Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1968

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1968

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UNITE

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION, ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYBG Edwin L Powell Jr .

COMMANDANT, U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMG Delk M. Oden

ASST COMDT, U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCOL M. H. Parson

DIGEST EDITORIAL STAFFLTC Robert E. Luckenbill, ChiefRichard K. Tierney, EditorWilliam H. SmithJohn P. JonesMarian JonesLinda McGowan

GRAPHIC ART SUPPORTHarold G. LinnHarry A. PickelDorothy L. CrowleyAngela A. Akin

DIRECTOR, U. S. ARMY BOARD FOR AVIATIONACCIDENT RESEARCHCOL Russell P. Bonasso

USABAAR PUBLICATIONS AND GRAPHICS DIVPierce l . Wiggin, ChiefWilliam E. CarterJack DeloneyTed KontosCharles MabiusPatsy ThompsonMary W. Windham

RMY VI TION

1GESJNOVEMBER 1968 VOLUME 14VIEWS FROM READERSHIGHWAY MISSION - AIRMOBILE STYLECOL Kenneth D. MertelSYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND ARMY AVIATIONMAJ W. H. GardnerCHATTERBOX, CW2 Billy J. AllenAIRCRAFT UTILIZATIONLTC Will iam B. Monts, Jr.THE WAYWARD WIND, CW2 William L PepinYOU CAN T BEAT THE ESTABLISHMENTCPT Michael J. WilliamsCLEARED TO LAND - ITS LEGAL PORTENT

LTC Richard A RuskSOLDIER, SGM Glenn E OwensUSE ALL FIRE SUPPORT EFFECTIVELYMAJ Francis X Delvey759EVOLUTION OF THE ARMED HELICOPTERMAJ Bill G LockwoodCRASH SENSEWHY TEFLON HOSES FAI L, Ted KontosPEARLSUSAASO SEZ

NUMBE

ARMY ROTARY WING SCHOOL BIRTHDAYFAIR SKIES OR FOUL

InsideBack

The mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Is to provide information of an 0r.eratioor functional nature concernin9 safety and aircraft accident prevention, tralnin ma ntenanoperations, research and development, aviation medicine, and other related data.The DIGEST is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly under tsupervision of the Commandant, U. S. Army Aviation School. Views expressed herein are nnecessarily those of Department of the Army or the U. S. Army Aviation School. Photos aU. S. Army unless otherwise specified. Material may be reprinted provided credit Is ,Iven to tDIGEST and to the author, unless otherwise indicated.Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army aviation are invited. Direct communicationauthorized to: Editor, U. S. Army Aviation Digest, Fort Rucker, Ala. 36160.Use of funds for printin9 this publication has b n approved by Headquarters, Departmof the Army, 3 November 1967.Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlinedAl 310-1. Complete DA Form 12 4 and send directly to CO, AG Publications Center 2Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Md. 21220. For any chan,e in distribution requirements, Initiaterevised DA Form 12 4.National Guard and Army Reserve units submit requirements fhrouth their State adluta,eneral and U. S. Army Corps commanders re.pectively.For those not eli,ible for official distribution or who desire personal cople. of the DI6ESpaid subscriptions, 4.50 domestic and 5.50 overseas, are available from the SuperIntendentDocument., U. S. Govemment Printin, Office, Washintfotl. D. C. 204CR


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The DIGEST received the followingfrom the Office of the Assistant Chiefof Staff for Force D eve lopment HQ Department of the Army, concerningredesignation of units:

On 17 August 1968, the Chief ofStaff, United States Army made thedecision to redesignate the 101st AirCavalry Division and the 1st Air Cavalry Di vision as the 10 1st AirborneDivision (Airmobile ) and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobi le) respectively.His decision also provided that divisionsorganized under this concept in thefuture would retain their then current designation with airmobile shownpa renthetically.

As background information, the following rationale was used by the Chiefof Staff, United States Army in a rr iv-ing at his decision:

I t is being done to preserve the historic significance an d traditions of thesetwo famous old divisions - 1st CavalryDivision and 101st Airborne D ivision .Thcy are both a irmobile d ivisions organized under identical TOEs. Thisfact and the type of organization willbe recognized by the Airmobile suffix. The 1st Cavalry Di vision has beensince its commitment in Vietnam informally and unofficially known as th e1st Air Cavalry Division. This will continue to be recognized informally although th e official designation will bethe 1st Cavalry Di vision (Airmobile ) .Goin g back to the original designationspreserves the long established esprit connected with these famous old outfits,one Cavalry and one essentia lly Li ghtInfant ry. Both organizations, i.e., Cavalry an d Light Infan t ry, because oftheir background, type mission, agility,mobility of mind and spirit, and flexibility, a re particularly suited to undertak e the ai rmobile role. Units assignedto the Division , for example ba ttalionsof certain regiments, will keep their olddesignation , simply adding the suffixAirmobile.

Sir:I am interested in a ttending th e CH-54 transitionin g course at the U. S.

NOVEMBER 1968

Army Aviation School a t Fort Ru cke r.I am refering to the article in the

February 1968 issue of Aviation Di gest[ Transitioning Into The CH-54,page 2].

I have not been able to get any otherinformation on the school. Could youdirect me on who I could write to andattain the complete information and ifdirect communication is authorized.

CW2 Larry G. Hatch66th Aviation Company (Corps)APO New York 09079 Prerequisites for the CH-S4 Pilot

Course as prescribed- in the CONARCProgram of Instruction and DA Pam3S0-1O are: Commissioned officer orwarrant officer member of Active Armywho is assigned or under orders to aunit equipped with CH-S4 helicoptersmust hold a currently effective aviatordesignation , be qualified as a rotarywing aviator ( 1981 ) or helicopter pilot(062 ) and possess a current Armyrotary wing instrument card (tactical,standard, or special). He must be turbine-engined qualified and have a minimum of SOO hours rotary wing time(pilot and/or instructor) of which 2S0hours must have been flown as pilotor instructor pilot in utility or cargohelicopters. No security clearance is required. Obligated service for ActiveArmy commissioned or warrant officersis one year.

Application to attend the coursewould be accomplished in the samemanner as for any other course. Manyindividuals have accomplished this bycontacting their respective branch.- The EditorsSir:

The article ' Filters, Screens andStrainers. Ju ne 68 DIGEST was exce llent. Th importancc of a properfun ctionin filtration system can' t beoveremphasized .

The picture (pag 8 ) shows anothersource of contamination . The protectivecap for th e fuel filter are shown layingon the ramp with th e open end facin g

down. On their next use the accumulated con taminants will be forced intoth e aircraft.

MAJ J ohn T. Snodgrass, J rHQ , 35th Signal GroupFt Bragg, N. C. 28307

Major Snodgrass is correct. Kudos tohis sharp eyes. - The EditorsThe DIGEST received the followingletter from MAJ Richard H Hummel195th Assault Helicopter CompanyUH-l) A), 214th Combat AviationBattalion A PO San Francisco 96384:

Sir:The following is inscribed on every

aviator's farewell plaque which is presented to members of the 195th AssaultH elicopter Company (UH-1 ) (A ), 1stAviation Brigade, APO San Franci co96384, prior to their DEROS fromVietnam. It has been written to distinguish primarily th e unique traits ofa dcdicated Army helicopter combatpilot. However, it al 0 is intended tobe a tribute to all Army aviators aswell.

I am submitting the inscription toyour office for possible future publication in the U . S Army Aviation Di gest.The author is CPT Gregg S. Bond , In fantry , OF 106 505, forme r ai rlift pla toon commander, flight operations officer, and currently the executive officerof this unit.

have flown through the fiery gates ofhellAnd hovered a t Satan's door;I have answered his ca ll from everyheightWith all th e fire I could pour .I ha\'c sensed the fea rs of combatYet I have never refused to flyIn support of my fighting comradesWho without me were destined to die.Now my destiny has been writtenIn the burnin g eternal sunI will forever be an Army AviatorWho in combat was surpassed by no ne.

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Lieutenant General Robert H. York in a June 1967 AVIATION DIGESTarticle stated, In Southeast Asia this bold new concept [Army airmobil i ty]has opened a dimension in warfare that is perhaps the greatest tactical in -novation since the German bli tzkrieg o World War II. The ful l impact of Gen-eral York's statement hits when one compares the situation faced by France'sGroup Mobile 100 a decade ago on Highway 19 in Vietnam with the airmobil i tyoffered by Army helicopters as described here. It is l ike comparing the 12thcentury crusades with the campaigns of World War II.Group Mobile 100, an elite combat unit, was decimated within a fewmonths because of the unique and trying condit ions of Vietnam. A mere 15miles may as well have been 1,000 when one considers the dense forestationand an enemy that knew its key to victory was to lure the French deep intothe jungles and then cut off all escape routes a tactic the Viet Minh exe-cuted all too well. However, Army aviation adds a new dimension. To feel theimpact one needs only to compare today's action in Vietnam with that of theproud unit that carried France's colors well in Korea, but was unable to copewith the Viet Minh.

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the situation for the French, hadthey possessed our airmobility.Air assault techniques with th irmarked advantages in movement,firepower, command and control,intclligence and reconnaissance andlogistics could have spelled successfor the French.

