Article Viii digested Cases

8/13/2019 Article Viii digested Cases

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INFOTECH TECHNOLOGY VS COMELEC

Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which

authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a

computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test

the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170

a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to

conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election

System; namely, Phase I Voter Registration and Validation

System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing System;

and Phase III Electronic Transmission.

On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to

fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of

Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.

On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to

Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".

On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the

herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the

Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.

Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos

Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC

"due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding

process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with

eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of

which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought are-bidding.

Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional;

Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;

Whether the petitioner has standing; and

Whether the petition is premature.

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby

declares NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding

the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium(MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed

between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec

is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract

or agreement entered into with regard to this project.

Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with

inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and observing

mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It also

accepted the proferred computer hardware and software even if, at

the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical

requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections:

1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even

participate in the bidding

2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to

meet the mandatory eligibility requirements

3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract

to MPC despite the issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed

the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31

4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during

the bidding process, there were violations of the mandatory

requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own

Request for Proposal on the automated election system IHaECA

5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-

bidding despite the failure of the bidders to pass the technical tests

conducted by the Department of Science and Technology

6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in theconduct of the bidding for the automated counting machines

After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised

during the Oral Argument, the Court deems it sufficient to focus

discussion on the following major areas of concern that impinge on

the issue of grave abuse of discretion:

A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC

as a bidder

B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the

DOST technical tests

C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and

DOST after the award, and their effect on the present controversy

In view of the bidding process

Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what

manner and by what standards or criteria the condition, performance

and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-

appraised and thereafter given the passing mark.

The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not

only the manufacturing of the ACM hardware but also the

development of three (3) types of software, which are intended for

use in the following:

1. Evaluation of Technical Bids

2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures

3. Election Day Use."

In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the

decision to award the Contract to the "winning" bidder partly on the

basis of the operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That

software was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo" software,


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which would not be the actual one that would be used on election

day.

What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the

software that was the subject of the Contract was still to be created

and could conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being

considered as being in final form?

In view of awarding of contract

The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP

(Request for Proposal for the Automation of the 2004 Election)

mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's

first envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish its

eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the

contract if its bid was accepted, while the second envelope would bethe Bid Envelope itself.

The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as

articles of incorporation, business registrations, licenses and permits,

mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents

containing documentary evidence to establish the track record of the

bidder and its technical and production capabilities to perform the

contract; and financial documents, including audited financial

statements for the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial

capacity.

However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture

agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement, or

business plan executed among the members of the purported

consortium.So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding process,

Comelec had no basis at all for determining that the alleged

consortium really existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the

arrangements among the members were satisfactory and sufficient to

ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's

interest.

In view of standing

On the other hand, petitioners suing in their capacities as

taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens respond thatthe issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and

of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and

questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would

impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process.

Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the

will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic

system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of

any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in

gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws

governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue

when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or if

public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or

when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public

funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."

In view of prematurity

The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May

29, 2003 28 serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an

actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award

the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein

petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the

Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.

Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the

requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because

it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.

Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule

on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as

follows:

"(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative

agency concerned,

(5) when there is irreparable injury,

(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts

as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed

approval of the latter,

(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would

be unreasonable,

(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,

(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case

proceedings,

(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and

adequate remedy, and

(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of

judicial intervention."

SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA

judicial power and judicial function


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Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem.

School. He was adjudged 3rd Honors (3rd placer). 3 days before

graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the

ranking of honor students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against

the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating

honors.

They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of

official discretion because they claim that

o the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of

Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only.

o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade

1 to 5

o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6

teachers during the summer (gaining unfair advantage)

o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers.

o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention

to pull him to a much lower rank

o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word first

place was erased and replaced with second place

o That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed

the buck to each other to delay his grievances.

The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was

improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the question has

become academic (because the graduation already proceeded).

Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on

the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a

tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions. (under Rule 65,

certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions)

ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is

judicial power?

SC:

A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers.

The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in thenature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to

exist,

(TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD

EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS)

1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons

brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination. , and

2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce

judgment and render a decision.

3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which

belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the

executive)

It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine

what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect

to a matter in controversy.

The phrase judicial power is defined:

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear

and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety

of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.

The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining

cases before them.

The construction of laws and the adjudication of legalrights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither

judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned

task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some

specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to

such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring therefrom is

brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and

authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the

respective rights of contending parties.

There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when

teachers sit down to assess individual merits of their pupils for

purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have

not presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for

Teachers which was allegedly violated by the Committee.

