Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1974

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1974

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.USAARL

SCI SUPPORT CENTERPO. BOX 620577

FORT RUCKER AL 36362 0577


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UNITED

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANDAUDITOR GENERALLTG H. N. MaplesCOMMANDER U. S. ARMYAGENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETYCOL Norman W PaulsonCOMMANDING GENERAL

RMY VI TION

1GESJNOVEMBER 1974 VOLUME 20 NUMBER 11Where We Are-Where We Are Going MG William J Maddox Jr. 1Aviation Training In FORSCOM COL Ray Pollard . . . . . . . . . . 4View From The Training Base LTC Ernest M. Wood Jr. . . . . . . 6Instrument Training In Europe CPT Donald B. Skipper. . . . . . . . . . . 10Army Aviation Hall Of Fame 3Parachute Escape From Helicopters, COL William P. Shane, M.D. . . . . 14Army Aviation Museum Association, LTC William H. Howell USA, Ret.) . 18ACase Study Of Instrument Refresher Training, Robert N. Isley. . . . . 24Mission Poss ible Sense MAJ Chester Goolrick. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30The Interview . 36


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WHERE WE ARECommander U S. Army Aviation Center

T ODAY ARMY AVIATIONtraining doctrine s being overhauled to prepare our airmobileforces for combat operations in amid-intensity war. But, the task ofdescribing the end results of today straining program - aviation employment in a mid-intensity war-


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to a force composed of 90 percent helicopters, mostof which served as true combat vehicles. With themwe proved the concept of airmobility as envisionedby the Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board,better known as Howze Board.

Army aviation has flown 16.7 million combathours during 11 years of fighting

Indeed, in Vietnam the helicopter became the keyto success in most combat actions. While action wasoften heavy, we did not generally operate in a highair defense threat environment. However, duringLamson 719 and the 1972 North Vietnamese offensive, we encountered increasingly sophisticated airdefense weapons. Only a relatively few aviators re-

mained incountry to share this experience. t theclose of the war, we demonstrated the capability ofthe aerial TOW Tube launched, Optically tracked,Wire guided) missile in the antitank role. Thus, itwas the requirements and experience of Vietnamthat have determined, for the most part, our currentcapabilities and force structure.

The October 1973 Middle East war gave aclearer picture of the mid intensity battlefield

In October 1973 a short, intense war occurred inthe Middle East. Although the helicopter was not usedextensively by either side, the war provided us a c1earerpicture of the mid-intensity battlefield. t described theenvironment within which our aviation systems mustoperate:

here e ereAn OH l 3 of the 1 9505


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First, highly sophisticated Soviet equipment wasused in vast quantities with heavy emphasis on antiaircraft and anti armor weapons. Second, the Arabs were equipped for extensivenighttime operations. This capability was not fullyexploited by the Arabs, but the threat was there. Third, extensive electronic warfare capabilitieswere demonstrated. Fourth, well-trained soldiers and combined armstactics paid off handsomely and are considered tohave made the difference once the Israeli forceswere fully mobilized and committed.Keeping the contrasting wars of Vietnam and theMiddle East in mind, where do we in aviation standtoday? Since the last Army Aviation Program Reviewin December 1972, we have assumed a post-Vietnamdeployment posture. We have one airmobile divisionat Fort Campbell, KY , and a skeleton air cavalrycombat brigade at Fort Hood, TX. The Tricap Division is returning to an armored configuration.To help further clarify where we are it is necessary to consider the following aspects of Army aviation as it exists today: Aviation organizations are decentralized to thelevel where the tactical ground commander has a

Where WeAren AH1 HueyCobra of the 96 5 and 7 s

fulltime need. Training responsibilities also havebeen decentralized. Proponency for aviation organizations and aircraft has been decentralized to the various branchcenters as listed in the box on page 21 . There is a body of applicable training literature,but it is incomplete, overly parochial and based primarily on our Vietnam experience.

The first steps have been taken for integratingArmy and Air Force training on the various closeair support and firepower means available. The U. SArmy Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)has established joint working committees with theTactical Air Command (TAC). Recently, TRADOCand TAC published a draft manual on airspace management that was endorsed by the Air Force chiefof staff, General George S Brown, and GeneralFrederick C. Weyand, as the Army vice chief. With the exception of attack helicopters and

utility fixed wing transportation, the Reserve Components are equipped with first line aircraft. TheArmy, as a whole, is at or near its authorized acquisition objective except for these two types of aircraft.Continued on page 2

WhereWe Are o ingAdvanced attack helicopter mockups


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Aviation Training In FoRSCoM

Readers will learn of FORSCOM U. S. Army ForcesCommand efforts to accelerate the state of readiness ofaviation units and the priorities established for trainingand equipping them. The training of instructor pilots inthe field was one major problem: new tactics, NOE night


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ponent aviators have been trainedin NOE flight techniques.One major problem that had tobe overcome to get the programmoving was the training of existinginstructor pilots (IPs) from the fieldin NOE flight techniques. Resourceconstraints precluded the U. S.Army Aviation Center at FortRucker, AL, from accomplishing

this training, except for a smallnumber of trade-off quotas. Tomeet immediate demands for IPsfor both active Army and ReserveComponent units, FORSCOMtasked four installations to conductNOE IP training Fort Bragg,NC; Fort Campbell, KY; FortHood, TX; and Fort Lewis, WA).To date, about 225 IPs have beenqualified; future requirements willbe satisfied as Aviation Center IPprograms are initiated (see ViewFrom The Training Base, beginning on page 6 in this issue).

A unit that cannot operateroutinely and effectively at nightis only 50 percent combat ready.Proficiency in tactical night operations has become increasingly important. It is accented by recent

FORS OM NOE Aviator TrainingPriority I Air cavalry troops

Attack helicopter companies Assault helicopter companies Brigade aviation sections Artillery sections/groups Aerial Field Artil lery batteries Air ambulance companies Special Forces detachments

Figure 1NOE Training PhasesPhase ICompletion Target Date End V 74

Active Army; FV75, Reserve ompo Selection of NOE training area Establish boundaries Layout fligh t routes min 4) Complete all land use agreements Assemble and post hazard maps Select and train instructor pilots Complete lesson plans and SOP Training area-POl-SOP approved byinstallation commander

Phase IICompletion Target Date end V 75,Active Army; V 76, Reserve omp

complete. The majority of aviatorsremaining to be qualified are in aprohibited flight status because oftheir current assignments.Some work remains in the Reserve Components. Latest reportsindicate that 69 percent of theReserve Component aviators haveacquired instrument qualifications.While great strides have been made,resource constraints, civilian jobconflicts and a lack of properlyinstrumented aircraft continue toimpact on the timely completionof this program.