Reconnaissance was \completedand the command party returnedto the battalion base where thefinal operations order was completed. The battalion order was is-sued with the company commandersupporting commanders, and thebattalion staff present. Basically,the plan provided for stationingairmobile forces on critical terrainfeatures and bridge sites. The entire area was to be covered by tubeartillery support from artillery po-sitions on preselected critical ter-rain features. Air Cavalry unitsand patrols would search enemyavenues of approach.

An efficient radio communications system was developed to tiein all critical combat elements andartillery. Tactical airpower wouldbe on Air Cap, particularly when4

convoys wer en route. Convoyswould be escorted employing thebattalion antitank platoon elementsin four %-ton trucks, each armedwith a 106 r coilless rifle an d .50caliber machinegun. The plancalled for the three rifle companiesto be employed, each assigned asector. Delta company (CombatSupport Company) acted as athunderbolt or reserve force,employing the reconnaissance platoon and remaind r of the anti

tank platoon not required for theescort mission.Upon completion of the battalionorder, Left Half 6 took the com

pany commanders on an aerialreconnaissance of the highway. Hepointed out their sectors, criticalterrain features and bridge sitesdirected for occupation by troops,positions where the artillery wouldbe emplaced and specific enemyavenues of approach. At the sametime they all discussed the SOPthat would be used and identifiedcertain terrain f atures with codewords to simplify future discussionsof those terrain features ov r the

The Battle of the laDrang would continue,and Highway 19 left)was to be opened . . .

radio. The flight pattern during treconnaissance in the commahelicopter was conducted so s nto divulge specific intentions of tunit. t was to appear to be oof the many daily flights to afrom An Khe to Pleiku.

After his return and completiof detailed plans, the compacommander issued orders. Equment was checked, supplies issuand the battalion prepared for tinitial move out the followimorning.

Execution of the airmobile plspecified initial occupation of crcal terrain features at first ligwi thout clearing all of the higway. Employing two platoons UH-1D helicopters, B Compasecured the eastern one-thirdthe highway from An KhePleiku. Two platoon positions wnearby bridges plus two additiobridge sites were to be held. battery of 105. mm tube artillwas emplaced in the most westeplatoon posi tion.

The move was completed wiout incident, followed in quU S ARMY AVIATION DIGE


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and secured anadditional eighty kilo-meters from An Kheright) to Ple iku

succession by the rapid air assaultof C Company to secure the nextmidd le third of the highway andA Company to secure the west rnportion. Company A and C areasincluded one critical terrain featureach, to be occupied by at least arifle platoon. The far the t unit tothe west, C Company, included abattery of 8-inch howitzers, 5e1-propelled, moved lat r into positionby highway.As soon as the artillery posi tionin A Company area was clearedan d secur d by a p latoon of infantry, Chinook b gan movement ofthe bat t ry by air to occupy thposition. As th e area wa securedwestward and under cover of em placed tube ar tillery, the engineerp latoon began a detailed roadreconnaissance of th highway toinclud a mine check of any susp iciou s areas, including bridges.The ngineers were followed by aself-propelled 8-inch howitzer ba tte ."y, whi ch joined C Company.As the air continuedunder es cort by UH -1B helicop tergunships and pro tec ted by an AirNOVEMBER 1968

Cap of two A-1Es overhead, theair cavalry teams were busy. TwoWhite teams, each covered roughlyone-half the battalion sector,patrolled both id s of the highwayfor five kilometers, searching forany sign of enemy activity. TheRed team remained generally inthe central portion of the battalionsector, ready to reinforce the Whiteteams as required.

The an titank platoon wi th itsfo ur gun- jeeps accompanied theengineers to familiarize themselveswith the road, prepared to provideescort for the initial convoy to bedispatche d that af ternoon .Each rifle company organiz dplatoon positions wi th as large acompany reser a possibl . Allth re 81 mm mortars were positione d at a central location withineach company sector. Fir of allth re mortars could cover th mostcritical portion of the unit area.Delta Company mor tars th e fo urgun pla toon, wer positioned in thec nt r company Company C ) tolend upport to ith r the ea t orw st.

The reconnaissance platoon withthe remainder of the antitank platoon were positioned at the battalion forward CP, established on ahigh mountain range at MangYang Pass in the vicinity of the 8-inch howitzer batt ry. H r h licopt r would lagg r3 with thebattalion r rve, prepared for employment as a thund rbolt or re-erve forc anywher within thebattalion sector. The maximumtime di tance was 10 minutes, 30kilom ter away.

The Arty LO carefully coordinated a program of mortar andartillery harra sing and interdiction H I ) fires for the first night,xtending five kilometers on either

side of the road. A careful ch ckwas ma de to keep Vietnam secivili ans ou t of the area especiallynear cr itical bridge site. O ne ortwo si tes on th ea tern end w rnear population cent rs.

3Lagger: tactical assembly areawhere airmobile Infantry and assaulthelicopters are joined for immediatetactical employment

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under battalion control to proceedto the locations of any disabledvehicles to expedite their movement. The air cavalry teams continued screening and reporting.

Part of the battalion plans included a habitual resupply ofdeployed units. This was usuallyaccomplished late in the afternoonnormally employing one UH-1Dhelicopter per rifle company. Preparations were also made to provide medical evacuation.

This was the sequence for thefirst day. The convoy completedmovement to Pleiku by nightfallwithout enemy opposition. Thebattalion continued with plans andmade preparations for the nightmaintained security on the criticalterrain features and prepared forescort duties the following morning.The engineers and antitank platoon accompanied by White teamscouts would thoroughly check theroad the following .morning toascertain if mines had been emplaced either on the road orbridges or to detect possible

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ambushes established during thenight.A similar sequence continued forten days with only minor interference by snipers. No real attemptwas made by the enemy to ambushconvoys on the highway. Yet it wasa long sector; the battalion wasresponsible for over 60 kilometersof highway. This extensive sectorwas held with three rifle companiesand a combat support company.Limited reinforcements were available to the battalion yet the mission was accomplished successfully.Had there been an enemy attackof any proportion it would havebeen met with devastating firepower and maneuver.

Why was this battalion successful? Primarily because of the mobility inherent in an airmobileforce. Its rapid reaction was a vitalfactor - the ability to spreadforces quickly over an extensivedistance occupy critical terrainfeatures easily from the air surprising the enemy. Second ofmajor importance was the use of

firepower to include tube artillerytactical airpower aerial rocketartillery gunships and mortars aswell as other organic weapons.Third many eyes of the White andRed teams as well as other aircraftflying back and forth between AnKhe and Pleiku assured superiordetailed observation. Last but notleast was excellent command andcontrol provided by the communications system and command helicopter plus correct functioning ofthe battalion command post midway within the sixty kilometerarea. The battalion was able tooperate as an economy of forceunit carry out the difficult missionwith its limited forces in support ofthe remaining part of the Battle ofthe Ia Drang.

One cannot help but realize howdifferent history might have beenfor Group Mobile 100 in 1954 hadit possessed the mob Ii ty firepower and command and control inherentwithin one airmobile infantry battalion. The Viet Minh would nothave been the victors.

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Systems Engineering and rmy viationUniform procedures are redesigning certain new coursesand redesigning old courses in the rmy training program

LAST FEBRUARY, CONARCpublished a new regulationwhich will have a significant impact on Army aviation training andtraining bases. CONARC Regulation 350-100-1, Systems Engineering of Training (Course Design),establishes uniform procedures fordesigning new MOS producing andfunctional courses, and redesigningexisting MOS producing an d functional courses and Army SubjectSchedules conducted or preparedby USCONARC service schoolsand training centers.

The Army aviation training program has some 5 existing courses(19 of which are MOS producers)affected and another 9 in theplanning stages. These coursesrange in length and complexityfrom the 9-month initial entryrotary and fixed wing aviatorcourses to 3-week transitioncourses. Only orientation courses,2 weeks or less in duration, areexempt from being systems engineered. As stated, although lowestin priority, Army Aviation SubjectSchedules also fall within the purview of this regulation. The priorities for systems engineering ofcourses are as follows:

High attntIOn courses (over10%) - Example: Initial entryrotary wing aviator courses(WORWAC/ORWAC).

High density courses - Example:Aircraft Maintenance (Entry)Course, MOS 67A10.

Other MOS producing courses- Example: Examiner courses,multi-engine qualification courses(FW or RW) for warrant officers.

Major W H GardnerFunctional courses - Example:

Helicopter Instrument FlightCourse.Other courses and Army SubjectSchedule - Example : Army Aviation Medicine (Basic) Course.The effective date of the regulation is 1 April 1968, and it states

that systems engineering of allexisting courses may well take upto five years to complete. All newcourses and Army Subject Schedules are to be designed followingthe procedures detailed in thisregulation.Systems engineering of training,is not new to the Army, nor toother members of the armed services. Studies conducted by the Armywith various universities some yearsago pointed up the advantagesgained by this approach when applied to training. Also much of theAir Force training today has beensystems engineered, although perhaps not in the manner as describedin Army Regulations.

HumRRO has conducted numerous studies which have indicatedthe value of the systems engineering approach to training. Thesestudies demonstrated that greatsavings in manpower and moneycould be realized by streamliningcourses to the point where onlythat required to be taught wasbeing taught and only to the extentnecessary.