The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of

judges.

And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty

contests, and similar competitions.

In re LAURETA

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY

ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF

CONTEMPTPROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-

ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE,

vs. HON. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, ET AL

G.R. No. L-68635May 14, 1987

Facts:

Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about

the dismissal of the her case (aland dispute involving large estate) by


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a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust

resolutiondeliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st

Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyondthe limits of

legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that,

there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finishedby a

long shot. She threatened that she would call for a pressconference.Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of

Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was establishedthat Justice

Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen

and counsel for theopponents.The letters were referred to the SC en

banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was

issued,the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice

Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and thatJustice Yap was not

aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also

made clear thatJustice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the

case.Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa,

Herrera, Cruz), again

with more threats to exposethe kind of judicial performance readily

constituting travesty of justice.

True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the

Tanodbayan, charging the Justiceswith knowingly rendering an

unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also

chargedof using their influence in the First Division in rendering said

Minute Resolution.Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He

circulate copies of the complain to the press, without anycopy

furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear

that the Justices were chargedwith graft and corruption.The

Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.Now, the SC is charging them

with contempt.They claim that the letters were private

communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor thecourt.

Issue: WON privacy of communication was violated

Held: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of

concern for the entire court.

There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority

and duty under the premises isunmistakable. It must act to preserve

its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate

lawyer,mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics

of the legal profession.

We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres

letters, nor with the complaint filedwith the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta

repeated disparaging remarks such as undue influence,

powerfulinfluence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report

that Laureta distributed copies of thecomplaint to the newspaper

companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over

the radio.Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the

proceedings.SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other

departments of the government because of separationof powers. The

correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches

of government.

NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE

Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under

RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and

privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision

plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by

the title

The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to

Noblejas, requiring him to explain.

Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank

equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and

investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the

Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the

Supreme Court

Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive

Secretary (ES)

Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of

the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be

investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank

equivalent to a judge)?

SC: NO.

If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank

and privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and

be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such

grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate

the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the

Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control

over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the

control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge

the Judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonable

incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor

can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are

essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and itsmembers should not and cannot be required to exercise any power

or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or

connected with the administration of judicial functions.

As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same priv ileges as those of a

judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to

demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or

removed only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would

be violative of the Constitution.

The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.


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Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a

judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and

binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties

themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not

automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the

resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the

administrative or executive functions.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996FACTS: On March 13, 1992,

Congress enactedRA. 7227

(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created

the Subic EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to

implement the declarednational policy of converting the Subic military

reservation intoalternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the

Subicmilitary reservation to the Philippines government.Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,

particularly thepreservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings,

houses and otherinstallations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the

Sangguniang Bayanof Moron, Bataan passed

Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10 Serye 1993

, expressing therein itsabsolute concurrence, as required by said

Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to jointhe Subic Special Economic Zone and

submitted such to the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a

Petition with theSangguniang Bayan of Morong toannul Pambayang

Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify

PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special

Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are

met.

The Sangguniang Bayanng Morong acted upon the petition

bypromulgatingPambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993

requestingCongress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of

RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under

theLGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on

theground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not

anordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued

Proclamation No. 53 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ

including therein theportion of the former naval base within the

territorial jurisdiction of theMunicipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued

Resolution No. 2845and 2848 adopting a "Calendar of Activities for

local referendum andproviding for "the rules and guidelines to govern

the conduct of thereferendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari

contestingthe validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public

respondent isintent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes

anamendment of a national law

ISSUE:

1.WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgatingResolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the

referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan

Blg. 10

2.WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the

powersof the people of Morong to enact;

i .e., whether such initiative "seeksthe amendment of a national law."

HELD:

1.YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.FIRST. The

process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVEbutrespondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM

only.In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the

footnote below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times,

but "initiative" is notmentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the

exercise as a "Referendum"; thecounting of votes was entrusted to a

"Referendum Committee"; thedocuments were called "referendum

returns"; the canvassers, "ReferendumBoard of Canvassers" and the

ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not

once was the word "initiative" used in saidbody of Resolution No.

2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably anINITIATIVE.As

defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and

laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of thelegislativeassembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right

reserved to the peopleto adopt or reject any act or measure which

has been passed by a legislativebody and which in most cases would

without action on the part of electorsbecome a law.In initiative and

referendum, the Comelec exercises administration andsupervision of

the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.

These law-making powers belong to the people, hence

therespondent Commission cannot control or change the substance

or thecontent of legislation.