Much of FORSCOM's efforts arecentered around devising programsand providing assistance to theReserve Components with the goalof increasing readiness. In thisregard FORSCOM, in coordination with the Aviation Center, istesting a program to bring selectedReserve Component aviation unitsto Fort Rucker for annual training.Earlier this year the Aviation Center developed a 2 week program ofinstruction POI) for this purpose.As one senior officer phrased it,The POI is designed to field strip,clean and oil the unit during the


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T owARD THE END of the United States in.volvement in the Republic of Vietnam we sawthe level of sophistication of the enemy forces risemarkedly. We discovered that flight techniques thathad been so successful for years were resulting inunexpected losses. This was particularly true nearthe demilitarized zone and the operational areas adjacent to Laos and Cambodia.

To survive, we began flying at lower altitudes thanhad previously been required. The U. S Army A viation Center at Fort Rucker, AL, could no longer afford to prepare graduates for operation in a lowintensity environment. We chose instead to orientour tactical flight training to a European environmentand to East European weaponry. We also found thatthe combat experience of the operational aviator wasrapidly decreasing.

Our equipment was also changing. The massivedrawdown of Army forces in Vietnam made available a s i g n i f i c ~ t number of UH l helicopters. Simultaneously technology had provided the AviationCenter with a new family of aircraft simulators.

In effect the aviation community was facing arequirement to address a rapidly increasing enemythreat capability. The reorientation required by thisincrease would be costly. But it had to be accomplished quickly. The timely introduction of these advanced state simulators gave the Army a choice. tcould reduce aviation training costs or it could usethe savings generated by the introduction of simulators to offset the cost of incre sed tactical flighttraining. The Army chose more tactics.

upon assignment to the unit, are prepared to receiveunit training focused on a particular deploymentscenario.An excellent example of this reorientation intactical training is the Initial Entry Rotary Wing(IERW) Course, the fountainhead of the aviatorforce structure. This course is the mechanism throughwhich aviators possessing new skills, knowledge andoperational techniques are provided to combat aviation units. During 1974 we will be producing about55 officer and warrant officer aviators every 2 weeks.This graduate has received more tactics, more nightand more instrument training than his predecessor.Today s graduate receives the program depicted infigure 1. The program was designed with the needsof the combat aviation unit in mind and is considereda better base on which to build a combat effectiveaviator.Speaking of tactics, I would like to discuss brieflyour experience in teaching terr in flight This is aterm you may not immediately recognize. We at theA viation Center have noted great disparity concerning the understanding of the term nap-of-the-earth(NOE). Many consider NOE to be flight at grasstop .level, or between treetops, or just above the treetopsa l l of which may at one time or another be correct.But when considering that the purpose of such flightis to avoid enemy detection by taking maximumadvantage of whatever natural or manmade terrain

features lie between an aircraft and the detectionmechanisms of the enemy, the term terrain flightappears to be more accurate and thus less prone to


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Initial Entry Rotary Wing Course180 flight hours ~ ; Contact/Tactics20 SFTS hours 4 ~ 1 I : t I UH 1 65 hours;t; Instruments- UH-l 30 hours

Instruments- Simulators 20 hours~ Primary-1H-55 85 hours

Figure 1terrain flight training has been a learning experiencefor us. We, and units in the field, found that inmost cases the military reservations were generallynot large enough to support an active terrain flightprogram. When this training was moved offpost wefound that public acceptance must be preceded byan active campaign to secure their support. Wefound that the procedure of flying an establishedcourse line had three major drawbacks: The student was not trained to select his route. The instructor quickly memorized the route. Free navigation allowing the injection of tacticalproblems was not permitted.These drawbacks emphasize the fact that the abilityto navigate is the cornerstone of terrain flight. Toensure proper navigation training we incorporated abox training concept.

Basically we have superimposed a division area ofoperations (AO) on the training area and furtherdesignated a brigade-sized area . . . a box . . . in

Current65 hours

163191215o

Tactics Flight Training

ContactContact NightTactical FlightTactical NightNOEFEXFigure 3

Optimum85 hours

18 (2)6 3)16 (-3)23 11)15 (0)7 (7)

into forthcoming Army training and evaluation programs and other training literature.Currently our night instruction incorporates lowlevel techniques, operations under conditions of reduced aircraft and landing zone lighting and ultimately we will begin utilizing night vision devicesin the initial entry program.There is an increased emphasis on electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures through suchmeans as the equipment in figure 2. With this equipment we can accurately simulate enemy jammingtechniques and thus provide added realism to tacticalproblems.We also have moved into the area of low altitudetactical instrument flight at altitudes compatible withthe requirement for limited all-weather capability ina high-threat environment.

These experimentations are an attempt to determine to what extent we can safely, and with confidence, exploit man and machine on the battlefield.


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UH-lSynthetic FlightTraining System 2B2SFTS)

This course has not been formally submitted andresources to support implementation have not yetbeen identified. We are still attempting to modify thiscourse in consonance with the needs of the user.Nevertheless, we feel that this optimum programwarrants serious consideration.Earlier I mentioned flight simulation. We at theAviation Center are quite enthusiastic concerningflight simulators. The 2B24 SFTS (synthetic flighttraining system) is the first simulator possessing highfidelity to actual flight. This simulator consists offour UR-1 cockpits (figure 4 ; a controller's console; and related computer equipment (see SFTS,September 1972 DIGEST .

The fidelity to actual instrument flight conditionsafforded by the 2B24 is such that we are able toeffect reductions in flight hours , particularly at thegraduate level of training. Two courses where the2B24 has made its performance well known are theRotary Wing Instrument Course and the RotaryWing Qualification Course.

Rotary Wing Qualification CourseFormer Training

.. Instruments~ ~ i '- UH-l 25 hours

Contact-UH-l 27 hoursz : = ~ Contact-OH-S8 25 hours

Figure 7

Rotary Wing Qualification CoursePresent Training%1ii Contact / Tactics

~ d 1 i i : aUH-l 30 hours

InstrumentsUH-l 6 hoursInstruments-Simulators 27 hoursContact-UH-l 6 hours

Figure 8Prior to the use of the 2B24, the Rotary WingInstrument Course was structured as shown in figure5. As you can see, we relied heavily on the WorldWar II vintage Link trainer and actual flight hours.

The new course initiated last May is depicted infigure 6. t has been reduced from 8 to 6 weeks,only 7 flight hours are now used . and substantialsavings have been realized.


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CH 47 Operational Flight Trainer 2831, with visualsystem engineering development unit

AH 1 Q Cobra)operationalflight trainer weaponsystem simulator, Device 2833 with visual system

Figure 9Now let s look at simulators that are down theroad. The CH-47 Chinook simulator-known as the2B31-and the AH-l Cobra/TOW simulatorknown as the 2B33 (figure 9)-will consist of essentially the same systems identified previously forthe 2B24 with one major exception-these two devices will be equipped with visual projection systemsusing one or more scaled terrain boards and opticalprobes to simulate visual flight conditions.The 2B31 and 2B33, scheduled for delivery latein 1976, will be the Army s first attempt to equipheiicopter simulators with visual systems. We fullyexpect these two simulators to permit the initial aircraft qualification of aviators and, in the case of theAH-I0 device, initial aircraft and gunnery qualification at reduced flying hour levels. In fact, we havedetermined through considerable testing and actual

use in the IERW Course, that a substantial portionof the instrument flight phase can be converted tothe simulator.

