARLSCI SUPPORT CENTERPOBOX 62 577

fORT RUCKER AL 36362 577

UNITE ST TES RMY

VI TION


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UNITED RMY VI TION.., 1GESJ

MG James C. SmithCOMMANDER

U S ARMY AVIATION CENTERA major activity of theS Army Training and Doctrine Command

COL Norman W. PaulsonCOMMANDER

S ARMY AGENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETYA major activity of theInspector General and Auditor Generalof the U S ArmyRichard K. Tierney

EDITORU S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

ABOUT THE COVERThe stylized representation ofthe 1778 flag I a timely dealgn theme in keeell)g with thespirit of our natlonY bicentennial ,ear

JULY 1976 VOLUME 22 NUMBEAnnual Writing AwardsTraining Points The Way, LTG Robert M. Shoemaker Guatemala, 210th Aviation Battalion Comes ThrougAgain In Disaster Relief, CW2 Larry R Santure Operation Wagonmaster MAJ Terry N Rosser The Army Aviation Story, Part XI: The Mid-1960s,

MAJ David H. Price Soviet Air Transportation-Projection Of Power,

CPT Terry L. Schott Views From Readers USAASO Sez A New Member Of The Team, LTC Robert F Forsyth Serious Shortcomings MAJ William C. Childree Who Killed George?, Ted Kontos To Your Health , Ted Kontos Hyperventilation - Causes and Cures,

LTC David H. Karney, MD Joint Technical Coordinating Group On AircraftSurvivability MAJ William A Allen Safety Versus Manhood Chaytor D Mason Briefs That TeachPearlHail And Farewell

Th. mission of the u.s. RMY VI TION IGEST I. to proyi . . information of an op.rator functional nature conc.rning saf.ty an aircraft accl .nt pr.y.ntlon. training, maint.nop.rations, r rch and . . .y . lopm.nt, ayiation m 'icin. and oth.r r . la t .. data.Th. IGEST is an oHicial D.partm.nt of the Army p.riadlcal publish . . monthly undsup.rvi.ion of the Commanding Gen.ral, U.S. Army AYlation C.nt.r . View. expr.H' hor. not n.ce arily thoae of the D.partment of the Army or the U.S. Army Aviation CPhotoa or. U.S. Army unl.aa oth.rwls. apeclfi.d. Material may be r.print . . provld .. crgiv.n to the DIGar and to the author, unl a oth.rwls. Indicat ...Articl.a, photo., and it.ms of Int.re.t on Army ayiation or. Invlt ... Direct communicatauthoriz. to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Di,e , Fort Ruck.r, AL 36362.Thl. publication has b n approved by The Adiutant General, Headquart., . , Departmthe Army, 23 Dec.mber 197$, in OC.co ,'lce with AR 3101.Actly. Army units rec.iv. distributionv ...er the pinpoint dlatrlbutlon .y . tem as outlinAR 3101. Compl.t. DA Form 125 unci .end directly to CDR AG Publications C.nt.r, 2800. rn loul.yard, laltlmore, MD 2122Q. or any chang. in distribution relJulreme ... Inltr .yi . . . DA Form 125.National Guard and Army R v. units und.r pinpoint di.trlbutlori also .hould .ubmForm 125. Oth.r Nationa' Guard unit. ahourd submit requ.sts through th.ir atat. adjgen.ral.Tho.. nat .Iigible for official dl.tribution or who . . . . r . p.nanal copi of the IGlord.r the magazine from the Sup.rint.ndent of Docum.nts, U.S. Gav.rnm.nt Printing OWaahington. D.C. 20402. Annual .ub.crlption rate. are $15.70 dom lc and $19.65 ov.


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LT RObert L Gand raham

LT Ray M Franklin -ov Oct

Jul Joseph P. CribbinsIf It Ain't Broke-Don't Fix It

Aug MAJ Curtis J. HerrickA 100 Kilometer NightAir Assault Raid~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - /Sep MAJ Jon R. Mills

Air Assault UpdateCPT Paul D. Carmichael

Tactical InstrumentsCW2 David M. Battle

Navigate, CommunicateDecCW2 David R. Heaton

Soviet Night Operations

Mar

Feb LTC Robert L Grahamand LTC Ray M. Franklin

MOBAGarvin L. HolmanAre You NOE And Lost

Apr CW2 Thomas K. EquelsSFTS: The Shape Of

Things To ComeMay No Contest Conducted(Issue devoted to

UTTAS and AAH coverage)LTC Richard E. Roach

In Extremis

OU COULD BE a winner if you submit anarticle to the AVIATION DIGEST S sixteenth

annual writing contest beginning this month.ach monthly winner will receive a certificate.Cash awards will not be made this year.

A person who does not place first will receivecertificate signifying that he or she has had an

published in the DIGEST. All authorseceive credit in their 201 or appropriate civilianersonnel filesThree annual winners will be selected from theonthly first place winners. First second and

place certificates will be awarded these

ULY 1976

NNU LWRITING

W RDSWInners.

To be eligible for publication in the DIGEST,an article must be original and concern Armyaviation or related subjects Winning articlesare selected by judges who review the manu-scripts without bylines. Selection is based onaccuracy completeness originality readibilitysoundness substance and overall merit.

Authors should include pictures diagrams orcharts available or necessary to illustrate manu-scripts. Your articles should be submitted toEditor U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST P.O.Drawer P Fort Rucker AL 36 362 - . - :


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Trainingoints The ay

Lieutenant General Robert M Shoemaker

T HIS BICENTENNIAL yearis an exciting time to be inthe Army. In fact these times areparticularly exciting times for theaviator. While the whole Army isstimulated by the experience ofrethinking its post-Vietnam role,doctine, organizations, equipmentand training methods, the aviator 'spart of this process is as controver-sial and perhaps less understoodthan any other.As we think about the role ofArmy aviat ion in modernmechanized combat from our baseof experience gained in theRepublic of Vietnam, a host of im-portant questions arise. Ratherthan listing a series of detailedquestions , let us note that the an-cient issues of survivability, 24-hourall weather capability, and costeffectiveness compared with surfacesystems still drive the aviationdebate. My purpose is not to arguewhether we should have more orless aviation, or whether our air-craft should be kept simple or mademore capable (hence more complexand costly), or to show how ourdoctrine or organizations should berefined. My aim is simply to pointout that good t r ~ n i n g on a dailybasis is the best thing we can do toensure that the Army comes upwith the right answers to those keyquestions.Aviation elements, like the rest ofthe Army, must train to beat ourpotential enemies on the kind of2

Commander Corps and Fort Hoodbattlefield over which we are likelyto have to fight. While we still havemuch to learn about the threat , itseems clear that our flight tacticsmust achieve two conditions. First,when closer than 3 kilometers toenemy air defense guns or missiles ,our aircraft should never be ex-posed to them for more than about30 seconds . Second , at rangesgreater than 3 kilometers, our air-craft must avoid giving away thelocation of any friendly unit orfacility which could become thetarget of indirect or aerial fire. Thiscan be done by flying in optical andradar defilade , or by avoidingpatterns of flight which wouldreveal to enemy radar the locationof helicopter landings. Of coursesuppression by friendly smoke orfire is an important tactic whichcan make temporary but very Im-por tan t changes to enemycapabili ties.All aviation tactical trammgshould be designed to develop andhone the tactics and procedures topermit continuous and routineachievement of the two conditionsjust described. Much more is in-volved than individual and crewtraining. All Army commanders ofArmor, Infantry, Artillery, Avia-tion or other supporting units mustunderstand, believe and train theirunits in these conditions for sur-vivable aircraft operations.Whatever task we want undertakenby aviation must be possible

without the aircraft beingdestroyed and without pinpointingfriendly units for attack by enemyfire.These following are a few ex-

amples of the kinds of aviationtraining about which we must beserious:

d jus tmen t of ar t i l le ryfire- This is where Army aviationbegan. Today s aerial observer willsurvive only if he habitually trainsin and perfects the hide and pop-up technique . That is , the LOH(light observation helicopter ) willremain in defilade and quickly popup to an altitude of 50 feet or moretimed to coincide with the burst ofthe round. After observation of theburst , the helicopter will drop backinto defilade, move several hundredmeters and prepare to pop up for asubsequent look. The observer'stransmissions and calculations areperformed while the LOH is mov-ing back to or into a hidden posi-tion . This should be the standardand usually the only acceptableway to use the LOH for artilleryobservation. Is your di visIon rtillerytrained

On the modern battlefield, divi-sion and brigade commanders oftenwill find the helicopter affords thebest means to get around to visittheir subordinates; to view thebattlefield; and from which to com-municate. When using thehelicopter as an OP (observationpost) the observation technique will

u .S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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be similar to the pop-ups of the arWhen visiting subunits, the helicopter must

enemy radar or optical obserat the point of landing.of division aviation comand brigade flight sections

know the areas where enemyground observers might

e emplaced, and fly in theshadows. They must beto fly down creek beds to get tobattalion CP (command post

being seen. The commandmust behave like a scoutmoving around the forwardareas. Commanders must

stay oriented and be trainedspecify altitudes as well as

track when directing theirAre your command flight sectionsyour commanders

The tactics for air cavalry and at helicopters seem to be well unMuch good training is

The new gunneryset forth in TC 17-17 aregiant step forward. But much

be done. Commanderstank and mechanized infantry

should know how to use

1976

an attack helicopter platoon withfull effectiveness. They should practice often in order to develop theteamwork necessary to integrateground observers and aerial scoutswith tanks; ground TOW; andCobra TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked , wire-guided missiles . These are complex mattersthe military art today demands ofits leaders a much higher levelof skill th a n in the past. Practice through realistic training isthe only way to get there . Do yourarmored and mechanized battalions trainregularly with attack helicopters