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2.The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal

resolution isstill in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet

anapproved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be

nothing tocontest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have

voted for it and ithas become an approved ordinance or resolutionthat rights and obligationscan be enforced or implemented

thereunder. At this point, it is merely aproposal and the writ or

prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture orpossibility.

Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only

actualcontroversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.In the

present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to

reviewComelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of

grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same

authority in regard to theproposed initiative since it has not been

promulgated or approved, or passedupon by any "branch or

instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. TheCommission on

Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncementsabout theissues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply

includedverbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848.

Hence, there isreally no decision or action made by a branch,

instrumentality or court whichthis Court could take cognizance of and

acquire jurisdiction over, in theexercise of its review powers

TANO VS SOCRATES

Facts:Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the ff:

a) Ordinance No. 15-92 (an ordinance banning the shipment of all

live fish and lobster outside Puerto prinsesa city from January 1,

1993 to January 1, 1998 enacted by Sangguniang panglungsod ng

Puerto Princesa

b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by city mayor Lucero

for checking or conducting necessary inspections on cargoes

containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto

Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the

jurisdiction of the City to any point of destination either via aircraft or

seacraft. The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the

shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by this Office

and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the

local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources

c) Resolution No. 33, issued by Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

palawan (resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing,

buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic

organisms)

They contend that the, the Ordinances deprived them of due process

of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice

of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and

7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition

under which the Mayor's permit could be granted or denied; in other

words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or

not to issue the permit.

Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan "altogether

prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and

shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any

distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishingmethod," the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen

to earn their livelihood in lawful ways.

Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null

and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano

and the others have to be dismissed.

The LGU contends that this was a valid exercise of power under the

general welfare clause and the specific power to protect the

environment

Issue/s

WON the said ordinances and resolutions are unconstitutional

Held/Ratio: No. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are

meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the

end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present

generation, but also for the generations to come.

The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal

fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In

accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to

the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII

of the Constitution, their "exploration, development and utilization

shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."

Moreover, their mandated protection, development and conservation

as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply

certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in

favor of anyone.

What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in

the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and

advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology

in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature

The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to

give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced andhealthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly

mentions this right

The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery

privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges

therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of

explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami,

and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any

violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the

sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the

sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the

general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall


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include, inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and

impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the

environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive

fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration

of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance."

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization asexpressly mandated by the Constitution. Indispensable to

decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that

"[a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be

liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question

thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the

lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the

existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local

government unit concerned." Devolution refers to the act by which

the National Government confers power and authority upon the

various local government units to perform specific functions and

responsibilities.

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC

on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters

including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes

the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws

within the municipal waters.

In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution

enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to local

government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause),

and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a)

(1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power,

the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

Parenthetically, these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No.

7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP)

for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992. This statute adopts a

"comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of

Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural

resources and endangered environment of the province," which "shall

serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government

agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans,

programs and projects affecting said province."

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal

objectives or purposes:

(1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or

aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and

(2) (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of

Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further

destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

The requirement of approval by the Secretary of the Department of

Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and

fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the

following reasons:

(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or

amends Sections 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 45 insofar as they are

inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.

(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the

LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact

ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology.

Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang

panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact

ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate

penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite

fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other

activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of

rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance

Judgment : petition dismissed

MALAGA VS PECHOS

Facts:

1.Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF), through its

Pre-qualification, Bidsand Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC)

published in Western Visayas Daily anInvitation to bid for the Micro

Laboratory Building at ISCOF containing the following:a.last day of

submission of pre-qualification requirements is Dec. 2, 1988b.bids to

be received and opened on Dec. 12, 3PM2.Pets. Malaga and Najarro

submitted their pre-qual req at 2PM of Dec. 2 but they werenot

allowed to participate since their documents were considered late.

PBAC said cut-off time is 10AM.3.Pets. filed a complaint with Iloilo

RTC against PBAC chairman and members for refusingto accepttheir pre-qual doc w/o just cause resulting to their non-participation

on thebidding. They prayed that the bidding be rescheduled and their

docs accepted and if

the bidding is over, that the project be not awarded pending the

resolution of complaint. A TRO was issued.