This is a rather basic portrayal compared to themyriad of tactical flight tasks that we expect an Armyaviator to perform. We believe that advances invisual technology, coupled with a comprehensive testand evaluation of the CH-47 and Cobra/TOWsimulators, will pave the way to improved studentquality at reduced training cost.The Army Aviation Standardization Program is

the Aviation Center s major onsite contact with anoperational unit. Recognizing the importance of thisprogram the Aviation Center has formed a hardhitting, double-barreled program aimed at providinga boost to the all-out effort to promote worldwidesafety and standardization. This program is conductedthrough the joint efforts of the Aviation Center sOffice of Standardization and the U. S Army Agencyfor Aviation Safety USAAAVS), an agency of theOffice of The Inspector General.We now have a mechanism for evaluating training activities at any level through assistance visits,


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frumentInEUROPECaptain Donald B Skipperd Armored Division


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look at the enroute, approach andtower facilities and gained insightsinto the problems of handlingthousands of aircraft on a dailybasis. The tour gave the Germanair traffic controllers an opportunity to brief the pilots on Germanflight procedures and created anatmosphere of lasting good willbetween the American pilots andthe German controllers.

The flight training was brokendown into two phases: 10 hours ofbasic instrument training to ensurethat the aviator could handle theaircraft without devoting 100 percent of his attention to it; 20 hoursof advanced instrument trainingconducted in the Federal Airwayssystem of Germany to acquaint theaviator with advanced instrumentflight procedures. Because of thelack of U. S. military instrumentapproaches in U. S. Army, Europe(USAREUR), the school used theGerman civilian facilities for mostapproaches.

All flights in the advanced phaseof training were made on instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plansto ensure that the student pilotgained a thorough knowledge of

To combat this instant terror inthe cockpit the emphasis in theground school was on thinking.There are two parts to flying inIFR conditions. One is knowinghow to control the aircraft withoutoutside reference. This is relativelyeasy to master and most of thestudents were confident partialpanel pilots after 10 hours ofbasic instrument training. Thesecond and possibly most important part to safe weather flying isnavigation by radio, handling myriad communications for air trafficcontrol (ATC) purposes, obtaining weather information, being ableto locate the position of the aircraft, figuring time, distance, fuelproblems and thinking.

One reason people get into somuch trouble flying IFR is thatthey do not do enough logicalthinking before they fly. The preflight planning for fuel reserves,weather analysis, route of flight,etc., must be done in a completelylogical manner. Desire alone doesnot a successful flight makeThe ground school really emphasized clear, logical thinking

tive and popular it was made partof the syllabus of instruction. Therules of the game were:1. The flight was to be conducted as if it were real (i.e., thestudent pilots could not leave theirseats) .2. ATC procedures were strictlyadhered to.3. All radio communicationswere spoken to the ATC instructor.

4. The actual time of flight orreal time was used.5. Only those charts, maps andapproach plates normally in the aircraft could be used.During these simulated flightstime could be taken to explain the

how or why of an ATC request.The simulated weather could bedeteriorated to stimulate studentthinking. What if the weather isreported to be below minimum atdestination with fog forming at thealternate? What if you receivedinstruction to hold at Salmunsterintersection? How will this affectyour capability to reach your alternate, if necessary? What if youhave lost communications whileholding?


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with some paper on it so he couldcopy clearance and estimates. Helearned to copy weather andclearance changes, keep track offuel and frequencies. When nocontact was made on a frequencychange, the student pilot just referred to his last frequency writt non his kneeboard to reestablishcontact.

Keeping a neat, organized cockpit makes instrument flying easierand more enjoyable but more im

aircraft. n excellent example ofour unofficial priority took placeover Nurnberg International Airport:

Army 60877 was cleared for abackcourse localizer, runway 10and report Nurnberg west. Clipper784 was told to continue holdingbecause our helicopter was on apractice approach.

The above situation actuallytranspired one autumn day in 1972

Each student toured thefacilities at Frankfort In -ternational irport forlook at the en route, ap-proach and terminal fa -cilities located there

strument School successfullytrained all the aviators in the division who required an initial issuestandard instrument ticket andsimultaneously trained those aviators assigned to a V Corps aviation unit 32d Signal BattalionAviation Section) based at Mau-rice Rose Army Airfield before the31 December 1972 deadline. Thirtystudents successfully passed grueling instrument checkrides oftenunder IFR conditions and the


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On 6 June 1974 aviationpioneers were inductedinto the U. S. Army Aviat ion Hall of Fame. TheAVIATION DIGEST hasprinted biographies oftwo. This is the third, LTGRobert R. Williams (USA,Ret.), who is consideredby many as the Fatherof Army Aviation

Lieutenant General Robert R. Williams USA, RetiredIn the photo to the left, Colonel Robert R. Will iams (left) congratulates Captain .James Bowman and Mr .Joe Givens in 1956 after havingstayed airborne in an OH-23 helicopter for 30hours while covering a distance of 1,520 miles


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Colonel William P. Schane M.D.

Experimental evidence shows that aparachutist experiences o d fficu Ityin achieving vertical and horizontalseparation from an autorotating hel i-copter. At high rates of descent thereis a 0.75 second delay before verticalseparation begins

minimal surface area to the relative wind, this ratecan be increased to as much as 21,000 fpm. Third, when the escaping crewmember leavesthe disabled helicopter he will begin his accelerationto his eventual equilibrium velocity from a baselinevelocity equal to the rate of descent of the helicopterat his moment of exit.Thus, logic dictates that the jumper will achieve


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COL Schane M.D. is Director Avia-tion Medicine Research DivisionU. S. Army Aeromedical ResearchLaboratory Ft. Rucker AL

P R CHUTE ESC PEFROM HELICOPTERS

frames per second with an Arriflex motion picturecamera and by 35 mm slides taken four frames persecond by a motorized Nikon camera.The photo platform was a chase helicopter flyingprecise formation with the jump helicopter. Themotion pictures were submitted to a frame-by-frameanalysis with data being obtained by measuring andrecording the distance separating a reference point

eter which provides precise altitude informationabove ground level. This recording radar altimetercontinuously plotted the position of the aircraft aboveground level. The exact time of the parachutist s exitwas marked on this plot. The helicopter s rate ofdescent at the moment of the exit was determined byestablishing the slope of the plot of altitude versusthe time at the moment of the exit.


