PHILOSOPHY
OF NATURE By Mariano Artigas
Renewed Fourth Edition
Translation from the original Spanish: FILOSOFÍA DE LA NATURALEZA
Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, S.A. (EUNSA)
Spain-1998
Translated by Carlo Annoscia
CONTENT
PROLOGUE
PART ONE
I. INTRODUCTION:
NATURE AND PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
1. General Introduction
2. Historical Panorama of the Scientific and Philosophical Study of Nature
3. The concept of Nature
II. THE NATURAL ENTITIES
4. Natural Systems
5. Natural Substances
6. How to Identify Natural Substances
III. DYNAMISM IN NATURE
7. Natural Processes
8. The Becoming: Act and Potency
9. Unitary Processes in Nature
IV. ORDER IN NATURE
10. The Natural Order
11. The Physico-Chemical Structure
12. Unity and Order in the Universe
V. THE BEING OF NATURE
13. Levels of Understanding Nature
14. Material Conditions and Formal Determinations
15. The Hileo-Morphic Structure
VI. QUANTITAVE DIMENSIONS
16. Properties Of and Relations Between Material Entities
17. Dimensional Extension
18. Plurality of the Physical World
19. Quantification in Science
20. Philosophy of Mathematics
VII. SPACE AND TIME
21. Localization and Space
22. Duration and Time
23. Unity between Space and Time
VIII. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS
24. Qualitative Properties
25. Quantity and Qualities
IX. ACTIVITY AND CAUSALITY OF NATURAL ENTITIES
26. Causality and Physical Activity
27. Contingency of Nature
X. THE LIVING BEINGS
28. Characterization of the Living beings
29. Origin of Life and Evolution of the Species
XI. ORIGIN AND MEANING OF NATURE
30. Origin of the Universe
31. Finality in Nature
32. Nature and the Human Person
33. Nature and God
Prologue
I am very pleased to present this book by Professor Mariano Artigas on the Philosophy of
Nature. The book covers objectives, which have been of common interest to both of us for quite some
years now in our work of investigation and teaching. This is not the place to speak at length of the
uninterrupted dialogue between us over this time on these objectives and on the preparations of this
publication. It is enough to mention the previous manual, published in two successive editions since
1984.
This book is the continuation and development of the first one. The fact of not being appearing
as one of its authors does not mean that I have dissociated myself in absolute from its content (and even
less from my studies on this matter). On the contrary, I believe that this manual is a full response to
what is needed. As one who now receives the text of this book, I would really like to thank Artigas
above all – and I would dare say in the name of all his readers – for the nice and deep synthesis, which
he offers to us, of the philosophy of nature (which was anticipated in a different way in his work “La
inteligibilidad de la naturalez”). His well-known competence as a philosopher of science, and as a
physicist as well, explains, for me, such a promising result. However, what pleases me most, if I am
allowed to use this verb of subjective nuances, is the fact that a book like this will ensure a future for
the philosophy of nature.
And here we touch, at least in part, those common objectives I was speaking of at the
beginning. I do not believe that nowadays one may develop a speculative and metaphysical philosophy
(including anthropology) disregarding science. The task of leading the scientific and philosophical
thought back to a unity of comprehension (definitely analogical) passes necessarily through the
philosophy of nature.. Only in this way it will be possible to repair the great breach which was
produced in the ancient worldview, when traditional metaphysics witnessed the arrival of modern
science. Artigas manages to give in this book, and with notable amplitude of horizons, a basic
philosophical view of the natural realities of the material world, which reconciles the perennial aspects
of the classical approach with a new worldview on nature, which arises from modern science. Artigas
does this without an extrinsic kind of reconciling, but by re-thinking the issues from their roots.
Moreover, he takes into account, in this task, epistemology as a necessary mediator between science
and philosophy, evidently because the presence of the gnoseological element cannot be neglected in a
realistic Aristotelian approach (not Platonic).
Philosophy of nature, a bit forgotten by academician philosophers, has been on its way to
revival for some time now, not in a systematic way, yet very effectively, in the notes at the margin in
the work of present-day scientists, in the informal presentations, as a synthesis, which time and again
appear in thousands of ways in magazines, books and other mass media. All people averagely educated
are receiving nowadays philosophical ideas about the world, life, man, which become progressively
crystallized in a specific perception of nature. On this basis, the great technological projects of mankind
are being elaborated nowadays, while at the same time a view of man is being shaped up, which is not
exempt from problematic issues.
The intervention of the philosopher can cast a lot of light on this natural process, which is full
of lights and shadows. The most desirable method to do this is, in my opinion, very similar to the one
used by Aristotle in his own times. In consists in giving metaphysical importance to what comes to us
from the natural being through the various theoretical and experiential accesses, which the world in
which we live offers. Artigas’ book is definitely placed in this route. I look at a work like this as an
important contribution to the whole field of philosophy and to the present-day debate, which seeks
harmony between the Christian faith and the scientific knowledge, not to talk about its evident
usefulness for the students owing to its great capacity of presenting topics.
JUAN JOSÉ SANGUINETI
Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy
Pontifical University of the Holy Cross,
Rome
PART ONE
I. INTRODUCTION:
NATURE AND PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
he study of nature can be carried out in two ways: scientifically and
philosophically. Science looks for explanations of the natural phenomena in
relation to other phenomena and causes, and it does this from specific points
of view. On the other hand, philosophy of nature looks for explanations rooted in the
«being» and «ways of being» of the natural entities and processes. These two
approaches are autonomous although related to each other. They are different in their
focuses although science leans on some philosophical assumptions and philosophy
needs to take into account the progress of scientific knowledge.
This chapter contains a general introduction to the philosophy of nature (Section
1), followed by an historical panorama (Section 2) and by considerations about the
character of nature (Section 3) which will form the base for reflections contained in the
rest of the book.
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Philosophy of nature is that branch of philosophy whose task is to reflect upon the
natural, or physical, world. We shall now consider the nature of this reflection and its
value. This consideration shall prompt us to analyse also the achievements of natural
sciences, since there is a close relationship between these sciences and philosophy of
nature.
1.1. Philosophical reflection on nature
The object of philosophy is the whole reality studied in the light of the natural
reason. Philosophy goes much further than the specific knowledge provided by science
and looks for the most radical explanations. This is the reason why it is said that
philosophy studies the reality in the light of its ultimate causes, or that it asks questions
about the being of reality.
According to a classical distinction, the philosophical reflection has three main
objects, i.e. the world, man and God. Philosophy of nature is the philosophical reflection
on the world, where world stands for the natural, or physical, world and this includes the
inanimate beings (stars and planets, the physico-chemical components of matter, the
physico-chemical compounds) as well as the living ones.
1.2. Relationship with other branches of philosophy
T
Anthropology studies the human person. Man, though, is also part of nature while, at the
same time, he transcends it. Because of this, there is a close relationship between
anthropology and philosophy of nature. Unquestionably the human person has spiritual
dimensions which are irreducible to matter. However, man is a being characterized by
an internal unity and, therefore, the study of the human person needs to take into
account the conclusions of philosophy of nature. On the other hand man is, so to say, the
ultimate aim of philosophy of nature owing to the central place he occupies in the
natural world.
It is worth noting that the main difficulties met with by anthropology derive from
philosophy of nature. Actually, the tendency of explaining the human person in terms of
his physical, chemical and biological components is an effect of the enormous progress
of natural sciences. It is an illegitimate type of reductionism, consequence of unlawful
extrapolations of scientific knowledge into areas that do not fall under the scope of
science. Philosophy of nature plays an irreplaceable role in clarifying these issues.
Philosophy of nature also supplies half of the basis on which natural theology is built.
Our natural knowledge of God is not immediate: with the help of our natural powers we
can know God only through created things. There are naturalistic stands according to
which the world could be explained without making recourse to God. This mistake
requires a reflection on what nature is, and this is the object proper to philosophy of
nature.
In the same way philosophy of nature provides the basis for metaphysics; metaphysics
studies the ultimate principles of being as being which can be applied to material as well
as to spiritual realities. We climb up to the general laws of being through a reflection on
nature. It is actually quite difficult, not to say impossible, to build a rigorous
metaphysics without taking into account an equally rigorous reflection on the physical
world.
1.3. Philosophy and natural sciences
Natural sciences have a common general goal: they look for a knowledge of
nature which can be submitted to experimental control. Any explanation which asks for
admission into the world of experimental science needs to fulfil this minimum pre-
requisite1.
Philosophy of nature has the obligation of taking into account the knowledge
acquired by the different branches of experimental science. Its focus, though, is
different: as already mentioned, it looks for the ultimate causes of nature and proposes
general explanations which go much further than what is usually looked for in the
experimental sciences. For instance, it proposes concepts such as substance, or act and
potency in order to explain specific characteristics of nature. Such concepts are objects
1 For a more detailed analysis of the objectivity and truth in the experimental science see M. ARTIGAS, Filosofia de la
ciencia experimental. La objectividad y la verdad en las ciencias, 2nd
ed., EUNSA, Pamplona 1992.
of no scientific discipline: science studies substances and the potentialities of nature, but
they do not ask the same questions as philosophy does about substance and about
potentiality.
Philosophy of nature needs the aid of science in different measure according to
the issue which is being considered. At times ordinary experience provides a basis
which is sufficient for a philosophical reflection. However, it is interesting to know what
science has to say even in these cases in order to make sure that our interpretation of
ordinary experience be correct.
Conversely, science is constructed on some assumptions which, of themselves,
are not objects of a scientific study: these, nevertheless, are their necessary premises.
Concretely, science presupposes the existence of a natural order which can be known
through arguments in which experiments play a central role. The success achieved by
science justifies the validity of such premises, it expands them and it makes them
clearer. For instance, scientific progress enables us to construct images of the world,
worldviews which unify the different types of knowledge we obtain about nature in one
image only. In order to construct a worldview, it is necessary to interpret and unify the
various data of scientific knowledge, and this requires a certain dose of philosophical
reflection.
A rigorous use of philosophy of nature helps prevent the risk of extrapolating
scientific methods and results into other areas of knowledge which are not properly
scientific. Scientific progress can be easily and erroneously interpreted if one is not
equipped with a good knowledge of philosophy of nature. For instance, at its very birth
in the 17th
century, modern experimental science was already accompanied by
mechanism, a sort of philosophical reductionism according to which what is natural can
be completely explained by the displacement of material parts. In reality, mechanism is
not a science, but rather a bad philosophy. Nevertheless, mechanism has been notably
influential by presenting itself, quite arbitrarily, as a consequence of the scientific
progress.
Philosophy of nature and natural sciences have different focuses, albeit
complementary. Actually, such a complementarity was acknowledged and respected
until the 19th century, when idealism invaded the field of science and, at the same time,
scientists felt that philosophy was an obstacle rather than a help to their work. The result
of this anti-philosophical reaction was the birth of the so-called scientism according to
which experimental science is the only valid knowledge of reality. Positivism, one of its
off-shoots, held the reductionist stand according to which the task of science consists in
establishing relations among observable phenomena, avoiding anything which goes
beyond this limit. Actually scientism is contradictory: the thesis according to which no
knowledge is valid unless scientifically acquired, is not a conclusion from any science.
Positivism also establishes limits which cannot be respected by science, whose progress
depends on steps which need to be taken beyond mere experience.
1.4. Value and achievements of the philosophy of nature
Experience plays an important role within the philosophical method. Philosophy
of nature does not seek a detailed knowledge in the way science does. Nevertheless
philosophy of science leans on the knowledge provided by ordinary experience as well
as by science. It is not possible to verify philosophical conclusions experimentally as it
is done with the scientific ones. Such conclusions, though, will be abandoned if they do
not correspond to the particular knowledge founded on experience and science.
The value of the philosophical conclusions depends on two factors. First, these
conclusions should correspond to genuine and well-founded problems; second, these
problems should be adequately resolved by such conclusions.
The existence of genuine philosophical problems is denied by those who claim
that it is sufficient to explain what things are made of and how they work. There is no
doubt that these two questions are important and they form the main theme of natural
sciences. However, they do not exhaust all the problems presented to human mind. For
instance, it is pertinent to ask for the ultimate explanation of the order present in the
nature. The various types of science provide us with ever more detailed explanations
about this order; they tend to cause, though, an increasing interest about radical
questions rather than satisfying it. The progress of science reveals an order in nature
which is ever more astonishing. Other problems refer to general explanation of entities,
processes and properties of nature which go beyond the specific knowledge provided by
science.
Once established that genuine philosophical problems exist, how can we assess
the solutions that philosophy gives? It is clear that philosophy cannot make use of the
experimental control in the same way science does. Nevertheless the validity of the
solutions is to be assessed in relation to the same basic canons, i.e. according to logic
and experience. It has already been pointed out that the solutions must be coherent with
the available data and satisfactory from the logical point of view, i.e. they should not be
contradictory and they should be useful to solve those problems one tries to solve.
Actually there is no automatic criterion for philosophical validity: the value of the
explanations has to be established in each individual case.
The achievements of philosophy of nature are different in different cases. In
principle, we may expect that the most important concepts be relatively few, since
philosophy of nature does not seek a knowledge as detailed as science does. The given
explanations will have a permanent value inasmuch as these refer to essential
characteristics of nature. We shall be able to see how philosophical concepts, proposed
many centuries ago, still retain their validity, although they need to be explained in a
way which is more consonant with our present knowledge. On the other hand, it is
assumed that many explanations of philosophy of nature will need a periodical revision,
owing to the enormous progress of science. In any case, we shall focus our attention on
the most basic problems and on the most permanent explanations, by examining both in
the light of the present scientific knowledge.
1.5. Themes and problems
Philosophy of nature has a wide scope: it actually deals with topics such as the
atom and the universe and it includes man and living organisms inasmuch as they are
natural beings. It seeks an answer about the meaning of nature and about its ultimate
foundations. It represents therefore the logical bridge between ordinary knowledge,
science and metaphysics.
We shall study the basic themes of philosophy of nature in the light of the
present worldview. We propose here two fundamental characteristics of nature: its
dynamism and its space-time framework. We shall show how these two distinguish
what is natural from what is spiritual and what is artificial. This starting point is
coherent with the present worldview, and allows us to tackle the problems of philosophy
of nature from a new perspective. This approach reveals the fact that in nature physical
dimensions (in relation to its space-time framework) co-exist with ontological ones (the
ways of being and of operating) and metaphysical ones (which are the foundation of its
being and of its operations).
In the five chapters of the first part of this treatise we shall examine the concept
of nature, the natural entities, the natural dynamism, the order in nature and the hileo-
morphic structure of the natural entities. In the six chapters of the second part we shall
expand by considering the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the natural entities,
their causality, the living entities and the origin and meaning of nature.
2. HISTORICAL PANORAMA OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDY OF NATURE
We shall consider in this section the development of the philosophy of nature
along history. The birth of experimental science in the 17th
century marks a key moment
in this development. We shall examine the ancient times, in a broad sense, until the 17th
century followed by an analysis of the subsequent development of philosophy of nature
in relation to the progress of science.
2.1. Science and philosophy in ancient times
The Greek philosophers emphasised fundamental philosophical problems and
gave corresponding answers to them which are still important, although limited by the
scarce development of science of those times. The validity of the Greek achievements
lasted some 20 centuries (and some are still valid nowadays), until the birth of the
modern experimental science in the 17th
century.
The very beginning witnessed the confrontation of opposing views: the
metaphysical one which considered nature as a divine work and the human person as
endowed with a spiritual and immortal soul; and the materialistic one which tried to
explain the whole reality in terms of its material components. The first view was held by
philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, whose ideas were
inherited by the Christian tradition. The second view was held by the Atomists such as
Leucippus and Democritus and their followers Epicures and Lucretius.
The dilemma between the two perspectives was clearly stated by Plato in his
dialogue “Fedo” whose protagonist is the same Socrates awaiting death in a cell in the
year 399 BC. Socrates’ friends propose an escape from prison to him. Socrates, in his
dialogue, explains how his ideas about nature have evolved. He says that in his youth he
studied the opinions of the previous thinkers (Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Anaximenes,
Heraclitus, etc.) about nature, moved by a desire of knowing the cause of all
phenomena. He was not convinced, though, by their explanations. He adds that those
thinkers had proposed explanations in terms of components and actions, without even
mentioning the essences of things or finality. Actually these latter are the ones that
provide the true reasons for understanding why something happens, why is it convenient
for this thing to happen and what is the relation that this thing has with the divine
foundation of everything.
In this way Socrates pointed out two central problems concerning philosophy of
nature and its relationship with science: What kind of relationship exists between these
two levels of explanation? Is it sufficient to consider physical causes? Is there any
finality in nature? Is there any superior plan which can account for the natural
phenomena? Socrates and Plato were strongly in favour of metaphysical explanations,
i.e. nature explained in terms of essence, finality and divinity.
On the contrary, Democritus’ atomism leaned on the physical aspects as centres
of explanation, i.e. the local movement of matter and atoms, of which matter is made, is
enough to explain everything without making recourse to metaphysics. In ancient times
this approach was followed by Epicures in Greece and by Titus Lucretius Caro in Rome.
Aristotle re-considered these problems and proposed a new perspective which
lasted 20 centuries. Aristotle’s physics is a mixture of scientific problems in modern
terms and of philosophical problems, and it is the latter ones that mark the pace.
It would sound anachronistic to blame Aristotle (or Plato, or the Stoics, or the
people of the Middle Ages) for not having built a kind of science in modern terms. For a
systematic rise of any experimental science, more than good will and interest for nature
were needed: actually all this already existed. For instance, within the limits imposed by
the means available in those days, the Biology of Aristotle is important and rigorous.
Aristotle’s worldview corresponds, in a fairly adequate way, to ordinary
experience. Part of it (the theory of the four elements, of the heavenly bodies and their
movements and of the natural places) received its death sentence at the birth of modern
science. People felt at that time that the whole Aristotelian philosophy had crumbled to
pieces. However, the central ideas of Aristotle’s natural philosophy still preserve their
value: the concept of substance, the hileo-morphic theory, the explanation of the
processes in terms of act and potency, the four causes and finality are a set of bridge-
ideas between physics and metaphysics. They are masterpieces of achievement and
constant points of reference, notwithstanding the discredit into which Aristotelianism
fell in some historical times. However, the enormous progress of science in modern
times makes it necessary to revise these concepts in the light of such progresses.
Aristotle’s physics was elaborated by Aquinas within a new perspective. By
introducing the concept of creation (absent in Aristotle) and creationist metaphysics,
Aquinas focused his synthesis on the act of being and the concept of participation. In
this way Aristotle’s concepts acquire new life. The relationship between physics and
metaphysics is completed. God is the efficient cause of nature (first cause that creates,
preserves and participates in the action, and so accounts for the second causes), its
exemplary cause (divine ideas) and its final cause (He creates a good world, out of his
Goodness, for man). God directs the world with his providence: this explains the finality
of nature. The freedom of creation underlines the contingency of the world.
Aquinas proposed an original and very important conception of nature viewed as
the realization of a divine plan through ways of being and operating which God has
placed within the very things. In this way, things can cooperate towards the building of
nature. He compares the divine action with that of a craftsman who can grant the power
to move to the pieces he is working with, and to achieve their end by themselves. This is
his basic idea which is quite coherent with the present-day worldview; in this view,
morphogenesis and self-organization occupy a pre-eminent position. On the other hand,
Aquinas relativised some important Aristotelian theses such as the eternity of the world
and of the movement, and the astronomical theories.
Aquinas’ synthesis contains some aspects which have not yet been fully
unravelled, especially in the area of philosophy of nature. Actually, efforts have been
made in this area in order to salvage the most metaphysical aspects of Aquinas’ doctrine
separating them from the ancients’ worldview. These aspects, once revised in the light
of a modern context, are most adequate for a deep integration of the present scientific
knowledge with a philosophical perspective.
2.2. The modern experimental science
Modern science was born in Christian Western Europe in the 17th
century, thanks
to an intense preparatory work done in the Middle Ages which lasted various centuries
(for instance in the Universities of Oxford and Paris). Modern science, though, appeared
on the stage with an attitude of polemic against the previous tradition. A lack of balance,
difficult to achieve in those days, caused valid aspects of the classical thought to live
together with erroneous ones. Previously, the balance had leaned towards philosophy,
now it started leaning in the opposite direction, owing to the success achieved by
experimental science. The persistence of the initial polemic, as well as the accumulation
of further equivocal stands, contributes to a poor interpretation of the relations between
science and philosophy and, as a consequence, of the philosophy of nature.
Work done in the Middle Ages has ploughed the furrow for the seed of modern
science. It has been customary to refer to the Middles Ages as the Dark Ages, meaning
an age completely uninterested to science, actually opposed to it. This does not
correspond to truth. The pioneer work of the historian Pierre Duhem cast new lights on
this issue2. Duhem showed that many works of the Middle Ages had prepared the birth
of modern science and the University of Paris (Jean Buridan and disciples; Nicholas
Oresme, Albert of Saxony, Henry of Hesse, Marsilius of Inghen) together with the
University of Oxford (Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, Richard Swineshead, John
Dumbleton, Thomas Bradwardine) were the leaders in this sense. For example, the
theorem of Merton College about the uniformly accelerated movement is equivalent to
Galileo’s law on the free fall. Nicholas Oresme offered a geometrical proof of this
theorem by using a figure which appears to be reproduced by Galileo. Also the
«impetus» theory of the physical school of Paris (Buridan, Oresme) provided the basis
for the subsequent notions of inertia and quantity of movement3.
The cultural milieu of those times was imbued with Christian ideas which also
had great relevance in the only possibly viable birth of the modern science. The doctrine
of creation, above all, had a great impact on the study of nature. Creation reveals the
contingent character of a world freely created by God, from which the need for
experience follows in order to study its characteristics. This study is possible because
the world, created by a God who is infinitely wise, is rational, and because man is
capable of knowing the world since he was created by God in His image and likeness
with a body and with a rational soul. Stanley Jaki has extensively shown with many
examples how the attempt to build a science in the great ancient cultures eventually
aborted and how, on the other hand, Christianity had a beneficial influence on the birth
of modern science4.
Thomas Kuhn has written: “From a modern perspective, the scientific activity of
the Middle Ages was incredibly effective. Actually, how else could science in the western
world have been born? The very centuries dominated by Scholasticism saw the
restructuring of the ancient scientific and philosophic traditions, their assimilation and
testing. As their weak points were discovered, they immediately became the objects of
the first investigations of the modern world. All the new scientific theories of the 16th
and 17th
centuries have their origin in the tattered clothes of Aristotle’s thought torn
apart by the Scholastic critique. The majority of these theories contain also key concepts
created by the Scholastic science. More important than these concepts, though, is the
mental framework that modern scientists have inherited from their medieval
predecessors, i.e. an unlimited faith in the power of the human reason to solve problems
related to nature. This point was beautifully expressed by Whitehead when he says that
“faith in the possibilities of science, born before the development of the modern
scientific theory, is an unconscious result of the medieval theology”5. This sounds
totally opposed to those platitudes endlessly repeated, for instance, by the positivists
according to whom theology and metaphysics had rather been a sort of a brake to the
scientific progress.
2 See P. DUHEM, Le système du monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, 10 volumes,
Hermann, Paris 1913-1917 and 1954-1959. 3 This topic is synthetically dealt with in M. ARTIGAS, “Nicolàs Oresme, gran maestro del Colegio de Navarra, y el origen
de la ciencia moderna”, Prìncipe de Viana (Suplemento de Ciencias), Year IX, No.9 (1989), pp. 297-331. 4 S. JAKI, Science and Creation. From Eternal Cycles to an Oscillating Universe, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh and
London, 1974. 5 T.S. KUHN, La revolucion copernicana. La astronomia planetaria en el desarrollo del pensamiento occidental, Ariel,
Barcelona 1978, p. 171.
There were other pioneers such as Leonardo da Vinci. However the modern
scientific revolution properly began with Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) when he
proposed the heliocentric theory. According to this theory the Earth does not stand still
at the centre of the universe: it rather rotates around the Sun as a planet. The theory
shook the worldview dominant at that time. Copernicus entitled his work De
revolutionibus orbium coelestium (About the revolutions of the heavenly orbits) and
dedicated it to the Pope. It goes without saying that this work did not raise any problem.
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) can be considered the «prophet» of a new science
which distanced itself from the ancient methods and aimed at the mastery of nature. His
contribution to the new science was minor and his methodology is insufficient. He
nevertheless had great influence in establishing a science based on experiments.
Bacon proposed a new method based on induction. This consists in formulating
general laws from individual cases by the use of devices such as tables of presence, of
absence and of degrees. He substituted the Aristotelian and Scholastic «forms» (by
which the nature of things was expressed) with «laws». According to Bacon forms and
finality of the traditional philosophy do not have a place in the modern science. He
defines finality as a «sterile virgin», incapable of giving fruits.