A major challenge of moderncombat will be keeping surfaceroutes open. We know that bridgeswill be blown, roads jammed withcivilians, vehicles and routes will beblocked by craters, dead vehiclesand debris. We can expect greaternot lesser, demands on our mediumand heavy lift helicopters to movecritical supplies and replacementequipment. The Chinook bringinga resupply of TOW missiles to aunit at the critical area, or bringingammunition up for the artillerybattalion whose trucks ca n t get

through, must f y tactically in theforward area just as do scout andcommand helicopters . Chinookcrews must learn to fly withtheir sling loads just clearing surface obstacles by a few meters-butnever , never permitting their loadsto collide with trees or wires . Whenin the division area, they must learnto f y along stream lines and drawsto stay hidden from enemy radar oroptics. Because of the need to staylow, there will be some critical missions in which internal loads onlycan be used. Crews and commanders must be trained to quicklyanalyze the tradeoffs to decidewhether internal or sling loadsshould be used. Are your comman ders logistlcal staffs and CH-47 crews train edand practiced in this vital business

Somewhat more than half thetime the battlefield is going to bedarkened or obscured to somedegree by night or adverse weatherBut the war will go on. Army aviation units of all types have to trainunder these conditions so thataviators and their commanders willknow what they can do and also

Continued on p ge 7


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Guatemala 210th Aviation BattalionComes Through AgainIn Disaster ReliefCW Larry R Santure

114th Aviation Company, 210th Aviation BattalionFort Clayton , Canal ZoneROVIDING RESPONSIVE airlift support fordisaster relief assistance to Latin American

countries is a pr imary mission of the 210th Av iationBat t alion, the aviation element of th e 193rd InfantryBrigade (Cana l Zone). J ust 16 mo nt hs after providingsuch support to Honduras fo llowing the disast rousH urricane Fifi , the battalion again received thecall- this time to assist in one of the worst natural disasters in Latin American history.Before dawn on 4 February 1976, a violent earthquake measuring 7.5 on the R ichter scale and lastingabout 34 seconds rocked Guatemala, spreading deathand destruction virtually across the entire country .Secondary tremors and earthquakes of varyingma gnitudes continued to add to the devastationthroughout February . All told, the disaster left 22,832dead , 77,060 injured and some 1,200,000 homeless .Within hours after the first earthquake , the ba tta lion was alerted to prepare for dep loyment of aircraft to Guatema la. On the afternoon of 5 February, aU-21 aircraft from the 210th s 352nd Aviation Detachment departed the Canal Zo ne an d arrived inGuatemala that evening. For the next two days t heU-21 sup ported th e U.S. Southern Command s sevenman Disaster Ass ist ance Survey T eam (DAST) with

Looks of despair as parents accompany injured young sonto a hospital aboard a 114th helicopter. Right, SP5 JohnCoffee ho lds an injured baby girl s hand and strokes herhair aboard a Huey enroute to the 97th Field Hospital

aircraft reconnaissance which revealed widespreadestruc tion to the road and br idge networks an d surounding villages . The DAST quickl y determined thahel icopte rs coul d provide the on ly means of gettinsupport into the d isaster area. The 210 th was thetasked to provide the necessary support which was tinclude performing da mage assessment , resupp lymedical evacuation and medical team transportatiomI Ions.O n 8 February, two UH-1H H uey helicopters fromthe batta lion s 1 14th Aviat ion Company werdeployed to G uatem ala. Even after th e 10-ho ur l ighfrom the Ca nal Zone, the day was not over for thcrewmembers. Re lief supp lies, docto rs nu rses anhu ndreds of vo lunteer workers cri t ica lly needed in t hstricken villages were bui lding up at th e GuatemalCity airport . T he p ilots began disaster relief supporimme diate ly transporting 2,500 po un ds of cargocompleting 9 medical evacuation missions a nd movi n


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Above example of widespread destruction to roadand bridge networks. Above right members of the114th and a WAC medic of the support ing Chinookunit from Ft Hood transfer a victim from theCH 47 to a Huey enroute to a hospital. Right local volunteers help UH-1 H crewchief load vitalfood supplies enroute to survivors in outlying areas

13 relief workers to the disaster area before darkness.The next day four more Hueys and an OH-S8Kiowa arri ved from the Canal Zone to assist in reconnaissa nce missions. Altogether the 114th committed10 Hueys to the enormous task that lay ahead.Initially, La Aurora Airport in G uatemala City wasused as the staging area for flights to the devastatedareas . T he air traffic using the single ru nway at the

airport made it an extremely conjested area. F lyingnto G uatemala City from the devastated cou ntrysiderequ ired a minimum of one hour tur naround flyingtime. Upon reaching the airport the aircraft were reuired to make an extended traffic pattern and thenand , shut down an d refuel.

CH -47 Ch inook helicopters from the 6th CavalryBr igade Air Combat), Fort Hood, TX, provided aethod of operat ion t hat greatly increased efficiencyd safety procedures. A rapid refuel ing point was set

up near the center of t he d isaster area . T he Chi nooksd SOO-ga llon co llaps ible fuel drums to a hardrface road within 10 mil es of Chima ltenango, one ofhardest hit villages. T his site a lso was withinof the 47th U.S . Army Field Hospitalbrought in from Fort Sill, OK, in a massive a irl ift byU.S. Air Force C 1 41 Starlifters an d a C -SA Galaxy) .site became a major distribution point for supplies and personnel coming out of Guatemala City.

With this ra p id refueling point, the time onstationor th e aircraft increased from 90 m inutes to approximately 2 Y hours. The CH-47s carrying theirarge ca rgo were ab le to set up other distributionpoints near other vi llages damaged by the earthquake.. Tak ing a dvantage of the new dist ribution points,he 11 4t h aircrews developed an operation plan thatncreased the efficiency and speed of the relief effort.ULY 1976

The plan , which ca lled for each aircraft to be assigneda specific work area each day, had several advantages.t decreased the amount of flying time wasted on

overlapping missions; enab led pi lots to becomefa miliar with a particular area of operation ; a llowedre li ef supervisory personnel in that area to better coordinate miss ions; and provided invaluab le informationas to damage, casualties, food and water needs in thatarea.

San Martin, a village where more than 2,000 werereportedly killed , was the site of a major distributionand collection center. CW2 Wayne Mi lbauer , a pilotin the 114th who had logged in excess of 60 hours insupport of that area , said It was incredible. I ha ve neverseen such destru ction , even in Vietnam. Wh erever we landed,people cam e running up to the helicopt er hey were alwaysorderly but we could tell they were hungry or looking Jor water.It was pretty disheartening becaus e we were primarily lookingfor casualties tho se f irst few days. Later when we were able toly in the supplies, the smiles we received we re enough rew ard tokeep us going forever

ontinued on p ge 2

S


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The people of the United States still have a common goalwith the founding fathers; to hold out the hand of friend-ship and assistance t our fellowman

N TH WAKE of the disastrous Guatamalan earthquake

on 4 February 1976, as reported byCW2 Larry Santure in his articleon page 4 the 6th Cav was alertedto lend assistance to the people ofGuatemala .

The D Company (Wagon-

masters) of the 34t h Support Batta lion, 6th Cavalry Brigade AirCombat), th e CH-47 Chinookhelicopter unit in support of Ft.Hood , TX , and the unit whose personnel constituted more than halfof the total contingent, immediatelybegan putting the finishing touches

OP RATIONWAGONMASTER

on their preparation to depart forGuatemala.At six minutes after nine on 7February , slightl y more than 7hours after official notification, a

Continued on page

Major Terry N Rosser


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longwith . . . . dMlrUollonmud . . . . . . high wlndl dU8t.ncIn . . . . . . . . . . . tMoperation dlfllcult In 1t probleme M heIIoom .ged to bring In auppl . . nd equipment to help


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In recognition of the Bicentennial, the IGEST is publishing three new chapters of The Army Aviation Story.This is the second of these articles. The first was TheArmy Aviation Story, Part X The Early 1960s, whichappeared last month. Part XII will appear in August

Grhe Jlrmy Aviation St )ryGPart XI

Grhe GMid-196 sMajor David H. Price

B y EARLY 1965 the Army of the Republic ofVietnam (ARVN) was being beaten on thebatt lefield. More American assistance was needed tostave off defeat pecifica lly ground combat troops.Inte ll igence reports held that the Vietcong and theirNorth Vietnamese allies would attempt to cut theRepub lic of Vietnam in two at its narrow waist in thecentra l highlands. f airmobility enthusiasts wereright , could not this threat be thwarted by a fast moving, ha rd-hitting force?

In March 1965 the decision was made to send theth Air Assault Division (T) into combat under thecolors of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The

advance party of t he F irst Team arrived at An Khein the central highlands of Vietnam in August 1965 .By November 1965 the 1st Cav was locked in heavycombat in the central highlands southwest of Pleikunear the Cambodian border at a place called the Ia8

Drang Valley . The enemy was aggressive, deter-mined , di sciplined and fought fanatically for 35 days.Many of their I.D. cards had been issued in Hano i.

