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IURISARS

UNIVERSIDAD PANAMERICANA

ARS IURIS NÚMERO ESPECIAL, 1993

Revista del Instituto de Documentación e Investigación Jurídicas de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Panamericana.

Consejo Editorial

Rafael Márquez Piñero. Director. Juan Federico Arriola.

Salvador Cárdenas Gutiérrez. Rodolfo Cruz Miramontes. Jaime del Arenal Fenochio. Guillermo Díaz de Rivera.

Mari Cruz Errecart Marqués. Miguel Ángel Ochoa Sánchez.

Alberto Pacheco Escobedo. Juan Velásquez.

Hernany Veytia Palomino. Ma. Reyes Márquez García. Secretario.

Unidad GuadalajaraJuan de la Borbolla. Luis Manuel Meján.

Luis Ramírez Orozco.

Miguel Ángel Lugo. Administrador. Nemesio Rivera. Redactor.

Roberto Hería Covarrubias. Editor.

INFORMES Y SUSCRIPCIONESFacultad de Derecho.

Augusto Rodin 498 y 507, Campana 91.Col. Insurgentes Mixcoac, 03910.

México, D.F.

EL CASO ÁLVAREZ‑MACHAIN Y EL DERECHO

SUMARIO

Presentación ............................................................................................. 5

Rodolfo CRUZ MIRAMONtES La sentencia Álvarez Machain y el orden jurídico internacional............................................................................... 8

José Luis SIqUEIROS El secuestro territorial de presuntos delincuentes es violatorio del Derecho Internacional...................................................26

ANEXOS I. Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Syllabus)‑Sentencia............................................... 35

II. the Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court......................... 38

III. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.‑ Voto disidente.......................... 50

IV. Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in support of Affirmance (of the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)...................... 65

V. Opinión jurídica sobre la sentencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de los Estados Unidos de América, pronunciado por el Comité Jurídico Interamericano............................... 94

VI. tratado de Extradición entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América, firmado en México, D.F., el 4 de mayo de 1978...................................................101

• Índice General§ Índice ARS 8

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COLABORAN EN EStE NÚMERO

RODOLFO CRUZ MIRAMONtESVicepresidente de la Comisión de Asilo y Extradición de la Union International des Avocats.

JOSÉ LUIS SIqUEIROSVicepresidente del Comité Jurídico Interamericano.

De las opiniones sustentadas en los artículos firmados responden exclusivamente sus autores.

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PRESENtACIÓN

Desde mediados del Siglo XV en adelante, las naciones civilizadas de la Europa cristiana occidental evolucionaron en su organización política, configurando el concepto del Estado nacional y con ello del Estado moderno.

La soberanía fue el concepto central alrededor del que giró todo el enfoque de la nueva forma de ordenación, en donde existiendo un pueblo organizado, habitando un territorio determinado, quedaban comprendidos bajo una misma autoridad que ejerce su imperio en el contexto romano del Ius Imperi.

El descubrimiento, la conquista y posterior colonización de los pueblos americanos provocaron un impacto brutal en los pensadores políticos de Europa y modificaron de alguna manera esta concepción, gestándose así la llamada comunidad de Estados.

Amalgama de todo ello fue el derecho internacional, en donde concurren el pensamiento aristotélico y tomístico junto con la ética cristiana, que permitieron diferenciar los dos elementos básicos de las relaciones interestatales o sea, el poder temporal y el poder divino.

Con una claridad envidiable, los creadores de la Escuela Española del Derecho de Gentes colocan a las cosas en su justo lugar, pero siempre bajo el imperio del Derecho como única forma para vivir en paz y para alcanzar todas las metas del bien común y, al mismo tiempo, de la realización personal.


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Por ende, el Estado de Derecho ha quedado como la única forma posible de existencia pacífica de las naciones y de los individuos, dentro de la comunidad internacional.

Cada vez que ha prevalecido la tentación por alejarse del orden jurídico establecido, el costo ha sido muy elevado en lo económico y cruento en vidas humanas. Baste recordar el episodio de la Segunda Guerra Mundial con sus líderes mesiánicos como un prototipo de lo anterior.

La pertinencia y necesidad de insistir en el respeto al Derecho es, pues, indiscutible y cuando se cometen actos de autoridad que de manera consciente no respetan a las normas jurídicas que deben acatar, el ciudadano se preocupa.

Más aún la inquietud trasciende a todas las esferas sociales cuando estos actos se producen en el seno de los países más fuertes.

todo esto viene a colación con motivo de varios actos formalmente legales, dictados por diversas autoridades de los Estados Unidos de América, como son la llamada Ley Torricelli, pero más especial‑mente la sentencia que la Suprema Corte de Justicia de los Estados Unidos dictara en el caso Álvarez Machain, en donde con una claridad meridiana se volteó de espaldas al derecho internacional y, además, trajo a la memoria otros casos similares en alguno de los cuales México ya había sido parte del acontecimiento.

Pese a que efectivamente nuestro país, en otros órdenes, ha sido víctima del olvido del Derecho, como sucedió por ejemplo en el de la salinidad de Las Aguas del Río Colorado, no por ello debemos quedarnos callados.

Es obligación como ciudadanos y, más aún, como estudiosos y hombres del Derecho, protestar y dejar constancia de nuestro repudio a esta resolución aberrante y contraria al Derecho.

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El hecho de que recientemente, el pasado 14 de diciembre, se dec‑retara la liberación del doctor Humberto Álvarez Machain por falta de pruebas, en nada afecta ni disminuye la gravedad de la falta cometida por la Suprema Corte de Justicia de los Estados Unidos, ya que se trata de dos procesos distintos.

En efecto, uno es la violación al tratado bilateral de extradición y otro es el proceso penal.

Por ende, las razones y argumentos en contra de la misma, conservan su misma fuerza y justicia.

ARS IURIS ha logrado conjuntar diversos documentos emanados del caso Álvarez Machain, en donde queda constancia del pensamiento y de la actitud que diversos juristas han tenido sobre el particular, así como la presencia del Gobierno de México, digno y respetable a lo largo del proceso.

Se engarzan también la condena que el Comité Jurídico Interamericano hiciera de la sentencia en cuestión y, desde luego, los textos tanto de la misma como del voto disidente de los tres Ministros de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, el que evita que la mancha de dicho tribunal sea completa.

El pensamiento y el juicio de nuestros abogados y, sobre todo, del licenciado José Luis Siqueiros, a quien le tocó plantear el caso ante el mencionado Comité, se incluye también en este volumen extraordinario.

La aparición del mismo esperamos que sea oportuna, pero sobre todo que provoque una reacción de nuestros colegas de México y en el resto de los foros internacionales.


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LA SENTENCIA ÁLVAREZ MACHAIN Y EL ORDEN JURÍDICO INTERNACIONAL 1

Rodolfo Cruz Miramontes

La aparición de los Estados Nacionales en el siglo XV provoca, al interrelacionarse, el surgimiento de la Comunidad Internacional, en donde sus miebros son entes jurídicos situados en un mismo plano de igualdad.

La concepción del atributo de soberanía exclusivo del Estado Moderno, le permite figurar como la obra más completa y más pura, de la sociedad organizada políticamente en donde se conjugan armoniosamente los elementos de territorio, población y gobierno.

Cuando Bártolo de Sasoferrato da a conocer sus ideas de separar los poderes terrenal y espiritual, acabando así con el cesareopapismo, a través de la definición del Estado como el único titular del imperio sobre un determinado territorio y sus habitantes, se consideró casi una herejía.

Las aportaciones de otros pensadores, como Bodino y Vattel, depuraron el concepto y así se aceptó que hubiere un Estado Soberano que fuese el único que ejerciese autoridad pública y mando en el país, independientemente de cualquier otro Poder en el orden temporal o sea que tuviera la «suma potestas».

Así, los integrantes de la Comunidad Internacional resultante, como decíamos de la aparición del Estado moderno, se consideran iguales entre sí en función de su carácter soberano.

1 El presente trabajo desarrolla con amplitud, la ponencia presentada ante la Academia Mexicana de Derecho Internacional Privado el día 31 de julio de 1992, con motivo de la accesión a Miembro de número en la misma.


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Empero, no significa el desconocimiento y acatamiento de ciertas normas de jerarquía superior que son las que permiten una convivencia pacífica. Ignorar lo anterior provocaría el caos en donde se impondría la ley del más fuerte.

La historia nos presenta dramáticos casos en donde el olvido de ello, bajo cualquier razón o filosofía política, desemboca siempre en destrucción y muerte. De esta suerte se ha enfrentado un concepto de soberanía «relativa», cuyo impulsor fue Hegel, en cuyas fuentes abrevaron filósofos, politólogos y dictadores.

Estas reflexiones simples vienen muy a propósito de la reci‑ente decisión jurídica de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América, dictada en el caso United States Petitioner vs. Humberto Álvarez Machain (No. 91‑712 del 15 de Junio de 1992).

Revisaré a continuación los puntos más sobresalientes de la misma.

Los antecedentes del caso aparecen condensadamente descritos en el «Syllabus» que precede al texto de la Sentencia y del voto disidente suscrito por tres Ministros de la Corte.

Así, tenemos que el Doctor Humberto Álvarez Machain, ciudada‑no mexicano fue «secuestrado por la fuerza» (Forcibly Kidnnaped) de su domicilio en territorio mexicano (Guadalajara, Jal.) y trans‑portado por la vía aérea en vuelo privado a El Paso, texas, Estados Unidos de América, en donde fue arrestado por su participación en el secuestro y asesinato de un agente de la DEA (Agencia para promover la lucha antidrogas) llamado Enrique Camarena y su piloto Alfredo Zabala Avelar, siendo el primero de nacionalidad norteamericana y el segundo mexicano. Adicionalmente a estos delitos se le acusa de complicidad para cometer actos violentos en actividades mafiosas; de complicidad para arrestar a un agente federal y otros más. tal vez lo más grave es que considera la DEA como parte acusadora, que el doc‑tor Álvarez Machain utilizó sus conocimientos científicos a efectos

RODOLFO CRUZ MIRAMONtES

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de prolongarles la vida a las víctimas y poder así continuar con las torturas y los interrogatorios.

La Corte Federal de Distrito de los Ángeles, Cal. conoce del caso [United States vs. Caro Quintero, 745F. Supp. 599, �02‑�04 (Cd. Cal. 1990)] y siete coacusados de los mismos delitos por considerárseles cómplices, por lo cual el proceso en contra del doctor Álvarez Machain se instauró en la misma.

Ante la petición de la Defensa, de que la Corte, se declarase incompetente por haberse violado el tratado de Extradición vigente entre ambos países (promulgado y publicado en el Diario Oficial del 2� de febrero de 1980) ya que el acusado fue presentado por medios violentos o extralegales no contemplados en el mismo, la Corte decidió, a efectos de conocer la veracidad de los argumentos en cuestión, realizar una exhaustiva investigación en la que se concluyó que si bien era cierto que el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos niega su participación en el secuestro, aparece probado que la DEA hizo inten‑tos, con anterioridad a los hechos, para que las autoridades mexicanas le entregasen al reo mediante negociaciones menos formales, las que no obtuvieron éxito.

Asimismo, al arribo del secuestrado al aeropuerto de El Paso, texas, lo estaban esperando agentes de la DEA, quienes de inmediato lo aprehendieron.

Por otra parte, la investigación reveló que las personas que secuestraron a Camarena habían recibido pagos parciales por $20,000.00 de dólares provenientes de la DEA, y que siete de los secuestradores y sus familias habían cambiado su residencia hacia Estados Unidos, pagándoles la misma Agencia una pensión mensual.

Por todos estos hechos la Corte determinó que la defensa era pro‑cedente al haberse violado el tratado de Extradición, por lo que el acusado debía ser devuelto a México.

LA SENtENCIA ALVARÉZ MACHAIN Y EL ORDEN JÚRIDICO INtERNACIONAL

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Posteriormente, el fallo fue confirmado por la Corte de Apelaciones de San Francisco. (United States Vs. Verdugo‑Urquidez 939F 2d 134h (CA9, 1991) Cert. Pending No. 91‑�70, 94�F 2d 14�� (1991)).

De lo dicho podemos derivar los siguientes datos:

1. La incoación de un juicio por diversos delitos penales de cierta gravedad en contra de múltiples ciudadanos mexicanos, en daño de un norteamericano agente del gobierno de su país y de un colaborador de nacionalidad mexicana.

2. El juicio está radicado en la Corte Central del Distrito en Los Ángeles, California, U.S.A.

3. Los hechos criminales ocurrieron en la Ciudad de Guadalajara, Jal., México.

4. La DEA intentó que las autoridades mexicanas le entregasen mediante procedimientos informales al acusado Humberto Álvarez Machain pero no tuvo éxito.

5. Los presuntos secuestradores 2 han recibido diversas sumas de dinero entregadas por la DEA y sus familias, que ahora radican en los Estados Unidos, a donde se trasladaron a raíz de los hechos.

�. Existe un tratado de Extradición vigente entre México y los Estados Unidos desde 1980 que se ha venido aplicando desde su promulgación.

7. El reo ha sido declarado fuera de la competencia y jurisdicción de la Corte Norteamericana por un tribunal de Primera Instancia y el fallo confirmado por el de Apelación, ordenando su deportación a México.

2 Ver en la revista Proceso, los artículos sobre el tema de la licenciada Lucía Luna, correspondientes a los números 818 y 821, de los días � y 21 de julio de 1992, respectivamente.


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Ante tal resolución, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos solicitó por los conductos idóneos ante la Suprema Corte, la revisión del fallo confirmado mediante el llamado Recurso de Certiorari con fecha 10 de enero de 1992, lo que provocó que se abriese el expediente 91‑712.

Pasados cinco meses y cinco días, con fecha 15 de junio de 1992, se pronunció la sentencia que ha provocado tanta consternación y asombro en todos los foros y que de antemano ya había atraído la atención de otro país vecino a los Estados Unidos y provocado que se apersonara ante dicha Corte Suprema, mediante la figura del Amicus Curiae en apoyo al acusado en el mes de marzo de 1992.

A lo largo de todo el proceso y, asimismo, de otro similar enderezado por los Estados Unidos en contra de Rene Martínez Verdugo Urquídez por complicidad en el mismo asesinato, el Gobierno de México 3 ha expresado su rechazo ante el procedimiento ilegítimo de los secuestros y se ha presentado a las Cortes como Amicus Curiae en diversas instancias, por lo que hay una postura definida y enérgica de dos Gobiernos afectados de alguna manera, con los que Estados Unidos tiene celebrados sendos tratados de extradición.

La decisión final que abordaré a continuación fue dividida ya que hubo una posición disidente, habiendo votado seis Ministros en un sentido y tres en otro.

De la lectura de la sentencia mayoritaria que revoca las decisio‑nes en revisión encontramos una interpretación del tratado cuya violación se dio, por demás bizarra, apoyada en precedentes no aplicables y además fundamentalmente internos.

3 La Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, publicó el pasado mes de junio (1992), el Libro Blanco del caso denominado Los límites de la jurisdicción nacional, en donde se recogen tanto las notas diplomáticas, como los documentos y presentaciones del gobierno de México, de Canadá y las resoluciones jurídicas del caso.


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Conforme al Common Law norteamericano, la fuerza de los precedentes en las decisiones de los casos que son conocidos por los tribunales es definitiva, al no contar con códigos escritos salvo excep‑ciones, máxime si el problema se ubica en el ámbito del Derecho Internacional Público por ser un tratado en interpretación.

Sin embargo, de ninguna manera riñe esta práctica con la apli‑cación sensata de los principios fundamentales del Derecho sino, al contrario, busca acomodar sus dictados al caso concreto. Un histo‑rial respetable continuo desde la creación de la Unión Americana la confirma.

Figuras de corte internacional, como los jueces Marshall, Cardoso y otros más, han dado respeto y autoridad al poder Judicial norteamericano, sobre todo en la competencia federal 4.

A efectos de precisar el problema citaré a continuación, textualmente, el primer párrafo de la Sentencia que contiene el punto a debate y la opinión controvertida, pero mayoritaria, de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de los Estados Unidos América:

«The issue in this case is whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this country’s courts.

We hold that he does not, and that he may be tried in Federal District court for violations of the criminal law of the United States» (No. 91‑712).

Veremos enseguida de manera resumida cuáles fueron las razones y argumentos que apoyaron tal decisión.

4 Ver el interesante trabajo del licenciado José Luis Siqueiros intitulado «Está en manos de Bush hacer cumplir los tratados de extradición», Excélsior, 10 de julio de 1992.


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De la lectura del texto en cuestión tenemos que se interrelacionan dos casos jurídicos pendientes sobre los mismos hechos criminales pero que han tocado situaciones similares, por lo que la interacción de ambos es necesaria; se trata de «United States vs. Caro Quintero» 745F Supp, 599, �02, �04 (Cd Cal. 1990) y de «United States vs. Verdugo‑Urquidez» 494, U.S. 259 (1990).

toda la argumentación del fallo gira en torno a la búsqueda en el tratado Bilateral de 1978, de la existencia de la prohibición expresa del secuestro de un acusado y su presentación a la parte juzgadora en contra de su voluntad.

Si apareciere esta evidencia se estimaría que se viola al tratado de Extradición mencionado, más en caso contrario la decisión será que no existe la misma y, por ello, que la Corte tiene competencia para conocer el caso en cuestión, sin importar como ha sido llevado al reo ante ella.

Al no existir un precedente igual al considerado, tal como lo reconoce la Suprema Corte (p.3, párrafo 3), se recurrió a un caso nor‑malmente invocado en asuntos similares y que ya se había utilizado en contra de peticiones anteriores de México, tal como sucedió en el llamado Incidente Martínez en el año de 1905, como es el juicio «Ker vs. Illinois», 119 US 43� (188�) del que han derivado toda una doctrina conocida con ese nombre.

tanto en el Incidente Martínez como en otros muchos que se mencionan, sobre todo en problemas interestatales, se ha venido apli‑cando la tesis de que el hecho del secuestro no da fundamento legal suficiente para que la Corte que conoce del caso en contra del ofen‑dido pierda su competencia y jurisdicción [vgr: Frisbie vs. Collins, 342 U.S. 519‑343, U.S. 937 (1952); Mahon vs. Justicie, 127 U.S. 700 (1988); Cook vs. Hart, 14� U.S. 183 (1892); Pettibone vs. Nicolás, 203 U.S. 192, 215‑21� (190�)].

En otras palabras, se sostiene que al no incluirse expresamente la prohibición de la comisión de actos en contra del derecho, tanto


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interno como internacional, el tratado no se desconoce (ver p.7 de la sentencia). Así, tenemos que no importa para la Corte la comisión de actos contra el Derecho para poder juzgar de otros anteriores también ilegítimos en los que se viole al Derecho internacional, para aplicar su ley nacional.

La defensa argumentó, entre otros puntos, apoyada por el Gobierno de México en detalle y en términos generales por el de Canadá en intervenciones como Amicus Curiae, que el precedente Ker no tenía aplicación al caso por lo que invocarlo no daba ningún apoyo al juzgador.

En breve recordaré que el caso en cuestión surgió del secuestro que sufrió el ciudadano norteamericano Frederick Ker por parte de un oficial que lo llevó de Lima, Perú, al tribunal en Illinois ante el que se le acusaba de hurto. En su defensa alegó que se le privaba por tal hecho, de un debido proceso legal y de que se le debía reintegrar al Perú, y en todo caso solicitar la extradición, pues existía un tratado entre ambos países.

La decisión, como hemos indicado con antelación, fue negativa y desde entonces se usa para desconocer la manera en que el acusado es presentado al tribunal [Ker vs. Illinois, 119 U.S. 430 at 443 (188�)].

¿Por qué no son comparables los casos Ker y Álvarez Machain?

Según lo acreditado, Álvarez Machain es un ciudadano mexicano y no norteamericano como Ker; secuestrado en su país y no en un tercero, quien desde un principio alega violaciones al tratado de extradición vigente, lo cual es apoyado por el Gobierno de México, sin escatimar esfuerzos, tanto en notas Diplomáticas (de abril 18, mayo 1� y 19 de julio de 1990), como en alegatos presentados como Amicus Curiae y más aún soportados por el Gobierno de Canadá (en marzo de 1992), lo que no sucedió en Ker, pues Perú no protestó en ningún momento y sin duda alguna el secuestro de Álvarez Machain fue apoyado, financiado y promovido por funcionarios del gobierno


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americano y, por último, el delito del que se acusó a Ker fue cometido en territorio norteamericano y el caso a consideración fue en México.

Por lo dicho, es inaplicable el precedente Ker y la Regla Ker‑Frisbie derivada del mismo, pese a que la Corte pretenda que México ya conocía su existencia (ver p.9 in fine) 5 pues tal hecho no legitima de ninguna manera su subsiguiente aplicación, en todo caso debió el Ejecutivo Mexicano haberse precavido en 1978 al celebrar el presente tratado y no pecar de confiado o de descuidado y exigido la inclusión de un artículo prohibiendo al gobierno americano, a sus agentes, a sus dependencias y similares, secuestrar, mandar caza‑recompensas o contratar terceros en la comisión de secuestros y delitos semejantes.

Lo más desconcertante es que afirmando la Corte que siendo un propósito general de los tratados de Extradición –ergo del presente– preservar la soberanía de los Estados y el trato justo a las personas, sostenga que: «... does not mean that the violation of any principle of international law constitutes a violation of this particular treaty» (ver nota No.14, de pie de página de la sentencia), cuando –decimos nosotros– está probado en autos que los actos cometidos por los agen‑tes norteamericanos atacan al tratado directamente, al no respetar sus disposiciones en cuanto a la extradición de reos.

Esto resulta evidente al existir un mandamiento expreso, el Artículo No.9, que regula el caso de los nacionales del país ante quien se solicita la extradición.

Más incomprensible resulta aún la argumentación que pretende justificar la realización de actos en territorio extranjero como no violatorio de la soberanía estatal.

En el voto disidente del Ministro Stevens, se ocupa del tema e invoca un precedente que también consideraron sus colegas mayoritarios pero interpretaron a medias [United States vs. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407


5 Cuando se aplicó al «Incidente Martínez».

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(198�)], para sostener que el tratado de Extradición, tal como ha sido considerado en situaciones semejantes, es suficiente para proteger al reo de cualquier persecución y de limitar el poder estatal extranjero.

Apoya su afirmación adicionalmente en otras decisiones citando al Ministro Story, quien en 1824 sostuviera que sería «monstruoso» pretender justificar la captura de un barco en puerto español por uno de bandera americana, ya que un Estado no debe realizar actos de soberanía en el territorio de otro, tal como se afirma por la Doctrina Internacional y desconocer tal principio resulta una «clara violación a la Ley de las Naciones Unidas», según afirmó Story en «The Apollon», 9 Wheat. 3�2 270‑371 (1824).

