CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015Page | 19

ARRESTI. NATURE AND DEFINITIONArrest the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec. 1 Rule 113).ARREST; HOW MADE.An arrest is made by:a. an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, orb. by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.NOTE: No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to greater restraint than it is for his detention. (Rule 113 Sec 2)DAVID ET AL VS. GMA ET AL GR NO 171396 (2006)

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of theEDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief,do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; andas provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.ISSUE/S:1.Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?2.Was the warrantless search and seizure on theDaily Tribunesoffices conducted pursuant toPP 1017 valid?

RULING:[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1.NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests arenormallyunreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.(b)When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; andx x x.

Neither of the [provisions onin flagrantenor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to seditionand violation of BP 880,all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invectiveOust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2.NO, the warrantless search and seizure on theDaily Tribunesofficesconducted pursuant toPP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires thata search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates thatthe search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states thatthe warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIOU227 SCRA 637 (1993)

FACTS: The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr. On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp. At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued in connection with Criminal Cases for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined. The respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime. The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice. SC thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou. On September 10, 1993, the seven information were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the information substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.

ISSUES:WON the arrest of Sanchez was legal- YES (by virtue of the jurisdiction subsequently acquired)

RULING:

"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 12 The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation. In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him. It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning. It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested." His arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested. The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal. Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that: Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

PEOPLE VS SEQUINO264 SCRA 79 (1996)

FACTS:The witnesses present by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Eugenio Godinez, Jimmy Serafin, police officers Elpidio Luna, Alfredo Mondigo and Mario Remulta, Dr. Arturo Sormillon, Lt. Myrna Areola, Emilio Daclan, Atty. Perpetua Socorro Belarmino, and Presentacion vda. de Broniola, while Olympio Lozano was presented as rebuttal witness. Only the accused testified in their defense. PEOPLE: Eugenio Godinez, overseer since 1952 of Hacienda Jose Ancajas in Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro Broniola, the hacienda's bookkeeper, went to the Medellin Rural Bank to withdraw P50,557.17 The bank's cashier instructed Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle driver of the bank, to drive Godinez and Broniola back to the hacienda on one of the bank's motorcycles. Serafin drove the motorcycle with Godinez behind him and Broniola behind Godinez. Godinez carried the money in a money bag which he hung over his left shoulder. As the three were in nearing the hacienda, the accused, armed with guns, tried to block their path and ordered them to stop. Godinez heard a gunshot. Broniola had fallen off the motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the motorcycle and ran away. The motorcycle toppled over Godinez, pinning him to the ground. Accused Tumangan, with gun in hand, approached Godinez, took the money from the money bag, and fled on foot with his co-accused. With the assailants gone, Godinez ran home, leaving Broniola behind. 8 Meanwhile, Serafin had proceeded to the house of the Broniolas, which was near the crime scene, and informed Broniola's wife of the incident. 9 SPO Elpidio Luna, Luna went to the crime scene where he found an abandoned motorcycle. People who by then had milled around the site informed Luna "that the culprit had already fled." Luna noticed that the "bushes were compressed" and found "a piece of paper utilized as toilet paper with a stool on it [which] was somewhat newly delivered." The paper was a bio-data sheet 1with the name " Melvida, Nenito" and the entry for the father's name filled in with "Elpidio Melvida." (EEEEWWW) After finding Nenito Melvida,Luna asked Melvida to go with him to the barangay captain's house. Melvida hesitated at first, but his companions prevailed upon him to go with Luna. The barangay captain was not home, so Luna took Melvida to the police station instead. Melvida was kept at the station the whole evening of 24 April 1991 for investigation conducted, first, by Luna, then, by his fellow policemen Sgt. Pablo Ygot, Cpl. Alfredo Mondigo and Eliseo Tepait, as Luna had to take his supper. Melvida was allowed to go home the next day, but only after the police had filed criminal charges against him he had posted bail. Melvida was not assisted by counsel during the police investigation, although Luna assured the trial judge that the Municipal Mayor of Medellin, who is a lawyer, was present, While Luna claimed he asked the Mayor to act as Melvida's counsel, he admitted that this request did not appear in the record of the investigation. Luna's investigation of Melvida was not reduced into writing. In the course of Luna's investigation, Melvida admitted that he kept "his share from the loot" in his house. Melvida then was brought to his house where he got P9,000.00, in one hundred peso bills, placed inside a shoe which he delivered to the policemen. During the investigation conducted by SPO3 Alfredo Mondigo, Melvida admitted that his (Melvida's) companions during the robbery were Vicente Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequio, Immediately, Mondigo and policeman Proniely Artiquela proceeded to the house of Hones where they saw Tumangan and Sequio on the porch. Noticing something bulging on the waist of Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela approached Tumangan and asked him what was that bulging at his waist. Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo patted the bulge which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires Bingham revolver with holster and four bullets. When ask if he had a license for the firearm, Tumangan answered in the negative. Mondigo and Artiquela then brought Tumangan and Sequio to the police station. Tumangan was then investigated in the presence of the Municipal Mayor. Tumangan admitted that he was one of the hold uppers.Mondigo further declared that the police recovered P22,526.00, but could not explain any further how the recovery was made and from whom. As to this amount, SPO1 Mariano Remulta, property custodian of the Medellin PNP station, merely declared that he was entrusted with the P22,526.00 which, according to the station commander, was "recovered in connection with the highway robbery case." The defense interposed alibi and denial and suggested a frame-up for their exculpation. The trial court gave weight to the prosecution's evidence and in its decision it found the accuseds guilty of robbery with homicide