Ia Drang was a dramatic victory for the FirstTeam. During the battle, the division 's aircraft ha u led 5,048 tons of cargo to the troops in the field ; in ad-dition, 8,216 tons were transported from seacoastdepots to tactical resupply points, all by the d ivision'sorganic a ircraft. Whole infanfry and artillery bat-talions were lifted by helicopter into, around and outof the battle area . About 2,700 refugees were flown byhe licopter to safety. With all this , only 59 aircraft werehit by ground fire and only four were shot down .Ge neral Wi ll iam C. Westmoreland, then com-manding all U.S. forces in Vietnam , had this to sayabout the victory at Ia Drang : The ability of theAmericans to meet and defeat the best troops theenemy could put on the field of battle was once moredemonstrated beyond any possible doubt , as was thevalidity of the Army's airmob ile concept.At this point in The Army Aviation Story it is ap propriate to temporari ly depart from thechronologica l approach to d iscuss the general natureof the airmobile concept and to glance at the evolutionof the armed or attack helicopter because without thehelicopter gunship, the airmobile concept cou ld nothave progressed as it did.

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heNature ofAirmobility Think about the termorganic aviation. n World War II aerial artillerydjustment was performed by observation squadrons

at the corps level. n other words the airlanes were commanded and controlled at least threeof command higher than the firing battery.observation squadrons were organic to the

but not to the firing battery. Lieutenant GeneralW.G. Rich director of the 11 th Air Assault Divitests 2 articulated the concept of increasinglyand effective airmobile support in the

statement:I wish to distinguish between three fundamental levels of airmobility. irst an aviation unit can be given to a combat forceon a temporary basis for a specific operation . This is equivalentto a corps truck company attached to a division for a one-timemove. Such an operation involves two separate staffs workingout detailed plans to integrate the SOPs and techniqyes of twoseparately trained organizations. The second level is representedby the organic aviation in an Infantry Division. This approachbenefits from unity of command, day-to-day training anc intangibles such as esprit. But it is limited to a company liftcapability; it does not permit replacement of ground vehicles byaircraft; its equipment is not tailored to aircraft capabilities;and it could never represent the primary thrust of the division.

l the third level a much greater gain is possible when theorganization is specifically trained and equipped to exploit thecontinuing close tactical integration of heliborne lift as a

primary means of maneuver accompanied by readily availableaerial fires and by highly responsive aerial reconnaissance andsupport systems. In my opinion the combat power offered atthese three levels rises on a geometric rather than an arithmeticscale and only at the third level do we find a new potential inthe tempo of operations in range over extended distances and infreedom from heretofore formidable terrain obstacles.

General Rich makes the point that only at the thirdlevel does the potential for drastically changing thetempo of operations lie. Effective support, indeedsometimes the most cost-effective aviation support,

can be rendered under conditions properly describedas first or second level. Such was the case in Vietnamwith the 1st Aviation Brigade to which nondivisional Army aviation was assigned.At its peak during the Vietnam years the 1st Aviation Brigade3 comprised the largest single Army aviation command in the world. The philosophy of support begun in the early years of the Vietnam conflictcontinued under the Brigade. For example in theBrigade's 164th Combat Aviation Group, whichoperated in the Mekong Delta, each of the three a viation battalion commanders went daily to the AR VNdivision headquarters that they supported in order toensure that the thrust of their effort was


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forward-toward the Infantryman who relied on thehelicopter for support. This same philosophy of support permeated the 1st Aviation Brigade, whethersupport was being rendered to U.S., ARVN or alliedtroops.

The Brigade was effective. Lieutenant GeneralJohnJ Tolson I I I recounts its accomplishments duringcalendar year 1967:

[The 1st Aviation Brigade] airlifted more than 5 milliontroops-the equivalent of 313 Infantry divisions Brigade aircraft flew more than 1.2 million hours, the equivalent of 137years. The Brigade was credited with killing 10,556 Vietcong,sinking nearly 10,000 supply sampans and destroying more than10,400 enemy structures and fortifications.

General Creighton Abrams, as commander of U.S.Forces in Vietnam, paid the highest tribute to the 1stAviation Brigade on behalf of the ground combatSoldiers:t has always been interesting to me to note that the aviators andmen of this Brigade have been taken into the brotherhood of the

combat arms. Not by regulation, not by politics, but they havebeen voted in by the Infantry the charter members of thatsecluded club, the combat arms .General Rich's third level of airmobility has beenbest exemplified in the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and in the 101st Airborne Division (AirAssault). General Tolson, a former commander of the1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam, offers this astuteobservation on the advantages of the airmobiledivision:

1

The tactical advantages of the airmobile division can besummed up as follows : increased efficiency due to the repeatedassociation of units ; thorough integration of its assets because ofclose association and command relationships; and the ability totake a different conceptual approach because of its assuredassets. The impact of organizational and commandrelationships has a direct and distinct impact on the quality ofsupport. There is no denying that general support units rarelytend to identify closely with the supported unit , at least not asclosely as organic units. This is a simple truism of humannature.

The epitome of superior airmobile tactics, as contrastedwith good , is the capability to exploit not only an opportunitybut the trends and changing patterns in enemy activity. Thisrequires a flexibility which is much more difficult to initiate andaccomplish when non-divisional units are involved. This is particularly true of air cavalry. More than any other unit, the aircavalry development in Vietnam has proven the need for quickreaction to meet the demands of the situation as seen by thecommander on the scene. Adaptation to a change in environment is more feasible and more likely when the unit is organic.

The airmobile division commander is able to plan a completecampaign based on airmobility as opposed to a campaignwhich, as an incidental element, employs airmobile assets insome of its battle plans. As a coro llary, I know of no other majororganization besides the airmobi le division [in wnich] the commander is willing to consistent ly commit all his forces on a day-

to-day basis; that is , not keep the traditional reserve. The airmobile division commander knows that he can extract a reserveout of is deployed units as needed because he has the assets andthe training to do so. This is a major economy of force .

By changing our perspective from that of the division commander to the individual Soldier, we can perceive one of theoften forgotten advantages of airmobility. t is ironic to me, afterthe millions spent to reduce a few pounds from the Infantryman's rifle, that many Soldiers would end up carrying asmuch (or more) total weight as the doughboy of World War I ASoldier, when he exits a helicopter, becomes the Army s mostimportant extension of the airmobile concept; and his individualload should consist of the bare essentials needed for the next fewhours-basically ammunition and water. To avoid the classicSoldier s syndrome of holding onto everything he owns, the 1st

Prior to the arrival o the UTT lift helicopters were escortedby 8 26 and T 28 aircraft

Cavalry Division developed a technique for keeping all the personal equipment of the individual in squad bundles that wereconsistently delivered when needed. This was a tremendousboost to morale as well as a very real increase in effectiveness.However, this seemingly simple technique has to be relearnedseveral times in every campaign.When the terrain and circumstances permit, armor and airmobility complement each other in a natural way to form an un

beatable team. Airmobility gives the commander uniquecapabilities in reconnaissance , maneuver and logistics while thearmor gives the shock and firepower which have characterized itin the past. Air cavalry and airmob ile infantry can find and fixthe enemy so that armored and mechanized forces can bebrought in at the decisive moment to finish him.

he Armed Helicopter: The development of thearmed or attack helicopter was essential to thegrowth, and indeed the survival, of the airmobile concept. 4 The U.S. Army Aviation School at Ft. Rucker,AL, had sponsored several basic tests of varioushelicopter and weapon mixes in the 1950s and in theearly 1960s conducted a regular course for selectedstudent aviators. The Tactics or Tiger Course as



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it was called, included both what was known of aerialgunnery at that time and nap-of-the-earth flying. TheTactics Course was begun in 1962 and furnishedmany of the first trained armed helicopter aviators inVietnam. Though the Tactics Course was deletedfrom the curriculum in 1964, the trend toward thewidespread Army use of armed helicopters continuedits enthusiastic growth in the combat zone.The Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company (UTT) fielded some 20 armed UH-1 Hueys inVietnam combat in 1962. The weapons used weretwin .30 caliber ground-type machineguns and 2.75inch rockets. They were attached to the aircraft bymakeshift, locally fabricated mounts.

The UTT mission was to provide armed escort tothe unprotected columns of lift helicopters whichcarried the Infantry into battle . Suppressive fire wasdelivered on enemy targets during the flight to thelanding zone and during landing. The rules of engagement varied from time to time with changes in ARVNleadership. At first, armed helicopter crews could notfire unless fired upon. But, as the war wore on, therules of engagement were relaxed.

Prior to the arrival of the UTT, lift helicopters wereescorted by B-26 and T-28 aircraft. After the armedhelicopters assumed the escort role, the number of lifthelicopters hit by ground fire dropped drastically.Soon each separate lift company had 7 to 10 armedHueys organic, to provide its own escort and suppressive fire support.

Armed helicopter teams could linger in the battlearea after the lift ships had departed the landing zone.Because they flew so low and slow, with four pairs ofeyes in each aircraft, the armed helicopter crewmensoon became noted for their ability to spot and kill theenemy quickly and efficiently. ARVN commandersand their U.S. advisors began to use the gunships inplace of artillery. The role of over-the-shoulderaerial fire support of ground units developed almostovernight. Often the Infantry did not detect the enemyuntil the distances between the two were 10 or 20meters (sometimes less). The advisor would hesitateto call artillery or fighter-bombers for fear of hittinghis own men. The armed helicopters were able toplace deadly fires on the enemy even though he wasvery close to friendly troops. Therefore, the helicoptergunship filled the gap between the infantry unit andthe other traditional forms of fire support. Aerial firesupport from armed helicopters soon became a vitalpart of every ground commander's operationalschemes.

The armed UH-1 was slow and its ammumtlOncapacity was limited. Also, if the armed Huey left thelift formation to suppress ground fire enroute to thelanding zone, it could never catch up in order to be inposition to support the critical landing phase. A

JULY 1976

The AH-1G HueyCobra is a faster more maneuverablegun platform than the UH-1faster , more maneuverable gun platform was required. That turned out to be the AH-1 G HueyCobraattack helicopter.

