CML, Army Chemical Review is pre-pared twice a year by the U.S. ArmyChemical School, Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri. CML presents professional infor-mation about Chemical Corps functionsrelated to nuclear, biological, chemical,smoke, flame field expedients, and NBCreconnaissance in combat support. Objec-tives of CML are to inform, motivate, in-crease knowledge, improve performance,and provide a forum for exchange of ideas.This publication presents professionalinformation, but the views expressedherein are those of the authors, not theDepartment of Defense or its elements.The content does not necessarily reflectthe official U.S. Army position and does notchange or supersede any information inother U.S. Army publications. Use of newsitems constitutes neither affirmation of theiraccuracy or product endorsement. Articles may be reprinted if credit isgiven to CML and its authors. All photo-graphs are official U.S. Army photos un-less otherwise noted. CML reserves theright to edit material. PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS: Avail-able through the Superintendent ofDocuments, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh,PA 15250-7954. POSTMASTER: Send address changesto Army Chemical Review, 320 MANSCENLoop, Suite 210, Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri 65473-8929.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKIGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army0129004

Official:

USACMLS/MANSCEN573-XXX-XXXX/DSN 676-XXXX

COMMANDANTBG Patricia L. Nilo 563-8053nilop@wood.army.mil

ASSISTANT COMMANDANTCOL Thomas W. Klewin 563-8054klewint@wood.army.mil

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORCSM James A. Barkley 563-5081barkleyj@wood.army.mil

3d CHEMICAL BRIGADE/DSN 581-XXXXCOL Thomas S. Spoehr 596-0016spoehrt@wood.army.mil

82d CHEMICAL BATTALIONLTC Joe Stewart 596-4835stewarjo@wood.army.mil

84th CHEMICAL BATTALIONLTC Patrick Sharon 596-2414sharonp@wood.army.mil

58th TRANSPORTATION BATTALIONLTC David Nelson 596-0991nelsonda@wood.army.mil

USACMLS Directors

JOINT SERVICE INTEGRATION GROUPLTC Frank Kohout 563-7754kohoutf@wood.army.mil

DOCTRINE TRAINING LEADER DEVELOPMENTORGANIZATION MATERIEL & SOLDIERSCOL Gary R. Wallace 563-6652wallaceg@wood.army.mil

CHEMICAL DEFENSE TRAINING FACILITYLTC James Smith 596-0608smithjame@wood.army.mil

MANSCEN

DIRECTORATE of TRAINING DEVELOPMENTCOL Kevin T. LaMar 563-4111lamark@wood.army.mil

DIRECTORATE of COMBAT DEVELOPMENTSChemical Division ChiefLTC Robert Serino 563-4078serinor@wood.army.mil

Managing Editor, Lynne M. Sparks 573-563-4104sparksl@wood.army.mil

Editor, Mattie E. Kirby 573-596-0131, 35267kirbym@wood.army.mil

Graphic Designer, Kathryn M. Troxell 573-596-0131, 37726troxellk@wood.army.mil

Forces in Transition and the NBC Threat: Where are we now?

NBC Battlespace Digitization

Responding to Terrorism

Terrorism and the Mind of It

Masks of the Sea Service�A Joint Effort

How the Chemical Corps Addresses Hazardous Materials

Environmental Transformations: What a Company Commander Needs to Know

The Mechanized Smoke Company� As I See It

Chemical Company Command Post Operations

Military Decision Making�A Process

Patient Decontamination

Chemical School Resumes Live Smoke Pot Training

Chief of Chemical

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Hall of Fame and Distinguished Members of the Corps Honors 2002

Send Us Feedback on Our Courses

Book Review

A Special Book Review

Attention! Future Cadets

PB 3-02-1 February 2002

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS

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CML2

A very tragic reality of terrorism struckour nation not only in the horrific events ofSeptember 11th but also, more recently, withthe very real presence of anthrax in our nation�scapital, Florida, New York, and many otherplaces around the world. We are no longerliving in a secure sanctuary, untouchable bythe threats that grow around the world. This isnot a new reality to our Corps. We have beenbeating the warning drum for some time�nowwe are being heard and responding to thesethreats.

It seems only yesterday, though it wasmonths ago, that our nation suffered a violentand brutal attack which leveled the WorldTrade Center Towers in New York anddamaged the Pentagon in Washington D.C.This was a direct attack at the very fiber of thefree society we live in as guaranteed by our Constitution�thesame Constitution you and I have sworn to uphold and protect.Exact figures are still unknown, but it appears that thousands havebeen killed or wounded. Many of them were emergency responsepersonnel who lost their lives as they endeavored to save the livesof others. �No greater love hath a man, than to lay down his lifefor his brother.� Such selflessness is what draws our citizens andour Army together and makes America a great nation.

September 11, 2001, is a date we will always remember.The unthinkable events that unfolded have already dramaticallyimpacted our nation�s and our Corps�s future. It will be a reminderto all of us that the freedoms we enjoy come at a significant price.

We just completed our second year at Fort Wood, Missouri,and what a year it has been. It certainly has been a year of challengefor all of us, but I am proud to say that the Chemical School andthe Regiment have met the challenge and continue to moveforward with great initiative and momentum. We have been akey and essential player in many of the ongoing homeland security,DOD, and Army NBC defense and Transformation forums, andmany more are planned in the near future. Also, we just completedour strategic plan for the Chemical School and have established aworking team for creating the strategic plan for the Corps. As theArmy undergoes Transformation and changes as a result of recentevents, so will our school and Corps, and you can look withanticipation and excitement to those changes as well.

This summer marked the 83d anniversary of the Corps andthe 18th annual Worldwide Chemical Conference. The highlightwas the Conference and Regimental Week activities that tookplace from 9-13 July, followed directly by the DecontaminationPlatform Performance Demonstration, 16-20 July, at Fort Wood.I did not think it possible, but this year�s conference was evenbigger and better than last year�s. This year�s theme was �NBCDefense�Transforming the Chemical Corps� and was mostappropriate to represent the many activities and programs ourCorps is leading and partnering to meet the new Joint and Armyvisions. As always, this was the preeminent chemical andbiological conference in the world, and it exposed and engagedits attendees in some glimpses of where we are going in near andmidterm future capabilities and organizations. We also gained

great insights into the potential replacementdecontamination systems for the old M12A1PDDA. Though it has served us well, it is timeto modernize and take advantage of today�stechnologies in decon systems and decon-taminants. We are aggressively pursuing theseadvances.

We have embarked on the most significanttransformation of our Army since World WarII. We have all recently experienced the shadowof terrorist acts, and they will not soon disappear.In moving forward to support our nation andour Army, the role of the Chemical Corps is toprotect the force and maximize combat power.We do this by training and equipping you toserve on America�s battle staffs to deal with theconsequences and manage the effects of a WMDevent. Officers, noncommissioned officers,

enlisted soldiers, and civilians all play key and critical roles in thedefense against these asymmetric threats. Furthermore, we clearlyunderstand that we must protect the force during all phases ofoperations. We must ensure that our strategic national interestsare protected against any enemy, foreign or domestic, attemptingto employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons,regardless of the level of the NBC threat. It is in this area that weall clearly play a critical role.

We accomplish this only through relentless preparation andproactive action. We cannot afford not to be ready! Some of youhave become very much engaged in preparing for our future. Icall your attention to some of the articles that were published bymembers of our Corps in this bulletin, as well as many others, toinclude the AUSA�s Institute of Land Warfare, Military Review,and Joint Forces Quarterly. Each has addressed critical aspectsof our future strategy and the path forward well into the twenty-first century. I challenge each of you to get just as engaged andshare your thoughts and ideas. Whether it is an article forpublication or an idea exchange across the doctrine net, we needeach and every one of you to do your part. Challenge what doesnot make sense. If it is truly a good idea, it will stand the test ofdebate.

As a Corps, we have a lot to look forward to in the comingmonths and years. Our Army and DOD have taken dramatic stepsto improve our nation�s overall NBC defense capabilities, andwe are not finished yet. Much work still needs to be done. I wantto thank all who have contributed to this effort for your manylong hours and tireless efforts. Your work will not go unnoticed.

My deepest condolences go out to those directly affected bythe attacks and to you who may have been directly impacted. Iencourage you to pray for the victims, the survivors, and the peopleinvolved in the ongoing recovery operations. Pray for our nationand our leaders as they endeavor to address this catastrophe andthe ongoing war against terrorism. May God grant us wisdomand discernment in this situation and the strength and resolve toact responsibly and appropriately as we go forward in the daysahead.

ELEMENTIS REGAMUS PROELIUM!Dragon Soldiers . . . Rule the Battle

Chief of Chemical

BG Patricia L. Nilo

February 2002 3

Greetings to all Dragon Soldiers!Since this bulletin was last published, our

world, as we knew it, changed dramatically.With the terrorist events of 11 September2001, our nation is now at war and, as Dragonsoldiers, we must be prepared to contributeto the effort when the call comes. This meanswe must continue to motivate and train ouryoung soldiers�train them to standard.

The terrorist threat has forced us to stepup our training and seek new technologicaladvances to counter this horrible war. We allface challenges in training to standard in theWMD environment. We have trained andcertified most of the civil support teams. Ourproponency must look at the career path ofthe 54B soldiers. Unfortunately, the numberof 54B soldiers has increased substantiallywithout having any skill identifier. We say they are 54Bs, buttheir duties are different from what other 54Bs are doing inthe field. They are trained on different equipment, and we needto recognize these differences with a special skill identifier orMOS. We are working this issue with proponency; doctrine,training, leader development, organization, materiel, andsoldiers (DTLOMS); and the Maneuver Support Center�s(MANSCEN�s) Directorate of Training Development andDirectorate of Combat Developments. We will continue towork this issue until it is resolved. I encourage you to providecomments or suggestions to the proponency office, DTLOMS,USACMLS.

The potential use of WMD against American citizens andassets is one of the most disturbing threats facing the UnitedStates today. For decades, the United States has faced thispossibility in a conventional setting. Today, however, use ofWMD against domestic U.S. targets is becoming a morecredible threat. The Chemical Corps is on the cutting edge ofthe advancements being made in combating the uses of WMD.

Army Transformation requires the Chemical Corps totransform and create new training strategies for DragonSoldiers. We are moving toward Joint training to help minimizecommunication within DOD, sister services, and federalagencies to combat the NBC terrorist threat.

Our Chemical School is taking the lead on training DragonSoldiers in new training endeavors�the Digitized ArmyDivision and the Initial Brigade Combat Team�to fight asthe Army of One. Some of our Dragon Soldiers are playing apivotal role during this Transformation. We need your help inproviding your comments to the trainers at MANSCEN.

Some of our doctrine may not reflect how you are trainingin the field. If you need help in this area, we would like to hearfrom you. Many of our Chemical Corps NCOs are performing

without adequate soldier training publications(STPs) and doctrine to support the newtraining concepts. We will continue to workhard in getting Corps training productsupdated. TRADOC has published the newSoldiers� Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT)21-1 and 21-24 skill levels. Our chemicalSTPs will be updated to reflect these changesas well. I urge you to help support and provideinput to these changes to help our DragonSoldiers train to standard. Again, this is onlya small part of the Army Transformation.

I assumed my duties as the RegimentalCommand Sergeant Major (RCSM) in June2001 and have several goals I plan to achieve.First, I intend to make a difference in theSTPs. MANSCEN and the Chemical Schoolare working to fix the manuals for skill levels

1 through 4 for our Dragon Soldiers. If you think a task youare performing in the field needs to be changed or that you arenot getting proper training, I would like to hear about it. Second,ensure that The Army School System (TASS) battalions areusing the same training materials that are being taught at theChemical School and MANSCEN NCO academy. The onlydifference in Active and Reserve should be the time it takes totrain. I intend for all Dragon Soldiers to be trained to onestandard.

Third, I understand that some soldiers have concerns aboutthe caliber of NCOs conducting training at the schoolhouse. Iassure you that we have top-notch NCOs, and most of oursmall-group leaders were honor or distinguished honorgraduates in their respective classes. Three of our sevenchemical TASS battalions rotated through Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri, this past summer/fall, and I�m happy to report thatall were accredited. This means that all of our TASS battalionsare accredited. I have talked with all of our Title XI NCOswho are assigned to these battalions, and I can tell you thatthey are outstanding advisors to our Reserve Component. Asyour RCSM, I intend to continue to assign top-notch soldiersto these positions. If you think you can contribute in thisimportant assignment and like a challenge to help others, Ineed to hear from you.

Finally, I know you Dragon Soldiers are ready to accept achallenge and that you deserve to be highly trained andmotivated when called upon. I commit to you my leadershipand support in providing trained-to-standard Dragon Soldiersto meet the current and future terrorist threats. As the ChemicalCorps moves to transform this fighting force with cutting-edgetechnology, let us never forget that terrorist threats must beeradicated.

Dragon Soldiers Stay Motivated!

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

CSM James A. Barkley

Full-Spectrum ContinuumBattlefield

UseDomesticTerrorism

Foreign-ConsequenceManagement

Attack onU.S.

civilians ornonmilitary

facilities

Attack onConusmilitaryfacility

supportingcontingencyoperations

Attack onU.S. forcesengaged incontingencyoperations

Peacetimeattack on

U.S. forces/facilitiesoverseas

Attackon alliesor hostnations

U.S. Military Response

U.S. Military the Target

4 CML

Only a decade ago, as the Berlin Wall fell, the Iron Curtain opened on the stage of a new-world order.The world applauded the final act of the Cold War as the threat of global annihilation faded and thesuperpowers bowed out in the last dramatic episode of the arm�s race. The threat of global annihilation hadbeen vanquished, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were just a fading nightmare. We wanted sobadly to believe in global peace. Insidiously, while the attention of the world focused on the superpowers oncenter stage, more sinister dangers were growing in the shadows of our global theater. Who knew thishistoric event would be an invitation for unrecognized players to step into the leading roles of this real-world drama? While this may sound like a fictional suspense drama, I believe it describes the real nuclear,biological, or chemical (NBC) concerns we face for our contingency forces today.

NBC Threat to Today�s Contingency ForcesToday�s actors are busy at work expanding their

conspicuous proliferation of WMD. Today, about 25nations have an NBC warfare program compared to only12 during the Cold War. These same countries have long-range delivery systems and continue to pursue efforts toacquire systems with greater accuracy and range. NBCweapons provide their only feasible counterbalance toU.S. precision-guided munitions and sophisticatedweaponry.

�America�s military superiority cannot shield uscompletely from this (nuclear, biological, andchemical) threat. Indeed, a paradox of thenew strategic environment is that Americanmilitary superiority actually increases thethreat of nuclear, biological, and chemicalattack against us by creating incentives foradversaries to challenge us asymmetrically.�

William CohenFormer U.S. Secretary of Defense

Our nation�s senior leadership is on recordfor expressing their opinions that the superiorityof America�s conventional warfighting willlikely push an adversary towards asymmetricmeans, including WMD. Adopting the policyof �If you know you cannot win a fair fight,then fight dirty,� countries possessing WMDhave gained strategic leverage without the costof a large military force and expensive

By Major William E. King, IV

Forces in Transitionand the NBC Threat:Where are we now?

equipment. The threat of WMD forces any opponent toconsider additional planning factors not normallyrequired.

Restraint, or the reluctance to respond to an NBCattack with NBC retaliation, is likely with large-yieldweapons; nevertheless, nuclear hazards on the battlefieldmay result from other sources. Restraint does not applyto chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Anadversary�s use of CBW is very likely as a means forreducing its military risk of defeat against deploying U.S.contingency forces into a new theater of operations. Theformer Secretary of Defense embedded these concernsin a number of clear policy statements. For example, the

Levels of NBC Threat

� Proliferation of WMD and long-range delivery systems throughout theworld should increase.

� WMD-capable countries may leverage their asymmetric advantageover U.S. forces, especially vulnerable during initial-entry operations.

� Levels I, II, and III threats significantly increase the planning factorsto mitigate WMD events versus those of Level I.

Level

I

II

III

Examples:

Nuclear

Weaponized

Military/industrial

facility

Toxic residue

HiroshimaChernobyl

Desert Storm

Biological

Weaponized

Military/industrial

facility

Toxic residue

ChekiangSverdlosk

Rajneeshees

Chemical

Weaponized

Military/industrial

facility

Toxic residue

Iran-IraqBhopal

Love Canal

5February 2002

2002-2007 Defense Planning Guidance states, �The threator use of chemical and biological weapons is a likelycondition of future warfare, including in the early stagesof war. Such weapons could be employed by hostile forcesas a means of disrupting U.S. operations and logistics.�And the Secretary directs that �U.S. forces will beprepared to fight and win in a chemically or biologicallycontaminated environment. The services also willcontinue to improve chemical and biological detectionand decontamination capabilities at ports and airfields.�

Additionally, underpinning the U.S. National MilitaryStrategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, are the conceptsof strategic agility, power projection, and decisive force.Joint Vision 2020, the conceptual template for U.S.military operational capability in the early twenty-firstcentury, is based on power projection from the continentalUnited States, achieved through rapid strategic mobilityand limited overseas presence. Operations at fixed-siteinstallations, including seaports and aerial ports ofembarkation and debarkation, logistical centers, andtactical airbases, are critical to executing this strategysuccessfully. The consequences of a CBW attack on oneof these critical nodes can severely hinder, if notcompletely impede, military operations and put ournational military strategy at risk if not properly addressedand resourced today.

The expectation that an asymmetric CBW will be usedas the preferred weapon of attack is even more clearlyapplicable to the Army Transformation Strategy. TheArmy Chief of Staff has stated that transformed forces�must be survivable when faced with an adversaryemploying asymmetric threats.� The Initial BrigadeCombat Team (IBCT) will face thisasymmetric threat for two reasons:

1. The very nature of this highly mobile,lethal force is to use advancedtechnologies to inflict U.S. �might�rapidly.

2. The United States has renounced itsoffensive CBW retaliatory capability.Thus, at best, we would only respondwith more conventional precisionfires probably delivered by the IBCTafter an NBC attack.

As the proliferation and availability ofWMD continue to expand, so do the threatsand the expectation of their use. AggressiveThird World countries and rogue radicalgroups cannot compete directly with thesuperpowers. The resources required forsupporting a large military force, or evenresearching and developing innovative

weapons systems, are beyond these groups� capabilities.Thus, as they compete for strategic positioning, power,and international recognition, they use the mostdestructive devices already within their grasp. Even theweakest state and nonstate actor believes large numbersof casualties and the ensuing panic inflicted by theirinsidious assaults will only promote their politicalobjectives.

Not to be overlooked is a more subtle, indirect threat:the possibility that some seemingly inoffensive ThirdWorld state would provide chemical, biological, orradiological weapons (one of the forms of nuclearweapons) to terrorists. Such an action could covertlycontribute to the struggle without fear of direct retaliationfrom the United States. The problem is still growing.

Current U.S. Response to WMD ThreatRenegade proliferation of WMD promotes regional

instability with potentially global consequences and, as aresult, challenges the interests of the United States.Obviously, a significant element of the asymmetric threatfacing U.S. forces today, and for the foreseeable future,is the use of nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological,and toxic industrial chemicals by hostile forces. Inresponse, the U.S. Army Chemical School recentlycategorized these NBC threats into three levels (see tablebelow).

Level I NBC threats equate to weaponized WMD.Level II threats include accidental or deliberate releasefrom industrial complexes. Level III threats include crude,yet potentially lethal, application of radiation, biological,and toxic and industrial materials. Although Level IIIthreats lack sophistication, these include substances

CML6

which, when released, can be highly lethal but lack thechemical and physical properties, behavior characteristics,or density to be capable of high-order (WMD) levels ofdestruction. NBC hazards may result from nonstate orterrorist aggression, collateral damage from conventionalweapons, natural disasters and industrial accidents, orother sources of environmental contamination. Ammoniaand methyl isocyanate are examples of industrialchemicals with potential operational impacts. Forexample, methyl isocyanate, released in Bhopal, India,resulted in 15,000 deaths and affected almost 300,000 ofBhopal�s 800,000 residents. These agents and others areproduced in large quantities in industrial chemical plantsaround the world and are usually located in and aroundthe airports and seaports and logistical nodes that wewould want to use in future operations. Smaller countriesand possibly some terrorist groups can exploit thisindustrial chemical threat. These newly identified threatspose great challenges to military planners andcommanders.

While the U.S. Army recognizes that a potentialenemy might employ NBC weapons at anytime, planningremains focused on the obvious military threat. The Armyusually plans for an NBC attack during a desperatemoment in the height of battle, but NBC weapons wouldactually be most effective during entry or deploymentoperations. These early preparatory stages of a tacticaloperation are the most vulnerable. An enemy�s goal wouldbe to quickly inflict a large number of U.S. casualtiesand either slow U.S. military forces deployment or swingpublic opinion against further involvement.

Future U.S. Response to the WMD ThreatThe security of the U.S. Army�s future requires an

NBC defense system that integrates a full arrayof land-, air-, and space-based sensors that candetect and identify chemical and biologicalagents. These sensors must be able to detectproduction, storage, movement, and envi-ronmental releases.