La fortaleza moral y jurídica que contiene el precedente invocado (Rauscher), cuando consagra el principio de la especialidad que carac‑teriza en especial a la extradición, se extiende por simple congruencia lógica a todo el tratado, de tal manera que el reo extraditado sola‑mente debe ser juzgado por los delitos de que se le acusa al establecerse la petición, lo cual encierra necesariamente como limitación al poder soberano del Estado solicitante. Así, se concluye que fuera de las causales previstas en el tratado no existen otras legítimas para lograr el traslado del reo (ver pp.9 a 12 y nota 2�).

Visto lo anterior y ante la reiterada posición de los juzgadores de no aceptar las conclusiones negativas que les llevaría la necesaria congruencia después de admitir los hechos probados, así como los argumentos sólidos hechos valer por la defensa y por el Gobierno de México, a lo largo de todo el proceso diplomático y jurídico, es pertinente buscar alguna razón o al menos explicación que apoye tan desatinada e infortunada decisión que provocara, desde su inicio, rechazo de los propios Ministros de la Corte Suprema.

Para ello haré una revisión rápida de cuáles son los principios rectores que tanto en la doctrina como en la práctica internacional guían a los tratados de Extradición, para revisar si el tratado violado adolece de alguna deficiencia que justifique su menosprecio.


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Partamos desde luego de la consideración de que la extradición se da a pedido de un Estado que solicita se haga una excepción al principio de territorialidad, lo que constituye un deber internacional. Naturaleza distinta es el derecho que tiene el Estado para expulsar de motu propio a quien considera dañino o inconveniente para el bien público. La razón que explica por qué se acepta la extradición, radica en el hecho de que se busca que ningún delincuente sea inmune al derecho territorial, como sucedió prácticamente hasta la Primera Guerra Mundial, ya que la única forma que tenía un Estado de juzgar a un delincuente que estaba fuera de su territorio, era mandar por él.

A través de diversos acuerdos internacionales, se han recogido algunos principios básicos que veremos enseguida, no sin antes recordar las convenciones multilaterales más significativas.

Dignos de mencionar, celebrados en nuestro continente, están el de Lima de 1879; el de Derecho Penal de Montevideo de 1889; el de Extradición y Protección contra el Anarquismo de México, que for‑man parte de la II Conferencia Panamericana; el Código Bustamante de La Habana de 1928; el Capítulo Relativo de la Séptima Conferencia Panamericana de 1933 y el de Derecho Penal de Montevideo de 1944, entre otros.

Un primer elemento es que el extraditable se encuentra procesado o sentenciado por un tribunal competente del país requirente.

Desde luego está que siendo, como se señala, reo del delito se encuentre físicamente en el territorio del país que sea requerido.

No basta, sin embargo, que la persona en cuestión sea acusada, sino se exige que el delito en cuestión tenga ese carácter en ambos países, debiendo penarse con privación de la libertad y además ser por un mínimo que generalmente se fija en un año, pudiendo ser obviamente superior.


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Los delitos que generalmente se consideran en la extradición son los clasificados como intencionales en sus cuatro grados: conato punible, delito intentado, delito frustrado y delito consumado.

Es práctica común enlistar en los tratados bilaterales los deli‑tos que quedarán comprendidos, sin perjuicio, desde luego, de las prohibiciones específicas que otras leyes dispongan como sucede en la Constitución Mexicana, cuyos Artículos 2 � y 15 7 contienen disposiciones concretas.

Una inquietud siempre latente en toda demanda de extradición está en la posibilidad de que se encierre una acción política, en cuyo caso se trataría de dos campos diversos: el común y el político.

Hasta ahora poco se ha logrado para establecer bases firmes y objetivas sobre la materia, que presenta además perfiles muy sen‑sibles ya que su existencia dará la posibilidad del asilo o al menos del refugio temporal.

Muchos son los casos concretos que han provocado estudios enjundiosos, así como también múltiples trabajos de instituciones especializadas y organismos internacionales que, sin cejar esfuerzos, siguen trabajando, tal como sucede por ejemplo con la Comisión de Asilo y Extradición de la Unión Internacional de Abogados, en cuya fundación participé en la sesión de Madrid de 1973.

Hasta ahora la calificación de delito político es facultad arbitral del Estado requerido, lo que provocará, bien la negativa a la solicitud y por ende el otorgamiento del asilo, o en su defecto, su obsequio 8.


� Artículo 2°. «Está prohibida la esclavitud en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Los esclavos del extranjero que entren al territorio nacional alcanzarán, por ese solo hecho, su libertad y la pro‑tección de las leyes»

7 Artículo 15. «No se autoriza la celebración de tratados para la extradición de reos políticos, ni para la de aquellos delincuentes del orden común que hayan tenido en el país donde cometieron el delito la condición de esclavos; ni de convenios o tratados en virtud de los que se alteren las garantías y derechos establecidos por esta constitución para el hombre y el ciudadano».

8 En mi estudio sobre «Asilo y extradición, derecho y práctica en México», hago una mención exten‑sa del tema, ver El Foro (octubre‑diciembre de 1973), Barra Mexicana, Colegio de Abogados.

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Sin embargo, nuestra Constitución considera en su Artículo 119 que es obligación del Estado entregar sin demora a los criminales que sean reclamados.

Justo es mencionar que en México se ha sostenido por los tri‑bunales y por la doctrina que dicha facultad del Ejecutivo, pese a ser absoluta, no es arbitraria pues debe respetar los mandamientos constitucionales que consagran las garantías fundamentales y cabe, al no observarse, el Juicio de Amparo.

La práctica general es de negarla cuando sus disposiciones legales permiten que un tribunal local conozca de violaciones a leyes extran‑jeras, contemplándose, sin embargo, la facultad del Poder Ejecutivo para acceder, pese a ello, a la solicitud.

Nuestro país ha sido congruente en su postura de negarse a la extradición de mexicanos, y así lo ha establecido tanto en su legis‑lación interna, particularmente en la Ley de Extradición Internacional de 1975, y en su predecesora, como en el Código Penal para el Distrito y territorios Federales en Materia del Fuero Común y para toda la República en Materia del Fuero Federal de 1931.

Será pertinente traer a la memoria, como ilustración, dos casos que fueron relevantes.

El primero es el caso del señor Chester W. Rowe, norteamericano de origen, que fue propietario de bienes inmuebles en nuestro país y por ese hecho tenía el carácter de nacional de acuerdo con las leyes aplicables en ese momento (la de extranjería de 188�), por lo que se negó su extradición, y el muy reciente de Jésus Raynaga León o Jésus León Raynaga, en el que la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores resolvió, con fecha 8 de mayo de 1972, negar la extradición por tratarse de un ciudadano mexicano. En ambos casos además se observó lo preceptuado por el Artículo 11 de la Ley de Extradición vigente, dados los extremos planteados en el Artículo 2° de la misma, de juzgar por medio de un tribunal mexicano competente los delitos


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de que eran acusados los requeridos, siguiendo así los lineamientos del Código Bustamante, al que se halla adherido.

Por lo que toca a la aplicación del Artículo 4° en casos de la comis‑ión de delitos por extranjeros a mexicanos en territorio extranjero, existe un caso muy famoso conocido con el nombre de Cutting, en el que un ciudadano norteamericano de nombre A.K. Cutting ofendió y difamó públicamente en un artículo periodístico publicado en El Paso Sunday Herald de El Paso, texas, en perjuicio del ciudadano mexicano, D.E. Medina, quien se querelló ante un tribunal mexicano ubicado en la ciudad llamada entonces Paso del Norte, hoy Ciudad Juárez, en el Estado de Chihuahua; en su querella invocó el Artículo 13� del Código Penal del Estado entonces vigente que contenía prác‑ticamente la misma disposición del Código Penal actual, por lo cual las autoridades locales, en la primera oportunidad, aprehendieron en territorio mexicano al señor Cutting e inició el juicio en su contra. El gobierno norteamericano protestó enérgicamente fundando su pre‑tensión en múltiples razones que iban desde la tan decantada buena vecindad, hasta negar el derecho de un país a juzgar a extranjeros por actos ejecutados fuera de su territorio, pretendiendo no sólo que se pusiera en libertad al señor Cutting, sino además que se le pagara una indemnización y, por último, que se derogara el precepto por contener «... una pretensión que invade la soberanía de un Estado vecino y amistoso». México rechazó esta pretensión y en nota del 1� de febrero de 1888 dijo: «Que el derecho que toda nación tiene para imponer disposiciones respecto a la internación de extranjeros... involucra... los derechos necesarios a efecto de hacer responsables a tales extranjeros por actos que hayan ejecutado en el extranjero en contra de cualquiera de sus ciudadanos o súbditos». Además sostuvo que «... no puede requerir de México que modifique su Legislación en ese sentido... puesto que los mismos Estados Unidos de Norteamérica en una o más de sus entidades Federativas sostiene y sigue la misma Legislación» 9.


9 tomado de Siqueiros, José Luis. «Los conflictos de leyes en el derecho penal», en Revista El Foro, p.20. 5A, Época, No.15, 19�9.

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Pasemos ahora a revisar muy brevemente el tratado de Extradición que vincula ambos países formado en 1978, que se promulgó hasta principios del año de 1980 (D.O. del 2� de febrero).

Este Acuerdo es un eslabón de varios que celebrado el primero en 1899, sufrió ajustes en 1902, 1925 y 1939 culminando con el actual, cuyo espartano preámbulo señala que el propósito es «cooperar más estrechamente en la lucha contra la delincuencia y de prestarse mayor asistencia en materia de extradición».

Con esta claridad y precisión se redactaron los 23 artículos y el Apéndice, observándose los parámetros generales ya consignados y, sin duda, incorporándose las enseñanzas que la experiencia de casi cien años les brindó a los negociadores.

Así, encontramos que se consagra la obligación legal de extraditar (Artículo 1).

Las condiciones de igualdad de delitos, de la existencia de pena corporal no menor de un año y los demás requisitos comunes apare‑cen; asimismo, se incluye la posibilidad de extraditar por complicidad o por simple tentativa (Artículo 2).

Las excepciones a la procedencia de la solicitud son los delitos políticos y militares y, desde luego, la prescripción de la acción con‑forme a cualquiera de las leyes de las Partes, así como la existencia de la causa de Non Bis in Ídem o bien, cuando la pena que le corresponda pudiera, en su caso, ser la de muerte y, por último, la de los naciona‑les sin desconocer la facultad de la parte requerida para acceder a la petición si lo juzgare pertinente (Artículo 9).

Las normas procedimentales son establecidas siguiendo las nor‑malmente practicadas, así como los elementos pertinentes para pro‑bar tanto los hechos como el Derecho; recordemos que es elemental demostrar que conforme las normas de ambos países la violación a la


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ley de que se acuse es un delito y que no ha prescrito; se previenen además las pertinentes para identificar plenamente al sujeto.

Siendo los canales diplomáticos los competentes para llevar a cabo los trámites se le da, sin embargo, participación al Judicial para que analice si el pedido y sus anexos cumplen todos los requisitos formales o, bien, si es necesario perfeccionarlos. Deberá abstenerse desde luego de emitir opinión alguna sobre la acción sustantiva. Al resolverse favorablemente la petición se deberá respetar cuidadosa‑mente los preceptos constitucionales, pues, de no hacerlo, cabe inter‑poner el amparo; existen ya precedentes judiciales que han determinado la importancia del respeto a la ley.

Asimismo, se consagra expresamente el Principio de la Especialidad de tal manera que solamente se podrá juzgar al extra‑ditado por los delitos que se reclama y no por otros con las salvedades que el Artículo 17 consigna.

Con lo dicho, podemos sostener válidamente que el tratado en cuestión se apega a los principios generales y sigue la práctica común en la materia que las naciones civilizadas observan, por lo que brindan las suficientes seguridades de que ningún delincuente quede sin castigo.

Así pues, no hay razón válida que justifique apartarse de sus pre‑ceptos como ha sucedido en el fallo, que el día 15 de junio de l992, dictara la Suprema Corte de Justicia de los Estados Unidos en el caso contra Humberto Álvarez Machain revocando los anteriores fallos. Se puede incluso estimar que el tratado es modelo en su género.

Si sumamos a la lista que la conducta ilegítima no sólo desconoce al repetidamente citado tratado bilateral, sino además cuestiona otros de evidente importancia que vinculan actualmente a dichos países 10

10 tales son los Tratados de cooperación entre los Estados Unidos de América y los Estados Unidos Mexicanos para brindarse asistencia legal (9 de diciembre de 1987), la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra el tráfico y el acuerdo de cooperación al combate del tráfico de drogas de 1992, Dependencia de la droga (23 de febrero de 1989).


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y, más aún, puede poner en tela de juicio los convenientes de elaborar el tratado de Libre Comercio ante la inseguridad jurídica que plantea, no encontramos una explicación sensata que justifique la sentencia.

Indudablemente que los juzgadores tomaron en consideración el hecho de que México no está obligado a extraditar nacionales, y de que históricamente se ha negado a hacerlo cuando se le ha pedido, pero también conocen que no ha escatimado esfuerzos para procesar y condenar a los co‑acusados en el caso del asesinato de Enrique Camarena, como ha sucedido con Alfredo Zavala y otros que ya suman 31 personas, por lo que no cabía duda de que el gobierno mexicano enjuiciaría al reo de ser extraditado y máxime cuando además ofreció hacerlo.

tal vez la respuesta se halla en un elemento primitivo del ser humano y éste es la venganza.

El hecho de que Camarena haya sido agente de la DEA, puede lle‑varnos a suponer que esta corporación tomara la decisión de llevar el asunto hasta sus últimas consecuencias, forzando al Poder Legislativo a encontrar una salida de pie de banco que, por otra parte, ya utilizó en muchas ocasiones como lo hemos mencionado en otros foros. De paso, se satisfacen también las actitudes prepotentes frecuentemente disfrazadas en tesis legalistas como es, entre otras, la que se nos aplicó en el conflicto del Río Bravo, a principios de siglo, denomi‑nada Doctrina Harmon. Los Ministros disidentes así lo temieron y se dolieron que esto sucediera cuando afirmaron:

«Tal como la Corte señala... en su opinión, existen razones para suponer que el acusado (Álvarez Machain) participó en un crimen particularmente brutal, en perjuicio de un agente judicial norteamericano. Este hecho, si fuera cierto, explicaría el gran interés del Poder Ejecutivo para procesar al reo en nuestros tribunales.

»Empero esta aplicación no justifica de manera alguna desconocer y no aplicar la “Norma de Derecho” que esta Suprema Corte debe acatar».


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Es por ello comprensible que el deseo de venganza ejerce una "especie de presión hidráulica... ante la que aún los principios más sólidos del Derecho oscilan" pero es precisamente en estos momentos cuando debemos tener presente y guiarnos por nuestro deber para juzgar, serena y desapasionada‑mente, conforme a Derecho, tal como lo comprendemos y consideramos debe aplicarse. Supongo que muchos de los tribunales de nuestro llamado mundo civilizado se perturbarán al conocer esta decisión tan «monstruosa que la Corte anunciara el día de hoy» (Ministro Stevens, en su voto disidente‑ Exp. 91‑712‑15 de junio, 1992).

triste día para el Derecho Internacional, sólo paliado por el res‑petable voto disidente que pone las cosas claras y nos da pauta –tal vez– para tratar de comprender esta monstruosidad jurídica 11.

México, julio de 1992.


11 La Comunidad Internacional, empieza a formular condenas formales de la sentencia en cuestión, más allá de las inmediatas y primeras manifestaciones de rechazo que recogió la prensa. Así sucede, por ejemplo, con la opinión del Comité Jurídico Interamericano que con fecha 18 de agosto de 1992, pronunciara (documento CJI/RES II‑15/92, que se incluye en los anexos).


2�

EL SECUESTRO EXTRATERRITORIAL DE PRESUNTOS DELINCUENTES ES VIOLATORIO DEL DERECHO

INTERNACIONAL

José Luis Siqueiros

Sumario: I. Las resoluciones de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América en materia de secuestros transfronterizos; II. Las implicaciones de estas decisiones en el ámbito interamericano; III. La integridad territorial y la independencia jurisdiccional de los Estados; IV. La razón de ser y el espíritu ínsito en los tratados de extradición; V. Conclusiones.

1. LAS RESOLUCIONES DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA EN MATERIA DE SECUESTROS TRANSFRONTERIZOS

Con fecha 15 y 22 de junio de 1992, la Suprema Corte estadounidense pronunció dos sentencias en los writs of certiorari 1 de United States vs. Humberto Álvarez Machain 2 y de United States vs. Rene M. Verdugo‑Urquidez 3 por las cuales la opinión mayoritaria (seis minis‑tros) resolvió revocar las sentencias que había pronunciado la Corte de Apelaciones del Noveno Circuito (San Francisco, California) en los recursos de alzada que el Gobierno Federal había promovido en

1 El writ of certiorari es una orden que el máximo tribunal federal utiliza en forma discrecional para solicitar que la Corte de Apelaciones (de cualquiera de los Circuitos) le remita una certifi‑cación de las actuaciones de determinado caso, a efecto de determinar si en el mismo existieron irregularidades y en su caso revocar la decisión del inferior. Para efectos prácticos, si bien queda al arbitrio del tribunal superior el aceptar el Writ del peticionario, viene a equivaler a un recurso de casación.

2 Cert. No.91‑712, 15 de junio de 1992, 504 U.S. 1992.3 Cert No.91‑�70, 22 de junio de 1992. La sentencia. dictada una semana después de la de Álvarez

Machain, sigue los lineamientos y motivos de ésta. Se resolvió por la misma opinión mayoritaria (Reconquist, White, Scaila, Kennedy, Souter, thomas), con el voto disidente de los tres minis‑tros de la minoría (Stevens, Blackmun, O’Connor).


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contra de los fallos emitidos por la Corte de Distrito en Los Ángeles. En resumen, tanto el tribunal de origen como el de apelación, habían resuelto que las órdenes en contra de ambos inculpados indictments deberían ser sobreseídas y que los dos inculpados serían repatriados a México en virtud de que sus arrestos llevados a cabo en dicho país se habían realizado por coacción violenta en contra de lo previsto en el tratado de extradición vigente entre ambos países 4.

Así, la cuestión issue planteada en los dos casos era la misma. El saber si los presuntos delincuentes, secuestrados en México por órdenes de una agencia del Ejecutivo, la Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), adquieren el derecho para eximirlos de la jurisdicción de los tribunales penales estadounidenses y responder de los cargos que el fiscal ha incoado en su contra, según las leyes del mismo país.

Ante el estupor de la opinión mundial 5, la Suprema Corte decidió (por seis votos contra tres) � que si bien la resolución pudiera con‑siderarse alarmante shocking y contraria a las normas del derecho internacional, el tratado de extradición no excluía la aprehensión vio‑lenta y extraterritorial, ya que el citado instrumento era omiso en este método; que en tal virtud debía de seguirse el precedente establecido por la propia Corte en el caso Ker vs. Illinois, 119 U.S. 43� (l88�) 7

JOSÉ LUIS SIqUEIROS

4 El tratado de Extradición entre México y los Estados Unidos se celebró el 4 de mayo de 1978 y entró en vigor el 25 de enero de 1980, Colección de Tratados del Senado (México). tomo XXII, p. �13; 31 U:S:t: 5059, 5074, t.I.A.S., No. 9�5�: UN Treaty Series 194�2.

5 La reacción de repudio ante dichas resoluciones, dentro y fuera de los Estados Unidos, ha sido unánime. Los medios de comunicación han transmitido las opiniones de juristas y estadistas que, sin excepciones, han condenado las decisiones de la Suprema Corte como aberrantes y monstruosas. todas convergen en advertir el peligro que los agentes policíacos estadounidenses, con su brazo largo han alcanzado una carta blanca para aprehender, secuestrar y llevar a la justicia de ese país a presuntos inculpados residiendo en cualquier parte del mundo.

� La opinión minoritaria, redactada como voto disidente, fue encabezada por el ministro Stevens, a ella se adhirieron los ministros Blackmun y O’Connor. Califica a la opinión mayoritaria, que aprobó la ponencia del chief Justice Rehnquist, como monstruosa y contraria a las normas del derecho internacional.

7 Ker, un ciudadano americano, acusado de robo y fraude a bancos del Estado de Illinois, había huido a Perú. Un agente privado (Julian) atraído por la recompensa ofrecida, viajó a Lima y sin hacer ninguna gestión oficial ante las autoridades peruanas, ni ostentarse como portador de órdenes de arresto para fines de extradición, simplemente capturó a Ker, por la fuerza y lo con‑dujo a Estados Unidos. Al ser juzgado invocó que se le había violado su derecho de asilo, y de que las reglas del tratado de Extradición no se habían cumplido. Debido a la crisis política que la República del Perú vivía en ese año, su Gobierno no protestó por los canales diplomáticos.

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por lo cual los tribunales de dicho país habían establecido la regla de que el arresto llevado a cabo por la fuerza, independientemente del tratado de extradición (en ese caso con Perú), era válido y que los tribunales locales son competentes para juzgar al inculpado dentro de un procedimiento de fair trial.

II. LAS IMPLICACIONES DE ESTAS DECISIONES EN EL ÁMBITO INTERAMERICANO

En opinión del autor de este estudio, las decisiones de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos vienen a sentar un peligroso precedente y constituyen una flagrante violación de las normas, consuetudinarias y convencionales, del derecho internacional. Además, por tratarse de resoluciones dictadas por el máximo tribunal de un importante país de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, que tienen fuerza erga omnes, así como de precedente obligatorio según la doctrina stare decisis del derecho angloamericano, indudablemente afectarán las relaciones políticas y de ayuda mutua en materia penal que dicho país mantiene con las demás repúblicas del hemisferio. En esa virtud con‑sidero que el Comité Jurídico Interamericano debe pronunciarse, en el ámbito de sus facultades, respecto a las implicaciones que dichas decisiones pueden tener respecto de los tratados, que en el ámbito bilateral 8 y multilateral 9, los Estados Unidos tienen celebrados con los países de la región.

En forma adicional, en vista de que estas resoluciones se produje‑ron como efecto indirecto de las actividades que el Ejecutivo de aquel país desarrolla en el hemisferio en la lucha contra el narcotráfico, en muchos casos en forma coordinada con las autoridades competentes de los países donde se produce, procesa o conduce el estupefaciente, es recomendable analizar si los convenios de cooperación recíproca

EL SECUEStRO EXtRAtERRItORIAL DE PRESUNtOS DELINCUENtES ES VIOLAtORIO DEL DERECHO INtERNACIONAL

8 Los Estados Unidos tienen vigentes tratados de extradición con la gran mayoría de los países del hemisferio.

9 Los Estados Unidos son parte de la Convención de Extradición celebrada en Montevideo el 2� de diciembre de 1933 y del que son también partes ratificantes Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá y República Dominicana.