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Figure 3

1 2 SEC

the aircraft. No information is available in jumpnumber seven due to a malfunction of the motion

1 2 EC

3 4 SEC


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3 4 S E igure 1 4 SE

SE

The vertical velocity plot of a stable parachutistduring his acceleration phase from an initial vertical

2 S E

a UH-l helicopter to view sling cargo loads, causesabout twice the drag as would be calculated from its


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rmyAviation Museum AssociationLieutenant Colonel William H. Howell USA, Retired

Curator, U. S. Army Aviation MuseumThe nonprofit Army Aviation Museum Association wasformed in 969 with the intention of building the proudheritage of Army aviation. Unenhanced by limited displayfacilities at Fort Rucker the Museum Association plansa vast new building one-half mile from the Ozark gate

I T SEEMS TH T $25.00 wouldbe hardly worth mentioning think about tactics, research anddevelopment, training, maintenance the building) is before the Congress of the United States. t al


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MusEu

Service so contributions would betax deductible.

I ~ @ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ @ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ @ 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I I I I I ~ @ I I I I I I ~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ @ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ _

VI TION IGESTiling AwarJd

The Army Aviation Museum Association is sponsoring a monthlyand annual writing awards contest to recognize the best articlesappearing in the u. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST. Each month theMuseum Association awards a 25.00 U. S. Savings Bond to theauthor of the best article appearing in that issue.At the end of the fiscal year three annual winners will be selectedfrom the monthly first place winners. The Museum Association willaward the author of the article selected as best of the year anengraved bronze plaque plus a 100 bond. t will award secondplace a 75.00 bond and certificate and third place a 25.00 bondand certificate.Monthly first and second place authors ,also will continue to getcertificates. N onwinners each month will be presented a certificatestating that they have had an article published in the u. S. ARMY

AVIATION DIGEST. All published authors are credited in their 201files or appropriate personnel records if they are civilians.To be eligible for ,an award an artiole must be original and concernArmy aviation or related subjects. Dual authored articles are noteligible for the contest, but they can be selected for publication.Winning articles are selected by judges who review the manuscripts without bylines. Selection is based on accuracy, completeness, originality, readability, soundness, substance and overall merit.

f you would like to discuss a topic, write us or call: commercialnumber, 205-255-3619/6680; AU TOVON, 558-3619/6680.Authors should include pictures, diagrams or charts available ornecessary to illustrate manuscripts. Your articles should be sub


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which cannot be displayed. Between the efforts of Fort Ruckerand the Association, the museumwill not become static but will growin size and quality in order topresent the story of Army aviationand the Army to the visiting public.Since its beginning in 1969 theMuseum Association, whose Boardof Directors consist of membersfrom Ozark, Daleville, Enterprise,Dothan and Fort Rucker, has attempted several approaches to itsgoal of building a museum. Theinitial plan was to raise fundsthrough a national drive to build

a facility on Fort Rucker and donate it to the Army. This plan wasabandoned due to the poor economic climate in the aviation industry which would have to donatemost of the funds. Another planwas to have the State of Alabamaform an Army Aviation MuseumCommission, build a state ownedfacility and operate it similar tothe Space Museum in Huntsville,AL. This bill was introduced in theAlabama legislature but did notreach the floor before adjournment.Mr. Brown then presented the current plan which now is before

Congress) to the Board of Directors and the commahding general of Fort Rucker.The new Army Aviation Museum not only will tell the storyof Army aviation from its beginning in 1942 to its present important role in airmobility capabilitiesof supporting the ground soldierbut also will be a memorial to thededicated Army aviation personneland the industry. This proud live

history presentation will be educational and inspirational to futureArmy aviation personnel and thevisiting pUblic --.....


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WHERE WE REontinued from page 3 Overall, our combat readiness flying program

has been updated. Most significantly, orders havebeen issued for the Army at large to conduct napof-the-earth NOE) training. Aviators are coming under Officer PersonnelManagement System OPMS). Immediate adjustments in the career handling of aviators are required,particularly in light of the new flight pay legislation.

The mid intensity battlefield points out threemajor deficiencies in Army aviation. Thefirst is doctrinal

In summary, Army aviation looks well overall.But to complete the assessment of our current statusand keeping in mind the contrasting wars of Vietnamand the Middle East, how well would our currentpost-Vietnam aviation force have fared in a midintensity war along the Suez Canal and GolanHeights? I t is my conviction that no aviation unit inthe Army today could have avoided unacceptablelosses if committed in that environment. In fact thebest units in Vietnam, and there were many, would

they were neither trained, equipped nor mentallyprepared for the type of combat encountered.n objective assessment of current aviation capa

bilities to meet the needs of the mid-intensity battlefield brings three major deficiencies into sharp focus.Each is interrelated and all three must be correctedif we are to get out of our people and machineswhat we have invested in them-and if we are tosuccessfully meet the challenges of the future.The first major deficiency is doctrinal. We mustrevise our concept of fighting to include operatingagainst armor supported by sophisticated air defense

weapons. As an army we seem to have been doctrinally marking time until the Cobra/TOW [AH-1Q]appears. We will begin receiving the Cobra/TOWin tactical units next year. But how will attack helicopter units be employed against tanks and on abattlefield with heat-seeking missiles and radar-controlled antiaircraft guns?Most people think of attack helicopters in termsof air cavalry, which translates into light combatavoid decisive engagement. Also, most people thinkin terms of fighting light fire teams-that is twoattack helicopters pitted against an enemy target,perhaps with the help of aerial scouts . Instead wemust think of employing attack helicopters as weemploy tanks-in mass-by platoon, company andbattalion. And they must be integrated with otherground elements and support by suppressive firefrom artillery and tactical air.f we look back on how we fired up the aviationeffort in Vietnam, we would find a blueprint in the


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changed; we have no blueprint now such as the airmobile division and air transport brigade had. TheHowze Board s third organization was the air cavalrycombat brigade (ACCB). We decided to test it afterthe war and after 3 years of testing it still is not wellbased doctrinally for today s battlefield environment.However, the ACCB appears to be the right unitfor determining and demonstrating the concepts thatwill get a full measure in combat capability out ofour people and machines on the high-threat battlefield.With Cobra/TOW, the ACCB is a heavy combatunit. t should be capable of decisive combat engagement because it has the essentials of real combatpower firepower and mobility. t has each of theseingredients in large measure. When properly employed it also has a high degree of impact.While a helicopter force can t hold terrain in thesame context as the infantryman or tanker, it hasthe capability to dominate and deny key terrain.Moreover it has the capability (when suitably integrated with other combat forces) of going into earlyexploitation behind enemy lines where the real combat paydirt is.Provided the right doctrine, the ACCB could exploit the firepower and mobility of the helicopterwhile reducing its vulnerability. I believe that themission statement for the ACCB, as a primarily antiarmor force, and its reorganization as a separatebrigade gives us the ideal testbed to resolve doctrinaluncertainties. Suitably integrated with other combatmeans, it should be able to do what airborne and

forces must use covered routes in the attack andsuppressive fire to deter or defeat enemy fired antitank guided missiles and shou1der fired antitankweapons, aviation forces also must use covered routeswith NOE techniques and suppress enemy air defenses with area and point weapons. They need suchtechnical improvements as radar warning receivets,chaff and radar-seeking missiles.To increase our effectiveness, we must be organized to operate around the clock and not justbe transient daytime visitors to the battlefield. Thenight vision equipment supplied to Syria and Egyptshould be adequate warning that the Soviets intendto push their attacks at night in order to maintaintheir offensive momentum. This means that we mustfly at night on a -regular, sustained basis, either withor without night vision aids. Obviously, we mustgain confidence in operating without vision aids before we take on sophisticated equipment which maybe available to only a limited number of aircraft.