This automated, real-time, joint hazardcollection system must also be capable ofmaintaining situational awareness, analyzinginput data from the various sensors, leveragingdigitized satellite communications, providingimmediate warning and reporting to thoseaffected military and civilian populations, andupdating the situational-awareness database forall other forces and population centers. Thissystem must operate from land-based sites aswell as air- and space-based platforms�anecessary redundancy if it is to providesufficient coverage to operate the triad ofprevention, deterrence, and defense.

This concept is not unique. It is already beingdeveloped as an integrated array of sensors transmittingto a central point of analysis, warning, and reporting asthe currently developing theater ballistic missile defense(TBMD) concept. The TBMD concept is built upon threepillars: attack operations, active defense, and passivedefense. The attack-operations pillar is focused on theU.S. armed forces� ability to prevent the launch of theatermissiles by attacking all elements of the enemy�s overallballistic missile system. The active-defense pillar isfocused on the U.S. armed forces� ability to intercept anddestroy theater missiles in flight. The passive-defensepillar includes all those individual and collective measurestaken to reduce the probability and effects of a theatermissile attack by reducing the vulnerability of criticalforces and infrastructure and by improving the potentialto survive and resume operations after an attack.

Obviously, the U.S. Army has already erected similarpillars for NBC attack operations, as well as activedefense. The third pillar, WMD passive defense, is alsobeginning to rise above its original cornerstone ofindividual soldier protection. I cannot over emphasize thecriticality of networking these three pillars to more closelyintegrate and, therefore, unify and strengthen them. Butbefore they can be linked, the most essential pillar�passive defense�must be developed more thoroughly.

ConclusionWe may feel as if we are scrambling to keep up with

the threat, but the fact of the matter is that we are still,with a few extra precautionary measures, the greatestArmy in the world. NBC attacks on our ports may slowour arrival to a theater, but they don�t have to stop us. Itis imperative to remember that, like the rest of the Army,

February 2002 7

U.S. Army Chemical School, TRADOC Pam 525-20, U.S.Army Operations Concept for Nuclear, Biological, andChemical (NBC) Defense (Draft), Washington, D.C.,Department of the Army, 31 March 1998, p.1.Department of Defense, 1997 Quadrennial Defense ReviewDefense Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C., GovernmentPrinting Office, 1997.

Major King is the battalion executive officer, 84th Chemical Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. His previous assignmentsinclude battalion chemical officer, 1st Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, 2AD; smoke platoon leader and company executive officer,46th Chemical Company (SG)(M); Battalion S1, 2d Chemical Battalion; aide-de-camp, DCG, III Corps; division chemicaltraining officer, DISCOM chemical officer, company commander, 91st Chemical Company, 24th ID, Battalion S3, 703d MSB,3d ID, G3 Plans, Eighth U.S. Army Yongsan, Korea; and chief of Concepts Branch, Chemical Division, Directorate of CombatDevelopments, MANSCEN. MAJ King is a graduate of the Chemical Officers Basic and Advance Courses, CAS3, U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and Airborne and Air Assault Schools.He holds a bachelor�s in chemistry from the University of Richmond in Richmond, Virginia, and a master�s in military arts andscience from the Command and General Staff College in general military studies and military space applications and from theSchool of Advanced Military Studies in theater operations and planning.

the Chemical Corps is in transition. Our goal should beto make NBC WMD so ineffective against us that ouradversaries won�t even bother with them. We are on theright track, from a defensive perspective, but we haven�tarrived yet. We have several high-tech concepts�suchas advanced point and stand-off biological detection andidentification, single-vehicle-integrated NBC reconnais-sance, NBC fusion and battle management, distributedlow-quality and high-density NBC sensors, and aerial-and space-based NBC reconnaissance and surveillancesensors�yet to integrate into our Corps� structure.References

Department of Defense, 1997 Quadrennial Defense ReviewDefense Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C., GovernmentPrinting Office, 1997.U. S. Army, Army Transformation Campaign Plan,Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, October 1999.Richard A. Jackson and Ralph G. Wooten, �Protecting theForce: 21st Century Chemical Corps,� Military Review,September-October 1996, p. 75. Now, more than 20 nationsare known to possess WMD. WMD proliferation is occurringexactly where the United States does not want it to occur-�in regional flash points throughout the world.Booz Allen and Hamilton, Assessment of the Impact ofChemical and Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in2010 (The CB 2010 Study), McLean, VA, Booz Allen andHamilton, Inc., November 1997, pp. 1-3.U.S. Army Chemical School, Theater Missile Defense(TMD) Passive Defense Strategy, Washington, D.C.,Department of the Army, May 1997, pp. 2-5.

Hall of Fame and Distinguished Member of the Corps Honors 2002Call for Nominations

Nominations are now being accepted for the Chemical Corps Regimental Association�s (CCRA�s) ChemicalCorps Hall of Fame and Distinguished Member of the Corps.

Introduction into the Hall of Fame is an honor extended to those (living or deceased) who have spent theirentire professional career working with and serving the Chemical Corps. Their services to the Corps must beextraordinary. However, the Distinguished Member of the Corps is an award extended only to living members ofthe Chemical Corps who have served the Corps for their professional life, and who are willing to continue to servethe Corps after they have retired. Current Chemical Corps military and civilian members are not eligible for theprogram. Only those who have been retired for at least two years or deceased may be nominated.

Nominating is easy. Simply write a note or send an e-mail to the Chemical Corps Historian, Dr. BurtonWright, and he will send you a CCRA regulation that governs the nomination process and will tell you all aboutthe honor. You can contact Dr. Wright at 573-563-7339 or on the Net at Wrightb@Wood.army.mil. Only onenomination per individual will be accepted. One piece of information for the nomination is vital � if the individualis living, the address is necessary, and if deceased, the name and address of any member of the family.

Elementis Regamus Proelium

8 CML

NBC BattlespaceDigitization

By Mr. Russell Williams, Mr. Romel Gallamoza, Mr. Edward Conley, and Mr. Richard Noel

Battlespace information is vital to tactical, operational,and strategic warfighting. Joint Vision 2010/2020 focuseson information superiority as the key to victory.Traditionally, battlespace information has been providedby text and voice communications. But, in joint vision,digital information and communications systems willundoubtedly become the American warfighter�s bestdefense�fusing all source intelligence with sensors,platforms, and command and control systems. In fact,these systems will give commanders and warfighters anunsurpassed view of the battlespace. Networking of

command and control elements will allow the entire forceto operate in concert, giving leaders a clear picture ofoperations so they can act quickly and decisively.

One of the new thrusts in force digitization is thecommunication of detected nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) threats. Using networked communi-cations systems, sensors mounted on the ground or oncombat vehicles will alert ground forces of potentialcontamination in a fraction of a second. Within moments,these systems will send data through the tactical Internetto command operations centers for automated processing

9February 2002

and relay precise, nearly instantaneous NBC hazard-zonepredictions back to the affected forces on the battlefield.Additionally, the network will notify local civilianauthorities in the hazardous area. The NBC hazard warningand reporting system will greatly enhance the warfighter�sability to fight and survive on the NBC battlefield.

NBC FORCE DIGITIZATION THRUST

The joint vision requirement of informationsuperiority can only be met by digitizing the battlespace,including the NBC arena. The Army�s project managerfor NBC defense systems supports several programs tomeet the goals of NBC battlespace digitization. Amongthese programs are the Joint Warning and ReportingNetwork (JWARN) and the multipurpose, integratedchemical agent detector (MICAD).

JWARN Program

As an important step toward the goal of NBCbattlespace digitization, the JWARN program will providea standardized NBC warning and reporting package to allservices, provide capabilities for enhanced downwindprediction and battle management, and interface withcommand and control systems and NBC sensor devices.In addition, the JWARN software provides the capabilitiesto plan and manage certain NBC operations such as smokeand mission-oriented protective-posture levels. It alsoprovides a rudimentary chemical-casualty-assessment tool. TheJWARN program is divided intomultiple blocks to push theseneeded capabilities to the fieldmore quickly.

Block I is an interimcommerc i a l -o f f - the - she l f /government-off-the-shelf packagethat will be used until the objectiveJWARN has been developed andprocured under the Block IIprogram. Since Block I�s initialrelease in June 1998, all serviceshave acquired it. Block I is dividedinto three variants�Blocks IA,IB, and IC.

� Block IA is a disk operatingsystem (DOS) and 16-bitWindows® bundle that pro-vides basic capabilities forNBC warning and reportingand downwind hazard predic-tion. It also is an information

and analysis suite of software containing NBCanalysis for DOS; hazard prediction and analysiscapabilities; vapors, liquids, and solids tracking; andemergency management information system. TheBlock IA package provides a variety of userdocumentation and NBC information, including theJWARN operator�s manual, software user manuals,and lesson plans for self-training and the NBCToolbox (a software tool that provides a variety ofNBC-related information through an easy-to-usemenu system). For example, the user can look up NBCthreat capabilities of many nations or find what NBCdetectors exist. Other information includes agentcharacteristics, chemical casualties handling, defenseunits organization, and staff responsibilities. Becauseof the hardware constraints in the field at the time offielding, the Block IA suite of software works in theDOS/16-bit Windows® environment on computerswith 486 Intel processors and low-end Pentiummachines. The JWARN program office stronglyencourages current users of Block IA to upgrade toBlock IC.

� Block IB is a Universal Internet Exchange (UNIX)variant that has been integrated with the Army�smaneuver control system (MCS). It, as well as the ICversion, has an improved and easier-to-use graphicsuser interface that provides a standardized NBCwarning and reporting process between UNIX (BlockIB) and Windows® (Block IC) platforms. The project

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manager has been integrating Block IB with theArmy�s MCS to use the common-message processor,the joint mapping tool kit suite, the Army�s commontactical picture, and the Army�s common database.Block IB can send and receive NBC reports, plot andpublish common NBC overlays, access unit databasesto provide analysis of units at risk, and perform manyother common NBC tasks. It can also interface withNBC sensors through a serial-port connection to theMICAD system. Block IB software is scheduled forrelease with MCS version 6.2.11 as a missionapplication on the MCS system and will be providedto all users as the system is fielded. The projectmanager will provide the training and support.

� Block IC is a 32-bit Windows® bundle that extendsthe capabilities of Block IA. It was acquired to residein today�s Windows®-based computing environment.Block IC software is not integrated with a commandand control system but can be networked to providean NBC warning and reporting capability on thebattlefield via e-mail, modem, or local-area network.It provides the same capabilities as Block IB but addsthe additional capabilities of Block IA.

Block II will be a full life-cycle acquisition program.It will not only integrate the best of several NBC models,but it will also be part of the user�s command and control,communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)systems in each service. It also will have hardware tointerface with a variety of NBC detectors to pass NBC-related information to JWARN software in C4I systems.Block II will be an integrated application to existingsystems and will provide a seamless operation within thatenvironment.

JWARN Distribution, Training, and Support

The NBC defense system�s project manager hasprovided more than 600 copies of JWARN to the fieldand trained hundreds of soldiers to use the various versionsof JWARN.

With the arrival of Blocks IA and IC, the MarineCorps Systems Command provided instructor training forkey personnel of each service. The training was limitedin availability and time because of the shortage of availablefunds and the expected arrival of the Block II program.The system project manager coordinated formal BlockIC training to six Army garrisons, and Marine CorpsCommand contractors conducted the training, which lasted8 months. After the training contract ended, the projectmanager�s subject-matter experts provided the remainingBlock IC instruction. The JWARN instructor base hasexpanded to the project manager NBC defense systems�

new equipment training and fielding team. Training isconducted on a request basis only.

The system project manager has provided orcoordinated Blocks IA and IC support in warfighterexercises. He has supported the 32d Army Air and MissileDefense Command�s (AAMDC�s) use of the Block IAversion for its home station training for Exercise RovingSands and Block IC training and support to the 4thInfantry Division (4ID) Chemical. Later, 4ID participatedin Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens and the system projectmanager provided JWARN support. V Corps usedJWARN in its Warrior Focus and Battle CommandTraining Program exercises and, again, the projectmanager provided training and support. The most neededtype of JWARN support was communication networking.NBC analysis is the only JWARN software that has thecapability to directly connect to a local area network, serialinterface, mail-application program interface (MicrosoftOutlook®, Exchange®, etc.), and modem. Thegovernment-off-the-shelf software has cut and pastefunctions so the user can put NBC plots on anyWindows® application like Microsoft PowerPoint®,Word®, and Corel Draw®.

Although the project manager supports and continuesto work with Army users, there is a JWARN help desk thatsupports users from all services. Marine Corps TacticalSystems Support Activity provides live, 24-hours, 7-days-a-week technical support. It has a toll-free number forimmediate help and an e-mail address for getting JWARNsupport. The help desk number is (800) 808-7634, andthe e-mail address for technical assistance isc4ihelpdesk@mctssa.usmc.mil. Suggestions for improve-ment are welcomed. Another avenue for obtaining technicalsupport or sending comments is the JWARN integratedprocess team; each service has one. The Army�srepresentatives are from the NBC defense system�s projectmanager. The teams can be used to formally solicit Block Isoftware, technical support, training, and softwareimprovements. To obtain JWARN point-of-contactinformation, go to: http://www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil/RDA/pmnbc/products.htm and click on the JWARN sectionunder Program Director Detection.

Other JWARN Efforts

The NBC defense project manager realizes that it willtake time to integrate Block II into the Army C4Iinfrastructure, so to bridge the gap, he will build uponBlock IB to integrate with other systems within the ArmyBattle Command System. For example, Block IB for MCSwill continue to evolve with the latest and future versionsof MCS because the Battle Command System continuesto march in evolutionary steps.

February 2002 11

In addition, Block IB has been ported to the ForceXXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)environment for the NBC reconnaissance systems. Workis ongoing to integrate Block IB with the FBCB2 servicessimilar to that in MCS. Upon completion of this effort,the JWARN software will reside on FBCB2 systemsthroughout the Army to provide a comprehensive NBCwarning and reporting network.

Other planned efforts include integration with MCS-Light and Global Command Control System�Army(GCCS-A). Other efforts are also being considered. Forexample, there has been interest in integrating with theGCCS, Air and Missile Defense Warning System, andAdvanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System.

JWARN User Feedback

Within the last 3 years, Block I software has beendistributed to users from all Joint services and to U.S.government agencies. Ease of use and rapid calculationof NBC plots has made NBC analysis the most popularsoftware in the JWARN package.

Feedback from the field indicates a strong desire tomerge JWARN with the C4I systems. For example, 4IDcan use JWARN effectively if it is integrated with MCSand FBCB2. The 32d AAMDC could provide moreadequate warning to subordinate units if JWARN werean application in the Air and Missile Defense WarningSystem and the GCCS.

The project manager has responded to these needs byinitiating integration with additional C4I systems. JWARNwill not only be integrated in a major C4I system such asMCS, but it will also be integrated in FBCB2, MCS-Light,and the GCCS-A. More C4I systems will follow.

MICAD Program

The M27 MICAD is the first step fordigitizing the NBC battlefield. It automatesNBC detection, warning, and reporting inarmored vehicles, tactical wheeled vehicles,vans, and shelters. Using standard detectorsor sensors, MICAD automatically detects athreat, issues a local alarm (both within avehicle and to dismounted troops), senses itsposition, and formats and digitally transmitsNBC messages over tactical communicationnetworks to command and control systems athigher headquarters. The modular componentsof MICAD require a minimum of humaninteraction for operation and maintenance. Thesize of the components permits them to belocated in any available space (under

platforms, behind equipment, under seats), which greatlysimplifies integration with existing host systems.

MICAD Distribution, Training, and Support

MICAD is an integral part of the M93A1 NBCreconnaissance system Fox vehicle and is currently fieldedwith the M93A1 at multiple sites within the Army andwith the Marines at Camp Pendleton, California. MICADinformation is incorporated in the M93A1 technicalmanuals and is trained as part of the M93A1 trainingcourse.

The M32 MICAD has been fielded to the 4ID as partof the Army�s first digitized division. The distributionwithin the 4ID consists of 56 systems in high-mobility,multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and M1068shelters. Fielding to HMMWV platforms was conductedin November 2000, and the project manager�s tacticaloperations center began installing MICAD in M1068s inFebruary 2001. MICAD technical manuals were provided,and new equipment training was conducted at Fort Hood,Texas, in October 2000 in support of all 4ID MICADsystems. The system was used in the first digitizeddivision�s Capstone Exercise I in April 2001.

Support for MICAD hardware installed on vehiclescomes in two parts. First, all MICAD hardware comeswith a 1-year warranty. When a unit determines that anitem is not functional, it will notify the project manager.He will coordinate the defective item�s return to theproduction contractor for repair. In addition, the projectmanager has MICAD assets that permit an immediatereplacement to the user while the item is being repaired.Second, MICAD spare and repair parts are beingpurchased and placed in the Army�s supply system to

Background left to right: display control, universal interface unit,communication interface unit, and telemetry link radio.

Foreground left to right: personnel alarm, output binding post,terminator, and input binding post.

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support MICAD. MICAD is using life-cycle contractorlogistics support. Beyond the warranty period, all depot-level MICAD repairs will be conducted through thissupport. The unit will order replacement componentsthrough the Army�s wholesale supply system.

Other MICAD Efforts

The battlefield automation team is currently workingon the next evolution of the MICAD concept called theEmbedded Common Technical Architecture (ECTA).ECTA will eliminate MICAD�s dedicated display unit andinterface with the C4I system on the vehicle to fulfill itsdisplay requirements. The current strategy is for ECTAto interface with the M88 chemical detector and with amember of the Radiac family of radiation sensors.Interfaces to various other vehicle systems will besupported, and the design will anticipate future interfaceexpansions. ECTA will implement some of the capabilitiesof JWARN Block I.

THE WAY AHEAD

To effectively meet the goals expressed in the Jointvision, digitization of the NBC battlefield must occur. Thisdigitization will be most effective if the concept isimplemented as a �system of systems.� The NBCbattlefield of the future will no longer contain disparate,stove-piped contamination-avoidance systems that requirelarge numbers of soldiers to operate. The NBC battlefieldof the future will contain a single NBC battlefieldmanagement system.

JWARN will be the heart of future NBC battlefieldmanagement. As a system of systems, it will integrateadvanced hazard prediction models, provide data reach-backcapabilities, and be capable of processing input from manysensor types, including non-NBC sensors. In the future,JWARN will leverage many of the current advances incomputer and information technology. By combining theseabilities into a single system, the goals expressed in the jointvision will be realized. Information superiority will be thekey to a clear picture of the NBC battlefield.

Mr. Williams is a computer engineer for the program manager for NBC Defense Systems, U.S. Army Soldier and Biological ChemicalCommand (SBCCOM), Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. He is currently working for JWARN�s Blocks I and II programs. Mr.Williams holds a bachelor�s in both computer and electrical engineering from West Virginia University and a master�s in computerengineering from Loyola College.Mr. Gallamoza is an electronics engineer for the program manager for NBC Defense Systems, SBCCOM, Aberdeen Proving Grounds,Maryland. He is currently working as a systems engineer for JWARN�s Blocks IB and IC programs. Mr. Gallamoza holds a bachelor�sin computer engineering from the University of Massachusetts at North Dartmouth.Mr.Conley is a mechanical engineer for the program manager for NBC Defense Systems, SBCCOM, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland.He is currently working as deputy product manager for the battlefield automation team. Mr. Conley holds a bachelor�s in mechanicalengineering from the University of Delaware.Mr. Noel is a software engineer for the program manager for NBC Defense Systems, SBCCOM, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland.Mr. Noel holds a bachelor�s in computer science from Towson State University.

Send Us Feedback on Our Courses!The U.S. Army Chemical School and the 3d Chemical Brigade are instituting a Web-based survey mechanism

to gather feedback about the courses we teach. Input from soldiers in the field is critical to helping us modify ourcourses to ensure that they are providing you, the Chemical Warrior, with the key knowledge and training you needto succeed in your assignments. Because of the personnel cutbacks we all have taken, the Chemical School can nolonger conduct external trips and visits to field locations to determine the relevance of our courses. We mustdepend on surveys, such as these, to gather our input. You can get to the Survey Questionnaires by clicking on theicon at the Chemical School�s home page http://www.wood.army.mil/usacmls/.

Both the course manager for that particular course as well as a senior leader at the Chemical School willreview the input that you provide us. We will use your input as we periodically update our courses. You can submitanonymously if you desire. Chemical Leaders�please encourage the Chemical soldiers you work with and superviseto take a moment to complete these questionnaires; it will help us all.

POC is Colonel Tom Spoehr, e-mail address is spoehrt@wood.army.mil.

February 2002 13

There probably aren�t many people, at least thosewithin the Department of Defense (DOD), who haven�theard about the 11 September terrorist attack on thePentagon. While the terrorist attack on the World TradeCenter (WTC) Towers certainly eclipsed the one on thePentagon in scope and number of casualties, there was aparticular sense of outrage within the military communitythat the nation�s military center was hit. For those of uswho work in the Pentagon, it was very hard tocomprehend, at first, and still is troubling to many of us.