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con la DEA, la agencia especializada en este combate, así como los acuerdos de ayuda mutua en materia penal, contemplan la posibilidad de que las autoridades estadounidenses puedan ejercer funciones de autoridad. Estas últimas deben quedar reservadas en forma exclusiva a las autoridades locales competentes en la materia, acatándose la aplicación de las leyes y reglamentos que internamente las regulan.

III. LA INTEGRIDAD TERRITORIAL Y LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL DE LOS ESTADOS

En la opinión disidente del ministro Stevens 10 se afirma que existe consenso en la opinión internacional para condenar la violación que una nación realice sobre la integridad territorial de un vecino amisto‑so. Esta afirmación se funda además en el mismo predicado que plas‑man la Carta de las Naciones Unidas 11 y la Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos 12. A mayor abundamiento, el artículo 12 de la última Carta establece el derecho de los Estados a determinar la jurisdicción y competencia de sus tribunales, sin otro límite que el ejercicio de los derechos de otros Estados conforme al derecho internacional.

Los alegatos producidos por el Gobierno de México 13, el Gobierno de Canadá 14 y el Comité de Abogados para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos 15, en su carácter de Amicus Curiae, y que hicieron llegar a la Suprema Corte en el Writ No.91‑712 (Álvarez Machain) enfatizan que la violación se llevó a cabo con las siguientes agravantes:

a) Se ignoró el tratado de extradición vigente entre ambos países;

b) Las personas inculpadas son de nacionalidad mexicana y residentes en México;


10 Ver página 9 de su opinión y nota 20 al pie.11 Artículo 2, párrafo 4. 12 Artículo 20.13 Nota 1 al pie de la opinión disidente. 14 Nota 2 al pie de la opinión disidente. 15 Nota 14 al pie de la misma opinión.

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c) Los presuntos delitos se cometieron en territorio mexicano;

d) El Gobierno de México protestó los secuestros en varias ocasiones por la vía diplomática, sin recibir respuesta;

e) El Gobierno de México solicitó la restitución (repatriación) de las víctimas del secuestro y ofreció procesarlas y juzgarlas en su territorio;

f) A diferencia del precedente Ker Vs. Illinois, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos (no un agente privado) fue cómplice en el secuestro e hizo pagos sustanciales a los individuos que lo perpetraron (de nacio‑nalidad mexicana) y que se presentaron a tan innoble acción por la codicia de una recompensa que pagó la DEA y;

g) Se violaron los derechos humanos de los secuestrados, priván‑doseles ilegalmente de su libertad, sin ser oídos ni tener oportunidad de defenderse contra una orden judicial que no se les exhibió (estuvieron esposados y amordazados).

IV. LA RAZÓN DE SER Y EL ESPÍRITU ÍNSITO EN LOS TRATADOS DE EXTRADICIÓN

Parece ser que la opinión unánime de la doctrina y los más res‑petados publicistas es en el sentido de que los tratados de extradición se celebran para proteger la soberanía y la integridad territorial de los Estados Contratantes. Estos tratados son uno de los instrumentos más antiguos de cooperación judicial internacional. Están diseñados para promover el auxilio procesal en materia penal. Ellos establecen el equilibrio entre la exigencia del orden social para que el delito no quede impune con la inquietud que el inculpado no sea sometido a métodos injustos en su procesamiento y castigo 1�.

1� Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States. No.47�, comentario (a) 1987.


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Moore, el prestigioso autor norteamericano de principios de siglo, hace alusión a una opinión externada por el Secretario de Estado al Gobernador de texas y referido a un caso análogo, en los siguientes términos: «El tratado de extradición entre los dos países prescribe la forma de llevarlo a efecto y no autoriza a ninguna de las partes, por cualquier motivo, a desviarse de esas formalidades o en forma arbitraria a secuestrar (abduct) del territorio de una de las Partes a una persona acusada de delito, con el propósito de juzgarla en la jurisdicción de la otra» 17.

Herch Lauterpacht, anterior Presidente de la Corte Internacional de Justicia, nos dice: «La obligación de respetar la soberanía territo‑rial de un Estado extranjero debe impedir a otro Estado el realizar actos, que aun estando autorizados por la soberanía de su propia jurisdicción, pudieran violar la soberanía territorial de aquel otro Estado extranjero»; y agrega: «es por lo mismo una trasgresión al derecho internacional el que un Estado envíe sus agentes al territorio de otro con el fin de arrestar a presuntos delincuentes. Haciendo un lado dicha satisfacción, la primera obligación del Estado que causa el agravio es la de devolver a la persona así arrestada al Estado donde fue indebidamente aprehendida» 18.

La Convención sobre Extradición firmada en Montevideo 1933, establece 19 que el Estado requirente podrá nombrar agentes de seguridad para hacerse cargo del individuo extraditado, pero que la intervención de aquéllos estará subordinada a los agentes o autori‑dades con jurisdicción en el Estado requerido o en los de tránsito. La Convención Interamericana sobre Extradición, suscrita en Caracas en 1981, precisa que la entrega del reclamado a los agentes del Estado requirente se efectuará en el sitio que determine el Estado requerido 20.

17 Moore, Digest of International Law, No.�03, p.330, 190�.18 Oppenheim International Law 295 (Lauterpacht ed. 8th, 1955).19 Artículo 13; Convención en «Sistemas Interamericanos a través de tratados, convenciones y

otros documentos», Vol.I, OEA, 1981, pp.284 y ss. 20 Artículo 19, párrafo 1. OEA/Ser. A/36 (SEPF).


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El tratado de Extradición entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América, celebrado en la ciudad de México el 4 de mayo de 1978 y actualmente en vigor, establece en su Preámbulo que los Gobiernos de ambos países «deseosos de cooperar más estre‑chamente en la lucha contra la delincuencia y prestarse mutuamente, con ese fin, una mayor asistencia en materia de extradición...». Contiene en 23 artículos y un Apéndice las disposiciones que normalmente regulan esta figura en el derecho convencional.

Obviamente, por considerarlo innecesario, no se establece que los agentes, vigilantes o inspectores de cualquiera de las Partes no podrán traspasar las fronteras, sobornar cómplices, secuestrar al presunto inculpado, ni torturarlo en forma alguna. No lo dice porque el derecho internacional no lo permite. Es decir, queda implícito que todos esos actos son ilícitos en sí mismos.

Lo inaudito de las decisiones que se comentan es que establecen la aberrante tesis de que lo que no prohíba expresamente el tratado queda permitido; que el procedimiento de extradición es opcional para el Estado requirente; que si no es ejercido según las normas del instrumen‑to bilateral, se puede optar por el secuestro al estilo Ker, el malhadado precedente de 188�. Volvemos, en el Decenio del Derecho Internacional, a la ley del más fuerte, a la vigilancia del policía mundial.

V. CONCLUSIONES

1. El Estatuto del Comité Jurídico Interamericano le fija dentro de sus atribuciones la de realizar por iniciativa propia los estudios y trabajos preparatorios que considere convenientes 21, en el contexto de una de sus finalidades básicas, que es la promoción del desarrollo progresivo del derecho internacional.

21 Estatuto, Artículo 12, inciso (c).


33

2. El Comité ha realizado trabajos y formulado proyectos para convenciones en materia de extradición, de cooperación procesal internacional, de asistencia judicial en materia penal y de perfec‑cionamiento en la administración de la justicia, siempre sobre los postulados del respeto a la soberanía e integridad territorial de los Estados.

3. En el ámbito cada vez más interdependiente de la cooperación procesal en materia penal, las decisiones judiciales pronunciadas en el más alto nivel de uno de los países miembros del sistema intera‑mericano, que preconizan la sustracción de presuntos delincuentes mediante métodos unilaterales de carácter extraterritorial, han pro‑vocado una justificada alarma en los países respetuosos del derecho internacional.

4. Este estudio ha tenido por objeto invitar a los ilustrados miembros de este órgano a reflexionar sobre las presentes y futuras implicaciones que las recientes sentencias de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos puedan tener, en materia de extradición, en los países de la región. No nos estamos manifestando sobre la política de un Poder Ejecutivo, ni sobre las prácticas inusuales de una de sus agencias administrativas, sino sobre un deplorable precedente juris‑prudencial que ha venido a sancionar medidas violatorias del derecho de gentes.

5. Sin perjuicio de que el Consejo Permanente o algún otro órgano de la OEA requiera posteriormente la opinión consultiva 22 del Comité sobre la materia de este estudio, sería aconsejable que este cuerpo se pronunciara desde ahora exponiendo su criterio jurídico.

22 Con posterioridad a la fecha de este estudio, el Consejo Permanente de la OEA solicitó la opinión consultiva del Comité Jurídico Interamericano. Dicha opinión fue firmada por el citado órgano el 15 de agosto de 1992. Su texto puede consultarse en el anexo IV de esta Revista.



34

ANEXOS

35

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1

SyllabusUNITED STATES V. ÁLVAREZ MACHAIN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

No. 91‑172 Argued April 1, 1992‑Decided June 15, 1992

Responded, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kid‑napped from his home and flown by private plane to texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent’s pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty) and ordered respondent’s repatriation. the Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper.

Held: the fact of respondents forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country’s criminal laws. pp.3‑15.

1 Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. the syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reorder. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co. 200 U.S. 321, 337.


3�

a) A defendant may no to be prosecuted in violation of the terms of an extradition treaty. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407. However, when a treaty has not been invoked, a court may properly exercise jurisdiction even though the defendant’s presence is procured by means of a forcible abduction. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 43�. thus, if the Extradition Treaty does not prohibit respondent’s abduction, the rule of Ker applies and jurisdiction was proper. pp.3‑7.

b) Neither the Treaty’s language nor the history of negotiations and practice under it supports the propositions that it prohibits abductions outside of its terms. the treaty says nothing about either country refraining from forcibly abducting people from the other’s territory or the consequences if an abduction occurs. In addition, although the Mexican government was made aware of the Ker doctrine as early as 190�, and language to curtail. Ker was drafted as early as 1935; the Treaty’s current version contains no such clause. pp.7‑11.

c) General principles of international law provide no basis for interpreting the treaty to include an implied term prohibiting international abductions. It would go beyond established precedent and practice to draw such and inference from the treaty based on respondent’s argument that abductions are so clearly prohibited in international law that there was no reason to include the prohibi‑tion in the treaty itself. It was the practice of nations with regard to extradition treaties that formed the basis for this Court’s decision in Rauscher, supra, to imply a term in extradition treaty between the United States and England. Respondent’s argument however would require a much larger inferential leap with only the most general of international law principles to support it. While respondent may be correct that his abduction was «shocking» and in violation of gen‑eral international law principles, the decision whether he should be returned to Mexico, as matter outside the treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch. pp.11‑15.

94� F 2d 14��, reversed and remanded.

CERtIORARI tO tHE UNItED StAtES COURt OF APPEALSFOR tHE NINtH CIRCUIt (SyLLABUS)

37

REHNqUISt, C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHItE, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUtER and tHOMAS J.J. joined. StEVENS, J. filed a dissenting opinion in which BLACKMUN and O’CONNOR, J.J. joined.

ANEXOS


38

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1

No. 91‑172

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. HUMBERTO ÁLVAREZ MACHAIN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT

June 15, 1992

tHE CHIEF JUStICE delivered the opinion of the Court.

the issue in this case is whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation whit which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this country’s courts. We hold that he does not, and that he may be tried in federal district court for violations of the criminal law of the United States. Respondent, Humberto Álvarez Machain, is a citizen and resident of Mexico. He was indicted for participating in the kidnap and murder of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent Enrique Camarena Salazar and a Mexican pilot working with Camarena, Alfredo Zavala Avelar 2. the DEA believes that respondent,

1 this opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in this preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 205‑43, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

2 Respondent is charged in a sixth superseding indictment with conspiracy to commit violent acts in furtherance of racketeering activity (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§371, 1959); commit‑ting violent acts in furtherance of racketeering activity [in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 1959 (ax2)]; conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1201 (ax5), 120 1 (c); kidnap of a federal agent (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1201 (ax5); and felony murder of a federal agent (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 (a) 1114). App. 12‑32.


39

a medical doctor, participated in the murder by prolonging agent Camarena’s life so that others could further torture and interrogate him. On April 2, 1990, respondent was forcibly kidnapped from his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico, to be flown by private plane to El Paso, texas, where he was arrested by DEA officials. the District Court concluded that DEA agents were responsible for respondent’s abduction, although they were not personally involved in it. United States v. Caro Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 559. �02‑�04, �09 (CD Cal 1990) 3.

Respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that his abduction constituted outrageous governmental conduct, and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to try him because he was abducted in violation of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. Extradition treaty, May 4, 1978, (1979) United States‑United Mexican States, 31 U.S.t. 5059, t.I.A.S. No.9�5� (Extradition treaty or treaty). the District Court rejected the outra‑geous governmental conduct claim, but held that it lacked jurisdic‑tion to try respondent because his abduction violated the Extradition treaty. the district court discharged respondent and ordered that he be repatried to Mexico. Caro‑Quintero, supra, at �14.

the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictment and the repatriation of respondent, relying on its decision in United States v. Verdugo‑Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (CAS 1991), cert. pending, No.91‑�70.94�F.2d 14�� (1991). In Verdugo, the Court of Appeals held that the forcible abduction of a Mexican national with the autho‑rization or participation of the United States violated the Extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico 4.

3 Apparently, DEA officials had attempted to gain respondent’s presence in the United States through informal negotiations with Mexican officials, but were unsuccessful. DEA officials then, through a contact in Mexico, offered to pay a reward and expenses in return for the delivery of respondent to the United States. United States v. Caro Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, �02‑�04 (CD Cal. 1990).

4 Rene Martin Verdugo‑Urquidez was also indicted for the murder of agent Camarena. In an earlier decision, we held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a search by United States agents of Verdugo‑Urquidez home in Mexico. United States v. Verdugo‑Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).

ANEXOS

40

Although the treaty does not expressly prohibit such abductions, the Court of Appeals held that the «purpose» of the treaty was vio‑lated by a forcible abduction, 939 F.2d. at 1350, which, along with a formal protest by the offended nation, would give a defendant the right to invoke the treaty violation to defeat jurisdiction of the district court to try him 5. the Court of Appeals further held that the proper remedy for such a violation would be dismissal of the indictment and repatriation of the defendant to Mexico.

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding that the United States had authorized the abduction of respondent, and that letters from the Mexican government to the United States government served as an official protest of the treaty violation. therefore, the Court of Appeals ordered that the indictment against respondent be dismissed and that respondent be repatriated to Mexico. 94� F 2d, at 14�7. We guarantied certiorari, 502 U.S‑1992, and now reverse.

Although we have never before addressed the precise issue raised in the present case, we have previously considered proceedings in claimed violation of an extradition treaty, and proceedings against a defendant brought before a court by means of a forcible abduction. We addressed the former issue in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (188�) more precisely, the issue of whether the Webster‑Ashburton treaty of 1842, 8 Stat. 57�, which governed extraditions between England and the United States, prohibited the prosecution of defen‑dant Rauscher for a crime other than the crime for which he had been extradited. Whether this prohibition, known as the doctrine of spe‑cialty, was an intented part of the treaty had been disputed between the two nations for some time. Rauscher, 119 U.S., at 411. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the Court, which carefully examined the terms and history of the treaty; the practice of nations in regards to extradition treaties; the case law from the states; and the writings of commentators, and reached the following conclusion:

tHE CHIEF JUStICE DELIVERED tHE OPINION OF tHE COURt

5 The Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing as to whether Verdugo’s abduction had been authorized by authorities in the United States. United States v. Verdugo Urquidez, 939 F. 2d 1341, 13�2 (CA9 1991).

41

«[A] person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty, and for the offense with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given him, after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings». Id, at 430 [emphasis added].

In addition, Justice Miller’s opinion noted that any doubt as to this interpretation was put to rest by two federal statutes witch imposed the doctrine of specialty upon extradition treaties to witch the United States was a party. Id, at 423 �. Unlike the case before us today, the defendant in Rauscher had been brought to the United States by way of an extradition treaty; there was no issue of a forcible abduction.

In Ker v. Illinois, 119U.S. 43� (188�), also written by Justice Miller and decided the same day as Rauscher, we addressed the issue of a defendant brought before the court by way of a forcible abduction. Fredrick Ker has been tried and convicted in an Illinois court for lar‑ceny; his presence before the court was procured by means of forcible abduction from Peru. A messenger was sent to Lima with the proper warrant to demand Ker by virtue of the extradition treaty between Peru and the United States. the messenger, however, disdained reli‑ance on the treaty processes, and instead forcibly kidnapped Ker and brought him to the United States 7. We distinguished Ker’s case from Rauscher, on the basis that Ker was not brought into the United States by virtue of the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru, and rejected Ker’s argument that he had a right under the extradition

� Justice Gray, concurring, would have rested the decision on the basis of these acts of Congress alone. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 433. Chief Justice Walte dissented, concluding that the treaty did not forbid trial on a charge other than that on which extradition was guarantied, and that the acts of Congress did not change the «effect of the treaty». Id. at. 43�.

7 Although the opinion does not explain why the messenger failed to present the warrant to the proper authorities, commentators have suggested that the seizure of Ker in the aftermath of a revolution in Peru provided the messenger no «proper authorities» to whom the warrant could be presented. See Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 7� Geo. L.J. 1441, 1451 (1988).

ANEXOS

42

treaty to be returned to this country only in accordance with its terms 8. We rejected Ker’s due process argument more broadly, holding in line with «the highest authorities» that «such forcible abduction is no suf‑ficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court witch has the right to try him for such an offense, and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court». Ker, supra, at 444.

In Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952), we applied the rule in Ker to a case in witch the defendant had been kidnapped in Chicago by Michigan officers and brought to trial in Michigan. We upheld the conviction over objections based on the due process clause and the Federal Kidnapping Act and stated:

«this Court has never departed from the rule announced in [Ker] that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a “forcible abduction”. No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. they rest on the sound basis that due process of law is sat‑isfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fair‑ly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. there is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will». Frisbie, supra, at 522 (citation and footnote omitted) 9.


8 In the words of Justice Miller, the «treaty was not called into operation, was not relied upon, was not made the pretext of arrest, and the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of authority under the treaty or from the government of the United States». Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 430 at 443 (188�).

two cases decided during the Prohibition Era in this country have dealt with seizures claimed to have been in violation of a treaty entered into between the United States and Great Britain to assist the United States in off‑shore enforcement of its prohibition laws, and to allow British pas‑senger ships to carry liquor while in the waters of the United States. 43 Stat. 17�1 (1924). the history of the negotiations leading to the treaty is set forth in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 11‑118 (1933). In that case we held that the treaty provision for seizure of British vessels operating beyond the three‑mile limit was intended to be exclusive, and that therefore liquor seized from a British vessel in violation of the treaty could not form the basis of a conviction.

In Ford v. United States, 273 U.S: 593 (1927), the argument as to personal jurisdiction was deemed to have been waived.

9 We have applied Ker to numerous cases where the presence of the defendant was obtained by an interstate abduction. See Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888); Cook v. Hart, 14� U.S. 183 (1892); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 215‑21� (190�).

43

the only differences between Ker and the present case are that Ker was decided on the promise that there was no governmental involve‑ment in the abduction, 119 U.S. at 443; and Peru, from witch Ker was abducted, did not object to his prosecution 10. Respondent finds those differences to be dispositive, as did the Court of Appeals in Verdugo, 939 F. 2d, at 1346, contending that they show that respondent’s prose‑cution, like the prosecution of Rauscher, violates the implied terms of a valid extradition treaty. the Government, on the other hand, argues that Rauscher stands as an «exception» to the rule in Ker only when an extradition treaty is invoked, and the terms of the treaty provide that is breach will limit the jurisdiction of a court. Brief for the United States 17. therefore, our first inquiry must be whether the abduction of respondent from Mexico violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. If we conclude that the treaty does not prohibit respondent’s abduction, the rule in Ker applies and the court need not inquire as to how respondent came before it.

In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985); Valentine v. United States ex. rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 11 (193�). the treaty says nothing about the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the treaty if such and abduction occurs. Respondent submits that Article 22 (1) of the treaty witch states that it «shall apply to offenses specified in Article 2 (including murder) committed before and after this treaty enters into force». 31 U.S.t., at 5073‑5074, evidences intent to make application of the treaty mandatory for those offenses. However, the more natural conclusion is that Article 22 was included to ensure that the treaty was applied to extraditions requested after the treaty went into force, regardless of when the crime of extradition occurred 11.

ANEXOS

10 Ker also was not a national of Peru, whereas respondent is a national of the country from which he was abducted. Respondent finds this difference to be inmaterial. tr. of Oral Arg. 2�.

11 this interpretation is supported by the second clause of Article 22 which provides that «(r) requests for extradition that are under process on the date of the entry into force of this treaty, shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of 22 February, 1899...». Extradition treaty, May 4, 1978 (1979) United States‑United Mexican States, 31 U.S.t. 5059, 5074, t.I.A.S. No. 9�5�.

44

More critical to respondent’s argument is Article 9 of the Treaty witch provides:

«1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.

«2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, he requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the pur‑pose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense». Id, at 50�5.

According to respondent, Article 9 embodies the terms of the bargain witch the United States struck: if the United States wishes to prosecute a Mexican national, it may request that individual’s extradi‑tion. Upon a request from the United States, Mexico may either extra‑dite the individual, or submit the case to the proper authorities for prosecution in Mexico. In this way, respondent reasons, each nation preserved its right to choose whether its nationals would be tried in its own courts or by the courts of the other nation. this preservation of rights would be frustrated if either nation were free to abduct nationals of the other nation for the purposes of prosecution. More broadly, respondent reasons, as did the Court of Appeals, that all the process and restrictions on the obligation to extradite established by the treaty would make no sense if either nation were free to resort to forcible kidnapping to gain the presence of an individual for prosecution in a manner not contemplated by the treaty. Verdugo, supra, at 1350.