ISSUES: Was there an arrest of the accused? YES; Is it valid? NO Are the admissions during the investigations valid? NO

Regardless of Luna's claim to the contrary, accused Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest "is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense," 44 and it is made "by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest." 4Melvida's voluntarily going with Luna upon the latter's "invitation" was a submission to Luna's custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being held to answer for the commission of the said offense. Since he was arrested without a warrant, the inquiry must now be whether a valid warrantless arrest was effected. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure . There was NO valid warrantless arrest in this case. Luna had no personal knowledge of facts indicating Melvida's guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable suspicion. Melvida's arrest was thus illegal. After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial investigation. The custodial investigation commenced when the police pinpointed Melvida as one of the authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect thereof. his brought into operation paragraph (1) of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing the accused's rights to remain silent and to counsel, and his right to be informed of these rights. There was no showing that Melvida was ever informed of these rights, and Luna admitted that Melvida was not assisted by counsel during the investigation. Indisputably, the police officers concerned flouted these constitutional rights of Melvida and Tumangan and deliberately disregarded the rule regarding an investigator's duties prior to and during custodial interrogation laid down in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated in a catena of subsequent cases.

DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ217 SCRA 663 (1993)

FACTS:An information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.An order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," which pertinently states in part:As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which required surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further, she cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain. . . . .On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted.WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled.Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearanceOn May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. "Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, setting the arraignment of the accused and setting aside the court's resolution which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division of said court on or before June 5, 1991.In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would like to prove as baseless. 7Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases for violations of RA 3019 and libel. Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency.The Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner which reads as follows: The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption.