4.On Dec. 16, respondents filed a motion to lift TRO alleging that

under PD 1818, thecourt cannot issue restraining orders of

injunctions. They added that the injunction ismoot and academic

since bidding ended at 11:30AM and the restraining order

wasreceived at 2PM.PD 1818, Sec 1: No Court in the Philippines

shall have jurisdiction to issue anyrestraining order, preliminary

injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction inany case, dispute, or

controversy involving an

infrastructure project,oramining, fishery, forest or other natural

resource development project of thegovernment, or any public

utilityoperated by the government, includingamong others public

utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities,stevedoring and

arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity

orgovernment official from proceeding with, or continuing the

execution orimplementation of any such project, or the operation of

such public utility, orpursuing any lawful activity necessary for such


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execution, implementation oroperation.5.Pets. argued that PD 1818

is not applicable since ISCOF is not part of the natl govt orany local

political subdivision thereof having its own charter. And even if it

wascovered, it is not a legal govt project within the scope of PD

1818.6.The RTC ruled in favor of resp. saying ISCOF is part of the

govt and is therefore w/inthe ambit of PD 1818. And even if not, the

injunction will still fail as it was receivedwhen the bidding was closed.Non-awarding of project cannot be sought as it is in thepower of the

ISCOf President to do so and he is not a party to the case.

7.Irregularities on the details of invitation to bid:a.No time for deadline

of submission of pre-qual req on Dec. 12.b.Time and date of bidding

published was 3PM but it was held at 10AM8.Pets. aver that

injunction is not moot because the projects was not yet awarded

andISCOF pres. is not an indespensable party since his function to

award is only ministerialupon the recommendation of the PBAC. At

any rate, the complaint was amended toinclude him.

9.Resp. contend that since the members of the board of trustees ofthe ISCOF are allgovernment officials under Section 7 of P.D. 1523

and since the operations andmaintenance of the ISCOF are provided

for in the General Appropriations Law, it shouldbe considered a

government institution whose infrastructure project is covered by

P.D.1818.

10.Pets added that the rule is that when the amount of the project is

P1M-5M, theproposal book forms should be submitted 30 days prior

to bidding but PBAC issuedthem only on Dec. 2.11.Resp., in their

reply, contended that pets licenses were expired.

Issues:1.W/N ISCOF is part of the govt2.W/N ISCOFs project is

covered by PD 1818Ruling:1.ISCOF is a chartered institution and is

therefore covered by P.D. 1818 The 1987 Administrative Code

defines a government instrumentality as follows:Instrumentality refers

to any agency of the National Government, notintegrated within the

department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction

by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,administering

special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usuallythrough a

charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, charteredinstitutions,

and government-owned or controlled corporations.

2.Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is

covered by the prohibitionin the said decree. There are at least two

irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of thebiddingand the award of the project.

a.PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of

bids and thenchanged these deadlines without prior notice to

prospective participants. It isan irregular notice. As a general rule,

non-compliance with the requirement willrender the same void and of

no effect.

b.PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans,

specificationsand proposal book forms for the project to be bid 30

days before the date of bidding if the estimated project cost was

between P1M and P5M. These formswere issued only on December

2, 1988, or only ten days before the biddingscheduled for December

12, 1988.P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny

irregularites committed byadministrative agencies such as the

anomalies above described.3.Restraining order upheld, nominal

damages of 10K to be paid by each member of PBACboard of

trustees to each pet separately, PBAC chairman and members

removed fromboard for malfeasance in office.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

(JBC)

G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.

FACTS:

This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the

controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory

requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days

after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman

Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed aletter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the

office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January

18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated

that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up

the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the

retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC

opened the position of Chief Justice for application or

recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement

in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting

of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of

announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the

public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if

any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun

the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in

accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to

submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the

controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which

led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the

prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to

pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice

by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by

the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.

Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the

RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,

respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by

which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the

exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions

during the period therein fixed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.


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3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.

HELD:

1.No.Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987,

mandates that decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the

President shallbecome final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt

of a copy therof xxx unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is

filed within such period.

The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made

it impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the

said decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot

be considered a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with

such referral, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period

fixed by law, rule or regulation.

The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made

subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body.

2.No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no

longer be disturbed or substantially modified. Res judicata has set in

and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.

Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due

regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases

to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival

claims and in the administration of justice. The Constitution

guarantees that all persons shall have a right to the speedy

disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and

administrative bodies.

While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be

prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure

an orderly & speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in the

relaxation of rules was never intended to forge a bastion for erring

litigants to violate the rules with impunity.

A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can

only be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes and

circumstances.

3.No. It is a question of substance & merit.

A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court ortribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was

rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of

Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is

an essential and mandatory requirement before a case or

controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done

in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed.