Bacon’s ideas were widely accepted for quite a long time. They gave rise,
though, to some problems, with which we are still dragging along presently, such as the
sense and value of induction in science, the relationship between science and
philosophy, the value of philosophy of nature. For centuries, for instance, science has
been considered as «inductive science»; but laws such as the free fall of the bodies and
gravity are not obtainable by induction, not to talk about those complex theories of
physics-mathematics and the difficulty in verifying those theories with data provided by
the experiments which are always fragmentary.
René Descartes (1596-1650) had great influence on the new science. He insisted
on the use of the mathematical method. He also made some partial contributions. His
physics, though, was insufficient when compared, for instance, with the one of Galileo
and Newton, while his philosophical background produced great historical mistakes.
Actually, with his concept of evidence (clear and distinct ideas) he reduced the corporeal
substance to extension. In so doing, he denied the reality of qualities and liquidated that
dynamism which is so typical of matter. The new physics became firmly established
only when the concepts of «force» and «energy» were introduced, and these do not
appear in the limited Cartesian framework. Descartes rejected also the notions of forms,
of qualities and of finality. His natural philosophy is a kind of «mechanism» which tries
to explain everything in terms of displacements and impacts of matter. The interiority
disappears to the benefit of pure exteriority: this is extended also to the living beings
(with the exception of the human spirit).
Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) formulated the first scientific laws of the new
science: they refer to the elliptical trajectory of the planets. These laws are a first-class
achievement: they integrated mathematics, data from observation (with emphasis on
accuracy) and a mystical view about the order of nature. They destroyed the belief about
the circular movement of the heavenly bodies.
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) was the main pioneer of the new science and the one
who best perceived its nature. He obtained great achievements, both theoretical and
observational (the law of the free fall of the bodies, the discovery of the satellites of
Jupiter and of the Venus’ phases, etc.). He actually laid the foundations for the method
of the new science. He stated that the objective of science is the formulation of laws
which refer to «changes» such as the ones in the case of place, movement, figure, size,
etc. He therefore gives up a knowledge based on essences, and the meaning of things: all
these are proper to philosophy and theology.
The famous «Galileo case» should not have occurred. It was the result of a
convergence of misunderstandings and polemical interests. On one hand, Galileo was
not in possession of conclusive demonstrations in favour of helio-centrism. On the other
hand, the theological difficulties involved were really superficial and they could have
been easily avoided, actually the geocentric view was never a part of the Christian
doctrine. There were other circumstances which contribute to pollute the issue. Galileo’s
punishment consisted in remaining confined in his villa near Florence. He kept working
until death which occurred, due to natural causes, when he was 78. The birth of the new
science was not stopped by these events6. Nevertheless, the problems about the nature
and achievements of the new science kept on producing ever greater polemics and
difficulties.
Shortly after Galileo’s death the science of physics-mathematics was born thanks
to the genius of Isaac Newton (1642-1727); this marked the crowning of ideas and
results accumulated during centuries, and of the new methods and achievements of the
modern science. Newton published his Mathematical Principles of the Natural
Philosphy in 1687: in this great work he formulated the first theory of the experimental
physics, i.e. the Newton’s Mechanics. A new era was born. Newton’s Mechanics was
easily applicable to terrestrial as well as to heavenly phenomena, it achieved great
continuous success in its theoretical as well as practical applications until the 20th
century, and it provided the main framework for the great strides made by physics and a
solid basis for the establishment of chemistry, biology and all the other branches of
experimental science.
The birth of the new science was accompanied by misunderstandings and
polemics mostly due to the fact that it was presented as a new philosophy ready to
replace the old one. The growing success of its practical applications seemed to indicate
that it was the compulsory way to face safely the problem concerning the value of the
human knowledge, central issue of modern philosophy. The new science was presented
as an alternative to the old philosophy, with the advantage of the use of mathematics
(precision and rigor in opposition to «occult qualities»), of the experimental approach
and practical applications (empirical character and usefulness in opposition to «sterile
speculations»), of its demonstrability and progress. In reality there was quite a bit of
lack of adequate understanding of the relationship between science and philosophy, i.e.
of the distinction and complementarity between the respective objectives and focuses.
6 A synthesis of the «Galileo case» and its implications can be found in M. ARTIGAS, Ciencia, razon y fe,
4th
ed., Palabra, Madrid 1992 (section «Galileo: un problema sin solver», pp. 15-36. See also W. BRANDMÜLLER, Galileo
y la Iglesia, Rialp, Madrid 1987.
The difficulties were not small because the development of science as well as of
epistemology was fragmentary. It is therefore understandable how different
interpretations have been given to explain the relationship that exists between science
and philosophy and, therefore, the philosophy of nature. The situation became clearer
only in recent times.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) gave a determining twist to the problem of
knowledge. He was convinced about the final validity of Newton’s physics. He at the
same time perceived that scientific concepts are a human construction and therefore they
are our way of representing nature. He stressed too much, though, the «subjective»
character of our concepts and interpreted the classical ideas of substance, causality and
finality from this perspective. Philosophy of nature lost therefore its objectivity and
became dependent on our subjective representations. Kant insisted on the fact that we
cannot know «things in themselves». This doctrine laid the foundation for the post-
Kantian idealism whose main representative, Hegel, accomplished the radical divorce
between science and philosophy.
Philosophy of nature was born again with Romanticism and Idealism at the end
of the 18th
century and beginning of the 19th
. It took the form of a Naturphilosophie, a
sort of reaction against mechanism while stressing at the same time the importance of
the vital, of the organic and of the system of nature. Its intuitions were mixed, though,
with a tint of pantheism and with a critique of real science: this provoked a serious
confusion between scientists and philosophers.
The Philosophy of Nature of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) forms
the second part of his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences. He supports an idealist
philosophy which interprets reality as the progressive unfolding of the Idea. Nature is
conceived by Hegel as a moment of this unfolding and, more precisely, the moment in
which the Idea dons «exteriority». Hegel seems to propose a somehow negative
conception of nature. Nature appears, within the idealist system, as an «unsolved
contradiction». It is also stated that «the Idea is inadequate to itself while donning this
exteriority».
It is difficult to follow Hegel when he deals with specific themes. He criticized
different aspects of the science developed up to his times, and proposed hardly
convincing alternatives. Actually, Hegel contributed in a decisive manner – as the
physicist Hermann Helmholtz said in 1862 – to the modern divorce between science and
philosophy: “The philosophers accused the scientists of narrow-mindedness, while the
scientists accused the philosophers of madness. The result was that scientists started
considering the convenience of removing any type of philosophical influence from their
work. Some, even among those more intelligent, reached the point of totally condemning
philosophy, not because useless but because positively harmful, besides being a work of
fantasy. They rejected – pity to say - not only the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian
system of dominating all the branches of knowledge, but also the legitimate claims of
philosophy about its right of criticizing the sources of knowledge and the definition of
the functions of the intellect”7. It goes without saying that this climate was favourable to
the development of a positivist mentality.
7 Cited by W.C. DAMPIER, Historia de la ciencia, Tecnos, Madrid 1972, p.318.
Auguste Comte (1798-1857), father of the Positivism, proposed his «law of the
three stages» through which, according to him, humanity had passed. The present and
definitive stage is the «scientific» or «positivist» one. In this stage we have stopped
asking questions about the ultimate causes of things and we are happy to deal with what
is accessible to the positive science, i.e. to formulate laws which are constant relations
among observable phenomena. The previous stages are therefore obsolete, i.e. the
«mythical-theological» and the «abstract-metaphysical». These last two are the result of
a lack of adequate instruments able to scientifically understand and control nature. There
is no place for a philosophy which is not a simple methodological and unifying
reflection on all sciences.
Positivism is at the extreme opposite of Hegel’s philosophy. But the extremes
touch each other: both are unjustifiable and monopolistic attempts of opposite signs.
They fail to save the complementarity between science and philosophy. It is
understandable how positivism exercises a certain fascination on the minds of those
scientists and philosophers who want to avoid fantastic lucubration. Positivism tells us
to stick to facts, to what is «positive», to what is «given» and to its relations. Positivism
ensures in this way the rigorous aspect of science which has nothing in common with
fantastic constructions. Nevertheless, positivism proposes a simplistic view of science; it
actually rejects the fact that there are always some philosophical assumptions, whether
theoretical or gnoseological which are necessary conditions for any scientific activity
(and which are backed up by the scientific progress). An interpretation of the methods
and results of science is also necessary to assess its accomplishments and to achieve a
unified world view. Besides, there are no such things as pure data (interpretations are
always there), and science goes much further than what is observable.
Finally, a «positive science» has never existed and it cannot exist: had
contemporary science followed Comte’s precepts, it would have never taken off. On the
other hand, the law of the three stages, although quite popular, follows nevertheless a
pre-conceived and quite simplistic scheme: relationships between philosophy, science
and theology have been, and keep being, much more important and complex than what
is stated by this law.
2.3. The philosophical impact of evolutionism, quantum physics and relativity
Philosophy of nature found a new challenge in evolutionism, especially from the
time of the publication of The Origin of the Species by Charles Darwin in 1859.
Evolutionism marked a very important step in the philosophy of nature in general and of
man in particular by raising the problems of naturalism and finality. Among the authors
who have centred their reflections on evolution are Bergson and Teilhard de Chardin.
Henri Bergson (1859-1941) published his Creative Evolution in 1907. He
maintains that the Greek interpreted time in function of eternity following, according to
Bergson, the natural pattern of our intellect, made for action: by decomposing real
becoming into static moments and by trying to re-compose the reality and articulating
these snap-shots. This procedure, though, very similar to that of a movie, is not helpful
in grasping authentic reality which is, in fact, becoming, process, evolution. This
procedure, on the contrary, assumes that things are already given once and for all.
Bergson’s judgment is conditioned by his basic thesis according to which
becoming is the framework of reality: it is a creative becoming similar to what happens
in the interiority of man. It is a life-impulse which crosses everything, so that its results
are always new and unpredictable.
Bergson repeats his thesis time and again, but he does not provide a serious
foundation for it. The thesis seems to be endorsed by the sound criticisms of the
mechanism which always accompany it. It seems that rejection of mechanism is
equivalent to a proof of this thesis; hardly so.
Without doubt Bergson is right when he criticizes mechanism and when he
stresses, also with reason, the importance of the becoming in the reality for explaining
nature. He perceives the importance of interiority and rebels against a way of thinking
which considers as sufficient those explanations based on the exteriority of repeatable
phenomena. The proposed alternative, though, is quite ethereal and fragmentary: it
simply consists in establishing a parallelism between the human psyche, where freedom
and creativity are found, and an evolution which is identified with the unfolding of a life
impulse. It states that the only way of understanding reality is to place oneself in the
inner of this life-stream through an intuition which goes beyond the possibilities of an
analytical intellect.
This «processualism», centred in the natural and historical becoming, has
acquired great importance in our days particularly because of authors such as Henri
Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. It stresses important aspects
of reality; nevertheless it needs to be supplemented with a more attentive consideration
about structural and stable dimensions.
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) assumed evolution to be a fact and
proposed a finalist and Christian interpretation for it. Leaving aside the questionable
theological conclusions of the work of Teilhard, it is interesting to stress, within the
context of philosophy of nature, the importance attributed to the «interiority». Teilhard’s
basic thesis states that science, up to now, has considered the «exteriority» of nature.
Now it is time to complete it by considering its «interiority».
Teilhard developed this thesis around the «law of complexity-consciousness»,
considered to be well established on the basis of experience. According to this «law»,
successive levels of consciousness (interiority) correspond to progressive levels of
organization of matter (exteriority). On this ground, he claims that there is some form of
consciousness at all levels of nature (pan-psychism) and that evolution consists in the
progressive unfolding of a «spiritual energy» which, at some critical stages, produces
qualitative leaps. This is particularly evident in the case of the origin of life and, still
more, in the origin of man in whom conscious reflection appears with all its specifically
human consequences. It is a kind of evolution with an ascending direction towards
forms of superior material (exteriority) and consciousness (interiority) organization: it is
therefore a true «ortho-genesis». Finally, he projects his ideas into the future, when he
states that we are in a new kind of humanity which tends towards a new critical point of
integration around a personal centre which he calls «Omega Point», endowed with
divine characters.
Teilhard’s work is marred by a certain lack of methodological precision. It offers
a synthesis between science, philosophy, poetry and theology, and it is difficult many
times to perceive what corresponds to what, and what the foundation of the conclusions
is. Nevertheless, the ideas about the «interiority» of nature are important, although they
are found mixed together with a poorly consistent «pan-psychism».
At the beginning of the 20th
century quantum physics and relativity caused a
flood of new ideas in the philosophy of nature and in science. They clearly showed that
classical physics which had been held as the definitive edifice subject only to some
decorations here and there, was valid only for a restricted set of phenomena. Quantum
physics is to be used whenever studies on micro-physical components of matter are
involved, while the relativity theory becomes important whenever great velocities occur.
The philosophical impact of these two theories has been huge, since they provide
knowledge about aspects of nature which are very far from the ordinary experience and
which affect basic concepts of philosophy of nature.
2.4. The revival of the philosophy of nature in our times
In the first third of the 20th
century the Neo-positivists of the Circle of Vienna
proposed a philosophy reduced to a logical analysis of the scientific language. In an
openly scientist direction, they stated that natural science contains the whole valid
knowledge about nature. In this perspective there is no room, therefore, for a philosophy
of nature. However, a close analysis reveals the contradictory nature of this doctrine
since it would remain senseless if its own canons were to be applied to itself: in fact, this
doctrine is not a conclusion from natural science.
The most systematic effort to formulate a philosophy of nature in line with the
progress of science is probably the one of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) who published
his Philosophy of Nature in 1950 (as Volume IV of his Ontology). It was conceived as a
«special theory of the categories» which depends, with a neo-Kantian but realistic
matrix, on the status of the scientific knowledge at each moment, and renounces a
positive metaphysics. Hartmann completed his philosophy of nature with the
Theological Thinking, a posthumous work which was published in 1954 and where he
expounds a systematic criticism against finality.
The Hartmann of the first period is neo-Kantian. This strongly appears in his
work although later on he includes in his thinking elements of phenomenology and
maintains, against Kant, the realistic value of knowledge. He held an agnostic stand in
relation to the existence of God. Sometimes he is lined up next to Aristotle.
Nevertheless, he criticizes the Aristotelian ideas of substance, form and finality as next
to a metaphysics which he considers not valid. According to Hartmann, metaphysics
deals with issues which do not have answers, since they go much beyond what we can
actually know about things. There is only room for a kind of ontology which never
reaches a metaphysical level and definitive answers. It is a hypothetical and provisional
kind of philosophy which tries to analyze and clarify problems by using, as a method,
the analysis of the categories of our thought. In this context, philosophy of nature is
conceived as an analysis of the special categories, as a philosophical reflection on the
knowledge provided by science and which, as such, participates in the permanent
provisional character of this knowledge.
This sort of philosophy of nature contains some interesting pieces of analysis
but, at the same time, the denial of metaphysics appears quite explicitly whenever
classical themes are dealt with. The Aristotelian and Scholastic ideas about substance,
act and potency, the analysis of movement, forms, causality and finality are heavily
criticized. It is stated that these ideas correspond to an obsolete perspective which tries
to establish relations between nature and the divine. In his Theological Thinking
Hartmann unleashes a systematic criticism against finality in nature, in accordance with
his anti-metaphysical ideas.
In the last decades of the 20th
century there has been a notable revival of
philosophy of nature. Many are the publications, for instance, about the indeterminism
of nature, the appearance of new forms and self-organization, natural finality and
teleological argument, origin of the universe, creation and cosmological argument,
relations between mind and body. The protagonists of these discussions are frequently
scientists and epistemologists who conceive philosophical reflection as a rational
discussion which expands the achievements of both science and epistemology. They are
authors with very different tendencies whose works achieve, at times, great popularity8.
This new heyday of the philosophy of nature is due mainly to the existence of a
new worldview. Actually for the first time in history we are in possession of a scientific
worldview which is rigorous and complete and which has important philosophical
implications.
When we talk of a rigorous and complete worldview, we do not mean that we
already know everything. What we mean to say is that for the first time in history we
possess a well-tested body of knowledge about all the levels of nature and about their
mutual relations: think, for instance, of the microphysics, the astrophysics, the molecular
biology, and the morpho-genetic theories. There are still many question marks, true
enough, but we know an important part of the basic framework in its synchronic
(present state of nature) as well as in its diachronic (historical unfolding) aspects.
The present day worldview stresses the importance of the dynamism of matter,
the existence of special and dynamic patterns, morpho-genesis, evolution, self
organization, synergism (cooperation), emergence (in opposition to the reductionism),
directionality and information. We are in the presence of a new scientific paradigm
which makes the mechanistic one definitively obsolete. This provides, at the same time,
a very adequate basis for re-formulating the classical problems of philosophy of nature
and for the study of new problems which arise from the progress of science.
8 Some of these authors are for instance Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Ilya Prigogine, René Thom, Hermann Haken, Michael
Ruse, Stephen Hawking, John Barrow, Roger Penrose, Richard Dawkins, Karl Popper.
3. THE CONCEPT OF NATURE
The present-day worldview provides a very good basis for characterizing nature
in such a way that it will be the point of reference for all the philosophical reflections
contained in this book.
3.1 Meanings of the terms «nature» and «natural»
The substantive «nature» has two main meanings: the first refers to «the nature
of something» (this is what we call metaphysical meaning); the second refers to
«Nature» in the sense of the totality of all physical beings (we shall call it physical
meaning).
In the metaphysical sense, «nature of something» means the characteristic of
something or that which belongs to that thing in such a way that makes it different from
anything else. The «thing» spoken of may be anything. Actually one can speak of the
nature of man, the nature of a problem, the nature of a specific science, as well as the
nature of God. In this sense, the term nature is applicable to very different realities and
therefore to anything. In this case we speak of a metaphysical sense of the concept of
nature because it is not limited to the physical reality (the material, the corporeal) but it
includes the spiritual as well as the supernatural ones. In this sense, the concept of
nature is similar to the one of «essence» which also expresses, in a basic way, the being
of something.
In the physical sense «Nature» refers to the totality of all natural beings and
processes which, for this reason, are identified with what is corporeal or material. This
meaning is clear enough in ordinary language; nevertheless problems arise when this
meaning is used in rigorous terms depending on what one understands for «natural
being», or rather on what one understands for «natural». We should therefore move
from the analysis of the substantive «nature» to the one of the adjective «natural». What
do we call «natural»?
The term «natural» may mean the following:
a) natural in the sense of spontaneous which corresponds to an internal
principle. Something is considered «natural» if it corresponds to the
proper way of being of a subject. It can be a property or a way of
behaving. In the first case, for instance, it is natural for man to be
rational, since rationality is a specific characteristic of man. In the second
case, natural is that activity which has an interior origin so that, although
conditioned by the circumstances, it corresponds to an interior core
which unfolds autonomously. In both cases, that which is natural
corresponds to that which is spontaneous and is opposed to that which is
violent or compelled. In this sense, the term natural is applicable to what
is material as well as to what is spiritual.
b) Natural as distinguished from artificial: that which is artificial is a
product of man’s activity, unlike that which is natural.
c) Natural as distinguished from spiritual: in this case the term natural is
identified with what is material or corporeal, i.e. with what belongs to
the physical level. Consequently, terms with spiritual connotation, such
as «rational» and «free» are not referred to as natural.
d) Natural as distinguished from supernatural: it is natural for man to have
spiritual dimensions; in fact, these belong to his proper way of being,
although they are the result of a divine action. On the contrary, a miracle,
for example, or any thing beyond that which corresponds to the proper
way of being of things, is supernatural. Ordinarily, that which is spiritual
and that which is supernatural are confused.
The above analysis shows that the terms «nature» and «natural» are not
univocally determined. We shall propose a characterization of the natural to distinguish
it from the artificial and the spiritual9.
3.2 Characterization of the physical world
We shall focus our attention on two basic aspects of the natural, i.e. the existence
of an autonomous dynamism and of structural patterns. They are real dimensions of the
natural; actually they constantly show up in the ordinary experience as well as in the
scientific knowledge. That which is natural has its own dynamism whose unfolding
obeys time patterns and produces space structures which, in their turn, are the source of
new unfoldings of the natural dynamism. Hence, that which is natural can be
characterized by an intertwining between dynamism and space-time structuring in such
a way that space-time structures revolve around specific patterns which are repeated.
Nature possesses its own dynamism independently from man’s action on it. Such
dynamism unfolds through a great variety of processes in accordance with space-time
patterns. Dynamism and structuring are basic and closely inter-related aspects of nature.
Structures are the result of the unfolding of the dynamism and, in their turn, they are the
sources of new unfoldings of the same dynamism. Such an intertwining between
dynamism and structuring provides a decisive key for interpreting nature in a realistic
way.
a) The dynamism of nature
Nature has its own consistency. Man can interfere with the natural processes but
he cannot change their laws. Autonomy of the natural implies, in a negative way, that it
is independent from man’s intervention and, in a positive way, that it has its own
dynamism.
9 This characterization is original and it was first published in M.ARTIGAS, La inteligibilidad de la naturaleza, 2
nd ed.,
EUNSA, Pamplona 1995. The first chapter of this book analyzes the proposed characterization, while the other chapters
deal with its implications.
Dynamism comes from the Greek dynamis which means force, power, capacity.
When we say that natural things have their own dynamism, we imply that they are not
mere passive subjects whose movement is something added to them from outside but
that they have their own activity, an internal dynamism which is only in part dependent
on the actions suffered from outside.
This nature’s dynamism is experienced at ordinary level as well as at scientific
level.
Before the ordinary experience, this dynamism appears at all levels: in the living,
in the stars, in the atmospheric phenomena, in the air, in water and on earth, with its
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.
Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, shows very clearly that natural
dynamism is a basic characteristic of the natural entities at all levels (microphysical –
subatomic particles, atoms and molecules – as well as macro physical – observable
entities). Microphysical entities are neither passive nor immutable. Physico-chemical
compounds (from the minerals to the stars, passing through the liquids and gases) have a
dynamism which sometimes passes unnoticed owing to the presence of states of
equilibrium. These, though, are dynamic states which can undergo changes whenever
appropriate conditions are present. This dynamism is ultimately evident in the living
beings.
The previous considerations show the fact that there is no such a thing as a
purely inert or passive matter. If sometimes material entities appear to be inert or
passive it is so only in relation to certain conditions or particular points of view. They
are realities found in a state of equilibrium and their components have a dynamism
which can unfold in other circumstances. In a condition of equilibrium, though, the
forces involved compensate one another and do not produce detectable effects.
Philosophy has always been acquainted with the dynamism of natural entities
and therefore it is not a new idea for it. It is present in Aristotle’s conception of the
world, and Leibniz10
speaks clearly about it: it has been stressed in recent times from the
scientific as well as from the philosophical standpoint11
.
In view of the fact that life is usually defined as self movement, the previous
statements about autonomous dynamism of the natural may seem to dilute the difference
between the living and the non living beings. Actually, life not only presupposes an
autonomous dynamism but also an organization of its components which cooperate as a
10
See G.W.LEIBNIZ, De primae philosophiae Emendatione, et de Notione Substantiae, in C.J.GERHARDT (publisher),
Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Georg Olms, Hildesheim 1965, vol.4, pp. 469-470. 11
For instance, Antonio Millán Puelles claims that “no entity is absolutely inactive…. An absolutely inactive entity would
be one which does absolutely nothing, not even to keep oneself in being. It would therefore be an entity kept in being by
another or others. Moreover, the whole of its being would be reduced to «to be kept» and therefore to pure passivity, a
complete «being-made-by-others»” : A.M.PUELLES, Léxico filosófico, Rialp, Madrid 1984, p.436. Juan Enrique Bolzán
has proposed a re-formulation of the philosophy of nature in which he gives first priority to the dynamism of the physical
entities: J.E. BOLZAN, “Fundamentacion de una ontologia de la naturaleza”, Sapientia (Buenos Aires), 41 (1986), pp. 121-
132.
whole and make it possible for the functions proper to life to be actualized.
Consequently, to have an autonomous dynamism does not necessarily mean to have life.
b) Structural patterns
Structuring is the second, but not less important, fundamental characteristic of
the natural entities12
. Nature appears to the ordinary experience as constituted by time-
space structures; scientific progress entails therefore an always wider and deeper
knowledge of the natural structures. Hence, it is essential to take structuring into account
in order to make a realistic characterization of nature.
The meaning of the term structure is wide13
. In general, a structure is a
distribution of parts mutually related which form a whole.
The characteristic structure of the natural possesses space and time dimensions:
natural entities are configured in space, and their dynamism unfolds in time. Although
ordinarily the term «structure» is used in the sense of space dimension, here we refer
also to the time dimension, i.e. both the entities and their processes.
There is a great variety of structures in nature and many times they have
common and repeatable characters. Nature is built around characteristic repetitive
structures which we will call here patterns. Patterns are of paramount importance for an
adequate representation of nature.
Nature appears to ordinary experience as a totality of well define structures. The
clearest example is the one of the living organisms: these have a type of structure
organized as a whole in which the different parts perform specific functions and work in
accordance with characteristic temporal rhythms. Non-living organisms also appear to
be characterized by space and time structuring.