We do not read the treaty in such a fashion. Article 9 does not purport to specify the only way in which one country for the purposes of prosecution. In the absence of an extradition treaty, nations are under no obligation to surrender those in their country to foreign authorities for prosecution. Rauscher, 119 U.S., at 411‑412; Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U. S. 27�, 287 (1933); cf. Valentine v. United States ex. rel. Neidecker, supra, at 8‑9 (United States may not extradite a citizen in the absence of a statute or treaty obliga‑tion). Extradition treaties exist so as to impose mutual obligations to sur‑


45

render individuals in certain defined sets of circumstances, following established procedures. See 1 J. Moore, A treatise on Extradition and Interstate Rendition, § 72 (1891). the treaty thus provides a mechanism which would not otherwise exist, requiring under certain circumstances, the United States and Mexico to extradite individuals to the other country, and establishing the procedures to be followed when the treaty is invoked.

the history of negotiation and practice under the treaty also fails to show that abductions outside of the treaty constitute a violation of the treaty. As the Solicitor General notes, the Mexican govern‑ment was made aware as early as 190�, of the Ker doctrine, and the United States position that it applied to forcible abductions made outside of the terms of the United States‑Mexico extradition treaty 12. Nonetheless, the current version of the treaty, signed in 1978, does not attempt to establish a rule that would in any way curtail the effect of Ker 13. Moreover, although language which would grant individuals exactly the right sought by respondent had been con‑sidered and drafted as early as 1935 by a prominent group of legal

ANEXOS

12 In correspondence between the United States and Mexico growing out of the 1905 Martinez inci‑dent, in which a Mexican national was abducted from Mexico and brought to the United States for trial, the Mexican charge wrote to the Secretary of State protesting that as Martinez’arrest was made outside the procedures established in the extradition treaty, «the action pending against the man can not rest (on) any legal fundamentation». Letter of Balbino Davalos to Secretary of State reprinted in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, H.R. Doc. No.1 59th Cong., 2d. Sess., pt 2, p.1121 (190�). the Secretary of State responded that the exact issue raised by the Martinez incident had been decided by Ker, and that the remedy open to the Mexican government, namely a request to the United States for extradition of Martinez’abductor had been granted by the United States. Letter of Robert Bacon to Mexican Charge, reprinted in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 1, 59th Cong., 2d. Sess, pt. 2, at 1121‑1122 (190�).

Respondent and the Court of Appeals stress a statement made in 1881 by Secretary of State James Blaine to the governor of texas to the effect that the extradition treaty in its form at that time did not authorize unconsentend to abductions from Mexico, Verdugo, 939 F.2d, at 1354; Brisf for Respondent 14. This misses the mark, however, for the Government’s argument is not that the treaty authorizes the abduction of respondent; but that the treaty does not prohibit the abduction.

13 the parties did expressly include the doctrine of specialty in Article 17 of the treaty, notwith‑standing the judicial recognition of it in Rauscher. 31 U.S.t., a 5071‑5072.

4�

scholars sponsored by the faculty of Harvard Law School, no such clause appears in the current treaty 14.

thus, the language of the treaty, in the context of its history, does not support the proposition that the treaty prohibits abductions out‑side of its terms. the remaining question, therefore, is whether the treaty should be interpreted so as to include an implied term prohibiting prosecution where the defendant’s presence is obtained by means other than those established by the treaty. See Valentine, 299 U.S., at 17 («Strictly the question is not wheter there had been a uniform practical construction denying the power, but whether the power had been so clearly recognized that the grant should be implied»).

Respondent contends that the treaty must be interpreted against the backdrop of customary international law, and that international abductions are «so clearly prohibited in international law» that there was no reason to include such a clause in the treaty itself. Brief for Respondent 11. the international censure of international abductions is further evidenced, according to respondent, by the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States. Id., at 17. Respondent does not argue that these sources of international law provides an independent basis for the right respondent asserts not to be tried in the United States, but rather than they should inform the interpretation of the treaty terms.


14 In Article 1� of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, the Advisory Committee of the Research in International Law proposed:

«In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any per‑son who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to meseaures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the States or States whose rights have been violated by such measures». Harvard Research in International Law, 29 Am In’L. 442 (Supp 1935).

47

the Court of Appeals deemed it essential, in order for the indi‑vidual defendant to assert a right under the treaty, that the affected foreign government had registered a protest Verdugo, 939 F. 2d, at 1357 («in the kidnapping case there must be a formal protest from the offended government after the kidnapping»). Respondent agrees that the right exercised by the individual is derivative of the nation’s right under the Treaty, since nations are authorized, notwithstanding the terms of an extradition treaty, to voluntarily render an individual to the other country on terms completely outside of those provided in the treaty. the formal protest, therefore, ensures that the «offended» action actually objects to the abduction and has not in some way voluntarily rendered the individual for prosecution. thus the Extradition treaty only pro‑hibits gaining the defendant’s presence by means other than those set forth in the treaty when the nation from which the defendant was abducted objects.

this argument seems to us inconsistent with the remainder of respondent’s argument. The Extradition Treaty has the force of law, and if, as respondent asserts, it is self‑executing, it would appear that a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the other nation. In Rauscher, the Court noted that the Great Britain had taken the position in other cases that the Webster‑Ashburton treaty included the doctrine of specialty, but no importance was attached to whether or not Great Britain had protested the prosecution of Rauscher for the crime of cruel and unusual punishment as opposed to murder.

More fundamentally, the difficulty with the support respondent garners from international law is that none of it relates to the prac‑tice of nations in relation to extradition treaties. In Rauscher, we implied a term in the Webster‑Ashburton treaty because of the practice of nations with regard to extradition treaties. In the instant case, respondent would imply terms in the extradition treaty from the

ANEXOS

48

practice of nations with regards to international law more generally 15. Respondent would have us find that the treaty acts as a prohibition against a violation of the general principle of international law that one government may not «exercise its police power in the territory of another state». Brief for Respondent 1�. there are many actions which could be taken by a nation that would violate this principle, including waging war, but it cannot seriously be contended an inva‑sion of the United States by Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition treaty between the two nations 1�.

In sum, to infer from this treaty and its terms that it prohibits all means of gaining the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond established precedent and practice. In Rauscher, the implica‑tion of a doctrine of specialty into the terms of the Webster‑Ashburton treaty which, by its terms, required the presentation of evidence establishing probable cause of the crime of extradition before extradi‑tion was required, was a small stop to take. By contrast, to imply from that terms of this treaty that it prohibits obtaining the presence of an individual by means outside of the procedures the treaty establishes requires a much larger inferential leap, with only the most general of international law principles to support it. the general principles cited


15 Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Verdugo reasoned that international abductions violate the «purpose» of the treaty, stating that «(t)he requirements extradition treaties impose constitute a means of safeguarding the sovereignty of the signatory nations, as well as ensuring the fair treatment of individuals» 939 F. 2d, at 1350. the ambitious purpose ascribed to the treaty by the Court of Appeals, we believe, places a greater burden on its language and history than they can logically bear. In broad sense, most international agreements have the common purpose of safeguarding the sovereignty of signatory nations, in that they seek to further peaceful relations between nations. this, however, does not mean that the violation of any principles of interna‑tional law constitutes a violation of this particular treaty.

1� In the same category are the examples cited by respondent in which after a forcible international abduction, the offended nation protested the abduction, and the abducting nation then returned the individual to the protesting nation. Brief for Respondent 18, citing inter alia, 1 Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, § 5.4 pp. 235‑237 (2d. rev. ed. 1987). these may show the practice of nations under customary international law, but they are of little aid in construing the terms of an extradition treaty, or the authority of a court to later try an indi‑vidual who has been so abducted. More to the point for our purposes are cases such as The Ship Richmond, 9 Cranch 102 (1815), and The Merino, 9 Wheat. 391 (1824), both of which hold that a seizure of a vessel in violation of international law does not affect the jurisdiction of a United States court to adjudicate rights in connection with the vessel. these cases are discussed, and distinguished, in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S., at 122.

49

by respondent simply fail to persuade us that we should imply in the United States‑Mexico Extradition treaty a term prohibiting international abductions.

Respondent and his amici may be correct that respondent’s abduction was «shocking», tr. of Oral Arg. 40, and that it may be in violation of general international law principles. Mexico has protested the abduction of respondent through diplomatic notes, App. 33‑38, and the decision of whether respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch 17. We conclude, however, that respondent’s abduction was not in violation of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico, and therefore the rule of Ker v. Illinois is fully applicable to this case. The fact of respondent’s forcible abduction does not therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for violations of the criminal laws of the United States.

the judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

17 the Mexican government has also requested from the United States the extradition of two individuals it suspects of having abducted respondent in Mexico, on charges of kidnapping. App. 39‑��.

the advantage of the diplomatic approach to the resolution of difficulties between two sovereign nations, as opposed to unilateral action by the courts of one nation, is illustrated by the history of the negatiations leading to the treaty discussed in Cook v. United States, supra. the United States was interested in being able to search British vessels which hovered beyond the 3‑mile limits and served as supply ships for motor launches which took intoxicating liquor from them into parts for further distri‑bution in violation of prohibition laws. the United States initially proposed that both nations agree to searches of the other’s vessels beyond the 3‑mile limit; Great Britain rejected such an approach since it had no prohibition laws and therefore no problem with United States vessels hovering just beyond its territorial waters. the parties appeared to be at loggerheads; then this Court decided Cunard Steampship Co. v. Mellon, 2�2 U.S. 100 (1923), holding that our prohibition laws applied to foreign merchant ves‑sels as well as domestic within the territorial waters of the United States, and that therefore the carrying of intoxicating liquors by foreign passenger ships violated those laws. A treaty was then successfully negotiated giving the United States the right to seizure beyond the 3‑mile limit (which is desired), and giving British passenger ships the right to bring liquor into United States waters so long as the liquor supply was sealed while in those waters so long as the liquor supply was sealed while in those waters (which Great Britain desired) . Cook v. Unilad States, supra.

ANEXOS


50

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESNo. 91‑712

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. HUMBERTO ÁLVAREZ MACHAIN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT

(June 15, 1992)

JUStICE StEVENS, with whom JUStICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O’CONNOR join, dissenting.

the court correctly observes that this case raises a question of first impres¬sion. See ante, at 3. the case is unique for several reasons. It does not involve an ordinary abduction by a private kidnaper, or bounty hunter, as in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 43� (188�); nor does it involve the apprehension of an American fugitive who commit‑ted a crime in one State and sought asylum in another, as in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Rather, it involves this country’s abduction of another country’s citizen; it also involves a violation of the territorial integrity of that other country, with which this country has signed an extradition treaty.

A Mexican citizen was kidnapped in Mexico and charged with a crime committed in Mexico; his offense allegedly violated both Mexican an American Law. Mexico has formally demanded on at


51

least two separate occasions 1 that he be returned to Mexico and has represented that he will be prosecuted and punished for his alleged offense 2. It is clear that Mexico’s demand must be honored if this official abduction violated the 1978 Extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. In my opinion, a fair reading of the treaty in light of our decision in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (118�), and applicable principles of international law, leads inexo‑rably to the conclusion that the District Court, United States v. Caro Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (CD Cal. 1990), and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 94� F 2d 14�� (1991) (per curiam), correctly construed that instrument.

1 the abduction of respondent occurred on April 2, 1990. United States v. Caro‑Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, �03 (CD Cal. 1990). Mexico responded quickly and unequivocally. tr. of Oral Arg. 33; Brief for Respondent 3. On April 18, 1990, Mexico requested an official report on the role of the United States in the abduction, and on May 1�, 1990 and July 19, 1990, it sent diplomatic notes of protest from the Embassy of Mexico to the United States Department of State. See Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae (Mexican Amicus) 5‑�; App. to Mexican Amicus 1a‑24a. In the May 1�th note, Mexico said that it believed that the abduction was «carried out with the knowledge of persons working for the U.S. government, in violation of the procedure established in the extradition treaty in force between the two countries», App. to Mexican Amicus 5a, and in the July 19th note, it requested the provisional arrest and extradition of the law enforcement agents allegedly involved in the abduction. Id., at 9a‑15a.

2 Mexico has already tried a number of members involved in the conspiracy that resulted in the murder of the DEA agent. For example, Rafael Caro‑quintero, a co‑conspirator of Álvarez Machain in this case, has already been imprisoned in Mexico on a 40‑year sentence. See Brief for Lawyers Committee for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae 4.

ANEXOS

52

I

the Extradition treaty with Mexico 3 is a comprehensive docu‑ment containing 23 articles and an appendix listing the extraditable offenses covered by the agreement. the parties announced their purpose in the preamble: the two Governments desire «to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to this end, to mutu‑ally render better assistance in matters of extradition» 4. From the preamble, through the description of the parties’ obligations with respect to offenses committed within as well as beyond the terri‑tory of a requesting party 5, the delineation of the procedures and evidentiary requirements for extradition �, the special provisions for political offenses and capital punishment 7, and other details, the treaty appears to have been designed to cover the entire subject of extradition. thus, Article 22, entitled «Scope of Application» states that the «treaty shall apply to offenses specified in Article 2 com‑mitted before and after this treaty enters into force», and Article 2 directs that «[e]xtradition shall take place, subject to this treaty, for willful acts which fall within any of the extraditable offenses listed

JUStICE StEVENS, WItH WHOM JUStICE BLACKMUN ANDJUStICE O'CONNOR JOIN, DISSENtING

3 App. 72‑87.4 Id., at 72. In construing treaty, the Court has the «responsibility to give the specific words of the

treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties». Air France v. Sarks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985). It is difficult to see how an interpretation that encourages unilateral action could foster cooperation and mutual assistance –the stated goals of the treaty. See also Presidential Letter of transmittal attached to Senate Advice and Consent 3 (treaty would «make a significant contribution to international cooperation in law enforcement»).

Extradition treaties prevent international conflict by providing agreed upon standards so that the par‑ties may cooperate and avoid retaliatory invasions of territorial sovereignty. According to one writer, before extradition treaties became common European States often granted asylum to fugitives from other States, with the result that «a sovereign could enforce the return of fugitives only by force of arms... Extradition as an inducement to peaceful relations and friendly cooperation between states remained of little practical significance until after the World War I». M. Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order � (1974). this same writer explained that such treaties further the purpose of international law, which is «designed to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and [to] restrict impermissible state conduct». 1 M. Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice Ch. 5, 2, p.194 (ed. 1987).

the object of reducing conflict by promoting cooperation explains why extradition treaties do not pro‑hibit informal consensual delivery of fugitives, but why they do prohibit states sponsored abductions. See Restatement (third) of Foreign Relations (Restatement) § 432, and Comments a.e. (1987).

5 App. 72‑74 (Articles 2 and 4).� Id., at 73, 75, 7�‑79 (Articles 3, 7, 1, 12 and 13).7 Id., at 74‑75 (Articles 5 and 8).

53

in the clauses of the Appendix» 8. Moreover, as noted by the Court, ante, at 8, Article 9 expressly provides that neither Contracting Party is bound to deliver up its own nationals, although it may do so in its discretion, but if it does not do so, it «shall submit the case to its competent authorities for purposes of prosecution» 9.

Petitioner’s claim that the Treaty is not exclusive, but permits forcible governmental kidnapping, would transform those, and other, provi‑sions into little more than verbiage. For example, provisions requiring «sufficient» evidence to grant extradition (Art. 3) withholding extradi‑tion for political or military offenses (Art. 5), withholding extradition when the person sought has already been tried (Art. �), withholding extradition when the statute of limitations for the crime has lapsed (Art. 7), and granting the requested State discretion to refuse to extradite an individual who would face the death penalty in the requesting country (Art. 8) would serve little purpose if the requesting country could sim‑ply kidnap the person. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized in a related case, «[e]ach of these provisions would be utterly frustrated if a kidnapping were held to be a permissible course of governmental conduct». United States v. Verdugo Urquidez, 939 F. 2d 1341, 1349 (1991). In addition, all of these provisions «only make sense if they are understood as requiring each treaty signatory to comply with those procedures whenever it wishes to obtain jurisdiction over an individual who is located in another treaty nation». Id., at 1351.

It is true, as the Court notes, that there is no express promise by either party to refrain from forcible abductions in the territory of the other Nation. See ante, at 9. Relying on that omission 10, the Court, in

8 Id., at. 83, 73.9 Id., at 7�.10 the court resorts to the same method of analysis as did the dissent in United States v. Rauscher, 119

U.S. 407 (188�). Chief Justice Waite would only recognize an explicit provision, and in the absence of one, he concluded that the treaty did not require that a person be tried only for the offense for which he had been extradited: «the treaty requires a delivery up to justice, on demand, of those accused of certain crimes, but says nothing about what shall be done with them after the delivery has been made. It might have provided that they should not be tried for any other offenses than those for which they were surrendered, but it has not».

Id., at 434. that approach was rejected by the Court in Rauscher, and should also be rejected by the Court here.

ANEXOS

54

effect, concludes that the treaty merely creates an optional method of obtaining jurisdiction over alleged offenders, and that the parties silently reserved the right to resort to self help whenever they deem force more expeditious than legal process 11. If the United States, for example, thought it more expedient to torture or simply to execute a person rather than to attempt extradition, those options would he equally available because they, too, were not explicitly prohibited by the treaty 12. that, however, is a highly improbable interpretation of a consensual agreement 13, which on its face appears to have been intended to set forth comprehensive and exclusive rules concerning the subject of extradition 14. In my opinion, «the manifest scope and object of the treaty itself», Rauscher, 119 U.S., at 422, plainly imply a mutual undertaking to respect the territorial integrity of the other contracting party. that opinion is confirmed by a consideration of the «legal context» in which the treaty was negotiated 15. Cannon. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. �77, �99 (1979).


11 to make the point more starkly, the Courts has, in effect, written into Article 9, a new provision which says: «Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, either Contracting Party can, without the consent of the other, abduct nationals from the territory of one Party to be tried in the territory of the other».

12 It is ironic that the United States has attempted to justify its unilateral action based on the kid‑napping, torture, and murder of a federal agent by authorizing the kidnapping of respondent, for which the American law enforcement agents who participated have now been charged by Mexico. See App, to Mexican Amicus 5a. this goes to my earlier point, see n. 4, supra, that extra‑dition treaties promote harmonious relations by providing for the orderly surrender of a person by one State to another, and without such treaties, resort to force often followed.

13 this court has previously described a treaty as generally «in its nature a contract between two nations», Foster v. Nellson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (1829); see Rauscher,119 U.S. at 418; it is also in this country the law of the land. 2 Pet., at 314; 119 U.S., at 418‑419.

14 Mexico’s understanding is that «[t]he extradition treaty governs comprehensively the delivery of all persons for trial in the requesting state “for an offense committed outside the territory of the requesting Party”». Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae, O.t. 1991, No.91‑�70, p.�. and Canada, with whom the United States also shares a large border and with whom the United States also has an extradition treaty, understands the treaty to be «the exclusive means for a requesting government to obtain... a removal» of a person from its territory, unless a Nation otherwise gives its consent. Brief for Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae 4.

15 the United States has offered no evidence from the negotiating record, ratification process, or later communications with Mexico to support the suggestion that a different understanding with Mexico was reached. See M. Bassouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice Ch. 2, § 4.3, at p.82 («Negotiations, preparatory works, and diplomatic correspondence are an integral par of the surrounding circumstances, and (are) often relied on by courts in ascertaining he intentions of the parties») (footnote‑omitted).

55

II

In Rauscher, the Court construed an extradition treaty that was far less comprehensive than the 1978 treaty with Mexico. the 1842 treaty with Great Britain determined the boundary between the United States and Canada, provided for the suppression of the African slave trade, and also contained one paragraph authorizing the extradition of fugitives «in certain cases». 8 Stat. 57�. In Article X, each Nation agreed to «deliver up to justice all persons» properly charged with any one of seven specific crimes, including murder. 119 U.S., at 421 1�. After Rauscher had been extradited for murder, he was charged with the lesser offense of inflicting cruel and unusual punish‑ment on a member of the crew of a vessel on the high seas. Although the treaty did not purport to place any limit on the jurisdiction of the demanding State after acquiring custody of the fugitive this Court held that he could not be tried for any offense other than murder 17. thus, the treaty constituted the exclusive means by which the United States could obtain jurisdiction over a defendant within the territorial jurisdiction of Great Britain.

1� Article X of the treaty provided: «It is agreed that the United States and Her Britannic Majesty shall, upon mutual requisitions by

them, or their ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found, within the territories of the other: provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and com‑mitment for trial, if the crime or offence had there been committed: and the respective judges and other magistrates of the two Governments shall have power, jurisdictions, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify the same to the proper Executive authority, that a warrant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive. the expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requisition, and receives the fugitive». 8 Stat. 57�.

17 the doctrine defined by the Court in Rauscher —that a person can be tried only for the crime for which he had been extradited— has come to be known as the «doctrine of specialty».

ANEXOS

5�

the Court noted that the treaty included several specific provi‑sions, such as the crimes for which one could be extradited, the process by which the extradition was to be carried out, and even the evidence that was to be produced, and concluded that «the fair pur‑pose of the treaty is, that the person shall be delivered up to be tried for that offence and for no other». Id., at 423, the Court reasoned that it did not make sense for the treaty to provide such specifics only to have the person «pas[s] into the hands of the country which charges him with the offence, free from all the positive requirements and just implications of the treaty under which the transfer of his person takes place». Id., at 421. to interpret the treaty in a contrary way would mean that a country could request extradition of a person for one of the seven crimes covered by the treaty, and ten try the person for another crime, such as a political crime, which was clearly not covered by the treaty; this result, the Court concluded, was clearly contrary to the intent of the parties and the purpose of the treaty.

Rejecting an argument that the sole purpose of Article X was to provide a procedure for the transfer of an individual from the jurisdic‑tion of one sovereign to another, the Court stated:

«No such view of solemn public treaties between the great nations of the earth can be sustained by a tribunal called upon to give judicial construction to them.

»the opposite view has been attempted to be maintained in this country upon the ground that there is no express limitation in the treaty of the right of the country in which the offence was committed to try the person for the crimeme alone for which he was extradited, and that once being within the jurisdiction of that country, no matter by what contrivance of fraud or by what pretence of establishing a charge provided for by the extradition treaty he may have been brought within the jurisdiction, he is, when here, liable to be tried for any offence against the laws as though arrested here originally. this proposition of the absence of express restriction in the treaty of the right to try him for other offences than that for which he was extradited, is met by the manifest scope and object of the treaty itself». Id., at 422.

thus, the Extradition treaty, as understood in the context of cases that have addressed similar issues, suffices to protect the defendant


57

from prosecution despite the absence of any express language in the Treaty itself purporting to limit this Nation’s power to prosecute a defendant over whom it had lawfully acquired jurisdiction 18.

Although the Court’s conclusion in Rauscher was supported by a number of judicial precedents, the holdings in those cases wore not nearly as uniform 19 as the consensus of international opinion that condemns one Nation’s violation of the territorial integrity of a friendly neighbor 20. It is shocking that a party to an extradition treaty might believe that it has secretly reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in the other party’s territory 21. Justice Story found it shocking enough that the United States would attempt to justify an American seizure of a foreign vessel in a Spanish port:

«But, even supposing, for a moment, that our laws had required an entry of the Apollon, in her transit, does it follow, that the power to arrest her was meant to be given, after she had passed into the exclusive territory of

18 In its opinion, the Court suggests that the result in Rauscher was dictated by the fact that two federal statutes had imposed the doctrine of specialty upon extradition treaties. Ante at 4. the two cited statutes, however, do not contain any language purporting to limit the jurisdiction of the Court: rather, they merely provide for protection of the accused pending trial.