ISSUES:WON respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner YESHELD:We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the afore stated pleadings she filed therein

COJUANGCO VS SANDIGANBAYAN300 SCRA 367 (1998)

CF: DIPLOMATIC AND PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES FROM ARRESTCONSTITUTION (1987) ART VI SEC 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.RPC ART 145: Violation of parliamentary immunity. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) from attending the meetings of the Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ART 31: 1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:a. a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;b. an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;c. an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the cases coming under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence.4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State.ART 371. The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Articles29to36.2. Members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission, together with members of their families forming part of their respective households, shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Articles29to35, except that the immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State specified in paragraph 1 of Article31shall not extend to acts performed outside the course of their duties. They shall also enjoy the privileges specified in Article36, paragraph 1, in respect of articles imported at the time of first installation.3. Members of the service staff of the mission who are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State shall enjoy immunity in respect of acts performed in the course of their duties, exemption from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of their employment and the exemption contained in Article33.4. Private servants of members of the mission shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, be exempt from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of their employment. In other respects, they may enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent admitted by the receiving State. However, the receiving State must exercise its jurisdiction over those persons in such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the performance of the functions of the mission.VFA ART VII

PEOPLE VS SIAO327 SCRA 463 (2000)

II. TYPES OF ARRESTA. WITH WARRANT OF ARREST1. When and how warrant issued:a. Constitution (1987) Art III Sec 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures or whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.Note:DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURE :a. personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest orb. if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of the witness to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.PLACER VS VILLANUEVAComment by Polly Pineda: if the judge is not satisfied to the findings of the prosecutor can dismiss the case for lack of probable cause.SEE DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURE.the determination of probable cause is in relation to the issuance of warrant of arrest.SC judge is not bound by the findings of the prosecutor.determination of probable cause is based on the records or findings of the prsecutor. ***it usually happens is that issuance of the warrant is based on the information filed. (reality)what you must do is check the documents that are submitted to the judge. If a warrant is issued basing on the information you can move for the quashal of the warrant.(read the DOJ NPS)126 SCRA 463 (1983)

FACTS:Facts:Petitioners filed informationsin the citycourt and they certified thatPreliminaryInvestigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Uponreceiptof said informations, respondent judge set the hearing of thecriminal casesto determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest.Afterthe hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him inthe exerciseof his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals certification in the informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification forthe judgeto issue warrants of arrest.

Issue:Whether or Not respondent city judge may, forthe purposeof issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during thepreliminaryinvestigation.

Held:Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue awarrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bindthe judgeto come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls forthe exerciseof judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,the judgemust satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing awarrant of arrest. If on the face of the information,the judgefinds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.

Petition dismissed

PEOPLE VS INTINGComment by Polly Pineda: For election related cases even criminal in nature, the comelec officer is the one to determine the probable cause. the fiscal has no right. The fiscal can only intervene when the case reaches the court. since the fiscal is the one to prosecute the case. What is the role of the COMELEC officer in the prosecution of the case when it reaches the court?ANS: The prosecutor can deputize the the COMELEC 187 SCRA 788 (1983)

FACTS:Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.After a preliminary investigation of Barbas complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

HELD:The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

ALLADO VS DIOKNOComment by Polly Pineda: Case of the missing German.The accused ordered to be arrested without bail.What is the offense? Kidnapping with murder.IS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT?No. One, they never recovered the body. no corpus delicti-the essential element of the crimeTwo, the judge relied only to the prosecutors findings.But what is wrong here is that the recommendation of the prosecution is infirmed.232 SCRA 192 (1994)

FACTS:On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a discharged Philippine Constabulary named Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. He accused them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national. Based on that confession of Umbal, a search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios of the RTC of Manila.Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), armed with the search warrant issued separately raided the dwellings of police officers who were also pointed by Umbal as the perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and ammunitions were found in the raid including Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and their other co-defendants were charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority. Their case was referred by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case.After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto Diokno found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned the issued warrants of arrests. They claim that Judge Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction as there is lack of probable cause for him to issue the warrants. They further contend that the judge did not personally determine the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence where the investigation was based from.

ISSUE:Whether or not a warrant of arrest without bail can be set aside and the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause even if the accused was not in the custody of the court.

HELD:Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding in the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. As with other earlier cases resolved by the high court, the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement that the accused be in the custody of the law. Various reliefs can be granted by the Supreme Court to accused even if they are not in the custody of the law.