These grave breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are

clearly substantial, not of technical nature.

When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and

executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all

others who should be benefited by the said Decision.

In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in

Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing party has

the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winningparty also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the

resolution of his/her case.

BAKER VS CARR

Facts

Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee.

Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of

Tennessee. Bakers complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature

had not redrawn its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the

Tennessee State Constitution which required redistricting according

to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urbanpart of the state, asserted that the demographics of the state had

changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities,

thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.

Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought

the remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court

denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a

political question and would therefore not be heard by the court.

Issues

Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge

to a legislative apportionment?

What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political

question?

Holding and Rule (Brennan)

Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional

challenge to a legislative apportionment.

The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a

case presents a political question are:

Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the

issue to a coordinate political department (i.e. foreign affairs or

executive war powers)?

Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards

for resolving the issue?

The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.


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The impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution

without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of

government.

Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political

decision already made?

Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of

embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various

departments on one question?

The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers

and whether a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases

basis. In regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive

governmental action regarding an issue then a court can construe a

treaty and decide a case. Regarding the dates of the duration of

hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a

decision, the court may be able to decide the case.

The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present apolitical question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by

another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial

standards under the Equal Protection Clause were well developed

and familiar, and it had been open to courts since the enactment of

the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and

capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with

any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a

political question and the Court will not answer it without further

clarification from the other branches.

See Brown v. Board of Education for a constitutional law case brief

featuring an interpretation and application of the Equal ProtectionClause of the Fourteenth Amendment in an opinion involving

segregation in public schools.

REPUBLIC VS GINGOYON

G.R. No. 166429 (E)December 19, 2005FACTS

The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the

Courtsdecision in Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in2003 (2003

Decision). This decision nullified the

Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer

Arrangementof the Ninoy Aquino International Airport PassengerTerminal III entered into between the Philippine

Government(Government) and the Philippine International Air

Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments

andsupplements thereto.The agreement had authorized PIATCO to

build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a

franchise tooperate and maintain the said terminal during the

concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified and that

theagreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the

promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities hadalready

been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the

ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities

following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights

of PIATCO for reimbursementfor its expenses in the construction of

the facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3

facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despitethe

avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into

immediate operation. The Government and PIATCOconducted

several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities.In 2004,the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay

RTC. The Government sought upon the filingof the complaint the

issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate

possession and control overthe NAIA 3 facilities. The Government

also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00

(3 Billion) inCash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing

the NAIA 3

terminals assessed value for taxation

purposes. TheGovernment insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court

governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusionofall other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act

No. 8974 which does apply.

ISSUE

Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974

governs the expropriation proceedings in this case?

HELD

The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to

be observed before the Government may take overthe NAIA 3, that

there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation inaccordance with law and equity. Any ruling inthe present

expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court

as pronounced in the Agan cases.Rule 67 outlines the procedure

under which eminent domain may be exercised by the

Government.Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation

proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more

favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably

applies in instances when the national government expropriates

property for national government infrastructureprojects. Thus, if

expropriation is engaged

in by the national government for purposes other than national

infrastructureprojects, the assessed value standard and the deposit

mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.Rep. Act No. 8974

applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate

payment by the Government of atleast the proffered value of the

NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards

or methods for thedetermination of just compensation. Applying Rep.

Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of

the Government over NAIA 3 is held inabeyance until PIATCO is

directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered

value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.


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TORRECAMPO v. MWSS

Doctrine:

Despite the presence of judicial power under Article I, Section VIIIof

the Constitution, a review of Executive policy is not under the

jurisdictionof the courts for such policies lies only within the wisdom

of the Executivebranch.

Petition:Petition for Injunction in the Supreme Court

Plaintiff & Appellees:Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo

Defendant & Appellant: Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System

Date: May 30, 2011

Ponente: Justice Carpio

Summary:

Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo filed a petition forinjunction in

the Supreme Courtregarding the C5 Road ExtensionProject for the

said project wouldresult to injury to the petitioner andeight million

residents of MetroManila. The project would endangerthe health of

the residents foraqueducts responsible for thewater supply in the

area could bedamaged. The Supreme Courtruled, however, that

Torrecampo isnot entitled to an injunction for heseeks judicial review

of anExecutive policy which is outside of the wisdom of the courts.