Scientific progress widens our knowledge of the space and time structuring of
nature, and this includes also those areas which are very far from ordinary experience.
The examples can be easily multiplied; it is not even necessary to make recourse to
specific cases: any scientific achievement is an example of this type. Actually, the
knowledge sought after by the experimental sciences is the one which can be related to
experimental control. Such control, though, is possible only when there are aspects
which repeat themselves, at least at the beginning, and therefore, when there are
patterns. Consequently, the more scientific progress advances, the wider becomes the
area of phenomena which can be related to experimental control, and the wider becomes
our knowledge of the space and time patterns. Nature is not only deeply marked by
structuring, but also by the existence of structures which are repeated, i.e. of patterns14
.
12
Jean Marie Aubert stresses the importance of structuring of the natural entities as a solid basis for the reasoning of the
philosophy of nature. See J.M.AUBERT, Filosofia de la naturaleza, 6th
ed., Herder, Barcelona 1987, pp. 301-319. 13
See J.C.CRUZ, Filosofia de la estructura, 2nd
ed., EUNSA, Pamplona 1974. 14
“Our world is made of patterns. If we had to describe the fundamental property of the matter of the universe, we would
have to say that matter is made –or created- in such a way that it shows a continuously accelerated development of
The term structure is wider than pattern. Actually any space and time
arrangement of natural has a structure. Therefore, structuring is not equivalent to
existence of a pattern. We talk of patterns whenever we come across structures which
are repeated. In principle any natural structure is repeatable provided that the conditions
which have caused its existence, are repeated. However, we talk about patterns only
when structures are actually repeated.
Our world is not one among the many possible: ours is a very specific world
which is marked, at all levels, by equally specific patterns. The structure of nature is
deeply marked by the existence of patterns. Not everything in nature is pattern, but
everything rotates around patterns. This statement has profound scientific as well as
philosophical implications; it actually expresses the highly specific and singular
character of our world.
Space structures refer to the order which the components of the natural entities
have: they can be called configurations. Time structures refer to the processes, i.e. to the
unfolding in time of natural dynamism. Many natural processes unfold according to
characteristic patterns which can be called rhythms.
c) The intertwining between dynamism and structuring
It has been shown how natural entities possess their own dynamism and a space-
time structure: the two are also intertwined.
Dynamism and structuring are constantly present in nature and condition each
other. Their relationship is not only external but deeply intertwined, so that one can
speak of their interpenetration or co penetration. Because of this, it can be stated that the
unfolding of dynamism produces space structures, while space structuring is the origin
of new dynamisms. Natural dynamism is somehow stored in space structures with their
own potentialities or virtualities whose unfolding depends on the external
circumstances.
There is proportionality between space organization and dynamism: the
unfolding of the dynamism of natural entities depends on the configuration of the latter.
The structure of organs and systems in the living organisms is responsible for their
specific activities and functions.
What is natural is characterized by the intertwining between dynamism and
structuring, which is the same as saying by its activity. Actually, this intertwining
expresses the type of activity that corresponds to natural entities: natural activity is the
result of an inner dynamism whose unfolding depends on the circumstances, but not
only on them. The unfolding of this dynamism is intertwined with space-time
structuring in such a way that dynamism and structuring are mutually conditioned, as it
has already been explained: this dynamism unfolds in accordance with time patterns,
and space structures are not only the result of this dynamism, but also the source of new
patterns”: CARSTEN BRESH, “What is Evolution?”, in S.ANDERSEN – A.PEACOCKE (publishers), Evolution and
Creation, Aarhus University Press, Aarhus 1987, p.36.
dynamisms. Therefore, what is natural can be characterized as the intertwining between
dynamism and structuring.
To characterize the natural realm in this way means that strictly speaking it is not
possible to really distinguish matter from the laws of its behaviour. Such a distinction is
legitimate in science which uses a particular methodological perspective. Properly
speaking, though, laws are found somehow incorporated or inscribed in matter and their
formulation corresponds to an abstraction. It is necessary to limit oneself to
experimental situations able to control the intervening factors in order to formulate
scientific laws. Such laws correspond to reality, but they are valid only in very specific
circumstances, and they do not exhaust the richness of the being of the natural entities.
3.3. The boundaries of the natural
Characterized in this way, what is natural can be distinguished from what is
artificial and what is rational.
a) Natural and artificial
Strictly speaking what is artificial lacks its own dynamism, while its natural
component parts have it. What is artificial has a space-time structure which corresponds
to an external plan conceived by a maker. Therefore, the structure of an artificial object
is not the result of its own dynamism. Natural dynamism has its own consistency which
is independent from the human will. In manufacturing, man makes use of the natural
dynamism, but he cannot modify it.
It is important to distinguish between ways of producing something and the final
result. It may happen that man’s action on nature produces entities which are identical to
natural entities; these may either exist already or not, yet have the structural and
dynamic unity characteristic of the natural entities. What is artificial in this case is our
intervention in the process of producing such entities. Even in this case, though, we are
unable to modify the original dynamism of nature: we can only channel it. We may say
that there is gradualness in what is natural and in what is artificial because there are
intermediate levels which participate in being in both ways, besides the pure extreme
cases. However, all processes lean ultimately on the inner dynamism and structuring of
what is natural.
b) Natural and rational
Man’s activity is the result of a dynamism which transcends those space-time
structures with which it is related. Intellectual knowledge includes evidence and truth,
the capacity of reflecting on the acquired knowledge, the possibility of building
arguments and examining their validity. Rationality implies establishing goals and
choosing means, i.e. the exercise of the will which includes freedom, capacity of loving
and ethical behaviour.
The exercise of these capacities is related to what is natural (we are natural
beings and not pure spirits). Yet rationality transcends what is natural. While natural
dynamism is conditioned by space-time patterns, rational activity can overcome them, at
least with the intelligence and the will.
Man’s relationship with nature is unique. Although subject to natural laws, man
can nevertheless contemplate them from without, know them and use them. Man is
immersed in nature while at the same time he transcends it, contemplates it,
conceptualises it, objectifies and controls it.
3.4. Properties of what is natural
When we usually say that natural entities are corporeal, sensible, material,
spatial-temporal, quantitative and necessary (as opposed to free) we actually refer to
their properties. The following analysis will try to show how the proposed
characterisation of nature as intertwining between dynamism and structuring perfectly
includes these properties, and how its use may also avoid the inconveniences which may
arise whenever one defines what is natural in function of those properties.
a) The corporeal property
What is corporeal is usually defined as that which has space dimensions, i.e.
extension. Although extension is a very important characteristic of natural entities, it is
nevertheless dangerous to identify what is natural with what is corporeal because in this
case the dynamism, fundamental characteristic of what is natural, would be left out.
Moreover, since the term body is usually employed to indicate the solid state of
matter, the identification of natural with corporeal would inevitably leave out the
aqueous and gaseous systems, as much natural and important as the solid ones. The
fields of forces in physics are also left out from the definition of corporeal, although
they are natural and play a very important role in the sciences of nature.
There is a more serious difficulty: although extension is something that belongs
to what is natural, it does not really connote its proper way of being; actually even
artefacts are bodies. Therefore we can say that the adjective «corporeal» is not sufficient
to distinguish what is natural from what is artificial.
On the other hand, the proposed characterization of nature in terms of dynamism
and structuring does not offer the same shortcoming. Actually, it includes the dynamism
proper to what is natural, it applies to entities as well as to properties and processes, it
covers all the states of matter, it includes not only corporeal entities but also fields of
forces which are also natural, it makes it possible to distinguish between natural and
artificial.
b) The sensible property
In other occasions what is natural is said to be sensible. Here a very important
aspect of our ordinary experience is being stressed, i.e. the physical world as perceived
by our senses. Definitely such a characterization is incomplete and lacks depth.
It is incomplete since it leaves out many natural entities such as the
microphysical ones which are accessible to our observation only indirectly. This
problem could be easily sorted out by expanding the notion of sensible so as to include
anything which is causally related to what we can perceive with our senses. This
solution is legitimate, though it requires precision for a rigorous meaning; the objection
arises, for instance, that human intelligence and will act on physical realities without
themselves being physical realities.
It lacks depth since natural entities have sensible as well as intelligible
dimensions. Moreover, the sensible refers to our possibilities of observation which are
external to the natural entities. Therefore, the term sensible does not reflect the
characteristics proper to the what is natural.
These shortcomings are avoided if what is natural is characterized through
dynamism and structuring. Dynamism does not make reference to our knowledge; it is
actually found in reality. The material character of what is natural is sufficiently
expressed if we include space-time structuring; at the same time we avoid defining what
is natural in terms of our capacity for knowledge.
c) The material property
What is natural and what is material are frequently made to mean the same
thing. In this way one stumbles into a plurality of meanings included in the concept of
matter.
Sometime the terms sensible and corporeal are identified with the term material.
In this case, we shall meet with the difficulties already mentioned with regard to these
two properties.
In other occasions, the term material indicates everything which acts as a
component, i.e. that of which something is made. It is one of the most classical
meanings of matter in philosophy as well as in ordinary life. It is, though, quite
inadequate to characterise what is natural.
Besides, what is material is different from what is immaterial. Actually, what is
immaterial can be natural: for instance, there is a certain degree of immateriality in the
sense knowledge which, nevertheless, belongs to the natural level.
The material is also distinct from the rational or spiritual. In this case, it will be
necessary to explain the nature of this distinction by using other explanations.
In its most philosophical meaning, material is distinct from formal; moreover,
what is formal is also found in nature so that it can also be considered a characteristic of
what is natural natural. What is formal is more important than what is material since it
makes reference to the determination of the way of being of natural entities.
It seems preferable, then, to characterise what is natural in terms of dynamism
and structuring. This makes it possible to distinguish what is natural from what is
rational, and helps avoid the misunderstandings previously mentioned; it can actually
include, without any shortcomings, the immaterial as well as the formal dimensions of
what is natural.
d) Space-time properties
The term natural includes space-time structuring and, consequently, makes
reference to space and time. Space and time express basic dimensions of the natural
entities.
Although they belong to the natural entities they are only dimensions and, as
such, insufficient to characterize what is natural. Actually, even what is artificial
possesses space-time dimensions. They are necessary conditions, albeit insufficient, for
the conceptualization of what is natural natural.
As already seen, space-time structuring is intertwined with the dynamism of
which it is the result and condition. Therefore, space-time structuring alone is
insufficient for the characterization of what is natural.
e) The quantitative property
The quantitative property makes reference to those dimensions which stem from
quantity (extension, divisibility, localization, etc.). As such, it is a primary characteristic
of the physical world.
Actually, any definition of nature should include a reference to the quantitative
characteristics. Like space-time properties, though, (closely related to quantity)
quantitative aspects are a condition, albeit not sufficient, to express the characteristics of
the natural since it is also characteristic of the artefacts. Actually, quantitative aspects
are unable to express the existence of a dynamism proper to what is natural.
On the other hand, the proposed space-time structuring includes reference to the
quantitative without reducing the natural to the quantitative.
f) The property of necessity
What is natural is usually referred to as necessary in opposition to what is
rational, the area of freedom. Here reference is made to the activity which is proper to
what is natural: an activity whose unfolding follows necessary patterns.
Although it seems legitimate to oppose natural necessity to the free activity
proper to a rational being, this ultimately means denial of freedom. To say that, unlike
free beings, natural entities act in a necessary way, simply means that the latter lack that
freedom which is proper to rational beings. If, on the other hand, one wants to clarify
what natural necessity consists in, one has to tackle the problem of determinism, an issue
which is far from trivial.
On the other hand, neither dynamism nor space-time structuring lead to a
determinist conception of what is natural; they actually leave open the problem of
indeterminism. The proposed characterisation of what is natural makes it possible to
distinguish what is natural from what is rational and avoids, at the same time, the
shortcomings which may arise when it is said that what is natural behaves in a rigidly
determinist way.
3.5. The Aristotelian characterization of the natural
The proposed characterisation of what is natural in terms of dynamism,
structuring and their intertwining contains the essential aspects of the same
characterisation proposed by Aristotle who presented nature as inner principle of
activity.
To cite Aristotle’s text: “Among the existing things, some exist by nature, while
some by other causes. Animals and their parts, plants and the elementary bodies (earth,
fire, air ,water) all exist by nature……nature is principle and cause of movement and
rest for those things in which it is present immediately per se and not per accidens”15
.
With these last words, Aristotle stresses the fact that natural is distinct from accidental
(understood as that which results from the fortuitous occurrence of causes or casual).
Nature, according to Aristotle, is an inner principle of activity, only present in
natural entities (usually called substances)16
. Natural entities par excellence are the
living ones, whose development and activity are the result of inner tendencies.
According to Aristotle, natural is distinct from artificial; the latter as such does
not have inner tendencies (those tendencies are present only in their natural
components). Natural is distinct from casual which is the result of the accidental
coincidence of natural causes and which, therefore, does not have determined ends.
Natural is distinct from the violent which proceeds from external causes preventing the
realisation of its natural tendencies and, therefore, the achievement of its natural end.
What is natural is found closely related to tendencies towards determined ends. The
Aristotelian philosophy of nature is teleological, since it is centred in the finality of the
substances, each with its own inner tendencies which are also cooperatively organised to
form the different system of nature.
Aristotle’s ideas are contained within a worldview which is partly obsolete
owing to the progress of science. This is the reason why they are usually said to have
lost value17
. Without doubt the Aristotelian worldview includes theories about the four
elements, natural movements and heavenly bodies: all this does not hold water
nowadays. However, the Aristotelian characterisation of nature does not depend on this
type of worldview and preserves its value in its essentials18
.
15
ARISTOTLE, Physica, II, 1, 192 b 8-23. 16
Ibid., 192 b 33-34. 17
A. Mansion, for example, who is one of the main modern scholars of Aristotle has stated that the Aristotle’s definition is
too fragile since it is based on a very superficial analysis of the daily experience and of the ordinary language. He adds that
the weakness of this definition has repercussions on his entire natural philosophy: see A.MANSION, Introduction à la
physique aristotélicienne, 2nd
ed., Vrin, Paris 1945, p.101 18
See A.PREVOSTI, La Física d’Aristòtil. Una ciència filosòfica de la natura, Promociones Publicaciones Universitarias,
Barcelona 1984, pp.207-239; A.QUEVEDO, «Ens per accidens». Contingencia y determinación enAristóteles, EUNSA,
Pamplona 1989, pp.219-261.
Is there any relationship between the Aristotelian characterisation of nature and
the one we have proposed? Both stress the internal dynamism of what is natural as
opposed to what is artificial. Besides, in claiming that such dynamism unfolds according
to patterns, we have also stressed its directionality, and this concept is also related to
Aristotelian finality. Although Aristotle does not mention space-time structuring in
defining nature, nevertheless, when he describes entities and activities, he makes it
understood that these exist in space and time situations. The two positions actually
coincide in their general essential lines.
II. THE NATURAL ENTITIES
Dynamism and structuring do not have existence of their own; they are present
in subjects which are the natural entities. There is a wide variety of natural entities with
different degrees of individuality, unity and organization.
Natural entities are represented by concepts such as substance with a long
standing philosophical tradition, and system which is very much in use nowadays. We
shall use both concepts and we shall try to show how the characterisation of natural
entities as systems makes it possible to represent the great variety of entities in nature
and to apply the concept of substance to individual unitary systems.
The first section of this chapter analyses the notion of system, its implications
and the types of natural systems. A notion of substance is proposed which corresponds
to the natural individual unitary systems. The last section deals with the topic on how
substantiality is actualized at the different levels of nature.
4. NATURAL SYSTEMS
We shall use the notion of system to represent individual entities, their groupings
and their articulation in the global system of Nature. We shall continue examining its
meaning and the different types of entities to which it is applied, focusing our attention
on natural systems.
4.1 The notion of system
The term system comes from the Greek syn (with, together with) and hístemi (to
put, to place). It expresses the idea of an object placed next to another, or others,
constituting an order, a succession, a whole. It is related to the term synthesis which
means composition, ordination, adjustment, harmony. It is used to designate a set of
intertwined rules or principles (for instance, a system of government), a combination of
bodies and movements which, although different, yet form a whole (for instance, the
solar system), a set or organs or similar parts which work together in the same function
(for example, the nervous system). In general, any series, or ordination, or succession is
a system (political, philosophical, metric, etc.). A system is concatenation, order,
correlation, harmony.
Without any further detailing, the notion of system is so general that it can be
applied somehow to any set whose components bear some relation to one another.
However, it is a term used in those cases in which there is a very strong unity,
particularly from the time in which the general theory of systems was formulated19
.
19
This theory is based on the works of Ludwig von Bertalanffy: General System Theory, George Braziller, New
York 1969; Perspectivas en la teoría general de sistemas, Alianza, Madrid 1986. An analysis of the central concepts of this
It is necessary to distinguish between the scientific and the philosophical use of
the notion of system. In the experimental sciences each branch adopts a particular
perspective and defines systems, their properties and states in function of this
perspective. For instance systems in thermodynamics and their states can be defined in
terms of pressure, temperature and volume. Therefore, these systems are not a complete
representation of the natural entities; they actually refer to some aspects which are
selectively considered by that branch of science. On the other hand, philosophy
considers systems as they are in nature but from the point of view of their fundamental
way of being (without presuming to exhaust this knowledge). Our reflection will
logically take into account the knowledge provided by science directing its attention,
though, to the natural systems with the purpose of determining their way of being from a
philosophical perspective.
4.2. Types of natural systems
There is a wide variety of systems in nature. We shall not exhaust their
classification; this would involve a mammoth task and the results would not have much
philosophical interest. Philosophy is interested in analysing some general types of
systems and in studying the peculiar characteristics of those which present a stronger
unity. It is thanks to these types of systems that nature possesses a very special
organisation.
We distinguish two main groups of systems in function of the integration of their
components. We call unitary systems those whose components are integrated in such a
way that they present the characters of unity and individuality. We distinguish these
systems from those which, although possessing certain unity, do not show characters of
individuality, i.e. mixtures, aggregations, systems of order and ecosystems.
a) Unitary systems
It is generally admitted that there are many natural entities at all levels in nature
which are authentic unitary systems. They are systems in which structural and dynamic
novelties appear (emergence of new characteristics). New structural patterns are formed
as a result of the interaction of their components, and the characteristics of the system
are not reducible to a mere sum of the characteristics of its components. These systems
are individual, have a new unitary structure and possess their own dynamism.
Unitary systems have different degrees of unity and organization. Some show
unity at structural as well as at dynamic level: these are systems with a high level of
integration, cooperation and directionality among their components. This is particularly
the case of the living beings.
theory can be found in S.S.ROBBINS – T.A.OLIVA: “The Empirical Identification of Fifty-one Core General Systems
Theory Vocabulary Components”, General Systems, 28 (1983-1984), pp. 69-76.
Although unity and individuality are the main characteristics of unitary systems,
this does not mean total independence of these systems from other entities, but yes a
certain degree of independence, since they have their own structure and dynamism.
Unity refers to the effective integration of the components of the system and it is
manifested in its structuring (holism or character of totality) as well as in its dynamism
(cooperation).
b) Other systems
Other systems have some character of unity, but they lack individuality: this
seems to be the case of mixtures, aggregations, systems of order and ecosystems. In this
case, the components preserve their individuality and their basic characters, while the
system acquires a lesser level of individuality as compared with the one of unitary
systems. Here the notion of system becomes weak, but still applicable since there are
structural relations which imply a certain unity.
In the case of mixtures, the components preserve their individuality without
forming a new unitary system. This feature admits various levels; at the lowest it is a
mere juxtaposition and the term system is loosely applied to it without much interest.
However in some cases this unity is greater and the term system is used in a weak way.
For instance, the natural aggregations of water in the seas and rivers are sufficiently
homogeneous and, although there are no new chemical patterns in it, there are
nevertheless structures and dynamisms in it of a systemic type.
In the systems of order we find that their components are individual and
completely differentiated systems which are ordered through stable relations so that
their mutual interactions produce situations with stable characteristics. This is the case
of the solar system in which the various planetary orbits follow regular patterns.
Ecosystems are the object of ecology. An ecosystem is a complex system with a
set of subsystems of different types. They have a certain unity since there are relations
of mutual dependence among their components, and their own dynamism20
.
5. NATURAL SUBSTANCES
Since ancient times the concept of substance has been used to connote natural
entities. It is one of the central philosophical concepts and an object of different
20
The notion of ecosystem was formulated by Arthur G. Tansley in his article “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational
Concepts and Terms”, Ecology, 16 (1935), pp. 284-307, where he stated: “Las tramas de la vida, ajustadas a determinados
complejos ambientales, son verdaderas unidades a veces muy integradas, que constituyen los nucleos vivientes de sistemas,
en el sentido que dan los fisicos a esta palabra…Dentro de cada sistema tienen lugar intercambios de muchas clases, no solo
entre los organismos, sino tambien entre el mundo organico y el inorganico. Estos ecosistemas, como preferimos llamarlos,
puede ser de muchas clases y tamaños, formando una de las categorias de los distintos tipos de sistemas fisicos del
Universo, que van desde el Universo como un todo hasta el atomo”. See P.BECO, voz «Ecosistema» in VV.AA.,
Diccionario de la naturaleza, Espasa Calpe, Madrid 1993, pp.198-202.
interpretations in every époque. We shall show how the previous considerations about
natural systems cast new lights on the concept of substance and of its applications in our
times.
5.1. Notion of substance
We shall first propose a characterisation of substance which will be our basis for
further reflections.
Substances can be characterised as entities whose way of being has three
characteristics: subsistence, subjectivity and unity.
Subsistence means that a substance has its own being. This makes it different
from accidents, such as the size and colour which do not exist separately: they only exist
as determinations of a subsistent subject.
Subjectivity means that the substance is the subject of attribution of properties
and activities. The term is closely related to subsistence; actually the subject to which
properties and activity are attributed is the entity which has subsistence, or its own
being.
Unity, characteristic of the substance, consists in having an essence, or a way of
being which is organised as a whole. This makes it possible to identify the subject and
persists throughout the accidental changes.
These characteristics summarise the classical characterisation of substance as
that entity whose essence is to be in itself and not in another. Substance has a way of
being organized as a whole, an essence, whose characteristic is to subsist with its own
being. On the contrary, it is proper to accidents to be in another: they do not have their
own being, since they are determinations of the substance.
5.2. Substance in Aristotle’s philosophy
The concept of substance is a central topic in Aristotle’s philosophy, and the way
in which he characterises it still preserves a privileged position nowadays21
, in spite of
the criticism it has received in history.
Aristotle poses the problem of substance as the key problem in philosophy, since
it corresponds to establishing what an entity is, what reality is made of, and what reality
is properly speaking.
21
The importance of Aristotle’s idea about substance for the study of nature has been stated in many present day
studies, from perspectives which our quite different from ours. See for instance: M.ESPINOZA, “Critique de la science
antisubstantialiste”, Theoria, 5 (1990), pp. 67-84, and “La catégorie naturelle ultime”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,
98 (1993), pp. 367-393.
According to Aristotle, being (ens) is spoken of with different meanings, i.e.
essence, quantity, quality, etc. Its first meaning, though, is essence which signifies the
substance. The fact is that when we ask: “what is this”? we do not say “this is white” or
“this is hot” or “this is three meters long”. We actually say: “This is a man” or “this is a
tree”. All the rest is said to be ens because it is either quantity or quality or effects of the
substance. That which is not substance does not have its own existence, nor can it be
separated from the substance, so that ens, in its primary meaning, is the substance. Only
the substance has its own existence; moreover, all the other categories presuppose the
substance and we know something in particular when we know what it is. Therefore, the
substance is the first object of the philosophical study22
.
The term substance speaks ultimately of the way of being of those beings (entes)
which have their own being (esse). For instance, to be a plant or to be a man implies a
substantial way of being, different from what is expressed by the accidents, such as to be
white or to be two meters long. A substance does not inhere in another and therefore is
not predicated of another (the verb to inhere means that something has its being (esse)
in another, that it is an accident of a substantial subject). A substance is a being (ens)
capable of subsisting separately, autonomously, in itself and by itself; it is something
determined, neither universal nor abstract; it has intrinsic unity, it is not a mere
aggregate of multiple parts; it is act, actuality, and not potentiality without
actualization23
.
When Aristotle applies the notion of substance to concrete entities he does so in
answer to the question: “what are substances”? He emphasises the fact that
substantiality is more clearly defined in animals, plants and their parts, and in the natural
bodies (fire, water, earth and similar) with their parts and what makes them up (the
heavens and their parts, the stars, the moon, the sun)24
.
According to Aristotle, in the material realm, only natural entities are
substances. Substances are distinct from mere aggregations in which parts preserve their
essence. They are also distinct from artificial entities, or artefacts, which do not have an
intrinsic unity but only a functional one.
Aristotle’s view does not include the concept of creation and, as such, is unable
to give an ultimate explanation of substance. According to him, the first mover moves as
a final cause, without producing being (esse). Aquinas made use of Aristotle’s ideas
integrating them within a different perspective which rotates around creation. The
material substance becomes intelligible because its reason d’être is found in creation, in
the divine intelligence and will. Creation is the ultimate foundation of being in nature.