The Cobra proved its worth time and again, fromits introduction in 1967 to the end of the U.S. presencein Vietnam. It was fast and deadly, and in addition tomachineguns and rockets, the Cobra could launch avariety of 20 and 40 mm ordnance with devastatingaccuracy . During LAMSON 719, the incursion intoLaos in 1971, the Cobra proved it could survive in ahigh threat antiaircraft environment. Not only could itsurvive, it could kill tanks. The implications of the at tack helicopter for future battlefields, in a Europeanenvironment for example, were indeed thoughtprovoking.

Next Month: Part XII The Late 196 5

For Additional Information See Previous Issues OfThe DIGEST1 1 st Cav Div (Airmobile), August 1965, InsideBack Cover; Over The Beach , April 1 966, page 18;Airmobile Firepower-Hallmark Of The 1st Cavalry

Division, March 1967, page 19; Ride A Slick Ship, June 1966, page 23; and Highway Mission-Airmobile Style, November 1968, page 22 The Army Aviation Story, Part X, June 1976,page 43 Hawk Colors Flying At Fort Rucker, May 1973,Inside Back Cover.4 We Armed The Helicopter, June 1971, page 2 andThe Armed Helicopter Story Parts I through VI,

July through December 1971.11


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ovietAir ransportation

12

Proiectionf Poweraptain Terry L Schott

Evaluation and Test DirectorateU.S. Army Logistics CenterFort Lee VAT HE ABILITY OF a militarilypowerful nation to exert itsinfluence abroad depends in partupon its capability to deploy troopsand equipment The most rapidmeans for this deployment is bystrategic aircraft. The Soviet Union

maintains an extensive inventory ofthe materiel required for thisstrategic aerial delivery.

Russia was one of the firstnations to recognize the importanceof air transportation A quick lookat a map and a history book willLeft, paratroopers descending stabilized. The three stagepersonnel chute consists of the stabilizing chute; maincanopy cover (sleeve); and the main canopy. Below, air-dropping Soviet paratroopers during a major exercise.

; .. .- . . .: .......~ . t ~ . - :fl.'.- -

. ': ...... ,- ....U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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show why. A trip to the map showsa country which covers a vastterritory, much of which is notreadily accessible by land or water.The history book reminds us that atthe beginning of the 20th centurythe means of communication inRussia were in a primitive state.The development of telecommunication and road and railnetworks posed extreme problemsfor Russian planners. The airplanewas seen as one means of overcoming these formidable problems.Nevertheless the Soviets havedeveloped a very extensive andmodern rail network on which theynow depend for long distancemoves within Eurasia.Despi te the early interest in aircraft, the onset of World War IIfound the Soviet Union without aviable air delivery capability .Throughout the war the Sovietsgreatly admired the air transportation capabilities of the Americansand the British. Following the warthe Soviets used the wartime experience and information gleanedfrom lend-lease aircraft to makegreat strides toward creating astrong air arm for their forces . Thenation s industry concentratedheavily on the development andproduction of fighter aircraft.

1976

The death of Joseph Stalin andthe close of the Korean War introduced a new era in the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics USSR .One result of this period was thedevelopment of aircraft for civilaviation and military logistics. During the late 1950s the Westernworld was surprised on numerousoccasions by the rapid advancement of Soviet air transportation.

While Aeroflot , the Sovietnational civil airline may be theworld s largest airline, VT A (SovietMilitary Air Transportation) evenwith its reserve augmentation fromAeroflot does not have more airliftassets than the USAF, active andreserve plus its augmentation underthe Civil Reserve Air FleetCRAF). Certainly the number ofaircraft alone is not a good measureof capability; a weighted index considering payload and range is moremeaningful. In this regard the U.S.

military airlift capability clearly exceeds that of the Soviets.In recent years the VTA hasclearly demonstrated its ability to

support the global policies of theSoviet government. Air transportation was a vital element in the 1968invasion of Czechoslovakia. tfigured significantly in the supportgIven to the Arab countries, par-

Soviet IL-76 Candid recently entered service. The turbojet is similar to our C-141 Starlifter. Belowheavy cargo landing with three 20-meter diameter chutes clustered.Air bags cushion ground impact

:> P ' . ' ~ ~ - ' ~ ) f W.*.: , . ... ' . , M . t ~ '

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Light airborne assault gun ASU-57 is driven onto platformfor transport by AN-12 Cub. The turboprop is the backboneof the VTA fleet. Below the ASU-57 is derigged after airdrop

Features f Heavy rop Platform

ROT TlNG CROSSB ROUTRIGGER SI

Platform outriggers helpprevent toppling of thecargo. Airdrop photo onnext page more clearlyshows arms extended

ticularly during the 1967 and 1973Mideast Wars. It should be notedthat all Soviet Union military aviation assets are invested in the VTAand that the Soviet army itself hasno air transportation nor combacapability.

The backbone of the VTA fleet sthe AN-12 Cub which was introduced in 1959. The Cub with itsfour turboprop engines s capableof transporting more than 44 000pounds of cargo. t has a range o2100 miles and a cruising speed o360 miles per hour ; however withmaximum payload the range sconsiderably less than cited. Forheavy transport the Soviets relyupon their AN-22 Cock which wasintroduced in 1967. With a cargocapacity that exceeds 176 000pounds this aircraft s second insize only to the U.S. giant C-5A.Maximum fuel gives the AN-22 arange of 6 800 miles but as with theCub range s far less carrying themaximum load . The four tur-boprop engines of the AN -22 allowa cruising speed of nearly 400 milesper hour .

Not all developments have beenmade with turboprop engines. TheIL-76 Candid which s just enteringservice s a turbojet which s verysimilar to the U.S. C-141 Starlifter.The Candid with a cruising speedof 560 miles per hour s easilyadaptable to the performance of amilitary role.A consideration that deservesmention s that the Soviets do nothave an inflight refueling capability. As a result they are dependenton enroute refueling bases andover-flight agreements with othernations for intercontinental moves.Only the Candid s a true global liftaircraft and though the Sovietspossess a formidable and increasingairlift capability the U.S . remainsnumber one in strategic airlift andthe capability to project power bythat mode.

The preferred method for usingthese aircraft to transport goods isby airlanding. This method re-



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less preparation of cargo forand achieves the

minimizing damagethe cargo. This method of

permits the aircraft toused during its return flight.

Equipment to be air transportedprepared for transportation andprior to loading.lists are used to achieveefficiency in this opera

arethe cargo compartment

their own power. Other equipis loaded with the aid of an

or if the weight isthan one ton, it may be loadedAfter all of the

is loaded, it is secured inin accordance with diagramspecifications. Upon arrivalits destination cargo is unloaded

the airlifted unit when possible,by aircraft crews when

f airlanding is impractical or imcargo may be airdropped.Soviet Union has developed anairdrop capability. Dur

the last 10 years, the Sovietsintroduced numerous air con

platforms and parachutes.Not all cargo to be dropped fromaircraft requires a parachute.been no particular

at the developmentcontainers there areof an inflatable rubber con

used to drop waterwithout breakage from an

of 3 000 feet. Paperspheres and other types

of inflatable containers also havebeen the subject of limited experimentation.

The standard method of airdropping continues to be with the use ofparachutes. All cargo to be airdropped is marked to facilitatepackaging and loading as well asidentification at the drop zone.Packages are color coded or stenciled according to content and thecenter of gravity is clearly marked.f the material is in a closed container, the type of supply also isnoted. Fuel is identified by its typegasoline, diesel, alcohol, etc.) and

ammunition is identified by typeand caliber.

The Soviets employ a wide variety of systems for airdropping cargo.There are, for example, at least 5light cargo drop systems known tobe in use. The P-8S is designed todeliver engineer equipment. Thiscontainer has a load capacity ofabout 1,600 pounds. The P-8S,with dimensions of 8 by 2 feet,would be for loads such as severalboxes of high explosives. Theweight of the container includingits two parachutes is about 900pounds.

The PDBB-120 is one of thesystems used for the delivery of liquids. This all metal container isdivided into three sections. The topcarries the parachute the center isa tank for up to 32 gallons of liquid,and the bottom is the shock absorption cushion. The PDMM-44 is anonrigid container used primarilyto deliver equipment such as small

GAZ-69 truck descending with two 20-meter diameterchutes clustered. Below the AN-22 Cock cargo capacityin excess o 176 000 pounds is second only to the

giant U S C-SA

arms ammumtlOn rations ormedical supplies. The containerwhich can accommodate loadsweighing up to 220 pounds consists of a soft, heavy canvas sackand rigging plates. The sack iscomprised of a parachute section, acargo chamber and a section forshock absorption. The cargo itselfis afforded extra protection by theuse of packing material whichranges from hay and rags to pineneedles. The container itself weighsless than 50 pounds.

One of the most common light tomedium weight cargo systems isthe PGS-SOO. This platform


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The PGS 500 medium weightcargo system has skid platesseparated by three layers of4 lnch high honeycomb blocksemploys skidboards separated bythree layers of 4-inch high paperhoneycomb blocks. This platformcan be used to drop loads of up to1 000 pounds. The PGS-500 is particularly useful in that it can bedropped from as high as 26 000 feetat an aircraft speed of 250 miles perhour and still provide full securityfor its load.