19 In fact, both parties noted in their respective briefs several authorities that had held that a person could be tried for an offense other than the one for which he had been extradited. See Brief for United States in United States v. Rauscher, O.t., 1885, No.1249, pp. �‑10 (citing United States v. Caldwell, 8 Blatchford 131 (SDNY 1871); United States v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchford 295 (SDNY 187�); Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N.Y.110 (1874)); Brief for Respondent in United States v. Rauscher, O.t. 1885, No.1249, pp. 8‑1� (same).

20 this principle is embodied in Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30,1948, 2 U.S.t. 2394, t.I.A.S. No. 23�1, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27,19�7, 21 U.S.t. �07, t.I.A.S. No. �847, as well as numerous provisions of the United Nations Charter, June 2�, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, t.S. No. 993 (to which both the United States and Mexico are signatories). See generally Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in International Law at a time of Perplexity 407 (Y. Dinsteind and M. tabory eds. 1989).

21 When Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser of the State Department, was questioned at a congressional hearing, he resisted the notion that such seizures were acceptable: «Can you imagine us going into Paris and seizing some person we regard as a terrorist...? (H)ow would we feel if some foreign nation —let us take the United Kingdom— came over here and seized some terrorism suspect in New York City, or Boston, or Philadelphia... because we refused through the normal channels of international, legal communications, to extradite that individual?». Bill to Authorize Prosecution of terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Government Exployees and Citizens Abroad: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,1st Sess. �3 (1985).

ANEXOS

58

a foreign nation? We think not. It would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels which had offended against our laws. It cannot be presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of nations». The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 3�2, 370‑371 (1824) (emphasis added) 22.

the law of Nations, as understood by Justice Story in 1824, has not changed. thus, a leading treatise explains:

«A State must not perform acts of sovereignty in the territory of another State.

«It is... a breach of International Law for a State to send its agents to the territory of another State to apprehend persons accused of having committed a crime. Apart from other satisfaction, the first duty of the offending State is to hand over the person in question to the State in whose territory he was apprehended». Oppenheim’s International Law 295, and n., (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) 23.

Commenting on the precede issue raised by this case, the chief reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations used language reminiscent of Justice Story’s characteriza‑tion of an official seizure in a foreign jurisdiction as «monstrous»:

22 Justice Story’s opinion continued: «the arrest of the offending vessel must, therefore, be restrained to places where our jurisdiction

is complete, to our own waters, or to the ocean, the common highway of all nations. It is said, that there is a revenue jurisdiction, which is distinct from the ordinary maritime jurisdiction over waters within the range of a common shot from our shores. And the provisions in the Collection Act of 1799, which authorize a visitation of vessels within four leagues of our coasts, are referred to in proof of the assertion. But where is that right of visitation to be exercised? In a foreign territory, in the exclusive jurisdiction of another sovereign? Certainly not; for the very terms of the act confine it to the ocean, where all nations have a common right, and exercise a common sovereignty. And over what vessels is this right of visitation to be exercised? By the very words of the act, over our own vessels, and over foreign vessels bound to our ports, and over no others. to have gone beyond thus, would have been an usurpation of exclusive sovereignty on the ocean, and an exercise of an universal right of search, a right which has never yet been acknowledged by other nations, and would be resisted by none with more pertinacity than by the American». The Apollon, 9 Wheat., at 371‑373.

23 See Restatement § 432, Comment c («If the unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand return of the person, and international law requires that he be returned»).


59

«When done without consent of the foreign government, abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law and gross disrespect for a norm hig in the opinion of mankind. It is a blatant violation of the territorial integrity of another state; it eviscerates the extradition sys‑tem (established by a comprehensive network of treaties involving virtually all states)» 24.

In the Rauscher case, the legal background that supported the decision to imply a covenant not to prosecute for an offense differ‑ent from that for which extradition had been granted was far less clear than the rule against invading the territorial integrity of a treaty partner that supports Mexico’s position in this case 25. If Rauscher was correctly decide —and I am convinced that it was— its rationale clearly dictates a comparable result in this case 2�.

III

A critical flaw pervades the Court’s entire opinion. It fails to dif‑ferentiate between the conduct of private citizens, which does not violate any treaty obligation, and conduct expressly authorize by the Executive Branch of the Government, which unquestionably constitutes

24 Henkingk, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 John Marshall L.J. 215, 231 (1992) (footnote omitted).

25 thus, the Restatement of Foreign Relations states in part: «(2) A state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another

state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state. c. Consequences of violation of territorial limit of law enforcement. If a state’s law enforcement officials exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter’s consent, that state is entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation from the offending state. If the unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand return of the person, and international law requires that he be returned. If the state from which the person was abducted does not demand his return, under the prevailing view the abducting state may proceed to prosecute him under its laws». Restatement § 432, and Comment c.

2� Just as Rauscher had standing to raise the treaty violation issue, respondent may raise a compa‑rable issue in this case. Certainly, if an individual who is not a party to an agreement between the United States and another country is permitted to assert the rights of that country in our courts, as is true in the specialty cases, then the same rule must apply to the individual who has been a victim of this country’s breach of an extradition treaty and who wishes to assert the rights of that country in our courts after that country has already registered its protest.

ANEXOS

�0

a flagrant violation of international law 27, and in my opinion, also constitutes a breach of our treaty obligations. thus, at the outset of its opinion, the Court states the issue as «whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a national with which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this country’s courts». Ante, at 1. that, of course, is the question decided in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 43� (188�); it is not, however, the question presented for decision today.

The importance of the distinction between a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over either a person or property that has been wrongfully seized by a private citizen, or even by a state law enforcement agent, on the one hand, and the attempted exercise of jurisdiction predicated on a seizure by federal officers acting beyond the authority con‑ferred by treaty, on the other hand, is explained by Justice Brandeis in his opinion for the Court in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933). that case involved a construction of a prohibition era treaty with Great Britain that authorized American agents to board certain British vessels to ascertain whether they wore engaged in importing alcoholic beverages. A British vessel was boarded 11 1/2 miles off the coast of Massachusetts, found to be carrying unmanifested alcoholic beverages, and taken into port. the Collector of Costumes assessed a penalty which he attempted to collect by means of libels against both the cargo and the seized vessel.

the Court held that the seizure was not authorized by the treaty because it occurred more than 10 miles off shore 28. the Government argued that the illegality of the seizure was immaterial because, as in


27 «In the international legal order, treaties are concluded by states against a background of custom‑ary international law. Norms of customary international law specify the circumstances in which the failure of one party to fulfill its treaty obligations will permit the other to rescind the treaty, retaliate, or take other steps». Vázquez, treaty‑Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 301, 375 (1992)

28 the treaty provided that the boarding rights could not be exercised at a greater distance from the coast than the vessel could transverse in one hour, and the seized vessel’s speed did not exceed 10 miles an hour. Cock v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 107, 110 (1933).

�1

Ker, the Court’s jurisdiction was supported by possession even if the seizure was wrongful. Justice Brandeis acknowledged that the argu‑ment would succeed if the seizure had been made by a private party without authority to act for the Government, but that a different rule prevails when the Government itself lacks the power to seize. Relying on Rauscher, and distinguishing Ker, he explained:

«Fourth. As the Mazel tov was seized without warrant of law, the libels were properly dismissed. the Government contends that the alleged illegality of the seizure is inmaterial. It argues that the facts proved show a violation of our law for which the penalty of forfeiture is prescribed; that the United States may, by filing a libel for forfeiture, ratify what otherwise would have been brought into the Port of Providence, the federal court for Rhode Island acquired jurisdiction; and that, moreover, the claimant by answering to the merits waived any right to object to enforcement of the penalties. the argu‑ment rests upon misconceptions.

»It is true that where the United States, having possession of property, files a libel to enforce a forfeiture resulting from a violation of its laws, the fact that the possession was acquired by a wrongful act is inmaterial. Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 [(192�)]. Compare Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 43�, 444. the doctrine rests primarily upon the common‑law rules that any person may, at his peril, seize property which has become forfeited to, or forfeitable by, the Government; and that proceedings by the Government to enforce forfeiture ratify a seizure made by one without authority, since rati‑fication is equivalent to antecedent delegation of authority to seize. Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 24�, 310 [(1818)]; Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197, 205 20� [(1845)]. the doctrine is not applicable here. the objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made by one upon whom the Government had not conferred authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made. the objection is that the Government itself lacked power to seize, since by the treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority. The Treaty fixes the conditions under which a ’vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the United States, its territories or pos‑sessions for adjudication in accordance with’ the applicable laws. Thereby, Great Britain agreed that adjudication may follow a rightful seizure. Our Government, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws. to hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the treaty. Compare United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407». Cook v. United States, 288 U.S., At 120‑122.

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the same reasoning was employed by Justice Miller to explain why the holding in Rauscher did not apply to the Ker case. the arrest‑ing officer in Ker did not pretend to be acting in official capacity when he kidnapped Ker. As Justice Miller noted, «the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of authority under the treaty or from the government of the United States». Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S., at 443 (emphasis added) 29. the exact opposite is tree in this case, as it was in Cook 30.

The Court’s failure to differentiate between private abductions and official invasions of another sovereign’s territory also accounts for its misplaced reliance on the 1935 proposal made by the Advisory Committee on Research in International Law. See ante, at 10, and n. 13. As the text of that proposal plainly states, it would have rejected the rule of the Ker case 31. the failure to adopt that recommenda‑tion does not speak to the issue the Court decides today. the Courts admittedly «shocking» disdain for customary and conventional inter‑national law principles see ante, at 14, is thus entirely unsupported by case law and commentary.


29 As the Illinois Supreme Court described the action: «the arrest and detention of (Ker) was not by any authority of the general government, and no

obligation is implied on the part of the Federal or any State government... the invasion of the sovereignty of Peru, if any wrong was done, was by individuals, perhaps some of them owing no allegiance to the United States, and not by the Federal government». Ker v. Illinois, 110 III. �27, �43 (1884).

30 the Martinez incident discussed by the Court, see ante, at 9‑10, n. 11, also involved abduction by a private party; the reference to the Ker precedent was therefore appropriate in that case. On the other hand, the letter written by Secretary of State Blaine to the Governor of texas in 1881 unequivocally disapproved of abductions by either party to an extradition treaty. In 1984, Secretary of State Schultz expressed the same opinion about an authorized kidnapping of a Canadian national. He remarked that, in view of the extradition treaty between the United States and Canada, it was understandable that Canada was «outraged» by the kidnapping and considered it to be «a violation of the treaty and of international law, as well as an affront to its sovereignty». See Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 78 Am. J. Intl L. 200, 208 (1984).

31 Article 1� of the Draft provides: «In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any per‑

son who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by such measures». Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int’l L. 435, 623 (Supp. 1935).

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IV

As the Court observes at the outset of its opinion, there is reason to believe that respondent participated in an especially brutal mur‑der of an American law enforcement agent. that fact, if true, may explain the Executive’s intense interest in punishing respondent in our courts 32. Such an explanation, however, provides no justification for disregarding the Rule of Law that this Court has a duty to uphold 33. that the Executive may wish to reinterpret 34 the treaty to allow for an action that the treaty in no way authorizes should not influence this Court’s interpretation 35. Indeed, the desire for revenge exerts «a kind of hydraulic pressure... before which even well settled principles of law will bend», Nothern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (19C4) (Holmes, J., dissenting), but it is precisely at such moments that we should remember and be guided by our duty «to render judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law, as each is given understanding to ascertain and apply it». United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). the way

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32 See e.g., Storm Arises Over Camarena; U.S. Wants Harder Line Adopted, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Mar.8, 1985, p.10; U.S. Presses Mexico to Find Agent, Chicago tribune, Feb.20,1985, p.10.

33 As Justice Brandeis so wisely urged: «In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe

the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good of for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto him: it invites anarchy. to declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means [to declares that the private criminal] would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face». Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

34 Certainly, the Executives view has changed over time. At one point, the Office of Legal Counsel advised the Administration that such seizures were contrary to international law because they compromised the territorial integrity of the other Nation and were only to be undertaken with the consent of that Nation. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 549, 55� (1980). More recently, that opinion was revised and the new opinion concluded that the President did have the authority to over‑ride customary international law. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101sr. Cong., 1st. Sess., 4‑5 (1989) (statement of William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice).

35 Cf. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (construing treaty in accordance with historical con‑struction and refusing to defer to change in Executive policy); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907) (rejecting Executive’s interpretation).

�4

that we perform that duty in a case of this kind sets an example that other tribunals in other countries are sure to emulate.

The significance of this Court’s precedents is illustrated by a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of the Republic of South Africa. Based largely on its understanding of the import of this Courts cases —including our decision in Ker v. Illinois— that court held that the prosecution or a defendant kidnapped by agents of South Africa in another country most be dismissed. S v. Ebrahim, S. Afr. L. Rep. (Apr. June 1991) 3�. the Court of Appeal of South Africa —indeed, I suspect most courts throughout the civilized world— will be deeply disturbed by the «monstrous» decision the Court announces today. For every Nation that has an interest in preserving the Rule of Law is affected, directly or indirectly, by a decision of this character 37. As thomas Paine warned, an «avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty» because it leads a Nation «to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws» 38. to counter that tendency, he reminds us:

«He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself» 39.

I respectfully dissent.


3� the South African court agreed with appellant that an «abduction represents a violation of the applicable rules of international law, that these rules are part of (South African) law, and that this violation of the law deprives the Court... of its competence to hear (appellant’s) case...». S. Afr. L. Rep., at 8‑9.

37 As Judge Mansfield presciently observed in a case not unlike the one before us today: «Society is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the law». United States v. Toscanno, 500 F. 2d. 2�7, 274 (CA2 1974).

38 2 the Complete Writings of thomas Paine 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945).39 Ibid.


�5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCtOBER tERM, 1991

No. 91‑712

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (Petitioner)Vs.

HUMBERTO ÁLVAREZ MACHAIN, (Respondent)

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARITO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES ASAMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

AFFIRMANCE

Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of this Court, the United Mexican States (Mexico) respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of affirmance of the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of October 18, 1991. By letters lodged with the Clerk of the Court, the petitioner and the respondent have consented to the filing of this brief.

Summary: I. Interest of the Amicus Curiae; II. Statement; III. Summary of argument; IV. Argument; V. Conclusion.


��

I. INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

the respondent, Humberto Álvarez Machain, is a national of Mexico. Until his abduction from Mexican territory, arranged by United States law enforcement officers, he was a resident of Mexico. Respondent was forcibly brought to Los Angeles where he was charged in federal court with complicity in the kidnapping and murder of a DEA agent in Mexico.

On this writ of certiorari, the Court will necessarily consider whether respondent’s forcible removal from Mexican territory was in contravention of the existing extradition treaty with Mexico and of general principles of international law, mandating respondent’s return to Mexico.

Mexico regards respondent’s abduction from Mexican territory as a deliberate disregard by the United States of its obligations under the extradition treaty. Respondent’s abduction by agents of the United States is incompatible with established principles of international law and with express undertakings by the United States in recent bilateral and multilateral agreements on mutual legal assistance in penal matters and on cooperation in combating narcotics trafficking that were in force between Mexico and the United States at the time of respondent’s abduction. Under general international law, and under those specific agreements, the United States is obligated to respect Mexico’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and not to perform functions of authority in Mexican territory.

Mexico repeatedly protested to the United States government the treaty violations and the attendant infringement of its territorial integrity, and it requested respondent’s return to Mexico. Its diplo‑matic protests and its request for respondent’s repatriation have gone unanswered.

The United States’ disregard of its commitments to Mexico undermines the rule of law in international relations to which both States are

BRIEF FOR tHE UNItED MEXICAN StAtES AS AMICUS CURIAEINSUPPORt OF AFFIRMANCE

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strongly committed. Mexico has a manifest interest in ensuring that treaties to which it and the United States are parties are interpreted an applied by United States courts consistently with the treaty’s text, history, object and purpose.

II. STATEMENT

a) The Mexican Government’s Protest

The respondent challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to try him on the ground that his forcible abduction form his homeland by officials of the United States violated the Mexico/United States extradition treaty 1 (Pet. App. 4a).

Mexico repeatedly protested respondent’s abduction through dip‑lomatic channels. Mexico’s first note to the United States Department of State of April 18, 1990 (J.A. 33), sought information on the par‑ticipation of United States officials in the abduction of respondent. the note placed the Department of State on notice that «if it is proven that these actions were performed with the illegal participation of the U.S. authorities, the binational cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking will be endangered» (ibid).

One month later, on May 1�, 1990 (J.A. 35), Mexico informed the Department of State that «[t]he Government of Mexico considers the kidnapping of Dr. Álvarez Machain and his transfer from Mexican territory to the United States of America were carried out with the knowledge of persons working for the U.S. government, in violation of the procedure established in the extradition treaty in

1 Extradition treaty between the United States of America and the United Mexican States with Appendix, done in Mexico May 4, 19789, entered into force January 25, 1980, 31 U.S.t. 5059, t.I.A.S. No. 9�5�, registered by the United States in the United Nations treaty Series as U.N.t.S. 194�2 on December 9, 1980, pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations; reprinted in J.A. 72‑87.

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force between the two countries». the note informed the Department that criminal proceedings had been instituted in Mexico against the abductors for the offenses of kidnapping, false imprisonment and criminal association, and that the Mexican government would seek the abductor’s extradition. The note requested that the Department of State «interven(e) before the corresponding authorities so that Dr. Humberto Álvarez Machain be returned back to Mexico in order to be investigated regarding his probable participation in the crimes whose investigation and prosecution correspond to [sic] the Mexican Government». the note concluded with a request for assistance «in order that... [the respondent] be tried and sentenced in Mexico with absolute respect to the Mexican laws in connection with the crimes in which... [the respondent] has participated» (J.A. 3�).

thereafter, on July 19, 1990 the Embassy of Mexico presented two notes to the Department of State (J.A. 39, 53), and transmitted two extradition requests from the Attorney General of Mexico for the provisional arrest and extradition of the two individuals who were principally responsible for respondent’s abduction from Mexico —a DEA agent, and a Mexican national who had been granted refuge in the United States. the United States did not respond to those notes.

On appeal, following the dismissal of the indictment by the district court, the Mexican Consul General in Los Angeles was instructed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to present a letter to the court of appeals setting forth Mexico’s position with respect to the treaty, its violation by the United States, and the manner in which the treaty regulates the extradition of Mexican nationals from Mexico (J.A. �7). the letter stated in relevant part:

8. the treaty constitutes the exclusive and sole means by which the Government of the United States can seek to bring a Mexican national present in Mexico to justice. Mexican legislation in force and effect makes it illegal for Mexican government authorities to exclude a Mexican national from Mexican territory, or for Mexican Government authorities to deport a Mexican national from Mexican territory. therefore Mexican Government authorities have not entered, and could not enter, into any special


�9

arrangement, either with the United States or with any other country, to sur‑render its own nationals.

In the case of extradition treaties to which Mexico is a party, the Government of Mexico has invariably and expressly reserved to the parties the right to refuse the requested extradition to [sic] one of their own respective nation‑als, agreeing instead to prosecute them in their own national courts, in the interest of justice.

9. the purpose and object of the treaty, was from its inception, precisely to provide the legal framework, with which one of the parties could request of the other the extradition of persons from the territory of the former to the ter‑ritory of the latter. the treaty is binding on its parties, but serves no purpose if the parties are free to ignore its terms.

10. the only legal means by which the United States could have pursued the prosecution of DR. HUMBERtO ÁLVAREZ MACHAIN, a Mexican national, was through the specific provision of the treaty, which was nego‑tiated, agreed upon and ratified precisely to deal, with the extradition of nationals...

J.A. at �8‑�9.

b) The United States’ Complicity in Respondent’s Abduction

After respondent’s arraignment, the district court held an eviden‑tiary hearing to determine whether United States law enforcement officers were responsible for respondent’s abduction (Pet. App. 6a). Although the United States denied its complicity in the abduction, the court found that in the evening of April 2,1990, respondent was seized by five or six armed men in his office in Guadalajara, put by force on a private plane, and flown to El Paso, texas. there he was met by agents of the DEA and arrested. He was flown to Los Angeles, where he was placed in detention awaiting trial (Pet. App. 10a‑11a).

the district court further found that as of May 1991, the DEA had made partial reward payments of $20,000 to the Mexican individuals who abducted the respondent; that the DEA had evacuated seven of the abductors and their families from Mexico to the United States;

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70

that it paid for their weekly living expenses (ibid.); that respondent’s abduction did not result from any cooperative effort by Mexico and the United States, or any participation in the abduction by the Mexican officials; and that the United States «unilaterally proceeded with the abduction without the knowledge or participation of the Mexican government» (Pet. App. 33a).

the district court determined as a matter of law that the United States violated the Mexico/United States extradition treaty, and that «[u]nder circumstances, the Court lacks jurisdiction to try this defen‑dant. Accordingly, the defendant to Mexico is ordered discharged and the government is ordered to repatriate the defendant to Mexico forthwith» (pet. App. 4a‑5a).

On appeal, the United States did not challenge the district court’s findings regarding its instigation and complicity in respondent’s abduction. the court of appeals affirmed per curiam (Pet. App. 1a), relying on its exhaustive treatment of the abduction issue in United States v. Verdugo‑Urquídez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. pending, No. 91‑�70, decided three months earlier. the court below concluded:

the Government of Mexico has stated unequivocally that the abduction of Dr. Álvarez‑Machain by United States agents violated the 1980 Extradition treaty and general principles of international law and has at all times demanded his immediate repatriation to Mexico. Moreover, the Mexican government has stated its position on these issues unequivocally to the court in this case... thus, there remains no question about the adequacy of Mexico’s protests in this case or about Mexico’s demand for repatriation... the Verdugo case requires the dismissal of the indictment and the repatria‑tion of the appellee (Pet. App. at 3a).

(Pet. App. at 3a). the United States seeks reversal in this Court. It maintains that respondent’s abduction was in the nature of an «extra‑territorial arrest», and is not inconsistent with the means provided for in the extradition treaty for obtaining custody of persons from Mexico for trial in United States Courts.


71

III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. The United States’ argument that the extradition treaty does not address abductions of Mexican nationals from Mexican territory, and that such «extraterritorial arrests» are conducted «outside the extradi‑tion context» (Pet. Br. 9) does not withstand analysis. the treaty, like all international accords, must be interpreted against the background of relevant rules of international law applicable to the relations between the parties. Of particular relevance to the forcible removal of a person by agents of a foreign state are the established international law principles of independence of states, non intervention in inter‑nal affairs, legal equality, and respect for territorial integrity. those principles are the foundation upon which all extradition treaties are constructed. For a state to send its agents to another State to apprehend or abduct that State’s nationals for trial elsewhere is incompatible with the established international legal order. there was, therefore, no reason for Mexico to insist that the extradition treaty contain express language that, absent permission from Mexico, the United States could exercise no police powers in the Mexican territory. At no time during the negotiation of the extradition treaty did the United States’ negotiators state or suggest that the United States reserved to itself the right to secure the presence of Mexican nationals for trial in the United States «outside the extradition context», and there exists no such reservation to the treaty.