SALONGA VS CRUZ PANOComment by Polly Pineda: SENATOR SALONGAhere there is no offense charged, those alleged violations of SEN Salonga does not constitute an offense, thus there is no probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest.134 SCRA 438 (1985)

FACTS:A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital)where he was place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. Bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons. The President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time. More bombs were reported to have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. Minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, as mall bomb exploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him.

ISSUE:Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped the case against petitioner Salonga.

HELD:The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and,therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decision sever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records.

LIM VS FELIXComment by Polly Pineda: Here merely relied on the recommendation resolution of the fiscal. Here it is obvious that the judge does not have the records because the records are not yet transmitted.(YOU CAN ONLY ASK FOR CERTIORARI FOR THE ACTION OF THE JUDGE)You have to look that the warrant was issued based on the the pieces of evidence in the information194 SCRA 292 (19910

FACTS:On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused..On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt,pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor.The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

PANGANDAMAN VS CASARComment by Polly Pineda: the rules applied here are not the present rules (don't be confused, that is why here there are two determination)JOHN DOE WARRANTSCan the judge issue John Doe warrants?GEN RULE: SC the warrants are not valid, they are equivalent to general warrants.warrant must describe the person to be arrested. Even if you dont know the name of the person, he can be describe (eg. work, address)But there is an exemption to this. 159 SCRA 475 (1999)

FACTS:The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) John Does transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.ISSUE: Whether said warrant is validHELD:No.Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) John Does not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of thenature of a general warrant,one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.[30]Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized,[31]the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.WHEREFORE,the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) John Does. The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further appropriate action.

DOJ-NPS PART VI SEC 1: Definition of probable cause as a ground for an arrest or issuance of a warrant of arrest. - Probable cause is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.2. How effectedRULE 113:Section 2. Arrest;how made. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. (2a)Comment by Polly Pineda: wag mo pagtatadyakan (-noel canlas)RETURN- 10 DAYS AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE WARRANT.THERE IS NO MOTION TO EXTEND WARRANT, WHAT DO YO DO? FILE FOR MOTION FOR ALIAS WARRANT.Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay. (3a)Section 4. Execution of warrant. The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor. (4a)Section 5. Arrest without warrant;when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)Section 6. Time of making arrest. An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. (6)Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. (7a)PEOPLE VS LUMAYOKComment by Polly Pineda: THE CASE THAT ESTABLISHES THE READING OF MIRANDA RIGHTSWhat are the rights of the accused?SEE consti rights.is the person arresting the accused need to be in possesion of the warrant on the time of the arrest?Rule 113 Sec 7.here the court is categorical that the arresting must be in possesion of the warrant.(these is the old rules)139 SCRA 1 (1985)*The confession was acquired by torturing and maltreating the accused. FACTS:Lumayok was charged with the crime or Rape with Murder for allegedly raping Gloria Belmos and killing her to conceal the commission of the crime. (denied by the accused) Mansueto Bemos went to the house of Edwin Rico and told him that his daughter was missing. The handbag of the victim was found and some 100 meters away from it, a black comb belonging to accused Lumayok was also found. Eventually, the body of the victim was found. The accused admitted to the police officer that he raped the victim and that he killed her after. He said that he did so because his bride-to-be (another girl) left him. (version of the accused) -he was playing basketball with Edwin Rico and other companions. Edwin Rico borrowed his black comb and never returned it (the comb found near the victims handbag). He said that he went home right after and that Edwin Rico went to his house in the evening and asked him to help in the search for Gloria Bemos. Edwin Ricos group found the body of the victim. -The policemen on a pretext that they needed Lucio Lumayok to accompany them in buying petroleum, invited him. He readily went with them. -He denied the accusation regarding the rape and murder of Gloria Bemos but he was maltreated and tortured. -The investigating policemen burned his penis and his pubic hair. They shaved his head and threatened that they would get the skin off his head if he wouldnt tell them that he did that. They told him that they would help him in court if he signs. -He put his thumbmark on the paper without knowing the contents as he was illiterate.