Facts:

1. Torrecampo filed the petition forinjunction pursuant to Sec. 3 ofR.A8975 on July 1, 2009, a day afterDPWH entered a portion of

Barangay Matandang Balara toimplement the C-5 Road

ExtensionProject. Torrecampo insists that theRI-PADA area is a

better alternativeto subject lots for the project.2. Atty. Agra for MWSS

finds thepetition immature for the roadproject has yet to be

implemented. The entry of DPWH in the area isdone to conduct

study on the areaand on the location of theaqueducts.3. Through RA

6234, MWSSexplains its participation in the C5Road Expansion

Project. The MWSSexplains that they have jurisdiction,supervision,

and control over allthe sewerage and waterworkssystems located in

Metro Manila,Rizal province, and a portion of Cavite province.4.

MWSS issued Board ResolutionNo. 2009-052 on March 12, 2009thatallowed DPWH to use the 60-meter Right-of-Way for

preliminarystudies of the road expansionproject.5. DPWH entered

the Right-of-Wayon June 30, 2009 to conductnecessary studies for

the project.6. The court issued that Torrecampo is not entitled to

aninjunction. Thus, Torrecampospetition is denied.

Issue:

1. WON respondents should beenjoined from commencing withand

implementing the C-5 RoadExtension Project along TandangSora

Road, affecting MWSSproperties.

Held:

1. The court rules that Torrecampois not entitled to an injunction for

judicial review does not apply tomatters concerning the

Executivebranch

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease

Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment

and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of

ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net

receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to

employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the

expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25

million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid

because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's

Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is stillviolative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public

bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.

Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the

law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the

Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to

determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors

of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further

their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because

they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining

the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings

on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were

actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the

present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in

Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be

regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the

cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An

issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former

suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between

the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule

does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated

claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an

instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from

the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the

second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal

matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous

decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing.

STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no


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constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate

issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

FRANSISCO VS HOR

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were

filed againstSupreme CourtChief Justice Hilario Davide. The

justiciable controversy in this casewas the constitutionality of the

subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvertthe rules of

impeachment providedfor by law.ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of

the second impeachment complaint against Chief JusticeHilario G.

Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional,

andcrisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in

ImpeachmentProceedingswhich were approved by the House of

Representativesare unconstitutional.Consequently, thesecond

impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide, is

barred underparagraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the

controversy, thisCourt is evermindful of the essential truth that the

inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among thelegislative,

executive or judicial branches of government by nomeans prescribes

for absoluteautonomy in the discharge by each of that part of

thegovernmental power assigned to it by thesovereign people.At the

same time, thecorollary doctrine of checks and balances which has

been carefullycalibrated by theConstitution to temper the official acts

of each of these three branches mustbe giveneffect without

destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists

noconstitutionalbasis for the contention that the exercise of judicial

review overimpeachment proceedingswould upset the system of

checks and balances. Verily, theConstitution is to be interpreted as

awhole and "one section is not to be allowed todefeat another." Both

are integral componentsof the calibrated system of independence

and interdependence that insures that nobranch of government act

beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.Theframers of

the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.

Thuswhen aproposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at

least one-third of all theMemberswas met by a proposal todelete the

line on the ground that the vote of the House doesnot initiate

impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complaint

does.Havingconcluded that the initiation takes place by the act of

filing and referral orendorsementof the impeachment complaint to the

House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at leastone-third of

the members of the House of Representatives with theSecretary

General of theHouse, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI

becomes

clear. Once an impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated, another

impeachmentcomplaint may not be filed against thesame official

within a one year period.The Courtin the present petitions subjected

to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the meritsonlythe main issue of

whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against theChief

Justicetransgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar

rule. Beyondthis, it did not goabout assuming jurisdiction where it had

none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly

political questions. Because it is not at all thebusiness of this Court to

assert judicialdominance over the other two great branchesof the

government

PACU VS SEC. OF EDUCATION

ACTUAL CASE / CONTROVERSY

Facts:

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a

petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the

Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory

for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was amended by Act No.

3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional

on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and

colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property

without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of theirNatural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and

3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited

powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute

towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706

It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain

a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of

the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to

the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction

given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his dulyauthorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and

regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the

efficiency of instruction given in the same,

The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary

of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the

original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the

petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right

of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring

previous governmental approval or permit before such person could

exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal

Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) thematters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable

necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in

estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is

constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed

by the court.

Issue:

Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and

Commonwealth Act no. 180 is void and unconstitutional.