This is not an �I-was-there� story because I wasn�t inthe building when the plane hit. You have all heardthe accounts and seen the news stories and are probablysuffering from news overload, as I am. However, I�d like togive an insider�s view of the after-action events and what itmay predict to the military chemical defense community.

Terror at the Pentagon

I left my joint staff office at 0815 to attend a JointService Integration Group working meeting in nearbyCrystal City. It was a normal day like any other day, nospecial warnings or threat indications. When we heardthe news about the WTC buildings, we were shocked,but after a few minutes, we returned to work. When thenews came about the Pentagon attack, it pretty much killedthe meeting. Although I couldn�t get in touch with mycolleagues in the Pentagon, I was somewhat comfortedby the fact that our office was directly opposite the impactpoint. After watching some of the television coverage, Ijoined the mass evacuation out of D.C. It was surreal,watching the dark smoke coming from the Pentagon anddrifting above Arlington. My wife and I spent the rest ofthe afternoon watching the news, trying to understandwhat was happening and the meaning of it all. At the endof the day, the news came that we were going back towork on Wednesday. The Pentagon was open forbusiness.

It was suspected that the terrorists might attack a secondtime with chemical or biological (CB) warfare agents,targeting the emergency responders and exposed populations.On Tuesday morning, some hospital workers had diagnosed

patients who were �short of breath� and they began askingif this was a symptom of a chemical warfare agent. Of course,there had been no CB attacks. One of the few good newsstories was the quick response of local emergency respondersto the incident site. This was partly due to the previouscoordination and training exercises between Pentagon andcounty emergency responders�practicing to respond to apotential CB terrorist incident at the Pentagon. The openlines of communication between key DOD and localresponder personnel and their familiarity with respondingto a potential terrorist incident at the Pentagon probably werekey factors in saving lives and minimizing damage.

I don�t know if the Army�s Technical Escort Unit wasinvolved or if any of the DOD�s CB specialists were at thescene. I suspect that the Joint Forces Command would havescrambled its Joint task force for civil support, although Ican�t say for sure what role it played. I hope those involvedtell us how well the current civil support plans held up, sinceit was local officials responding to a federal terrorismincident site instead of the other way around. It does

Editorial

Responding to TerrorismBy Albert J. Mauroni

It could have been worse, in many ways. That�s the good news.You�ve already heard the bad news.

14 CML

reemphasize that for no-notice incidents, the emergencyresponders will be the first to encounter any CB hazards.The DOD CB specialists still have a role in restitutionoperations, which is a message to the National Guard�sweapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support teams(CSTs).

On Wednesday, we returned to work. Those of uscommuting from the Metro had to walk from the PentagonCity stop, through the south parking lot, to enter thePentagon. Smoke still was wafting from the roof, and thestrong campfire smell of burned wood lingered throughoutthe corridors. The west end of south parking was turnedinto a supply depot, complete with food trailers from somefast-food chains sustaining the workforce. Security wastight�the security force was checking 100 percent ofthe bags, and armed guards with MP5 machine gunsroamed the halls. The offices between the second andsixth corridors were roped off and guarded by �OldGuard� soldiers from Fort Myer.

On Thursday, the smoke had ceased, but not much hadchanged inside the building. The firefighters� vehicles werestill in the Pentagon courtyard, functioning as a commandand control post. I walked over to the end of south parkingto view the damage. The gaping hole in the E-ring hit mehard; it is one thing to see the damage on television and inthe papers, it is another thing to see it in person. The crewswere working hard. I saw the large American flag hangingfrom the roof to the right of the hole. American flags werewaving from many vehicles and trailers surrounding thedamaged west side. Walking around the Pentagon, I saw thepools of water in the sixth corridor A-ring. We had heardthat all the Army Chemical Corps personnel in the buildingwere healthy and accounted for; however, the Headquarters�Army staff personnel were unable to return to their office.By Friday morning, the cordoned-off areas were starting toshrink, and personnel with offices off corridors two and sixwere returning to work.

A Way Ahead

The attacks of 11 September lead to further speculationnow as to how DOD should prepare for future CB terroristincidents. Already, in the many major newspapers acrossthe nation, people were discussing when (not if) terroristswould use CB warfare agents against U.S. military andcivilian targets. The terrorist groups� resolve to create masscasualties was no longer in question. As one pundit pointedout, if one had asked what the odds were that four commercialairplanes would be hijacked simultaneously, the answerprobably would have been infinitesimal to none. Yet ithappened�so too could a CB terrorist incident withthousands of related casualties. Still the fact remained thatthe terrorists did not use CB warfare agents this time.

Prominent speakers have stated over and over again, sincethe Aum Shinrikyo incident in 1995, that it was a matter of�not if, but when.� Well, it appears that terrorists still prefersimple and conventional tools to complex ones. (See JonathanTucker�s book, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use ofChemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, 2000.)

There has been a good deal of discussion within theDOD CB defense community, and specifically the ArmyChemical Corps, as to its role in consequence managementor force protection. The challenge to the Chemical Corpshas spread from its traditional roots to a more diverse CBthreat. The question is how should the Chemical Corpsdevelop and execute doctrine, organization, training, andmateriel development in these new, emerging mission areas.Some would suggest that the concept of operations(CONOPS) in responding to a CB incident in consequencemanagement or force protection missions has a differentfocus than the current CONOPS for passive-defenserequirements�it�s not as simple as thinking in the sameprinciples of contamination avoidance, protection, anddecontamination. While the Chemical Corps is leading thedevelopment of multiservice tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTP) in these areas, it is not clear if the armedforces and its leadership have registered this new emphasison CB defense.

Consequence management and force protection are moreoriented toward operations other than war, with a greateremphasis on protection of emergency responders than onmilitary personnel. For instance, with consequencemanagement, the requirements are to protect the emergencyresponders, assess the hazardous area, evacuate and treatthe unprotected personnel, and then worry about fullrestoration of public services. For force protection, therequirements are to protect the military personnel withinthe gates (especially the gatekeepers), harden key facili-ties, and ensure that the base has an adequate capabilityto absorb an attack and continue functioning. These aredifferent requirements than individual protection of theJoint task force�providing situational awareness of CBhazards across the theater of operations, maintainingmaneuver operations tempo, and sustaining operations atfixed sites. This means that the CONOPS will be differentfor executing a military response to these three verydifferent mission areas (see figure).

In addition, the Army Chemical Corps can safely claimthat passive defense is mostly, if not all, within its realm ofCB defense expertise�not so for consequence managementand force protection. While there are CB defense tasks withinthose mission areas, they do not constitute a major function.They are service-specific funded efforts focused on counter-terrorism or responses to terrorism, as opposed to a jointprogram focused on military operations. Consider that in2001, according to the Government Accounting Office

DOD CBDP may supportresearch and developmentrequirements for passivedefense, force protection, andconsequence management, butthe operational capabilities andpolices differ.

Passive Defense (War):� Situational awareness of

NBC hazards.� Protect Warfighters.� Maintain maneuver

OPTEMPO.� Sustain operations at

fixed sites.

Force Protection (Peace):� Survey and monitor

protected area for hazards.� Protect site occupants.� Maintain services.� Protect site infrastructure.

Consequence Management(Both):

� Identify unknown hazardsto safeguard civilians.

� Protect first responders.� Restore government

services.� Restore and protect civil

infrastructure.

CB Defense Emphasis

February 2002 15

estimates, the federal government spent fivetimes the amount of counterterrorism funds onefforts not related to CB incident response thanon related efforts. If the members of the DODCB defense community do not appreciate thereal politics and issues within the consequencemanagement and force protection mission areas,they will be drummed out of DOD meetings asirrelevant distractions, and the DOD CB defenseprogram�s (CBDP�s) value will be diminished.

The catch is that the technical developmentof material solutions for passive defense,consequence management, and force protectionaddressing CB defense requirements areapplicable across the three mission areas. Thisis both a blessing and a curse. The same DODlaboratories and industrial firms develop similarCB defense equipment in all three areas, whichmeans they are leveraging the talent andexpertise to ensure that the technical capabilityis state of the art and consistent in capability. Thedownside is that the current and projected DOD budgetfor CB defense research, development, and acquisitiondoes not adequately cover all passive-defenserequirements of the Defense Planning Guidance, let alonethe additional consequence-management and forceprotection CB defense requirements.

Some have already suggested that DOD CBDP (andspecifically not the service budgets) should procure CBdefense equipment for responding to CB terrorism as wellas for traditional passive-defense requirements. If this isthe case, it will require a hard examination of the services�priorities. It is not yet clear that the Office of the Secretaryof Defense and service leadership will add additionalresources to the jointly funded DOD CBDP to cover thesenew costs once they understand the current shortfalls inDOD�s ability to respond to CB terrorism. Many will pointto the 11 September incident and state that there was noCB warfare threat.

There are other DOD capabilities with higherpriorities that need financing, such as intelligencecollection efforts, information security, and forceprotection measures against conventional munitions. Eventhe national missile defense program, despite its lack ofcapability against this particular form of terrorism, willstill be fighting to retain its planned funding profile. Therecertainly will be some funding for responding to CBterrorism, but the force protection bill of the more than600 DOD installations will be very high. Certainly it willtake additional DOD guidance, policy, and increasedfocus to institute any new efforts.

If DOD CBDP is taxed to provide for these newmission areas without additional funding, the armed

force�s passive-defense capability will suffer. Theoperations and maintenance costs of procuring millionsof protective ensembles and medical CB defense material,tons of decontaminants, and thousands of collectiveprotection filters are a considerable burden, and (to date)not the top priority of most commanders. The costs ofprocuring additional protective ensembles and medicalpre- and posttreatments for hundreds of thousands ofDOD and other-than-U.S.-forces personnel will beimmense (not to mention additional CB agent detectors,decontaminants, and collective protection systems forevery military base that perceives a terrorist CB threat).It may be wiser to have DOD CBDP pay for the researchand development of CB defense equipment for all threeareas and procure equipment only for passive defense,while the services provide their own funds to procureequipment for force protection and consequencemanagement requirements. Otherwise, we may face anunconstrained appetite for new CB defense equipmentthat is not disciplined toward the top priority threats.

The DOD CBDP may be the appropriate vehicle forfunding all these new requirements, but it is not prepared toexecute the effort even if the required funding cametomorrow. A long-term DOD CB defense strategic plan hasnot been developed and is not in place yet. We need a serious,top-down examination of the DOD counterproliferationstrategy, including how the counterproliferation pillars ofcounterforce, active defense, passive defense, andconsequence management work together and who is incharge of developing and implementing these capabilities.We need to clearly identify how the CBDP should supportcounterproliferation and force protection areas. Next, weneed to plan how to transition the DOD CBDP from a

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passive-defense-only effort to a DOD program thatcoordinates service and DOD requirements in passivedefense, consequence management, and force protection.Considering all that has occurred since Public Law 103-160 made this a joint program area in 1994 (the DefenseReform Initiative, DOD counterproliferation strategy,the two Quadrennial Defense Reviews), it is time todevelop a new DOD CB defense strategy and revise itsmanagement structure.

This plan will also require increased interaction withthe Army staff and senior leadership. While Public Law103-160 and the Joint service agreement on NBC defensemanagement created a new and stronger DOD CBDP, itunintentionally decreased the Army�s leadership role. TheArmy once had control of more than 70 percent of theDOD CB defense budget, and, having the only dedicatedforce structure addressing WMD required this emphasis.Previously, a general officer was on the Deputy Chief ofStaff for Operations (DCSOP) staff and a colonel in theDeputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). Now theArmy has 25 percent of the program, a colonel in DCSOPand a major in DCSLOG. For a service charged with beingthe DOD executive agent for NBC defense, it ishandicapped in its attempts to lead discussions with thesenior Army leadership, let alone with the other servicesthat now equally share the program.

The Army Chemical School is understaffed andoverworked to keep up with its current responsibilities,let alone develop a new path forward in counter-proliferation, as the other services and joint staff aredeveloping in Washington, D.C. The Chemical Corpswould benefit if it had a general officer and staff inWashington to liaison with the Army leadership, Jointstaff, and services. Certainly there have been enoughindications that the time has come for an expansion frompassive defense to a broader counterproliferation and forceprotection charter. Without an Army chemical officer onthe Army staff, perhaps even on the Joint staff, thisexpansion is not certain.

There are numerous other cases to be made for arevitalized Army chemical presence on the Army staff. Toomany unanswered policy questions and responsibilities existin DOD CBDP for the DOD executive agent to ignore. Thevery basic question of �how clean is clean� begs to beanswered, not just for chemical, but also now for biological(re: anthrax in the mail system). We need leadership on howto protect DOD civilians overseas from CB attacks, we needbetter implementation of the biological vaccine and WMDCST programs, and we need a serious evaluation of theArmy�s transformation plan to ensure it develops a forcethat can survive in a CB environment.

Conclusion

These are just bold brush strokes of a concept intendedto start us thinking on a way forward from the 11 Septemberincidents. It is great to charge forward and offer our expertisein this time of crisis, but we also need to focus on aninstitutional fix for the DOD CBDP. We are no longeroperating under the old scenario of two major theaters ofwars. What we need is a clear way forward, unburdenedfrom the constraints of the Chemical Corps operationalconcepts developed for the Cold War in the mid 1980s. Thiswill require strong leadership and a willingness to explorenew options while developing a concept that is executablefrom a budgetary standpoint as well as supported by theDOD counterproliferation strategy.

The Army needs to continue its executive-agent rolein guiding the discussion on joint CB defense logisticsand consumption rates, and it needs to continue developingDugway Proving Grounds as the premier DOD CBdefense test and evaluation center. This requires ChemicalCorps colonels, not majors, to interface and coordinatewith the other services and DOD agencies. We are treadingwater now, and we need to lead the DOD program.

Postscript

As a final note, I want to acknowledge a personal loss.On that Tuesday, a friend and past colleague of mine died inthe attack on the Pentagon. Gerald (Geep) Fisher, a Booz-Allen consultant, was meeting Lieutenant General TimMaude, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, alongwith two other colleagues when the plane hit. He was briefingan improved system for survivor benefits for militaryemployees. He was a great guy to know and work with, andhe will be sorely missed. His death had a significant impacton me�making me realize how fortunate I was. While I workin the Pentagon every day, the news of his death reallybrought the impact of the incident home to me.

On Monday, 17 September 2001, I saw that theconstruction workers had posted American flags on top oftheir tallest crane. From inside the A-ring, I saw the highestone fluttering in the breeze above the Pentagon�s roof onthat beautiful fall day. Their work goes on�so does ours.

Mr. Mauroni is a senior policy analyst for Analytic Services, Inc.,and former Army chemical officer with 16 years of experience onJoint chemical and biological defense programs and policy issues.He currently supports the J5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on DOD CBissues. He is the author of two books on chemical-biologicaldefense and is currently working on his third book on the Army�schemical demilitarization program.

February 2002 17

Many experts believe that the attacks on the WorldTrade Center Towers and the Pentagon bear the hallmarkof Osama bin Laden, the world�s number one terrorist.The attacks were well thought out and executed almost toperfection. They indicated a high state of planning andthought. The attacks also required that the terrorists diein the attempt. A terrorist giving his life for a cause duringa terrorist act isn�t new.

On the former island of Ceylon, a group of minorityTamils has been fighting the government allied with Indiafor almost 20 years. Its members are famous for notallowing themselves to be captured alive. The group alsois known to use suicide bombers to assassinate high-ranking government officials. Rajiv Gandhi, the son ofIndira Gandhi who had been assassinated by one of herSikh guards, was one of its most famous victims.

In Russia during the 1880s, one terrorist group oftenused suicide bombers known as Social RevolutionaryCombat Squads to assassinate members of the Tsargovernment. Its best-known victim was Tsar AlexanderIII, who was blown up by a suicide bomber as he walkedfrom his coach to see some of his staff who earlier hadbeen wounded in a bombing attack. The attacker wasblown to bits, and Alexander (horribly mutilated by theblast) died several hours later. It was later discovered thatthe head of these combat squads was also an agent ofthe Tsarist Secret Police, the Okrana.

In feudal Japan, ninja assassins were known to commitsuicide if they failed in an assassination attempt or weresurrounded after the assassination so they could not becaptured and interrogated. Ninjas were clan-oriented andloyal only to their clan and the individual who employedthem.

The attacks on the U.S. embassies in Africa showedthe same type of attention to detail as the 11 September2001, attacks that bin Laden is accused of masterminding.In fact, the embassy attacks�smaller, less dramaticoperations to see if three different teams could attackseparate targets almost simultaneously�could have beena precursor to the 11 September attacks.

Terrorists don�t normally reach old age. They areengaged in a high-risk profession where many dieviolently in less than 10 years or end up in jail for life.The chief plotters of the assault on the U.S. embassies in

Africa are likely to receive a life sentence. That Osamabin Laden has survived for nearly two decades in such ahigh-risk business says much about his abilities.

Bin Laden is the son of a very wealthy Saudi businessfamily. He was raised in comfort and educated as anIslamic scholar. Although his family has disowned him,they apparently gave him an inheritance of more than $100million, which he has invested all over the world. Hence,he is often his own paymaster.

The world�s number one terrorist once trained anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan for the United States. Helives simply and moves about very often. Loyal followers,who are not likely to turn against him, guard him. Whenreporters have been allowed to meet with him, they wereminutely searched to ensure they were not carryinghoming devices.

It was rumored that some of his soldiers were inMogadishu during the time the U.S. Rangers were caughtbehind enemy lines and that they helped the Somali gunmanpin down the Rangers. Bin Laden�s graduates also have beenknown to fight in Kosovo as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Bin Laden is well known by most of the intelligenceorganizations across the Islamic world. He has agents inmany major nations, including the United States. Theseagents do not draw attention to themselves; they merelyeither acquire information needed for operations or justwait for the phone to ring. Thus, bin Laden can strikefrom anywhere he chooses.

Why does he dislike the United States so much? Thereason seems to be his interpretation of his religion and

Terrorism and the Mind of ItBy Dr. Burton Wright III, USACMLS Command Historian

The Pentagon after the 11 September attack

18 CML

Western culture. Bin Laden is what some have called anIslamic fundamentalist. He tends to view Islam with theperspective of a fifteenth-century warrior. Western cultureand the influence of the United States around the worldare a danger to Islam, as far as Bin Laden is concerned,and he believes the only way to fight this problem is todrive it back to the shores of the United States. Toaccomplish this, he will use terrorism. We may have seenjust the opening salvos in this war with the 11 Septemberattacks and the loss of thousands of lives.

Terrorism has changed often over the centuries, butit has reached a new and very dangerous stage. In pastyears, terrorists expected to survive the act. They tookhostages and also asked for a great deal of money to usefor the struggle. Today�s terrorists are not interested insuch a mundane reward. Dying in the act is their reward�they believe they will enter paradise. This belief is not,however, that widely held in Islam. Most Moslem scholarsdo not agree that the Koran allows this. Most Arabs andMoslems are not terrorists but are kind and friendly people.

In recent press interviews, bin Laden has made it clearhe will now target the United States. Since he recruitsfrom the disaffected all over the Middle East, he does nothave a lack of those willing to give their lives for his cause.The final count (including the Pennsylvania crash)suggests that there were at least 18 terrorists involved inthe 11 September attacks who died for bin Laden�s ideasand faith.

The United States has faced such fanaticism before.During World War II, Japanese pilots deliberately dovetheir planes into U.S. ships. Casualties among ships andcrew were high, but America won that war. We canovercome this problem as well; however, it will take time.

Bin Laden is not headquartered in Afghanistan byaccident. The terrain favors his ability to remain hidden,and he can move around with his small group of directsupporters and guards. Since he doesn�t require an estateor what we call luxuries as some of the other terroristswould, he will be as difficult to find as a needle in ahaystack. However, if the United States puts its full effortinto finding him, he will, eventually be found.

But to put him on the defensive, the United Statesneeds to strike along several levels. First, the source ofhis major troublemaking is his money, which he movesfrom bank to bank to finance his operations. We must use

our economic power to force countries known to launderhis money to provide assistance and to freeze his assets.Tracing the money can be done, but it will take time toget a handle on it. Second, bin Laden�s group has othermembers and other leaders who support him. They, too,must be brought to justice, and they are less protected.

The Taliban government of Afghanistan has saidpublicly that bin Laden wasn�t involved. In a sense thatcould be true�he works through a layered network ofoperatives. In fact, some of those who killed themselveson 11 September may not have known whom they reallyworked for. Bin Laden could have come up with theconcept and then let others do all the work.

Do not think that bin Laden can be persuaded to relentin his terrorist campaign. He will continue until we find andeliminate him or he dies naturally. He will not give up norwill those who support him. Unfortunately, they will notlisten to reason. That�s why terrorists have short life spans.

Bin Laden is but one of a group of like-mindedindividuals. Some are involved in wars in other countries.Terrorism is a worldwide problem, and its solutions willnot only involve the United States but other nations aswell that hold to a universal standard of brotherhood andpeaceful coexistence. Only then will the mind of a terroristinterest only psychologists and historians. Soon, we willbe taking the first steps in that direction.

Rescue workers search through the rubbleof the U.S. Embassy in Kenya in 1998.