What is systems engineering oftraining? The regulation defines itas That series of orderly, systematic steps designed to produce acourse of instruction that will provide graduates with skills and

knowledge essential to perforthe entry level in his MOS.

CONARC Regulation 350-1discusses seven processes, to bcomplished in sequence, that mup systems engineering of traijob analysis, selecting tasksschool learning, training anadeveloping training materials,veloping testing materials, conof training, and quality contr

Job analysis consists of operations: .identifying the job,developing the task invenWhen the purpose of the job asis is to analyze an existing jobsequence is to identify the jobthen develop the task invenWhen the purpose is to devnew Army jobs, the sequenreversed. Several elements of imation must be obtained andcorded for use when develothe task inventory, such as:structure; duty pOSItion; and organizations assigned; reunits, organizations and Mmajor job requirements; workvironment; assistance availand equipment to be used.

The task inventory itself maprepared in either a matrix foor as a list. The matrix is eto prepare but more difficuanalyze and the reverse is truan inventory list. For many oaviation MOSs the number ofthat the individual must acplish may well run into thesands. The task inventory then be validated for existingthrough the OPO data banlocal feedback channels.Based on validation informaU S ARMY AVIATION DIG


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the second step consists of determining which tasks should betaught in formal school courses.Those tasks not selected for schooltraining must be selected for training elsewhere or specified as prerequisites. A trainee has alreadylearned to perform certain tasks.He may learn them in a course oftraining or on the job. The regulation prescribes the major considerations in identifying tasksmost essential for school trainingwhich includes, where applicable,Army Training Programs andArmy Subject Schedules. t mustbe recognized that the selection oftasks for other than formal schooling at aviation schools will involveconsiderable coordination and/orthe preparation of materials toassist in on the job training.

The third step, training analysis,which is outlined in considerabledetail, bridges the gap betweenselecting tasks for school trainingand developing training materialsand test instruments. Four operations are involved: Identifying the job conditions,standards, supporting skills, knowledges, and attitudes, using whatthe regulation calls a Job TaskData Card.

Converting job requirements totraining objectives and criteria.Tasks and subtasks recommendedfor training, their associated conditions and standards, the supporting skills and knowledges, andthe significant attitudes are converted to training objectives usinga format entitled a TrainingAnalysis Information Sheet. Thepreparation of training objectivess the cri tical step in the development cycle as it determines thecontent of the training program.Where the systems engineer mayhave begun with a thousand tasks,he has now prepared possibly fivetimes that number of TrainingAnalysis Information Sheets.

Developing the course structure. The Training Analysis Infor-NOVEM ER 968

mation Sheets training objectives)are arranged in their most logicalorder for instructional purposes.This is done in three steps: sortingtrammg objectives into closelyrelated groupings, sequencing thetraining objectives within thesegroupings, and sequencing thegroupings into an overall coursestructure.

Developing a course evaluation concept. Decisions are maderegarding the most appropriatepoints within the course structureto evaluate student achievement ,using what the regulation prescribes as an Evaluation PlanningInformation Sheet.

The next two steps are performedconcurrently. Considering each inturn, the developing of trainingmaterials consists of taking thesequenced training objectives andthe overall course structure, andpreparing instructional materialsand aids, including handouts,training aids, lesson plans, andfinally POls. As it is in this stepthat the actual time requir d toperform the various training objectives s determined, lesson plansare deve loped ahead of the POls.

In this step the decision can bemade as to whether part or all ofthe particular course is suitable forprogrammed instruction. It s inthis step that such factors as thecharacteristics and capabilities ofstudents, instructors available, andresources obtainable facilities,materials, equipment, simulators,training methods, and trainingmedia ) are considered for the firsttime.

The fifth step, developing testingmaterials, specifically deals withtest construction and the preparation of test outlines, standards, andinstruments. With the finalizationof the test instruments, the POIfor a particular course can now becompleted and sent to CONARCfor approval.

The sixth step in the systemsengineering process the conduct

of training ) is not covered in theregulation. FM 21-6 s referenced.

Quality control, the last step, isthe trial and evaluation of theinstructional system. t is a continual empirically-based process ofanalyzing various feedback information and adjusting the instructional system. The feedbackinformation will either be externalor internal in nature.

External feedback includes suchareas as Vietnam lessons learned,interviews with aviators, and morecurrent information from the OPOdata bank. Internal feedbackwould involve test score analysisand course critiques. Internal feedback will affect the conduct of acourse and ex ternal feedback willaffect the content of the course.Success of the systems engineeringapproach depends on the collationand validation of continuous feedback and its application at theappropriate step in the overallprocess.Briefly, it can be seen from theabove that the Army aviationtraining bases have a monumentaljob ahead of them to implementthis regulation over th e next fiveyears. Overall responsibility hasbeen given to the CurriculumDivision, Office of the Directorof Instruction, USAAVNS, FortRucker , but the impact ofCONARC Regulation 350-100-1will be felt throughout all Armyaviation schools. At first, the initialentry rotary wing course and oneof the seven ATC courses plannedfor FY 70 will be systems engineered. By breaking out at intervals the expertise gained in theseareas, by late 1969 all courses willhave begun the systems engineeringprocess.

The systems engineering approach to training throughoutArmy aviation will result incourses, geared specifically to theneeds in the field, that will betaught as professionally as possiblein the shortest practical time.

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Chal I erbox:w OFTEN have you gone

through a lengthy period ofinstructing, with both the UHFand fox mike radios chattering fullblast in your ears about everythingfrom a dissertation on cockpit procedure to what someone had fordinner last night? This can be veryannoying and ti resome, especiallyin the ea rly stages of a new training cycle, when a considerableamount of discourse over the in tercom is necessary in addition tomonitoring the radios for information pertinent to the conduct ofsafe flying.

Let's examine what effect excessive or lengthy transmissions haveon the safety of flight. For obviousreasons, it is mandatory that youmonitor the frequency of th e stagefield or facility at which you areworking. f an excessive amount ofchatter is present over the radios,there is a natural tendency to turnthe volume down, since it becomesvery difficult to impart word of

w i s ~ m with distracting chatterassaulting your ears. This maycause you to miss pertinent transmissions , for it is difficult to discernthese from th e remaining chatter.

From another viewpoint, supposeyou are working the local area andmonitoring the appropriate stagefield frequency, and you experiencea flame-out. You attempt to notifythe 'stagefield of this fact, plus giveth em your location. From 700feet AGL in the UH-1B, assuminga normal autorotative descent of1,200 to 1,500 feet per minute, youhave approximately 30 to 40 seconds before ground contact ismade. How often have you heardthis time far exceeded by somestudent inadvertently broadcastingan epilogue on cockpit procedure,10

CW Billy J Allenor some instructor discussing aproblem that could have beendelayed until he was on theground?

Also consider mandatory transmissions at the stag-efield or facility ,such as turning base for a lowlevel autorotation or entering anddeparting traffic. These transmissions not only inform the tower ofyour intentions, but other aircraftin proximity as well, permittingthem to plan accordingly. Yetmore often than necessary, so muchchatter exists as to preclude thesetransmissions until they are eitherworthless, or much reduced ineffectiveness

The whole point is that muchtoo often , really unnecessarychatter prevents transmissionswhich are not only mandatory, butnecessary for the safe operation ofso many aircraft in close proximityto each other.

The great majority of chatter, orunnecessary radio transmIssIOns,can be divided into two generalclasses, those made intentionally,and those mad e with the selectorswitch inadver tently left in thetransmit position, and the floormike switch is used to talk over theintercom.

Let's consider the first groupof transmissions, including thosemade intentionally which are eitherexcessive in length or completelyunnecessary. Many of these transmissions could bes t be eliminatedand the information passed onafter landing. Yet many more couldbe eliminated completely, amongthose being the usual half dozen. responses when someone heedlesslymakes a transmission. I am surewe have all been guilty of this atone time or another.

Perhaps the best way to reduunnecessary chatter is to shortthe length of the transmissiitself. It should be concise, an d'the point. First think about whyou intend to say, then make yotransmission. This will not onreduce repeats caused by errobut it will also reduce the totransmission time considerably. call need only specify who yare, where you are, and your intetions. Let me reiterate, be conciseNow consider the second, somt imes humorous, grouptransmissions, those made unintetionally and those made intentioally, but on an incorrect frequencSometimes they are on the correfrequency, making a legitimacall, but are suddenly distracted some minor crisis, usually precitated by the student.

I recall just such a case. Tinstructor cut the throttle, givihis student a forced landion east downwind at HoopHe made the. required ca

Hooper, six-one-three-four simlated east at which pointvery choice hyphenated expletiwas heard very loud, then silenOne often wonders about tthoughts left unexpressed in susituations. Recently, I overheaan emergency in progress at CairA UH-1 had called in foremergency landing with compltail rotor failure and severe vibtions. He was cleared by the towto take the current active forrunninOg landing. As he stoppsliding, the tower operator askhim to expedite in clearing tactive. There was silence on tradio, but you may rest assurthere were plenty of thougbegging to be expressed. PerhaU S ARMY AVIATION DIGE


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in

we should give the gentleman an"A" in composure.