The heavy equipment platformsdemonstrate the highest degree oftechnology. The Soviets use metalload-bearing platforms. That is, theparachute is attached to the platform not to the cargo. The plat-

GAZ 668 truck ready for air-craft loading. The platforms aresimple but rugged n designas s most Soviet equipment

form is fitted with inflatable airbags to cushion the landing. Sincethe uninflated bags do not touchthe ground during the loading sequence vehicles can be drivendirectly onto the platform. Thiseliminates the requirement for acrane to lift the vehicle onto theplatform. These airbags do tend todecrease stability of the load at thetime of impact. In order to overcome this shortcoming antitoppling arms or outriggers areplaced at each corner of the platform.As most Soviet equipment theplatforms are simple and rugged indesign. The heavy-drop platformsare fitted with removable swivelingwheels at the rear and center of theplatform. A unique feature.is themounting of additional largerwheels at the rear of the platform to .facilitate movement of the unloadedplatform in the rigging area and the

movement of loaded cargo to theaircraft. Derigging of equipmenthas also been simplified. TheSoviets claim to be able to derig ajeep type vehicle in 3 to 5 minutes .A final significant factor in theairdropping of cargo is deliveringthe loads on target. Drop zones areselected with great care. Consideration is given to the type of aircraftmaking the delivery the method ofdischarge airspeed of the aircraftand load and speed and directionof ground winds. An ideal dropzone for cargo would measure approximately 4 000 by 7 000 feet. Inorder to reduce deviation fromtarget aircraft electronics normallyused for night and adverse weatheroperations are used routinely. As afinal precaution cargo may be fittedwith a light beacon to assistlocating a load when it is off target.

The Soviet Union maintains alarge and sophisticated militaryforce. The ability to quickly movemen and materiel to distant parts ofthe world is a means of projectingthe might of this force. Airtransportation is the key to thisglobal power.

The U.S. Army Logistics CenterFort Lee VA is constantlyevaluating the logistics capabilitiesof other nations. In looking at theseareas to include the aerial deliverysystems we hope to better prepareour own combat combat supportand . combat service supportorganizations for the u t u r ~


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- -

raining Points TheWay

From the base of experience gained in Vietnam above) aviation unitsmust train to win as part o the combined arms team on modern battlefieldsthey cannot do under these to learn flying habits that would be redirected, killed or augmented.

There is no suicidal on a modern battlefield? But unless the Army demands andfor training at night. Historically, the central thrust of becomes accustomed to serious,is as true for aviation units as aviation training directives and dedicated and innovative trainingor all other Army units. The con- regulations has been directed at the of aviation units on a day-to-dayfidence of aircrews builds rapidly individual training of pilots. We basis, we are not likely to get op-s they learn what they can do un- must reorient standardization timum decisions on aviation

er the widely varying light con- training, regulations, the annual matters. There are many senior of-itions caused by different moon written examination, and our in- ficers of the Army whose image ofthe year and strument training to point clearly aviation results from their observa-conditions. Aircrews must toward the proper final objec- tion over the years of aviators doingall the standard ways tive-the development of aviation administrative flying with train-

augment operations during units trained to win as part of the ing programs designed to meet an-visibility, i.e., flares, combined arms team on modern nual minimums and passage of the

and with viewing battlefields. annual writ. Flight detachmentevices. And they must continue to There are today, and I suppose aviators are a small and importantto find better ways to always will be, a bewildering ar- group of specialists, but they are faruse or combine current devices to ray of decisions which must be from the mainstream. We mustnight operations. The key made concerning aviation materiel focus our energy on winning the

oint is that we must train at night developments, aviation organiza- battle, not on administrative travel.now with what we have and not wait tions and the basic question of Training points the way. Notor gadgets which may never come. how much aviation is enough only for current readiness but tore you happy with your night training and what tradeoffs must the provide a foundation upon which to

We must rid ourselves of the idea Army make to get there. Bil- make program decisions forthere is such a thing as ad- lions of dollars worth of aviation tomorrow . This bicentennialflying for our tactical programs are at stake. These year in fact this bicentennialunits. How can we permit programs will be frequently re- day-is a good day to start theviators to spend costly flying hours viewed properly so) and affirmed, buck up.

1976 7


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J WSROE DERS

Sir:Your series of articles on tactical instrument flying has helped point out the importance of an effective airspace control systemand the requirement for all concerned to understand how this system can support Armyaviation operations. As a result ofTAC/TRADOC Airspace Managementagreements, provisions now exist for the establishment of an airspace control system.

What is an airspace control system, howdoes it work, and how can it contribute tothe effective employment of Army aviation?First it is ajoint Army-Air Force system thatcan be implemented OW using currentlyauthorized personnel and equipment. t includes Army and Air Force activities andprocedures necessary for coordinating andintegrating airspace requirements. On theArmy side, the airspace control system includes airspace management elements(AME) , flight coordination centers/flightoperations centers (FCC/FOC), Army airfield terminal control facilities , and Armyair defense -command posts (AADCP) . Atmaneuver brigade/battalion levels the unitcommander becomes a part of the airspacecontrol system because aviation and otherairspace activities are coordinated at theselevels at the personal direction of the commander. To be effective the a irspace controlsystem is under a single authority, the AirForce Component Commander, and mustbe responsive to the needs of all airspaceusers.

Th e flight assistance available to Armyaviation through the airspace control systemwill vary from the advisory-only aspects of amonitoring service to one of positive controlin a radar environment. Terrain flying hasalmost eliminated the FCC capability toprovide flight following service to aircraftoperating in forward areas. Also, becausethe FOC and FCC do not currently haveradar, their capability to provide assistanceduring IMC is limited. An interim solutionfor the FCC is to use the direct supportHawk battalion radar capabilities to provideradar service to Army aircraft on a standbybasis. (There is a common misconception

8

that this service is available only on anemergen y basis.) Other sources of flightassistance available to the Army aviator arethe Air Force faciliti es that serve as part ofthe airspace control system. The Air Forcecontrol and reporting center (CRC) , control and reporting posts (CRP), and forwardair control posts (FACP ) provide air trafficcontrol with a radar capability. The Armyaviator must know how to take ad vantage ofthese facilities.

Th e March 1976 article on instrument flying, Air Traffic Management and TacticalInstruments , did not clearly depict the airspace control system and its capability tosupport Army aviation.Using the same missions stated in that ar -ticle, let 's take another look at examplesand 2 and fly them in an area using an integrated airspace control system . Example 3remains as flown since one condition is thatradio contact cannot be established with anystations other than the FARRP and theaviation unit.EXAMPLEYou must fly a utility helicopter from thecorps rear area to a forward brigade location. You plan the flight using the unit SOPas a checklist. Your route of flight andaltitudes are selected after considering suchfactors as the mission requirements, terrain ,weather, tactical situation (includes thethreat), and the current status and locationsof air traffic control facilities andnavigational aids . Your planning is notlimited to only Army operated air trafficcontrol facilities and navigational aids, butincludes all available facilities that can sup-port your flight. Your request for IFRclearance is relayed from your unitoperations to the airfield terminal control. Itis then relayed through the appropriateATC facility , usually the FOC for Armyrequests , to the clearance authority which isthe airspace management center located atthe Air Force CR C . The flight clearance isreceived and you depart the basefield.

Enroute, your flight is initially monitoredby the CRC and is under positive radar control. As you progress forward it is necessary

to transition to a lower flight altitude inord er to avoid enemy air defense detectionand destruction. Your flight is handed overfrom CRC to a n air traffic controller at aF ACP. The FAC P , an extension of theCRC, continues to provide you with positiveradar control at your lower altitude.As you progress forward and your altitudeis reduced to avoid enemy detection , radarcontact at the FACP is lost and you are toldto contact the division FCC. The FCC ,collocated at the direct support Hawk bat-talion operations center, has received information concerning your flight from theFOC. You contact the FCC and are toldth at radar contact has been made by one ofthe Hawk battery 's continuous wave acquisition radar scans. The FCC also gi vesyour pr es ent location , as determined by theHawk radar contact , and provides other information concerning weather, air warningsand status of navigational aids. The FCCalso provides radar vectoring using theHawk radar .

Contact with the FCC is lost. Severalminutes later you establish contact with anelement of the forward brigade. You requestand obtain weather conditions in the areaand direct that the N AVAID there be turn-ed on .After tracking inbound and arriving at thebrigade location, you initiate the preplannedapproach to the portable nondirectionalbeacon (NDB). During descent to theminimum descent altitude (MDA), youbreak out of the low clouds and visuall ymake the landing. You request the brigadeS3 air notify the airspace management element at the division main CP that yourflight has been completed.EXAMPLE 2You are the pilot of an observationhelicopter assigned to an air cavalry troopoperati ng near the forward edge of the battlearea (FEBA) . You have been directed to flythe a ircraft from your locat ion to the corpsrear to a support maintenance facility.By conducting a thorough map reconnaissance you select the route and determinethe minimum enroute altitude . Contact with



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the FCC cannot be made prior to takeoff butcommunications with the forward supportedbrigade confirm the location and operationof an enroute navigational beacon at thebrigade aviation section location. The nightroute is modified to use this beacon.You request the forward supported brigadeS3 air relay your intended route of flight,altitudes and estimated departure time tothe division airspace management element(DAME). The DAME receives this information and coordinates it with other knownaviation and air defense activities that mayconflict with your night. The DAME alsorelays your fl ight plan information to thedivision FCC who in turn notifies the FOC.The FOC, collocated with the CRC,coodinates your proposed flight with the airspace management center (AMC). TheAMC alerts the appropriate FACP toprovide ATC service when radar contact isestablished . Meanwhile, the division FCC,collocated with the direct support Hawkbattalion operations center, coodinates yourplanned flight with the radar consoleoperator in the AN/TSQ-38 fire distributionvan. Remember, your flight has not yetdeparted, however, due to an effective, integrated airspace control system, you haveall of the available ATC facilities ready tosupport your flight.