Examples of early Navy masks: The Mark I (left) andthe Mark II (right), with the canister on top of the head.

February 2002 19

World War I

The Navy�s first gas mask, the Mark I, was developedby The Bureau of Mine�s American University ExperimentalStation. It was also known as the Navy snout-type mask.The facepiece was of thin, rubberized fabric mounted on afabric frame. This mask combined the best features of allEuropean masks the designers had available for study. Thenoseclip and mouthpiece were copied from the Americanpattern of the British small-box respirator. The replaceablecanister and check valve were similar to the French AppareilRespiratoire Special (ARS) masks. The general appearanceand rubberized fabric were similar to the standard Germanmask designs. It was carried in a metal can with ahinged cover and an attached web strap to hangover the shoulder. An interesting characteristic ofthe mask was the wire frame that allowed the userto adjust the mask for best vision.

The Navy Mark II was an attempt to improvethe concept of the Mark I by using the latesttechnology available. Various designs were tried,including placing the filter on the back of the neckand containing it under a helmet. The final maskused the Tissot principle of relying on the facepieceto form the seal that forces the wearer to inhalethrough the canister. Whereas the Mark I had asnout-type canister, the Mark II put the canister onan aluminum helmet on top of the head. The airflowed through the filter to a Y-adapter that splitthe airflow to both eye lenses, flowing over theeye lenses and keeping them clear (preventingdimming) and then into the lungs. Exhaled airflowed out the mask through a flutter valve

mounted over the nose. For smoke concentrations, a pair ofparticulate filters could be mounted on either side of thechemical filter to filter out the smoke particles. An additionalfilter was available for carbon monoxide.

By mounting the filter on top of the head, the Navyleadership sought to increase the usability of the mask onshipboard�there were no hoses to catch on anything, andthe mask was relatively well balanced despite being heavy.However, sailors using the Mark II probably had problemsducking through bulkheads. Normally they could duck toone level to get through, but now they had an extra thicklayer of stuff on their head and needed to duck lower thanbefore, resulting in a steep learning curve and many sore

Masks of the Sea Service �A Joint Effort

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Walk

Until recently, the U.S. Navy always plotted an independent course in acquiring technology, which resultedin similar requirements but different answers for the Army, Navy and, later, Air Force. This occurred withshipboard weaponry as well as gas (or protective) masks. The Navy desired a gas mask to protect the userfrom chemical agents while working. This meant that the sailor needed to project his voice for effectivecommunications, see clearly to view gauges and knobs, move about the ship through bulkheads and aroundpipes and machinery, and breathe easily while doing so. After initial developments in World War I, the Navytried various concepts to protect forces afloat, optical instrument users, shore-based forces, civilians, andsubmariners. After much effort, it finally issued a standard mask for all Navy personnel. This is the story ofNavy mask development.

CML20

heads and necks. It is interesting to note that the basis ofissue of the Mark II was 50 percent of crew members oncruisers and destroyers and a total of 500 to battleships (crewof 1,860 sailors) in 1920. No mention is made of how theothers were protected.

Between the Wars

In 1921, the Navy ordered the Army�s MI service mask(also known as the Kops-Tissot-Monroe and the Model 1919)for issue to its forces. By 22 February 1922, a total of 25,000masks had been delivered.

At a 1922 chemical warfare conference, the Navyannounced the need for a gas mask with speaking capabilityfor the forces afloat, a gas mask to use with opticalinstruments, and an improved mask for submariners. Workcommenced immediately. By 1924, prototypes wereproduced.

Gas Masks of the Forces Afloat

The Navy wanted to issue all sailors a mask withspeaking capability. The mask so equipped was known as adiaphragm mask. The first one issued to the Navy in 1924was called the Navy Diaphragm (ND) Mark I. Itwas essentially an Army MI service mask modified to includea speaking diaphragm. The facepiece was constructed ofstockinette-coated rubber sheeting. The diaphragm washoused in a circular metal housing with an inlet valve at thebottom and a protected flutter-type outlet valve right next toit. Keeping with the Tissot design, the mask had a Y-shapedair deflector inside the mask to ensure airflow over the eyelenses. The Army adopted this mask as the Army DiaphragmMI (some references call it the Mark III mask) for leadersand soldiers needing to communicate. The only differencebetween the Army and Navy masks was the head harness�the Army used a standard six-point elastic harness, while

the Navy used a six-point coiled-spring harness. In fact, thecoiled-spring harness was used on all Navy diaphragm masksuntil the Mark V. In actual use, the diaphragm was onlymarginally effective, so work on an improved maskcontinued.

The diaphragm mask was improved by making the eyelenses replaceable and making a one-size-fits-all mask (calleda �Universal� mask). This mask was known as the ND MarkII (Army: MII diaphragm gas mask). A mask with anunmistakable appearance, it continued to use the basicstockinette-coated rubber sheeting for the facepiece, but ithad an ungainly appearing diaphragm. The diaphragm waslarge, but recessed, and the inlet air tubes were externallymounted to protect the diaphragm and the outlet flutter valve.The outlet flutter valve was mounted directly in front of thediaphragm and pointed up. This mask, while an improve-ment, still had problems: exhaling was difficult when fac-ing high winds, the long hose could catch on ship equipment,it was bulky, and vision was still restricted. Researchcontinued to create a new mask, preferably a technologicallyadvanced one with a molded facepiece.

By 1939, technology had advanced far enough to allowthe Navy to adopt a fully molded facepiece�the ND MarkIII. This mask had the B2 filter mounted behind the head,aviation goggle-type eye lenses, an improved speakingdiaphragm, and a new outlet valve. The aviation goggle-type lenses were thoroughly examined in the 1930s by boththe Army and Navy to improve the field of view. The Army,who improved vision by using the triangular-shaped lensesin its first fully molded masks, never adopted the ND MarkIII. Note, however, the similarities of eye-lens design betweenthe ND Mark III and the newest Army M45. Obviously,there are some advantages to using the aviation goggle-shaped eye lens.

The ND Mark III moved the filter from the waist to thehead to eliminate the long hose that could catch on the myriadof protrusions onboard ship. It also eliminated the filter on

ND Mark II ND Mark IIIND Mark I

February 2002 21

top of the head from the Mark II that probably caused headand neck injuries when sailors tried to move quickly throughthe ship or forgot to duck low enough when passing throughbulkheads. Finally, the best aspect of the B2 filter was that ithad less breathing resistance than earlier masks. These maskswere issued only in universal size, purchased for the shipscomplement, and stored on board for issue when needed.Unfortunately, while the Mark III was lighter than previousmasks, all the weight was on the head (although balanced),and this weight probably plagued sailors for the next twodecades.

In the quest to improve the ND Mark III (andstandardize as much as possible with the Army), the Navy

adopted the Army�striangular-shaped eyelenses as used onthe M2, M3, M4, M5,and M8 masks. Thenew mask was theND Mark IV. Thismask provided im-proved vision for thesailor but still retainedthe basic flaws ofthe ND Mark III�weight, bulk, and headinjuries. It remainedthe standard Navy fleetmask until the mid-1950s when the NDMark V replaced it.

Gas Mask for Optical Instrument Users

At their 1922 chemical warfare meeting, the Navydetermined it needed a mask to use with opticalequipment. This mask was difficult to make�the firstwas called the E6 (Experimental Model 6) and wasquickly delivered to the Navy. This mask was again avariant of the Army MI service gas mask. The use of flat,rubber sheet stock in the mask with optically ground glassused in the eye lenses made the mask extremely difficultto make and required many hand operations.Experimentation continued on this mask through the1920s and into the 1930s. Finally, in the late 1930s, afully molded face blank was developed in parallel withthe ND Mark III, and a successful optical gas mask wasdelivered to the fleet. This mask was the Navy DiaphragmOptical (NDO) Gas Mask Mark I (Army: Optical GasMask MI) and was standard in 1939. This mask, whilesuccessful, still was extremely difficult to manufacture.A relative of the ND Mark III and IV, it shared the othersfaults (with more problems because of the optical lenses).Vision was extremely limited, and sailors wearing this

mask were se-verely handicappedwhen working and,most likely, walk-ing. Despite this,the mask was pro-duced in quantitybefore and duringWorld War II. Stillstandard in 1952,however, by 1960this mask was nolonger mentioned inNavy publications.

Mask for Submariners

The Navy was extremely concerned with protecting thesubmariners also. The hazards on early submarines weremany, not the least of which were noxious chemical vapors(modern terminology: industrial chemicals)�carbonmonoxide, chlorine (from the batteries), hydrogen chloride(batteries again), sulfur dioxide, gasoline vapors, oil vapors,carbon tetrachloride vapors, and industrial smokes.Emergency masks consisting of only a filter and noseclipwere examined in the quest for an adequate submarine mask.They were noted as the Naval Submarine (NS) Model Aand B, although no mention is made of any issuance. By1920, the Navy�s Mark I gas mask was listed as the standardfor defense against chlorine, the primary hazard by far dueto battery deterioration. This mask was insufficient, but therewas nothing better.

Experimentation continued with modifications of theArmy Model 1919 (MI) mask resulting in the NS ModelC, D, E, and F. Thealterations includedattaching the filterdirectly to the face-piece and mountingthe flutter (outlet)valve parallel to thefilter (pointing out).This was ultimatelythe best design andwas adopted as theNavy submarine maskMark I, of which5,000 were produced.The filter was areactive canister de-signed strictly for thethreat in submarines. Itwas not meant to pro-vide protection against

ND Mark V

NDO gas mask Mark I

Chlorine canister forsubmariners, front view

22 CML

chemical warfare agents. Because of the harsh conditionsaboard submarines, later reliability testing showed thatthe masks and filters did not maintain usability for long.To correct these deficiencies, the mask was constructedof leather, with the filter sealed until used. This leathermask was adopted as the Mark II submarine mask. By1939, the Navy had deleted the submarine masks fromthe inventory and replaced them with the submarineescape apparatus. The escape apparatus, also known asthe escape lung, provided the submariner with air andcould be used in noxious atmospheres inside of thesubmarine as well as in the water. As space on submarinesis at a premium, the mask was deleted.

World War II

With the onset of World War II, needs developedbeyond what the Navy had anticipated in 1922.Production, fitting, and usability difficulties resulted inthe need for more than just diaphragm, optical, andsubmarine masks. New challenges arose in outfittingNavy units whose primary responsibility was on land,not sea. The Navy then procured additional masks forshore-based forces as well as civilians working with theNavy.

Masks for Shore-Based Forces

During World War II, the Navy adopted the Army�slightweight service gas mask for shore-based forces. Withthe Navy�s vast increase in size and the difficulty inmanufacturing the ND Mark III, it needed a mask quickly.In addition, naval-construction battalions and portorganizations needed an Army-style mask that they couldwear under helmets. The Army mask was immediatelyavailable because it was a simpler design already in massproduction. It also was designed to be worn under thestandard Army helmet. This mask did not providespeaking capability, but the ND Mark III or IV could beissued when necessary. This mask remained in use bythe shore-based Naval forces until the early 1960s whenit was phased out.

A Mask for Civilian Workers

For civilians, the Navy produced the Navy Civilian(NC) Mark I mask. Starting in 1941, this mask wasproduced for Navy civilian-support personnel to useduring an emergency, beating the Army�s MInoncombatant gas mask into production by almost a year.Although the NC Mark I was inexpensive, it still providedthe necessary protection for the civilians to escape thehazard, but it was not meant for hard use. This mask wasmade of stockinette-covered rubber sheeting (like the ND

Mark I and II) with a glued-in plastic eye lens, two cheek-mounted filters, an army-style six-point head harness, andan exposed outlet valve. The filters later inspired thedesign of the filters for the M6 Dog Mask. The NC Mark Imask was eliminated shortly after World War II.

Post World War II Masks

At the end of World War II, the Navy had fourstandard masks: NDO Mark I, ND Mark III, ND MarkIV for forces afloat, and the lightweight service mask forshore-based forces.

The ND and NDO masks for forces afloat (still inuse) were bulky and heavy. To reduce cost and weight,the Navy sought a lighter, less bulky mask with bettervision, which resulted in the ND Mark V. This mask usedthe same basic layout as the earlier NC Mark I and manyof the concepts of the Army�s fledgling E13 maskprogram, but it was constructed for hard shipboard use.Adopted in the mid-1950s, the ND Mark V had a single,large eye lens; two large, flat C-1 canisters; and a carrierwith a metal plate to prevent damage to the mask. Thefacepiece also was designed with a new type of sealaround the periphery to improve fit and comfort. Theinnovative seal was pneumatic and allowed the mask to

NC Mark I

23February 2002

properly fit most faces. This feature worked well whennew, but it did not last long in service. It was onlyproduced in size medium (formerly called universal), sothe Navy recommended carefully tightening the five head-harness straps. This mask carried the Navy from the 1950sto the 1980s. The ND Mark V�s uniqueness among theservices and allies was probably its biggest problem.

The lightweight service mask used by shore-based forceswas phased out by the early 1960s. It was replaced by theM9A1 mask, which was supplemented by, and then replacedby, the M17-series masks. These Army-standard masks havebeen discussed at length in the article, Mask History�Infantry or General-Purpose Mask (see Army ChemicalReview, February 2001), and will not be discussed furtherhere.

The All-Navy Mask

Technology advanced in the aerospace industry in the 1970swith a wonder material�silicone. The military worked withsilicone for aviation uses as well as use in chemical warfaredefense. Silicone is a wonder material because it is nonallergenic,and it is so flexible that it can be fitted to anyone. Using siliconeas the face blank material, the Army designed the XM29- andXM30-series masks and then dropped the program. The Navyand Air Force liked the XM30�s basic design and adopted thismask in 1983 as the Mask, Chemical Uniform (MCU) number2 or MCU-2/P for short. This became the first �All-Navy� maskas envisioned in a 1928 article.

This one mask replaced both the ND Mark V for the forcesafloat and the M17-series masks for forces ashore, which easedthe logistical burden. The new features of the mask included

two voicemitters (one for speaking to others and one for usewith telephones), a nosecup to minimize eye lens fogging, andspectacle insert capability, and it allowed the user to drink froma canteen. The NATO standard C-2 filter canister could bemounted on either side of the facepiece to suit the users needs.Like the ND Mark V, the mask had one large eye lens, but thisone was more flexible for use with optical instruments. An outsertalso could be added for scratch and sun protection.

The MCU-2/P was altered to fit a microphone pass throughand became the MCU-2A/P. This mask could be fitted toindividual sailors through the use of three sizes (small, medium,and large). The MCU-2/P-series mask was the primary maskused by the Navy during Operation Desert Storm, although therewere probably some ND Mark Vs still in the system as well.Seeking to further improve the voice transmission of the mask,the Navy adopted the same voicemitter amplifier as the Army�the M7�except the Navy called it the AN/PNT-2.

Mask for Joint Service

As technology advances, the Navy looks for a better maskas well. It is full partners in the Joint Services General PurposeMask (JSGPM) Program. The JSGPM issued to each soldier,sailor, Marine, and airman is to be lightweight, inexpensive,and compact. In addition, the mask will be tested againstselected standard industrial chemicals to ensure that the usersare protected in modern toxic environments. The program�sobjective is to lower total ownership cost for the military.

ND Mark V

MCU-2A/P

CML24

Since this mask will be used by all services, the initial unitcost and spare and repair parts will benefit from an economyof scale. In essence, the more the military buys, the less eachmask will cost. Reduction in overall weight and bulk arecritical also, and the JSGPM must occupy less space than areplacement MCU-2A/P facepiece.

The JSGPM or XM50 is a technological leap forward,but it is not ready for issue yet. The U.S. Army projectmanager for the Nuclear, Biological, and ChemicalDefense Systems (PM NBCDS) is the lead for the JSGPMprogram and is working closely with theU.S. Navy Coastal Systems Station,Panama City, Florida. On 30 March2001, the Program Definition and RiskReduction (PDRR) base developmentalcontract was awarded to Avon Rubberand Plastics, Cadillac, Michigan. Avoncurrently makes the FM12 and S10military masks for the United Kingdomand many other NATO countries.

As of September 2000, initial proto-types were received from Avon. Over thepast year, development on refining themasks continued. Final PDRR test articleswere received in November 2001. Earlyinitial operational test and evaluation fieldtests of this masks will occur in 2001 and2002, and end users will get an opportunityto influence both mask design and doctrinedevelopment.

Conclusion

Never truly satisfied with the status quo, the Navyleadership sought innovative solutions to the problem ofchemical warfare protection. They had specialized masksdeveloped and issued them to the forces afloat and ashore,optical instrument users, civilian workers, andsubmariners, as needed. When technology allowed it, theNavy finally issued only one mask for all and are fullyintegrated in the JSGPM Program.

ReferencesBell, Robert C. LT (jg), �The All-Navy Gas Mask�, ChemicalWarfare, Volume 14, Number 7, The Chemical WarfareSchool, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, July 15, 1928.

Hains, Paul W. LT, �The Protection of Capital Ships AgainstPoison Gas,� Chemical Warfare, Volume 9, Number 9, TheChemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, September15, 1923.NAVDOCKS-TP-PL-2, ABC Warfare Defense Ashore,Bureau of Yards and Docks, Washington, D.C., 1960.NAVEDTRA 10054-F, Basic Military Requirements, GPO,Washington, D.C., 1986.NAVPERS 10899A, Disaster Control (Ashore and Afloat),GPO, Washington, D.C., 1964.

�The Navy Mask�, Final Report of GasDefense Division Chemical Warfare ServiceU.S.A. Technical Section, Volume 34,Undated.Optical Mask E6-7-4, Progress Report No.549, Project D1.1-22, Mechanical Division,Protective Department, Edgewood Arsenal,MD, October 10, 1927.Project Designations Telephone Mask NavyDiaphragm Mask, Progress Report No. 239,Mechanical Division, Protective Department,Edgewood Arsenal, MD, July 19, 1922.Rockwell, P.O. Development of a Canisterfor Submarine Service, Project F-65, ReportE.A.C.D. 224, Edgewood Arsenal, MD,November 7, 1922.Service Chemicals United States Navy 1936,GPO, Washington, D.C., 1936.Service Chemicals United States Navy 1939,GPO, Washington, D.C., 1939.

Submarine Facepiece E4, Progress Report No. 551, ProjectD1.1a, Mechanical Division, Protective Department,Edgewood Arsenal, MD, October 21, 1927.Submarine Mask, Progress Report No. 400, Project D1.1-18,Mechanical Division, Protective Department, EdgewoodArsenal, MD, September 24, 1923.Submarine Mask E4-6-3, Progress Report No. 545, ProjectD1.1-18, Mechanical Division, Protective Department,Edgewood Arsenal, MD, August 15, 1927.Submarine Mask E4-6-3, Progress Report No. 556, ProjectE1a, Mechanical Division, Protective Department, EdgewoodArsenal, MD, November 26, 1927.http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/BB/BB-33_Arkansas.html, Accessed February 25, 2001.

Joint Service General ProtectiveMask, XM50, prototype

Bureau of Construction and Repair, Breathing Apparatus(Rescue and Protective), GPO, Washington, 1920.Carey, Christopher, U.S. Chemical and Biological DefenseRespirators: An Illustrated History, Schiffer Publishing, Atglen,PA, 1998.The Gas Mask, Mechanical Division, Protective Department,Edgewood Arsenal, MD, March 26, 1927.

LTC Walk is an Active Reserve chemical officer assigned asthe ultimate bureaucrat (executive officer) in the Deputy Chiefof Staff, Operations, United States Army Reserve Command.He is a volunteer hazardous-materials technician and firefighterfor Fayette County, Georgia.

Special thanks to Mr. Bart Wilkus for his photographicassistance.

February 2002 25

BookReview

By Dr. Burton Wright III,USACMLS Command Historian

Germs: Biological Weapons And America�s Secret War,Judith Miller, Stephen Engelburg, and William J. Broad.New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001

Knowledge is power. You can�t deal with a situation ifyou don�t know anything about it. This is especially trueconsidering the anthrax scare that America is presentlyexperiencing.

Knowledge of the situation is vital in understanding thecurrent problems, and it requires serious reading. A newbook, just published, should help the average Americancomprehend the problems and pitfalls of attempting to stopthe spread of bioweapons as well as defending against them.

Germs: Biological Weapons And America�s Secret War,by Judith Miller, Stephen Engelburg, and William Broad, isa sober and well-researched book on the problems Americahas faced in protecting itself from bioweapons attacks.

The book begins with an example of bioweapons use�the poisoning of salad bars in Antelope, Oregon, with thesalmonella bacteria. The perpetrators were a cult led by acon man from India who wanted to gain control of the town.The cult believed that if these attacks were executed, it couldwin upcoming elections and rule the town.

The authors take you through the incidents, searchingfor the cause and then hunting for those responsible, andtheir eventual defeat, disbanding, and disappearance. Thesearch wasn�t much different than the one now beingconducted to find whoever is mailing anthrax.

The book covers the Gulf War and the U.S. military�sscramble to try and protect its personnel against Iraq�sbioweapons capabilities. It was then thought (later confirmedby the United Nations Special Commission�s [UNSCOM�s]inspectors) that Iraq had a large biological and chemicalweapons arsenal. After UNSCOM�s work, it became clearthat the bioweapons program Iraq was engaged in was moremassive than first thought.