Recently an aircraft working thelocal area inadvertently transmitted the following conversationbetween its occupants: "Man aliveLook at that red bathing suit.WOW There are two of them.Let's take a closer look." Thencame the usual response from otheraircraft wanting the exact location.

Quite often you only hear onehalf of a conversation such as"but sir but sir From theanguish in the student's voice, youcan pretty well guess the other half.

Usually when an instructormakes the mistake of giving instruction over the air, he s metby a barrage of comments fromhis fellow instructors. These comments may be anything from"Intercom, intercom" to "Wonderful, I was unaware it could be donein that manner."

One particular instructor madethis mistake. He realized it immediately, and then came back overthe air with "Intercom, intercom,"endeavoring to cover it up. How-NOVE ER 9 8

ever everyone recognized his voice.He did not live that one down fora while.

Being on the wrong frequencycan d finitely have its disadvantages. A short time ago a solostud nt made an effort to contactLowe for landing directions whileon Hooper's frequency. One of theinstructors , apparently in a mischievous mood , answered him with,"Roger, six-one-two-zero, approachthe field from east to west at threethousand, make a vertical descentdoing right pedal turns, and landon the fire truck in front of thetower." It goes without question -the student checked his frequency.

Another very common mistakemade by stud nts s attempting tomake a transmission with theselector switch on the intercomposition. The following, related byone of the instructors , apparentlybroke his student of this habit. Thestudent attempted to call Lowe fortakeoff instructions while on theintercom. The instructor answeredon the intercom, "Roger, six-onethree-four, cleared to zero-six left,

QN I procedure turn

make a vertical takeoff to twothousand, make a left pedal turnand depart traffic to the north."The student turned to the IP withhis eyes wide, and said, "Sir, didyou hear that? H e must be joking "

Unfortunately, th majority ofthese accidental transmissions donot provid amus m nt, but ared finitely considered a nuisanceand a hazard. We are not trying totell you how to make your radiocalls, but w do ask you to be briefand to the point. We will not try totell you what transmissions you canmake, but we do ask you to usediscretion. No one s interested inthe fact that you can smell thepine trees while working the contour area, as was overheard veryrecently on the air-to-air frequency.

Remember, a little commoncourtesy never hurt anyone, especially to the poor guy who is tryingto get a message across to hisstudents.

Weare all guil ty of these abusesand we must all work tog ther toeliminate them. Remember thesaying, "Sil nce s golden"?


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HAVE YOU EVER wondered A- twhy, when all else was equal,= Ire raone man was able to live better on t i l i z a t i o nthe same income than another manwho seemingly is under continualfinancial duress? The answer issimple - better management.So, what does that have to dowith Army aviation?

Everyone knows we need moreaircraft and more aviators to meetour commitment in Vietnam . Butwait Do we really? Or are we,like the man in financial trouble,victims of inefficient management?

When infantry divisions werereorganized under the ROCID concept, a major complaint of commanders was that all organic aviation was concentrated at divisionlevel in the aviation company. Thiswas especially true at the battlegroup level.

While the - aviation companyTOE provided a combat supportflight for each battle group, to consist of one helicopter, two pilots, amechanic and a radio-telephoneoperator, these personnel still werea part of the aviation company andonly assigned to the group for duty .One of the pilots acted as the battlegroup aviation officer, but since hewas not assigned by TOE , he wasunable to function as a staff officeron a continuous basis.

When the Army was reorganizedunder the ROAD concept, thisproblem was taken into consideration. In addition to the centralizedpool of aircraft and aviators in thedivision aviation battalion , eachbrigade headquarters and headquarters company was authorizedan organic aviation sectio'n., Thissection consists of four aviators,four light observation helicoptersand the necessary support personnel - all assigned direct ly to thecompany.

The TOE provid es that th eaviation section command er willalso serve as the brigade aviationofficer. Thi s gives the brigadecommander a "full-ti me" staff2

Under ROAD, the aviation officer is available to thebrigade commander as a full-time staff officer. Itsounds good, but it isn t working outLieutenant Colonel illiam B. Monts Jr.

officer to advise him on all matterspertaining to Army aviation support. The aviation officer also mustdo the planning for the most effective use of this support.Looks good doesn t it? I mean ,they ve smoothed all the roughedges and really gotten it in properperspective. There's just one littlebug: it isn t working out that way.Too often the aviation officer isout flying while missions whicheventually will involve aviation arebeing planned. By the time hedoes sit in on the planning session,it frequently is too late to usethe aircraft in the most efficientmanner. Had he been there fromthe start he could have advisedhis fellow planners on how to obtain the ultimate from the proposed operation.

Who is to blame? Both theaviation officer for not demonstrating the importance of planning toinclude the aviation section fromthe start, and the brigade commander for not using the aviationofficer in a staff capacity.Airmobile forces , or teams, employed in offensive operations cantransform limited success into sizeable gains, or th ey can substantiallyshorten th e ti me requir ed toexecu te an operation . A classicexample of what well coordinatedplanning can do is the combinedarms teams of infant ry and armor.The same can and should be donewith avia tion.

The sole miss ion of Ar my aviationis to enh ance the capability of theArmy in per fo rming its overallmiss ion . To accomplish th is mission, avia tion mu st be accepted as

a member, a vital part, of tcombined team.

In addition to the need for haing the aviation officer instrmental in planning, training mwell be a key to the team s succeAviation cannot perform its msion effectively unless it is includin all phases of ground unit traiing. Troops must be familiar wthe types of aircraft that will suport their units. They shouldindoctrinated in safety procedurfor loading, in flight and unloadinTo get the job done requires ththey be proficient in the techniquof rapid unloading and reorgazation in the landing zone.Personnel who are responsifor equipment must be. capable preparing it for movement ashould be familiar with the tecniques of loading and securiequipment aboard the aircraSpecial individuals shouldtrained in selecting landing siand in the techniques of guidiincoming aircraft to landing spoThis will prove invaluable whsmall units such as patrols are be picked up from remote areand during resupply operations.

Major commanders must dirand ensure that training is carriout. Ground commanders atlevels should welcome every oportunity to incorporate combintraining with organic or supportaviation units. This combineffort will benefit both units aensure effect ive teamwork whemployed as a fighting team.

Another problem that couldrectified by better managementaviation resources would beU S. ARMY AVIATION DIGE


15/68

ver-pres nt problem of aircraftThere is seldom

nough aviation support availablesatisfy all justifiable demands.h erefore economy must band missions must b

on a priority basis. Prop rcoordination and controlusing the aviation officera staff capacity would result ing the aircraft where th y're

eeded, when they're ne ded.The present brigade TOE prodes for the aviation section comander to serve as a staff officeras an additional duty though theemphasis placed on his staff

responsibilities I aves much to bedesired. The profes ional Armyaviator can no longer be contentwi th flying proficiency alone H ealso must have a thorough knowl-

dg of the tactical employmen t ofArmy aviation and the opportunityto use his knowledge in staffplanning.

Perhaps the most effective wayto achie e the ultimate from ouraviation avai lable in Vietnamwould be a plan similar to this: Assign a UH-l qualifi d aviatorto the brigade aviation officer slot,making certain he has at least 60days' experience as a member ofan operational assault helicopt rcompany in Vietnam Mo r important, utilize thebrigade aviation officer primarilyas a staff officer and second ari ly asa pilot

Impl ment a tr aInmg programfor all p ronnel with emphasi onteam effort, teaching them howone area of operations complements the other.

While it certainly is cliche, itstill is true that United we standand divided we fall. f the righthand knows what the left is doing,they can share the load . . . if not,they may unknowingly be pu llingagainst each other.NOVEM ER 968


16/68

TheWaywardind

CW William L epin

ERPENT 26, THIS is Jolly 36.Have you in sight. We are at

Y 9ur 1 :30 position Throwingsmoke now, over.As the Hight leader acknowedged the transmission, the pilot


17/68

right seat of the lead helia gentle turn to theand yawed widely. Since

Serpent flight had beento the tops of

that rose abruptly fromcoastal plain. It was now earlyhad logged over six

and the pilot was gettingand tired.Yellow smoke blossomed from a

the nose of theship."Serpent flight, go trail. One

separation between aircraft.five troops, ordered theand the following

into line. Thepilot eased into a descendinglooking the landing zone overThe LZ was extremely small,

lay about halfway up thein a narrow valley.

steep to sit down,pilot, but we can puton the ground and let theof Battle get aboard. Nope,do that - it's too narrow. If

turn sideways we'll get our tailin the trees. We'll have to go

and just touch the toesthe skids while we load. Thendo we get out? Pick up, backa little, then kick in right pedallet the aircraft fall down theDone it beforeno sweat. Wind is real shiftysmoke going in every direction.blowing too hard, though, so

Satisfied with his recon and, the pilotagain and started the Din on final.For the preceding 3 weeks the

battalion of which Serpentpart had been operat-

in not-so-high but extremelyFor the most

the LZs had been single shipmany so small or

get bothon the ground. It was neces

power in, touching oneNOVEM ER 968

skid down lightly to steady the aircraft while loading or unloading.But good fortune had been on theside of the aviators, and aside froma few hairy moments, all had gonewell.

This mission was routine: pickup members of a recon platoon anddrop them off at their companyCPo One trip for each of the fourchoppers, just a 10 minute flight.Piece of cake.