Ruling:


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The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs

no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no

justiciable controversy presented before the court. I t is an established

principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of

sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely

invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and

legislative action he must show that he has sustained commoninterest to all members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the

courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest

of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection

against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the

decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass

on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases

where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the

legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is

legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to

determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus,

actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual

positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mereacademic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court

however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and

state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to

invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse

by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se

demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of

the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue

delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list

of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education

they fail to indicate which of such official documents was

constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance.

Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition.

DAVID VS ARROYO

Facts:

- Consists of 7 cases consolidated alleging that in issuing

Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order

No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed

grave abuse of discretion

- On February 24, 2006 issued PP 1017 declaring a state of

national emergency saying that the Communist insurgents are in a

systematic conspiracy to bring down the government with Magdalo

Group and Gen. Lim and Marine Commander Ariel Querubin (clear

and present danger); suppress terrorism and lawless violence

- Pursuant to the order, warrantless arrests and take-over of

facilities may be done

- During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police

arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at

the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also

arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list

Akbayan

- At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006,

operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG)

of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily

Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories

by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday

issue

- During the hearing, the Solicitor General narrated the events

that led to the proclamation of the Decree: from the discovery of

bomb in the PMA Reunion Arroyo was suppose to attend to factual

documents seized from a Magdalo member detailing the military

takeover of the government led by the Philippine Marines

- The petitioners did not contend the facts stated by the

Solicitor General

Issue:

WON the implementation of PP 1017 is unconstitutional

- It encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress/they

arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees

- It is a deception to avoid the constitutional requirements for

the imposition of martial law

- It violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the

press, of speech and of assembly

Ratio Decidendi:

- Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.

This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing itto delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot

delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during

grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for

Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our

Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency

powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

o There must be a war or other emergency.

o The delegation must be for a limited period only

o The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the

Congress may prescribe.

o The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national

policy declared by Congress

- The Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional

insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate

decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the

Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative

power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall

consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure,

neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency


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can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing

decrees

- The President also cannot call the military to enact laws such

as laws on family, corporate laws, obligations and contracts, etc.

Under the PP 1017, she can only call out the military to suppress

lawless violence

- The President is authorized to declare a state of national

emergency. However, without legislation, she has no power to take

over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public

interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional

circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned

public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can she

determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.

Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out

the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be

taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to

exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII inthe absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress

Decision:

- PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL as far as the calling out of the

military to suppress lawless violence. However, the military cannot

enforce other laws

- PP 1017 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL when it comes to

promulgating Decrees. Only the 2 Houses of Congress can legislate

laws

- Warrantless arrests and seizures conducted without proof thatthey are part of rebellion, lawless violence, and takeover is

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

LINA VS. PURISIMA

power to dispense rules

Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB.

Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos

(President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position.

Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in

gadalej.

It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that

Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 14-A / LOI # 19-A

for being notoriously undesirable.

The RTC dismissed the petition because:

o Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by

the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality

of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less

modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the

power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.

o The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule

upon the validity or legality of any decree order or act issued by

President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.

SC:

The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC

invoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted

abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware

that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically

inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity

among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive

to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given

case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly

under the authority of martial law proclamations.

Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was

martial law, it is still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the SC.

Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over

the case. Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the judge to be

tried on the merits. Yet, this Supreme Court, whose power and duty

to do justice are inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all

instances where it appears that final resolution of the parties involved

full opportunity to be heard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever

it feels the best interest of justice would be thereby subserved,

dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case to the court

of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the SC may already

resolve the issues and rended the final judgment on the merits.

SC reinstated Lina to work.

TAN VS MACAPAGAL

Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino

people.The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the

Deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power,under

Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to

consider, discuss and adopt proposals whichseek to revise thepresent Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government

other than the form nowoutlined in the present Constitution [the

Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to

thepresent Constitution without altering the general plan laid down

therein."

Issues:WON the petitioners has locus standiWON the court has

jurisdiction over the caseHeld:

1.NOJustice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who

impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal andsubstantial

interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct


16/27

injury as a result of its enforcement ."Pascual v. The Secretary of

Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by one who

will sustain a directinjury, in consequence of its enforcement

.Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the

disbursement of public funds.Expenditure of public funds, by an

officer of the State for thepurpose of administering an

unconstitutional actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds,' whichmay be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."