Getting a vaccine for anthrax was a top priority for theUnited States because it was believed that Iraq had developednosecones filled with anthrax for SCUD missiles, which laterproved to be true. Thus, Iraq possessed a biological weapon,which the United States feared they would most likely use.

The government�s efforts, at the time, form severalchapters of good intentions running into politics and thebureaucratic inertia of government. The authors clearly statethat the situation was not handled well. This cannot beallowed to happen in the future.

Throughout the book, the authors call the situationas they see it, and most times are right. This book is notan �I-told-you-so� type, but one that lays out the problemsand then discusses the attempts made to solve them�some successful and some not. By using the authors� factson what didn�t work in the past, America can build adefense for the future. Several well-researched chaptersare devoted to the Soviet bioweapons program calledBIOPREPARAT and its full implications. The authorsdo not exaggerate for effect in this book, but the detailsthey describe are chilling.

When the Unites States discovered that the Soviet�sprogram existed, it attempted to develop a defense. The start-and-stop system that followed restarted genuine efforts tocreate a defense system that would allow the United Statesto identify a biological attack, isolate the contamination, andthen find out who did it and retaliate.

The authors of Germs point out, quite accurately, this isnot an easy fix and that there are enough �natural� problemsin nature requiring much work to be done, such as the WestNile virus. They state that the response, in general, to theoutbreak of the virus was good, and that the state and localagencies where it existed worked together. But, they alsopoint out that the system used, while it worked well enough,could not stand any real strain and that communication upand down the health net was poor.

The seriousness of having to deal with mass casualtiesis no laughing matter. It would not take long for hospitals tobreak under the strain of a truly massive use of bioweapons.We are not ready now for this calamity. The authors areclear on one thing�biological warfare is very REAL. It isnot the child of a hyperactive press.

26 CML

Germs says it right�the United States, as the soleglobal superpower, is now the direct site for enemies whoWILL use weapons of mass destruction. In fact, it is verylikely that the recent anthrax attack is but a precursor toothers. Remember, the authors also point out thatbioweapons can be used against targets other thanpeople�crops, animals, computers.

The book confirms that while terrorists can engagein somewhat crude uses of biowarfare (as is occurring),the most sophisticated use of bioweapons and theircoordination over a spectrum of different agents thatheralds a conventional attack can only be accomplishedby a relatively sophisticated state or country�Iraq or Iran.

Reading this book brings the reader up to date on thesituation through the mirror of past events and how theywere handled. This gives any American a reasonableunderstanding of the parameters of the problem ofHomeland Security and how tough it will be to developand put in place such a protective system. The authorsbelieve this is not impossible and that it must be doneright now.

Waste no time and use the past as a way of creatingwhat will work and what will provide lasting protectionto the United States. An informed public with the requisiteknowledge will ensure that we create what will be neededto keep us safe from this type of an attack.

Media ReleaseU.S. Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project Completes First Set of Engineering

Scale Tests PLASMOX® System Tested in Switzerland on Neutralent Simulants

For further information, contact: Jeff Lindblad (410) 436-4555

Edgewood, MD�The U.S. Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) has completed the first of threephases of engineering scale testing of plasma-arc technologies for the destruction of neutralents. Neutralents are compoundsproduced by the destruction of either chemical agents or industrial chemicals.

In January 2001, while under contract with Stone & Webster for NSCMP, Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc. and itstechnology partner, MGC Plasma AG of Switzerland, completed tests of MGC�s PLASMOX® plasma system. Plasma isgenerated from ionizing gas so that it becomes a conductor of electrical energy. Plasma technologies use a high intensityelectrical discharge, or arc, to break apart the chemical bonds of solid, liquid, and gaseous compounds into simpler,nonhazardous compounds. It has been demonstrated that both liquid and solid wastes can be processed effectively usingplasma technologies. The demonstration was performed at MGC�s facilities using its transportable plasma system.

The purpose of the testing was to assess system operability during the processing of two simulated neutralent wastestreams and to obtain engineering data to support preliminary design parameters. The scale tests were also used to demonstratemaximum system throughput; the continuous, stable operation of the PLASMOX® system; and the ability to treat neutralentsso their byproducts can be readily disposed of without additional treatment. The tests also provided assurance that thesystem�s discharge would meet or exceed environmental laws and regulations.

The chemical agents treated during the scale tests were sarin (GB) and mustard (H). Each of the agents was combinedwith the neutralent simulant monoethanolamine, or MEA. The results of the first of three tests indicate that neutralent by-product streams treated by a PLASMOX® unit can be disposed as nonhazardous wastes. Additional plasma technology testsare planned based on the results of the PLASMOX® system tests.

The PLASMOX® plasma system was selected by NSCMP for limited engineering scale testing based on therecommendation of an independent group of academics, related industry professionals and citizens known as the TechnologyEvaluation Panel (TEP). TEP�s members have many years of experience in conducting technology evaluations for governmentand industry.

PLASMOX® technology has been successfully deployed in fixed-base and mobile applications in Europe and Asia. TheGerman Ministry of Defense selected plasma-arc technology to treat chemical warfare materiel and contaminated soils. Thetransportable plasma system was used to destroy chemical warfare agents, including Clark, Lewisite, Phosgene, Adamsite,and Yperit. Based on its proven success, the plasma system was recently shipped to Albania to destroy its chemical warfaremunitions and agents.

For more information, please contact the program manager for Chemical Demilitarization Public Outreach and InformationOffice at (800) 488-0648.

27February 2002

They say a picture is worth a thousand words. Trueenough, but a bodyguard of words that explain thesignificance of the picture also must surround it. Thissystem usually creates what is often called a �coffee tablebook��one that you leave around for visitors to lookthough and enjoy. The Army, published by the ArmyHistorical Foundation, is a 353-page book with hundredsof color photos and prints. It has a beautiful hardcoverthat contains a brass insignia. This book is the type ofpublication that marks an individual as one whoappreciates the sacrifice of those who have served in theU.S. Army and who serve today. The binding of the book,the selection of visuals, and the production indicaterichness and a first-class effort.

The authors of the book are not only well qualified topick the visual support for their writing, but they are alsogood historians. The senior editor, BG Harold Nelson,was the Commander of the U.S. Army Center of MilitaryHistory before retiring. Before and since his retirement,BG Nelson has been active in writing and speaking abouthistory.

The book is essentially a history of the Army fromits early days to the present, with a small part dedicated toits perceived future. The current Chief of Staff of theArmy, General Eric Shinseki, wrote the first section. It isa short synopsis of what the Army has done during itslong and proud history. The next section, which is longand detailed, is a simple time line of what the Army hasaccomplished from its beginnings.

Any organization has to have some form of spirit,and the Army is no exception. But what has been requiredof the Army�to defend this Republic�is not an easytask, but it is one the Army has always accomplished.

BG Nelsondescribes the spiritof the Army, section three, throughout its 200 plus yearsof existence. He does a superb job of covering the Army�shistory, considering the limited space (353 pages) he has towork in.

Leaders guide a military force. America has had itsshare of leaders, both good and bad. Section four,�Legends,� is dedicated to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army,who were often legends in their own time�DouglasMacArthur, U.S. Grant, and William T. Sherman�andleft indelible marks on the Army. They did their workthrough conflicts like the Civil War, World War I, andWorld War II. The Chief of Staff is an enormousresponsibility, but this Army has been blessed with leadersthat help create a first-class fighting force.

No army, however large or small, can operate withoutgood noncommissioned soldiers. The American Army hashad more then its share of outstanding NCOs. In thesection written by a historian who is also a sergeant major,the reader is introduced to the life of the NCO in picturesand words. One NCO corps legend, William McKinley�who as a sergeant won the Medal of Honor during theCivil War�later became President of the United States.The quality of the current Army NCO Corps makes it thebest Army in the world.

The Medal of Honor is the highest award for valorgiven to a soldier. It usually means that a person ofuncommon valor is recognized for actions performed incombat. The Army has had some remarkable Medal ofHonor winners, and in the section , �Brotherhood of theBrave,� their stories are told. My favorite is of the bravery

A Special Book Review

The ArmyBrigadier General Harold W. Nelson, USA (R), Editor-in-Chief;

Major General Bruce Jacobs, AUS (R), Editor;Colonel Raymond K. Bluhm, Jr., USA (R), Graphics Editor

By Dr. Burton Wright III, USACMLS Command Historian

CML28

of Trumpeter Calvin P. Titus who was asked by his officerto climb the walls of Peking. He replied, �I�ll try, sir!�He proceeded to do it under fire and plant the flag of theUnited States on the battlements.

Many Americans, while familiar with the early historyof the United States, are not familiar with the Army�s partin the development of the American frontier. Lewis andClark were Army officers, as was the �Pathfinder,� JohnC. Fremont. Roads, harbors, and other parts of theinfrastructure of this nation�s formative years were builtusing the genius and hard work of Army personnel. Armyengineers built the Panama Canal�one of the wondersof the modern world. This is a part of what the Armydoes today that has not changed with time and willcontinue far into the future.

The Army is a fighting force. Its principal task is todefend this nation against any enemy. But the Armydoesn�t always fight to get the job done, which the authorvividly illustrates in the section, �Building of the Nation.�One area the Army has always been, when needed, is civilrelief after natural disasters. When a hurricane hit SouthernFlorida, Army units (Active and Reserve) were rushed tothe devastated areas to assist in the cleanup andmaintenance of order. They were mighty appreciated, too.

Soldiers don�t acquire their ability to do their job wellby instinct�they must be taught. The section written byformer Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan, whowas a historian before he was a soldier, depicts theevolution of the Army school system and how it has cometo train its leaders and soldiers so well. Training enablesthe Army to operate successfully in all parts of the worldand create (in less than 24 months) an army of 10 millionmen in World War II. It is a feat that has never beenduplicated before or since.

From nothing, the Army fought its way into shapeagainst formidable opposition in the Pacific and Europeand learned how best to train its soldiers. The Germans,who after Kasserine Pass believed that the U.S. Armywasn�t that good, sorrowfully learned that they were a bitpremature in their judgment.

Almost since its inception, the Army has been a two-part force�an Active Component that soldiers 365 daysa year and a Reserve Component that reinforces the ActiveComponent when the need arrives. That �strength in

reserve� has proven vital in our history�it was so inWorld War I, World War II, and Desert Shield/DesertStorm. The Army National Guard and the Army Reservewere then, and are now, an integral part of the Army.Without the Reserves, the Army would not be able toproject American power where it needs to be.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is oneof the last sections, which deals with the future. Whatwill the Army be like in the first decades of the twenty-first century? There are great changes in the works today.The Army is, quite literally, reshaping itself to be able torespond to the situations it sees in the future. This is notan easy task, but one that is necessary. In the wars of thelast century, the Army often started behind and had tocatch up. The leaders of today want to reverse the trendand be ready from the first minutes of the conflict.

That they have succeeded has been amplydemonstrated by the events in Afghanistan. The strategydeveloped by the military leadership has provided asituation where the Army used its new training anddoctrine to perfection. There will be more situations likethis, but the Army is ready to undertake any mission,anytime, anywhere. This is evident if you use The Armyas a point of reference.

In a surrender ceremony in the closing days of WorldWar II, a German general asked an American general forhis �credentials.� What the German wanted to know waswhat schools, what commands, and what medals theAmerican had so he could determine if he was sur-rendering to an equal. The American general didn�tunderstand the question at first, but when he did, he pointedto the large number of American soldiers nearby and toldthe German general, �These are my credentials.�

Americans can be proud of many things in our history;The Army demonstrates how much pride they should havein the men and women who wear the uniform today. Theyhave never failed this country�history demonstrates that.They will never fail this country�history tells us that istrue as well. The Army is a must for the table of everyonewho has pride in the Army and its members.

The Army is available now, and can be ordered directlyfrom the Army Historical Foundation (703-522-7901 orhttp://www.armyhistoryfnd.org/). Additional informationis available at Website (www.hlla.com).

February 2002 29

On 18 July 2001, about 3 in the afternoon, a CSX train of about 60 cars derailed inside a 2-mile tunnelrunning under Baltimore�s inner city. This train carried a number of hazardous chemicals, including propyleneglycol, glacial acetic acid, ethyl hexyl phthalate, fluorosilicic acid, tripropylene, and hydrochloric acid. Italso carried several boxcars of plywood, pulpboard, and paper. The tanker of tripropylene caught fire andwas burning at temperatures above 1000 degrees Fahrenheit. The two tankers of hydrochloric acid, next tothe tripropylene tanker, were leaking at a rate of 700 gallons per hour. A total of 13,000 gallons of hydrochloricacid leaked out of the two tankers. The acid didn�t burn, but the intense heat created a toxic vapor environmentwithin the tunnel which severely limited firefighters� attempts to control the blaze. This is called a classictoxic industrial chemical (TIC) incident.

The residents in the immediate area definitely noticed the incident, not just because of the thick, blacksmoke pouring out of the tunnel�s entrance, but they could also smell the strong chemical odor, somethinglike burning pain which stung their eyes. Firefighters went door to door advising the residents to keep theirdoors and windows closed. Police closed roads in a five-block radius of the tunnel, causing a tremendousrush-hour incident. The police wore cloth masks as they directed traffic around the incident; hours later,their eyes felt gritty, their noses were dripping, and their throats were dry from the smoke. The irritants wereso strong that the Baltimore Orioles-Texas Rangers doubleheader at Camden Yards was canceled.

This incident is an excellent scenario to consider howthe Chemical Corps and the other services� chemical-biological defense (CBD) specialists should be addressingTICs. FMs 3-3, Chemical and Biological ContaminationAvoidance, and 3-4, NBC Protection, are being redraftedto address TIC hazards, including those deliberately andaccidentally released. How the military addresses thesehazardous materials (HAZMATs) will impact our futuredoctrine, training, and materiel for addressing CBDthreats on the battlefield. Do TICs pose a dangerousweaponized threat equal to that of chemical warfareagents, or are TICs just environmental health hazards?The nuance is very important; either we should modifyall our chemical detectors, protective ensembles,collective protection shelters, and decontaminants toinclude protection against TICs, or we could address TICsas the medical environmental health and HAZMATspecialists do. I suggest the latter proposal is moreappropriate.

TICs�Chemical Warfare Agentsor HAZMAT Incidents

In the last Army Chemical Review, Major Mark Leepointed to the Bosnian peacekeeping mission as an Armyoperation that involved a TIC hazard, one that wasaddressed by chemical specialists as a preventive-medicine response. The Air Force and Navy have raised

the issue of TICs as something that needs to be addressedin military scenarios. They do not have full-time CBDspecialists; rather, their CBD expertise comes fromgeneral-disaster preparedness experts that address naturalincidents, such as severe weather, as well as HAZMATspills in addition to CB warfare agents. In current militaryoperations, the armed forces are increasingly involved insmall-scale contingencies involving nonstate militaryactors, as well as small nations that cannot afford high-tech weapon systems or a full-scale chemical warfareweapon program. One concern is that these adversariesmay employ TICs as a substitute for a chemical weapon,although that scenario hasn�t yet been seen in actualcombat.

Some experts believe that terrorists, lacking asophisticated laboratory or access to bulk chemicals(unlike the Aum Shinrikyo), might use a tanker full ofsome industrial chemical or a crop duster with pesticidesas a weapon against a military installation. Certainly itwould be easier to obtain (or steal) industrial chemicalsthan manufacture chemical warfare agents, but again, wehaven�t seen that happen. Several Arab-American citizenswere arrested after the 11 September incident for havingfalse HAZMAT certificates; however, none had anyconnections to terrorist organizations. It may be morelikely that these terrorists would use a large tanker to placea large amount of fuel or volatile gas near an installation

How the Chemical CorpsHow the Chemical CorpsHow the Chemical CorpsHow the Chemical CorpsHow the Chemical CorpsAddresses Hazardous MaterialsAddresses Hazardous MaterialsAddresses Hazardous MaterialsAddresses Hazardous MaterialsAddresses Hazardous Materials

By Albert J. Mauroni

CML30

and ignite the chemical for its high-yield explosive effect,rather than for its TIC effect. In the event that a HAZMATevent does occur as a domestic-terrorist incident,firefighters and their HAZMAT teams are well-versed inhow to handle these events. It may be that military CBDspecialists will not be in place with the right equipmentto respond as quickly or as thoroughly as these full-timeexperts.

There is the concern that our forces, operating in somemilitary operation overseas, may be deployed near anindustrial site that is either not in compliance with ourEPA standards or that is accidentally blown up. TheChemical Corps calls this incident a �release other thanattack� (ROTA). The resulting health effects could bedetrimental to our forces; traditionally, this has been amedical surveillance concern rather than a ChemicalCorps concern. While the CBD specialists should assistthe commander in identifying industrial chemical hazards,it is not clear if DOD should modify all CB detectors toview releases of TICs on the battlespace, if DOD shouldredesign its protective masks and suits to protect its troopsfrom any TIC exposure, and if DOD has the charter torestore the battlespace from TIC residual contamination.Again, it depends on whether we see TICs as a potentialhealth hazard or something equal in lethality to chemicalwarfare agents.

The term toxic industrial materials (TIMs) expands thedefinition to include toxic industrial biologicals (TIBs) andtoxic industrial radiologicals (TIRs), respectively. Themilitary community has not defined a list of TIBs and TIRs,as it has with TICs, but these terms are emerging in doctrine,training, and acquisition documents. This is dangerousbecause people may start generalizing the threat, as is oftendone with the term WMD or NBC. Our community stressesthe point that NBC defense against NBC agents presentsoperational differences, which is also true of TICs, TIBs,and TIRs. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to drop theTIC/TIB/TIR/TIM mix and refer to these threats asHAZMATs, as the private sector does.

All these statements illuminate the fact that it is notclear if we are considering TICs as weaponized threatsor as health hazards. Either we are training DOD CBDspecialists to double as HAZMAT or medical specialists,or we think that future adversaries are seriouslyconsidering the use of less toxic chemicals than sarin ormustard as weapons against our forces. Of course, maybeboth cases are true. But the lack of clarity on this topichas created great confusion among the doctrine andtraining centers, the material developers, and the policymakers.

Examining the Threat of TICsI believe there are three aspects as to why we should

not be addressing TICs as a threat equal to chemical

warfare agents. First and foremost, TICs are several ordersof magnitude less toxic than chemical warfare agents.While all nations in World War I that initiated a chemicalweapons program started with industrial chemicals suchas chlorine and phosgene, they moved on to other agentsfor several reasons. Many WW I chemical warfare agentscould be seen and smelled by individual soldiers beforelethal effects took hold. Many were harassing, not lethal,agents. Others, such as hydrogen cyanide, had to bedelivered in such large quantities, or they dissipated toorapidly to kill large numbers of military personnel.

For a moment, let�s not even look at the firstgeneration gases of WW I. The International Task Force(ITF)-25 report categorized 98 potential TICs in terms ofhigh, moderate, and low hazard. To make the list, theyhad to have an LCt50 (lethal concentration dose for 50percent of an exposed population) less than 100,000 mg-min/m3 and be produced in quantities exceeding 30 tonsper year at a single facility. In addition, these chemicalshad to have appreciable vapor pressures at 20 degreesCentigrade or be listed in the North American EmergencyResponse Guidebook. When comparing the respectivepermissive exposure limits (PELs) of selected hazardouschemicals

(see table, p. 31), one can immediately identify

several orders of magnitude difference in lethalitybetween TICs and modern chemical warfare agents. Themajor difference between these two types of chemicalsis, while a small glass of chemical warfare agents can beincapacitating or fatal to a large crowd, it takes tons ofindustrial chemical agents to cause mass casualties. Themethyl isocyanate spill at Bhopal, India, occurred at nightwhen unprotected individuals were sleeping, and itinvolved hundreds of thousands of gallons�40 tons inall. Those are the only reasons mass casualties ensued.No one evacuated Baltimore because of the July 2001spill, which involved 13,000 gallons of hydrochloric acid.

It may be an error to state that TICs are �just as lethalas the traditional chemical warfare agents.� There are onlyfour TICs that fall in this category�phosgene,chloropicrin, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen chloride�and these are listed in the CWC�s Schedule III list. Ifthere were other industrial chemicals as lethal as these,countries would develop them not only for industrial usebut also as chemical warfare agents. These agents aredeveloped to kill people, and the more lethal agents areclearly the nerve and blister agents, not toxic industrialchemicals.

Second, from a threat perspective, do we expect majornation states (or even minor state players) to employ suchtactics? Saddam Hussein�s orders to dump oil into theGulf and light all the oil derricks in Kuwait causedinconveniencies to our armed forces, but that didn�t stopthem from accomplishing the mission. Health effects aswell as economic repercussions developed from those

31February 2002

actions, but ultimately the Chemical Corps�s mission wasto ensure that the armed forces could survive and sustaincombat operations. Does this mean the Army should havehad chemical TIC detectors during the Persian Gulf War?Would the military units have stopped and donnedprotective ensembles before moving across the oil fieldsif their chemical detectors alarmed to less-than-lethalhydrogen sulfide concentrations? I don�t think so.