ISSUE: WON the admission of the accused may be used as evidence and establishes his guilt.

HELD: No. -The accused was not informed of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination or that he was afforded opportunity to avail himself of assistance of a counsel. -The purported confession is in English and there is no mention that the question answered by the accused had been translated by anyone. -The confession was not submitted to the Municipal Judge. -The following requisites were not observed: 7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, ... . He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible- or by letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. - It was a mistake for the trial court to accept the testimony of Sanciano Satorre saying that he burned the accuseds pubic hair and that the accused allowed him to do so. Such is beyond basic human instincts and the ordinary normal behavior of persons. -The initial reaction of the accused was to deny having committed the crime. HE signed the confession with a thumbmark, but denied again during trial. It goes to show that he did not understand the confession.

PAGALUNAN VS ALBIORComment by Polly Pineda: here there was no counsel to assist them. (lack of representation from independent counsel)they were made to sign the affidavit, that the police prepared.163 SCRA 332 (1988)

FACTS:The accused, together with other men, was charged with Robbery with Homicide with Rape. They allegedly robbed the house of Florencio Garces in Project 8, Quezon City and raped Dana Garces. -Albior pleaded not guilty. After trial, the trial court found Albior guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. -Agent Teofilo Jamela of the CIS Investigation Section testified that Albior and Vasquez (his co-accused) admitted that they served as lookouts while Bernardo Reyes entered the victims room. Vasquez stated that Manansalang and Reyes related to him that earlier that day they robbed the house of the victim, and in the course of the robbery, Reyes raped and killed the victim. -Agent Dayco stated that he interrogated the persons to whom the typewriter stolen from the Garces residence was sold and that the first buyer pointed to Manalangsang and Vasquez as the persons who sold it to him. -Sgt Prado testified that the panty of the victim and the stolen Adidas shoes were found in Vasquezs house. -Albior testified that he was at the house of his cousin in Baesa, Quezon City when the crime was being committed. He said that he did not understand Tagalog, the dialect tin which the confession was written, and signed it only because he was told hed be released if he signed it. -Vasquez testified that during a drinking spree where accused Manalangsang and Albior were also present, Bernardo Reyes recounted how he and Manalangsang robbed the house of the victim, and how he hit her with a baluster when she awoke. Reyes brought out the panty of the victim. Vasquez denied having sold the stolen typewriter and said that it was Manalangsang who sold it. He said that he signed the extra-judicial confession because he was threatened at the CIS headquarters with physical violence. -The trial court held that the extrajudicial confession of Albior was voluntarily and freely given. ISSUE: WON the extra-judicial confession of Albior was valid. Held: No. -7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, ... . He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible- or by letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. -lack of assistance of counsel in Albiors waiver of his right -It must also be noted that although Albior hardly speaks Tagalog, Cebuano being his native dialect, the sworn statement is in Tagalog (Exh. "N"]. It does not suffice that an interpreter, an agent of the CIS, was present during the interrogation (as stated in the sworn statement) because by virtue of its being written in Tagalog, Albior was deprived of the opportunity to comprehend through his own reading what he was signing. Finally, the testimony of Albior that he agreed to sign the sworn statement because he was promised that he would be released adds to the conclusion that he did not understand what he was signing. No reasonable person would believe the promise that he would be released if he knows that he had just signed a statement admitting his participation in the commission of a very serious offense.