The divine plan of creation is seen as the diffusion of the divine perfection and goodness
with their consequent participation by the creatures (especially by man, rational creature
capable of knowing and loving God), and this plan makes the created reality intelligible.
22
See ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, VII, 1, 1028 a 10 – b 7. 23
Ibid., VII, 3, 1029 a 7 ss. 24
Ibid., VII, 2, 1028 b 8-13.
Aquinas’ perspective on substance makes use of Aristotle’s ideas integrated,
though, into a new one which notably enriches them. Aquinas’ doctrine rotates around
the actus essendi (the act of being) of creatures: this is received by participation from
the divine Being. God does not have being (esse), He is Being. His way of being, or
essence, consists in the fullness of Being, and He produces the being of creatures by
creation. Created substances, in their entity as well as in their intelligibility, remit to
their being (esse) which they have as their own although received by God. Their being
(esse) is realised in accordance with their concrete way of being which is expressed by
the essence.
5.3 Substances and unitary systems
We have characterised unitary systems as having a clearly differentiated
individuality and a strong unity. Actually, substances also have these two
characteristics: they are individual subjects with a structural unity. Therefore, one can
say that unitary systems correspond to the notion of substance. Substances are
individual systems which have that unity characteristic of a whole, have their own
organisation and, ultimately, a way of being organised as a whole. For this reason we
claim that unitary systems correspond to the notion of substance.
There is a great variety of systems in nature and many of them are not organised
as a whole. However, even these are the result of a dynamism which unfolds around
unitary systems; they are made of unitary systems and are produced as a result of the
interactions of the latter. We can claim that not everything in nature is substance, but
everything is organized around substances.
5.4. Characteristics of natural substances
We now refer to the three basic characteristics of substance which have been
already mentioned (subsistence, subjectivity and unity). They will be analysed in the
light of the identification made between substances and unitary systems.
a) Substances are the natural entities in their full meaning
Living beings occupy a privileged position among natural entities because they
are systems which show forth the organisation of nature in a most clear way; they are
individual systems organised as a whole whose components cooperate in a functional
way. Other natural entities have also such a strong unity as to be classified as unitary
systems. The notion of substance connotes being (ens) in a primary way: this is
expressed by the identification made between unitary systems and substance. Substance
is that natural entity which has its own and characteristic way of being. To be a
substance is the basic way of being and to be subject of accidental modifications.
Substance as being (ens) in its primary meaning, expresses what a natural entity is par
excellence.
For this reason, the notion of substance is a basic category needed in order to
conceptualise the physical world: it expresses being (ens) in its proper sense, and
everything else is referred to it. To say that substance is the central category is the same
as saying that all the other aspects of nature presuppose it and refer to it.
The real existence of natural unitary systems shows the fact that substance is not
a simple mental need, it actually reflects real ways of being. The natural substance is not
an object of fantasy added to the data provided by experience (as Empiricism teaches); it
is a real entity, the centre of the intertwining between dynamism and structuring.
Substance is the primary way of being and all the other ways of being make reference to
it, i.e. aggregations of substances and accidents.
b) Substances are the subject of natural dynamism
Natural unitary systems are in no way passive subjects; on the contrary the
dynamism of nature unfolds in them in a specific way: they are the source of specific
activities. Dynamism is not a mere movement added from without to the unitary
systems; it is rather the result of an energy which unfolds from within according to
certain patterns. Following the identification of substance with natural unitary systems,
one can say that substances are the subjects of the natural dynamism.
Substances are the centre of dynamism and structuring; this fact is clearly shown
by science whose method of investigation is specific and different from the
philosophical one. Actually, the quest for organizations characterised by unity which are
at the origin of processes, and which are the natural results of these processes, occupies
a very important place in science. Such organisations are the unitary systems. The
intertwining between dynamism and structuring is clearly evident in them; their
dynamism, characterised by a unity of efforts, bears relation to their structure which, in
its turn, is the result, as a whole, of natural processes.
Unitary systems, and therefore substances, are the results of the unfolding of
natural dynamism. Their existence depends on specific conditions and, if these are not
present, systems fail to come into existence and, if they exist, they would stop existing.
This is equivalent to saying that natural substances do not have absolute consistency,
independent from the circumstances. Their being and activities are contingent since they
depend on contingent conditions. Therefore natural substances are not immutable,
indestructible and absolutely permanent subjects.
Substances are ultimately immersed in the natural dynamism of which they
are source and result. They keep in existence as long as suitable conditions persist, and
unfold their dynamism through processes usually called accidental changes since the
substance is not radically affected by them. On the contrary, when those conditions
suitable to their existence disappear substantial changes intervene in which the whole
substance is transformed. The system then loses its characteristic consistency and
another system, or others, is produced. The consistency proper to each substance is
related to its structural unity.
c) The substance is a structural unity
It was pointed out that the term substance refers to the structural unity; if there is
no unity there is no true substance but a mere aggregation. Again, this characteristic
becomes evident when the substance is identified with the natural unitary systems, so
called because of their structural unity.
Structural unity implies a certain order. This unity is particularly strong when
there is an authentic organization and not just a generic type of order. In this case the
components cooperate towards the existence and activity of the system in a functional
way. This is particularly evident in the case of the living beings in which the structure
prevails over the components: considered in their specific materiality, the components
change continuously while the basic structure persist throughout these changes.
Moreover, the existence and activity of each component is conditioned by the
cooperative functionality of the other components within the structural organization as a
whole.
The natural substance has, therefore, its own way of being and this is
characterized by a specific structural unity; it is a basic core which persists throughout
multiple changes which do not manage to modify it (accidental changes). Its way of
being can nevertheless be changed into another way of being when suitable conditions
cease to be present (substantial change).
5.5. Mechanism, subjectivism, processualism
We shall consider some conceptions about the substance which are quite
different from the one so far considered: the Cartesian mechanism, the Kantian
subjectivism and the processualism.
a) The Cartesian mechanism
Mechanism had already been proposed by the ancient atomists (Leucippus,
Democritus, Epicures, Lucretius Caro). With the systematic birth of modern physics-
mathematics in the 17th
century, mechanism was defended by scientists and
philosophers as a philosophy pretty coherent with the new science. It became very
influential in the 18th
and 19th
centuries.
The mechanistic philosophy was explicitly formulated by Descartes. The central
tenets of the Cartesian mechanism are the following: a corporeal substance is nothing
but extension, all the properties of a substance are aspects of quantity, (i.e. dimensions,
form and movement), the whole movement is nothing but local movement (i.e.
displacement of parts of matter)25
.
In this perspective, nature is left without internal dynamism. More precisely,
Descartes considered the movement of the bodies as the result of an original impulse
communicated to them by God when He created them. He added that, owing to the
divine immutability, the quantity of this movement would remain constant in time26
.
On the other hand, the Cartesian mechanism eliminates the distinction between
the natural and the artificial: everything corporeal can be explained in accordance with
the same principles. For instance, living beings would basically be like any other
machine. The only distinction admitted by Descartes is between the corporeal-material
and the spiritual. In accordance with this radical dualism, the human being is composed
of two complete substances, soul and body which communicate between themselves in
an extrinsic way, without ever establishing one substance only.
Descartes defined substance as “that thing which exists in such a way that does
not need any other thing in order to exist”27
. This definition, though, is quite confusing.
Actually, the same Descartes immediately realized that, strictly speaking, this definition
can only be applied to God while creatures need divine intervention in order to exist.
Descartes claimed that the existence of the thinking I is the basic certitude and
the foundation of any other certitude. The “I” thinks, doubts, understands, conceives,
states, denies, wants, imagines and feels: it is a thinking substance or res cogitans. The
material substance, on the other hand, is a res extensa: its essential character is
extension, while qualities are nothing but modifications produced by the matter in a
knowing subject. Substances have a principal attribute which constitutes their essence:
in the case of the soul, it is thought, and in the case of the bodies, it is extension28
.
The identification of the corporeal substance with extension presents difficulties,
since extension is an accidental characteristic and, as such, unable to be the foundation
of that unity required by the substance. Descartes claims that extension corresponds to
the clear and distinct idea one has about bodies; actually, it is an image which can be
studied in a geometrical way. In his efforts to provide a philosophical basis for the new
mathematical science of nature, Descartes reduced the corporeal substance to its
geometrical aspects. This reduction cannot be founded rigorously and presents serious
difficulties. For instance, one of the difficulties is related to the knowledge of
substances: “how can we know a corporeal substance after stripping it of all its
properties and reducing it to pure extension? It is an issue at loggerhead with reality.
Within the perspective of Descartes, the corporeal substance lacks internal
dynamism and tendencies and is reduced to a kind of passive and inert substratum. The
25
See R.DESCARTES, Principia Philosophiae, 1st part, No. 53 (in Oeuvres, published by C.Adams and
P.Tannery, Vrin, Paris 1964, Vol. IX-2, p.48), and 2nd
part, No. 23 (ibid., p.75) 26
Ibid., 2nd
part, No.36 (in Oeuvre, Vol. IX-2, pp.83-84). 27
“Une chose qui existe en telle façon qu’elle n’a besoin que de soi-même pour exister”: R.DESCARTES,
Principia Philosophiae, op.cit., 1st part, No.51 (in Oeuvre, op.cit., Vol.IX-2, p.47).
28 Ibid., No.53 (in Oeuvre, op.cit. Vol.IX-2, p.48).
consideration of this fact sparked the subsequent criticisms against the concept of
substance in general and the rejection of the concept of natural substances in particular.
Critics have not realized, though, that what they rejected was the Cartesian concept of
substance.
The mechanistic image is just a partial explanatory model with serious
limitations also in the field of physics-mathematics. The basic mechanistic ideas are
now obsolete. Actually, even in the classical physics there were already topics (such as
forces and fields of forces) which could hardly be compatible with a mechanistic view.
Nevertheless, the success of the new physics was frequently used as a proof in favor of
mechanism. Many centuries had to pass before the limitations of mechanism appeared in
the scientific field. The scientific revolutions of the 20th
century (quantum physics and
relativity theory) have clearly shown how the mechanistic models are just one type
among many possible ones: they represent only some aspects of nature and are not
applicable to the study of many phenomena.
The identification of the corporeal with an inert and passive kind of matter,
reduced to pure extension and exteriors, is a residue of the Cartesian mechanism which
has played a very important role in the western thought.
b) The Kantian subjectivism
According to Kant substance is one of the a priori categories and, as such, it
does not have its origin in experience but it is condition and possibility of experience.
Knowledge proceeds as follows: senses provide only incoherent impressions, while
thought gives order to them. At first, this ordering takes place in space and time which
are a priori forms of the sense knowledge. Afterwards, concepts are formulated which
are also a priori and which make experience intelligible. Substance is one of these
concepts, a pure form which does not correspond to any thing real, but to our way of
conceptualizing. One cannot think without the notion of substance which expresses that
which remains throughout the changes. Such a notion enables us to organize experience
in an intelligible way. It is impossible to represent changes without a subject of change,
and this subject is what we call substance.
In the Kantian perspective substance is an a priori condition of knowledge
which enables us to think the phenomena as permanent in time, and makes it possible to
determine time. Substance is conceived as an inert and passive substratum, without its
own life: it is a notion which refers to the permanence of phenomena in time.
Kant’s ideas are conditioned by the definitive value that Kant attributed to
Newton’s physics for which he tried to give a philosophical justification. Substance,
then, became Newton’s matter: its quantum (or quantity) remains, and this corresponds
to the constancy of Newton’s mass conceived as quantity of matter. The scientific
progress has shown the limits of the Newtonian physics and therefore the limits of the
Kantian stand which intended to justify the definitive validity of this type of physics.
Kant correctly realized that science would become constructive if based on
mathematics. This is very important: actually the concepts of physics-mathematics are
not only obtained by abstraction, they are also constructed by us. It is understandable,
then, that, in using the concept of substance as the foundation of science, Kant also
claimed this concept to be our construction. Kant’s merit consists in having pointed out
the fact that, in order to assess our knowledge of nature, it is necessary to consider the
way in which we conceptualize. Nevertheless, he failed to explain how our knowledge
could have a real validity.
The Kantian stand is conditioned by a false dilemma: “is our knowledge totally
derived from sense experience, or is it totally a work of our intellect”? Senses and
intellect, totally separated from each other, would be united through intellectual
categories whose value is difficult to justify. In reality, there is a deeper continuity and
interpenetration between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge, so that we know
the natural substances intellectually through their sensible accidents. There is no doubt
that the substance is a mental category, yet it ca be used to represent reality.
c) Processualism and energysm
Since the 17th
century experimental sciences have emphasized the importance of
concepts such as force and energy which refer to the natural dynamism. In our own
times, doctrines such as dynamism, energysm, and processualism have had an even
greater impact in emphasizing the relevance of forces, energy and processes as dynamic
aspects of nature.
These doctrines represent a healthy reaction against mechanism. However, in
some cases they are a bit exaggerated, since they seem to grant the status of substance to
dynamism, and to deny the structural aspects of nature. For instance, according to some
forms of processualism, stability in nature is nothing but a moment within a continuous
flux, and the latter would be the authentic natural reality.
Henri Bergson is one the classical representatives of processualism. The
background of all his work is a kind of dualism which opposes the static to the dynamic,
and in which the dynamic is the winner. Bergson successfully emphasized the
importance of the dynamic aspects against mechanism. He went so far, though, as to
grant the status of substance to change. Bergson criticized, with reasons, the
characterization of some aspects of reality as absolute stillness. He claims that
dynamism is not something which is added to a still reality. He reached the conclusion
(difficult to be accepted) that “although changes occur, nevertheless things do not
change, in other words, change does not need a subject. There is movement but there is
no inert and invariable moving object: movement does not imply something that
moves”29
. Bergson may have held this stand owing to the polemical character of his
reflections. Actually, it is true that there is no inert and invariable object behind any
change, but it is also true that there is an active and variable subject.
29
H.BERGSON, El pensamiento y lo moviente, La Pleyade editions, Buenos Aires 1972, pp. 120-121.
Following Bergson’s thinking, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) represented
nature as a process, as a continuous becoming. He defines substance as an activity
process: the existence of a real entity is its own activity of becoming. Duration is
inherent to the nature of substance. Hence he states : “a real entity is a process and
cannot be described in terms of morphology of some stuff”30
. A real entity is active, and
the ultimate nature of things is activity. The substance is activity. Whitehead sees his
thesis justified by physics.
Like Bergson, Whitehead adopts an evolutionary type of worldview in which
nature is creative. The category of ultimate is creativity or creative action; it is pure
activity which lacks its own characteristic (like the matter of Aristotle) but does not
appear without some characteristic. For Whitehead, substance is a kind of acting which
has a particular form, or characteristic. There cannot be any acting without some form or
characteristic, and vice-versa. There is proportion between creativity (or activity) and
characteristic (or form) similar to the one between matter and form in Aristotle.
According to Whitehead, activity becomes the ultimate condition of nature.
Acting cannot be separated from the one which acts; there cannot be acting agents
without actions, the essence of an acting agent implies its acting. The nature of the
acting agent will be determined by the characteristic of its actions. In this perspective,
the acting agent is the result of its own actions. The being of a real entity is determined
by its own acting. To be and to become are not separable. Being includes becoming, the
former is determined by the latter. The way in which an entity becomes determines what
that entity is: this is the principle of the process. The metaphysics of Whitehead is an
elaboration of what is implied in the principle of the process.
In this way we reach a philosophy of the process. The activity of the real agent
has to be self-creative. The ultimate ontological nature of a real entity – or substance – is
self-creative activity. Any activity is the self-establishment of an agent. The self-
creation is not something isolated or self-sufficient. The substance needs to be internally
related with other entities, from which it obtains its own characteristics: it has an
emergent character. This perspective is also a philosophy of the organism which stresses
the interconnection among all the real entities. The result is an evolutionary process
from which new emergent syntheses are created.
Whitehead’s worldview is evolutionary, organicist and emergentist. These are
characteristics which have acquired great importance in our present times in accordance
with an evolutionist image of nature. These aspects, emphasized by Bergson, are
integrated by Whitehead in a kind of philosophy which is difficult, somehow confused
and with some pantheist trends, but with a lot of prestige nowadays.
It is worth noting how this kind of worldview emphasizes the following ideas:
a) the real unity of each entity and of all entities as a whole;
b) the characteristic of the reality as a process;
c) the central place occupied by action;
d) the rejection of the mechanistic-atomistic point of view.
30
A.N. WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology, Harper & Row, New York 1960, p.55.
Processualism presents difficulties, though, because it gives little importance to
that consistency which is proper to each substance; and because of the unilateral
criticism of the classical notion of substance, of self-creation and of the pantheist
tendencies. At the same time, the structural and stable aspects of reality seem to
evaporate.
Some times it is said that the natural is ultimately nothing but energy: this would
consist in an ultimate substratum of dynamic type whose concentration would produce
the bodies (sub-atomic particles, atoms, molecules and bigger bodies). This energysm is
in line with dynamism and processualism: the equivalence between mass and energy
which is a consequence of the relativity theory, is often mentioned as an argument in its
favour. This equivalence would show up, for instance, in the production of sub-atomic
particles starting from energy, and of energy from sub-atomic particles in the reverse
process. An attempt is made to identify energy with the proto-matter of philosophical
tradition, as if this concept could now find a physical realization. In this case, everything
would be made of energy and the physical particles would be nothing but concentrated
energy31
. Sometime it is added that matter has the nature of a process32
, since the
different forms of energy can be transformed into one another.
These statements should be understood within the framework of the critique
against the atomistic mechanism and are somehow valid within this context. The
atomistic mechanism claimed that matter is made of indivisible particles and, as such,
unable to undergo transformations: they could only change place. However, the
microphysical world is in reality an extremely dynamic one.
This, though, does not justify the reduction of matter to energy. Actually, energy,
and the particles dealt with by physics, does not correspond to either intuitive or
philosophical concepts; they are theoretical constructions which, although very much
related to reality, establish this relationship by conceptual and experimental means
whose meaning cannot be directly extrapolated to philosophy33
.
Energysm is particularly suggestive when a metaphorical, rather than literal,
meaning is attributed to it. Energysm and processualism emphasize, with reasons, the
fact that dynamism is inscribed within the very heart of nature, and that the individual as
well as the structural aspects of nature are lumped together in the unfolding of a natural
31
Werner Heisenberg is one of the physicists who formulated the quantum mechanics in the 20’s. He maintained
that “All the elementary particles are made of the same substance, i.e. energy. They are the forms that energy needs to
acquire in order to be converted to matter”: W. HEISENBERG – E. SCHRÖDINGER – M. BORN – P. AUGER,
Discussione sulla fisica moderna, Einaudi, Turin 1959, p.17. 32
Karl Popper says that: “Matter is not a substance, since it is not preserved. It can be destroyed and created again.
Even the most stable particles, the nucleons, can be destroyed by collision with their anti-particles, and their energy is
transformed into light. Matter appears to be a very compressed kind of energy which can be transformed into other forms of
energy and, consequently, has the nature of a process, since it can be converted into other processes such as light and, of
course, movement and heat”: K. POPPER – J.C. ECCLES, El yo y su cerebro, Labor, Barcelona 1980, p.7. 33
Actually the Einstein’s equation is a mathematical relation established between physical magnitudes: the mass
(and not matter) and the energy. The equation means that the values of the magnitudes involved are related through the
formula E=mc2 where E is energy, m is mass and c is the speed of light in the vacuum. Here, therefore, we are not dealing
with statements on the concepts of matter and energy in a philosophical sense, but of magnitudes which are defined in
accordance with the procedures of the physics-mathematics.
dynamism which produces a big cosmic process. However, in some cases they appear to
reduce nature to its dynamic aspects and deny the consistency of the structural aspects.
In reality, only the combination of the dynamic and the structural can provide an
adequate representation of nature.
6. HOW TO IDENTIFY NATURAL SUBSTANCES
Up to now we have dealt with the existence of entities which can be called «unitary
systems» or «substances», we have analyzed their main characteristics and we have used
some illustrative examples. In order to achieve a wider perspective, we shall now ask
ourselves which of the natural entities can be actually considered substances. We shall
answer while keeping in mind that, according to our way of setting the problem, this
question can be formulated in a different way, i.e. which systems can be actually
considered natural unitary systems.
There is no doubt that this question is philosophically interesting for three reasons.
First, the notions of system and substance would remain at an abstract level unless we
actually apply them to natural entities. Second, the study of these examples provides a
solid basis for a faithful representation of nature, on which a further philosophical
reflection can be carried out. Third, since this study compels to apply the notions of
system and substance to real entities, the former will be enriched in their meaning.
We have already stressed that the basic characteristics of the natural unitary systems
are individuality and unity. We have also said that unity can be referred to structural
aspects (structural unity) as well as to dynamic aspects (operational unity much related
to directionality). Therefore, such characteristics will be used as criteria of
substantiality. We shall now consider how these characteristics appear to ordinary
experience and to the scientific knowledge.
6.1. Substance and ordinary experience
The ancients used the concept of substance when dealing primarily with living
beings. As far as inorganic matter is concerned (elements and compounds), the
application of the same concept differed variously according to different ideas which
were quite weak. The consolidation of the physics-mathematics in the 17th
century and
of the mechanism (its self-appointed philosophical ally), meant the abandonment of the
notion of substance. The focus was diverted onto the quantitative properties of matter
which could be studied with the aid of mathematical concepts. Even living beings were
now considered as mere aggregations of physical components.
There was no well-founded knowledge of the microphysical structure of matter up to the
first part of the 20th
century, and a detailed knowledge of the physico-chemical aspects
of life had to wait until the middle of the same century. Scientific progress was
accompanied by a progressive awareness of the fundamental role played by the holistic
and directional aspects of the systems. This is to say that at present we are able for the
first time to determine rigorously the way of being of the natural systems.
With the present scientific knowledge available, we can actually claim that only
the living beings, among the natural entities accessible to our ordinary way of knowing,
are natural unitary systems: other entities are either aggregations or fragments. This
explains the fact that there were many perplexities in the past when one wanted to apply
the notion of substance to non-living beings. Actually, there are other unitary systems in
nature, but they do not appear as such to our ordinary experience: they do so only after
being scientifically investigated. The non-living unitary systems are microphysical
entities (atoms, molecules, and macromolecules) with a notable structural unity; they
exist, though, only as parts of aggregates or of greater systems.
In any case it is evident that only the ordinary experience is insufficient to
determine with rigor which systems may be considered unitary systems. We shall
therefore consider the types of unitary systems present at the different levels of nature in
the light of the knowledge provided by science.
6.2. Substance and science
We shall distinguish three levels in nature: the biological which includes the
living beings; the microphysical which includes the non-living entities of very small size
that cannot be observed directly; and the macro-physical which includes the non-living
entities of bigger size.
a) Substance at a biological level
Living beings are natural systems with a high degree of individuality. Some exist
in colonies with divisions of functions among the individuals. The majority, though,
have a well-defined individuality when compared with entities. There is also a great
structural as well as dynamic unity in living beings. The parts of a living being are
components of an organism which is structured according to a unified plan, and they
carry out cooperative functions which support one another and contribute to the unified
activity of the living being.
Therefore, living organisms can be said to be natural unitary systems (although
in some cases their individuality appears to be reduced, or their organization is
rudimentary) and the concept of substance can be properly applied to them. Actually, we
are in the presence of the most clear case of natural substances.
Reducing living beings to cybernetic systems has introduced scepticism on the
possibility of considering living beings as substances. Descartes claimed that living
beings are machines and, as such, mere combinations of physical components exactly in
the same way they are in a mechanical machine. Such mechanistic ideas are actually
inadequate to explain the characteristics of living beings. Nevertheless, in our times they
have been reconsidered in a more sophisticated way, taking into account our present-day
knowledge about cybernetic systems. Such systems have properties such as feedback
and homeostasis which are also properties of living beings. Since there should be no
need to attribute to living beings characteristics which go beyond what is material, it
seems possible to claim that living beings are just cybernetic systems with a highly
sophisticated type of organization34
.
There is no doubt that living beings are cybernetic systems: many of their
aspects are being clarified as the understanding of these systems progresses. This is,
though, perfectly compatible with our characterization of the natural, i.e. natural entities,
unitary systems and natural substances. However, it is not compatible with a mechanism
of Cartesian type which reduces living beings to a simple aggregation of parts; in this
perspective, these parts are unable to form a new structural and dynamic unity, or a new
way of being35
.
b) Substance at a microphysical level
The substances found at this level are sub-atomic particles, atoms, molecules and
macromolecules. We shall consider them in this order.
The sub-atomic particles which are the constituents of matter, are, according to a
well-proved model called «standard model», six types of leptons (or light particles) and
six basic types of quarks which constitute the heavier particles by couples or triads.