Your night progresses as follows. You execute an instrument takeoff and fly at yourplanned min imum safe altitudes andheadings. Your altitude is such that allattempts to establish contact with groundstations are unsuccessful. As you proceedfarther toward the rear area, a higheraltitude is continally selected to widen thesafety margin above the terrain.

Contact is established with the divisionFCC and through Hawk radar contact youare given your location and provided radarvectoring to an NDB located in the divisionrear. Later you are able to receive the NDBand begin tracking inbound. The FCC alsoprovides your IFR clearance as relayed fromthe CRC through the FCC. As your flightprogresses you are handed over from theFCC to the FACP. Radar vectoring isprovided to your destination. At the termination airfield, a GCA may be initiated ifvisual conditions are not encountered.

The airspace control system discussedabove has been tested during joint trainingexercises and has proven to be a workablesystem. f you are interested in learningmore about this system and what it can dofor you, get a copy of the soon-to-be published FM 100-42/AFM 2/XX, US Army/USAir Force Airspace Management In AnArea of Operations .

COL Griffin N. DodgeDepartment of StrategyCommand and General Staff CollegeCo-Chairman TAC/TRADOC JointAirspace Management Working

Group

1976

Sir :Frequently inquiries are made to theReserve Components Liaison Officer and

the Adjutant General (AG) Ho lding Custodian, U. S. Army Aviation Center(USAA VNC) at Ft. Rucket, AL , for copiesof aviator original rating orders. The mostfrequent requests come from com'11anders ofreserve component aviation units.

Many former active Army aviators wish tojoin either National Guard or Army Reserveaviation units. During inprocessing of theseindividuals, an administrative requirementof the Flight Evaluation Board is to reviewthe flight records of the aviators. One of themore important documents is the originalaviator rating order.

When separated from the Army , the individual's military personnel record (201file) is forwarded to the U. S. Army ReserveComponents Personnel and AdministrationCenter (USARCPAC) at St. Louis, MO ,where it remains until requested by the individual s new military unit. Because manyindividuals do not keep extra personalcopies of documents such as their aviatororiginal rating orders, it is necessary for theindividual's new military unit to try tosecure copies of the order from USAAVNC.

Commanders in the field cannot be expected to be knowledgeable of the AGrecords holding policies and procedures atUSAAVNC and USARCPAC. As a consequence considerable time is lost andresearching efforts are duplicated becauseinquiries are made with insufficientbackground information or the inquiry ismade to the wrong records holding agency .

Information required to initiate search tolocate an aviator's original rating orders includes: Special Order number, issuingheadquarters and date issued. This information may be found in the individual 's old DAForm 66 (b lock 15) or DA Form 66B (block45). A portion of this information may befound in the individual's DA Form 2-1(block 13 - Pilot Ratings) . Without accurate

information , th e records custodian must intensively research his files to locate thedesired orders.

The USAAVNC Records Holding arearetains these Special Orders for 3 full yearsafter the cutoff date , which is always 31December of the year in which the order waspu b l ished. Example: SO 100 , H QUSAA VNS, dated 21 September 1968. ThisSO remained in the active functional files inSAAV C AG academic records until 31December 1968. I t was then transferred toUSAAVNC AG Records Holding area for 3full years. This SO, a long with all other1968 SOs , was shipped to the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) , MilitaryRecords Section on 31 J anuary 1972. Theserecords were then retired indefinitel y in theNPRC Records Holding area.

To obtain copies of aviator original ratingorders issued by the Adjutant General,USAA VNC , after 31 December 1969, address inquiries to:National Personnel Records Center111 Winnebago StreetSt. Louis, MO 63118To obtain copies of aviator original ratingorders issued prior to 1 January 1970, address inquiries to:CommanderU S. Army Reserve ComponentsPersonnel and Administration CenterATTN : AGUZ-ED-SS9700 Page BoulevardSt. Louis, MO 63132To expedite the location of desired Special

Orders requested of USARCPAC , aviationcommanders should submit informationshown in the box below for the year the orderwas issued. Complete shipping records aremaintained for each year to include date ofshipment , shipment number , bill of ladingnumber, number of containers shipped andcontents within each container.I believe this information will be welcomed by the thousands of aviators andnumerous aviation commanders who will inthe future want to obtain the original aviatorrating orders.

LTC Richard W. LewisReserve Component Liaison OfficerU.S. Army Aviation CenterFt. Rucker, AL 36362INFORMATION FOR USARCPAC REFERENCE AVIATION ORDERS

Spec Orders Date Box TotalShipped By Shipped No. of Boxes Accession No.1964 USAAVNC 18Jan68 60f7 68-A-13331965 USAAVNC 18Jul69 20f4 69-A-1251966 USAAVNC 28Jan 70 30f6 70-A-10591967 USAAVNC 18Mar71 2 thru 4 of12 71-A-12161968 USAAVNC 31Jan72 14 thru 16 of 16 72-A-6711969 USAAVNC, 1 Feb 73 9 thru 10 of22 73-A-557

Jan-Oct1969 AG,Nov-Dec 1 Feb 73 2 thru 70f22 73-A-5571970 AG 31Jan 74 10 thru 25 of 28 SL74-A-8101971 USAAVNC 31Jan 75 2 thru 1 7 of 38 SL75-A-8951972 USAAVNC 22Jan 76 3 thru 19 of 19 3.38-76A-0215

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USAASO Sez: : : i ; : : r : : r : I : r ~ r : : : r : : : = : : i Z ~ Z : : : : : r

20

The New ATC Equipment Course s Tops

ANOTHER PLUS for the Army Air Traffic Control (ATC) field was scored recentlywhen the Army Communications Command ACC) requested activation of an Air Traffic Control Equipment Maintenance Course. The 8-week repair course is being taughtat the U.S. Army Signal School, Fort Gordon, GA, and is geared to accept military occupational specialty (MOS) 35L20 and MOS 26D20. Completion of the course leads to the awardof an additional skill identifier 2B4, identifying trained personnel as ATC MaintenanceSpecialists.The Signal School has put together a meaningful course and filled a void that has existedin the ATC field for many years. The course offers training on communications andmeteorological console AN/FSW-8; communications radios AN /GRR-21 and -22 and AN/GRT-23 and -24; dictaphone recorders; and nondirectional beacons. In addition interfaceof these systems in a control tower configuration is taught. Future expansion of the course, toinclude training on the terminal VHF omnidirectional range (TVOR) navigationalsystem and instrument landing system ILS), is planned. Further expansion is planned asnew ATC equipment enters the Army inventory.Upon completion of training, graduates will be assigned to one of many Army airfieldsoperated and maintained by ACC with the responsibility of providing maintenancesupport for ATC equipment located at the airfield. A high degree of professionalism is re quired and is reflected in the way the course is presented.

Personnel interested in attending the ATC maintenance course should contact their unittraining officer. Unit training officers can request a quota from CDRUSACC, ATTN:CC-PA-PT, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613, or can contact Mrs. Burcham in the Office of theAssistant Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration, Fort Huachuca, AZ,AUTOVON 879-6647/6640.

Prerequisites for the course are that an individual possess either MOS 26D or 35L, have aminimum education level score of 90, and have 9 months retainability upon completionof the course . Units requesting quotas must provide TDY and travel funds.

S ANDARDIZATION Cornerno longer will appear inthe VI TION DIGEST. Insteadthis feature will be publishedmonthly as part of U.S. ArmyAgency for Aviation Safety'sFLIGHTFAX, under the title ofSTACOM (StandardizationCommunication). The Deputyfor Standardization, as proponent for STACOM, is anxious tohear from Army aviatorsworldwide and pledges to re spond to flight standardizationquestions within 24 hours ofreceipt. Readers are encouragedto use the 24-hour flight stand-

ardization information centernumber (AUTOVON 558-3504,commercial (205) 255-3504) orto communicate by letter ifmore appropriate. Address yourquestions or requests for training assistance visits to Deputy

for Standardization, U.S. ArmyAviation Center, Fort Rucker,AL 36362.In the ne r fu ture theDIGEST plans to reinstate itsInstrument Corner featurewhich was so popular in themagazine a few years ago. Alsothe DIGEST is considering starting a checklist corner. Yourcomments concerning publication of instrument and checklistcorners would be appreciated.Send them to Editor, U SARMY AVIATION DIGESTP.O. Drawer P, Fort Rucker, AL36362.



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GuatemalaContinued rom page

With aircrews logging eight or nine hours daily during the relief operation, it became obvious thatmaintenance help would be needed. Aircraftmaintenance had been provided by maintenance personnel of the 114th Aviation Company. On 12February, they were joined by a 15-man maintenanceteam from the battalion s 590th Maintenance Company (Aircraft), which was airlifted in from the CanalZone on an Air .Force C-131 Hercules. Sustainedmaintenance was performed around-the-clock andwith the use of the disciplined running periodic inspection concept, six complete inspections were performed without the loss of aircraft mission time duringdaylight hours. Additionally, an engine change wasperformed at a field site approximately 20 nauticalmiles west of Guatemala City.

An efficient flow of aircraft parts and specializedmaintenance personnel was made possible throughdaily U-21 flights between the Canal Zone andGuatemala. Such liaison flights contributedsignificantly to the sustained performance in the disaster area .