The lead ship approached theslope cautiously, tall grass bendingaround the chin bubbles as the toesof the skids felt for the ground. Atfirst one toe and then the othermade contact, the pilot made analmost imperceptible power adjust-ment, and the D model hung there,balanced like a dragonfly on a grassstem.

The lead pilot eyed his positiondisapprovingly. The slope wassteeper than he had judged - thetips of the rotor blades were whirling very close to the ground infront of the helicopter. Treespressed tightly on either side. Hewould have to move straight backat least 25 feet, for the load wouldsurely be too heavy to allow avertical liftoff.

s the infantrymen clamberedaboard , the helicopter lurchedslightly. Less than 30 secondsafter touchdown the crewchief an -nounced over the intercom, "OKsir, we're up " The aircraft liftedheavily up and backward, awayfrom the slope.

At once the pilot noted that thehelicopter had required far morepower and aft cyclic to get airborne than he had anticipated, buthe was unaware of the reason.Instead of the recommended ACLof five, he had six passengers onboard; three of them were squat-ting on the floor wi th their backsagainst the pilot's seats. Everyoneon board was hanging precariouslyon the ragged edge of the forwardc.g. limit. Then Mother Natureentered the game.

The wayward wind, which hadbeen light and shifting, settleddown to blowing from the fiveo'clock position, increased noticeably in velocity, and added a seriesof short, sharp gusts for goodmeasure. s the wind tried to blowthe tail to the left and into thetrees, the pilot applied left pedal.This placed a greater demand onthe already straining turbine, and ,engine rpm promptly began todecrease.

Then the first gust hit, and thetail lifted. The pilot attempted tomove the cyclic to the rear - andthe stick hit the aft cyclic stop. Theforward tips of the main rotordipped to within inches of themountainside. Just as it seemedcertain the blades would strike theground the gust ended as abruptlyas it had begun, and the taildropped slightly. The audio warn-ing system was screaming in theearphones. The tachometer read5900 rpm, but stabilized - notenough to do any good and nowhere to go.

Then the second gust reachedthe aircraft. Once again the taillifted and rotor blades reached forthe ground. But now the pilot hadrealized the problem and shoutedfor the crewchief to get the troopsto move aft.

Three, perhaps four, times thenose dipped as gusts rocked theship. Each time it seemed thatthe blades must surely strike theground. Then almost simultane-ously the passengers moved aftrestoring the c.g. and the wind,tired of its mischief making, diedas suddenly as it had risen. Asengine rpm built rapidly, the pilotbacked clear of the LZ, made aright pedal turn, and let the air-craft slide down the mountainside,quickly building airspeed.

The flight leader sighed deeplyand keyed the . radio.

"Serpent flight, this is Serpent26. Better make that ACL fourtroops "

5


18/68

You Can tBeat The

Establishment(of good safety procedures)

Students in the U.S. ArmyOrdnance School s aircraftarmament repair course re-ceive intense instruction onsafety procedures. For ex-ample, the soldier at right ispointing out that a sure wayto make conventional typemachine guns safe is to re-move the barrels.

Captain Michael J Williams

SOMEWHERE in Vietnam:Hazy in the darkening twilight,the returning flight of gunshipsmaterialize over the green horizonas a single pulsing dot. The approach is at treetop level, and thenoise of the weary machines reverberates across the sodden land inall di rections. s they move to theirfinal, the sound grows and seemsto saturate the already heavy air,until, like well-strung beads, theHueys drop simultaneously to thebase camp pad. While rotors stillrevolve in the sad, softly swishingbeat which sounds the postlude toevery mission, the crews rapidlyperform their armament safechecks:

Rocket system: off - safed - armswitch - OFF.

Grenade Launcher: power switchOFF.

6

Machineguns: clear.Miniguns: clear.The crewmembers, having com

pleted their tasks, climb down fromtheir aircraft and leave the field,secure in the knowledge that thearmament subsystems behind themare safe. To the ships come themaintenance crews to perform theiroperations - to perform theiropera.tions on dangerously loadedand unsafed weapons, to bewounded or possibly killed ButHOW? WHY?

While South Vietnam has pr,ovedto be an excellent testing groundfor battle, proving an impressivearray of armament subsys,tems forthe UH-l series of helicopters, thewar there has also shown that thesesame weapons must be handledwithin the requirements of a well-

formulated safety program. Soproblems arise because of the coplexity and newness of the weons concerned, but most accideresult from two causes: peoeither fail to comply with SOand clear the weapons systems properly or incompletely or peoassume that hot systems are and act and treat the weapaccordingly. (Are you sure youall six bullets out of every miniglast time you checked the lidevils? You didn't walk in frof the rocket launcher whilemechanic checked the firing cuits? Oy )

Correct and complete emplment of all safety devices orgato each system is basically necsary, augmented in some casesmechanical "fail-safes" and inU S RMY VI TION DIGE


19/68

cases by the liberal application ofgood common sense.Along the safety fixture line, Sagazine has suggested the use ofa cleaning rod between the barrelsof the minigun systems to keep the

barrels from rotating and thusavoid accidental firing. A differentapproach, now in development,involves a bullet catcher-deflectortype of hardware which would slipover the ends of the multibarrelledweapons.

Of course, neither of these, norany other gadgets, will decreasethe need of the crewmen to properly safe their weapons in accordance with all established safetyprocedures.

At the U. S Army OrdnanceCenter and School, maintenancetraining given students enrolled inthe Aircraft Armament RepairCourse (MOS 45J20) is closelyintegrated with intense and continuous safety instruction.

Faculty members in the AircraftArmament Branch of the schoolhave devised their own augmentation systems, which can be usedin addition to the existing electricaldevices to make the safing of theweapons as nearly foolproof aspossible.

These mechanical augmentingdevices use the best features of anumber of special systems and alsoemploy warning flags so that personnel in the area can see forthemselves the actual state of theweapons.While it may be correctly arguedthat all weapons should be treatedas deadly and uncleared, somemeans of advising personnel thatthey are definitely so is advisable,both for on-ground safety reasonsand to eliminate any possibility ofsafed weapons getting off theground.

As prescribed by the school ssystem, aircraft mounting conventioaal 7.62 mm machineguns arecleared through removal of thebarrels during deplaning. In ac-NOVEMBER 968

complishing this and the procedures required by other safingsystems, personnel are taught toboard and deplane the aircraftwithout exposing themselves to thefront of any weapons systems.U sing this procedure, rocket podsare safed against stray voltage andaccidental firing by disconnectingthe cannon plugs immediatelyafter firing. Warning flags can beattached to both these systemsafter the safety procedures areaccomplished.Safing the M -134 minigun inthe M-21 subsystem is a moreinvolved matter because it is amore exotic weapon. With theM-21 subsystem the object of safing procedures is to prevent theweapon from firing by making it

impossible for either the bolt toclose or for the barrels to rotate.The safing problems involved aresomewhat complex because of thedifference between the system andconventional weapons, but the procedures taught by the OrdnanceSchool are simple. With practice,the process, which is designed touse preflight and postflight SOPsby both the crew and maintenancepersonnel, should take no morethan 10 seconds to implement.

The first step in this safety procedure is to clearly mark directional arrows on the gun mount,just above the barrels, which indicate the direction of rotation ofthe barrels to fire or safe. A redarrow indicates the firing rotation,while a green or yellow arrow IS

Figure 1 depicts where the arrows are to be pointed on the gunmount and the location of the hole to be dri l led for use of thesafing systemGUN SUPPORT

IIIIIIIII5 / 16 \ HoleI

GRE E Nr REDY ELL OW I

4 ITO SA F E I TO FIREIIIIII

FRON T17


20/68

You Can t eat The Establishment of goo safety procedures)recommended for the safing direction (fig. 1).

The next step is a modificationof the gun mount above the barrels.This consists of increasing thediameter of the hole located in thecenter of the mount to 5/16th inchto permit a safing rod to beinserted through the hole and between the barrels to prevent thebarrels from rotating. f duringthe insertion of the rod it is necessary to rotate the barrels, the arrowon the gun mount serves as a readyreference for indicating the safedirection.

Even after this rod is installed,however, it is also necessary to safethe gun by preventing the boltfrom closing and allowing a possible misfire. To do this, the outboard safing sector pin and rearcover pin must be removed and thesafing sector cover opened. Withthe reinstallation of the safingsector pin while the cover is stillopen, the gun is safe and ready forcleaning and maintenance. Butthis alone will not clearly indicateto surrounding personnel or tocrewmen that the armament subsystems are safe and cannot be

Figure 2

fired.A visual warning system is employed, therefore, using two red

flags per weapon, about 30 incheslong, to show that the safety operations listed above have been completed. One end of a chain, aboutthree feet in length, is permanentlyfastened to the safing rod. Theother end is clipped to the safetysector pin after it is reinstalled bya snap fastener. One of the flagsis attached to this slip, while theother is permanently attached tothe top of the safing rod. When theoperation , is completed, the flagswill indicate that the armamentsystem is safe to anyone withinsight, with one flag to the frontand the other to the rear.