There are several acids on this ITF-25 list. Is therenow a requirement to redesign our protective ensemblesto resist TIC penetration if the TIC is a corrosive acid? Ifso, this may require wearing impermeable suits and airtanks. Fixing the masks to filter out industrial chemicalvapors is not too hard, but that doesn�t make them NationalInstitute of Safety and Health (NIOSH) compliant. Rightnow, NIOSH standards for operation in hazardousenvironments require a self-contained breathing apparatus,such as oxygen-fed firefighter masks. Restoration effortsmay require CBD specialists that are HAZMAT-qualifiedto use Level A suits so they can supervise cleaning uptoxic chemical spills.

The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion andPreventive Medicine (USACHPPM) has suggested thatnot only should the Army have detectors that sensemilitary chemical warfare agents and TICs, but that they

should also be designed to alarm to much lower levelsthan they currently detect. Specifically, the concern isthat troops may deploy near industrial sites that are off-gassing low concentrations of TICs, which over time mayresult in adverse health effects. This is not just a concernabout immediate operational effectiveness;USACHPPM�s mandate in preventive medicine alsoaddresses long-term chronic health threats�thosemedical concerns that may emerge years after a militarydeployment�as well as immediate acute threats. Thismeans the concentration levels being monitored are wellbelow first noticeable effects. The long-term health ofour military personnel is a top concern to commanders,but this is a medical-force health-protection mission. Whatwould it cost to procure CBD equipment, train our CBspecialists in health-protection doctrine, and burden ourforces with overly sensitive gear? We just don�t know.

Designing Military Equipment to New StandardsThere are a growing number of civilian chemists and

engineers at military laboratories developing CBDequipment who have specific questions about TICs. Theyaren�t questioning the requirement. If the requirement todetect/protect/decontaminate TICs is in the operationalrequirements document, they will research and develop

Hazardous Chemical Materials Physical State Odor Color OSHA Permissive Exposure Level

Ammonia G Yes No 50 ppmArsine G Yes No 0.05 ppmBoron trichloride G, L Yes No N/A � LD50 � 2541 ppmBoron trifluoride G, L Yes No 1 ppmCarbon disulfide L Yes Yes 20 ppmChlorine* G Yes Yes 1 ppmDiborane G Yes No 0.1 ppmEthylene oxide G Yes No 0.5 � 5 ppmFluorine G Yes Yes 0.1 ppmFormaldehyde L Yes No 1 ppmHydrogen bromide* G, L Yes No 3 ppmHydrogen chloride* G Yes Yes 5 ppmHydrogen cyanide* G Yes No 5 ppmHydrogen fluoride* G, L Yes No 3 ppmHydrogen sulfide* G Yes No 20-50 ppmNitric Acid, fuming L Yes Yes 2 ppmPhosgene* G Yes No 0.1 ppmPhosphorus trichloride G, L Yes No 0.5 ppmSulfur dioxide L Yes No 5 ppmSulfuric acid L Yes Yes 1 ppmTungsten hexafluoride G Yes No N/A � LD50 � 217 ppm

Sarin G No No 0.00001 ppm* JCAD objective requirementG=gas, L=liquid ppm=parts per million

Table. Comparison of Various Hazardous Chemicals to Sarin

32 CML

appropriate equipment against those DOD requirements.The question is, what is the military standard? Are theuser representatives asking the material developers todesign equipment against all 98 TICs listed in ITF-25, orjust the 21 high-hazard agents? The service programmanagers are creating different TIC lists, based on whatcan be done from their specific material perspective. Howdo we ensure consistency that the TICs chemical detectorsenses are the same TICs against which our suits andshelters can protect, or that we have decontaminants thatcan neutralize TICs and detectors to verify that equipmentand terrain is �clean enough?� These questions haven�t beenanswered.

There has yet to be a discussion on what the militarilysignificant challenge levels of TICs should be forcontamination avoidance, protection, and restoration.There is no generic category of TICs with general physicalproperties, as we sometimes generalize nerve or blisteragents. Some TICs are liquid hazards that off-gas vapors;others are strictly vapor hazards. Both types are includedin the high-hazard ITF-25 list. Lately, the Office of theSecretary of Defense�s Low-Level Chemical WorkingGroup has been struggling in its attempts to define whatis operationally hazardous in terms of traditional chemicalwarfare agent exposures. The medical community has oneview; the nonmedical community has another. There isno joint consensus or guidance on industrial chemicalhazard levels other than the existing Occupational Safetyand Health Administration guidance that was developedfor peacetime industrial standards.

Without solid guidance on what the challenge levelsare for these TICs, the material developers have no wayto tell industry what to build to or how to test theequipment. This is beginning to be a very real challengeto the research and development community on severalprograms approaching procurement stages. The jointchemical agent detector (JCAD), our next chemical agentdetector, has an objective requirement of eight TICs. Thecurrently designed JCAD only detects phosgene inaddition to chemical warfare agents. Because of a lack ofguidance on challenge levels and what the ultimatecapability should be, we may be developing equipmentthat doesn�t match the future doctrine.

Correcting Perceptions on HAZMATsTo summarize:

1. We have not yet seen nation-states or terroristsattempt to weaponize TICs for employment againstU.S. forces.

2. TICs are not as lethal as chemical warfare agents.3. TICs are definitely environmental health hazards

but may not be operationally significant hazards.

4. The user community is still in the process ofdetermining what the challenge levels for TICsshould be to guide development of doctrine orequipment.Looking at the news stories about the Baltimore

chemical fire, we can ask some hard questions. What isthe real threat�is it that adversaries will use these TICsagainst military forces or are they just environmentalhealth hazards? Can the Chemical Corps addressenvironmental health hazards without making itsprotective equipment more encumbering than mission-oriented protective posture gear? At Baltimore, no onewas evacuated despite a 13,000-gallon toxic acid spilland 5 days of burning fumes�the residents stayed indoors(what emergency responders call �shelter in place�). Whatdo we expect will happen when military personnel areexposed to low levels of industrial chemicals? Is it animmediate life-threatening event or a long-termenvironmental hazard? There is a big difference.

If the concern is ROTA or HAZMAT, are these eventsgoing to happen so frequently that we need to modify allour detectors and protective suits? If not, our troops shouldretain the correctly designed equipment against the majorweaponized threat�the traditional CB warfare agents.There is always the option to purchase commercialHAZMAT gear which is already available in largequantities, is not �ruggedized,� and is designed forpersonnel that assume much less risk at the cost of higherencumbrance. I suggest the middle ground is just that�CBD specialists may become experts in HAZMATswithout modifying detectors, protective suits, shelters, anddecontaminants away from their focus on CB-warfareagents.

We should consider long and hard how the CBDcommunity is going to address TICs or HAZMATs,whatever the better term is. The Joint Service NBCDefense Modernization Plan should outline a concept thateither identifies TICs as a threat equivalent to chemicalwarfare agents or as environmental health hazards. Weneed to examine how we best benefit the warfighters andwhether we can execute CB warfare defense while alsoacting as environmental/HAZMAT technicians.

Mr. Mauroni is a senior policy analyst for Analytic Services, Inc.,and former Army chemical officer with 16 years of experience onJoint chemical and biological defense programs and policy issues.He currently supports the J5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on DOD CBissues. He is the author of two books on chemical-biological defenseand is currently working on his third book on the Army�s chemicaldemilitarization program.

February 2002 33

Environmental stewardship is changing as the Army shifts the way it does business through the ArmyTransformation process. We, as company commanders, need to understand how the changes will affect theway we run our companies. The Army Environmental Campaign Plan identifies the four areas the Army isfocusing on to improve environmental stewardship. Implementing these focus areas�materiel purchasing,facility management, training, and operations�will make us better environmental stewards.

By Captain Jessica Prindiville

Environmental Transformations:What a Company Commander

Needs to Know

Army VisionThe Army�s mission is to fight and win the nation�s

wars. General Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. Army Chief of Staff,has promoted the Army�s vision and its plan to transformitself into a force that is strategically responsive and domi-nant across the spectrum of operations. The followingexcerpt is based on the objective statement for ArmyTransformation and is from �The Army EnvironmentalStewardship 2000 Progress Report.� It summarizes whatArmy Transformation is all about and how it applies toenvironmental stewardship.

Each day, as we train soldiers and grow leaders, weensure that the finest army in the world will be readyto quickly and decisively respond to any threat to ournational security. . . As we move into the twenty-firstcentury, we are beginning an historic �transforma-tion� into a more responsive, deployable, agile, ver-satile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable force�onethat is capable of dominating at every point of thespectrum of operations. More than ever before, ourinstallations must support tough, demanding train-ing to serve as a solid foundation for the high degreeof readiness in the continuing Army mission and trans-formation objective demands. . . As we make the trans-formation, we will ensure that environmental stew-ardship remains an integral component of all our op-erations and activities. (p. 2)

Environmental StewardshipAs company commanders, we will be the implementers

of the Army Transformation process. It is important forcompany commanders to understand environmental con-cerns and how to assess their impact on training resources.Army leaders, along with installation managers and civilianagencies, discussed critical environmental and energy issuesfacing the Army at the Army Worldwide Environmental and

Energy Conference. This summit resulted in the Army En-vironmental Campaign Plan that will lead to the integrationof environment and energy in support of new Army objec-tives. This plan integrates environmental stewardship withthe Army�s Transformation strategy. The plan identifiesfour focus areas:

� Materiel and weapon systems we buy.� Facilities we manage.� Training we provide to our personnel.� Operations and activities we undertake.This article provides company commanders valuable

information about environmental transformation.Materiel Purchasing

The Army is one of the largest institutions in the UnitedStates and has great purchasing power and demand for prod-ucts. The Army has become a catalyst for developing greener,more environmentally friendly products and services. Com-pany commanders will use these environmentally friendlyproducts that have been developed. Two of the first brigadesto go through the Army transformation process at Fort Lewis,Washington, are using lead-free 5.56-mm green bullets. Leadis an environmental hazard that affects wildlife and maycontaminate groundwater. The green bullet is a dense, rub-ber material that posses no risk to wildlife of water resources.The Army demanded a safer product, and industry respondedwith the green bullet.

An alternatively fueled vehicle is another product thatthe leadership in the White House Council on Environmen-tal Quality is exploring. With new technology, these proto-type vehicles will cut costs and emissions for the Army�squarter of a million trucks. The future combat system (FCS)will be the primary weapon/troop-carrying platform for thefuture force. The FCS will include other technologies suchas an electromagnetic gun, a directed-energy weapon,precision missiles, networked fire control, and robotics.

CML34

Environmental protection is a key concern when this tech-nology is developed. The Army has moved beyond a merelycompliance-based approach toward long-term sustainability.Company commanders will achieve long-term sustainabilityby considering current and future impacts of our activitieson the environment, energy usage, and the well-being ofour people. This means we must reduce the environmental�footprint� that our operations and activities have on com-munity resources.

Facility ManagementPollution prevention is key to reducing our negative im-

pact on community resources. Since 1993, the Army hasreduced hazardous-waste disposal by 52 percent. This isaccredited to the company commanders who appointed en-vironmental compliance officers to ensure that soldiers usedand disposed of petroleum products correctly. When choos-ing an environmental subject-matter expert, select and trainsomeone from the motor pool. Most environmental con-cerns stem from petroleum products, maintenance, and otheractivities generally conducted in the motor pool.

In 2001, the Army hosted the first U.S. Army World-wide Environmental and Energy Conference in Atlanta,Georgia. This summit highlighted installations that were us-ing alternative energy technologies. For the past 20 years,Fort Huachuca, Arizona, has been operating with solar en-ergy in the form of conventional solar water heaters andphotovoltaics or direct electric production from the sun.Consequently, the Army is focusing on other alternativesfor energy sources. The post where our companies are lo-cated may be involved in switching over to nontraditionalenergy technologies. In addition to creating energy efficientposts, the Army is looking at how to best regionally manageland and natural resources and execute sustainable rangeoperations.

Most posts have the Integrated Training Area Manage-ment (ITAM) program that ensures training operations in-clude natural-resource conservation practices. ITAM workshand in hand with range control to make sure that companycommanders are practicing environmental stewardship dur-ing field training.

TrainingCompany commanders have little influence over areas

such as material purchasing and large facility management.What they can and do control is training. Leaders must en-sure that soldiers have the principles or standards that guideprofessionals to do the moral or right thing. Every post hasdifferent environmental laws and regulations that are man-dated at the state level. Company commanders must be fa-miliar with these laws, and ignorance is never an excuse.Mistakes that lead to water and air pollution, training area

abuses, and mismanagement of hazardous wastes result inlost training areas, expensive land reclamation, negativepublicity, and fines from state and federal regulators. In 1994,the Army paid $10 million in fines from base operating bud-gets. The Army has gone to great lengths to train its leaders,and this effort has resulted in a 66 percent reduction of thenumber of regulatory fines from 1993 to 1999. However,offending units may now pay fines from their training bud-get. Commanders may have to pay violation fines from theirbudget if they do not abide by governing regulations.

Every commander is required by AR 200-1, Environ-mental Protection and Enhancement, to comply with poli-cies, regulations, and laws; address environmental concernsthroughout the year; promote environmental stewardship;adopt a standing operating procedure (SOP) for environ-mental considerations; and appoint and train an environmen-tal compliance officer. Battalions generally take care of theserequirements, but separate companies, such as divisionalchemical companies, are on their own to fulfill these require-ments. Of course, company commanders do not need to cre-ate new SOPs and training programs; the post environmen-tal office will help.

Environmental Constraints onTraining and Other Actions

The following is a partial list of items used at Fort Hood,Texas, to assist company commanders in being good envi-ronmental stewards.

Hazardous-Materials/Hazardous-Waste Management(HAZMAT). Take the time to personally inspect HAZMATstorage facilities regularly. Check out the battery collectionpoint, ensure that batteries are being recycled to preventheavy metals from reaching the landfills, and allow somematerials to be reused. Look at the company�s hazard-communication program. It instructs individuals on thepotential hazards in using various substances and includesdirections on how to read a material safety data sheet, andAR 200-1 mandates the requirements for the annualtraining program.

Noise Management. Smoke generators and vehicles, ingeneral, can make a lot of noise. You must address ways toavoid community annoyance with excessive noise from train-ing. Habitation encroachment on training areas has resultedin more complaints about routine training noise. Soldiers�hearing must be protected when operating loud equipmentor working in a noisy area such as the motor pool.

Air Quality. Painting with chemical-agent-resistant coat-ing paint must be done in approved paint booths only. Unitscan have touch-up paint, but each installation regulates howmuch. Think about the last time you sent a person to burnclassified material. Is that legal on the post where you

February 2002 35

operate, and did you consider the air quality and fire hazardissues in conjunction with burning?

Pollution Prevention. There is so much that individualscan do if each person just takes a little pride in the appear-ance of the environment�spill prevention is one thing.Conduct training on how to fill liquid containers, maintainspill kits, and operate oil-reclamation points properly. Thereare oil-water separators in wash racks. Do not allow soldiersto spray at the separators; if soldiers damage these, then youwill receive the fine. Refueling procedures are restricted tocertain areas, so check and see where.

NBC Training. We know that many petroleum, oil, andlubricant products used in the motor pool require specialhandling, but so do many items in the NBC room. Decon-tamination agents that have expired shelf life also needspecial handling. DS2 is not maintained at the unit levelanymore; consequently, turn it in if you find some stashedin a container express. Unserviceable filters for NBC masksrequire specialized turn in. Do not allow smoke or tear gas(CS) to become a nuisance to others. Hexachloroethane (HC)smoke use is limited. Actual decontamination agents are forwartime use only. Use of soapy water is limited nearnatural-water sources.

Water Resources. Policies designed to protect waterquality affect decontamination activities. Detergent is usu-ally discouraged because of runoff contamination of sur-face waters, and use of DS2 and supertropical bleach (STB)is restricted.

Threatened and Endangered Species. Nearly every posthas some plant or animal concern; accordingly, training hasthe potential to threaten this environment. It is essential thatyou check the post environmental center for a map of deli-cate habitats. Leave the wildlife alone, and check to see whatpermit you need before cutting down trees or removing brushin training sites.

Land Management. Not all training areas are dig sites,so check with range control or the Directorate of PublicWorks before digging. If you find archeological materi-als, stop digging and contact the area manager. Do notbury garbage or other solid waste; take it to anapproved landfill site.

Recycling. Absolutely mandatory, every product that canno longer be used for its intended purpose needs to be re-cycled. Federal law requires the Army to reduce the amountof solid waste sent to landfills. You must institute a unitrecycling program and lead by example. Through efforts ofinstilling soldier awareness, the Army has reduced solid-waste disposal by 58 percent since 1993. This is not enough;

there is a need to recycle more. Natural-resource raw sourcesare limited and so is the land that waste can be buried on.

OperationsLeaders must comply with regulations and understand,

teach, and hold subordinates accountable. Something assimple as putting a soda can in the recycle bin instead ofthrowing it out or directing smoke tracks to be refueled awayfrom a watershed safety zone is a nonverbal communica-tion that soldiers always watch and evaluate commanderson. Our operations and actions influence the environmentaround us.

Wrapping It All UpThe Environmental Campaign Plan that focuses our

commitment to a world-class environmental programconsists of four focus areas: material purchase, facilitymanagement, training, and the operations and activitieswe undertake. Army land is becoming increasinglyvaluable because there is little possibility for more. Inspite of intensive military use for many years, militarylands contain a rich diversity of flora and fauna. Com-pany commanders will not be in charge of millions ofacres but probably just a motor pool and a fleet of lessthan a hundred vehicles. No matter what the size of ourarea of operation, it is our job to ensure that environ-mental ethics are spread and environmental laws and ourunit comply with regulations. As we make the ArmyTransformation, we must ensure that environmental stew-ardship remains an integral component of all our opera-tions and activities.ReferencesConrad, Joseph C., �Environmental Considerations in ArmyOperational Doctrine,� White Paper, CR-9421, January 1995.Headquarters III Corp and Fort Hood, �SupplementalHandout for Environmental Coordinators,� SupplementalTwo: Environmental Management Course, June 2000.Houston, Cynthia, �Army Plans 21st Century EnvironmentalTransformation,� USAEC Environmental Update,(http://www.hqda.army.mil), Spring 2001.Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (PAO), The ArmyEnvironmental Stewardship 2000 Progress Report,(http://www.hqda.army.mil/acsimweb/env/), 2001.Steele, Dennis, �The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to ArmyTransformation,� Association of the United States Army,2001.

Captain Prindiville is a student in the Chemical Captain�s CareerCourse (CMC3) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She was theenvironmental officer coordinator for 69th Chemical Company inHanau, Germany, for 5 months. After CMC3, she will be workingat Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

36 CML

The Mechanized Smoke Company�As I See It

During my command, I have noticed some dis-crepancies in the mechanized smoke company�s modifiedtable of organization (MTOE). With some small changes,a smoke company could function better. However, withsome major changes, the company could function at aneven higher level.

The first discrepancy I noticed is in the maintenancesection. In the past, the company was assigned two63B10s (light-wheeled mechanics); now it is not. Withthe current authorized personnel, the company is unableto maintain and service the M998s that are authorized. Irecommend that two 63B10s be added back to the MTOE.Without 63B10s, the company�s operational readinessdrops. The company is currently authorized one 63B20,but that soldier has to do the job of three individuals.

The second discrepancy is not in personnel but inequipment authorized. Each platoon is authorized nineradios�one radio for each track and two for the platoonleader and platoon sergeant�s vehicles. The support squadis not authorized any radios. However, under an upcomingMTOE, the support squad is authorized radios, but theplatoon tracks will lose two. This just does not make sense.How are those crews expected to communicate with theother vehicles, especially under limited visibility? Sincethe Army is converting divisional chemical companiesto corps-level, dual-purpose companies, there should bemore radios in the inventory. That way every vehicle willget a radio.

As we approach fiscal year 2003, mechanized smokecompanies are going to four line platoons consisting of25 personnel, seven M58s, and two heavy expandedmobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) per platoon. This willincrease the authorized personnel from 111 personnel to136. While supporting maneuver brigade commanders, Inoticed that most all of them split up the mechanizedsmoke platoon. They typically give three M58s to onetask force and four to another. They justify this by sayingthat every task force needs smoke assets on an obstaclewhile breaching, because of their �big picture� of howthe battle is going to flow. I understand their concept andtheir idea, but it raises big issues for me as a companycommander. I also have to figure out how to commandand control the sections and resupply them.

Currently, a company is scheduled to stand up a fourthline platoon composed of seven M58s and two HEMTTs.If the company were to transition to a support platoonconcept, this would lead to having a fourth platooncomposed of a lieutenant and a platoon sergeant with threesquad leaders and three E4s or below. The soldiers couldcome from our existing support squads. This would keepthe personnel numbers down to 113. Command andcontrol could be worked out if the line platoon leader andsergeant, as well as the support platoon leader andsergeant, each had two radios. This concept would solvenot only the C2 issue but also resupply issues.Additionally, two M998s need to be added to the MTOE,but these should be easier to add than two HEMTTs andseven M58s.