The 210th s involvement in relief operations beganto wind down on 16 February when the first two of theMaintenance was an essential part of therelief effort. Two men from the 590th Main-tenance Company Install a new main rotorsystem on a Huey

Towns and villages in the countryside suffered the worstIn this village more than 2 000 residents died

Men form a chain to offload food and medicineat Chimaltenango one of the most severly hit villages

Hueys returned to the Canal Zone. After 1 Marchonly two Hueys remained in Guatemala. They supported the 548th Engineer Battalion from Fort Bragg,NC, which had been called in to help reopen the important highway between Guatemala City and theAtlantic coast, a vital element of Guatemala srecovery from the earthquake.

During the hectic period of 5 to 29 February, thebattalion s aircraft flew 833 hours completing 2,041sorties; carried 246,662 pounds of re lief cargo ;transported more than 4,200 passengers and performed 750 medical evacuations .Even though the 210th Aviation Battalion haddeployed one-third of its total aircraft resources and109 personnel to Guatemala, it still was able to carry-out its mission of supporting the 193rd InfantryBrigade back in the Canal Zone. Indeed February wasa long, tiring month for the men of the 21 Oth, but alsorewarding ; for the collective professionalism and esprit de corps of the Army aviators had once againbeen put to test.

21


24/52

OPER TIONGONM STER

Continued from pageflight of six CH-47s, four primaryand two standbys , and a total of 45personnel departed Ft. Hood. Atthat time these people did notrealize the magnitude of the earthquake destruction; the fact thatmore than 700 tons of vitally needed food , water and life supportingsupplies would be delivered toGuatemala; and how warm andfriendly the Guatemalan peopleare. All of these factors soonbecame realities.

Intermediate stops were made atKelly Air Force Base, TX, for anin te rna t iona l briefing; atBrownsville , TX, await ingdiplomatic clearance for entry intoMexico; and refueling stops weremade at Tampico , Veracruz, Ixtepec and Tapachula, Mexico.

When the sun had set inGuatemala on 9 February, fourhinooks had ar r ived in

Guatemala City and preparationhad begun to support this disasterstruck country. Within minutescoordination was being effectedwith the appropriate U.S. militarygroup personnel at the DisasterOperations Center. After missionanalysis it was determined that themajority of the cargo would betransported using the more rapidand economical external cargo netmethod. The first day s activitieswere quickly outlined and anticipated by all. By the end of theirfirst day of operation, the four incountry helicopters had carriedmore than 70 tons of corn, beansand other vitally needed supplies tothe hardest struck regions of thecountryside. Meanwhile, the second flight of four CH-47s arrivedat Guatemala City - again atsunset.

The total Corps and Ft. Hoodcontingent, now incountry andeager to assist, included eightChinooks and crews from the 34th22

Support Battalion; selected communications personnel from the16th Signal Battalion; parachuteriggers from Headquarters andHe adquarters Comp a ny , U.S.Army Garrison at Ft. Hood;medica l specialists out of the 507thand th Medical Companies; plusrequired linguists, maintenancepersonnel , pathfinders , fuelspecialists and crewmembers fromthe 6th Cavalry Brigade.

Working altitudes, mountainousterrain and high winds were immediately recognized as formidablehazards to both aircraft and crews.Operating from the Guatemala airbase, with an elevation of 5,041feet, flights were required to initiateclimbs immediately after departureto clear the surrounding mounta inous terrain. Adequate landingsites were scarce, and in somecritical areas improved highwayshad to be blocked off to allowhelicopter operations.

Wh ere the landmass a nd villagear rangement prohibited mediumlift helicopter operations, UH-lHuey helicopters from the 210thAviation Battalion of the PanamaCanal Zone, various vehicles andhuman resources were used tofurther distri bute the essentialsupplies .

Resupply sites ranged from 5,000to 7,000 feet in altitude with higherenroute flight levels often demanded . Although the relief operationoccurred during the Guatemalandry season, providing amplevisibility during most workingdays , severe dust conditions in thelanding sites, coupled with theworking altitudes and high winds,definitely challenged a group of excellent aviators and crewmembers.

The Ft. Hood group provided amaximum effort throughout the 3weeks of Operation Wagonmaster.While in Guatemala, the forcescarried (externally and internally)a total of 709.5 tons of food, water,supplies and various types of equipment; transported 1,219 passengers; made 23 medical evacuations;

and flew 199.5 hours . Entire mission data , including the trip to andfrom Guatemala, totaled 929 tonsof cargo, or if you prefer, 1,858,000pounds, and 377.9 hours flown.This was a tremendous effort during a critical time in the history ofGu atemala .Suc c es s ful efforts of themagnitude just mentioned are notonly the results of highly trainedand efficient aviators, crewmembers and operational experts, butalso are made possible throughthe abili ties of all the variousskills represe nted in the Ft.Hood contingent. Fuel specialists,as an example, played an essentialrole throughout the operation. Thisfact can best be illustrated by explaining an action that took place

Regardless of the situation the air-craft must be refueled and receivethe necessary maintenance


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during refueling operations atVeracruz. At the time, a 4-inchrefueling hose was unintentionallyuncapped inside an aircraft.Instantly this large hose began tospray the interior of the CH-47with highly flammable jet fuel.Specialist Five William Zaleski,realizing what had happened andwithout concern for his own safety,maintained control of the hose. Hemuscled it out of the aircraft , andalthough blinded and drenched byfuel, he did not release it until thepressure system was cut off and thehose became limp.After receiving extensive first aidand changing clothes, SpecialistZaleski firmly requested, and wasgranted, permission to return to hisrefueling duties. His actions, trulyheroic in nature, possibly saved thelives of numerous Soldiers, at leastone CH-47 and certainly providedadded inspiration for all concerned.

Although the personnel constituting the disaster relief forceplayed a major role in a mostsuccessful operation , scores ofothers from many units, headquarters and even countries wereequally effective. Members of thefirst flight will never forget an eventthat occurred 40 miles out ofVeracruz while enroute to Ixtepec.Because of adverse weather, theflight was required to land in a fieldsite. Even before the rotor bladeshad stopped, crowds of people fromVilla Isla, Mexico, immediately encircled the flight of aircraft. Afterconcluding that the flight would beunable to continue, planning forthe evening began. Thanks to thelinguistic ability of CaptainEdward Hayes, Sergeant FirstClass Ernesto Moya, SpecialistFive Angel Delahoya and SpecialistFour Erick Gonzalaz, the crewmenwere able to communicate with thelocal residents in an effective andfriendly manner.

Within an hour, the PresidenteNahum Dressarrived at the field site to

the contingent with freshJULY 1976

pineapples and well wishes from hiscommunity. Mayor Manica openedhis townhall for a sleeping area,reserved rooms for crewmembers inthe city s only hotel and providedfree transportation to and from thefield site. The hospitality of MayorManica and his community thatcool, rainy night in February ensured them a warm , permanentplace in our hearts and memories.

On 24 February, Secretary ofState Henry Kissinger arrived inGuatemala on an official visit. TheFt. Hood contingent was selectedby the U.S Ambassador and thecommander of the Military Groupas a point of interest for theSecretary to visit. SecretaryKissinger witnessed the departureof the last resupply mission, greetedand shook hands with the Soldierspresent and expressed his appreciation on behalf of the United Statesfor a job well done .

The true impact and realizationof the success of the Guatemalandisaster relief operation will andcan onl y be known by the participants, the observers and thepeople of Guatemala. The deathand destruction inflicted on thiscountry was devastating. Only bythe use of U.S. Army helicoptersand especially the Chinook, a wordall Guatemalans grew to understand-were sufficient quantitiesof food , clothing, water and building materials delivered to thecountryside.The pprec i t ion of theGuatemalan people was madeknown in many ways. Most oftenthere was a crowd of well-wishersand observers at the base ofoperations. Families, mothers andfathers would come and requestpermission to take the members ofthe Corps and Ft. Hood con-

tingent shopping, to dinner, or on atrip for some rest and relaxation.Newspapers , meals and gifts weregiven, however reimbursement forthese items was firmly but nicelyrejected.

Most personally rewarding andsobering to the participants was thespirit and s trength of theGuatemalans who bore the brunt ofthe disaster. Villages where twothirds of the population waseliminated fought back-thrustingthemselves into normal lifepatterns. Reflections such as anelderly Indian woman, barefootand clothed in her native dress,praying and thanking God for thepresence and assistance of a CH-47helicopter and its crew can never beforgotten . This depth of appreciation was not limited to or shown byonly the less fortunate and hardeststruck, but also by Guatemalanssuch as a television channel assistant producer and a U.S. Embassyemploye who outwardly expressedtheir feelings of God bless thosebig birds and God bless you.It was a privilege to be a part ofthe contingent from Corps andFt. Hood and to participate in thisdisaster relief operation realizing itcan only be successful because ofpeople. People such as the fuelspecialist who performed an act ofbravery; the citizens of Villa Isla,Mexico, who provided warmhospitality; and most importantly,the 92 men and women from Ft.Hood, who joined the many othersfrom the United States to serve asable humanitarians. t is gratifyingindeed to note in this bicentennialcelebration year that the people ofthe United States still have a common goal with the founding fathers:to hold out the hand of friendshipand assistance to our fellowman.

Major Terry N. Rosser was the OIC of the III Corps and Ft.Hood contingent and commander of D Company, 34th SupportBattalion, 6th Cavalry Brigade Air Combat). CW2 James EBennett was the mission aircraft maintenance officer. Photo-graphs by Mr. Bennett and the U.S. Air Force

23


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24

A ew Member Of The TeLTC Robert F ForsythExperimental Test Pilot andResearch And Development Coord natorSystems Development And Qualification DivisionRD E Directorate

U S Army Aviation Systems CommandSt. Louis, MO

A RMY AVIATION has added a new memberto its stable of fixed wing aircraft- the C-12AHuron manufactured by Beech Aircraft Corporationof Wichita KS. Beech Aircraft was awarded a contract to manufacture 20 C-12A aircraft for the U.S.Army and 6 for the U.S. Air Force during the yearbeginning July 1975 to meet their UX/CX-X requirement.