After maintenance and reloading, the cover is closed and the rearcover pin and safing sector pin areinstalled. The clip with the flagis then attached to the top of thesafing rod. This places the twoflags together, indicating to thosepersonnel in the area that theweapon is loaded. The safing rodcan be removed as part of lastminute preflight preparations. Installation of the device is portrayed

MINIGUN SAFING DEVICE1. Barrel safing rod

Length: 30 inches approximate)Diameter: 5/16 inchesLength from step to tip: 11 inchesMaterial: steel2. ChainLength: 36 inches3. Flags 2 each)

Width: 3 to 4 inchesLength: 30 inchesColor: red or other highly distinguishable color

4. Snap fastener to clip to safety sector pin

18

in figures 3 thru 8 (next page).Two additional safety precautions can be used to make the sys

tem less dangerous. Before landing,the M -134s can be fully depressedwith the action switch on the sight.The trick is to keep the actionswitch pressed down while the system is quickly switched from thearm to off position.

After the guns are reloaded,they can be cranked manually tothe 90 vertical position with thesafing rod still in place until theaircraft is ready for flight. Theguns can be left in that positionuntil after the safing rod is removed and the aircraft is off theground. At that time, the weaponscan be returned to the desiredoperating position with the electrical control system.

The safing device can be carriedon the aircraft when not in use,and can be used immediately afterlanding. The 5/16 inch safing rodis more desirable than a cleaningrod for this purpose since it is lesslikely to bend.

We reiterate and reemphasize:the device is not mistake proof.Like all other systems it requiresconscientious application by safetyminded personnel. It requires continuous checks of safety practicesand systems implementation, andit requires that safety proceduresbe included in unit SOPs ndenforced.

Materials used in the OrdnanceSchool s minigun sating device areavailable in the service section ofa DS or GS company. Materialsare listed in figure 2

Use of the preceding systemswill lmost eliminate any accidents,but the most important elementof any well-formulated safetyprogram remains the same: welltrained personnel to properly implement the unit s establishedsafety program.

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


21/68

Figure 3: Holding the mechanical safing device in his hand, anOrdnance School demonstratorshows proper method of dismounting an aircraft mountingthe XM-21 subsystem. He hasstepped over the rocket tubesand is approaching the minigunf rom the inboard sideFigure 6: The instructor removesthe rear cover pin prior to opening cover. The barrel of weaponis depressed in order to showthis step. The safing rod extendsf rom barrels at lef t

NOVEM ER 1968

Figure 4: While insert ing thesafing rod, the demonstrator iscareful to rotate the minigunbarrels in to safe direction.Notice configuration of safingdevice

Figure 7: This view of the safingdevice clearly shows the conf iguration when properly in stalled. The separated flagsindicate that the weapon is notloaded. In this position the gunis prepared to be loaded

Figure 5: The third step is theremoval of the outboard safingsector pin. The pin is thenclipped to the snap fastener (indemonstrator 's left hand)Figure 8: Both f lags hangingf rom the same point indicatethat the weapon is loaded andonly kept f rom f ir ing by thesafi ng rod. The f lags have beenseparated slightly for i l lustrativepurposes. The gun should nowbe depressed to full vertical tofur ther enhance safety

9


22/68


23/68

The Army-Navy-Air ForceFederal Aviation Agency Procedures for the Control of Air Traffic(AN C / PCAT) Manual V prescribes the duties and responsibilities of air traffic control personnel.In essence it says that the primaryobjective of ATC service is to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious movement of air traffic.This includes preventing collisionsbetween aircraft and obstructions,expediting and maintammg anorderly flow of air traffic, assistingthe person in command of aircraftby providing such advice andinformation as may be useful forthe safe and efficient conduct ofa flight, and notifying appropriateorganizations regarding aircraftknown to be or believed to be inneed of search and rescue aid, andassisting such organizations asrequired.

In general, an airport trafficcontrol tower is responsible forissuing clearances and informationto aviators to protect air traffic byaiding pilots in the prevention ofcollision between aircraft operatingon the ground; aircraft, vehiclesand personnel operating on themovement area; aircraft landingand taking off and in the trafficpattern; and aircraft operatingunder in strument flight rules(IFR) after control of such aircraft has been passed to the towerby the appropriate air route trafficcontrol center. An airport trafficcontrol tower is also responsible forissuing and relaying informationand clearances which will avoid orprevent unnecessary delays.

Several notable court cases haveled to assigning these duties to theATC. In one case the court saidthat Cleared to land issued toan aircraft in the traffic patternau thorizes the pilot to commencehis approach immediately wherever he may be in the trafficpattern and implies that there isno plane ahead of him and that hemay make his turn at his dis-NOVEM ER 968

he airliner was struck from abovecretion, landing at once on thedesignated runway. In this particular case it was held that in clearingtwo planes for the same runway atapproximately the same time control tower personnel failed to exercise reasonable care and their negligence was actionable.

In another case the court heldthat the responsibility of the control tower to give information forthe prevention of collisions hadbeen fully discharged. In this case,the tower had radioed warnings tothe pilot of one of the two planeson a converging course and thepilot acknowledged, reporting hehad the other plane in sight. Flightconditions were visual flight rules(VFR ) .A later court similarly found thefocal point of ultimate responsibility for safe operation of aircraftunder VFR to rest with the pilot.I t ruled that even in the presenceof tower negligence where a pilotcontributes his own negligence byviolating rules of right-of-way hisaction precludes recovery. It wasstated and reiterated that thefunction of tower personnel is toassist the pilot in the performanceof the duties imposed, not relievehim of those duties.

In the days long past, sovereignimmunity prevented the government from getting invoived in actsin violation of du ty by a government employee. Since the TuckerAct of 1887, however, a remedyfor contract clairris against theUnited States has been available.In the '40s, the congressionalcalendar was so choked with individual actions against employeesof the federal government that theFederal Tort Claims Act (FTCA )was enacted to give specific remedythrough the court system.

Dating from 1946, the FTCAwas designed to provide a comprehensive judicial remedy for

claims against the U. S. involving,with certain exceptions, damagecaused by a negligent or wrongfulact or omission of an employee ofthe federal government .while acting wi thin the scope of his 'office oremployment, under circumstanceswhere a private person would beliable in accord with the law of theplace where the act or omissionoccurred.

One specific exclusion meritsmention. The FTCA shall notapply to any claim based uponthe exercise or performance of adiscretionary function or du ty onthe part of the Federal agency oremployee

One of the leading test cases ofthe government's liability cameabout as 'a result of a midair col- 'lision at Washington National Airport. Both an airline carrier and amili tary aircraft were cleared toland on th e same runway at nearlythe same time The weather wasexcellent and the visibility unimpeded. On its final approach theairliner was struck from above andbehind and cut in two. It plungedinto the Potomac Ri ver, killing allon board. The military craft fellinto the river as well, but miraculously the pilot lived. On the finalappeal, it was ruled that thegovernment was liable for its controller negligence and that theairline contributed by failing toobey recognized landing patterns.To present a feeling for the orderof magnitude of damages, theestate of one decedent . wasawarded $100,000, half from theU. S and half from the airline.

Two important governmentallegal premises fell in this case. TheU. S argued that the governmenthad not consented to be sued fornegligence of control tower em ployees regulating air traffic at apublic airport, since the FTCAlimited U. S. liability to that which

2


24/68

learedTo Land -Its Legal Portenta "private individual" would have

un der like circumstances" and theclaims arose from performance of adiscretiona ry function or du ty,thereby being outside the scope ofthe FTCA.

The court's lengthy response boilsdown to this: a number of towers(at that time) were operated bymu nicipalities or corporations whowould be liable for their controlleractions in just such a manner aswas sought to be imposed upon thegovernment here; and tower oper ato rs merely handle operationalduties where there is no room forpolicy judgment an d decision, thusoutside discretionary functions andduties referred to in the act.

In a 1949 case, workers repairingtaxiways were instructed to watchthe tower for warning signals andto move to a safe place when th eywere received. The tower clearedan Army aircraft to taxi and itcollided with a tractor of the workcrew. It had given no signal warnings to the tractor operator, whowas in fact in a blind spot." The:court ruled th a t the tower op erators were un der a du ty to exer cise reasonable care to guardagainst collision and that it was upto them to inform themselves ofthe tractor's location and not togive clearance to aircraft until theway was clear. One man was'severely injured by a propeller.The government was held liable.

Recovery was also permit tedwhere the tower directed a planeto land at night on a runway uponwhich a stalled truck without lightswas being assisted by a secondtruck , also without lights.

Government liability was foundagain where ATC cleared an aircraft to land only to immediatelynotice a craft without radio onth e runway. The latter ignoredlight signals and the two collided.The court the controller

should have advised the approaching airplane of th e danger.

The government was successfullyjoined as a third party where anairline passenger was injured bybeing thrown about inside the airliner during an evasive maneuver.The collision courses were observed on radar by two operatorson the ground ; neither issued awarning.

In another case governmentalliability was established as ATCfailed to give continuous weatherinformation upon which the flightcrew relied.

In one case when air control

The control tower operator is in an extremelyresponsible position,but he doesn t haveabsolute control overthe aviator. For example, one controllercleared student totaxi on the ramp, butnot to collide withgovernment car

personnel transmitted incorrectinform ation to rescue parties concerning the iden tity an d locationof the flight in distress, the U. S.bore th e brunt of their er ror.Passengers in this example wereordered to parachute, but air res- .cue teams were told the wrongarea to search. This mistakenaction worsene d the victims'position.