B. Article 9 of the extradition treaty leaves it to the discretion of each State whether to extradite its nationals. During the negotiation of Art. 9, the Mexican negotiators expressly informed the United States negotiators of the restraints that Mexican laws impose on the President of Mexico with respect to the extradition of Mexican nationals. Consequently, the parties included a second paragraph –similar to one contained in most modern U.S. extradition treaties with civil law countries– to assure that Mexicans whose extradition was denied solely on the basis of nationality would be prosecuted by Mexico.

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72

In this case, the United States did not inquire whether Mexico was prepared to deliver the respondent for trial in the United States, nor did it afford Mexico the opportunity to try the respondent in its own courts. Instead, in disregard of the stipulations of the extradition treaty and its responsibilities under established principles of international law, the United States abducted the respondent from Mexico, brought him without the consent of the Mexican government to the United States for trial, and deprived him of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution and laws of Mexico.

C. Mexico and the United Stales are parties to two recent bilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance and on cooperation in combating narcotics trafficking, and both States have ratified a multilateral United Nations Convention on the latter subject. Both treaties and the Convention make it explicit that, in rendering assistance to each other and in combating crime and drug trafficking, the States must carry out their obligations in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity. The United States’ action in abducting the respondent from the territory of Mexico was in total disregard of those solemn treaty commitments.

II

the Ker Frisbie rule, which holds that an illegal arrest or abduc‑tion dues not void a subsequent conviction, is a rule of United States domestic law, not a principle of international law, and has been most often applied in the United States in the context of domestic kidnap‑pings, abductions and wrongful arrest.

this Court has never sanctioned the prosecution in a United States court of a foreign national abducted from his home State by officials of the United States, where an extradition treaty was in force with that foreign State, where the offense was committed in the territory of the foreign State, and where the foreign state protested the abduction.


73

Ker is no authority for the issue in this case. The rule’s namesake, Frisbie, and its progeny, deal with domestic interstate abductions and are not relevant to the statesponsored international abduction which lies at the heart of this case. International law, which this Court has traditionally applied, firmly establishes the principle that absent con‑sent or acquiescence by the territorial State, another State may not send its agents into that State’s territory to apprehend persons accused of a crime.

III

the appropriate remedy for the contravention of the treaty that occurred in this case, and the only remedy that will prevent the recur‑rence of the violation of Mexico’s territorial integrity, is the return of respondent to Mexico. Repatriation of a national who was unlawfully abducted from his home State by agents of a foreign State will sig‑nify the courts’ unwillingness to countenance lawlessness by its law enforcement agents on foreign soil. Unlike the result which frequently follows from the application of the exclusionary rule in the domestic context, ordering the respondent’s repatriation will not immunize him from prosecution, as the United States claims. His return to Mexico will only change the place of trial and the applicable law since Mexico is committed under the extradition treaty to submit the case to its judicial authorities for investigation and prosecution.

IV. ARGUMENT

a) Absent consent by Mexico to o less formal rendition of offenders, the extradition treaty provides the sole means by which the United States may secure and offender from Mexico.

The Treaty Prohibits U.S. Government Authorized or Sponsored Abductions of Persons From Mexican Territory for Trial in the United States.

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74

The thrust of the United States’ argument is that the Extradition treaty «is not a general compact for the protection of territorial rights» (Pet. Br. at 9). Elsewhere, the United States submits that the Extradition treaty does not prohibit «extraterritorial arrests» by the United States «outside the context of extradition proceedings» (Id. at 23), and that «nothing in the treaty speaks to the consequences of an apprehension that is made without a request for extradition» (Ibid). Mexico rejects in the strongest terms the view that the United States authorities may perform «extraterritorial arrests» in Mexico.

As a sovereign state, Mexico alone has the right to determine which authority exercises governmental powers in its territory, and no State may arrogate to itself the right to perform sovereign’s acts within its borders without its consent. the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States, the foundation of an enlightened interna‑tional legal order, are fundamental. the principle was forcefully and unequivocally set forth by this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, in The Schooner Exchange v. Mc Faddon, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 11�, 13� (1812):

the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction.

...

All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. they can flow from no other legitimate source.

See also Art. 2, para. 4, of the Charter of the United Nations of June 2�, 1945 2, the members of which include Mexico and the United States, which obligates «All Members» to «refrain... from the threat


2 59 Stat. 1031, t.S. No. 993.

75

or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen‑dence of any State...». Additionally, the Charter of the Organization of American States of April 30, 1948 3, whose members also include Mexico and the United States, provides in Art. 17 that the «territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily... of... measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever». It is within this framework that the Mexico/United States Extradition treaty must be interpreted 4.

Extradition is one of the oldest forms of international judicial assistance. Extradition treaties are designed to promote the coopera‑tion between States in criminal matters. they «Balance[] the demands of the international legal order that serious crime not go unpunished with concern that persons accused of crime not be subjected to unfair methods of adjudication or punishment». Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 47�, comment a (1987). Since the beginning of extradition relations between Mexico and the United States one hundred thirty years ago, it has been clearly understood by both States that their extradition treaties were designed, among other things, to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both States. United States Secretary of State Blaine acknowledged this principle well over a century ago when he advised the Governor of texas that:

the treaty of extradition between the United States and Mexico prescribes the forms for carrying it into effect, and does not authorize either party, for any cause, to deviate from those forms, or arbitrarily abduct from the terri‑tory of one party a person charged with crime for trial within the jurisdiction of the other.

3 2 U.S.t. 2394, t.I.A.S. No. 23�1, 119 U.N.t.S. 3, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires of February 27, 19�7, 21 U.S.t. �07, t.I.A.S. No. �847.

4 See Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, May 23, 19�9, Art. 31, reprinted in �3 Am. J. Int’l L. 875, 885 (1969):

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaningto be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2... 3. there shell be taken into account, together with the context: ... c. any relevant rules of

international law applicable in the relations between the parties [Emphasis added.]

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7�

4 Moore, Digest of International Law § �03, at 330 (190�), empha‑sis added.

that the United States regarded the extradition treaty as the exclu‑sive means by which Mexico could secure a person from the United States was also made clear by Secretary of State Bayard in 1887 when a Mexican national was seized in texas by a Mexican police officer with the aid of local deputy sheriffs and forced across the border to Mexico. Mr. Bayard stated that the wanted person’s return to Mexico was «obtained not in accordance with, but in fraud of existing trea‑ties». 2 Moore, supra § 204, at 27�. Nothing in the negotiating his‑tory of the three successive extradition treaties that Mexico entered into with the United States, beginning in 18�2 5, or in the diplomatic correspondence between them following the entry into force of these treaties, lends support to the view pressed by the United States that the police authorities of the signatory states may, consistently with the detailed stipulations of an extradition treaty, make «extrater‑ritorial arrests» in the territory of the other «outside the extradition context» (Pet. Br. at 21). the acknowledgement of this extrater‑ritorial right in either Party would have constituted such a radical departure from the very raison d’étre of extradition treaties, that it would have excited contemporary comment. No consent to arrests in the territory of the other party is discernible from the text, history or purpose of the treaty. the United States does not, and cannot, point to any source that would support its thesis —a thesis that it announces here for the first time. Had the United States at any time insisted on such a reservation to the treaty, its extradition relations with Mexico would have ended.

Respondent’s Abduction Has Deprived Him of the Special Safeguards Stipulated in the Treaty for Nationals of the Signatory States.


5 the precursors of the current extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States are the treaty of May 20, 18�2, 12 Stat. 1199, t.S. No. 209 (terminated January 24, 1899), and the treaty of April, 22, 1899, 31 Stat.1818, t.S. No. 242, with supplements of 1903, 192� and 1941 (terminated January 25, 1980).

77

1. Article 9 of the 1978 extradition treaty provides (J.A. at 7�):

Extradition of Nationals

1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.

2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of persecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.

this Article takes into account the provisions of the Mexican Law on International Extradition � which prohibit the extradition of its nationals. the United States fully understood this to be the law of Mexico and agreed in Art. 9 of the treaty that extradition of Mexican nationals was subject to a special regime.

In submitting the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, President Carter’s message provided an article –by article analysis prepared by the Department of State 7, which described the import of Art. 9 thus:

Article 9 deals with the extradition of nationals. It is similar to provisions in some of our other recently signed extradition treaties. It grants the executive the discretionary power to extradite its own nationals. If extradition is denied on the basis of nationality, the requested Party undertakes to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense. This article thus takes into account the law of Mexico prohibiting the extradition of its nationals but allowing for their prosecution in Mexico for offenses committed abroad [Emphasis added].

The United States’ brief makes light of the Mexican government’s discharge of its domestic legal order when it complains that «to date,

� Art. 14 of the Ley de Extradición Internacional of December 22, 1975, provides: No Mexican shall be extradited to a foreign state except in exceptional cases in the discretion of the Executive (informal translation).

7 Exec. Rep. M, Extradition treaty with the United Mexican States, 9�th Cong., 1st Sess. VI (1979) (Letter of Submittal by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance).

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the government of Mexico has not extradited a single Mexican nation‑al under the terms of the extradition treaty pursuant to an extradition request by the United States» (Pet. Br. at 21 n. 17). the accompanying sentence in the text is ominous: «[N]othing in our extradition treaty with Mexico affirmatively indicates that a defendant who has been forcibly abducted from that country is immune from prosecution in an American court» (Id. at 20). It then proceeds to justify the abduction by stating: «Yet if respondent is repatriated to Mexico, he will acquire just such an immunity form prosecution» (Id. at 20‑21, emphasis added). the assertion is demonstrably false.

A Mexican national accused of having committed a crime on Mexican soil does not, by reason of being abducted to a foreign coun‑try, become «immune» form prosecution. Along with all citizens and residents, he enjoys the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution, treaties and laws of Mexico 8. One of these rights is to be tried by the courts of Mexico for an offense committed in Mexico. the United States’ abduction seeks to deny to the respondent that right —a right also guaranteed by Article 9(2) of the extradition treaty 9. there can,


8 the Mexican Political Constitution provides in relevant part: «Article 14... No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions, or rights without a trial

before a previously established court in which the essential formalities of procedure are observed in accordance with laws in effect prior to the act.

In criminal cases no penalty shall be imposed by more analogy on convincing rationale but rather must be based on a law which is in precisely applicable to the crime in question...

Article 1�. No one shall be disturbed in his person, family, domicile, documents or possessions except by virtue of a written order by the competent authority stating the legal grounds and justification for the action taken. No order of arrest or detention shall be issued against any person other than by the competent judicial authority, unless such arrest or detention is preceded by a charge, accusation, or complaint concerning a specific act punishable by physical punishment, made by a credible party, supported by a sworn affidavit or by other evidence indicating the probable guilt of the accused…».

9 Mexican munipal law makes no distinction between «self‑executing» treaties and those that merely constitute a contract between States, as known in United States law.

Article 133 of the Mexican Political Constitution provides: «this Constitution, the laws of the congress of the Union which emanate there from, and all trea‑

ties made, or which shell be made in accordance therewith by the President of the Republic, with the approval of the Senate, shell be the Supreme Laws throughout the Union. the judges of each State shall conform to the said Constitution, the law, and treaties, notwithstanding any contradictory provisions that may appear in the Constitution or laws of the States.

A treaty that has been approved by the Mexican Senate and proclaimed by the President forms part of the munipal law of Mexico and confers personal rights on individuals that are enforceable in Mexican courts».

79

of course, be no question that the courts of Mexico are competent and obligated to try the offenses with which the respondent is charged.

the United States‑sponsored abduction plainly denied to the respondent the procedural rights guaranteed to him by Articles 14 and 1� of the Mexican Constitution, by Article 3 of the extradition treaty 10 and by Article 1� of the Mexican Extradition Law 11, to have the inculpating evidence against him reviewed by an impartial Mexican magistrate before he was deprived of his liberty.

The United States’ answer to the deprivation of all of these rights is simply that since respondent was not extradited under the treaty, he has no rights (Pet. Br. at 13). Mexico disagrees. the extradition treaty governs comprehensively the delivery of all persons requested for extradition «for an offense committed within the territory of the requesting Party» (Article 1(1)), and, as in this case, for an offense committed inside the territory of the requested party (Article 1(2)). In consequence, the United States’ failure to use the extradition treaty deprived Mexico of its sovereign right to prosecute the respondent in its domestic courts and denied to respondent the rights guaranteed him by the Mexican Constitution, treaties and laws. the frustration and denial of these rights constitute independent material breaches of the treaty.

10 Article 3 of the treaty provides in relevant part: Evidence Required. Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found sufficient, according to the laws of the

requested Party... to justify the committal for trial of the person sought if the offense of which he has been accused had been committed in that place.

11 Article 1� of the Mexican Extradition Law requires that the Mexican authorities be furnished: the formal extradition request and the documents on which it is based by the requesting State must include:

I. Specification of the crime for which the extradition is sought. II. Proof that the crime has been committed and the probable involvement of the accused. If

the accused has been convicted by the courts of the requesting state, it will suffice to submit an authenticated copy of the final judgment.

III... IV. A copy of the legal provisions of the requesting State, with regard to the definition of the crime

and the punishment, and the corresponding statute of limitations, as well as an authorized statement of the fact that said provisions and statute were in force at the time the crime was committed.

V. the original warrant of arrest which may have been issued against the accused.

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Respondent’s Abduction Violated Three Other Recent Accords between Mexico and the United States

three other accords presently in force between Mexico and the United States emphasize Mexico’s willingness to provide the fullest cooperation in combating crime and narcotics trafficking, and in providing effective and timely, legal assistance to the United States. The United States’ brief treats these accords with silence 12.

First, the 1987 treaty of Cooperation for Mutual Legal Assistance 13 expresses in its preamble the commitment of both States «to cooperate in the framework of their friendly relations, and to undertake mutual legal assistance to provide the best administration of justice in criminal matters» (Emphasis added). thereafter, paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the treaty sets forth the understanding of both States that:

this treaty does not empower one Party’s authorities to undertake, in the territorial jurisdiction of the other, the exercise and performance of the functions or authority exclusively entrusted to the authorities of that other Party by its national laws or regulations [Emphasis is added].


12 the treaties described in the text provide a «relevant rule of (conventional) international law» that governs the relations between Mexico and the United States within the purview of Art. 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, supra, n.4.

13 treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States for Mutual Legal Assistance, done in Mexico City December 9, 1987, entered into force for the United States, May 3, 1991, t.I.A.S. No. ‑‑‑, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 443 (1988). Article 1 provides as follows:

SCOPE OF tHE tREAtY 1. the Parties shall cooperate with each other by taking all appropriate measures that they have

legal authority to take, in order to provide mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, in accor‑dance with the terms of this treaty and subject to the limitations of their respective domestic legal provisions. Such assistance shall deal with the prevention, investigation and prosecution of crimes or any other criminal proceedings arising from acts which are within the competence or jurisdiction of the requesting Party at the time the assistance is requested, and in connection with ancillary proceedings of any other kind related to the criminal acts in question.

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Second, the 1989 Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Narcotics trafficking and Drug Dependency 14 emphasizes in Article 1, that:

2. the Parties will fulfill their obligations under this Agreement in accordance with the principles of self determination, non intervention in internal affairs, legal equality, and respect for the territorial integrity of States.

3. This Agreement does not empower one Party’s authorities to undertake, in the territorial jurisdiction of the other, the exercise and performance of the functions or authority exclusively entrusted to the authorities of that other Party by its national laws or regulations. (Emphasis added).

14 Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican State on Cooperation in Combating Narcotics trafficking and Drug Dependency, done in Mexico City February 23, 1989, entered into force July 30, 1990, t.I.A.S. No. ‑‑‑, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 58 (1990).

the preambles and Article I state as follows: the United States of America and the United Mexican States (the Parties), Aware of the need

to protect the lives and health of their respective peoples from the serious effects of narcotics trafficking and drug dependency.

Agreeing that such conduct should be attacked comprehensively from four major areas: preven‑tion and reduction of the illicit demand for narcotics and psychotropic substances; control of supply; suppression of illicit traffic; treatment and rehabilitation.

Acknowledging that the various aspect of narcotics trafficking and drug dependency threaten the security and the essential interests of each of the Parties;

Resolved to extend to each other the necessary cooperation to effectively combat narcotics traf‑ficking and drug dependency, given the international scope and nature of these phenomena;

Encouraged by the spirit of the recommendations contained in the Comprehensive and Multidisciplinary Plan of Future Activities in the Control of the Improper Use of Drugs (the Plan) adopted at Vienna, Austria, on June 2�, 1987, and

Inspired by the goal that cooperation under this Agreement complement the cooperation that both Parties provide in fulfillment of their international obligations under the United Nations Convention on Illicit trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances (the Convention), adopted at Vienna, on December 20, 1988,

Have agreed as follows: ARtICLE I. Scope of the Agreement. 1. the purpose of this Agreement is to promote cooperation between the Parties so that they can

combat more efficiently narcotics trafficking and drug dependency, phenomena that transcend the boundaries of both countries.

the Parties shall adopt the necessary measures in fulfillment of the obligations they have entered into under this Agreement, including legislative and administrative measures, in conformity with the fundamental provisions of their respective internal legal systems.

2. the Parties will fulfill their obligations under this Agreement in accordance with the prin‑ciples of self‑determination, non‑intervention in internal affairs, legal equality, and respect for the territorial integrity of States.

3. This Agreement does not empower one Party’s authorities to undertake, in the territorial jurisdiction of the other, the exercise and performance of the functions or authority exclusively entrusted to the authorities of that other arty by its national laws or regulations.

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third, the multilateral 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs, which both Mexico and the United States have ratified 15, echoes the provisions of the two bilateral agreements between Mexico and the United States with respect to the observance of the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity by the High Contracting Parties.

these accords establish no new norms for the conduct of States. they codify the established rule of international law prohibiting the authorities of one State from performing police or other enforce‑ment functions in the territory of another State without the express permission of the latter, and the principle that extradition treaties are designed, inter alia, to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Contracting States (See supra, pp.10 12). the United States conspicuously disregarded those principles, and the reciprocal pledges contained in those international accords when its agents arranged for respondent’s forcible removal from Mexico.

b) The Rule Announced in Ker v. Illinois does not govern this Case

Ker v. Illinois 1�, decided more than a century ago, concerned the prosecution in an Illinois court of an American citizen who was

15 United Nations Convention against Illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, done at Vienna, December 20, 1988, entered into force for the United States and for Mexico on November 11, 1990, t.I.A.S. No. ‑‑‑, reprinted in 28, I.L.M. 493 (1989), defines the scope of the Conventions as follows:

ARtICLE 2. Scope of the convention. 1. the purpose of this Convention is to promote co‑operation among the Parties so that they

may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psycho‑tropic substances having an international dimension. In carrying out their obligations under the Convention, the Parties shell take necessary measures, including legislative and administrative measures, in conformity with the fundamental provisions of their respective domestic legislative systems.

2. The parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non‑intervention in the domestic affaire of other States.

3. A Party shall not undertake in the territory of another Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Party by its domestic law (Emphasis added).

1� 119 U.S. 43� (188�).


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charged with larceny and embezzlement from a Chicago bank. Ker fled to Peru to escape prosecution and was forcibly returned by a pri‑vate Pinkerton agent to Chicago to stand trial. Although the agent car‑ried an extradition warrant for Ker’s arrest which was to be presented to the local authorities, on his arrival in Lima, the agent found that the city was occupied by military forces of Chile. there apparently was no Peruvian government to which the extradition warrant could be presented 17. the agent apprehended Ker and brought him forcibly to Chicago where he was tried and convicted. Peru at no time protested Ker’s abduction.

the Illinois Supreme Court sustained the conviction and rejected Ker’s defenses that the manner in which he had been brought before the court denied him due process of law and that as a result of his presence in Peru he had acquired a «positive right» that he could be removed from that country only under the extradition treaty. Ker v. Illinois. 110 III. �25 (1884). On writ of error to this Court, Ker again raised both defenses. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Miller rejected the due process argument:

the «due process of law» here guaranteed is complied with when the party is regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the State court, has a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived and when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he is lawfully entitled.

119 U.S. at 440.

the court dismissed the asylum argument, stating:

there is no language in this treaty, or in any other treaty made by this country on the subject of extradition of which we are aware, which says in terms that a party fleeing from the United States to escape punishment for crime becomes thereby entitled to an asylum in the country to which he has fled; ...

119 U.S. at 442.

17 The additional historical facts, not recorded in the Court’s opinion, are taken from Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 Am. J. Int’l L. 678 (1953).

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As regards the extradition treaty with Peru, the Court observed:

Julian (the Pinkerton agent), in seizing upon the person of Ker and carrying him out of the territory of Peru into the United States, did not act nor profess to act under the treaty. In fact, that treaty was not called into operation, was not relied upon, was not made the pretext of arrest, and the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of authority under the treaty or from the government of the United States.

119. U.S. at 443, emphasis added.

Most relevantly to the present case, the Court declined to consider whether this private abduction constituted a violation of international law, leaving final determination of that question to the state courts as a matter of state law 18:

the question of how far his forcible seizure in another country, and transfer by violence, force, or fraud, to this country, could be made available to resist trial in the State court, for the offence now charged upon him, is one which we do not feel called upon to decide, for in that transaction we do not see that the Constitution, or laws, or treaties, of the United States guarantee him any protection...

However, this may be, the decision of that question is as much within the province of the State court, as a question of common law, or of the law of the nations, of which that court is bound to take notice, as it is of the courts of the United States. And though we might or might not differ with the Illinois court on that subject, it is one in which we have no right to review their decision.

119 U.S. at 444, emphasis added.

the distinctions between the factual and legal underpinnings of Ker and the instant case are palpable and striking:

18 It was less than three decades ago, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 37� U.S. 398 (1984), that the Court squarely ruled that international law is federal law, and that state courts must follow the federal lead in ascertaining, interpreting and applying that body of law. «(R)ules of international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations». Id. at 425.


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—In 188�, the legal protections afforded to individuals throughout the civilized world today and the emerging international law of human rights did not exist.

—Ker’s abduction by a private agent was «without any pretense of authority... from the government of the United States». 119 U.S. at 443; here, the Court is faced with an abduction sponsored and financed by the United States and carried out by agents of the United States in the performance of their official functions.

—Ker, unlike the respondent, was a United States citizen who, under established doctrine, cannot invoke international law against his own sovereign, but must be satisfied with such protections as the Constitution and laws of the United States may afford to him; respondent is not so limited.

—Ker, unlike respondent, was charged with offenses which he committed solely in this country and he became a «fugitive from justice» in the dictionary sense of the term when he fled from the United States; respondent is charged with no offense committed in the United States and he did not flee to escape prosecution, nor did he seek asylum elsewhere 19.

—It is subject to doubt whether the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru was in force at the time of Ker’s abduction, in light of the political instability in Peru when Ker was abducted; no such doubt exists here.