We also should be able to operate intermittentlyinto and out of front line instrument conditions, inan electronic warfare environment and in icing conditions. Russian helicopters generally are equippedto operate in icing conditions; however, during theVietnam years we were not even required to thinkabout ice.Staying power deficiencies all have been studiedin recent years; now is the time to step in and beginresolving them.


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TRADOC commander, remarked that w should notspend the bravery of our people to make up for ourlack of preparation. This comment applies specificallyto aviation training in the Army today.Let me touch on the preparation measures w aretaking at the Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, AL.Each is discussed in more detail by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest M. Wood Jr. in his article, View FromThe Training Base, beginning on page 6 of thisissue.We are placing much more emphasis on tactics,NOE skills, electronic warfare/signal security, nightoperations and tactical instrument work. All of this isaccomplished in an operations order environment sothat the student thinks in tactical terms from thestart. Our thinking here also includes the preparedness of Reserve Component aviation units. We areencouraged by test results of an Aviation Center testprogram designed to bring selected aviation reserveunits to Fort Rucker for annual training. ColonelArnold R. Pollard discusses this program in hisarticle, Aviation Training In FORSCOM, beginning on page 4 of this issue.To conduct training without an inordinate increasein cost, we have made a threefold increase in theuse of the synthetic flight trainer, from th to 20hours. We expect to turn the hours and funds savedthrough this device into more extensive tactical training. Our aim is to qualify the new aviator in modern

flight fundamentals, so that when he reports to hisfirst unit he is a fully participating asset, not a newtraining requirement. I should add that commensurate

through good, hard training. I say misplaced safetyemphasis because I am of the opinion that bettertactical training can be conducted safely. Despiteextensive student NOE training at Fort Rucker, in1974 only one aircraft was torn up in tactical training.I say misunderstood because w are sacrificing liveson a future battlefield for the sake of avoiding potential criticism on anticipated safety statistics.As an example of how safety rules impinge onrealistic and practical training, one major installationprohibits aerial gunnery below 100 feet and nightflight below 500 feet. Finally, there are inadequate readiness standardsboth for individual aviators and tactical units. Irecently attended a meeting of more than 200 unitaviators at Fort Bragg, NC, primarily field grade andcaptains. By a show of hands, only fiv indicatedthey ever have been on an NOE course. Neither havew qualified all working aviators in helicopters despiterequirements placed on the Army in 1971.

Much work must be done if Armyaviation is to meet the challenges ofmid intensity war


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asa hldy OfINSTRUMENTREFRESHERTR ININGRobert N IsleySenior ScientistHuman Resources Research OrganizationDivision No 6 Aviation)HUMRRO


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AviationTraining In

Operation Red Scarf \FORS OM South Waymouth, NASSelfridge N ~ tJV J McGuire FBontinued from page

The 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion, 101st AirborneDivision (Air Assault), in late 1973completed a self-generated training exercise as a first step inexploring the feasibility of overwater deployment of the CH-47helicopter. Designated OperationLonghaul, this flight from Homestead Air Force Base, FL, to SanJuan, Puerto Rico, consisted of anonstop, overwater flight of 900nautical miles-more than twicethe normal operating range (seeOperation Longhaul, February1974 DIGEST). The additional rangewas obtained through installationof a unit designed system of interconnecting 400 to 600 gallon fueltanks in the cargo compartment ofeach aircraft to the internal aircraft fuel system. This missionprovided invaluable experience in

PittsburghGlenview N S IntFort Meadeangley FB

Figure 3pany (Aerial Surveillance), OregonArmy National Guard, in cooperation with the Oregon ForestryDepartment, has developed an innovative training program whichpays off handsomely for both theunit and the state. This programuses the infrared lR) capabilityof the OV-1 Mohawk to determinethe precise location of forest fires.Unit imagery interpreters plot this

ficiency through successful completion of a technical proficiencyinspection TPI) before being deployed to bases of operation fromcoast-to-coast (figure 3). Fromthese bases of operation the unitsflew more than 1,200 operationalflight hours transporting missilecomponents from ARADCOMsites to Army depots or to militaryairfields for further shipment by


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CH-47s deployed coast to coast,flew 1,200 flight hours andtransported more than 718 classified i tems fromARADCOM sites

been satellited on Brave Crew 74;Brave Shield IX; and other plannedjoint exercises.Training preparations have beenextensive, particularly for the BraveShield IX exercise, since the majormaneuver unit was a ReserveComponent unit and not accustomed to working with attackhelicopters.Members of the 4/77 AerialField Artillery Battalion, 101 st Airborne Division (Air Assault)-theunit providing the attack helicopters-worked closely with the personnel of the 256th Infantry Brigade (Separate), Louisiana ArmyNational Guard, to familiarize andprovide guidance to the brigade inthe employment and control ofattack helicopters.Both Red Scarf and the closeair support validation effort provided excellent training experiencefor the aviation unit and the individual aviator.FORSCOM's major aviationproblem areas center largely

situation in the enlisted skills asof 3 July 1974. The first twocolumns depict the percent fillmeasured against authorized levelsfor the active Army and FORSCOM, respectively. The last column depicts the percent fill of skilllevel 20 or the maintenance ranks.The situation continues to deteriorate. Until personnel can berecruited and trained to fill these

FORSCOM disclosed a shortfall of192. Some improvement was projected with a shortfall of 161 by theend of August 1974. While lastspring's study disclosed a substantial number of Cobra aviators notbeing utilized in Cobra flying positions, only a small number wereavailable for reassignment to Cobraunits.Various factors preclude the


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pered efforts to solve the problemfrom trained resources. About 380of those qualified and not assignedto Cobra units were in the gradeof captain or above, whereas therequirement is for warrant officerand lieutenant aviators.