Another fix is to give both the first sergeant and theoperations officer M998s with dual-net capabilities.Currently, neither one has an M998 as regulated by theMTOE. First sergeants and operations officers are askedto do many tasks; now imagine trying to do these withouta designated vehicle. That is what will happen if all excessequipment is turned in. Both have to attend meetings andrehearsals on the battlefield ranging from combat servicesupport rehearsals to logistics packages and maintenancemeetings. The company is currently authorized only oneM998. If the commander is at a brigade meeting orchecking on his platoons that are attached out, how arethe first sergeant and operations officer suppose tooperate? Therefore, I do not think we could afford to notgive first sergeants and operations officers an M998.

As we begin to reconfigure the corps, let us take thetime to hear from those serving in those positions thatcan best influence the decision. We need to set up ourcompanies for success. We need to give smoke companiesthe right MTOE and fill them to it.

By Captain Todd L. Baney

Captain Baney is the commander of 172d Chemical Company.His previous assignments include both overseas and statesideduties. CPT Baney is a graduate of the Chemical Officer Basicand Advanced Courses, Combined Arms and Services StaffSchool, Nuclear Target Analysis Course, and the Senior OfficerLogistical Management Course. He has a bachelor�s inengineering from Pennsylvania State University.

37February 2002

Training Day (TD) 04 Deliberate Attack (Scenario)The 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) crossed the

line of departure (LD) beginning its deliberate attackat 0600. The chemical company is supporting theattack with a smoke platoon; a nuclear, biological,and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance squad; and adecontamination platoon. The chemical company�scommand post (CP) is under BCT control and islocated near the BCT tactical operations center(TOC). The company commander is located at theCP. The Fox squad and decontamination platoon areunder company control; the smoke platoon is ingeneral support of Task Force (TF) Mech. The smokeplatoon is screening the north flank of TF Mech (task)to protect them from antiarmor ambushes (purpose).The NBC reconnaissance is overwatching namedarea of interest 003 (task) to ensure that TF Armor�saxis of advance is not blocked by a persistentchemical strike (purpose). The decontaminationplatoon has occupied decontamination site 100 andis prepared to support thorough decontaminationoperations (task), to assist the BCT in maintainingcombat power during the fight (purpose).

The fight seems to be going well until both taskforces are fixed at the breach and the enemycombined-arms reserve (CAR) makes an unan-ticipated counterattack into the BCT�s north flank.

The BCT commander issues a fragmentary order(FRAGO) committing the BCT�s reserve armorcompany to fix the CAR. This catches the companycommander by surprise. Part of the FRAGO shiftssupport of NBC reconnaissance and smoke to supportthe BCT reserves� attack.

Suddenly the commander realizes his CP has lostcommunication with the NBC reconnaissance squad.The smoke platoon is out of fog oil, and its heavyexpanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) has beendeadlined for more than 20 hours. Also, thecommander is unaware that the CAR is approaching

By Captain Tom Duncan, National Training Center Chemical Company Trainer

Chemical CompanyCommand Post Operations

decontamination site 100 because he has lostsituational awareness.

The CP is out of the fight. Its inability to receive,distribute, and analyze information; make recom-mendations to the commander; and integrate andsynchronize resources lead to the loss of chemicalassets as a combat multiplier. The BCT reserve isdestroyed, and the BCT is unable to penetrate theenemy�s defensive belt and achieve its objective. Thecommander needs to know why the CP encounteredthese obstacles and how to avoid them during thenext fight.

PurposeFM 3-101, Chemical Staffs and Units, states, �CPs are

the focal point of all tactical and logistical planning andexecution in the company.� However, this FM contains onlytwo paragraphs about the chemical company CP. This isinsufficient coverage for such a critical command-and-control tool for the company commander. This articlediscusses trends in the chemical company CP operationsconducted at the National Training Center (NTC), as wellas tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that can beapplied during home-station training to address these

Layout of training day 04 attack

CML38

trends. All of these issues are based on my direct observationas an observer/controller at NTC. TTP are based on FM 3-101; FM 3-100, Chemical Operations, Principals andFundamentals; FM 101-5, Staff Organization andOperations; and the Center for Army Lessons LearnedNewsletter No. 95-7, May 95, Tactical Operations Center.

CP FunctionsAccording to FM 3-100, �Synchronized NBC

reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke operationsbegin with planning, preparation, and teamwork. Thechemical company CP should play a key role in integratingchemical assets into the BCT.� However, many CPs cometo the NTC manned with soldiers that have little or noexperience in a CP. They often do not know the six basic CPfunctions:

1. Receive Information. This is the collection ofmessages, reports, and orders from subordinate unitsand higher headquarters that deal with monitoring thetactical situation, maintaining current unit locationsand activities, and tracking the building of combatpower.

2. Analyze Information/Consolidate Reports. The CPNCOIC or XO must anticipate events and activities,identify information that relates to the commander�scritical information requirements (CCIR), conducttroop-leading procedures, and be prepared to executecontingency plans based on the current situation.

3. Distribute Information. The CP serves as a commu-nication relay between units, publishing orders andsubmitting reports to higher elements.

4. Make Recommendations to the Commander. TheCP NCOIC or XO analyzes information to makerecommendations to the commander.

5. Integrate Resources. The commander, along with thecompany command posts, coordinates the integrationof chemical assets into the BCT�s scheme ofmaneuver.

6. Synchronize Resources. The CP leadership mustassist the commander to orchestrate all elements ofthe company to achieve the company�s mission.Examples of these elements are�

� The maintenance section which has a priority ofmaintenance that supports the mission.

� The first sergeant who has a functional casualty-evacuation plan in place.

� The supply NCO who has given the platoons allnecessary classes of supply, etc.

In the scenario, the commander is unaware the HEMTTis deadlined. The commander is also surprised by the suddenturn of events as the CAR counterattacks and is unawarethat the decontamination platoon is on the enemy axis ofadvance. The question is how can we gain better situationalawareness in the future. The solution is to�

� Incorporate the six CP functions into the companywritten standing operating procedures (SOP).

� Clearly define each soldier�s role in the execution ofthese functions.

� Establish a training program to address these issues atthe home station.

� Show subordinates in the CP what the expectationsare and how to accomplish them correctly.Time is the primary concern when planning and

executing a training plan at the home station. Home-stationtraining time is already strained with the multitude of taskscurrently being assigned. I recommend integrating all of theseTTP into the daily activities of the operations section. Forexample, in garrison we track equipment deadlines on a DAForm 2404, Equipment Inspection and MaintenanceWorksheet. But how does the operations section track themaintenance status on a day-to-day basis? Why not use thesame tracking system in and out of the field? Battle trackingthe status on classes of supply, maintenance, and training/missions can be conducted every day. This not only trainsoperations soldiers for their field exercises, but it also willassist the leader/commander in managing day-to-daymissions by standardizing the operations section�sinformation management procedures. The same techniquesused to gain situational awareness in a field environmentwill enable the commander to manage information in garrisonbetter. This allows the commander to make better decisionsbased on more accurate data.

We can also train information analysis and distributionin garrison. We can submit the same reports done in thefield to both higher and lower elements. Information dis-tribution to subordinate elements also can be done routinelyin a warning order, FRAGO, or operations order format.The commander can issue priorities and give guidance tosupporting elements (maintenance, supply, and commu-nication) to synchronize the company effort. Integration ofthese TTP into the home station�s day-to-day activities canhelp commanders and operations NCOs to understand CPfunctions before arriving at NTC. Integrating thesetechniques into your home-station training also gives youthe chance to develop your information management systemsand show the soldiers what right looks like in your CP.

Duties and Responsibilities of CP PersonnelNBC trainers at NTC observe that soldiers often

understand how a CP supports the commander and thecompany but do not understand their individual role in theprocess.

The first thing the CP needs is a clearly designated leaderwith a defined role. This can be the executive/operationsofficer, the first sergeant, or the operations sergeant.Whatever technique that works for you is fine, but there aretwo keys to success. The role of the CP OIC or NCOICmust be clear and captured in the unit�s SOP, and it is

February 2002 39

helpful if this soldier supervises theoperations shop in garrison as well.If the same information collection,analysis, and distribution tech-niques are used both in and out ofthe field, and the same soldier isresponsible for these actions, it canbe beneficial in training the rest ofthe CP team.

The operations shift NCOICis often one of the hardest workingsoldiers in the CP but is rarely themost effective. The trend is for theNCOIC to be on the radio con-stantly, writing in the log, orupdating the map. Someone mustbe responsible for analyzing theinformation that is coming into theCP, determining what is important,and providing quality control ofproduct production (FRAGO,graphics, etc.) before it goes to the commander for approval.

If the operations NCO in the scenario had maintainedbetter situational awareness, instead of serving as a radiooperator, the CP would have had a better opportunity toidentify critical issues.

There are two TTP that have worked well at NTC. Thefirst is to train junior enlisted soldiers to use the radio, managethe log, and update the map board. This accomplishes twogoals�training young soldiers and freeing the NCOIC tosupervise multiple taskings. If the NCOIC is busy talkingon the radio, then he is not able to analyze what the companyis doing, determine the current friendly/enemy situation, orprepare a recommendation for the commander. The secondTTP is to set clear standards and enforce them at the homestation. The radio/telephone operators (RTOs) can answerthe phones, log information, and maintain tracking charts inthe rear to the same standard they are expected to execute inthe field. The junior enlisted soldiers also can assist in theorders production in garrison. Soldiers need to be trained ontheir duties daily and then held to the standard.

The scenario revealed that the commander in thedeliberate attack was unaware of the current tactical situationand the deadlined HEMTT. Establishing CP responsibilities,clearly defining the soldier�s roles, training soldiers everyday, and holding soldiers to the set standard will help putvital information into the hands of the commanders earlyenough to take corrective action and keep the chemicalcompany in the fight.

Information ManagementPutting the role of the CP and its soldiers into the SOP is

a great start to ensure that a CP is functional, but it is notenough. At NTC, we often see rotational units developing

their information managementsystems on training day one,instead of bringing a system thathas been proven at the homestation. Let�s look at three areasof information management�information displaying, messagehandling, and battle-trackingtechniques.

Displaying InformationTechniques

Rotational units often areunsure of how to display infor-mation effectively in the CP. FM101-5 describes the �desirablecharacteristics of all informationto include utility, accuracy, clarity,brevity, coherence, objectivity,and the ability to verify theinformation.� As long as that

criterion is met, any technique that enables the commanderto maintain situational awareness will work.

There is no one solution as to what information shouldbe posted. The answer is found in the commander�sguidance on what information is needed to accomplishthe mission. Based on my NTC experience, I developedtwo rules of thumb. First, the commander or CP OIC/NCOIC should be able to sit in a central location; evaluatethe tactical situation just by looking at the map (withcomplete overlays and up-to-date information); and knowthe maintenance, logistical, and precombat check/inspection status by looking at the tracking charts withouthaving to ask a lot of questions. Second, only the chartscontaining necessary information should be displayed.Too much information is worse then too little becausethe information becomes unmanageable.

CP RTO

Planning� Specified, implied, and

mission-essential tasks� Weather data� Constraints and limitations� Timelines (CO and

platoons)� Restated mission� Task organization� Commander�s guidance� CCIR

Battle Prep� Class of supply status� Subordinate-unit order

issue and rehearsal status� Maintenance status

Execution Phase� Combat power� Unit location and activities� CL III/V status� Enemy contact� Aid station locations� Status of adjacent units

Post-Battle Phase� Equipment readiness� Personnel strength� Resupply status� Unit locations� Consolidation and

reorganization status� Maintenance and casualty

collection status

Note: This is not an all-inclusive list.

Examples of information to display

40 CML

Displaying information is another area we canestablish systems for our everyday garrison operations.Of course, everyone will not need all of the sameinformation from day to day in garrison. However, thesupply status, work priorities, subordinate unit missionstatus/timelines, CCIR, and maintenance status apply toall company activities each day. We can develop and traininformation tracking and display systems that can be usedboth in garrison and the field with minimal differences.

If the commander in the scenario had been able tosee the information posted in the CP easily, she couldhave identified the issue with the deadlined HEMTTwithout being told or having to ask. This would haveenabled the commander to identify the issue and attemptto fix it before the attack.

Message-Handling TechniquesChemical company CPs lose vital information because

of a lack of established message-handling techniques. Wesee rotational units taking notes on scraps of paper that arelost or destroyed easily, resulting in failure to transfer valuabledata to a chart, logbook, or graphic overlay.

The fix is simple�establish a system for informationmanagement. Ensure that each message is logged with adate/time group, the recorders name or initials, and the actiontaken because of the information. Most importantly, givethe RTOs a clear task/purpose, train them to standard in thedaily operations, and supervise them to ensure that they meetthe standard.

BCT reserve in support of the counterattack, if the CP haddone the following:

� Obtained the information that the HEMTT fuel truckwas deadlined (information collecting/battle tracking).

� Posted the information on the combat power statuschart (message handling).

� Identified that a maintenance team needed to bedispatched to the smoke platoon to fix the deficiency(analysis).

� Recommended that course of action to thecommander.Again, this is something we can execute on a daily basis.

We can exercise our battle-tracking systems every time aplatoon prepares and executes a training event.

Time Event Actions Taken Initials 0600 0605

0615

0630

BCT crosses LDStart smoke insupport of TF MechFox squad occupiesORP 0021 M58 SMK trackdestroyed by directfire

Update map.Update map/informBCT.Update map/informBCT.Inform BCT/dispatchCASEVAC vehicle.

TADTAD

JN

TAD

Example of log book

Battle-Tracking TechniquesMost rotational units at NTC do a fair job of battle

tracking during a battle. However, CPs are not very good atbattle tracking while building combat power. Many CPs atNTC do not know the commander�s priority of work, platoontimelines, or how to track the status of platoons to meet thecommander�s requirements. The CP often does not help thecommander ensure that the company is prepared to go intothe fight by battle tracking the platoon�s readiness status andthen either tasking to correct the issue or making arecommendation to the commander on how to correct anydeficiencies. In the scenario, the HEMTT may have beenavailable for the fight, resulting in a smoke screen for the

� Identify and prioritize critical information to betracked.

� Develop tracking systems.� Ensure that all participants understand the

tracking system.� Ensure that everyone actively works the system.� Avoid letting informational input into the log

create a backlog in posting and distributing thedata.

Battle-tracking TTPsCP Layout

There is no exact answer to what a chemical companyCP should look like. But there are three general rules wehave developed based on our direct observation at NTC: theCP must be kept orderly, the map and tracking charts mustbe easily assessible, and the CP NCOIC must be able tooverwatch both the RTO and the soldier updating informationon the map and charts easily. Ensuring there is a system forreproducing orders and graphics is also critical to the CP�ssuccess.

Cleanliness and organization are also critical to the CP�ssuccess. The CP loses vital information if the area is full oftrash, scraps of paper, coffee cups/food, and out-of-dategraphics. It becomes difficult to sort relevant informationfrom irrelevant material.

A chemical company CP is usually small. Space is ata premium. If the space available is not used efficiently,operations will be hindered. Soldiers must have adequateroom to update information quickly and not impede theview of the company leadership, who is depending onfast and accurate data to make decisions critical to thesupport of the attack.

The positioning of the CP NCOIC is very importantalso. He (or the commander) cannot accurately absorbinformation that he obtains from eavesdropping on theBCT and company nets and analyze what�s on the mapand tracking charts unless positioned to observe all areassimultaneously. If the CP NCOIC becomes committed to

February 2002 41

one area or action, he loses pieces of the puzzle, and theanalysis loses accuracy.

In the scenario, we should understand that the CARwill be committed to the fight before it happens, anticipateits axis of advance, and prepare a FRAGO supportingthe BCT commander�s response.

Finally, it is a good idea to have a reproductioncapability of some sort. A significant amount ofinformation is lost between the company commander andthe most junior soldier of the squad. Giving written ordersand graphics to the platoons can reduce the loss of criticaldata significantly as the order flows down to the soldierswho execute the plan.

Home-Station TrainingToo many company headquarters come to NTC without

testing their CP layout and information management systemsbefore deploying. Once a unit arrives at the NTC, it is toolate to develop those systems. NTC is where your SOPs canbe validated. FM 101-5 states, �Command posts (duringtraining) should be set up to replicate a field environment.�Nothing can replace taking your CP to the field to conductrealistic, combined-arms training. However, throughout thisarticle we discussed how we could develop systems that canbe used both in garrison and the field with minimaldifferences. This will help operations soldiers prepare forany deployment.

To reverse negative trends, we must make use of everyavailable training opportunity to train our company CPs. Irecommend professional development classes on such topicsas CP functions, battle drills, orders process, and battletracking for our headquarters personnel. These classes shouldbe given to the entire CP section, not just a group of officersor NCOs. Training together ensures everyone understandsthe systems that will be used.

You also can train the soldiers at CP operations everyday. RTOs can answer the telephone and log in calls; the

(continued on page 44)

Potential CP layout

Home-station-training checklist

� Create systems that can be used both in the fieldand in the garrison.

� Use field shift change SOP as your daily/weeklymeeting agenda.

� Develop, rehearse, and improve TOC battle drills.� Train the CP in the field prior to deployment.� Train with the unit you are likely to support prior to

deployment.� Cross train maintenance, communication, and

supply personnel to assist in the CP as needed.

commander can develop and post daily CCIR. The CP shift-change SOP can be used as the agenda for daily/weeklymeetings.

As discussed earlier, nothing can replace realistic,combined-arms training. The CP can go to the field to planand battle-track platoon field training exercises or toparticipate in company/battalion lane training with the unitslikely to be supported during a deployment. It is a good ideafor the CP to participate in BCT training events beforedeploying to the NTC to ensure the SOPs are aligned withthe BCT. This also allows us to get to know the leaders wewill be supporting and gives us a chance to train them onour capabilities and limitations.

CP in operation

TD 06 The Next FightThe CP maintained an accurate depiction of the battle

and the current status of each platoon. The commanderanticipated the commitment of the CAR, moved to reestablishcommunication with the NBC reconnaissance squad, orderedthe smoke platoon to conduct refuel operations, was preparedto link up with the BCT reserve, and told the decontaminationplatoon to prepare to move to decontamination site 200 onorder.

These actions enabled the commander to provide asmoke haze to screen the advance of the reserve, observea persistent chemical strike that went on the reserves�axis of advance, establish an uncontaminated bypass route,

CML42

The military decision-making process (MDMP),according to FM 101-5, Staff Organization andOperations, is the single, established, and provenanalytical process and the Army�s approach to problemsolving. By this framework, the brigade chemical officer(ChemO) provides input to the brigade plan and ensuresthat the realities of nuclear, biological, and chemical(NBC) warfare are not dismissed and that the chemicalunits assigned are used effectively as combat multipliers.The seven steps of MDMP are�

1. Receive the mission.2. Analyze the mission.3. Develop courses of action (COAs).4. Analyze the COAs.5. Compare the COAs.6. Approve the COA.7. Issue orders.This article discusses how the ChemO contributes to

the MDMP framework in steps 1 through 5.Receive the Mission

This begins as soon as higher headquarters issues afragmentary order or as soon as the commander anticipatesa new mission. Before initiating mission analysis, theChemO should gather the necessary tools, which mayinclude overlays, standing operating procedures (SOPs),and staff estimates.

Analyze the MissionThe commander begins to visualize the battlefield.

The ChemO�s duty is to ensure that NBC is part of thatvision. Mission analysis can be simplified through thefollowing approach: see the terrain, see the enemy, andsee yourself.

See the terrain/weather first; it is the first point ofinterest that you share with the S2. The ChemO ensuresthat he receives updated weather and light data for themission. Once the ChemO has the weather data, he candetermine if the enemy�s use of chemical munitions isfavorable and identify the potential targets, based on theterrain and weather. Once the terrain analysis is complete,the enemy analysis follows.

See the enemy by determining the type and compositionof the enemy NBC units, their disposition, and their intent.Determining the type and composition of enemy NBC units

requires identifying the type of unit regimental/divisionartillery group that will deliver chemical munitions onfriendly units and areas and its delivery systems (2S5s, 2S7s).Disposition of enemy NBC units are chemical threatindicators on the battlefield that are more obvious as anenemy increases in protective posture or movement ofchemical munitions toward delivery systems. Next,determine the enemy�s capabilities, to include range andeffectiveness of enemy NBC delivery systems, agent types,protection, and detection equipment available. Then,determine the enemy�s intent on chemical weapon use.Determine if he is terrain-oriented�will he use chemicalweapons to shape the battlefield�or is he force-oriented�will he use chemical weapons to target large troopconcentrations to cause casualties?

Assist the S2 and the rest of the battle staff with theconstruction of the threat COAs. The S2 and battle staff willcreate two to three threat COAs. The ChemO identifiesprobable target areas of interest and designated named areasof interest (NAIs) and recommends observationresponsibilities for each of these COAs. The ChemO ensuresthat every templated NBC event becomes an NAI and isplaced on the situational template. Once the enemy isanalyzed, the friendly posture can be assessed.