—Ker was a state prosecution in the 19th century, not a federal prosecution conducted in the last decade of this century.

19 Aside from the provisions of the extradition treaty, under international law Mexico has the primary right to place him on trial, both under principles of territoriality and nationality.

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8�

—Peru at no time protested Ker’s abduction through channels of diplomacy or by appearance in the United States courts, either at trial or on appeal.

It would be presumptuous for Mexico to comment whether the rule formulated by this Court in Ker should retain its vitality in the purely domestic context, as reaffirmed in Frisbie v. Collins, 3242 U.S. 519 (1952). Mexico submits that the court below was correct in its dis‑criminating analysis and in declining to apply the Ker rule mechani‑cally in an international abduction case, as the United States urges (Pet. Br. at 11‑17). Blind adherence to doctrines formulated in another era, and disregard of international agreements to combat crime, will not further international efforts to bring criminals to justice.

It is true that numerous lower federal courts have struggled in recent years with various aspects of forcible seizure of suspects abroad in disregard of extradition treaties, and that they have felt bound by this Court’s pronouncement in Ker. their decisions are, nevertheless, distinguishable from the facts here because of such factors as non involvement by agents of the United States in the forcible removal of the suspect from foreign territory 20; rendition of the suspects, or active assistance in their rendition to the United States, by the authori‑ties of the territorial sovereign 21; seizures of suspects in international waters 22, or the tacit condo nation of the abduction by the sovereign in whose territory the abduction occurred 23.

the United States pleads with the Court to reaffirm the Ker rule in this case for the reason that «immunizing a defendant from all prosecution is tool high a price to pay for an illegal arrest» (Br. at 17;

20 E.g., United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d �8, 70‑71 (2d Cir. 1975).21 E.g., United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Verdugo‑Urquidez,

supra, 939 F.2d at 1353 n .2 (citing cases).22 E.g., United States v. yunis, 924 F.2d 108� (D.C. Cir. 1991).23 E.g., Matta‑Ballesteros v. Henman, 89� F.2d 225, 25�0 (7th Cir.). Cert. denied, ‑‑ U.S. ‑‑ (1990);

see also Verdugo‑Urquidez, supra, 939 F.2d at 1349 n.9 and 1353 n. 12 (citing cases).


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emphasis added). As Mexico pointed out earlier, the plea’s prem‑ise is both false and disingenuous. Mexico does not appear in this Court in support of «immunizing» the respondent from prosecution 24 ; it respectfully asks the Court to recognize and enforce its right to try the respondent in its courts –a right which the United States acknowledged and agreed to in the extradition treaty, but which the United States seeks to deny to Mexico in this case.

c) International Law Mandates that Respondent be Returned to Mexico

this Court has uniformly recognized that prosecutions in American courts of violations of treaties and international law require the resto‑ration of the status quo ante, and the release of persons or property prosecuted or seized in violation of the international commitments of the United States. See e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.407 (188�) (prosecution in violation of extradition treaty); Cook v. United State, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) (seizure of property in violation of Convention to Prevent Smuggling); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927) (same); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. �77 (1900) (condem‑nation of fishing vessels as price of war in violation of international law);

24 Mexican authorities commenced a criminal investigation in 1985 into the kidnapping and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena Salazar and Alfredo Zavala Avelar. Warrants of arrest were issued for Rafael Caro quintero, Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo, and others in the state of Jalisco (Guadalajara) on charges of illegal deprivation of freedom in the form of abductions, homicides, and various narcotics offenses. they were charged with the offenses named on September 19, 1989, and were tried and convicted on December 12, 1989. the court imposed the maximum penalty on both defendant, viz., 40 years imprisonment, various fines and forfeiture of properties. the convictions were affirmed on appeal on August 10, 1980, by the third District Criminal Court of the State of Jalisco. Nine of their principal associates were also convicted and sentenced for their complicity in the offenses.

In addition, Caro quintero, Fonseca Carrillo and twenty‑one of their associates were convicted and sentenced in the Federal District (Mexico City) for narcotics offenses, firearms offenses, criminal association and illegal deprivation of freedom offenses. In that case, Caro quintero was sentenced to a separate 34‑year prison term and Fonseca Carrillo was sentenced to a separate 11‑1/2 year term. their twenty‑one associates received sentences ranging from 12‑1/2 to 14‑1/4 years, plus fines and forfeitures.

A third person, belied to be a principal in the Camarena case, Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, has also been arrested and is being tried, together with nine of his associates in the Federal District (Mexico City) on various narcotics trafficking, firearms and bribery charges.

they have been in custody since April 1989.

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Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. �4 (1899) (prosecution for an offense committed prior to extradition). the court below was correct in rely‑ing on these decisions in formulating its order that the respondent be allowed to return to Mexico.

In its Judgment (indemnity phase) in the Chorzów Factory case (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No.17, at 4, 47, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that restitution is the foremost remedy for international wrongful acts:

the essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act —a principle which seems to be established by international prac‑tice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals— is that reparations must, as far as possible, wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have exited in that act had not been committed (Emphasis added).

Among the ambitious studies in international law conducted under the auspices of Harvard University between the two world wars, the results of which were formulated in the form of «draft conventions», was a proposed convention on «Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime» 29. Am. J. Int’l L. Supp.435 (1935) 25. the scholars who participated in this project agreed that the following rule comprised a fair state‑ment of customary international law with respect to transborder abductions that violate treaties:

25 the Reporter and the Assistant Reporter of the project were Prof. Edwin D. Dickinson and Prof. William W. Bishop, Jr., respectively.

The advisory panel on the project consisted of a veritable Who’s Who of American interna‑tional law scholars and practitioners at the time: Judge Learned Hand; George W. Wickersham, former Attorney General of the United States; Elihu Root, former Secretary of State; Manley O. Hudson, former judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice and a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration; Green H. Hackworth, Legal Advisor of the Department of State; Charles Chaney Hyde and James Brown Scott, former Solicitors of the Department of State; Philip C. Jessup, a future American judge on the International Court of Justice.


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Article 1�. Apprehension in Violation of International Law

In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by such measures.

29 Am. J. Int’l L. Supp. at 623.

In commenting on the rule, the project stated: «It is everywhere agreed of course, that «recourse to measures in violation of interna‑tional law or international convention» in obtaining custody of a per‑son charged with a crime entails an international responsibility which must be discharged by the release or restoration of the person taken, indemnification of the injured State, or otherwise». Id. at �23‑24. Writers and publicists on international law are near unanimous that the appropriate municipal law remedy for the United States’ violation of the extradition treaty is respondent’s discharge from the custody of the courts and his return to Mexico.

A former President of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and one of the most distinguished scholars on international law in the English speaking world, Hersh Lauterpacht, stated:

«the duty to respect the territorial supremacy of a foreign State must pre‑vent a State from performing acts which, although they are according to its personal supremacy within its competence, would violate the territorial supremacy of this foreign State. A State must not perform acts of sovereignty in the territory of another State».

1 Oppenheim’s International Law 295 (Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). to illustrate such an international delinquency, and the remedy therefore, Judge Lauterpacht refers to abductions from another State’s territory:

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It is therefore a breach of International Law for a State to send its agents to the territory of another State to apprehend persons accused of a crime. Apart from other satisfaction, the first duty of the offending State is to hand over the person in question to the State in whose territory he was apprehended (Emphasis added).

Id. n. 1.

Contemporary American, English, Canadian and Latin American scholars and publicists support the view. See e.g., Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution in International Law, Continued, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 444, 474, 481 (1190); Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 91, 105 (1953); Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International Law, 29 Brit. Yb. Int’l L. 265, 266 (1952); Lewis, Unlawful Arrest: A Bar to the Jurisdiction of the Court, or Mala Captus Bene Detentus? Sidney Jaffe: A Case in Point, 28 Crim. L. q. 341, 348 (198�); Garcia Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over Fugitives Brought From a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 Ind. L. J. 427, 430 (1957).

This Court’s uniform holdings, beginning with Rauscher, supra, and the foregoing authorities support the view that if there was no jurisdiction in a State to make the original arrest or seizure, because it was in violation of a treaty or of international law, there is no juris‑diction in the courts to subject the person or property to its process 2�. Restoration of the status quo ante is the only proper remedy for the violation of international law that occurred here.

2� the United States reliance on The Ship Richmond v. United States, 9 Chanch (13 U.S.) 102 (1815) (Pet. Br. at 14 n.8) is misplaced. the holding of that case cannot be reconciled with this Court’s decisions, supra, and Richmond must be regarded as having been overruled.


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V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals judgment ordering the respondent’s repatriation should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Bruno A. Ristau Counsel of Record Michael Abbell Ristau & Abbell Attorneys for the United Mexican States

Luis Miguel Díaz Legal Advisor Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico

March 5, 1992.

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Río de Janeiro, 18 de agosto de 1992

CJI/0/11A Sua Excelencia el señor Embajador Joao Clemente Baena Soares Secretario General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos Washington, D.C. E.U.A.

Estimado señor Secretario General:

Como es del conocimiento de Vuestra Excelencia, el Consejo Permanente de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, en su sesión celebrada el 15 de julio de 1992, mediante resolución CP/RES. 586 (909/92), acordó solicitar al Comité Jurídico Interamericano se sirva emitir una opinión en el presente período de sesiones, prefer‑entemente, acerca de la juridicidad internacional de la sentencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de Estados Unidos en el caso United States vs. Álvarez Machain.

Al respecto, en su sesión realizada el 15 de agosto en curso, el Comité Jurídico Interamericano, por nueve votos a favor y una abstención, aprobó el documento CJI/RES, II‑15/92, titulado Opinión Jurídica sobre la Sentencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de los Estados Unidos de América. Votaron afirmativamente los doctores José Luis Siqueiros, Eduardo Vío Grossi, Luis Herrera Marcano, Galo Leoro Franco, Juan Bautista Rivarola Paoli, Francisco Villagrán Kramer, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, Jorge Reinaldo A. Vanossi y el suscrito. El voto de abstención correspondió al doctor Seymour J. Rubin.

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De acuerdo a lo dispuesto en el artículo 37 del Reglamento del Comité y por haberlo anunciado en el momento de la votación, pre‑sentaron sus votos razonados concurrentes los doctores Eduardo Vío Grossi, Jorge Reinaldo A. Vanossi y el suscrito. El doctor Seymour J. Rubin presentó su voto razonado de abstención.

tengo, pues, a honra de remitir al señor Secretario General y, por su digno conducto, al Consejo Permanente de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, el mencionado documento que contiene a continuación del mismo los referidos votos razonados.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para renovar a Vuestra Excelencia las seguridades de mi estima y más alta consideración.

Manuel A. Vieira (Rúbrica) Presidente Comité Jurídico Interamericano

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CJI/RES.II-15/92

OPINIÓN JURÍDICA SOBRE LA SENTENCIA DE LA SUPREMA CORTE

DE JUSTICIA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA

I. ANTECEDENTES

1. El Consejo Permanente de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, mediante Resolución CP/RES.586 (909/92), de 15 de julio de 1992, solicitó a este Comité emitir una opinión, preferente‑mente en el período de sesiones que transcurre del 3 al 29 de agosto actual, acerca de la juridicidad internacional de la sentencia dictada por la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de América, el 15 de junio de 1992, en el caso (recurso de certiorari) No.91‑712, interpuesto por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América, como peticionario vs. Humberto Álvarez Machain, acusado.

2. El texto de dicha resolución es el siguiente:

«EL CONSEJO PERMANENtE DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN DE LOS EStADOS AMERICANOS

VIStOS:

Los artículos 104 y 105 de la Carta de la OEA, y

El artículo 12 del Estatuto del Comité Jurídico Interamericano, y

CONSIDERANDO:

La repercusión internacional, en particular en los Estados miembros de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, de la sentencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de los Estados Unidos de América de fecha 15 de junio de 1992, dictada en el caso número 91‑712,


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RESUELVE:

Solicitar al Comité Jurídico Interamericano se sirva emitir una opinión en su próximo período de sesiones, preferentemente, acerca de la juridicidad internacional del referido fallo».

II. COMPETENCIA

3. El Comité Jurídico Interamericano estimó pertinente precisar, en primer término, los alcances de su competencia para emitir o rendir opiniones jurídicas solicitadas por otros órganos del Sistema Interamericano. El Comité consideró, para este caso, por siete votos contra dos, que los artículos 104 y 105 de la Carta establecen su competencia con suficiente claridad, máxime al tenerse presente que se trata de opiniones consultivas sin efectos obligatorios para el o los órganos que las solicitan.

III. LA SENTENCIA

4. Los términos de la cuestión planteada en la sentencia son textu‑almente los siguientes:

«El acusado, Humberto Álvarez Machain, es un ciudadano y residente de México. Fue acusado de participar en el secuestro y asesinato del agente espe‑cial de la Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) de los Estados Unidos de América, Enrique Camarena Salazar y de un piloto mexicano que trabajaba con Camarena, Alfredo Zavala Avelar. La DEA cree que el acusado, que es médico, participó en el asesinato al prolongar la vida del agente Camarena a fin de que otros pudieran continuar torturándolo e interrogándolo.

»El 2 de abril de 1990, el acusado fue sustraído por la fuerza de su consulto‑rio médico en Guadalajara, México, para ser trasladado en un avión privado a El Paso, texas, donde fue arrestado por oficiales de la DEA. La Corte Federal del Noveno Distrito concluyó que los agentes de la DEA fueron respon‑sables de la sustracción del acusado, aun cuando no estuvieron involucrados personalmente en la misma.

»El acusado promovió el desechamiento de la acusación, reclamando que su sustracción constituía una conducta gubernamental ultrajante y que la Corte de Distrito carecía de jurisdicción para enjuiciarlo, porque había sido sustraído

ANEXOS

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en violación al tratado de Extradición vigente entre los Estados Unidos y México, suscrito el 4 de mayo de 1978. La Corte de Distrito rechazó la reclamación por conducta gubernamental ultrajante, pero sostuvo que carecía de jurisdicción para juzgar al acusado porque su sustracción violaba el tratado de Extradición. La Corte de Distrito desechó los cargos y ordenó que el acusado fuera repatriado a México.

»La Corte de Apelaciones confirmó el desechamiento de la acusación y la orden de repatriación del acusado, apoyándose en su decisión en United States vs. Verdugo Urquídez. En Verdugo, la Corte de Apelaciones sostuvo que la sustracción forzosa de un nacional mexicano, con la autorización o participación de los Estados Unidos, violaba el tratado de Extradición entre los Estados Unidos y México.

Aun cuando el tratado no prohíbe expresamente tales sustracciones, la Corte de Apelaciones sostuvo que el propósito del tratado había sido violado por la sustracción forzosa, que junto con la protesta formal por parte del Estado ofendido, otorgaba al acusado el derecho de invocar la violación del tratado con el fin de impugnar la jurisdicción de la Corte de Distrito para juzgarlo. La Corte de Apelaciones estableció además que el remedio apropiado para tal violación sería el desechamiento de la acusación y la repatriación del acusado a México.

»En el presente caso, la Corte de Apelaciones confirmó la conclusión de la Corte de Distrito de que los Estados Unidos habían autorizado la sustracción del acusado, y de que las cartas [Notas] del Gobierno mexicano al de los Estados Unidos servían como una protesta oficial por la violación del tratado. En consecuencia, la Corte de Apelaciones ordenó que la acusación fuera desechada y que el acusado fuera repatriado a México».

5. Según se señala en el propio fallo:

«La controversia en este caso es si un acusado sustraído de un país con el cual los Estados Unidos tienen un tratado de extradición adquiere por esta razón una protección contra la jurisdicción de las cortes de los Estados Unidos. Nosotros sostenemos que no es así y que puede ser juzgado en una corte federal de distrito por violaciones al derecho penal de los Estados Unidos».

�. La Suprema Corte concedió el recurso de certiorari y revocó el fallo de la Corte de Apelaciones, expresando que:

«Podría ser cierto lo afirmado por el acusado y sus amici en el sentido de que el secuestro fue “escandaloso” y que el mismo constituye una violación

OPINIÓN JURÍDICA SOBRE LA SENtENCIA DE LA SUPREMACORtED DE JUStICIA DE LOS EStADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA

97

a los principios generales del Derecho Internacional. México ha protestado por la sustracción del acusado a través de notas diplomáticas y la decisión sobre si el acusado debería ser devuelto a México, como una materia al margen del Tratado es una decisión que corresponde al Poder Ejecutivo. No obstante concluimos que la sustracción del acusado no fue violatoria del Tratado de Extradición entre los Estados Unidos y México y por lo tanto, la resolución dictada en el caso Ker vs. Illinois es aplicable al presente caso. El hecho de que el acusado haya sido secuestrado en forma violenta no impide su enjuiciamiento en una Corte de los Estados Unidos por violacio‑nes a las leyes penales de este país.

»Por lo tanto la resolución respectiva dictada por la Corte de Apelaciones queda sin efecto y el presente caso se sujetará en lo sucesivo a lo dispuesto en esta resolución.

Así se ordenó».

IV. OPINIÓN DEL COMITÉ JURÍDICO INTERAMERICANO

7. La presente opinión, conforme a lo solicitado, se limita a analizar la sentencia de la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos de América desde el punto de vista de su conformidad con el Derecho Internacional Público. No le corresponde al Comité opinar acerca de la conformidad de dicha sentencia con el derecho interno de los Estados Unidos, pero recuerda que es norma indiscutible del Derecho Internacional que las disposiciones del derecho interno de un Estado no pueden ser invocadas por éste para eludir el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones internacionales.

8. El Comité tuvo presente que el Estado es responsable por la violación de sus obligaciones internacionales, no sólo por el Poder Ejecutivo sino por cualquiera de sus órganos, incluido el Poder Judicial y que los actos u omisiones de éste pueden constituir trans‑gresiones del Derecho Internacional, bien en sí mismos o bien por confirmar o dejar sin remedio violaciones de otros órganos estatales.

9. El Comité se ha basado, en cuanto a los hechos, exclusivamente en lo afirmado como indiscutido en la misma sentencia que estudia.

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Así, da por cierto que el ciudadano mexicano Humberto Álvarez Machain fue secuestrado en territorio mexicano y llevado a territorio de los Estados Unidos y que la responsabilidad de ese secuestro cor‑responde a la Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), órgano del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América que tiene a su cargo la lucha contra el tráfico de estupefacientes.

Del mismo modo, el Comité considera que está fuera de toda discusión y duda que el secuestro en cuestión configure una grave violación del Derecho Internacional Público, pues constituye una trasgresión de la soberanía territorial de México. tampoco se discute la responsabilidad de los Estados Unidos de América por la conducta de la DEA en este caso, pues, en pleno conocimiento de la misma, se ha abstenido de revertirla.

10. De conformidad con las normas que rigen la responsabilidad estatal en Derecho Internacional, todo Estado que viole una obligación internacional debe reparar las consecuencias de esa violación. La reparación tiene por objeto volver en todo lo posible las cosas al estado en que se encontraban antes de suceder la trasgresión. Sólo en la medida en que esto resultara imposible o que la parte agraviada consintiera en ello, habría lugar a una reparación sustitutiva.

11. En virtud de lo antes expuesto, es claro que los Estados Unidos de América, como responsable de la violación de la soberanía de México por el secuestro del ciudadano mexicano Humberto Álvarez Machain, está obligado a repatriarlo, sin perjuicio de otras reparaciones a que su conducta haya podido dar lugar.

12. El análisis de la sentencia de la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos lleva al Comité a la conclusión que la misma es contraria a las normas del Derecho Internacional por las razones siguientes:

a) Porque al afirmar la jurisdicción de los Estados Unidos de América para juzgar al ciudadano mexicano Humberto Álvarez Machain, sustraído por la fuerza en su país de origen, desconoce


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la obligación de los Estados Unidos de restituirlo al país de cuya jurisdicción fue secuestrado.

b) Porque al sostener la tesis de que los Estados Unidos de América son libres de juzgar personas secuestradas a través de la acción de su gobierno en territorio de otros Estados, a menos que ello esté expresamente prohibido por un tratado vigente entre Estados Unidos y el país de que se trate, desconoce el principio fundamental de Derecho Internacional que es el respeto a la soberanía territorial de los Estados.

c) Porque al interpretar el tratado de Extradición entre los Estados Unidos de América y México, en el sentido de que no es impedimento para el secuestro de personas, hace caso omiso del precepto según el cual los tratados deben interpretarse de conformidad con su objeto y fin en relación a las normas aplicables y principios del Derecho Internacional.

13. Finalmente, observa el Comité que si los principios invocados en la sentencia en estudio fueran llevados a sus últimas consecuen‑cias, quedaría irremediablemente quebrantado el orden jurídico inter‑nacional, al atribuirse cada Estado la facultad de violar impunemente la soberanía territorial de los demás Estados. Debe igualmente sub‑rayar el Comité la incompatibilidad de la práctica del secuestro con el debido proceso que corresponde a toda persona, por grave que sea el crimen del que se le acuse, y que constituye uno de los derechos humanos consagrados por el Derecho Internacional.

Esta Opinión fue aprobada por nueve votos a favor y una abstención.

Río de Janeiro, 15 de agosto de 1992.

Manuel A. Vieira (Rúbrica) Seymour J. Rubin (Rúbrica)

ANEXOS

100100

Luis Herrera Marcano (Rúbrica) Juan Bautista Rivarola Paoli (Rúbrica) Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro (Rúbrica) José Luis Siqueiros (Rúbrica) Eduardo Vío Grossi (Rúbrica) Galo Leoro Franco (Rúbrica) Francisco Villagrán Kramer (Rúbrica) Jorge Reinaldo A. Vanossi (Rúbrica)



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LEGAL OPINION OF THE INTER AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE ON

THE RESOLUTION CP/RES.586 (909/92) OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ABOUT THE DECISION ISSUED BY THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE CASE US VS. ALVAREZ

MACHAIN

EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY DR. SEYMOUR J. RUBIN

I have abstained from voting on approval or disapproval of the Report of the Committee on the above cited matter. My reasons are as follows:

1. I have expressed my strong views during the course of the exten‑sive discussion of this matter in the Committee to the effect that,

a) the Committee does not have jurisdiction to issue an opinion on the basis of a resolution on the legality or not of a judgment issued by the Supreme Judicial Authority of one of the member States;

b) I am firmly of the opinion that the acts committed by agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration were a clear violation of International Law;

2. Clearly, whatever the language used in the resolution of the Permanent Council, the Committee is bring asked to issue an opinion directly as to the validity of a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. In doing so, the Committee would he assuming the role


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of a judicial court or an arbitral tribunal. the Committee has no juris‑diction to act in this way. to make such a decision would require the Committee to provide a procedure for the hearing of arguments and the filing of briefs, in other words, to give the parties in interest the kind of opportunity which due process requires in a judicial or arbitral procedure. therefore in this case and following the arguments which I have previously expressed to the Juridical Committee when it sought to make a decision as to the merits of the controverter case, I have consistently, in statements which are on record, made the point that the Inter American Juridical Committee cannot take action of this sort. However one reads articles 104 and 105 of the Charter, they make it clear that Juridical Committee is to take cognizance of juridical —not judicial— matters. My position on this point has been made clear over the years and I am equally convinced here —as I was in cases involving legal claims to the Panama Canal Zone, to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, and to the dispute of territory of Belize—, that the Committee should not take up this aspect of the resolution of the Permanent Council.