~ l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l n l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l I I Number Of Units That Have e t ALO* ISome improvement has beenmade but there exists a continuingshortage of qualified Cobra aviators. The inability of the Department of the Army to increase

quotas at the Aviation Center forCobra transition during FY 1975and th,e planned activation of asecond attack helicopter squadronin the separate Air CavalryCombat Brigade at Fort Hood,prompted FORSCOM to authorize local Cobra transition at FortHood. Additionally, TRADOC hasauthorized local transition at FortKnox to alleviate shortages there.

20

July 73 August 74With respect to equipment, aserious shortage exists in air trafficcontrol ATC) major items. Getwell dates are not firm and onlyestimates are available. The outlook, however, is bleak.

division and nondivision unitsFigure 5 Authorized level of organization

The TSC-61A, a mobile flightcoordination center, is a new item.A total of eight are currently in

for the Mobile Aircraft ControlCentral, TSQ-70. Requirementsare being filled from overhaul andFORSCOM is scheduled to receive

Shortages of these major itemsof equipment continue to impacton ATC training and the capabilityof Army elements to provide re


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View From The Training aseontinued from pageSubjects presented during phase 1 are common tothe production of a well-rounded IP, to include theexpertise required of an instrument examiner. Notethe liberal application of SFfS time within this phase.Phase 2 addresses the critical need for IPs qualified to teach tactics and terrain flight techniques.Phase 3 will validate the aviator s proficiency in

the specific platform from which he will instruct.Most importantly, when an aviator completes thisprogram there is no requirement for him to returnto Fort Rucker for subsequent qualification as an IPin another type aircraft.Interestingly, a survey of the IP force at FortRucker revealed that the mean number of separateIP courses which an IP has attended was seven.Under this proposal we will not have an IP returningto Fort Rucker to upgrade his qualification ratingevery 2 or 3 years. Rather he will be trained for in-structor duties just once and be capable of repetitiveutilization for instructing in the academic, safety,instrument and contact/tactics/terrain flight subjectareas. We then will depend on the worldwide aviationstandardization program (figure 11) to disseminatethe new training concepts concepts that will becarried to the field by: new graduates, new IPs, training literature, standardization and safety assistancevisits and the development of comprehensive Army

Phase I6 weeks 27 hours Proficiency Progression)Ol

Safety

Phase II3 weeks 23 hours Proficiency Progression)

Safety

Phase III

ProficiencyProgression

3-23 flight hours

NOE


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Maior hester Goolrick

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able to do in the first place.As often as not it wasn't their fault. They wereasked or ordered into waters so far over their headsthey sank without a trace.IF IT S WORTH OING

. . . It's worth doing in bang-up style, right? Takethe case of Army aviation missions. Anythingrepeat, anything can be fouled up by just one mandoing the wrong thing in the wrong place at thewrong time. It doesn't matter whether he is the topman on the totem pole or the poor Joe at the bottomholding everybody else up. f he is unequal to hisassigned task, fails to give it the attention andplanning it demands, isn't properly briefed as towhat the mission is all about, or allows haste anddistraction to interfere with proper execution, theresult is almost certain to be a can of worms whichcould best be given the code name Operation TotalLoss.

But let's take it as a matter of faith that self-pridealone makes every aviator anxious to do his job welland also that everybody is responsible enough to wantto see it through to a successful conclusion. No argument, there. At the same time, let's face the fact thatnot every mission comes up smelling like roses.Things go wrong which, by rights, shouldn't. Howcome?One easy answer given in the Republic of Vietnambu t not always the correct one, by any meanswas that in combat, aviators, like everyone else, sometimes were forced to undertake assignments with

two aviators of limited experience were ordered ona medevac mission to pick up two injured soldiersin the hills. You probably won't be surprised to learnthat on the way back they flew into a hill and nobodyaboard ever returned to base. The ironic fact wasthat one of the men they picked up had a brokenarm and the other was suffering from a minor cut.Both could have waited until daylight-and survived.Needless losses of this sort stand as tragic testimonyto the fact that a jailed mission is worse than nomission at all Sometimes much, much worse.USED C R WARRANTY

How can you guarantee the success of any mission?You can't, of course. In any operation in which anumber of fallible human beings are involved, somany things can go wrong nobody would want tobet there won't be some sort of monumental snarlbefore the day is out.But what the heck, just about everything involves


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sound management program. n aviation unit canno more do without these professional tools than


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tacklers zeroing in on a punt returner. f he doesn thandle the ball with professional slickness, he knowshe will end up face down on the turf under a halfton or so of enemy linemen. f an aviator falls downon the job there s a good chance he may find himselfunder a couple of tons or so of thoroughly junkedhelicopter.SIC EM TIGER

Everybody who has been in the Army long enoughto draw his first paycheck knows that enthusiasm forflying is part of every successful aviator s makeup.He takes pride in his job and he wants to do it well.Nobody is going to argue with this healthy attitude.As long as it stays healthy, that is t starts gettinga little green around the gills when it is carried theone fatal step into overenthusiasm, to the point wherea man s professional pride is transformed into hisdesire to demonstrate to anybody around-and sometimes himself-how good he really isAny aviator who manages to slide into this dangerous state is a large package of re l bad medicine.Accident prone? He s loaded for bear as far as accidents are concerned, that s for sure, and unless heis disciplined or grounded, he will wind up a shortbut thrill-packed career.There is something else equally capable of gumming up the works of any mission and that s pressure,or stress, or tension or whatever you want to call it

If an Army aviator falls down on the job,there s a good chance he may find himself

a \ 1

Too large a slug of lOO-proofOld Gung Ho can psyche a manup to the point where he is amenace to himself

Every worthwhile enterprise has some sort of goal,


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MISSION POSSIBLE SENSEBasically, it comes down to rigid insistence onstrict by-the-book procedures plus a constant surveillance designed to spot and correct the aviatorwho is about to be swept off his feet by his ownemotions the way Romeo was the first time he laideyes on the fair Juliet.At the heart of every worthwhile managementprogram is the realization that the ultimate goal isthe successful completion of missions. That s prettymuch what military aviation is all about whether itis the deadly business of combat, rescuing strandedpeople in . looded disaster areas, ferrying aircraft orcountless other tasks an Army aviator can expect tobe called on to perform. Nobody knows what thecall will be tomorrow, but it s good sense to be prepared for anything.No easy task, that. Mission Impossible, you mightsay. Not at all. Sure, you could worry yourself intopremature old age by trying to put down in blackand white everything the future holds, but the kindof horsesense most of us are born with keeps usfrom such idiocy. Instead, w prepare ourselves bylearning, and learning well, and sticking by accepted,standard procedures which have stood the test oftime in and out of the heat of battle.And that s what a mission-conscious management

program s training is built around. Good trainingmakes for good flying habits.