See yourself; it is the final step of mission analysis.The ChemO performs the following staff actions:vulnerability analysis, mission-oriented-protective-posture (MOPP) analysis, NBC threat status, NBCprotective measures, chemical asset employment, and taskorganization of chemical units.

Vulnerability analysis and NBC threat analysis arediscussed in FM 3-14, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical(NBC) Vulnerability Analysis. Vulnerability analysisdescribes how susceptible a friendly unit is to chemicalattack. The brigade establishes a minimum NBC threat

By Captain John F. Fennell

Military Decision Making �A Process

43February 2002

status as a result of vulnerability analysis, but task forcesmay increase the NBC threat status in their units as a resultof their planning process.

When the ChemO completes intelligence preparationof the battlefield (see the terrain, see the enemy), he has agood idea of what MOPP the brigade combat team (BCT)should assume. At BCT level, the ChemO strives torecommend the appropriate minimum levels of MOPPwhile reserving the option to raise the level of MOPP totask force commanders and their ChemOs. A techniquemay be establishing minimum MOPP levels by phase lineor by using proximity to templated chemical strikes totrigger an increase in MOPP.

NBC protective measures include passive and activemeasures. Active measures affect the enemy�s ability toengage us with chemical weapons (destruction of chemicalweapons facilities, enemy munitions and their deliverysystems). Passive measures include actions that preventfriendly units from being targeted (dispersion andcamouflage).

The ChemO makes initial recommendations duringmission analysis for task organization and chemical unitemployment. These recommendations are preliminary, yetthey help the commander and staff to focus on how toemploy chemical units and task organization.

Develop COAsCOA development is largely the BCT battle staff�s

attempt at designing unpredictable COAs that are difficultfor the enemy to deduce. COA development is focusedand usually has constraints placed upon it by the brigadecommander. The S3 generates options based on thecommander�s guidance and relative combat power. TheChemO considers the doctrinal employment of allchemical assets and how they support the S3�s maneuverscheme, within the guidance that he received from thebrigade commander during the mission analysis briefing.A plan for smoke, reconnaissance, and decontaminationassets is developed for each COA.

Smoke PlanningSmoke planning is either centralized or decentralized.

At the BCT level, the brigade prepares a centralized smokeplan that includes smoke missions and targets, start/stoptimes, and applications. This is an effective method ofcontrol for area defense missions, passage of lines, andlanding-zone denial. Brigades control smoke operationswhen smoke must be coordinated between two or moremaneuver units that require smoke coverage by a singleplatoon. In this case, the ChemO posts a smoke supportannex to the BCT operation order (OPORD). Indecentralized smoke planning, the smoke platoon isusually attached to a task force. Ensure that the task forcecommander and his ChemO understand the brigade

commander�s intent for generated smoke. Decentralized-smoke planning is practical for offensive operations thatinclude deliberate/hasty attacks and movement to contact.

Reconnaissance PlanningChemical reconnaissance is every soldier�s job and not

just a chemical unit function. Assign all NAIs to observersat the brigade (brigade reconnaissance troop), task force,and separate company level. These NAIs coincide withtemplated chemical strikes on each enemy COA and mustbe included in the brigade and battalion intelligencecollection plans. Ensure that the observers at the NationalTraining Center know what they are looking for in respectto the center�s NBC rules of engagement. Assign the Foxsquad to observe NAIs most critical to the BCT�s schemeof maneuver. Keep in mind the command and supportrelationship. It is recommended to keep the squad underbrigade control to maintain flexibility. The unit in whosearea of operations the Fox squad is operating will supportthe squad with Classes I, III, V, and IX, and medical andrecovery assets. A Fox squad requires additional security,preferably larger than an M2 .50 caliber machine gun.

Decontamination PlanningKeep in mind the principles of decontamination

according to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination:� Decontaminate as far forward as possible� Plan

link-up points and decontamination sites as close tocontaminated areas as mission, enemy, terrain,troops, and time (METT-T) allow.

� Decontaminate as soon as possible� Keep thedecontamination platoon set up and water resupplytime in mind. Plan for decontamination in depth(along the whole axis of advance) for the offense.In the defense, consider having the decontaminationplatoon set up and dig one decontamination site.

� Decontaminate only what is necessary�Adecontamination platoon is located at the brigadelevel for your use; use it wisely. Weathering is stillthe least costly method of decontamination.

� Decontaminate by priority�The BCT commanderusually establishes decontamination priorities.Reestablishing operation tempo and reconstitutingcombat power are key priorities.When the COA is completed, the ChemO should have

a good understanding of each friendly maneuver plan andhow chemical assets, NBC operations, and logistics fitinto each COA.

Analyze the COAsCOA analysis identifies which course of action

accomplishes the mission with the minimum casualties,while best positioning the force for retaining the initiativefor future operations. This is done through the war-gaming

44 CML

process. The ChemO recommends the task organizationfor chemical assets and the task and purpose for theseassets and triggers in COA analysis.

An important, yet often overlooked, part of wargaming is the development of triggers. Triggers are event-or time-oriented criteria used to initiate planned actionsdirected toward achieving surprise or inflicting maximumdestruction on the enemy. The creation of triggers can bedriven by enemy action (chemical strike at templated area),friendly movements (crossing of phase lines) and, ofcourse, time.

The commander�s critical intelligence requirements(CCIR) are also identified during COA analysis. Chemicalstrikes are CCIR and usually become priority intelligencerequirements. A chemical strike at a templated locationconfirms an enemy COA.

The ChemO and the S2 cooperate to portray anadversary�s intent to use chemical weapons. The ChemOmust be adamant about this during the war game. Actingotherwise would produce a friendly COA that is easilydesynchronized by NBC attacks.

Compare COAsDuring this step, the brigade staff analyzes and

evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each COAwith respect to each Battlefield Operating System. Theend product for this step is the decision matrix, whichuses evaluation criteria to analyze the effectiveness andefficiency of each COA.

NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke arecombat multipliers that can significantly increase therelative combat power of the brigade while force ratiosremain constant. These are the criteria the ChemO shoulduse to evaluate the effectiveness of the employment ofchemical assets.

When COA analysis is completed and briefed to theBCT commander who approves the COA (step 6 ofMDMP), the ChemO writes his NBC annex and posts itto the OPORD and then prepares for rehearsals. Followingthe final MDMP step�issue orders�the ChemO shouldbrief at the combined arms and combat service supportrehearsal. Once the rehearsals are complete, only then canthe ChemO rest.

Captain Fennell is stationed in Korea but was a student in theChemical Captain�s Career Course (CMC3) at Fort LeonardWood, Missouri, when this article was written. Followinggraduation from the Chemical Officer Basic Course, he wasassigned to 3-7 Infantry as the battalion chemical officer atFort Stewart, Georgia. His subsequent assignments weredecontamination platoon leader and executive officer in the92d Chemical Company (HVY). CPT Fennell served as theDISCOM, 3d Infantry Division (MECH).

ConclusionFM 3-101 states, �The chemical company is the

lowest chemical echelon that can plan and executecontinuous operations in support of tactical forces.�The ability of our company CP to receive, distribute,analyze information; make recommendations to thecommander; and integrate and synchronize resourcesis vital to the integration and synchronization ofchemical company assets in support of a tactical planthat involves multiple chemical platoons. We cannotbe satisfied until a chemical company CP�

� Effectively assists the commander to develop atimely and accurate picture of the company�scurrent status.

� Understands the capabilities and limitations ofthe enemy.

� Can visualize the terrain and what effects it willhave on our operations.

� Analyzes information to predict what willhappen next during the fight.

� Has a company FRAGO ready to issue andexecute before the BCT commander�s FRAGOis issued.The only way to achieve this goal is to create

systems that effectively manage information flow andtrain soldiers in the CP to effectively use thisinformation to manage the company. We must establisha system, train our soldiers on it every day, andruthlessly enforce the standards.

The next fight

and was prepared to provide decontamination supportto the BCT. These capabilities contributed to thedestruction of the CAR, the BCT�s penetration of theenemy defensive belt, and seizing the objective.

(continued from page 41)

February 2002 45

Patient DecontaminationBy Captain DeAnna Miller

Patient decontamination is not an operation that medical providers or chemical personnel conductregularly. The majority of medical training usually is focused on caring for patients during peacetime.Chemical organizations focus their effort on conducting operations in support of other units. However,during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it became obvious that the threat of chemical/biologicalattacks required medical professionals to have a greater understanding of processing contaminated patients.Many warfighters and their leaders who deployed to the Persian Gulf knew little about how the medical andchemical communities must work together to accomplish patient decontamination in an effective manner.

Since Desert Storm, there has been a renewed interestin ensuring that chemical leaders and health careprofessionals gain the necessary background in this importantarea of decontamination. It is known that several potentialadversaries of the United States have worked on or arecontinuing to explore the offensive use of weapons of massdestruction. The next time American soldiers deploy againstan aggressor such as Saddam Hussein, they must have asolid understanding of patient decontamination operationsfor the medical and chemical communities to execute aseamless patient decontamination process. Effective trainingwill reduce the casualties and conserve the fighting strengthof our forces. This article focuses on the roles of chemicalorganizations, the health support system (HSS), andidentification of reoccurring problems during the patientdecontamination process.

Roles of Chemical Organizations

Whether you are the chemical platoon leader or abattalion/brigade chemical staff officer, it is important tounderstand the role of the Chemical Corps during patientdecontamination operations. Leaders must ensure that allchemical soldiers are familiar with the procedure and knowtheir role in the process. Although a medical platoon is incharge of patient decontamination, chemical soldiers areoften tasked to assist. Also, the chemical decontaminationsite may be the first place that contaminated units go toreceive initial assistance. If contaminated patients areprocessed through the decontamination site, a workingknowledge of how to assist these casualties is imperative.

Chemical leaders must ensure that unit combat lifesaversand decontamination team members are trained to manage,decontaminate, and treat chemical agent casualities.Personnel must be trained to protect themselves fromchemical injuries. In addition, rehearsals must be conducted

to provide decontamination personnel with the skills toaccomplish their responsibilities with speed and efficiency.All personnel must understand contamination detection,decontamination, and buddy aid.

It is important that the chemical staff officer understandsthe process of coordination for medical support of a unit.First, he must accurately articulate the level of assistancethat is needed. This requires making an initial assessment ofhow many casualties are involved. The chemical staff officermust provide crucial information, such as the location ofthe casualties and knowledge of the agent used during theattack. This information is included in the initial assessment.After the assessment is complete, the chemical staff officercontacts the supporting medical brigade and requests support.Based on the assessment of his request, the medical brigadetasks a medical subordinate unit that has the size andcapability to handle the task. This assessment gives themedical personnel an idea of the amount of equipmentneeded to complete the mission. Initially, a medical platoonis tasked to set up patient decontamination at the designatedsite. However, in the event of mass casualties, a platoon isnot sufficient and other assets are required.

The Health and Support System

Next, it is important to understand the role that themedical community plays in the decontamination of patients.The HSS is organized and equipped to provide support in aconventional environment. The HSS must train and prepareto operate in all battlefield environments. According to FM8-10-7, Health Service Support in an NBC Environment,HSS has several goals it must accomplish to successfullycomplete patient decontamination. These goals include�

� Managing casualities so chemical agent injuries areminimized and any other injuries or illnesses arenot aggravated.

CML46

Decontaminating the hood

� Protecting persons handling contaminated casualtiesor working in contaminated areas.

� Avoiding the spread of contamination inambulances or working in contaminated areas.In addition, divisional and nondivisional medical

supply company�s preventative medicine personnel areresponsible for testing the quality of water for the division.Water testing is conducted to ensure that water is notcontaminated with biological/chemical agents.

What role does HSS have in the actual patientdecontamination process? It is solely responsible forproviding medical personnel to supervise the patient�sdecontamination process. However, in echelons I and II (unitand division) and nondivisional units, the supportedcommander must provide eight nonmedical personnel toperform patient decontamination. At echelons III and IV(corps and communication zone hospitals), a 20-man patientdecontamination augmentation team or 20 nonmedicalpersonnel must be provided to perform patient decon-tamination. The base cluster commander or units within thegeographical area of the hospital provide the augmentees.

Identification of Problems

Last is the actual patient decontamination process andexamining the reoccuring problems that arise in each step.The teams must be adequately dressed and equipped beforedecontaminating the patients. Each team is dressed in amission-oriented protective posture level 4 butyl-rubberapron. Each station is supervised by at least one medic.Before most patients receive any medical treatment, thepatient decontamination team decontaminates them. Beforebeginning decontamination procedures, the team uses M8detector paper and/or a chemical agent monitor to determinethe extent of contamination on each patient.

Patient decontamination is extremely time- andmanpower-intensive. Patients must be stabilized before theyare processed through the decontamination line becausedecontamination requires approximately 20 minutes perpatient. Patient decontamination teams consist of fourpersonnel per station (nonmedical, if possible). Patientdecontamination consists of the following seven steps:

Step 1: Decontaminate patient�s mask and hood. Thefirst step is usually the easiest part of the process. As apatient enters this station, the decontamination team musttake several factors into consideration:

� Consciousness of the patient. If the patient is notconscious, what steps are required to ensure that thetask is completed efficiently? During training, unitsneed to ensure that different scenarios are practiced.

� Cutting of the hood. It is common to see personnel

operating this station not decontaminate the scissorsregularly. This is a small, but important, step to ensurethat the contaminated scissors do not touch thepatient�s skin.

� Inlets that are contamination-free. Soldiers must usea 5 percent solution of chlorine while cleaning thepatient�s mask. The decontamination personnel mustcover the patient�s mask air inlets with their hands orgauze. A common mistake is that soldiers do notdecontaminate their hands or handle the gauze withcontaminated hands.

Step 2: Remove all visible contamination using theM95 skin decontamination kit (SDK). If an SDK is notavailable, soldiers may use a 5 percent chlorine solution,bleach, or hot, soapy water to remove the majority of thecontamination.

Step 3: Remove patient�s protective overgarment andpersonal effects.

� It is very important that soldiers decontaminatescissors after every cut of the battle-dressovergarment (BDO). It is especially importantwhen cutting around the bandages, tourniquets, andsplints of the contaminated patient.

� The technique for taking off the BDOs is anothercommon problem in the process. The BDO top andbottom must be carefully rolled off a patient�s bodyto avoid contaminating the patient.

� It is important to know where and how personaleffects are handled and where they are maintainedafter removing them. Often, the procedure forhandling the personal effects of the contaminatedpatient are not practiced in training. This part of thestep is frequently overlooked, but it is important to

47February 2002

Cutting the overgarment trousersCutting the overgarment jacket

implement it into this training. If disposal of personaleffects are overlooked, they have the potential tocause harm to the decontamination team.Step 4: Remove patient�s BDUs.

� This step requires the decontamination team to cut theBDUs off the patient. In training, soldiers simulatethis process. However, it is important for the soldiersto simulate decontaminating the equipment used to cutaway the BDUs. A 5-percent solution of chlorinemust be readily available to decontaminate the cuttinginstrument. Decontaminate it continuously until theBDUs are removed. This safety measure decreasesthe patient�s chances of becoming contaminated. Aneffective way to do this is to use the cut-and-dipmethod. After each cut, dip the cutting instrument intothe chlorine solution to ensure that the patient does notget contaminated.

� The team is now ready to remove the patient�s boots.To remove them correctly, a team member shouldpull them towards him. A common, incorrect methodis to remove the boots so that the team member�sgloves touch the patient�s sock or exposed skin.Before removing the boots, the team member isexpected to decontaminate his gloves, because at thispoint there is a higher risk of contaminating thepatient�s exposed skin. As a precautionary measure,the team member should take all actions necessary toensure that he does not contaminate the patient.

� After removing the boots, it is imperative todecontaminate the litter before placing the soldiers�feet back on it. This ensures that all liquidcontamination is neutralized.Step 5: Transfer patient to the litter.

� This step is the most dangerous for the patient. Crosscontamination usually occurs because the patient mustbe transferred from a dirty litter to a clean one. If thedecontamination steps were not conducted tostandard before arriving at this station, the soldier is

at a great risk of becoming contaminated again.� All litters must be decontaminated after each use

with a 5 percent chlorine solution. Soldiers mustremember to check for contamination before usingthe litters for clean patients. Unfortunately, acommon step avoided is the final check of thelitters by an improved chemical agent monitor orM8/M9 paper to ensure that the litter is free ofcontamination.Step 6: Decontaminate skin. At this point, a

professional medical team assists the patient. The patient�sinjuries are the primary focus at this station.

Step 7: Transfer the patient across the shuffle pit.Decontamination teams are usually efficient in this step.

Conclusion

This type of decontamination is very tedious andrequires soldiers to pay attention to detail. They also needto pay attention to what implied tasks must beaccomplished. Successful patient decontamination is acompilation of knowledgeable leaders and well-trainedsoldiers working together. With intense training and unitemphasis on patient decontamination, American soldierswill be adequately prepared for the potentially �dirty� warsof future conflicts.ReferencesFM 8-10-7, Health Service Support in an NBC Environment, April1993, Army Medical Department Center and School ChemicalClassroom Guidance.FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, July 2000.

Captain Miller was a student in the Chemical Captain�s CareerCourse (CMC3) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri when thisarticle was written. Her previous assignments include decon-tamination platoon leader , 4th Chemical Company, 2d InfantryDivision, Camp Casey, Korea; battalion chemical officer,Illesheim, Germany with a deployment to Albania. She iscurrently working at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

CML48

The United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, NewYork, is the world�s premier institute of leader development. Graduates notonly receive a bachelor of science degree but also a commission as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army.They also gain practical leadership experience that is virtually unmatched in any other profession.

Each year, West Point or the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS) at FortMonmouth, New Jersey, offers admission to approximately 250 soldiers (Active, Reserve Component,and National Guard) and more than 100 military dependents. USMAPS prepares soldiers for success atWest Point through an intensive curriculum focused on English and mathematics.

For a dependent to be eligible, he or she must be the son or daughter of a military member in one ofthe following categories. First are career family members. These are members of an armed force (Army,Navy, Air Force, Marines, or Coast Guard) who are on active duty (other than for training) and who haveserved continuously on active duty for at least 8 years or who died while they were retired with pay orgranted retired or retainer pay. Second are service members currently serving in the Reserve Componentwho are credited with at least 8 continuous years of service computed under Section 12733 of Title 10,United States Code (i.e., at least 2,880 points). Third are reservists who are entitled to retirement paywhen they reach age 60, including those who have died.

Applicants must be�� U.S. citizens.� Unmarried with no legal obligation to support dependents.� High school graduates.� Under 23 years of age before July 1 of the year entering USMA (under 22 years of age prior to July 1 of the year entering the Prep School).� Of high moral character.

Most importantly, the applicant must have a sincere interest in attending West Point and becoming anArmy officer.

Soldiers and dependents who meet the basic eligibility requirements, have achieved SAT scoresgreater than 1,000 or ACT composite score of 20 or higher, and have earned good grades in acollege preparatory high school curriculum are especially encouraged to apply. All applicationrequirements must be submitted by 1 April 2002 to be considered for appointment to West Pointor the USMAPS in July 2002. Those who are interested should contact Captain Cliff Hodgesat (DSN) 688-5780 or (845) 938-5780, email: tc2324@usma.edu, or fill out the request form athttp://forms.admissions.usma.edu/cb.

Attention!Future Cadets

By Major Kirk W. Gohlke

February 2002 49

BackgroundFort Leonard Wood (FLW), Missouri�s air-quality

control restricts the use of hexachloroethane (HC)smoke mixture on its installation. The Army hasdeveloped a new, less toxic training smoke based onterephthalic acid (TA). PineBluff Arsenal, Arkansas, hasproduced and manufacturedthe M8 TA smoke pot,floating training. It is theonly type of smoke pot thatFLW�s air quality controlallows. The Smoke/FlameDivision, U.S. Army ChemicalSchool (USACMLS), re-ceived its first shipment ofsmoke pots in August 2001.The USACMLS instructorsat FLW can only use the M8TA smoke pot because ofadditional safety restrictions.

Pine Bluff Arsenal andRock Island, Illinois, haveproduced a new configura-tion M8 TA smoke pot andshould start production in thefirst quarter of fiscal year2002 for Armywide use. It isanticipated that by the first

Chemical School ResumesLive Smoke Pot Training

By Melvin Banner

quarter of fiscal year 2003, or when there is a sufficientsupply, the M8 TA should be available for Armywidetraining. However, the Armywide community willcontinue to use the current M4 and M5 HC smokepots pending the restriction of HC use at each location

until the new M8 TAs areavailable.

Live M8 TA Smoke PotTraining

Class 4-01 of the Chem-ical Officers� Basic Coursereceived live smoke pottraining in September 2001.The students gained morevaluable knowledge fromthis training than from theprevious training which wasrestricted to the showing ofan inert pot and a film. Thestudents were able to see thesmoke pot function and theresults of the smoke pro-duced by the live smoke pot.

Instructors explain the techniquesof using live smoke pots

Mr. Banner is a training specialist,Chemical Division, WARMOD,DOTD, MANSCEN. He is a careercivil servant and a retired U.S.Army master sergeant.

PIN 079365-000