3. I am however equally convinced that the intrusion of agents of the United States of America into Mexico to kidnap and to bring back to the United States Dr. Álvarez Machain was an illegal act, illegal under all standards of International Law. I have also stated this on record.

4. therefore in so far as the report under consideration by the Committee purports to decide —whether by binding opinion or not— that a specific decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is wrong or internationally illegal, I believe that the Committee has no competence or jurisdiction under its statute —that is, the OAS Charter. On the merits, as I have said, my own opinion is that an act violative of International Law has been committed.

5. Finally, the argument has been made in the Committee that the Committee as an organ of the OAS has a duty to respond to requests made to it by the Permanent Council. In a sense, I agree

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that the Committee does have an obligation to reply. But the request of the Permanent Council cannot confer upon the Committee an authority which is not conferred on either the Permanent Council or the Committee by the Charter of the OAS. the proper reply to the Permanent Council should be an analysis of International Law con‑siderations which are raised by the case at hand, but not an opinion, advisory or otherwise, with respect to the correctness of a ruling of the Supreme tribunal of one of the member States.

It is my belief that for the Committee to do this would be itself an intrusion prohibited by the Charter of the OAS.

�. In summary, therefore, I believe that there has been a clear viola‑tion of International Law. But I do not believe that the Committee has a right to apply that conclusion to specifics of the case at hand. It is the nearly unanimous view of jurists the world over that a violation of International Law has taken place, I would hope that the matter will be corrected as soon as possible. I note that the United States has already indicated that it would take no further action of this sort. that should be stated. there are several possible ways of doing this. While the res‑titution of Álvarez Machain to Mexico is one such way, other cases, such as the Eichmann case in Argentina, indicate that there are other ways of handling a matter of this sort. I believe that this is a special case, and that its consequences for international law will be limited.

Seymour J. Rubin (Rubric)

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104 104

DECRETO de promulgación del Tratado de Extradición entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y

los Estados Unidos de América, firmado en México, D.F., el 4 de mayo de 1978.

(Publicado en Diario Oficial de 2� de febrero de 1980).

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.

JOSÉ LÓPEZ PORtILLO, Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, a sus habitantes, sabed:

Por Plenipotenciarios debidamente autorizados al efecto, se firmó en la Ciudad de México, Distrito Federal, el día cuatro del mes de mayo del año mil novecientos setenta y ocho, un tratado de Extradición entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América, cuyo texto y forma en español constan en la copia certificada adjunta.

El anterior tratado fue aprobado por la H. Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de la Unión, el día veinte del mes de diciembre del año mil novecientos setenta y ocho, según Decreto publicado en el Diario Oficial de la Federación del día veintitrés del mes de enero del año mil novecientos setenta y nueve.

El Canje de Instrumentos de Ratificación respectivo se efectuó en la ciudad de Washington, D.C., el día veinticuatro del mes de enero del año de mil novecientos ochenta.

Por lo tanto, para su debida observancia, en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en la Fracción Primera del Artículo Ochenta y Nueve de la

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Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, promulgo el presente Decreto, en la residencia del Poder Ejecutivo Federal, en la Ciudad de México, Distrito Federal, a los doce días del mes de febrero del año mil novecientos ochenta.‑ José López Portillo. (Rúbrica). El Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Jorge Castañeda. (Rúbrica).

La C. Aída González Martínez, Oficial Mayor de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, certifica:

que en los Archivos de esta Secretaría obra uno de los dos origi‑nales del tratado de Extradición entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América, firmado en la Ciudad de México, Distrito Federal, el día cuatro del mes de mayo del año mil novecien‑tos setenta y ocho, cuyo texto y forma en español son los siguientes:

TRATADO DE EXTRADICIÓN ENTRE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA

El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América.

Deseosos de cooperar más estrechamente en la lucha contra la delincuencia y de prestarse mutuamente, con ese fin, una mayor asistencia en materia de extradición,

Han acordado lo siguiente:

Artículo 1Obligaciones de Extraditar

1. Las Partes Contratantes se comprometen a entregarse mutua‑mente, con sujeción a las disposiciones de este tratado, a las per‑sonas respecto de las cuales las autoridades competentes de la Parte requirente hayan iniciado un procedimiento penal o que hayan sido

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10�

declaradas responsables de un delito o que sean reclamadas por dichas autoridades para el cumplimiento de una pena de privación de libertad impuesta judicialmente, por un delito cometido dentro del territorio de la Parte requirente.

2. Cuando el delito se haya cometido fuera del territorio de la Parte requirente, la Parte requerida concederá la extradición si:

a) Sus leyes disponen el castigo de dicho delito cometido en circunstancias similares, o

b) La persona reclamada es nacional de la Parte requirente, y ésta tiene jurisdicción de acuerdo con sus leyes para juzgar a dicha persona.

Artículo 2Delitos que Darán Lugar a la Extradición

1. Darán lugar a la extradición conforme a este tratado las conduc‑tas intencionales que, encajando dentro de cualquiera de los incisos del Apéndice, sean punibles conforme a las leyes de ambas Partes Contratantes con una pena de privación de la libertad cuyo máximo no sea menor de un año.

2. Si la extradición se solicita para la ejecución de una sentencia, se requerirá además que la parte de la sentencia que aún falte por cumplir no sea menor de seis meses.

3. Darán también lugar a la extradición las conductas intencionales que, sin estar incluidas en el Apéndice, sean punibles, conforme a las leyes federales de ambas Partes Contratantes, con una pena de privación de la libertad cuyo máximo no sea menor de un año.

4. Bajo las condiciones establecidas en los párrafos 1, 2 y 3, la extradición también será concedida:


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a) Por la tentativa de cometer un delito; la asociación para prepararlo y ejecutarlo; o la participación en su ejecución; o

b) Cuando para los efectos de atribuir jurisdicción al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, el transporte de personas o de bienes el uso de correos u otros medios de realizar actos de comercio interestatal o con el extranjero sea un elemento del delito.

Artículo 3Pruebas Necesarias

Sólo se concederá la extradición si se determina que las pruebas son suficientes, conforme a las leyes de la Parte requerida, bien para justificar el enjuiciamiento del reclamado, si el delito del cual se le acusa hubiese sido cometido en ese lugar, bien para probar que es la persona condenada por los tribunales de la Parte requirente.

Artículo 4Ámbito Territorial de Aplicación

1. A los efectos de este tratado, el territorio de una de las Partes Contratantes comprende todo el territorio sometido a su jurisdicción, incluyendo el espacio aéreo y las aguas territoriales, así como los buques y aviones matriculados en ella, siempre que, tratándose de estos últimos, se hayan encontrado en vuelo en el momento de cometerse el delito.

2. Para los efectos de este tratado, una aeronave será considerada en vuelo todo el tiempo que medie entre el momento en que todas las puertas que dan al exterior hayan sido cerradas, con posterioridad al embarque, hasta el momento en que cualquiera de esas puertas sea abierta para el desembarque.

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Artículo 5Delitos Políticos y Militares

1. No se concederá la extradición si el delito por el cual fue solicitada es político o de carácter político.

En caso de surgir cualquier cuestión respecto de la aplicación del párrafo anterior, corresponderá decidir al Poder Ejecutivo de la Parte requerida.

2. Para los efectos de este tratado, los siguientes delitos no se consideran incluidos en el párrafo 1:

a) El homicidio u otro delito intencional contra la vida o la integri‑dad física de un Jefe de Estado o de Gobierno o de un miembro de su familia, incluyendo la tentativa de cometer un delito de esa índole;

b) Un delito que las Partes Contratantes tenga la obligación de perseguir en virtud de un convenio internacional multilateral;

3. No se concederá la extradición cuando el delito por el cual fue solicitada sea un delito puramente militar.

Artículo 6Nom bis in Ídem

No se concederá la extradición cuando el reclamado haya sido sometido a proceso o haya sido juzgado y condenado o absuelto por la Parte requerida por el mismo delito en que se apoye la solicitud de extradición.

Artículo 7Prescripción

No se concederá la extradición cuando la acción penal o la pena por la cual se pide la extradición hayan prescrito conforme a las leyes de la Parte requirente o de la Parte requerida.


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Artículo 8Pena de Muerte

Cuando el delito por el cual se solicita la extradición sea punible con la pena de muerte conforme a las leyes de la Parte requirente y las leyes de la Parte requerida no permitan tal pena para ese delito, la extradición podrá ser rehusada, a menos que la Parte requirente dé las seguridades que la Parte requerida estime suficientes de que no se impondrá la pena de muerte o de que, si es impuesta, no será ejecutada.

Artículo 9Extradición de Nacionales

1. Ninguna de las dos Partes Contratantes estará obligada a entregar a sus nacionales pero el Poder Ejecutivo de la Parte requerida tendrá la facultad, si no se lo impiden sus leyes, de entregarlos si, a su entera discreción, lo estiman procedente.

2. Si la extradición no es concedida en virtud de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 1 de este artículo, la Parte requerida turnará el expediente a sus autoridades competentes para el ejercicio de la acción penal, siempre y cuando dicha Parte tenga jurisdicción para perseguir el delito.

Artículo 10Procedimientos para la Extradición y

Documentos que son Necesarios

1. La solicitud de extradición se presentará por vía diplomática.

2. La solicitud de extradición deberá contener la expresión del delito por el cual se impide la extradición y será acompañada de:

a) Una relación de los hechos imputados;

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b) El texto de las disposiciones legales que fijen los elementos constituidos del delito;

c) El texto de las disposiciones legales que determinen la pena correspondiente al delito;

d) El texto de las disposiciones legales relativas a la prescripción de la acción penal o de la pena;

e) Los datos y antecedentes personales del reclamado que permi‑tan su identificación y, siempre que sea posible, los conducentes a su localización.

3. Cuando la solicitud de extradición se refiera a una persona que aún no haya sido sentenciada se le anexarán además:

a) Una copia certificada de la orden de aprehensión librada por un juez u otro funcionario judicial de la Parte requirente;

b) Las pruebas que conforme a las leyes de la Parte requerida jus‑tificarían la aprehensión y enjuiciamiento del reclamado, en caso de que el delito se hubiere cometido allí.

4. Cuando la solicitud de extradición se refiera a una persona sentenciada, se le anexará una copia certificada de la sentencia condenatoria decretada por un tribunal de la Parte requirente.

Si la persona fue declarada culpable, pero no se fijó la pena, a la solicitud de extradición se agregará una certificación al respecto y una copia certificada de la orden de aprehensión.

Si a dicha persona ya se le impuso una pena, la solicitud de extradición deberá estar acompañada de una certificación de la pena impuesta y de una constancia que indique la parte de la pena que aún no haya sido cumplida.


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5. todos los documentos que deban ser presentados por la Parte requirente conforme a las disposiciones de este tratado deberán estar acompañadas de una traducción al idioma de la Parte requerida.

�. Los documentos que, de acuerdo con este artículo, deban acompa‑ñar la solicitud de extradición, serán recibidos como prueba cuando:

a) En el caso de una solicitud que se origine en los Estados Unidos, estén autorizados con el sello oficial del Departamento de Estado y legalizados además en la forma que prescriba la ley mexicana;

b) En el caso de una solicitud que se origine en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos estén legalizados por el principal funcionario diplomático o consular de los Estados Unidos en México.

Artículo 11Detención Provisional

1. En caso de urgencia, cualquiera de las Partes Contratantes podrá pedir, por la vía diplomática, la detención provisional de una persona acusada o sentenciada. El pedimento deberá contener la expresión del delito por el cual se pide la extradición, la descripción del reclamado y su paradero, la promesa de formalizar la solicitud de extradición y una declaración de la existencia de una orden de aprehensión librada por autoridad judicial competente o de una sentencia condenatoria en contra del reclamado.

2. Al recibo de un pedimento de esa naturaleza, la Parte requeri‑da tomará las medidas necesarias para obtener la aprehensión del reclamado.

3. Se pondrá fin a la detención provisional si, dentro de un plazo de sesenta días después de la aprehensión del reclamado, el Poder Ejecutivo de la Parte requerida no ha recibido la solicitud formal de extradición con los documentos mencionados en el artículo 10.

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4. El hecho de que no se ponga fin a la detención provisional en aplicación del párrafo 3 no impedirá la extradición del reclamado si la solicitud de extradición y los documentos necesarios para fundarla, enumerados en el artículo 10, son entregados posteriormente.

Artículo 12Pruebas Adicionales

Si el Poder Ejecutivo de la Parte requerida estima que las pruebas presentadas en apoyo de la solicitud de extradición no son suficientes para satisfacer los requisitos de este tratado, dicha Parte solicitará la presentación de las pruebas adicionales que sean necesarias.

Artículo 13Procedimiento

1. La solicitud de extradición será tramitada de acuerdo con la legislación de la Parte requerida.

2. La Parte requerida dispondrá los procedimientos internos necesarios para dar curso a la solicitud de extradición.

3. Los funcionarios competentes de la Parte requerida quedarán autorizados para emplear todos los medios legales a su alcance con el fin de obtener de las autoridades judiciales las decisiones necesarias para la resolución de la solicitud de extradición.

Artículo 14Resolución y Entrega

1. La Parte requerida comunicará sin demora a la Parte requirente su resolución respecto de la solicitud de extradición.


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2. En caso de denegación total o parcial de una solicitud de extradición, la Parte requerida expondrá las razones en que se haya fundado.

3. Si se concede la extradición, la entrega del reclamado se hará dentro de un plazo que fijen las leyes de la Parte requerida. Las auto‑ridades competentes de las Partes Contratantes convendrán en el día y lugar de entrega del reclamado.

4. Si la autoridad competente ha expedido el mandamiento u orden para la extradición del reclamado y éste no es llevado fuera del territorio de la Parte requerida dentro del plazo prescrito, será puesto en libertad y la Parte requerida podrá posteriormente negarse a extraditarlo por el mismo delito.

Artículo 15Entrega Diferida

La parte requerida podrá, después de acceder a la extradición diferir la entrega del reclamado cuando existan procedimientos en curso en contra de él o cuando se encuentre cumpliendo una pena en el territorio de la Parte requerida por un delito distinto, hasta la con‑clusión del procedimiento o la plena ejecución de la sanción que le haya sido impuesta.

Artículo 16Solicitudes de Extradición de Terceros Estados

La Parte requerida, en caso de recibir solicitudes de la otra Parte Contratante y de uno o varios terceros Estados para la extradición de la misma persona, ya sea por el mismo delito o por delitos distintos, decidirá a cuál de los Estados requirentes concederá la extradición de dicha persona.

ANEXOS

114

Artículo 17Regla de la Especialidad

1. Una persona extraditada conforme al presente tratado no será detenida, enjuiciada o sancionada en el territorio de la Parte requirente por un delito distinto de aquél por el cual se concedió le extradición, ni será extraditada por dicha Parte a un tercer Estado a menos que;

a) Haya abandonado el territorio de la Parte requirente después de su extradición y haya regresado voluntariamente a él;

b) No haya abandonado el territorio de la Parte requirente dentro de los �0 días siguientes a la fecha en que haya estado en libertad de hacerlo; o

c) La Parte requerida haya dado su consentimiento para que sea detenida, enjuiciada, sancionada o extraditada a un tercer Estado por un delito distinto de aquél por el cual se concedió la extradición.

Estas disposiciones no se aplicarán a delitos cometidos después de la extradición.

2. Si, en el curso del procedimiento se cambia la calificación del delito por el cual el reclamado fue extraditado, será enjuiciado y sentenciado a condición de que el delito, en su nueva configuración legal;

a) Esté fundado en el mismo conjunto de hechos establecidos en la solicitud de extradición y en los documentos presentados en su apoyo; y

b) Sea punible con la misma pena máxima que el delito por el cual fue extraditado o con una pena cuyo máximo sea menor.


115

Artículo 18Extradición Sumaria

Si el reclamado manifiesta a las autoridades competentes de la Parte requerida que consiente en ser extraditado, dicha Parte podrá conceder su extradición sin mayores trámites y tomará todas las medidas permitidas por sus leyes para expedir la extradición. No será aplicable en estos casos el artículo 17.

Artículo 19Entrega de Objetos

1. En la medida en que lo permitan las leyes de la Parte requerida y sin perjuicio de los derechos de terceros, los cuales serán debidam‑ente respetados, todos los Artículos, instrumentos objetos de valor o documentos relacionados con el delito, aun cuando no hayan sido uti‑lizados para su ejecución, o que de cualquier manera puedan servir de prueba en el proceso, serán entregados al concederse la extradición, aun cuando la extradición no pueda consumarse por la muerte, desaparición o fuga del acusado.

2. La Parte requerida podrá condicionar la entrega de objetos a que la Parte requirente dé seguridades satisfactorias de que tales objetos sean devueltos a la Parte requerida a la brevedad posible.

Artículo 20Tránsito

1. El tránsito por el territorio de una de las Partes Contratantes de una persona que no sea nacional de esa Parte Contratante, entregada a la otra Parte Contratante por un tercer Estado, será permitido medi‑ante la presentación por la vía diplomática de una copia certificada de la resolución en la que se concedió la extradición, siempre que no se opongan razones de orden público.

ANEXOS

11�

2. Corresponderá a las autoridades del Estado de tránsito la custodia del extraditado mientras permanezca en su territorio.

3. La Parte requirente reembolsará al Estado de tránsito cualquier gasto en que éste incurra con tal motivo.

Artículo 21Gastos

La Parte requerida se hará cargo de todos los gastos que ocasionen los procedimientos internos mencionados en el Artículo 13, con excepción de los gastos inherentes a la traducción de documentos y, en su caso, al transporte del reclamado, los cuales serán expensados por la Parte requirente.

Artículo 22Ámbito Temporal de Aplicación

1. Este tratado se aplicará a los delitos especificados en el artículo 2 que hayan sido cometidos, ya sea antes o después de su entrada en vigor.

2. Las solicitudes de extradición que se encuentren en trámite en la fecha en que entre en vigor este tratado serán resueltas conforme a las disposiciones del tratado de 22 de febrero de 1899 y de las Convenciones Adicionales sobre Extradición de 25 de junio de 1902, 23 de diciembre de 1925 y 1� de agosto de 1939.


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Artículo 23Ratificación, Entrada en Vigor, Denuncia

1. Este tratado está sujeto a ratificación; el canje de los instrumen‑tos de ratificación se hará en la ciudad de Washington a la brevedad posible.

2. Este tratado entrará en vigor en la fecha del canje de los instru‑mentos de ratificación.

3. Al entrar en vigor este tratado, el tratado de Extradición de 22 de febrero de 1899 y las Convenciones Adicionales sobre Extradición de 25 de junio de 1902, 23 de diciembre de 1925 y 1� de agosto de 1939 entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América dejarán de surtir efectos sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 22.

4. Cualquiera de las Partes Contratantes podrá poner término a este tratado mediante aviso que dé a la otra Parte. La terminación surtirá efectos seis meses después del recibo de dicho aviso.

Hecho en dos originales, en español y en inglés, ambos igual‑mente válidos, en la Ciudad de México, a los cuatro días del mes de mayo del año mil novecientos setenta y ocho. Por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos: Santiago Roel García. (Rúbrica). Por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América: Cyrus Vance (Rúbrica).

Apéndice

1. Homicidio; parricidio; infanticidio; aborto.

2. Lesiones graves intencionales.

3. Abandono de menores u otros dependientes cuando haya peligro de daño o muerte.

ANEXOS

118

4. Secuestro; privación ilegal de libertad; robo de infante; rapto.

5. Violación; estupro; atentado al pudor; corrupción de menores, incluyendo actos sexuales ilícitos cometidos con menores de edad.

�. Lenocinio.

7. Robo; robo con violencia; allanamiento de morada.

8. Fraude.

9. Abuso de confianza: peculado; malversación de fondos.

10. Delitos relativos a la falsificación en todas sus formas.

11. Extorsión; exacción ilegal.

12. Recibir o transportar sumas de dinero, valores o cualquier cosa a sabiendas de que fueron obtenidas delictuosamente.

13. Incendio intencional y daño intencional en propiedad ajena.

14. Delitos relativos al tráfico, posesión producción, elaboración, importación o exportación de drogas y productos químicos peligrosos incluyendo drogas narcóticas, cannabis, drogas psicotrópicas, opio, cocaína o sus derivados.

15. Delitos en materia de control de productos químicos venenosos o de sustancias dañinas a la salud.

1�. Piratería.

17. Delitos contra la seguridad de los medios de transporte incluyendo cualquier acto que ponga en peligro a una persona en un medio de transporte.


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18. Secuestro o apoderamiento ilegal de trenes, aeronaves, barcos u otros medios de transporte.

19 Delitos en materia de armas prohibidas y control de armas de fuego, municiones, explosivos, aparatos incendiarios o materias nucleares.

20. Delitos contra el comercio internacional y en materia de trans‑misión internacional de fondos y metales preciosos.

21. Delitos previstos en las leyes relativas a la importación, exportación o tránsito internacional de bienes, artículos o mercancías incluyendo objetos históricos o arqueológicos.

22. Delitos en materia aduanal.

23. Delitos previstos en las leyes relativas al control de sociedades mercantiles, instituciones bancarias y otras personas morales.

24. Delitos previstos en las leyes relacionadas con el mercado de valores, incluyendo la venta de acciones, bonos y títulos de crédito.

25. Delitos previstos en las leyes relacionadas con la quiebra o suspensión de pagos de una sociedad mercantil.

2�. Delitos en materia de monopolios y de competencia desleal.

27. Delitos previstos en las leyes relacionadas con la protección de la propiedad industrial y derechos de autor.

28. Delitos previstos en las leyes relacionadas con el abuso de autoridad.

29. Cohecho y concusión.

ANEXOS

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30. Falsedad en declaraciones judiciales o en informes dados a una autoridad publica distinta de la judicial. Sobornar a otro para que se produzca con falsedad.

31. Delitos relativos a la obstrucción de la justicia, incluyendo el encubrimiento y la supresión de pruebas.

La presente es copia fiel y completa en español del tratado de Extradición entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América, firmado en la Ciudad de México, Distrito Federal, el día cuatro del mes de mayo del año mil novecientos setenta y ocho.

Extiendo la presente, en veinte páginas útiles, en tlatelolco, Distrito Federal, a los ocho días del mes de febrero del año mil novecientos ochenta, a fin de incorporarla al Decreto de Promulgación respectivo. La Oficial Mayor, Aída González Martínez. (Rúbrica).



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