Subsequently the Army and Air Force obtained anoption to procure another 100 and 14 aircraft respectively . The Army option is for 20 aircraft per year overa 5-year period. The Air Force exercised its 14 aircraftoption in July 1975 and the Army exercised its first 20aircraft option in August 1975.



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What are some of the features of the C-12A whichenhance its operation? Let's start with the cockpit.The first thing old U-8 and U-21 pilots will notice isthe cockpit arrangement. Gone is the Beech commerciallayout so familiar to you. The commercial cockpitwas designed and configured for single pilot operation. Such an arrangement forces several compromisesto optimum control display and switch arrangement ,as those of you who have flown the U-8 and U-21recognize. o while buying a modified off-the-shelfaircraft the Army was able to better optimize thecockpit for the two-pilot operation desired by themilitary services for this type airplane. Themilitarized cockpit allows both pilots easy access toall switches, circuit breakers ' rheostats and avionicscontrol heads, and therefore allows total aircraftsystem control from the right seat when desired(figure 1).

To enhance its capability as an all-weathertransporter of people and things, the aircraft has beenequipped with a comprehensive IFR avionics packagewhich includes: weather radar; DME; dualVOR/ILS; dual ADF, dual VHF comm; HF, MBand diversity (360-degrees coverage) transponder(figures 2 and 3).

Cockpit lighting also represents a much neededfirst for Army aviation. All instruments , controlheads and panels are integrally lighted and thelighting intensities balanced. The specification which

required this was the most advanced ever incorporated into a production contract for an Army aircraft. Unwanted glare has been reduced through theuse of special coatings on the instrument cover glassesand incorporation of improved dimming controlsallow uniform dimming to below the t h r s h o l ~ of

visibility.

See Acronym KeyOn Page 27

To aid the pilot and reduce his workload anautomatic flight control system, consisting of a flightdirector and three-axis autopilot, is provided. Thisallows automatic control of heading, navigation,altitude, airspeed and approach (to include backcourse ILS).Safety is enhanced by incorporation of a rudderboost system, dual gyrosyn compasses, emergencylocator beacon, high intensity (3,SOO-candlepowerdaytime intensity) strobe beacon, ice inspectionlights, and dual 1,OOO-candlepower landing/taxilights and a survival raft and kit. The passenger/cargocompartment floor is designed to withstand concen-

JULY 1976

Figure 1Overhead Console

Figure 2 tInstrument Panel And Throttle QuadrantFigure 3

Center Console


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Figur. 4

\ I\J

Cabin Arrangement Standard 8 Passenger)

trated loads of 200 psf when supported by the seattracks and 100 psf in other floor areas. The seat withits supporting floor structure is capable o f withstanding crash design loads when occupied by a 250-poundperson facing forward) and a 170-pound personwhen facing aft FAA requi res crash design for 170-pound person for either seating direction).

The passenger/cargo compartment is arranged toprovide for eight passengers, a toilet area, a baggagearea capable of accepting 300 pounds of baggage anda survival kit see figure 4). The entire cockpit andcabin/cargo area is pressurized to a differential of 6.0psi, allowing the aircraft to maintain a cabin altitudeof below 10,000 feet at cruise altitudes up to 31,000feet.

In the event of loss of pressurization , an emergencyoxygen system provides both crew and passengerswith sufficient oxygen to descend from 30,000 feet tosafe breathing altitudes. It also provides sufficientreserves to allow the pilot and copilot to continue tobreathe normal demand oxygen for the remainder ofthe flight from a half-way point on a maximum rangemlSSIOn.

The passenger masks are the standard airlinepassenger type which provide continuous oxygen flow.The pilot and copilot are provided with quick donningmasks which incorporate the diluter-demand/100percent regulators and microphone. In addition topressurization the aircraft environmental controlsystem provides heating, cooling and ventilation suf-26

30,000

2 5 0 0 0wuIwg 20,000j.....c

15,000::::>nnW: : 10,000

5,000

S200

Figure 5Maximum Cruise Speeds

1,800 RPMWeight 11,000 Lb

210 220 230 240 250 260TRUE AIRSPEED KNOTS



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U-21A/G C-12ATakeoff/Landing 9,650/9,168 Ibs 12,500/12,500GWT IbsCruise Speed Alt* 180 KTAS@ 240 KTAS@10,000 ft 25,000 ftRange w/45 min 935 NMI 1,040NMIres)SE Service Ceiling 12,000 ft 16,700 ftSE Rate of Climb 290fpm 545 fpm

SL 95 degrees F)Landing Distance 2,440 ft @ 9,168 2,600 t @ 12,500(50 ft obst)** GWT GWTTakeoff Distance 2,000 t 2,820 ft(50 ft obst)Service Ceiling 25,000 ft*** 31,000 ftVmc 88 KIAS 87 KIASVmo 208 KIAS 270 KIASSE Best R/C Speed 112 KIAS 2 KIAS

U-21A/G cruise at 10,000 feet due to lack of cabinpressure** At max landing gross weight*** Qualification limit

Figure 6Comparison between the C-12A and the U-21A/G

ficient to maintain a comfortable cabin temperatureregardless of outside air temperatures .The aircraft is FAA certified to fly into moderate icing conditions. The ice protection subsystem provideselectrical anti-icing for the pitot, windshields andpropeller, and pneumatic deicer boots for the wings

and horizontal stabilizer (extensive test ing establishedthat deicing lS not required for the vertical fin).Engine inlets are anti-iced by engine bleed air. Rainremoval is provided the pilot and copilot windscreenby electrically driven windshield wipers.All these features enhance the usefulness of the C-12A, but for aviators the most significant measure ofan aircraft is its performance and handling qualities.Typical cruise speed performance of the C-12 isshown in figure 5 A comparison between the C-12Aand the U-21 is shown in figure 6 and provides a basisfor judging the increased capability of the C-12A.The rudder boost system mentioned earlier helpsthe pilot in maintaining directional control followingan engine failure or a large variation of power betweenthe two engines. This unique feature involves the incorporation of two pneumatically boosted servos inthe rudder cable system which are activated by apreset pressure differential switch. This switch sensesbleed air pressure from each engine. The boost systemprovides about 60 pounds of rudder pressure aid tothe pilot.

\JULY 1976

The C-12A underwent an engineering flight evaluation by the Army Engineering Flight Activity,Edwards AFB, CA, during the winter and spring of1975-76. These tests determined the degree to whichthe aircraft met the contractor s performanceguarantees , established soft and rough field capability, and assessed the C-12 s overall handling qualitiescharacteristics.The flight and maintenance crews for the C-12s arebeing trained at the Beech Training Facility atWichita. Logistics support for the aircraft is providedby Beech Aircraft on a worldwide basis. This supportincludes maintenance, overhaul and parts. This totallogistics support is a new concept to Army aviationand has both DOD and Congressional blessing. t ishoped that the users give it a fair trial as it has manyadvantages in this time of budgetary and manpowerconstraints.

The initial aircraft production is being a llocated tom ajor headquarters in the U.S. and to major headquarters and military assistance groups in Europe, theFar East, Africa and the Middle East. Ultimately theC- t2 will be the replacement for a portion of theArmy s aged and well used U-8 eet and some of itsolder U-21As. The C-12 will be with the Army at leastuntil the turn of the century. Its usefulness is limitedonly by the imagination of those of us who fly and useit. ,

ADFDMEFAAfpmGWTHFIFRKIASKTASMBNMIpsfpsiR/CSESLUSAUSAFux/cx-x

VHFVmcVmoVORIILS

Acronym Keyautomatic direction finderdistance measuring equipmentFederal Aviation Administrationfeet per minutegross weighthigh frequencyinstrument flight rulesknots indicated airspeedknots true airspeedmarker beaconnautical milespounds per square footpounds per square inchrate of climsingle enginesea levelUnited States ArmyUnited States Air ForceDepartment of Defense DOD) and Congressional directed jOint procurementUSA/USAF) of an off-the-shelf utility/executive type aircraft for the support ofattaches, MAAGs and major headquarters.The Army was designated the procuringagency for both servicesvery high frequencyminimum control speed, critical engineinoperativemaximum operating limit speedVHF omnidirectional range/instrumentlanding system

27


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8

< 3 ~ ~U S V SMajor William C Childree

Directorate for Aircraft AccidentAnalysis and Investigation

U S Army Agency or Aviation Safety

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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VER A RECENT 3-month period , overgrosscondition andj or out-of-CG condition was afactor in five accidents and suspect in two others.These accidents resulted in eight fatalities and thirteen injuries and cost 1.5 million in aircraft losses.This prompted a hard look at the performance chartsin the UH-1H jAH-1G operator s manuals. We founddeficiencies in the performance charts serious enoughto warrant the recommendation that they be revised.

Some of the shortcomings are: Information is misleading when determining,before actual flight, the aircraft s weight limitationsfor a particular temperature and altitude. The charts present misleading information basedon engine performance and disregard transmissioncapabilities. Three terms used to describe engine power(military power, normal power and takeoff power)output are neither adequately defined nor appliedconsistently throughout the charts in the manual.

Since these terms all represent power outputs in excess of the transmission limits or in the case of takeoffpower, an unidentified quantity, the charts present un- tt in ble performance levels for these aircraftI t is apparent that few aviators use the chartsbecause these deficiencies would have been revealedbefore now. Failure to use the charts can be attributedto

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Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1976

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