These particles, as well as the ones made of quarks (such as the proton and the neutron),
correspond to four fundamental interactions (strong nuclear, weak nuclear,
electromagnetic and gravitational). Many of these particles are very ephemeral (they last
just for a small fraction of a second), and it is very difficult to determine the nature of all
of them although in many cases their behaviour is very well known. For instance, they
exhibit properties of waves as well as of particles without a clearly established status.
New theories are being proposed in order to solve this issue; they are much deeper than
the present ones and their experimental verifiability is, at present, very difficult.
In this situation, it is possible to say that the more stable particles (such as the
proton, the neutron and the electron which have well-established properties of mass,
charge, spin, half-life, way of interacting) can be considered substances, at least when
they exist in an independent way. These three particles can exist as free particles. They
are also the components of the atoms: when considered in this state, they are definitely
parts of a new unitary system, i.e. the atom36
.
34
This thesis is widely defended from a perspective which presumes to be in accordance with a Thomistic
philosophy in P.CHALMEL, Biologie actuelle et philosophie thomiste, Téqui, Paris 1984. 35
Actually in the work mentioned in the previous note Chalmel reaches the same conclusion; he states that living
beings are cybernetic systems, and criticizes some «vitalist» ideas. At the same time, though, he rejects the Cartesian
mechanism and holds that living beings are substances. Cf. ibid., pp. 312-313 and 318-319. 36
One can find a more detailed discussion on this topic in M.ARTIGAS, El problema de la substancialidad de las
particulas elementales, Pontifical Lateran University, Rome 1987. Another realistic perspective, different though from the
previous one, can be found in R.HARRÉ, Varieties of Realism, Blackwell, Oxford 1986 (with many points in common with
the «experimentalism» maintained by IAN HACKING, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 1983).
There are ninety-two basic types of atoms in nature which have well-defined
structures: a very stable nucleus made of protons and neutrons, and a peripheral area
occupied by electrons at different energetic levels determined by quantum laws. When
on their own, they can be said to constitute true unitary systems (and therefore
substances), since they show a characteristic unitary structure with a corresponding
unitary dynamism; this structure, as well as the set of properties which depends on it, is
fairly stable.
Molecules are made of atoms: they also have their own structuring and
dynamism proper to the unitary systems and are different from a mere aggregation. In
order to separate their components it is necessary to trigger processes able to alter the
forces which keep the same components together. Something similar happens with the
macromolecules (e.g. the biochemical components of the living beings: proteins, nucleic
acids, etc.) whose structure and dynamism are very specific since they have a very
complex organization. It is an easy job to apply the notion of unitary system and of
substance to molecules as well as to macromolecules.
In summary, microphysical systems have a structure and a dynamism proper to
unitary systems and therefore they can be properly referred to as substances, at least
whenever they have an independent existence. This last clarification is important
because in many cases they form part of other systems. In these cases, although
preserving many of their properties, they become parts integrated in higher structures
which are new unitary systems
c) Substance at a macro physical level
With the exception of the living beings, the new states of matter are formed as a
result of aggregations of microphysical systems. It is understandable, therefore, that
these states are not properly speaking unitary systems although our ordinary experience
may be deceived. This makes it difficult many times to apply the concept of substance to
the non-living entities.
There are systems at meso physical levels (i.e. visible entities but not too big)
and macro physical levels (big sizes) of the inorganic world which show different
degrees of unity, integration, dynamism and functionality. For this reason they are
considered as aggregations of different substances in a heterogeneous kind of
combination. We shall show some examples out of many.
At geophysical level, minerals are, in many cases, aggregations of different
chemical substances in a more or less pure state. It is necessary to process them in a
complex way in order to obtain chemical substances in a pure state; even in this case,
though, the solids obtained are atoms or molecules bound together by forces. The earth
as a whole, together with the atmosphere, forms a system which is heterogeneous but
specific at the same time, so that life in it becomes possible. There are a great variety of
systems and sub-systems within the earth and among these we find the ecosystems
which encompass peculiar combinations of inorganic and living beings37
.
At astrophysical level, stars have a nucleus which is the core of their structures
and activities (i.e. nuclear fusion reactions which condition the characteristics of each
star). Because of their huge size, there are many components in the periphery of stars
whose union with the whole system is relatively weak. The structure of the sun, with its
corresponding activity, is an essential factor for the existence of life on earth. It not only
determines the temperature and many related characteristics of our planet, but also the
food-chains and food-webs in which some organisms feed on others whose existence
ultimately depends on their capacity of utilizing solar energy to produce chemical
compounds.
6.3. The analogical concept of substance and its degrees
The concept of substance cannot be applied univocally (i.e. exactly and always in
the same way) but analogically (i.e. according to a meaning which is partly the same
and partly different).
Actually, it is possible to apply the concept of substance to entities so different
from one another, like living beings and microphysical entities, because all of them
show a certain degree of individuality and unity. It is also clear, though, that the concept
of substance is not used in the same way in all of them.
The notion of unitary system has a well-defined content but, at the same time,
broad enough to be applied to very different systems. These systems may have common
characteristics, but also differences which can be very important.
The concept of substance is predicated analogically because there are different
degrees of individuality and unity. We have already pointed out how living beings show
a kind of unitary organization which is particularly consistent. It is because of this that
substantiality is realized in them in an eminent way. Even among living beings, though,
there are different degrees of individuality and unity. There is a strong unity in many
entities of the microphysical world which, nevertheless, do not always show a clearly
differentiated unity, since they happen to exist as components of higher systems.
All this hair-splitting is not trivial at all: it helps us understand better the
philosophical meaning of substance in nature. The concept of substance which rotates
around those of individuality and unity, points at the existence of holistic systems which
have a way of being characterized by unity. Their components, although partially
retaining their own characters, are nevertheless integrated in a new system with a new
type of unity in which emergent properties and a cooperative dynamism exist. The ways
37
Following the Gaia hypothesis proposed by James Lovelock, some hold that the biosphere (the environment of
water, land and air where life around us develops) is one system only, like a big organism. In reality, it does not seem
possible to consider it as an individual unitary system, i.e. as a substance.
of being holistic are greatly various, but they always reflect a common characteristic:
they are entities which have an essence, or a way of being, characterized by unity. They
are therefore the subjects of a natural dynamism.
The denial of the reality of substance leads to an atomized representation of
nature which is then left as a disconnected collection of particular qualities or processes.
On the contrary, nature is a huge system made up of particular systems which, in one
way or another, articulate around the unitary systems or substances. The application of
the notion of substance shows the fact that there are many unitary systems in nature:
they are mutually related and integrated in more general systems up to reaching the
global system of nature, and these unitary systems, or substances, are subjects with
specific ways of being. This representation of nature is the basis for a metaphysical
reflection in which the notions of essence and act of being occupy a central place, and
which finds its ultimate meaning in the participation in being.
6.4. Anti-substance stands
The empiricist and processualist critiques are two among many which have
attacked the notion of substance and which are especially important nowadays.
a) The knowledge of substances
David Hume (1711-1776) developed a radical critique against the concept of
substance from his empiricist stand. He claimed that the idea of substance actually
corresponds to a collection of particular qualities united by the imagination; it is a
simple name which we give to this collection in order to remember it38
.
The empiricist theory of knowledge, on which Hume leans in order to criticize
the concept of substance, claims that only the qualities which appear to the sensible
experience, have an objective value. Developed in a coherent way, the theory is forced
to state that qualities may exist without a subject and that, therefore, qualities may have
a certain existence of their own. Actually, this conclusion is found in Hume’s writings39
.
This is equivalent, though, to granting a status of substance to qualities without any
solution to the problem. On the contrary, a new insoluble difficulty is introduced since it
is difficult to understand how there can be qualities without a subject-substance.
Some other critiques, much related to empiricism, accuse the notion of substance
of scientific emptiness: it is a useless concept hardly used by science. As a matter of fact,
biology takes it for granted, chemistry uses it in quite a proper way although it does not
characterize it philosophically, and physics-mathematics uses ideal models with
concepts equivalent to those of substance when applied to the study of concrete matter.
38
Cf. D. HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975, p.16. One may find a clear exposé
and a penetrating critique of Hume’s ideas in R.J. CONNELL, “An Empirical Consideration of Substance”, Laval
théologique et philosophique, 34 (1978), pp.235-246. 39
Cf. D. HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, op.cit., p.222.
The concept of substance does not appear usually in scientific formulations.
Nevertheless the existence of substances and accidents is implicitly admitted in science.
At times (e.g. in chemistry) the characterization and classification of substances
corresponds exactly to their philosophical notion. At other times (e.g. in microphysics)
this correspondence cannot be established unequivocally. It is logical that the concept of
substance is not studied philosophically in scientific formulations, since science does not
claim a philosophical perspective. Nevertheless, science takes the notion for granted:
actually, the study of nature is based on the existence of unitary systems, or substances,
and the scientific progress provides an ever more detailed knowledge of such entities.
The empiricist critique gives us the opportunity to point out the fact that the
substance is known through the accidents: they are the ones which reveal the substance
and its essential way of being. That which directly appears to the experience is the
accidents: they are accidents though which belong to a subject. In order to know the
proper way of being of substantial subject one needs to study its properties and, because
of this, it seems that we are only able to know properties, never substances. However,
the denial of the notion of substance inevitably leads to granting the accidental
properties the status of substance: this is actually impossible.
b) Substances and processes
The notion o substance is also criticized and accused of fixism in certain
philosophical stands such the processualist one. Processualism considers processes as
the only core of nature and nothing is found which is not a process. In this perspective,
the notion of substance seems to imply the existence of some subjects which are found
outside the continuous flux of changes present in nature.
This accusation is unfounded since it has nothing to do with the idea of
substance which has been considered so far. This accusation of fixism, though, offers
another opportunity to clarify what is the consistency in being proper to the substances
and what type of relations exists between substance and processes.
The permanence in being, or temporal duration, cannot be used to characterize
the substance philosophically. The concept of substance refers to the consistence in
being. Nevertheless, this permanence unveils, in many cases, such a consistence:
stability accompanies substantiality in many instances. This, though, does not happen
necessarily: actually, there may be truly substantial entities with a more or less
ephemeral duration. A substance has a relative stability according to the type of natural
system considered in each case and to the circumstances in which it is found.
Consistence in being does not depend on duration or permanence in being.
On the other hand, the substance is not unalterable. Natural substances are
subjected to accidental changes in which the substance remains the same since a entity
continues being the same while changing accidentally. The substance is the subject of
the change and is something changing, not immutable. During accidental changes the
substance changes in an accidental, and not substantial, way. The substance can also
disappear and become a different one: this happens in the substantial changes. All this is
easily understood when one relates the substances to the natural unitary systems, in the
way we have done here. Unitary systems are the result of processes and source of new
processes, and therefore they are not left outside the flux of changes.
In accordance with the characterization of the natural made here as an
intertwining between dynamism and structuring, we shall emphasize once again that a
substance is not a passive and inert substratum. On the contrary, it is the first subject of
being, articulating centre of structuring and dynamism. The whole activity of an entity
originates from the substance.
Physical substances are at the same time source and product of the natural
dynamism. The dynamic aspect of the reality which is very much related to the present-
day scientific knowledge, has to be emphasized against any mechanistic type of
reductionism,. The natural dynamism unfolds around the substances and it is never
opposed to the latter. The dynamic activity of the substances produces other substances
with their own dynamism. To counterpoise being to becoming and stability to dynamism
is meaningless. They are complementary aspects which need each other.
From a scientific point of view, natural entities are equilibrium systems. Stability
is the result of energy balances and these can be upset. Stable systems are found at each
level of the composition of matter, and they are the result of energy balances. An
energetic unbalance is a source of processes, and equilibrium is not a synonym of
absence of forces or of dynamism: equilibrium means balanced forces. One can, then,
understand how stability and dynamism are combined in natural entities. States of
equilibrium always refer to specific conditions. Therefore, the stability of the physical
entities is never absolute and ceases to exist if the conditions are not kept within the
margins required by each situation of equilibrium.
III. DYNAMISM IN NATURE
Change is a characteristic of nature at all its levels: none of its aspects can escape
it in the various ways it takes place. As a matter of fact, the transformations which occur
in nature rotate around specific dynamic patterns, so that our world shows a very
singular type of organization. This organization consists of many unitary processes with
coordinated steps whose unity can only be explained by the existence of specific
potentialities, and of an information which directs the unfolding of the natural
dynamism.
There are specific potentialities in nature whose actualization leads to a
hierarchy of levels with a progressively increasing complexity of organization. The
building of nature appears, then, as a huge global process of self-organization in which
authentic emerging novelties are produced. All this is made possible thanks to the
storage and the unfolding of information.
The first part of this section shall consider the natural processes and the
existence of dynamic patterns. The second part shall explain the same processes in terms
of potentiality and actuality, after analyzing the modalities of the natural becoming. The
third part shall illustrate with examples the knowledge we have of the unitary processes
at present. Some aspects of the natural becoming related to the emergence of novelties
are also examined in the light of the previously developed ideas.
7. NATURAL PROCESSES
Natural systems are never encountered in a completely isolated situation. Moreover,
since they have their own dynamism, they interact among themselves. Changes are the
results of these interactions in which the intervening dynamisms are integrated to
produce common results. The basic structure of any change consists in interactions
whose result is a state of equilibrium.
There is a great variety of interactions; nevertheless, all of them proceed
according to patterns through highly specific processes.
7.1. Notion of natural process
The cataloguing of the different changes which occur in nature would result in a
mammoth enterprise. Here we shall analyze only the main modalities of these changes,
focusing our attention on the unitary processes in a special way. This choice is
important since unitary processes consist of a coordinated succession of steps which
clearly reveal the specific character of the nature in which we live.
Although sometimes any type of change is referred to as «process», here we
shall use this term only in relation to those types of changes which consist of a series of
articulated steps that lead to a final state starting from an initial state. This implies
therefore that the steps of the process are coordinated and characterized by a certain kind
of unity. In this sense, a process can be defined as “the totality of the gradual steps of a
natural phenomenon or of an artificial operation”40
. It can also be defined as a “gradual
series of operations that lead to a specific objective” or to the “transformation of a
system”41
.
It is easy to see why we focus our attention on processes. Actually, if one
considers the becoming in a general way, what appears before his eyes is a wide variety
of changes whose detailed study is the task of science. Change in a general way is
studied in many philosophical treatises; the actual object of its philosophical
investigation, though, is the study of unitary processes with their specific characteristics,
although one may not always realize it.
There is a great variety of processes in nature. Most of them are very complex
and can be divided into sub-processes. Moreover, they unfold in a continuous way so
that to determine where one process stops and where another begins depends, somehow,
on the point of view one takes. From a philosophical perspective, particularly interesting
are those characteristics of the processes which permit to understand the basic properties
of our world together with its highly specific organization which makes life on it
possible. Consequently, philosophy is particularly interested in those processes with
holistic and directional characteristics.
There are many processes in nature with a high degree of unity and directionality
in their starting point as well as in their final point and during their unfolding. Their
beginning and their end consist in well-established situations, and the transit from the
initial state to the final one unfolds in a characteristic way. This is clearly evident in the
living beings: their development from the early stages up to maturity is a great process
clearly holistic and directional, and its way of progressing is full of functional relations
which manifest also the unity and tendencies of the organisms. The scientific progress
has made it possible to know also many unitary and directional processes at physical and
chemical levels.
It is evident, though, that the directionality of natural processes is different from
those processes guided by human reason. Rational and artificial processes are guided by
the conscious quest of an end: this does not happen in the case of natural processes.
Rational processes consist in a mental linking of ideas, and the artificial ones correspond
to a project and therefore both have a directionality deliberately imposed by the agent.
On the other hand the natural processes originate from irrational agents and therefore the
same finality of the rational processes cannot be attributed to them.
40
Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua española, 21st ed., Espasa Calpe, Madrid 1992, p.1185.
41 Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales, Vocabulario científico y técnico, Espasa Calpe, Madrid 1990,
p.566.
Nevertheless, the natural processes develop in a directional way and lead to
results with a high degree of organization. Although non-rational in a strict sense, yet
they manifest a certain type of rationality in their results and ways of achieving them.
These are the aspects which appeal most to a philosophical reflection.
7.2. Natural processes and dynamic patterns
We emphasize the fact that natural processes do not unfold in an erratic manner;
on the contrary, everything in them rotates around specific patterns. Hence, it is
necessary to consider such patterns in details in order to present a veritable picture of the
natural processes. We shall call these patterns dynamic patterns in order to distinguish
them from patterns related to space configurations.
The use of the concept of information comes in very handy in order to
understand such patterns. Actually, our knowledge of the dynamic patterns is
represented by laws which are equivalent to operational programs. In this sense, laws
contain an information on the possible course of the process; this information speaks of
the possibility of the unfolding of a natural dynamism whenever some specific
conditions are present, and it corresponds, therefore, to something real.
The concept of information is used in three contexts which, although related to
one another, are nevertheless different. First, information is related to the concept of
communication of messages in ordinary life as well as in the science of information, and
therefore to the action of informing someone about some meaningful contents. Second,
the theory of information studies technological aspects of transmission and handling of
messages by the use of mathematical concepts related to the theory of probability. Third,
a concept of information approximately equivalent to a program guiding the natural
activity is more and more used in the experimental science. Biology started using this
concept when the existence of genetic information was discovered. It was more and
more used, since then, in physics and chemistry. Here we shall use the concept of
information in the third sense42
.
We are able to detect the typical elements of information, i.e. signals, codes,
storage, communication, interpretation and integration, in observing natural
interactions. We are far from knowing these elements in a complete way; nevertheless,
they are sufficiently known in some cases and it is possible to confirm their existence in
some others.
42
An interesting analysis of the concept of information in biology can be found in P.SCHUSTER, “Biological Information.
Its Origin and Processing” in C. WASSERMANN–R. KIRBY–B. BORDORFF (publishers), The Science and Theology of
Information, Labor et Fides, Geneva 1992, pp. 45–57. About the extension of the concept of information to other scientific
areas one may read G. DEL RE, “Complexity, Organization, information”, in G.V. COYNE – K. SCHMITZ–
MOORMANN (publishers), Origins, Time & Complexity, part I, Labor et Fides, Geneva 1994, pp. 83–92. Doubtlessly there
is a danger of using the concept of information indiscriminately and in an inaccurate way. However, the remedy is not in
abandoning the concept but in using it appropriately.
Information is stored in the space structures whose configuration is equivalent to
a program, or instructions which determines the action to be initiated before each type of
signal. The structure of each system determines some internal organization whose
actualization depends on the interactions occurring in any specific case.
The respective pieces of information are integrated or combined in one result
only in the interactions; dynamisms and structures are combined and the result is the
appearance of new information patterns.
It is difficult to avoid an anthropomorphic feeling when using concepts such as
signals, codes, communication and interpretation of information. However, this
difficulty can be overcome by keeping in mind their metaphorical character. For
instance, physico–chemical entities do not have a knowledge or a language similar to
ours. Nevertheless they know and communicate with one another in a metaphorical but
real sense: an electron «knows» that it is within an electromagnetic field, «knows» that
the field has specific characteristics and consequently it knows its possible ways of
behaving. In the same way, when a particle reaches an atom with a specific energy, the
atom detects it, «knows» its characteristics and reacts accordingly with the
corresponding patterns. All this has nothing to do with a sort of «pan-psychism» which
attributes a kind of consciousness to the physico–chemical entities. It is a way of
expressing aspects of the reality for whose conceptualization we are forced to use a
metaphorical language. This way of expressing such aspects of reality is also equivalent
to acknowledging the fact that there is no matter which is purely inert or passive:
actually, every material entity contains an information which guides its interactions.
Any dynamic pattern corresponds to the unfolding of an information structurally
stored, and can therefore be called «information pattern». We can actually distinguish
two big types of dynamic patterns, i.e. the dynamic laws which represent the behaviour
of different systems in specific conditions, and the information patterns in a more
restrictive sense which correspond to the unfolding of more complex processes with a
sequence of successive stages and with a higher degree of organization.
There are many dynamic laws in any branch of science: this emphasizes the
importance of the dynamic patterns in nature. Although these laws correspond to reality,
yet they do not exist «separately». They are «incorporated» in the natural systems and
we abstract them from their behaviour. It should not be surprising therefore that,
although very precise, they have only an approximate character.
There are processes made of a complex series of successive stages which are
mutually coordinated, in those systems with a higher degree of organization, particularly
in the living ones. In this case, we are in the presence of information patterns with a full
program of action. Information patterns are basically instructions which guide the
unfolding of the natural dynamism. The genetic information is the typical case: it is
equivalent to an information pattern stored in a structural pattern (the space structure of
the DNA) which guides the unfolding of so many particular dynamic patterns
(transcription and translation of the DNA), whose results are new structural patterns
(the proteins) which, in their turn, unfold other dynamic patterns (the processes which
are controlled by the proteins) and so on and so fort. Hence, in the genetic information,
dynamism and structuring intertwine through information patterns.
In the activity guided by the genetic information, each step unfolds in
accordance with particular physico–chemical laws (dynamic laws), as part of the
processes, though which unfold according to a program. During this unfolding (which
lasts for the entire life-span of the organism), many processes are produced in which a
regeneration of biochemical substances, cells, tissues, organs and systems takes place. It
is actually a global process which includes cooperative, holistic and directional aspects.
7.3. Synergism, organization and tendencies
The existence of information patterns demands actually the joint actions of many
components; only in this way it is possible to obtain a space structure containing stored
information, and to have this information unfolded along a series of coordinated steps.
The existence of a synergism, or cooperative action, is a necessary condition for the
existence of information patterns only if it has very specific characteristics, so that a
simultaneous as well as successive coupling of very many factors is made possible.
A cooperative action of this type can be given only if there is a high degree of
organization, and this has to be very stable. Presently, we already know many aspects of
the organization of living beings and of the cooperation of its components. This
knowledge shows clearly how subtle all this is.
Synergism and organization clearly show the existence of tendencies. The issue
of finality will not be tackled now in a detailed way; however it is important to point out
that directionality is not only hinted by the existence of dynamic patterns, but also, and
much more, manifested by the existence of information patterns which guide the
unfolding of the unitary processes whose stages appear to be coordinated.
8. THE BECOMING: ACT AND POTENCY
Natural processes can be explained as actualizations of potentialities. We shall
now examine how Aristotle presented this explanation which is still central in the
philosophy of nature.
8.1. Being and becoming
Nature contains structural as well as dynamic aspects: it is a combination of the
being of what already exists, and of the becoming in which changes are produced.
Already before Aristotle, philosophers had tried to reconcile being and
becoming. Aristotle proposed to resolve the problem through the concepts of being in
potency and being in act.
To be in potency means that a being has a capacity, or virtuality which, in the
appropriate conditions, can lead to a being in act. The development of living beings
from eggs and embryos can illustrate this concept. Actually, the initial stages, or
embryonic stages, of the development of a living being are very different from its later
stages; this means that the living being has real capacities which are progressively
actualized in time and whose aim is to produce the new being. The present-day concept
of information appears to give a special significance to this example. The presence of
information in a living being makes it easier to understand how its initial stage does not
resemble its final stage of development; this is made possible by the existence of
instructions which lead it to the production of a new being.
The Aristotelian explanation applies very fittingly to the already mentioned
unitary processes. However, it is possible to apply it to other ways of becoming. This
will be the object of our next consideration before going ahead with the analysis of act
and potency.
8.2. Ways of becoming
The dynamic aspects of nature have different names with different meanings, but very
much related among themselves such as «becoming», «change», «movement»,
«transformation», «mutation», «process». The use of these terms varies with different
authors and contexts.
The term «becoming» is used in a general way to express the fact that all the
natural entities are subjected to change. The term «change» is used to indicate any type
of variations. The term «movement» at times means any type of change, but habitually
has a more restrictive meaning to indicate change of place or location, i.e. the local
movement. The terms «transformation» and «mutation» emphasize the fact that change
affects a subject. Finally the term «process» refers to the totality of the successive stages
which lead from an initial state to a final state.
Obviously the terms «becoming» and «change» have a much wider meaning
than the other terms. Both are related to «movement» since they always imply some
movement, or change of location. The term «process» indicates an articulated type of
reality: it implies a series of steps which lead to a final result. Any process is then
characterized by the presence of a series of changes and movements.
We have already considered the distinction between different types of change:
accidental changes occur without affecting the identity of a substance which, on the
other hand, changes in relation to some accidents. Substantial changes occur with the
disappearance of a substance and the appearance of a different one. Moreover, we may
distinguish three types of accidental change: change of place also called local movement
or simply movement; changes in the accident quantity resulting in an increase or
diminution; changes in the accident quality which are called alterations.
There is a hierarchical order among changes. The first is the local movement,
since this only implies displacement and can occur without deeper kinds of change. On
the other hand, any change in nature necessarily implies the existence of local
movement: it is impossible for any natural thing to change without any of its parts
somehow moving. Change in quantity comes after movement which presupposes local
movement only. Change in quality comes next which presupposes the previous two.
Substantial change, which has deeper implications, comes last.