2.NO At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized

any resolution that would radically alter the 1935constitution

therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe

when the Con-Con has actually doessomething already. Then the

court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.Separation

of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see

fit. The Executive and the Legislature arenot bound to ask for advice

in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it may

fulfil its duties well. Thecourt may not interfere until the proper time

comesripeness

TELEBAP vs COMELECG.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998Facts:

Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on

theground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and

without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television

broadcastcompanies the equal protection of the laws; and

(3) that it is in excessof the power given to the COMELEC to

supervise or regulate theoperation of media of communication or

information during the period of election.

Issue:

Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC

tosupervise or regulate the operation of media of communication

orinformation during the period of election.

Held: No.

The petition is dismissed.With the prohibition on media advertising

by candidates themselves, theCOMELEC Time and COMELEC

Space are about the only means throughwhich candidates can

advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than

merely depriving candidates of time for their ads,the failure ofbroadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by thegovernment

would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III,7 of

the Constitution provides that the right of the people to informationon

matters of public concern shall be recognized, while Art. XII, 6

statesthat the use of property bears a social function [and] the right

to own,establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the

duty of theState to promote distributive justice and to intervene when

the commongood so demands. To affirm the validity of 92 of B.P.

Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcastersto their obligation to see to it

that the variety and vigor of public debate onissues in an election is

maintained.

For while broadcast media are notmere common carriers but entities

with free speech rights, theyare also public trustees charged with the

duty of ensuring that thepeople have access to the diversity of views

on political issues

. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast

media. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to upholdthe peoplesright to information on matters of public concern. The use

of propertybears a social function and is subject to the states duty to

intervene forthe common good. Broadcast media can find their just

and highest rewardin the fact that whatever altruistic service they

may render in connectionwith the holding of elections is for that

common good

CONCEPTION VS COMELEC

(1) EO No. 94 issued by then President Aquino; (2) COMELEC s

April 2, 2007 Resolution conditionally granting NAMFREL s

accreditation, subject to the conditions that the petitioner and

similarly situated barangay officials shall not be included as members

or officials of NAMFREL; and (3) COMELEC Resolution 7798, issued

pursuant to EO No. 94 and which in turn is the basis for the April 2,

2007 Resolution.

-Jose Concepcion, Jr. (petitioner-the incumbent Punong Barangay of

Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City) "seeking to set aside the En

Banc Resolution dated 02 Apri

l 2007 and Order dated 8 May 2007" of respondent Commission on

Elections (COMELEC)-on January 5, 2007, the National Citizen s

Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for

Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count with theCOMELEC, docketed as SSP No. 07-001-COMELEC promulgated

Resolution No. 7798:

-Section 3to insure that elections are peaceful, orderly, regular and

credible, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers

vested in it by theConstitution, the Omnibus Election Code, EO No.

94, and other election laws RESOLVED to prohibit, as it hereby

RESOLVES to prohibit BARANGAY OFFICIALS AS CHAIR

PERSON AND/OR MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF ELECTION

INSPECTORS OR AS OFFICIAL WATCHER OF ANY CANDIDATE,

MAJOR POLITICAL PARTY, ETC IN THE 2007 NATIONAL ANDLOCAL ELECTIONS and from STAYING INSIDE ANY POLLING

PLACE EXCEPT TO CAST THEIR VOTE-COMELEC ruled on

NAMFREL s petition for accreditation on April 2, 2007 in the assailed

Resolution (April 2, 2007 Resolution), conditionally granting

NAMFREL s petition-Pursuant to Section 2(5), Article IX (C) of the

1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 52(k) of the Omnibus

Election Code, as amended, this Commission en banc hereby

resolves to accredit petitioner NAMFREL as its citizens arm in the 14

May 2007 national and local elections, subject to its direct and

immediate control and supervision-Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the

National Chairman of NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a

member and overall Chairman of said organization. As cor


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18/27

what the petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity

under Rule 65-petition should be dismissed for its blatant violation of

the Rules

Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works Case Digest

WENCESLAU PASCUAL, AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR VS.

SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS

FACTS: On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as

Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory

relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920,

entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on

June 20, 1953, an item of P85,000.00, "for the construction,

reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder

road terminals"; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said

Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected

and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, within the

Antonio Subdivis ion si tuated at Pasig, Rizal" which projected feeder

roads "do not connect any government property or any important

premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio

Subdivision were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta,

who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a

member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May 29, 1953,

respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of

Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the

municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was

accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor

would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the

names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the

municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953,

respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling

attention to the approval of Republic Act No. 920, and the sum of

P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected

feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig

endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of

Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement

thereon"; that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question

were private property at the time of the passage and approval of

Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made,

for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and

improvement of said projected feeder roads, was "illegal and,

therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 wasmade by Congress because its members were made to belie

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