A man working toward a goal with only a fixed (and not alwaysas much as he wants) time to do it in is a man working underpressure


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At the heart of every worthwhile management programis the realization that the ultimate goal is the successful5 f A;.l .omplel;on of m;,,;on,

f commanders and aircrews are mission conscious enoughnot to allow mistaken enthusiasm, tension, or simplefatigue to overcome their skills, they ll come through withflags flying and the band playing

involving a thick steak and perhaps a few shortbeers is ripe for a l s t ~ o m e n t letdown which willmake his evening turn out a good deal differentlyfrom what he had hoped.


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4


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the Interviewa one-act playCAST OF CHARACTERSin order of appearance):

INTERVIEWEEINTERVIEWER

SCENE: A fairly large, windowless, well-lit office.There is one desk, covered with thick manila foldersand overflowing in-baskets. All of the walls visible

< 3 ~ ~U S V S

t ke aminute fovi tion safety JINTERVIEWER: That's great. What do you dowith them?INTERVIEWEE: I post 'em on these charts here.INTERVIEWER: What else?INTERVIEWEE: That's all, just post 'em. Keepsme plenty busy, too. Just look at my in-box.INTERVIEWER: I see. I guess what you aredoing really helps the aviation safety program, huh?INTERVIEWEE: Oh no. I just post the charts. Igripe a lot, but really, no one cares . They say theycare, but they don't, really.INTERVIEWER: What do you mean, "they don'tcare?"INTERVIEWEE: I'll give you an example. Notlong ago a Huey piled up on takeoff. Noone hurt,mind you, but anyhow, the helicopter was on aroutine flight and while moving from the pad totakeoff it hit the ground and tore everything up.They had an accident investigation and one of thosecollateral investigations and they said it was causedby improper technique by the pilot. They gave thepilot a postaccident checkride and said he had nobad flying habits. Actually, he caused that accident


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minute for .. .h lvi tifm s fety

TH INT RVI WINTERVIEWEE: Here's another. I was chewingthe fat with a Chinook pilot the other day. Somehowthe subject came up about DA Form 365Fs. Hedidn't know what a Form F was. I told him and hesaid something about their being on file. Said henever had to compute weight and b ~ l a n c e . Hadn'tcomputed weight and balance since an annual writseveral years ago. Weight and b a l ~ m c e questionshaven't been on the writ lately, so he guessed itwasn't important. So even though the regs say tocompute weight and balance they don't care if youdo or not.INTERVIEWER: I guess it isn't important if itisn't on the annual writ.INTERVIEWEE: Oh, it's important, all right. It'sjust that they don't think the annual writ is too important. f you fail it, all you have to do is takeit over .until you pass it. How many jocks have beengrounded or put before a Flight Evaluation Boardbecause they failed the annual writ? They don'trealy care about it.INTERVIEWER: I still don't see what you are

to remember the days when each and every aviatorhad his own subscription to the Jeppesen Manual,complete with the weekly revisions. Sure it was expensive, but just how much does it cost to bury adead aviator? It would be a lot of trouble to set up,I guess, but wouldn't it be a great way to ensureeach man got the word all the time? I know thisisn't a new idea, but they don't care enough to seeit through.INTERVIEWER: That's one point, but there mustbe others.INTERVIEWEE: There's a lot more. Ever see acrewchief so tired from guard duty, or KP, or something not related to his aviation duties that he pulleda bad boo-boo? Everyone knows that the maintenancetypes are worked to the bone, and become errorprone. But they don't do anything about it. Theydon't care.INTERVIEWER: But you'll have to admit Armyaviators are a pretty professional bunch.INTERVIEWEE: Oh? I was chewing the cud withan Air Force weather forecaster whose detachment


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EROSION OF T53 SERIES 6AS TURBINE EN6 NESlarence J arter

Directorate for ircraft ccidentnalysis and Investigation

E t D I ~U S V S

RECENTLY, A TEAM fromthe U. S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) in-spected T53 series gas turbine engines at a P9st in the eastern partof the United States. The followingconditions were noted::UH-IH aircraft flying 'slick' ortroop-carrying missions have beensubject to erosion of the compressors and some engine stalls.This is due apparently to flying intounimproved landing zones of finesand.

AH-l and UH-l gunships flyoff of prepared surfaces and consequently do not experience the compressor erosion and subsequentcompressor stalls.Three engines were examined

well maintained. This cleaningshould be a continuing trainingsubject and a special item for inspection at each PMI (preventivemaintenance inspection).Other reasons for compressorstalls were discussed along with thecompressor erosion. The enginesshould be closely monitored forproper bleed band function, operation of the variable inlet guidevanes (VIGV) and malfunction ofthe fuel control, and operation insand and dust should be kept to aminimum.Certain criteria were established as representative of theerosion conditions ,noted in enginessubject to o m p r e s ~ o r stalls. Thesecriteria may be used as guidelinesin identifying engines which arecandidates for compressor stalls.These criteria should not be considered as no-go indicators inauthorizing return of engines todepot. These criteria are shown infigure 1.

from an aircraft operating in themiddle west. Flight time on thisengine was just short of 400 hourswhen compressor stalls occurred ata hover. It is apparent that extensive erosion is not limited toanyone geographical area. Therequired cure in this case is dailycleaning and inspection of the particle separator or inlet filters and athorough v i s u ~ l inspection of thecompressor after each day's operation in a dusty or contaminatedenvironment.

f you have a powerplant problem requiring a crash facts message,no matter what the problem is besure the message contains: (1) engine serial number, (2) number ofoverhauls, (3) hours since overhaul, (4) hours since new, (5)hours since last installation and(6) last overhaul facility. This information will enable us to spotmishap trends as they develop. (Asample crash facts message can befound in AR 385-40, appendix D.)


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Insurance against running out of fuel is v il ble t a very cheap premium. Its only cost isthe little time it takes to compute fuel consumption before flight and you ll avoid thewhite knuckles and shaky knees that go with operating quantity unknown U S V S

QUANTITYUNKNOWN

WHY


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at a very cheap premium. Its only cost is the littletime it takes to compute fuel consumption beforeflight. While flight regulations state you will not runcomplete the two mlssIOns , you need to know theanswers to the following questions:

1 What is your long-range cruise LRC) air-speed?2. What is your LRC flight time?3. What is max range no wind)?4. What is your max endurance ME) airspeed?5. What is your ME flight time?6. What is the distance difference between maxrange LRC) and ME range?7. f while cruising at airspeed n question No.1,you found your fuel state lower than expected, wouldyou increase or decrease your airspeed to better yourchances of making your destination?8. Suppose that just prior to takeoff, two unexpected passengers (combat soldiers) climbed onboard, increasing your gross weight to 3 ,000 pounds.While remaining within dash 10 operational limitations, how will this additional weight affect theanswers to questions 1 through 5?

a. Did this added weight increase or decreaseyour LRC flying time? ME flying time?b. Did it increase or decrease your LRC range?ME range?Answers:1 93 KTAS2. 3 hours, 10 minutes3. 294 NM (less wind)4. 52 KTAS5. 4 hours , 03 minutes6. LRC range is 83 NM greater7. Airspeed remains the same (one exception noted)


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E t ~ ~ Lieutenant Colonel William F. Gabella and Billy H. AdamsU B V B Directorate tor T echnical R esearch and pplications

t ke am nut orvk oon s fety iI N MARCH 1968, General Harold K. Johnson,Chief of Staff of the Army, directeq that $3 millionin emergency Research and Development funds beapplied immediately to develop a crashworthy fuelsystem for Army helicopters. General Johnson (nowpresident of the Freedoms Foundation) recently toldus that his action was generated by the concernexpressed to him by various Army field commandersduring a trip to the Republic of Vietnam in thespring of 1968. Of particular significance were thereports he received of aircrew and passenger personnel being either killed or seriously injured fromburn trauma in what would otherwise have beensurvivable helicopter mishaps.