A substance changes during an accidental change but only accidentally, i.e.
without affecting its identity or its essential way of being. This includes, for instance, all
those changes which a living being undergoes without losing its identity. A substance
changes radically in a substantial change since it ceases to exist while a new substance
begins to exist: this is what happens when a plant dies.
A substantial change is being prepared by a series of accidental changes: when
these become too intense they cause the change of substantial identity.
That a change is accidental does not mean that it is unimportant: it only means
that the subject of change does not cease to exist according to its essential way of being.
It is true that there are accidental changes which are very superficial. There are others,
though which can seriously affect the substance of a subject.
These Aristotelian ideas can be easily integrated in a contemporary perspective
of the material world which is actually compelled to take into account the concepts of
substance and accident. We have already seen how the concept of substance is easily
applied to living beings and to the microphysical systems. Substantial changes will also
be more easily detected in those entities which can be more easily recognized as
concrete substantial subjects.
It will be interesting to consider the aspect of processes and the articulation of
their different stages when focusing on the organization of nature (and therefore on its
rationality). One perspective, though, does not exclude the other; actually, natural
processes consist, in the last analysis, of substantial and accidental changes. We can also
say that the Aristotelian explanation of change in terms of potency and act corresponds
mainly to those processes which we have called unitary processes.
8.3. Act and potency
The doctrine of act and potency is, without doubt, one of the most important
achievements in Aristotle’s philosophy and in philosophical thinking in general; it is
also used by those who do not share other aspects of the Aristotelian philosophy.
Aristotle made use of this doctrine in order to explain the becoming. It is a
doctrine, though which is applied to many other problems. We shall now consider this
topic, examine some meanings of act and potency which are of specific interest to the
philosophy of nature, and show how the explanation of the processes as actualization of
potentialities acquires a new meaning when considered from the point of view of the
concept of information.
a) The becoming as actualization of potentialities
We have already seen how some of the early philosophers denied the reality of change.
They argued that change presupposes a novelty in being, and that this novelty cannot
rise from nothing but from something pre-existing. They concluded that change does not
exist, it is just an appearance. Granted that such conclusion is incompatible with
experience, it should be added that experience does not provide an authentic knowledge
of the reality; therefore there seems to be a dichotomy between true reality – accessible
only to the intellectual knowledge – and the world of the sensible appearances. This was
the line of thought followed by Parmenides.
The Greek atomists (Leucippus and Democritus) tried to give an explanation of
nature as a combination of atoms and the vacuum. They held that atoms are immutable
and indivisible entities («atom» in Greek means indivisible), ultimate entities of nature’s
framework. The only real change is local movement, and nature is explained through
displacements and combination of atoms. Natural entities are the result of the
combination of atoms, and processes are reduced to displacement of material parts.
Aristotle endeavoured to reconcile the demands of reason and senses by
explaining change in terms of act and potency. To be in act means to have a certain
determination, while to be in potency means that, although such a determination is not
possessed, nevertheless there is a real capacity of getting it. In this perspective, change
is the actualization of a potentiality. To be in potency is to be somehow in-between the
pure non- being and being in act, since there is a real capacity of being what one is not
yet. To be in potency has, moreover, a teleological or finalistic connotation since it
means that some capacities, or predispositions, are possessed with respect to specific
types of acts, i.e. there is a kind of directionality. When adequate conditions are present,
potentialities are actualized: change is actually a process of actualization.
According to the classical definition given by Aristotle, change is the act of the
entity in potency insofar as it is in potency43. This means that the starting point is an
entity which does not have a certain determination in act, but it has the potentiality, or
capacity, to acquire it. It also means that change appears when this potentiality is
actualized and, more specifically, while it is being actualized. That is why in the
definition it is not only said that change is the act of the entity which is in potency, but it
is also specified that it is this act as long as the entity is still in potency, i.e. while it is
actualizing its potentiality. Once the determination is acquired, the change stops.
The difficulty met with in trying to conceptualize movement consists in the fact
that it is a clear reality which consists, though, in a transition from a potentiality to an
actuality. It is difficult to conceptualize a reality in flux. Aristotle expressed this
difficulty when he said that change “is an actuality of descriptive type, difficult to frame
but not incapable of existing”44
. The reality of change is a dynamic reality difficult to
capture conceptually. It is also important to stress the fact that becoming is a real flux
and not a simple sum of successive static stages.
43
ARISTOTLE, Physica, III, 1, 201 a 10. 44
Ibid., 2, 202 a 1-3.
In every entity there are different potentialities. A concrete potentiality is
actualized, though, only if specific factors are present. The existence of a potentiality is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the unfolding of a certain process; even
though it is not actualized, it remains nevertheless as a real capacity; it is somehow
equivalent to a tendency since it means that there is a specific possibility which may
lead to a specific result if it were actualized.
The idea of potentiality is quite a general one. It is not a substitute for the
physical mechanisms through which processes take place; nor is it a philosophical
diversion in order to avoid detailed investigation. It is the conceptualization of a way of
being, necessary to be admitted in order to explain the possibility of change in a rational
way. Aristotle focused on the explanation of becoming at an ontological level by
considering it as a way of being in function of being in potency and being in act. The
becoming, understood as actualization of a potentiality, is the way of being proper to
that which is on its way to be something that was not before. In this light, it is possible
to understand Aristotle when he says that “there are as many types of movement, or of
change, as there are meanings of the word is”45
, and that “there are as many species of
movement, or change, as there are entities”46
b) The real meaning of act and potency
The detailed study of act and potency is reserved to metaphysics. However, it is here
convenient to make three clarifications which may help us understand better the reach of
this doctrine and its application to the study of the philosophy of nature.
i) It is more accurate to speak of being in potency and being in act rather
than of «potency» and «act». Actually, «potency» and «act» do not
indicate things or aspects of things, but ways of being: something is
either in potency or in act or in-between potency and act (when it is in
movement).
ii) «Potency» and «act» are relative concepts, i.e. they make reference to
some determination, quality or perfection: something is either in potency
or in act with respect to some determination. Consequently it will always
be correct to make reference to the determination respect to which an
entity is either in potency or in act.
iii) «Potency» and «act» are also relative respect to each other. Something is
in potency respect to an act, i.e. it has the capacity to become what this
act signifies. A potency always refers to an act. However, the other way
around is not always certain; actually, although there is always a
transition from potency to act in any natural change, yet there may be an
act which is not the result of a process of actualization of potencies. This
case does not exist in nature, but the metaphysical reflection shows that
45
Ibid., 1, 201 a 8-9. 46
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, XI, 9, 1065 b 13-14.
nature ultimately points at a Being which is Pure Act, without mixture of
potency which has being by himself. This way which leads to God, has
its basis in the philosophy of Nature of Aristotle and was used by
Aquinas in his first way to demonstrate the existence of God.
c) Types of potency and act
There are two types of potency and act, one in relation to being and one in
relation to operating.
In relation to being, one speaks of passive potency and first act. Passive potency
refers to the possibility, or capacity, of coming to be in a certain way, while first act
refers to having actually achieved that way of being.
In relation to operating, one speaks of active potency and second act. Active
potency is the capacity of operating in a certain way, while second act refers to the
actual operation by which that capacity is exercised.
First act always refers to a corresponding passive potency, while second act
always refers to a corresponding active potency.
An active potency always belongs to a subject which already has a determined
way of being, and which therefore has this way of being in first act. Moreover,
operating always follows being (operatio sequitur esse) as the old aphorism says. The
second act (operating, operation, activity) is proportional to the active potency (the
capacity of operating in this way), and the latter is proportional to the way of being (that
which is in first act, its way of being).
9. UNITARY PROCESSES IN NATURE
Experimental sciences use an analytical method which consists in taking phenomena
apart. It is because of this that many times the character of the whole is easily missed in
the study of the processes. This risk may even go as far as forgetting about the unity of
the processes, and therefore about their holistic and directional characters. This risk
becomes even bigger because science progresses in a fragmentary way, i.e. by studying
particular phenomena and formulating progressively more general theories which
establish relationship among different areas of nature.
As a matter of fact, it took a long time to obtain reliable knowledge of unitary processes:
these in general include laws and theories which belong to different areas. Only in
recent times, a detailed knowledge of these processes has been obtained, thanks to the
contribution of the many specific pieces of knowledge obtained from various sciences.
We shall now consider some examples of unitary processes with the intent of showing
the central place they occupy in nature, and the vast panorama they open to the present
philosophical reflection. These examples will show how the different levels of nature
are actually related to one another in the present worldview, and how the emergence of
new levels is the consequence of a huge process of self-organization of nature, in which
information plays a central role.
9.1. Unitary processes and the ordinary experience
Two big types of unitary processes appear to an ordinary observer: those related to the
living beings and those related to the biosphere and the heavens.
The precise mechanisms of the processes which take place in the living beings, have
become more and more clear only in the last decades. Some have always been known
such as generation, development, the different functions of the organisms, the
regeneration of damaged parts and reproduction. These are all unitary processes.
It is also very easy to acknowledge the existence of many processes around us which
have a unitary character, although less evident than the ones observed in living
organisms, such as, for instance, air and water circulation, the processes of evaporation
and condensation, rains and thunderstorms, seasons and tides. People have always been
able to admire the movement of the celestial sphere and of the planets whose detailed
study led eventually to the consolidation of the modern experimental sciences.
In ancient times, all these processes were regarded as manifestation of mysterious
forces, since the specific mechanisms involved were unknown. Scientific progress
introduced «disenchantment» about nature. Phenomena were being explained more and
more in terms of natural forces. The disenchantment consisted mainly in reducing the
natural processes to the sum of mini-processes explainable in terms of laws which were
progressively discovered by science. The stage was set for the loss of the unitary
character of the processes being studied. Nature, contemplated with an analytical eye,
appeared as gigantic machine whose functioning, like the one of a clock, could be
understood through the behaviour and assembly of its parts.
However, the most recent scientific advances have emphasized the fact that natural
processes have a unitary character which is much greater than the one observable in the
ordinary experience. This fact is at the basis of the present-day resurgence of the
philosophy of nature. The situation can be summed up in the following way: if we could
visualize what science reveals about the natural processes, we would be more amazed
than the ancients would, before the unusual spectacle offered to our sight. Actually,
behind any plant, or animal, or star, or the soil where plants live, or the waters of the
rivers and seas, or the air which surrounds us, we would discover an infinity of
interlinked mini-processes actually presenting an astounding spectacle. It comes with no
surprise, then, that those metaphysical and theological questions which seemed to have
been liquidated by the scientific progress, are now asked once again. We shall now
illustrate this new situation created by science at present.
9.2. Unitary processes and science
Various types of unitary processes will be now considered that shows the
interconnection of the different levels of nature.
a) Holistic processes
The reality is that any unitary process has holistic characters. In this section, though,
only those processes which are related to the organization of unitary systems will be
considered; the reason is that, thanks to such processes, unitary systems can develop and
operate. There is no shortage of examples, and some shall be mentioned.
Processes related to homeostasis are very important. Homeostasis refers to the
maintenance of all those conditions that make it possible for an organism to keep its
internal environment constant against the fluctuations of the external environment. It
operates through processes of feedback regulation. One can distinguish between
physiological and developmental homeostasis. The former refers to the tendency of an
organism to preserve its physiological conditions against the fluctuations of the
environment, while the latter refers to the tendency of the patterns of development of an
organism to produce a normal phenotype against fluctuations in the circumstances. It is
interesting to note the relationship between homeostasis and directionality: actually
homeostasis signifies the existence of tendencies towards certain states. The
mechanisms which make homeostasis possible, explain the holistic and directional
character of the processes involved.
There is coordination among the successive stage of the holistic processes. This appears
not only in the organisms but also in many of their components which, frequently
behave as unitary systems; this is the case of the cells of a multicellular organism. They
are coordinated structures, but each of them shows a certain autonomy represented by
the continuous unfolding of unitary processes within it which make it possible for the
cell to function and to establish relationship with the other cells. It is known, for
instance, that the human body has more than 10 billion cells distributed in more than
250 types (nerve cells, blood cells, muscular fibres, etc.). Each cell is made of a nucleus
and a cytoplasm. The nucleus contains the genetic information within the chromosomes.
The cytoplasm contains organelles which perform multiple functions, each of which
presupposes different unitary processes. One of its permanent activities is the
biosynthesis, a process through which biological material is manufactured with the
materials that reach the cell. Mitochondria are the power stations where useful energy is
produced. Ribosomes manufacture proteins according to instructions which come from
the nucleus. Through the cell membrane, processes of communication are established
with the external environment, and this takes place through highly specific procedures
(diffusion, active transport, osmosis, facilitated transport).
Each one of the above-mentioned activities is made of processes with their own unity,
and is coordinated with many others. In all of them information plays a very important
role. To give an example, the communication among cells is carried out in a very
specific way through an information which is stored, transmitted, processed and
integrated. It is one the cases in which the metaphor «lock-and-key» is used in order to
express the specific and coordinated character of the interactions47
There are many unitary processes in each of the cells of a multicellular organism, and
moreover, are coordinated. The same occurs in the tissues, organs and systems which
have a higher degree of organization and which therefore have more complex and more
coordinated processes. For example, the nervous system is the system of integration par
excellence. Its complexity increases with the complexity of the respective animal
species. In man, it is the most complex: only in the cerebral cortex there are some
30,000 million neurons, each of which ends with some 3,000 synaptic joints (or
connections with other cells). The human brain has an astounding organization: it
coordinates the whole body (senses, language, movement…) through information
processing. It is estimated that in the brain cortex of a human being there are between
1014
and 1015
synaptic joints. Brain functioning is made possible only because of the
existence of a very sophisticated coordination among a huge variety of processes at
different levels of organization.
In conclusion, the present-day knowledge about organisms shows the existence of a
great variety of unitary processes, coordinated among themselves at cellular level as
well as at higher levels (tissues, organs, systems, the whole body). These processes
unfold through physico-chemical mechanisms. Therefore, the existence and
coordination of unitary processes is extended also to the physico-chemical level. The
horizons opened by science in this direction are quite astounding, yet we are just at the
beginning of the exploration.
b) Functional processes
The term functionality refers to the activity of the parts in function of the whole. Among
the various functions of living beings one finds respiration, nutrition, transport,
excretion, nervous coordination, hormonal coordination, immunological defence. Some
have been known from ancient times, others were discovered in modern times. Only in
recent times, though, the detailed knowledge of their mechanisms was unveiled.
The systems and the machinery of living beings are characterized by their functions.
These are integrated by organs, and organs by tissues. The different functions reveal the
existence of multiple unitary processes coordinated by unitary processes at higher
levels; this highlights the importance of information in the unfolding of functions.
47
“Biologists accept the fact that cells recognize one another thanks to the existence of couples of complementary structures
found on their surface: one structure located on the surface of the cell carries an information which can be deciphered by
the other one, an idea which generalizes the lock-and-key hypothesis, formulated in 1987 by Emil Fisher, in order to
describe the specificity of the interactions between enzymes and substrata. Paul Ehrlich expanded it in 1900 in order to
explain the high specificity of the reactions in the immunological system. In 1914, Frank Rattray Lillie, of the University of
Chicago, used the same hypothesis in order to point out the mutual recognizing of the egg cell and of the spermatozoon.
Around the ‘20s, the lock-and-key hypothesis became one of the central postulates of molecular biology”: N. SHARON –
H. LIS, “Carboidratos en el reconocimiento cellular”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 198, March 1993, p. 20 (italics added).
The importance of information appears clearly in all those systems which, through
unitary processes, coordinate the various aspects of the organism. The nervous system is
just one of the many available examples we can mention. Explanations of this system
make recourse, many times, to ideas borrowed from the science of information when it
is said, for instance, that “the nervous system is a communication network which makes
it possible for the organism to interact with its environment in an adequate manner. It
has sensory components which detect stimuli proceeding from the external environment,
integrating components which process the sensory data, information stored in memory
and motor components which generate movement and other activities….The functional
unit of the nervous system is the «neuron»…The activity of the neurons, and of the
whole nervous system, is codified and information moves from one neuron to the next
through synaptic transmission”48
. When the activities of the nervous system are
analyzed in detail, one discovers an amazing level of coordination of unitary processes
which involve storage, coding and de-coding, transmission and integration of
information. A similar picture is presented by the endocrine system, also closely related
to coordination49
.
These examples are sufficient, without any further detail, to realize that there is great
cooperation and coordination of unitary processes. In many cases the agents that trigger
such processes are well known: they play the role of signalling agents. These agents
transport information and communicate them to receptors which act in accordance with
the information received. New knowledge has unveiled the existence, for instance, of
the so-called neuro-transmitters and regulatory genes among others which have been
known for a long time. The whole physics and chemistry is wrapped in mechanisms
which, through information processing, are at the basis of the functions of the living
organisms. Again, one can appreciate the existence of holistic and directional
dimensions in the functional unitary processes.
c) Morphogenetic Processes
Morphogenesis refers to the formation of the unitary systems and their parts. One of the
main cases of morphogenesis is reproduction, or replication of living beings. Another
one is development of the living beings from the early stages of existence.
Our knowledge about this area of investigation has advanced in a spectacular way from
the time in which James Watson and Francis Crick discovered in 1953 the double helix
structure of the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), the macromolecule responsible for the
genetic program. The DNA in the chromosomes contains a genetic program coded in its
structure. It is amazingly vast and its information unfolds according to the
circumstances. The processes depending on the DNA affect not only the individual
functions of the organism but also its constitution since they regulate the manufacturing
of its components.
48
R.M. BERNE - M.N.LEVY, Fisiologia, 2nd
reprint, Editorial Medica Panamericana, Buenos Aires 1987, p.56 49
Ibid., pp. 478-479.
The functioning of the genetic program is based on the elaboration of information50
.
The program is like a written text which uses only four letters (the four nitrogen bases
orderly arranged along the DNA chain) whose sequence determines the types of
products at the end of the program. Each cell contains in its nucleus the complete set of
chromosomes characteristic of the species. In each chromosome there is DNA made of
portions called «genes». Human cells contain more than 100,000 genes: this
presupposes the existence of 3,000 millions nitrogen bases (the letters of the genetic
alphabet). Writing only the letter corresponding to each one of the bases, in the case of
the genetic code of a virus which codifies 8 proteins, would occupy one page, in the case
of a bacterium, with 3,000 genes, it would occupy 2,000 pages, and in the case of man,
with 100,000 genes, it would take one million pages. This is a real library with a lot of
information, together with the instructions necessary for the execution of the multiple
functions of the program.
The information of the genetic code undergoes transcription, translation,
regulation and error correction. Some genes are regulators: they guide the expression of
other genes, are related to the plans of the organs and body structure. Actually, only a
fraction of genes is activated and transcribed in each process, in accordance with the
orders received from the cytoplasm or from messengers produced by other cells.
Nucleus and cytoplasm interact in a coordinated way, and so constituting a cybernetic
system. There is a hierarchy of levels of control and execution which are coordinated at
each stage of the processes and which are being progressively known at present51
.
Only some aspects of the morphogenesis – which includes regeneration - have
been considered. They are enough to show the existence of many unitary processes,
coordinated in a succession of organizing levels, whose dynamism is guided by
information stored in structures.
d) Cyclic processes
Cyclic processes are unitary processes of special interest since they develop in
periodical temporal sequences; they reveal a type of unity found at the basis of all
activities in nature: the unity of the time rhythms. Patterns related to the unfolding of
time – i.e. time rhythms – have at least the same importance as the ones related to space
patterns: the unfolding of the natural dynamism depends essentially on them.
One finds time patterns everywhere. For instance cell division, a process by which new
cells are produced, proceeds according to time patterns. In the last decades, the first
strides in the knowledge of the development of the cell cycle of some simple organisms
50
“ The main functions of the nucleus are directly related to the treatment of information; they encompass also the
preservation and, if necessary, the restoration of the genetic library and, especially, the transcription which is a very
selective and complex process. Through transcription, stored instructions are read where information is found, and this is
sent afterwards to the cytoplasm for expression. Genes exercise their domineering influence on the cell through these
mechanisms”: Christian DE DUVE, La célula viva, Labor, Barcelona 1988, p. 19. 51
One may read in this respect: E.M. DE ROBERTIS – G. OLIVER – C.V.E. WRIGHT, “Genes con homeobox y el plan
corporal de los vertebrados”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 168, September 1990, pp. 14-21; T. BEARDSLEY, “Genes
inteligentes”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 181, October 1991, pp. 76-85.
have been made. The alternation of the various phases is directed by self-generating
chemical reactions in the cytoplasm; it is a kind of an «oscillator», a «clock» which
provokes periodical contractions with great regularity52
.
Great progress has been made in the knowledge of the biological rhythms. They are not
isolated phenomena; on the contrary, the whole activity of a living being is closely
related to the existence of rhythms. It is understandable why this should be so; actually
time organization is absolutely indispensable for the different functions to take place in
a successive and coordinated way.
The study of these time structures (the biological rhythms) has originated a branch of
science called «chrono-biology». The functioning of the organisms includes, on one
hand, internal rhythmical mechanisms and, on the other, some other mechanisms which
make it possible to adjust the internal rhythms to the external conditions. Some rhythms,
such as the respiratory and the cardiac, have external manifestations which are easily
observed; some others have been discovered with the progress of science. There are
low-frequency rhythms (with periods from 6 days to various years), medium-frequency
rhythms (with periods between 30 minutes and 6 days) and high-frequency rhythms
(with periods from 0.5 milliseconds to 30 minutes). High-frequency rhythms, such as
respiratory and cardiac, are highly temperature-sensitive and their generation depends
on the property of the neurons and neural network with an oscillating and resonant
character53
.
Biological rhythms are very important, few of them have been really studied in their
detailed mechanisms; they are unitary processes with a high level of coordination and
are based on physico-chemical mechanisms which are also coordinated unitary
processes. Such mechanisms are known as oscillators, i.e. systems with a periodical
behaviour in which the same movements are repeated time and again. It should be
pointed out that single and isolated oscillators are unable to explain natural phenomena;
many of these can only be understood with the coupled oscillators in which there is an
inter-linking that makes it possible for the oscillators involved to be synchronized54
. In
these cases, a crucial role is also played by the so-called synergy or cooperative action,
bridge between the physico-chemical and biological phenomena which manifests the
holistic and directional character of the unitary processes.
52
One may read: A.W. MURRAY – M.W. KIRSCHNER, “Control del ciclo cellular”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 176,
May 1991, pp. 26-33. On page 33, one finds the following statement: “Yeasts, as well as the somatic cells of the
multicellular organisms, have mechanisms to delay the beginning of mitosis until the DNA is replicated, and until any
damage suffered is repaired”; “We already know that, in somatic cells as well as in embryos at an advanced stage, the
decision of replicating the DNA in the interphase is subjected to a very fine regulation, as it is the decision of beginning the
mitotic process …(for this second decision) the cell assesses if it has grown enough and if it can proceed without fears, to
the replication of the DNA and ,therefore, to mitosis…The steps to the starting point are as controlled as the steps to mitosis
are…they are also subjected to the control of nutrients, hormones and growth factors” (italics added). 14
Cf. J.M.DELGADO, “Ritmos biologicos” in J.A.F.TRESGUERRES (publisher), Fisiologia humana, Interamericana-
McGraw Hill, Madrid 1992, pp. 1170 and 1174. 54
“We can find coupled oscillators at both extremes of the natural world; however, they are particularly conspicuous in the
living organisms: the pace-maker cells in the heart, the cells that secrete insulin in the pancreas, the neuronal network in the
brain and in the spinal cord which control the rhythmic behavior such as respiration, race or mastication”: S.H. STROGATZ
– I. STEWART, “Osciladores acoplados y sincronización biológica”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 209, February 1994, p.
54.
There are many other particular processes with an oscillating or periodical character,
although they are not found so well cooperatively organized as the ones previously
mentioned. Actually, it would be impossible to understand the functioning of nature if
periodical phenomena were not there. Of great importance are also the so-called bio-
geo-chemical cycles, i.e. the routes followed in nature by the main elements involved in
the constitution of living organisms; these play a central role for understanding, in an
ecological perspective, the cooperation of the multiple factors which integrate the
natural systems.
9.3. Genesis of nature
Nature is made of levels hierarchically organized, and in each of them there are
characteristic patterns.
In the present-day worldview the building of nature can be contemplated as the result of
a vast process of self-organization in which successive levels of organization are
produced and in which information plays a very important role.
a) The emergence of new realities
How do new types of organization arise?
One may think that a new reality is nothing but the unfolding of something which pre-
existed, like a carpet which was rolled up. Nothing may come into existence which did
not exist somehow previously. There is no doubt that some changes are of this type.
Other changes really produce something new. Potentiality does not mean pre-existence
to the produced act. As Aristotle had already pointed out, in explaining the emergence of
new realities all the causes and conditions intervening in the process need to be taken
into consideration.
In order to explain new realities one needs to take into account all the
interactions existing among the entities which take part in the process. For instance, in
those processes in which new chemical compounds are formed, interactions develop
which did not exist when the components were isolated; this explains how new
properties can arise. A water molecule has properties which cannot be reduced to the
sum of the properties of hydrogen and oxygen. As a matter of fact, new properties arise
in a natural way when oxygen and hydrogen interact in certain circumstances.