3. Assistance; breaking into and out of building or enclosureRULE 113Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself. (10a)Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. (11a)Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure.Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself.B. WARRANTLES1. When justifiedRULE 113 Section 5. Arrest without warrant;when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; andComment by Polly Pineda: personal knowledge facts - considered that he was informed(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.(IHE: IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO, HOT PURSUIT,ESCAPEE)PEOPLE VS TUDTUDComment by Polly Pineda: Is the arrest justified? NOHere he was arrested without warrant, not valid.It is not in flagrante delicto, arrested merely by reliable information.here it is not sufficient, there must be an overt act indicating he is committing an offense.(wala namng ginagawa yung tao palabas lang cya ng bus)412 SCRA 142 (2003)

FACTS:Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratoryfor examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. ISSUE: Whether the Tudtuds implied acquiescence (Tudtuds statement of its all right when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be considered a waiver.HELD: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Soliers information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the assets there. The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.

PEOPLE VS CHUAComment by Polly Pineda: Here it is also based on reliable information. There is no overt act. SC you cannot reverse the process, it is not search incidental to lawful arrest.will not fall in the principle of stop and frisk, search must be before the arrest.396 SCRA 657 (2003)

FACTS:On Sept 21, 1996, police officers of PNP Angeles received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant Chua was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City On the basis of this lead, a team of police operatives was formed to accost Chua. They positioned themselves across the street fronting Thunder Inn Hotel At around 11:45pm, a car driven by Chua arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel After Chua alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box walking towards the entrance of the Hotel, police officers hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers In the course of said arrest, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from Chuas pocket. Forthwith, police officers subjected him to a body search which yielded 20 pieces of live .22 caliber bullets; same officer also peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, and saw that it contained a crystalline substance (arrest preceded the search) The police confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the bullets, and Chuas car; said items were brought to the PNP Headquarters in Angeles City Initial field test conducted at the PNP Headquarters (not at the crime scene) revealed that the seized items were methamphetamine hydrochloride/shabu Thereafter, these items were subjected to further examination at the PNP Crime Lab where, after due testing, it was concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive results for shabu Appellant Binad Sy Chua was then charged with violation of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations He pleaded not guilty on arraignment and the cases were jointly tried The defense presented an entirely different version of the facts9 which, in sum, intimated frame-up RTC of Angeles City rendered judgment acquitting Chua for Illegal Possession of ammunition but convicting him for Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs, hence, this appeal

ISSUE:WON warrantless arrest of Chua and the subsequent search of his person which yielded material evidence against him (shabu) were conducted in a lawful and valid manner HELD: NO. The decision of the RTC of Angeles City convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubtRATIO: RTC, in convicting Chua, ruled that the warrantless arrest was valid as Chua was accordingly arrested in flagrante delicto while then carrying prohibited drugs, hence, the subsequent search of his person was also valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest and akin to stop-and-frisk this is UNTENABLE The RTC confused two principles on warrantless searches, i.e. search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and stop-and-frisk These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of (1) the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and (2) in their allowable scope Searches in flagrante delicto Stop-and-frisk Searches

Arrest precedes search Probable cause (personal knowledge) is required arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the surrounding area where evidence may be located; he may also seize any property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence

Search precedes arrest Probable cause is not required; well-grounded suspicion is enough, provided that according to the surrounding conditions and the officers experience, a person of suspect behavior may be reasonably believed to be potentially dangerous limited search of outer clothing of a person for weapons or contraband

A warrantless search incidental to an arrest in flagrante delicto is necessary because the suspect has already been caught red-handed while committing, has just committed or will commit a crime at the presence/within the view of the arresting officer Stop-and-frisk, on the other hand, is defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or contraband Common elements of a stop-and-frisk are: (1) the police officer firstly introduces himself properly and make initial inquiries; (2) then approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct; and (3) check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons It serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection;10 and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation

Inapplicability of in flagrante delicto and stop-and-frisk In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on Chua For a valid arrest in flagrante delicto, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer both elements are not present in this case The records of the case reveal that there was no overt manifestation that Chua has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime (he was merely entering a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O box which is not a suspicious activity) Also, it has been held that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest leading to the only conclusion that there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search of Chua Further militating the case of the prosecution is the fact established by the arresting officers testimony on trial to the effect that they have already known and investigated Chuas drug-dealing activities for two years prior to his actual arrest this only means that whatever information the civilian asset relayed to the police on the night of the arrest was not an on-the-spot tip which may excuse them from obtaining the proper warrant of arrest All circumstances considered, there was also no valid stop-and-frisk in the case of Chua For one, he was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession (contrary to established stop-and-frisk principle that requires the search to precede the arrest) Also, the fact reveals that the police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into Chuas business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying; they merely identified themselves as policemen but this was when they have already arrested Chua Further, Chua was not exhibiting any unusual and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law on stop-and-frisk

Inapplicability of Other Valid Means of Warrantless Searches Search (of evidence) In Plain View (1) there was no valid intrusion; (2) the evidence, i.e., the plastic bag, the Zest-O box which contained shabu and the pieces of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered (the police intentionally searched for these items and were not in plain view) In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot also fall under exigent and emergency circumstances

PEOPLE VS MENDEZComment by Polly Pineda: Was there a warrant of arrest when they were arrested? NOhow were they placed in the custody of the police officer? They were taken from their work.They were brought before the custody of the police because of a speculation. They were already in custody before the testimonies were entered.Also, it is to be noted that there is no overt act.GR NO 147671 (2002)

FACTS:

Appellants Renante Mendez and Rene Baby Cabagtong were charged with the crime of rape with homicide of one Candy Dolim Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty and then trial ensued The prosecutions theory (supported by its witnesses testimonies): On the morning of Dec 8, 1996, Candy was asked by her father to go out and collect bets for the PBA endings game from the local residents. She never returned that evening and her relatives looked for her in vain. She was to be found only on Dec 12, brutally molested and lifeless Later, the victims father heard reports that a certain Ronnie Cabagtong was involved in the killing of his daughter, hence, he filed a complaint against Ronnie This caused Ronnies warrantless arrest (and detention) together with appellant Mendez; but while Ronnie was being investigated at the police station, his mother Aurea arrived and declared that she knew what really happened to Candy and offered to be a witness. She pointed to appellants Mendez and Baby Cabagtong as the perpetrators Aurea testified that on the night of Dec 8, appellants went to her house looking for Ronnie and that her son asked her to let the two inside. She testified that she saw appellants washing their clothes to remove bloodstains on them when the two spent the night in her house Ronnie Cabagtong, for his part, claimed to be an eyewitness to the crime. He testified that on the evening of Dec 8, he was in a local Betamax screening place where the victim and the appellants were also present. He said that Candy left early and that appellants followed her. He himself left the place 5 minutes later and on the way home, he allegedly saw from 3 meters away appellants raping Candy. It was raining and there was no moonlight, but Ronnie said he recognized appellants because of a lantern which illuminated the place. After witnessing the crime, he casually proceeded home and went to sleep only to be awakened by appellants coming to his house (and the rest in Aureas story) Ronnies statement, however, was never put into writing, but he was released from custody as a result thereof. And by the strength of his and Aureas testimonies, appellant Mendez was kept in custody, supposedly for further investigation while a manhunt for Baby Cabagtong was ordered Baby Cabagtong was subsequently arrested, but not by the police but by a civilian (barangay tanod). His arrest, like Mendezs was without warrant Investigating officer SPO2 Cernio testified that the arrest of appellant Mendez without a warrant was based on their knowledge of his guilt The tanod who arrested Baby Cabagtong, also without warrant, testified that his conduct was sanctioned by the citizens arrest law and that he based his arrest of Baby from the statement of Aurea Cabagtong The defense, on the other hand, presented a theory diametrically opposed to that of the prosecutions that the crime was committed by one Randy Gomba, and not by appellants This is supported by their own eyewitness, one Josefina Bernas who testified that on the night of the crime, while she and her husband were making copra, they heard a woman crying. When Josefina went to see what it was, she saw a girl being raped by a man. Josefina recognized the assailant to be Randy Gomba The RTC was swayed by the prosecutions case (giving particular weight to Ronnie and Aurea Cabagtongs testimonies) and convicted appellants of the crime and sentenced them accordingly Upon appeal, the appellants raise the following issues: ISSUES:1.) WoN RTC erred in finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime 2.) WoN their warrantless arrests were valid