Under the sponsorship of the Chief of Researchand Development, the U. S. Army Materiel Commandlet contracts to develop and procure a crashworthyfuel system (CWFS) for the U 1 series helicopterswhich were then bearing the brunt of combat inSoutheast Asia.The contractors proposed the development of aCWFS which had three basic characteristics to nullifypostcrash ignition of the UH 1 fuel load. Thesecharacteristics were: Minimize fuel spillage through the use of im

occurred in 989 mishaps of aircraft without CWFS(an average of one fire in 13 mishaps ), as opposedto 16 postcrash fires in 838 mishaps of aircraftequipped with CWFS (one fire in 5'4- mishaps) .Thus far, all postcrash fires which have occurredin Army aircraft equipped with CWFS have beenof the progressive type, i.e., small localized fires,the propagation of which is delayed significantly toallow occupants to escape or be rescued.

The dramatic success of CWFS in nullifyingcasualties due to postcrash f i r ~ has prompted theArmy to embark on an ambitious long-range program of equipping all present and future rotary wingaircraft (except the CH-54) with CWFS. In thecase of the CH-54, the magnitude of engineeringchanges required for the relatively few numbers ofaircraft has proved to be prohibitive. This is especiallytrue in view of the excellent safety history of theaircraft.While the overall results of the CWFS have beenextremely encouraging, the Army has initiated anumber of product improvement actions with respectto existing CWFS. Chief among these have been theextension of breakaway fuel lines and the incorpora-


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U S S O S e zl : : : : : : : r : : : r : r : " : I : : : r : : : ~ : : : : : : : :

The U. S. rmy eronautical Services Office discussesProblems with stopover flight plans

A STOPOVER FLIGHT plan li{{e some marriages is for better or for worse, but not forlunch. In other words, use this operational flight planning advantage when it suits themission. Don't use it i f your ground time requirements are uncertain.Field reports indicate a continuing problem with stopover flight plans. For the most part,problems appear to be pilot-induced through lack of understanding of the ATC/FSS s y s t m s and/orthe DD Form 175 instructions contained in DOD FLIP Planning n. Some problems aregenerated in either the military dispatch office or Flight Service Station along the way. The latter,usually in more remote areas with little military traffic. Study of the following points andreferences should be helpful.Questions on the DD Form 175 instructions generally evolve because of the seemingredundancies of the enroute and remarks sections. This is a system requirement generated bythose elements of information which are handled by ATC facilities and those by the FSS system.Detailed instructions on flight plan handling by military base operation offices are found in AR9511. FSS responsibilities are detailed in FAA Handbook 7110.10B, chapter 8, section 4. Pilotinstructions in filing and follow-on communication requirements are outlined in FLIP Planning IIunder Preflight (I, B16 and IF 3, 4 and 5). In general, route information goes to the ARTCC databank for dissemination to enroute and terminal agencies and becomes the basis for IFR flighthandling. Remarks ~ the flight plan such as passenger and cargo codes, void time and stopover


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OP SUnder the OPMS concept, each officer is expected to develop skills in two specialties. One in his

basic entry specialty and the other in his designated alternate specialty. The objective is toensure that an officer receives assignments and schooling which will enable him to attain the

professional development necessary for his specialties. This will assure that we develop,advance and retain officers with the skills so critical to the management of Today s Army. We willhave a system which recognizes the importance and contribution of officers in all specialtyfields. In addition, OPMS will provide evidence of the equal opportunities for advancement

in career fields other than the traditional command oriented assignment patterns. To stress thispoint, I personally emphasize OPMS in my orientation to all officer promotion boards.

Successful implementation of OPMS will depend in large measure on each officer realizing itsimportance and readjusting his own thinking concerning the traditional value system within

the Officer Corps. However, they wil l only become convinced when they see the system actuallywork. I want the Officer Corps to know that I am fully behind OPMS and intend to see t work.

HOWARD H CALLAWAYSecretary of the Army

VEST TYPESURVIVAL KIT SRU-211A)AND COMPONENTS

1. DA Technical Manual 55-


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USAAAVSO '12This i the fifth of 12 bock cover, d.signed to

how peraonol .urvlval. r cue and protectiveequipment. Detach each cover for a bull.tlnboard dl.p ay of the more Important survivaland protective equipment oval labl to cr.w.members n the f1el d

8465-215-10, Operator's Manualfor Vest, Survival, SRU-21/P,Hot Climate.2. Survival Kit, Individual (SRU-21/P), Vest Type: Complete withcomponents: NSN 8465-00-177-4819,Line Item No. U72733, CTA 50-900.Without components: NSN 8415-00-177-4818.3. Survival Kit, Individual, Tropical, NSN 6545-00-782-6412.4. Tourniquet, NSN 6515-00-383-0565.5. Net, gill, fishing, NSN 4240-00-300-2138.

6. Bag, Water (Size B), NSN8465-00-634-4499.*7. Revolver, .38 caliber, NSN1005-00-835-9773.

*8, 9. Cartridge, caliber ,38,Special Ball M-41, NSN 1305-00-322-6391.

Q .Compass, magnetic, card,pocket, NSN 6605-00-515-5637.(Replaces lensatic compass, FSN6605-846-7618.)11. Mirror, Emergency, Signaling,Type I, NSN 6350-00-105-1252.12, 13. Signal Kit, Foliage Penetrating, NSN 1370-00-490-7362.14. Fi r,e Starter, Butane Lighter,NSN 9920-00-999-6753,15. Knife, Pocket, NSN 5110-00-162-2205.16. Flash Guard, NSN 6230-00-401-2285.17. Light, Marker Distress, SDU5/E, NSN 6230-00-938-1778.*18. Radio, Receiver-Transmitter,AN/PRC-90, with wave lengthantenna, NSN 5820-00-782-5308.

. .... Zl r1*Items are not supplied with the ~ : ~ vest. They are procured in accord- llc 6ance with TOE/MTOE/TDA/MTDA.

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Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1974

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