Moreover, the information contained in the components of the processes can
become integrated into new unitary patterns. One may well understand therefore that
new realities may arise which are really unpredictable if one takes into account only the
intervening factors, and forgets about their capacity of being integrated into new unitary
realities.
Some authors have emphasized, in this sense, the creative character of the
natural processes. However, it is very important to try to avoid a too anthropomorphic
way of interpreting the term «creative». The term only means that the natural processes
can lead to new results, different from what existed before. On the other hand, no one is
entitled to say that any result may arise from natural processes, as if nature acted with a
sense of freedom. One cannot even say that the unfolding of natural processes takes
place in a totally self-sufficient way. A deeper understanding of the term «creativity» of
nature can be achieved only by taking into account nature’s ultimate foundation, i.e. its
relation with divine action.
Consequently, an explanation of the natural processes as actualization of
potentialities, understood as unfolding of a natural dynamism directed by information
which becomes integrated into new patterns, shows how new realities can actually be
produced at the end of the same processes. New light is cast upon the important problem
of the «emergence», although the metaphysical questions about the ultimate explanation
of the processes involved remains pending.
b) Self-organization of nature
When considering the integration of patterns at successive levels, one comes face-to-
face with the issue of spontaneous self-organization of nature. It is a fascinating issue
for the scientific as well as the philosophical study. Actually it encompasses a variety of
themes55
, including a series of problems which in physics go under the name of
complexity56
.
The topic is fascinating because on one hand it reveals the internal and
directional dynamism of nature and, on the other hand, it feeds those hopes of extending
the explanations in physical terms up to the human realities.
The experience of the self-organization of nature is not something new, but it
goes back in time. Actually, the field of biology is rich of this type of experiences: it can
actually be said that the world of living beings is the world of self-organization. The
seeds that become trees, the conception and development of animals, the different
biological functions, etc. are all manifestations of the capacity of nature of organizing
itself. The issue of self-organization has special interest nowadays because more light is
cast through the knowledge of its basic mechanisms. It is possible therefore to claim the
existence of a self-organization at a physico-chemical level and to relate it to the
biological one57
.
Phenomena of self-organization manifest the internal dynamism of the natural
entities, their intertwining with structuring, and the cooperation among the different
elements and levels. They show the existence of an information which is stored in the
natural structures and which unfolds and is combined in the processes.
55
This vast subject, together with its themes, was pointed out in the Coloquio de Cerisy held from the 10th
to the 17th
June,
1981 about the self-organization. The texts of the oloquio were published with the title: L’auto-organisation: de la physique
au politique, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1983. 56
The main themes related with the problem of self-organization in physics are dealt with in: P.DAVIES (publisher), The
New Physics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989, Ch. 7 to 12. 57
A synthesis of the main themes related to self-organization in physics can be seen in M.ARTIGAS, La inteligibilidad de
la naturaleza, Ed. EUNSA, Pamplona 1995, Ch. II.
Knowledge of the self-organization does not eliminate, though, the metaphysical
problems involved; on the contrary, it is an invitation to pose them anew. For instance,
how do physical entities know their own identity and the way they should behave? (the
metaphorical meaning of the verb to know should be obvious in this particular context);
how are such sophisticated patterns formed through the interaction of purely natural
forces? It is in this sense that Paul Davies refers to the “singular propensity of matter
and energy to organize themselves into coherent structures and patterns” and states: “It
is one of the universal miracles of nature how huge numbers of particles, subjected only
to blind forces of nature, are able to organize themselves in patterns of cooperative
activity”58
.
Science with its progress is unable to give exhaustive answers to these questions.
Finally, the study of the activities of nature suggests the existence of a kind of
unconscious intelligence. It is important to emphasize that this is again a metaphor;
actually, the expression is literally a contradiction. The metaphor refers to the existence
of an information which directs and controls. This is an evident fact which goes beyond
the limits of science.
c) Processes as unfolding of information
Unitary processes and information patterns are closely related since both need each
other.
On one hand, it is difficult to understand how a unitary process could exist without some
type of program guiding the unfolding of the process itself which consists in a
coordinated succession of steps. This program is what we call information pattern.
On the other hand, an information pattern consists of structurally stored instructions
from whose unfolding a series of dynamically coordinated patterns originates which is
what we call a unitary process.
The typical method of the experimental sciences is analytical. Processes are
disassembled so that their component parts can be isolated and studied in a systematic
way. Investigations are carried out to monitor how the various factors change under
controlled experimental conditions. Aspects which are of interest, are isolated and
studies while aspects of minor interest are left aside. It is an extremely fruitful method
which makes it possible to obtain a detailed knowledge otherwise very difficult to
obtain. However, there is a risk of reductionism from a philosophical point of view
which consists in reconstructing nature as a simple sum of particular transformations
capable of being studied in an analytical way. In this way, what is most characteristic in
nature is being overlooked, i.e. the existence of an organization which appears, in its
dynamic aspect, through unitary processes made of an articulated series of steps that
lead to a specific final stage from an initial one, in a directional manner.
58
Cf. P.DAVIES, «The New Physics: A Synthesis», in P.DAVIES (publisher), The New Physics, op.cit., pp. 4-5.
The recent scientific advances have shown how it is possible to study in a scientific way
many unitary processes which correspond to information patterns, without lessening the
importance of the analytical perspective, and acquire a knowledge of particular dynamic
patterns (laws). This new panorama has been clearly opened in the last decades, thanks
to the progress made in the morphogenetic theories. In the light of these new advances,
the philosophical reflection carried out earlier on in history on the problem of becoming
acquires new relevance. The explanations offered by the analytical method appear now
to be insufficient, while at the same time more importance is given to those which stress
the holistic, synergic and directional aspects of the natural processes. Moreover, the
concept of information makes it possible to understand in a better way those aspects
which, up to now, have appeared somehow mysterious.
The actualization of potentialities is better understood when considered in the light of
the concept of information, as a program, or as a set of instructions which is stored in
the natural structures and which is the origin of specific types of behaviour in each
specific situation. The Aristotelian explanation is still valid and seems quite adequate, in
the light of the present-day scientific knowledge, to harmonize the scientific and
philosophical perspectives.
Actually, the existence of a structurally stored information whose unfolding depends on
external factors which intervene in each case, makes it possible to understand how the
effect may somehow pre-exist without existing in miniature and without the processes
being univocally determined. The existence of information patterns makes it possible to
understand how the results are produced through the unfolding of a pre-existing plan. It
is possible to understand, at the same time, how this very unfolding is compatible with
the production of true new entities, since it implies the convergence of multiple factors
which will hardly be always the same.
IV. ORDER IN NATURE
Nature is a huge system; it is made of different levels of organization which are
interrelated through multiple connections. Order is therefore a basic, and one of the most
important, characteristic of nature. Science presupposes this order and tries to know it in
details. Philosophy of nature, on the other hand, mostly reflects on this order.
However, nature is not ordered from any point of view: it is not difficult to come
across disorder together with order. Therefore, the philosophical reflection on the
natural order needs to be preceded by an analysis in order to pin point its real
characteristics.
10. THE NATURAL ORDER
Our reflection on the natural order begins with some clarifications on the concept of
order and on the main ways in which order exists in nature.
10.1. The concept of order
Order is one of the classical concepts which has not only survived up to our
modern times, but which also occupies a central place in the present scientific and
philosophical discussions59
.
The concept of order connotes unity in the diversity: it refers to different parts
which obey a specific arrangement. However, in speaking of unity and arrangement one
is already using terms which are related to order. Any attempt to define order without
using concepts which somehow include it already, is going to be unsuccessful; actually
anything without any kind of order would be absolute chaos. A chaos of this kind,
though, would be unthinkable: we cannot represent any reality whose components are
not somehow related to some kind of order. When we talk of chaos, we talk always of a
relative chaos, a reality which has a high level of disorder and not an absolute disorder:
this last type of situation cannot exist.
Therefore, order encompasses the whole reality. Because of this, order has been
called a quasi-transcendental60
concept. Consequently, the concept of order cannot be
59
A philosophical analysis of the concept of order can be found in J.J.SANGUINETI, La filosofia del cosmo in Tommaso
d’Aquino, Ares, Milan 1986, pp. 29-48. 60
Cf. H. KUHN, «Orden», in: H. KRINGS – H.M. BAUMGARTNER – C. WILD and others, Conceptos fundamentales de
filosofia, Herder, Barcelona 1978, tome II, pp. 693-694.
defined without using previous ideas which somehow already presuppose it. It is
nevertheless possible to pin point some of its most important characteristics.
One of these characteristics is the relational one. The concept of order is
relational: order is always said in relation to something, it is relative to some criterion
taken as reference element. Different degrees of order can be attributed to the same
situation according to the selected point of view. For instance, the books in a library can
be classified according to the subject, catalogue number, size, colour, or by combining
this factors and others. In the case of personal books, everyone uses his own criteria, and
it happens sometimes that an apparently disordered arrangement is the most ordered and
useful to the owner of the books. Therefore, order is a relative concept: order is always
spoken of in relation to some specific criteria.
Consequently, there are many types of order. Since we are studying the natural
order, we shall now analyze the basic types of order found in nature.
10.2. Types of order in nature
Clearly, there is a high level of order in nature: it is shown in our every-day life,
and science constantly discovers many of its aspects which are inaccessible to ordinary
experience.
The natural order appears in three successive degrees of complexity: structuring,
patterns and organization.
a) Order in structuring
The space-time structuring is a basic dimension of nature. Natural entities show
a space configuration. Processes unfold in a time succession. Space configurations, as
well as time successions, presuppose some kind of order, i.e. a distribution of
components, or stages which are related among themselves. In this sense, all natural
realities have some kind of space and time order, including those which appear to be
disorderly.
Space-time structuring is a general characteristic of the natural realities and
admits several modalities. Two of them, particularly important, are the patterns and
organization.
b) Order and patterns
We use the term «pattern» to indicate all those space or time structures which are
repeated in nature. We call the space patterns «configurations», and the time patterns
«rhythms».
Patterns are then repetitive and repetition is a central aspect of order. We state
that there is order every time there is something which repeats itself. It may be the case
of a space configuration realized in different systems, or a time rhythm found in
different processes.
Patterns are also regular. A configuration or a rhythm presupposes the existence
of natural processes or systems which have a specific structuring produced in a natural
way. Because of this, they are repeated in different individual cases.
Patterns play a very essential role in nature. We may imagine worlds which, in
theory, have less patterns than our world has. However, the nature we actually know,
and which makes our existence possible, is marked by patterns at all levels and in all its
phenomena. We have already pointed out that, although not every thing is pattern in
nature, nevertheless everything rotates around patterns. Science actually seeks the
detailed knowledge of these patterns. Any new step in the scientific progress means
finding new patterns in nature.
Ultimately, the natural order is centred on space-time patterns: space
configurations and time rhythms.
c) Order and organization
There is, however, another fundamental level in the natural order which is
organization. Order is not synonymous with organization. The idea of organization
contains an active meaning which is not always found in the idea of order; it suggests
something more elaborate than a simple generic order. Organization is a particular case
of order, a strong kind of order which appears with structured components that
cooperate in a functional way, i.e. when there is unity and cooperation among the
components of a system. This is the kind of order found in those systems whose
components cooperate towards its maintenance and activity, by carrying out specific
functions which contribute towards this end.
The typical case of natural organization is the one of the living organisms, whose
physical systems are called organisms. Here one finds a typical individuality together
with unity, cooperation and function. In reality, organization is not exclusive of the
biological level, it is found also at a physico-chemical level.
The distinction between order and organization is a key issue in the study of
nature. Actually, what is more important in nature is not the fact that it has a certain
order (a universe without order is unthinkable), but the fact that it has a high level of
organization. This is witnessed by ordinary knowledge, while science expands this
knowledge in an amazing way.
10.3. Order and organization in nature
Because of the scarcity of specific knowledge, ancient philosophy lent itself to
ambiguities and was seriously limited. The fragmentary way in which science developed
after its systematic beginning in the 17th
century did no facilitate a reliable
representation of nature in its totality. Tanks to the present-day knowledge, we are in a
better vantage point than our predecessors were, and for the first time in history it has
become possible to formulate a global worldview which includes the basic aspects of the
organization of nature.
We shall now consider how nature is organized. We shall first describe its
different levels of organization and then analyze how these are integrated with each
other to form the characteristic unity of nature.
a) Diversity of levels of organization in nature
Three broad levels of organization can be described in nature: physico-chemical,
astrophysical, biological.
The physico-chemical level
This level consists of the microphysical components which cannot be observed
directly owing to their small size, i.e. the subatomic particles, atoms (made of particles),
molecules and macromolecules (made of particles and atoms). This is the stuff which
compounds are made of usually referred to as aggregates. Aggregates can be found as
solids, liquids or gases, depending on the strength which binds the microphysical
components. We shall consider later the knowledge available about the composition of
matter and the problems arising from it.
The astrophysical level
This is the level of stars, galaxies and planets. Stars have a nucleus with a
temperature of millions of degrees, with nuclear fusion reactions in which hydrogen
nuclei produce helium nuclei with a great release of energy. Because of this, stars have
their own light which can be seen from the earth, although they are very far. On the
other hand, planets are simple aggregates of matter in a solid, liquid or gaseous state and
do not have their own light.
There are approximately 100,000 million galaxies and each of them contains
between 1000 million and 1 billion stars. The distance between them varies in terms of
millions of light-years. The galaxies which are closer to the earth, are the Clouds of
Magellan: the Great Cloud is 170,000 light years away, while the Small Cloud is
200,000 light-years away (one light-year is the distance covered by the light in one year
at the speed of 300,000 kilometres per second). The Andromeda galaxy is the next one
in proximity to the earth: 2.2 million light-years.
Our galaxy contains some 150,000 million stars. The diameter of its disc is some
90,000 light-years long and the thickness of the central core is 10,000 light-years. Its age
is calculated at 12,000 million years.
Galaxies are made of stars whose origin lies in the gravitational contraction of
interstellar gases, principally made of hydrogen and helium. One can easily see some
6,500 stars. The closest visible star is found in the constellation of Centaurs at a distance
of 4 light-years. There are only 11 stars which are less than 10 light-years away from the
earth. Of the easily visible stars the greatest is “epsilon Aurigae” with a diameter of
3,000 million kilometres and at a distance of 3,400 light-years away from the earth.
Although huge, it is observed from the earth as a small dot because of the enormous
distance.
The sun is a medium-sized star. It has a radius of 696,000 kilometres and it is
150,000 million kilometres distant from the earth. As a consequence of the
thermonuclear reactions which occur in its nucleus, the sun loses every second some 5
million tons of matter which is being converted into energy. The sun has been fully
active for about 5,000 million years: in spite of this, it still has fuel for some 20,000
million years.
Stars contain almost all the types of known matter. They are huge aggregates of
matter which obey quite simple physico-chemical principles. The phenomena occurring
in the stars develop around the stellar core which is basically a huge oven of
thermonuclear fusion.
Formation, development and disintegration of the stars are cyclic processes. Their life
span is quite long, it goes, nevertheless, through different stages and eventually ends. In
the processes which develop within the stars, the basic materials are formed which are
needed for the building of the planets as well as of living beings. Moreover, the life as
we know it depends on the energy provided by one star only, the sun.
The conditions of a planet such as the earth obey physico-chemical laws. We
tend to think that the conditions in which we live are absolutely stable. Nevertheless, at
a cosmic level the present conditions of the earth are quite unique and correspond to a
stage which had a beginning and will have an end. It is likely that these conditions
underwent drastic changes in the past owing to impacts with other objects. In any case,
the present conditions which make life possible depend on the intensity of the energy
coming from the sun; when this will change in future, not all the forms of life we now
know – including ours - will be able to find the necessary conditions for their
preservation.
One of the most striking aspects at this level is the immensity of the universe
and, at the same time, the similarity of the physico-chemical processes which unfold in
the stars. It is a relatively simple level of organization. There is no doubt that many
different processes go on in the enormous volume of the stars; however, the basic
principles which govern them can be understood pretty easily on the basis of the
knowledge of the physico-chemical level of organization.
Before the development of nuclear physics in the 20th
century, very little was understood
about the authentic nature and activity of the stars.
Biological level
The highest degree of organization is found at biological level whose subtlety is
being known more and more thanks to the huge strides of molecular biology.
It is important to emphasize here the continuity between the biological and the
physico-chemical level. The peculiarity of the biological level is found not in its
components but in the type of organization.
We have here a new opportunity to emphasize also the highly specific character
of the physico-chemical level. Actually, the life we know is made possible thanks to the
existence of very specific physico-chemical properties. The properties of carbon, for
instance, make it possible for this element to combine with itself and with other
chemical elements in an immense variety of ways. As a consequence, the existence of
bio-molecules is made possible together with all the biological phenomena associated
with them.
The biological structures form a long chain with many branches of systems and
sub-systems with a very specific organization and with a highly cooperative dynamism.
They obey structural principles which are relatively simple yet very efficient. For
example, the genetic information of each organism is stored in the genes and coded
through a simple “alphabet” of four “letters”: the four nitrogen bases which are found
along the DNA of the genes. The activity of the proteins which play many roles in the
organism depends on their specific tri-dimensional structure, and this last one is
determined by the components of the protein whose sequence explains the structure the
system adopts. The biochemical world is made of a relatively small number of
components, sufficient, though, to form very specific and sophisticated structures.
In this area, the intertwining between dynamism and structure is particularly
evident. Actually the biological activity depends on the specific structures which make
up the organism, from the molecular level to the level of tissues, organs and systems.
b) Stratification of the natural levels: continuity and gradualness
From what has already been said, it is clear that there is in nature a basic unity of
composition and a stratification of the various levels. The physical level (microphysical)
is present at all levels, followed by the chemical one. The levels after the physico-
chemical branch into two different series of entities: the major entities such as the stars,
the earth and the planets, and the living entities.
It is also clear that the different levels are related among themselves. We have
just stated that the physico-chemical forms the basis of all the other levels. There are,
moreover, other types of relationships, e.g. living beings depend on the energy supplied
by the sun and on the physico-chemical conditions which make the earth inhabitable. As
a matter of fact, there is no level which is completely independent from the others.
At the same time, there is distinction and continuity among the different levels.
Levels are stratified: this means that the inferior levels are integrated in the superior
ones. It is therefore possible to speak of continuity, gradation and hierarchy.
Each level can be considered as a condition of possibility for the other levels,
according to the respective order. This does not mean that everything included in one
level is a necessary condition for the following levels, however, the basic aspects are.
The basic aspects of the physical level make the chemical one possible. The same occurs
with the chemical ones respect to the astrophysical ones, with the astrophysical respect
to the geological, and with the geological respect to the biological.
One level may be a condition for the possibility of another in two ways: either
because it provides the constituent elements or because it provides the external
conditions which make the existence of the latter possible. In this way, the basic
physico-chemical entities (particles, atoms, molecules) are at the basis of everything else
as their constituent elements. The astrophysical level provides the constituent elements
for the geological one. The geological level provides the constituent elements for the
biological one, and both – the astrophysical and the geological – provide, moreover, the
external conditions which make the biological level possible. There are many
relationships of both kinds in the biological level among the different organisms. For
instance, plants are irreplaceable links for the existence of animals and of man, since
they are the only ones which are able to manufacture organic compounds from inorganic
material. Organic materials produced by plants are, in turn, necessary to the other living
organisms, (the heterotrophs depend on the autotrophs which in turn “feed” directly on
the sun energy and on the soil).
On the other hand, there is a hierarchy of organization among the different
levels. It would not make much sense to ask whether a star is more perfect than the
earth, or if an elephant is more perfect than an eagle. One may say, though, that the
physico-chemical compounds present a greater organization than the basic elements, and
that the organisms at biological level have a much superior organization than the entities
of all the other levels. Clearly, man occupies the supreme place in this hierarchy. This
statement is usually criticized by labelling it as “anthropocentric”. It is claimed that the
earth does not occupy any privileged place in the universe and that man, as a biological
being, is not superior to the other beings in all their aspects. This does not affect the
obvious and incontestable fact that man is supreme, from the organizational point of
view, respect to the other beings (this superiority becomes essential if the spiritual
dimension of man is taken into account).
11. THE PHYSICO-CHEMICAL STRUCTURE
The physico-chemical components are the basis of all natural entities and
processes. It is therefore appropriate to analyze the physico-chemical composition of
nature.
11.1. The composition of matter
The ancients had already proposed theories about the composition of matter.
Knowledge of the latter however became reliable only from the 19th
century when
sufficient information from chemistry and physics was gathered. Actually the atomic
theory was being formulated at the beginning of the 19th
century.
a) Historical review of the physics of the elements
The knowledge of the elements has been a central theme since ancient times. The
pre-Socratics proposed explanations such as the theory of the four elements whose
influence lasted two thousand years, and the atomic theory which, in some aspects, was
always present during centuries and played a certain role in the formulation of the
scientific atomic theory at the beginning of the 19th
century. The composition of matter
has always been an object of scientific investigation and accompanied, since ancient
times, by empirical work. The technique of working with metals is for instance an
example of empirical work. Empirical techniques led to the discoveries of new chemical
elements: seven metals (gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, tin and mercury) and two non-
metals (sulphur and carbon). Although they were not known as elements, they provided
the empirical basis for a further development of the experimental science.
The theories which established modern chemistry in a definitive way, had not
been formulated yet in the 18th
century. In this century however first class scientific
work was carried out with still poor equipment which led to the isolation of various
elements: cobalt (1735), zinc (1746), nickel (1751), manganese (1774). Three basic
gases were discovered with similar outstanding investigations: nitrogen (1772), oxygen
(1774) and hydrogen (1776). A group of other metals was also discovered: cobalt,
molybdenum, uranium, chromium, and elements such as tellurium, niobium, tantalum
and vanadium.
The atomic theory proposed by John Dalton in 1808 was based on studies on
chemistry which had been carried out already for one and half century, and firmly
established itself in the 19th
century. In 1869, Dimitry Mendeleyev formulated the
periodic table of the elements, basic types of atoms which constitute matter. In this
table, the chemical elements are listed in orderly groups with similar properties. The
periodic table aroused interest and spurred scientists to look for missing elements. It is
in this way that elements such as scandium, gallium and germanium were discovered 15
years after their theoretical prediction. The very table facilitated other discoveries such
as the artificial elements produced from 1940 onwards.
The use of highly technological procedures made it possible to obtain transuranic
elements which are found beyond uranium in the periodic table (that is, elements with
an atomic number greater than 92). The first of these artificial elements was produced in
1940 during experiments on nuclear fission of uranium. The construction of particles
accelerators has made it possible to make new discoveries in this line.
Democritus proposed the idea of atom in ancient times. The modern atom,
however, has little to do with Democritus’ atom. The ancients called atoms the ultimate
components of matter thinking that they really were indivisible elements. On the
contrary, atoms studied by present-day science are quite complex systems and they are
not the ultimate elements. Actually, they are made of sub-atomic particles which, at
times, are called elementary particles. We know though that many of them are also
composed, and it is probable that none of them is really elementary.
Molecules are made of atoms which are bound to one another by chemical bonds
of different types. In nature there are 92 types of atoms (more can be manufactured in a
laboratory although they happen to have a very ephemeral average lifespan) and a great
number of molecules and macro-molecules.
We shall now examine the present-day ideas about the elementary components
of matter.
b) Present-day theories about the micro-physical components of matter
In accordance with the well-established and experimentally proved standard
model, the basic components of matter are the quarks and the leptons. The combination
of quarks produces the heaviest particles (such as protons and neutrons), while leptons
are light particles (such as electrons).
The nucleus of the atoms is made of protons and neutrons. Electrons are found
rotating around the nucleus, in the same number as the protons of the nucleus and at
different levels of energy. Therefore, ordinarily matter is made of three particles:
protons, neutrons and electrons. Two important characteristics need to be pointed out
about this level of composition: first, the organization of the particles is very specific. In
an electrically neutral atom, the protons are the ones that determine the positively
charged atom, while the electrons determine the negative one. Since the electrons are in
the same number as the protons, the atom is electrically neutral. Moreover, there are in
nature less than 100 atoms many of whose properties are grouped in families in
accordance with the number of electrons of the last shell (hydrogen has one proton,
helium has two, and each subsequent one has one more). The distribution of the
electrons in the various shells obeys the “principle of exclusion” of quantum mechanics
proposed by Wolfgang Pauli. According to this, no two electrons in an identical state
can be found in the same shell. Consequently, as the number of protons in the nucleus
increases, the number of electrons increases in an equal manner and their specific
organization in shells justifies the properties of the single atoms. Therefore, matter is
already organized in a very specific way at atomic level.