In an area less clea rly defined ,a controller ' gave a stu dent flierclearance to take off, along withth e standard phrase Watch forturbulence." The student crashedin the wake of a DC-8. The courtfound th e tower oper ator negligent

in his judgment of the dangercreated by air turbulence.

On the other hand, quite a fewwho have taken recourse underthe FTCA haven't fared so well.No government liability was foundin these three cases - where acontroller cleared an aircraft toanother airway; to land underVFR (accepting the pilot's state ment on sighting th e field); or totake off when the pilot lacked theproper license. Likewise government negligence was found not tobe controlling where a departingairliner developed an engine fire ;a member of the Armed Forcessought relief under FTCA; helicopter wake turbulence was allegedto have caused an accident; or ina di fferent wing-tip vortices incident. Further, several instances arein evidence where aviator contributory negligence existed to barrecovery.In one example the United States

brought an d won a case where theto wer had cleared a stu dent to taxion the ramp, but had not clearedhim to collide with a governmentcar

It is th en well established thata control tower operator may beliab le if he is negligent in the per formance of hi s duties. The UnitedStates may also be liable for thenegligence of control tower operators un less their conduct fallswithin an exception to the waiverof sovereign immunity granted byCongress in the Federal TortClaims Act.

There are 10,000 airports in th eUnited States with commercial airlines serving about 550 of them.Only 22 are of major importancein the category of Chicago O'H are.These 22 handle 68 percent of allth e air traffic in the country. Atpeak times, 6,000 aircraft are inU. S skies looking for a place toland. Are our air traffic capabilities

up" to th e challenge ? Thinkabout it yourself the next time youissue, "Cleared to land."U S ARMY AVIATION IGEST


25/68

o ld ierThe soldier not only must be built up physically andmentally he also must acquire moral and spiritual values

A TOUGH soldier in battle ishard and well coordinated.Hi s mind is alert to dangers aroundhim and he is thoroughly groundedin the principles of his arm of theservice. He knows what he is fighting for and believes it is worththe effort. Physically, mentally,morally and spiritually he is prepared to make the supreme sacrific e for the things he cherishes.This, then, is the "tough soldier."

But, toughness has nothing to dowi th how much he can drink,the obscene words he knows, howvulgar he can be, or in how manyways he can show his lack of respect for himself and everybodyelse. Yet to ma ny of our youngsoldiers the word "tough" connotesjust such characteristics, eventhough it is well known that thatkind of soldier does not win battles.He is the kind of "tough" who digsa foxhole so deep that he needs aladder to climb out. H e is the onewho cow ers in the bushes when thefighting begins because he does nothave standards - he does not havea sense of values. H e will not fightfor anything because to him thereis nothing worth fighting for.

Some of the toughest soldiers Iknew in World War II , Kor ea andVietnam were quiet, gent le men.An outstanding instance of coldcourage that I recall occurredwhen an aircraft was down inVietnam. Even after repeatedwarnings, another aircraft went inunder heavy fire to try to save thedowned crew.

Toughness Gentleness Cour:age Indeed, all the human quali-NOV M ER 968

Sergeant Major lenn E Owens

ties that make the soldier are partof our training program, or shouldbe. Military training recognizes thenature of th e man and makes provisions for his well-rounded developm nt. The soldier not onlymust be built up ph ysically andalerted mentally, he also mustacquire a sense of moral andspiritual values.

We ha ve had long exp erienceteaching military subjects andph ysically developing men. Therecords since World War II showwe have been successful and th ereare few who would challenge ourclaim of being exp ert s. Where th emind is concerned, we have forseveral years been using a farreaching and successful method to. stimulate our soldiers. We haveoffered th em educational opportunities far beyond the scope oftechnical military trammg. W ehave helped th em develop th eirminds and improve their skills sothey may l >ecome better soldiers,as well as citizens.

In another field of training however - that of moral and spiritualvalues - we must not let up onour efforts. We do not need menwho fight only because they areordered to, men who are resentfuland careless of their obligationsand of their companions' lives.

There is no reason why the behavior standards - both moral andethical - of a group of soldiersshould not remain as high orhigher than those of a comparablegroup of men anywhere in theworld. The average young soldierwants to do th e right thing and hewill if he knows what it is. H ewants to get along in his unit. Hewants the good opinion of hisassociates and of his superiors. Heis ambitious and he wants to getahead. What he needs more oftenthan not, is proper guid nce andproper leadership But these mustbe accomplished by a strong handto guide him.

23


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G UNSHIPS CLEAR out of thearea. We are going to bringin artillery. All too often attackhelicopter team leaders in Vietnamhear this call from fire supportcoordinators or ground un t commanders. Undoubtedly artilleryforward observers also have beentold to check fire as attack helicopter teams or tactical fighteraircraft were brought in to striketargets that the artillery wasengaging.

This technique of using only oneform of fire support at a time isunnecessary. I t is perfectly safe andproper to use multiple fire supportagencies simultaneously. This isparticularly true if the target areais large. Each fire support categoryhas element s of information thatare necessary for safe operationwh en being employed on the sametarget with other fire supportsystems.

Consider a target that is to beattacked simultaneously by conventional artillery , TAC air, andatt ack helicopters. Preplanning,when possible, will give th e besttarget coverage and effort, but isnot essential. The targe t can evenbe engaged as each type of firesupport becomes available.

Cert ain common element s ofinformation are necessary to alltypes of fi re suppo r t. Simply sta tedeach agency needs to know whereth e ta rget is where the friendlyforces are, and if the friendly forcesare moving, in what di rection andwith what speed .

Generally speaking, certain typesof fire suppo r t require more air- .space than others. This is alwaysconsidered but is especially vitalfor efficient preplanned strikes.Ground artillery (as opposed tonaval gunfire) is normally statiqnary in an established fire supportbase. Artillery units will be firingfrom a fixed position, along anazimuth to fire to th e target . Onlarge operations it is not uncommon for artillery from mo re thanNOVEM ER 968

one fire support base to be able toreach the target. The choice ofartillery locations and types ofartillery only makes th e fire support coordinator or the groundunit commander more flexible inhis method of simultaneous targetattack.

Once the artillery fire supporthas been selected and th e fire baseand azimuth to fire line announced,aircraft can remain clear of thisline.

Air Force fighter aircraft , because of their high speed, needmore airspace than attack helicopters . Once the forward air controller has th e artillery data, hecan select and announce th e direc-

tion of attack and br eak of theT AC aircraft. This will identifythe in tended flight pattern of thehigh performance aircraft.

~ t t c k helicopters while theymay not deliver the most devastating ordnance , are by far th e mostflexible means of fire support. Afterchecking with th e fire supportcoordinator, artillery and T AC airare ass igned sectors of the targetand the a tt ack helicopter teamleader ca n select and recommendhis portion of th e ta rget. H e willavoid the a rtillery azimuth to fireline and the TAC air flight pattern.If severely cra mp ed for airspaceth e att ack helicop ter team leadercan contac t th e forward air controller on UHF radio and requ estadjustment of th e flight pattern of

the high performance aircraft toallow some airspace for the attackhelicopter team. The use of UHFradio will avoid tying up theground FM radio during criticalphases of th e battle.

In guerrilla warfare most targets, ar e fleeting. If we have asuitable target and multiple firesupport agencies ar e available toengage th e target, it is of ten desirable to use this fire support simulta neously. Certainly th ere will betimes when th e commander or hisfire support coordinator may holdvarious types of fire support oncall for Injection at anotherphase of the battle. However, alltoo often the commander or his firesupport coordinator fails to realizethat it is possible to use multiplefire support agencies in a simulta neous attack on a common target. One of the major causes of thislack of technique is non-battletraining safety criteri a .

Training safety will not letvarious fire support agencies practice attacking the same targetsimultaneously. Such a trainingpolicy does not take into accountthe fac t th at we may be receivingcasualti es from th e ene my force inth e target area during the time weare delivering our firepower inincrements. W e ha ve on occasionpaid dea rly when two fire supportmea ns were held off a target whileonly on e fi re support agency wasused to fire on th e enemy force thatwa s cau sing allied casualties.

As creatures of training andhabit we tend to apply what wehave practiced in training ratherth an use the more imaginativem ethods that combat calls for.

Although the separate fire support agencies ha ve not practicedsimultaneou s attack of a commonta rge t, th e lead ers are highlytrained officers who will quicklyadvise each other or the fire support coordinator if the attackj eopardizes ~ i t the groundtroops or support aircraft.

5


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Above, a platoon leader of the 1st Infantry Division calls for firesupport during an assault in Vietnam. Below, an Army aviator ofthe 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile) pinpOints the locations offriendly and enemy troops. To obtain the most effective fire support, both must exchange all significant intelligence concerningthe combat situation

6

The forward air controller isan .officer and pilot. The attackhelicopter team leader is either acommissioned officer or a battleseasoned warrant officer. The artil-lery will be controlled by a highlytrained , often fully seasoned, com-bat veteran. A simultaneous attackof a common target is well withintheir capabilities.