HELD: YES, the RTC committed an error in finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged; and NO, the warrantless arrests made against appellants were NOT VALID. The decision of the RTC Loaogan, Northern Samar is REVERSED and accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Rene Baby Cabagtong are ACQUITTED of the crime of rape with homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt RATIO: Issue #1: Error in the Finding of Guilt The RTC favored the prosecution by giving credence to Ronnie and Aurea Cabagtongs testimonies. It should not have, because certain circumstances make these testimonies suspect! For one, it is highly doubtful how Ronnie could have witnessed the rape considering that it was raining and there was no moonlight. His contention that there was a lamp illuminating the area is belied by the testimony of another prosecution witness who described the crime scene as uninhabited and surrounded by thick foliage. Thus, there could not have been any lamps in the area. Also, Ronnies behavior after he allegedly witnessed the crime, if he is to be believed, is contrary to normal human reaction (he casually proceeded home and went to sleep as if nothing happened). The police also took at face value Ronnies and Aureas testimony against appellants without considering (or overlooking) the ulterior motive that the former has in pointing to appellants as the culprits

PEOPLE VS DORIAComment by Polly Pineda: The arrest of Gadao was only based on the testimony of Doria. She has not commited, not committing or not attempting to commit.A mere allegation that a marked money was left in the possesion of Gadao is not an element of Dangerous Drug Act.301 SCRA 668 (1999)

FACTS:In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two civilian informants (CI) that a certain "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation, so they arranged a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" scheduled on Dec 5, 1995 in Mandaluyong through their CI Members of Narcom prepared marked money worth P1,600 as payment to the supposed drug-dealer; PO3 Manlangit was to be the poseur-buyer At 7:30 in the morning of Dec 5, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills and "Jun" instructed them to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place and took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua (back up police) rushed to help in the arrest They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to Neneth's house nearby at Daang Bakal The buy-bust team found the door of Neneth's house open and the woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate As SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the marked bills, PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house; and standing by the door, he noticed a carton box under the dining table One of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper appeared similar to the wrapper of the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun" PO3 Manlangit's suspicion was aroused, hence, he entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama After trial, the Pasig RTC convicted the accused-appellants. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each Upon this appeal, the appellants raised the following issues:

1. WoN the buy-bust operation was valid YES 2. WoN the consequent warrantless arrest and search of appellants were valid as to Doria, YES, but as to Gaddao, NO. HELD: The buy-bust operation was valid absent any showing of ill-motives or abuse of power on the part of the arresting officer, hence, DORIA'S warrantless arrest and search arising from such lawful exercise is UPHELD. His conviction perforce must be AFFIRMED. The warrantless arrest and subsequent search of Gaddao, on the other hand, is tainted with fatal procedural irregularities which merit her ACQUITTAL based on reasonable doubt

RATIO: On Buy-Bust Operation (Entrapment v. Inducement) A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense It evolved12 from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses Unlike in the American jurisdiction, entrapment is not a defense available to an accused in our jurisdiction; instead, it is inducement/instigation that is a possible defense in cases such as this one The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics operations because recently, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offender

CADUA VS CAComment by Polly Pineda: VALID WARRANTLESS ARRESTmore of the second exemption, the personal knowledge of the facts. take into consideration the circumstances.here there is the personal knowledge of the facts relayed and the expertise of the arresting officer.it is not more of in flagrante delicto but of hot pursuit.312 SCRA 703 (1999)

FACTS:

Central Police District were patrolling the vicinity of Fairview, QC when they received a radio dispatch requesting them to proceed to an address where a