Other problem areas and mis-uses of attack helicopters are com-mon in Vietnam. Many of theseproblems can be brought up atpremission briefings and on liaisonvisits to ground troop commandposts. Aviation personnel shouldcontinually strive to make theforces they support aware of theseproblems and should suggest alter-nate methods and techniques toachieve bett er, less costly results.Some of the more serious and mostcommon problems, as well as sug-gested solutions to these problems,are discussed briefly.

On occasion the ground com-mander will instruct the attackhelicopter team to strike in a givendirection, such as Attack fromnorth to south. This is not desir-able. The ground commander isnot trained in attack helicoptercardinal rules; he may not realizethe limitations of attack helicop-ters; and he will often subject theattack helicopter team to fires hewould not ask his ground troops toexpose themselves to. Attack heli-copter teams make every effort tohonor the ground commander's re-quested direction of attack, but thefinal de cision on a di rec tion ofattack rests with th e team leader.

f after considering cardinalrules and weapons limitations theteam leader feels he cannot com-ply with th e requested direction ofat tack, he should notify the groundcommander before starting the firstfiring pass. He should also tellthe ground commander the reasonfor selec ting another di rection ofattack. An example of this callmight be: I will attack from east

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to west. I observe friendly forcessou th of the target and my ricochets and long rounds would endanger them.

A better method for the groundcommander is to briefly give theattack helicopter team leader anyspecial considerations such as,

Another friendly unit is east ofme and moving toward objectivered. This permits the attack heli-copter team leader to consider allcritical information before selectingthe ordnance, direction and angleof attack.

Numerous methods are used inmarking targets and designatingfriendly unit locations. Somc ofthese techniques include: map co-ordinates, colored smoke grenades,polar coordinates from a prominentlandmark, use of points of origin,flare guns, mirrors, panels, tracersmoke rockets, or artillery markingrounds.

An attack helicopter team leadermust be prepared to receive, or callfor, any of th ese signals to identifyfriendly ground units or enemylocations. One of the cardinal rulesfor attack helicopter employment isto positively locate the friendlyunits before firing. Normally, whennot operating in high dense jungle,the team leader will call for asmoke marking grenade from thefriendly ground units. This isusually a mark of the forwardunits. To designate the target; acommon practice for the groundcommander is to then give a rangeand azimuth from the smoke to thetarget.

Ground commanders are changedfrequently. This is caused by rotation policy, friendly casualties, andan effort to allow officers to getexperience as ground commandersin combat. Unfortunately, markingmethods are all too often forgottenin training replacement groundcommanders. Sometimes it is neces-sary for attack helicopter teams toassist n vy ground commanders inmarking their positions and thenNOVEM ER 968

milk from them the location ofthe target. Liaison visits before anoperation can smooth out thisproblem while no combat pressureexists.

Attack helicopters frequentlyare misused to furnish blocking. fires. Normally, this role is accomplished more efficiently and morecontinuously by artillery. Whenattack helicopters are employedon station to assist ground ele-

ments and are not attacking targets, they can often be sensiblyemployed in a screening role.

Sometimes it is necessary for theattack helicopter team leader tosuggest this role to the groundcommander, especially if givensuch instructions as, Gunshipsorbit somewhere out of the areauntil I call you in.I t is possible for an attack heli-copter team to screen lightlywooded escape routes and streamsfor enemy activity while artilleryblocking fires are used in th edensely wooded areas. f thescreening aircraft receive fire orsight enemy personnel, they areimmediately able to react withfires.

Often blanket firing approval

can be given for large portions ofthe operational area. This is mostdesirable. When it is not possibledistinct rules of engagement andsources of firing approval can bequickly arranged by radio.

During premission briefings andliaison visits the roles of air block-ing and screening can be discussed.Aviation personnel should attemptto point out how they can bestserve as attack helicopter teams.This assists ground commanders insensibly planning for attack heli-copter teams and facilitates earlyfiring clearance on targets.

Frequently the supported groundtroops hear enemy fire on attackhelicopter teams and assume thatthe fire team is aware of the enemyfire. Attack helicopter teams willeither avoid the area of fire or willreturn fire or request to return it.f the helicopter team continues to

orbit and takes no action againstthe enemy force, then the groundforces should assume that the airteam is unaware of the enemyspresence.

t IS possible through commander's conferences and notesand through premission and liaisonvisits to encourage ground com-

Attack helicopters often are misused to furnish blocking fires whenusually this is accomplished better by artillery. Below: 1st CavalryDivision Airmobile) artillery provides such fire in an engagementnear Qui Nhon in Vietnam


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viatorsshould not attack over the heads of friendly forcesmanders to bring this problem tothe attention of their junior leaders.

The problem of hearing enemyfire is more acute in the HueyCobra attack helicopter. The enclosed canopy makes audio detection of enemy fires virtually impossible.

Once a target has been desig-nated by the ground force it doesnot mean that attack helicopterfires cannot be adjusted. Groundelements may see the aircraft striking the wrong treeline or canal,which is highly possible when thetarget may be only 50 meters or soapart. Then two weeks later thehelicopter team may learn of thiswpen an infantry or cavalry friendchides one of the team membersabout striking the wrong treeline.This is a waste of fire support. t isperfectly correct and sensible forthe ground unit to advise the attackhelicopter to adjust his fires. Itmight be as simple as this call,Strike the next canal line closer

to us or Move it out to the westanother 100 meters. Ground unitsshoul make a fire adjustment afterthe first firing pass and before thesecond. This ensures maximum ef-fect from the ordnance delivered.

One of the cardinal rules ofattack helicopter employment is toavoid attacking over the heads offriendly units. There are sevpr tlreasons for this. One is that as theenemy is usually on line in anydeliberate opposition to our move-ment he will have most of hisweapons oriented at our friendly28

ground forces. To attack over thefriendly forces would be to attackinto the greatest number of enemyweapons. A second reason is thatthis method of attack usually doesnot line up the long axis of thetarget with the long axis of thehelicopter weapon's. beaten zone.A third reason is that brass frommachine or automatic guns andexpended rocket caps will fall onfriendly troops. Only the mostseasoned troops do not get rattledby this falling brass. The low altitudes and airspeeds used by attackhelicopters does not make the fall-ing brass dangerous, but the noiseand sight of the brass is discon-certing.

The low angle of attack some-times used by helicopters causesrockets to pass close over the headsof friendly troops. This is anotherconsideration for not firing overthe heads of the friendlies.

Most field commanders arenormally located behind their advance elements. This allows thecommander necessary freedom tocommand his entire unit toemploy various means of fire support. Most field commanders havesome idea of the attack angles usedby fighter type aircraft. However,unless the field commander hasseen combat in Vietnam, he usuallyis not familiar with the low angleof attack that helicopters usewhile engaging most targets.A rocket fired by an attack heli-copter may pass only 10 feet abovethe trees that mark the known

pOSItion of friendly units. Thisrocket, because of the shallow angleof attack, may detonate 150 metersor more in front of the friendlytroops. An inexperienced fieldcommander, even a very cool one,will often get upset when he seesfriendly ordnance flying only a fewfeet above the heads of his troops.Attack helicopter team leaders aretrained to make every effort toavoid attacking over the heads offriendly units.

In some cases attack helicoptersare forced to fire over the heads offriendlies if they are to furnish firesupport. This may be caused bydeployment of large numbers offriendly forces or by the nature ofthe terrain, such as when contactis made on a very narrow canal ortreeline down which friendly forcesare moving.

When it is necessary to fire overfriendly units, the hdicopter teamleader should notify the groundcommander and remind him of thefalling brass. Present training doesnot prepare our ground troops forthis problem. Some allied forcesand even unseasoned U. S. forceshave mistaken the brass for eitherfriendly or enemy fires and havetaken inappropriate actions, suchas withdrawing or wastefully ex-pending ammunition.Several points in this article areintended for both ground commanders and attack helicopterpilots. For ground commandersthere are some points to considerin training and advising the troopsand some personal do s and don'ts.For aviation types there are severalpoints to bring up to field commanders at liaison visits, premission brie.fings, and planning conferences. In summary these pointsare: A common target can be at tacked simultaneously by multiplefire support systems such as artillery, TAC air, and attack heli-copters.

It is best if ground unit com-U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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manders do ot request a specificdirection of attack from the helicopter team leaders. The teamleader may violate a principle ofemployment in an effort to attackas requested. A better techniques for the ground commander tobriefly give the attack helicopterteam leader any special considera-tions that may influence his selection of a method of attack.

Ground units should be pre-pared to mark their positions inthe field. Panels smoke and inheavy jungle, flares should be car-ried by advance u n i ~

Attack helicopters are notusually well used when called onto furnish blocking fires. Artillerycan do this job better.

Attack helicopters can effectively screen large areas of semiopen terrain and are best employedscreening when given firing clear-ance in advance, if the rules ofengagement permit.

Troops on the ground may beaware of enemy fires being de-livered at attack helicopter teams.If the team does not return fire oravoid the area the ground unitshould advise the helicopters ofthis fire.

Ground troops should makefire adjustments of attack helicopter fires for maximum effect.

Troops should be informedof possible falling brass and rocketcaps and the low angle of attackoften used with rockets when at-tack helicopters are supporting.

Why so late with these tips?Why didn't one of the early UTTteam leaders get this down inwriting ? So of en we assim

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Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1968

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