Another important characteristic is the fact that in reality the sub-atomic particles
do not correspond exactly to the intuitive concept of particle since in many phenomena
they behave like waves. Here therefore we are in the presence of microphysical entities
which only in part correspond to the classical concept of corpuscle. Present-day theories
about microphysical entities are “field theories”, and particles are conceived as “quanta”
of these fields, i.e. as very peculiar entities which do not correspond exactly to any
entity commonly experienced. They are highly sophisticated scientific constructions
which do not match ordinary images. Sometime they were proposed to our consideration
as “concentrated energy”. This expression does not entail an exact scientific meaning:
however, it can be useful to understand that the composition of matter does not
correspond ultimately to immutable juxtaposed particles. It is rather made of dynamic
entities which interact and, in doing so, produce in many cases new unitary structures.
The sub-atomic particles interact with one another with four types of basic
forces:
a) strong nuclear: forces which keep the nucleus of the atom together;
b) weak nuclear: forces which appear in very specific phenomena such
as radioactivity;
c) electromagnetic: forces which appear between electrically charged
particles and are responsible for the cohesion between
atoms and molecules and for many properties of
matter;
d) gravitational: forces which produce important effects in the
attraction between those bodies with a conspicuous
mass.
The scope of nuclear forces is very small; actually they act only inside the
atomic nucleus. On the other hand, the scope of the electromagnetic and gravitational
forces is very big, though the intensity of the respective interactions diminishes with the
distance between the interacting bodies.
The particles within atoms, and the atoms within molecules, are bound by forces
of electric type. Again, it is important to avoid the image of a mechanistic model since
the connections are not just a mere juxtaposition of matter. Atoms and molecules are
dynamic structures since their cohesion is due to the action of forces, and they can be re-
united to form new unitary structures. It is also inappropriate to say that atoms are
aggregates of particles, and molecules are aggregates of atoms.
Molecules are also bound to each other by electric forces. The intermolecular
forces are nil outside the sphere of molecular action, attracting within the same sphere
up to a point of cancelling each other, and repulsive from then on. These forces are of
short and wide range action.
The major compounds are made of molecules or simply of atoms which do not
manage to become molecules (e.g. ionic crystals such as sodium chloride). The
macromolecules (proteins, carbohydrates, lipids, nucleic acids) are made of many
molecules which are chemically bound to one another to form unity structures. The
smallest of these molecules contain up to 200 atoms and the bigger ones something like
thousands ore hundreds of thousands bound in a repetitive way. This is the case of the
biochemical molecules (such as proteins and nucleic acids) which play a fundamental
role in the organization of the living beings.
Finally, the following is worth noting: there are pure substances, with fixed and
well-defined composition and properties; mixtures, made of two or more pure
substances which preserve their properties; aggregates which display a variety of
features.
There are, then, successive levels of organization at physico-chemical level,
from the atoms to the molecules, macromolecules and chemical compounds which
correspond to very specific components and interactions. The physico-chemical
organization does not correspond to a simple mechanical machine whose pieces are
simply juxtaposed. It rather corresponds to systems with holistic properties, cooperative
activity, and a great capacity of integration. Therefore the physico-chemical level is
completely permeated by dynamism and structuring which intertwine in the different
types of systems.
c) Unifying theories
Experimental sciences progress in a fragmentary way; this progress is possible if
particular problems are marked out. New knowledge can always be integrated into new
theories.
It is the case with those theories which deal with the fundamental interactions.
Newton’s physics, formulated in the 17th
century, included a theory on gravity. Later on,
laws regarding electricity and magnetism were established and Maxwell unified both of
them into a theory on electromagnetism. In the 20th
century Einstein formulated a new
theory on gravity with his general theory on relativity. At the same time, theories on the
strong and weak nuclear forces were developed. It seems possible now to unify
electromagnetism and weak nuclear forces: this has recently led to the formulation of
the weak electric theory. Attempts are being made also to unify the weak electric theory
with the strong nuclear forces through the theory of great unification. Other attempts are
being made, although at a more hypothetical level, at unifying gravity with the three
above mentioned forces through the theory of quantum gravity which would link gravity
with quantum physics.
The interest in such efforts for unification is not only theoretical. Models,
presently accepted to explain the formation of the universe in the first instants after the
Big Bang, portray the four fundamental forces as united, not differentiated and in a state
which would correspond to the hypothetical theories of quantum gravity. Through
successive alterations in the symmetry, there would have been first the separation of
gravity from the other three forces still united at this stage in a state which is reflected in
the theory of the great unification. Shortly afterwards, separation would have occurred
between the strong nuclear force and the other two forces described in the weak electric
theory.
Consequently, to make progress in the theories of unification would mean to
know better how processes developed in the early stages of the existence of the
universe. The physical situation of those stages cannot be studied directly. However, if
the theories really correspond to past events, then it would be possible to test them in a
laboratory through experiments.
Such experiments are difficult to be set owing to the high energies involved. The
cost of these experiments is exorbitant. In the 90s, a circular underground tunnel with a
circumference of 80 Km was built in Texas with the idea of installing a super
accelerator of particles (SSC). The operations were shortly frustrated by the re-thinking
of politicians who revoked their previous decisions, and the project was stopped.
Presently therefore, the only centres where these studies can be carried out are the
European laboratory of CERN in Geneva and the FERMILAB of Chicago in the US.
11.2. Mechanism, dynamism and energysm
In the philosophical study on the composition of matter two stands are usually
seen as opposed to each other, i.e. mechanism and energysm or dynamism. The former
conceives matter as basically passive and reduces nature to collisions and mechanical
impulses, while the latter emphasises the basic character of forces and energies and, in
doing so, places itself at the antipodes of mechanism.
The word “dynamism” is, within this context, a theory or a system of natural
philosophy which ultimately reduces the whole nature to «forces». On the other hand,
this term has been used so far with a different meaning, to emphasize the fact that what
is natural has «its own dynamism» or an «internal dynamism» which does not depends
on external actions either only or primarily. Dynamism here does not refer to a system
of thought but to a concrete characteristic possessed by the natural which is difficult to
express with different terms.
In considering mechanism and energysm, we have previously emphasized how
partial their explanations of nature are in view of the present-day knowledge about the
composition of matter. They emphasize only some aspects of nature while leaving
others aside.
Modern science shows how matter is really equipped with an internal kind of
dynamism which does not have any thing to do with the rigid elements portrayed by the
mechanistic doctrines. However, the purely dynamist doctrines are not a valid
alternative to the mechanistic ones either; actually nature is not just pure energy. Any
reliable picture of nature must include both of its aspects, the dynamic and the structural,
closely related to each other but without confusion between the two.
Matter is found structured at different levels of organization as a consequence of
the dynamism of its components. The dynamism of matter unfolds according to patterns
and produces structures which, in their turn, are the source of new types of dynamism.
11.3. Philosophical problems related to quantum physics
At times it is said that science corrects experience or the common sense, and that it
manages to invalidate convictions which appeared well founded. Concretely, recourse is
made to quantum physics in order to claim that the classical notions about being and
causality have lost value.
At times, for instance, it is said that quantum physics invalidates the principle of
causality and also the very notion of an objective and independent reality. Some of the
pioneers of quantum physics – such as Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg – have given
credit to such interpretations in claiming that quantum mechanics shows how the
concept of causality cannot always be applied, or how terms such as «being» and
«knowing» lose their unambiguous meaning, since it is not possible to assign an
independent reality, in the ordinary physical sense, either to phenomena or to the
observer. All this is claimed on the ground that all the experiments are subjected to the
laws of quantum mechanics and, therefore, to the laws of uncertainty. It seems therefore
that physics requires the putting aside of the basic concepts of the common sense, and
that the latter cannot be used to judge whether the enunciations of physics are correct or
not. Is this true?
Yes and not. When an enunciation is formulated which goes beyond the possibilities of
ordinary knowledge, it is obvious that its validity has to be assessed through the specific
methods of the corresponding science. However, it is also true that these methods make
use necessarily of the basic resorts of any valid knowledge, that is, of experience and
logic. An analogy can illustrate this. Technical systems of control can be used in a 100-
m flat race in order to decide who came first, and at times it is necessary to do so. These
electronic controls, though, would not make any sense without the ordinary knowledge:
it is know that there is a track, that some athletes start and that the same athletes reach
the goal in a certain order. These data, provided by the ordinary knowledge, are the
indispensable basis for the use the technical systems of control. Similarly, the methods
and results of physics presuppose the existence of an external reality which is different
from the thought of the physicist. They also presuppose that there is a natural order in
this reality in accordance with objective laws so that any event has a cause that has
provoked it. It is also presupposed that the physicist has the capacity of knowing this
reality and of reasoning logically in a correct way. Without these assumptions physics
would not have any sense.
Problems related to quantum mechanics began to appear from the beginning of its
formulation around 1927. It was decided to leave aside unobservable factors, such the
trajectory of sub-atomic particles, and to use only observable magnitudes, such as
energy changes recorded in the atomic phenomena and following the quantum laws.
One should add, to all this, the impossibility of providing an intuitive representation of
the micro-physical phenomena, with the result that the corpuscular and undulatory
models are both partial. Moreover, the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg establishes
limits to the precision with which conjugated variables can be measured, such as
position and moment of a particle. Finally, according to the probabilistic interpretation,
the theory cannot provide predictions about the behaviour of individual particles in
single cases but only probabilities which refer to events as a whole.
One finds in this context the polemic flared up in 1927 between Einstein and Bohr and
its development which had at its root the imaginary experiment proposed by Einstein
and two of his collaborators – Podolski and Rosen – in 1935 (called EPR experiment
from the initials of its three authors). Einstein claimed that quantum mechanics needs to
be replaced by a new theory which can re-establish realism and determinism in the way
he intended it, while Bohr claimed the opposite. The polemic flared up again with the
appearance of inequalities formulated by John Bell in 1965, and this led to the carrying
out of experiments able to decide on the problems raised in the polemic. Although the
experiments of Alain Aspect and col. seem to have shifted the weight of the balance
since 1982 in favour of Bohr, discussions continue61
. There are problems in these
discussions which refer to the scope of the present-day quantum theories. There are also
philosophical problems about the indeterminism of nature which spring from quantum
physics. All this, though, does not affect the claims of realism and the existence of
causality, since these are purely philosophical and need to be accepted if physics must
make sense. The problems related to indeterminism and causality are different. One
thing is to claim that any event must have a real cause (causality in a philosophical
sense), and another very different one is to claim that all natural causes act in
accordance with deterministic laws (in the sense of classical physics or of the
determinism associated with it). The existence of causality is not something doubtful,
while indeterminism is an open problem.
12. UNITY AND ORDER IN THE UNIVERSE
Present-day science provides a knowledge of each of the natural levels and their
reciprocal relations. Although this knowledge is far from being exhaustive, yet it is
sufficient to elaborate a worldview which has scientific as well as philosophical
implications; the following are some aspects and consequences which stem from it.
12.1 Unity of composition and dynamism in the natural systems
The unity of nature is one of its outstanding aspects which are reflected in the present-
day worldview. This is shown first of all in the unity of composition of the natural
entities.
Actually, all natural entities have the same basic components, i.e. the microphysical
entities such as subatomic particles, atoms and molecules. They are not all present in
each system, or with the same abundance or with the same structuring. Various theories
about this unity of composition have been formulated since ancient times. However,
61
There is a wide bibliography on these issues. One may read syntheses and discussions, for instance, in: Le monde
quantique (a collective work directed by S. DELIGEORGES), Editions du Seuil, Paris 1984; Franco SELLERI, El debate
de la teoría cuántica, Alianza, Madrid 1986. In the former, B. D’Espagnat presents an interpretation which seems to be
opposed to the common sense in its ordinary understanding. In the latter, Selleri appears to be in favor of future changes in
the quantum theory, by presenting arguments that are also not very convincing.
only at present, and for the first time, an authentic knowledge of such a unity has been
obtained
The microphysical components cannot be represented as portions of an immutable or
inert matter. For instance, the very atom is present in many different states in the
different structures in which it is found (it is integrated in that structure, it shares
electrons with other atoms, etc.). One could also say that atoms and molecules which are
studied in science are general types which correspond approximately to concrete,
tremendously various and dynamic situations.
There is also a unity of dynamism since the laws which regulate the basic levels of
nature, are also in force at the levels of higher organization. Moreover, there are laws
which are applicable at all levels: for instance, the principle of conservation of mass and
energy. The four basic interactions appear in the phenomena of all levels: the nuclear
forces within the nucleus, the electromagnetic forces within a very wide area which
spans from the structure of the atoms and molecules to the cohesion of the various states
of matter, and gravity which, appears in all those phenomena in which the influence of
the mass becomes considerable.
The unity of composition and of dynamism are aspects of the unity of nature in its
twofold aspect, i.e. the dynamic and the structural ones.
12.2. The universe
Nature is not made of a collection of heterogeneous beings. One of its most notable
characteristics is unity. There is not only unity of composition and dynamism but also a
superior type of unity which allows us to speak of the universe as a huge system.
a) Notion of cosmos or universe
The ancients looked at the world as a cosmos, or universe, i.e. as a unity based on the
cooperation of different factors, and on a hierarchy in which man occupies a central
position. This is the way in which nature appears to the ordinary experience which
witnesses the central place man occupies. Nevertheless, the recent progresses of science
seem to cast doubt on a spontaneous notion of universe, and tend to replace it with a
scientific notion, a fact which would entail important implications.
Ordinary experience clearly shows the central position of man in the universe.
Everything seems to suggest that the universe exists in function of man. Nevertheless,
this idea has been criticized in the name of the scientific progress and dealt with as if it
belonged to a primitive type of mentality, but already made obsolete by the knowledge
provided by science. Two appear to be the decisive factors in this change of perspective.
The first refers to the universe: the earth is not the centre of the universe, as the ancients
used to say; it is rather one of many planets immersed in the immensity of the universe.
The second comes from the evolutionist theories according to which man would be
another animal among animals, the result of the unfolding of natural laws through a
process of biological evolution.
Nevertheless, the philosophical reflection shows that the first factor (the one which
refers to the place occupied by the earth in the universe) is irrelevant in judging the
position of man in the universe (unless one intends to determine only his physical
position). The second factor (which refers to evolutionism) is also of little importance if
one admits that, (be the origin of his organism whatever it may) man possesses
characteristics which place him well above the rest of nature. The existence of the very
science is one of the most cogent proofs of this.
In this sense, there is an absolute order in the universe which is hierarchical. The human
person is found above the rest of nature. Man is a natural being which transcends nature.
Man is a natural being which sores above nature through his intellectual knowledge, will
and freedom. It is not difficult to perceive a type of order in nature which is not relative,
if the specific characteristics of the human person are taken into account. Nevertheless,
this order is based on a hierarchy which transcends the strictly natural level. It is for this
reason that this order includes absolute aspects.
b) Finite and infinite universe
The question on whether the universe is finite or infinite has always drawn the attention
of scientists and thinkers. The ancient Greek thinkers used to relate finiteness to
perfection, so that a finite universe would be an aspect of its perfection. Nevertheless,
the birth of classical physics in the 17th
century seemed to favour the idea of a
homogeneous and infinite universe. Kant, in the 18th
century, claimed that the finiteness
or the infinity of the universe present conflicts which are difficult to resolve.
Progress made by science in the 20th
century has opened new panoramas for the solution
of this problem which can be considered in relation to space and time.
In relation to space, the relativity theory seems to support the idea that the universe is
finite but unbound, as if it were locked around itself in such a way that, no matter how
far we go in one direction, one may never find the ultimate limit. It is the case of one
who is on a spherical surface. He may walk on it in any direction without ever finding
an end. In any case, this comparison does not give a solution to all the problems.
In relation to time, the models of the universe more accepted by the scientists in the
second half of the 20th
century and later are those which see a universe of limited age of
about 15 thousand million years. The universe seems to have a history and an evolution
which begins at the origin of time. Nevertheless, even these theories do not resolve the
problem completely, since the origin of the big initial explosion remains unexplained. It
is always possible to think that its origin came from a pre-existent and different state of
matter and energy of the universe. Science alone is not able to deny such a possibility.
Even in the case of time, a theory has been proposed similar to the relativity theory in
the case of space. Concretely, Stephen Hawking suggested that, in accordance with the
hypothetical theories of the quantum gravity, it could happen that the universe may be
limited in time and yet no concrete moment for its origin could be determined since, in
getting closer and closer to this moment, the same concept of time would be altered.
From a philosophical point of view, the universe is finite since it is a whole of limited
creatures. In a strict sense, only God can be infinite. God’s eternity is not an unlimited
duration: God is outside time, and time does not exist independently from the universe.
In this respect, the space and time magnitude of the universe, whose being necessarily
depends on God, is of little importance. On the other hand, when Christians admit that
time has its origin with the universe, and that the latter does not have unlimited duration,
they do so by leaning on Revelation and not on scientific or philosophical
demonstrations.
12.3. Physical cosmos and human world
Nature provides those conditions necessary for the existence and the development of the
potentialities of the human person. One could say that with man we reach a level
essentially superior to the rest of nature to which, however, man is deeply bound. In the
present-day culture, the new science of ecology emphasizes the interdependence of all
the components of nature.
a) The earth as ecosystem of life
Although we do not have definitive explanations of the origin of life on earth, yet it is
quite evident that the very existence of life and its unfolding in such a variety of forms is
made possible because of the existence in the biosphere of very specific physico-
chemical conditions.
The biosphere consists of the earth crust together with its boundaries in the atmosphere
and in the oceans, as a carpet of many miles where life, as we know it, is found. It is
made of many different entities which depend on each other in an intimate relationship:
it is because of this that one can talk of the biosphere as one huge system. According to
the most extreme opinions represented by the partisans of the Gaia hypothesis proposed
by James Lovelock, the biosphere should be considered as an authentic unitary system,
as a true organism. We do not hold this extreme stand here. However, the progress of
science shows clearly the existence of a unity among the different levels and entities of
nature much which is stronger than what immediately appears.
One may find as many interconnections as one wish. From a physico-chemical and
geological point of view, a set of very specific conditions is found on earth able to make
the existence and development of life possible. Such conditions refer to the fundamental
laws of physics and chemistry and to the characteristics of our planet62
.
62
One may want to consider and deep and detailed study of these types of characteristics in: John D. BARROW and Frank
J. TIPLER, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986.
b) Ecology and ecologism
Ecology is a scientific field of study which deals with ecosystems: these are natural
systems which comprise a number of living organisms with a certain unity of
interdependence.
The concept of ecosystem is very wide so that it can be applied to a huge number of
different systems: from a pond to a wood, including the biosphere as a whole. The limits
of an ecosystem depend very much on the objectives of the specific study.
Ecology is, of its own nature, an interdisciplinary branch of science: it makes use of data
provided by physics, chemistry, geology and biology. The scope of the problems
ecology deals with are also huge. However, its unifying principle is a perspective which
considers the conservation of the riches and the variety of nature of high priority, and
avoids anything which may damage it.
Ecologism appears as the defender of nature. It has gained importance from the growing
awareness of the destructive threat posed to nature by the technological progress if this
does not take place in a rational and controlled way.
There is a theoretical as well as a practical reason why the respect of nature should be
promoted. The theoretical one is founded in the unity existing among all beings in
nature. Being aware of the fact of being part of nature, leads to an attitude of respect
which is compatible with a rational use of nature for the benefit of man. This respect can
be related to a religious attitude with very well known historical manifestations. The
practical reason refers to the inconvenience for the present and future generations which
can originate from the irresponsible use of natural resources.
Frequently ecologism points at real problems. Actually the world has made great
progress in the awareness of these problems. Serious efforts are often needed to solve
them because of their difficult nature. The ecological perspective in the present
scientific worldview is strongly supported by the unity of nature and by the mutual
interdependence of its constituents. On the other hand, the divine order to dominate the
earth – as gathered by the Christian faith – cannot be taken as an excuse to foster the
indiscriminate exploitation of nature, or an attitude of despise towards other living
organisms, or an irresponsible attitude towards the future generations. On the contrary,
philosophical personalism and the religious perspective can help avoid the radicalisms
of certain ecologist stands. Sometime these stands pose unjustifiable claims such as
considering animals as subjects of rights equal, or equivalent, to human rights.
12.4 The new world view
We have so far examined some aspects of the present worldview: the central aspect of
the emergence of self organization in the genesis of nature, the continuity and
gradualness of the different levels in nature, and the unity of composition and of
dynamism in the natural systems. I shall add here some complementary considerations.
a) Theories on chaos, complexity and self organization
We have already hinted at some of the most significant advances of contemporary
science which go under the title of complexity. The term includes advances related to
morphogenesis, i.e. origin of new forms. Science explains how new modes of order
originate from states of lesser order.
The theories of the deterministic chaos, as well as the thermodynamics of the
irreversible processes and synergism, study the formation of new structures in certain
conditions which imply discontinuities or critical points. Such theories encompass many
phenomena of cooperative type, and show how the formation of new patterns depends
on the cooperative activity of different systems. One of the most important ideas of the
theory of chaos is that the systems under consideration evolve with an intrinsically
unpredictable pattern, although subject to deterministic laws. It would be possible to
determine the position of the system in a far future only if the initial conditions could be
known with total precision. Unfortunately, this is not possible according to the
uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. The impossibility is compounded by the
fact that minute differences in the initial conditions end up by evolving towards
something which is much different from the respective systems.
Therefore, these theories point at a worldview where the emergence of new things is the
consequence of some processes of self-organization which cannot be reduced to
activities of deterministic type.
At different levels, there is a true emergence of novelties in nature which are different
from their components. In each level there are new characteristics which do not exist in
the components: new holistic structures, new types of dynamism and new properties.
This is a fact which can be acknowledged without problems, independently from the
explanations one can give.
The idea of self-organization occupies a central place in the present-day worldview.
Self-organization means formation of structures as a result of the unfolding of a natural
dynamism. Therefore self-organization is closely associated with the idea of
characterization of the natural in terms of dynamism and structuring.
The new thing is the fact that today many phenomena of cooperation are already known
in physics and chemistry, and that the physico-chemical basis of the biological
phenomena is better understood. New forms of organization may appear in those
systems which exchange energy with the exterior. They are systems outside equilibrium
in which the collective behaviour of their components appears in such a way that in
specific conditions a new form of organization prevails.
Phenomena of self-organization clearly show the existence of cooperation, tendency and
directionality in nature, and these invite to reconsider the problems related to forms and
ends.
b) Cooperation, accuracy and information
The integration among the various natural levels clearly shows the existence of a co-
operation among all the natural entities and among the different levels. For instance, the
biological level requires the physical one and the chemical one for its internal
composition, the geological one for its habitat, and the astrophysical one as source of its
energy. The different levels form a compact whole in which there are many relations of
cooperation.
Besides the cooperation among the different continuous, gradual and hierarchical levels
of nature, there is another other aspect which is very important in order to appreciate its
perfection: the subtlety of its organization. Actually, there are, at each level of nature,
very specific processes which unfold in a coordinated manner and which make the
singular organization of our world possible. The unfolding of this natural dynamism can
be looked at from the point of view of an information which is stored and unveiled in a
structuring process that proceeds according to patterns.
For instance, at physical and chemical levels, an immense variety of compounds can be
obtained from very few components and basic laws. These are the compounds that make
it possible for the other levels of organization to exist. This basic level of organization
corresponds to specific patterns which can be looked at as structural principles we
already know in some details; it is not the result of some kind of chaos. There is
something we call chance, understood as accidental coincidence of different dynamisms.
However, each one of these dynamisms and their mutual integration unfolds according
to patterns. The basic structural principles are pretty simple: basic interactions, the
principle of exclusion, the principles of conservation, etc. Nevertheless, they explain the
formation of an enormous variety of very specific compounds which constitute the basis
of the other levels.
Something similar occurs in the other levels. Ultimately, the organization of nature
corresponds to an information which is coded and stored structurally, unfolds, combines
and integrates.
Therefore, the organization of nature shows the fact that there is some rationality in it
which is, moreover, very sophisticated. As science progresses, we come to know more
and more of the structural principles of the natural order, and its rationality and accuracy
appear more and more clearly.
c) Fortuitous factors in nature
Order, as well as disorder, are relational concepts: they are defined in each case
according to particular criteria. The order found in nature is not absolute. Order is
present with disorder, and latter also is not pure disorder, or absolute chaos. A mixture
of order and disorder (which are relative), is the normal situation at the different levels
of nature.
For example, the concept of regularity refers always to some aspects and not to others.
The regularity of space configurations is always relative: matter in its crystalline state
has specific geometric properties which can be considered orderly when looked at using
certain types of criteria and not others. Something similar is true with the regularity of
processes: a uniform movement has order, while the accelerated one and the movement
along a circumference do not have it. However, the opposite is also true. These
considerations can also be applied to laws.
Natural forces are not simply cooperative forces; in many cases they are opposed to one
other and originate concurrent dynamisms. The resulting order depends on the
prevailing forces and, in general, on how the various dynamisms integrate with one
another.
Moreover, fortuitous factors are present in the natural processes. The complexity of the
intervening factors in most processes is enough to realize it, and the concurrence of
specific dynamisms is not a necessary consequence of any of them. In this sense, the
existence and the relevance of fortuitous factors is unquestionable: there is chance in
nature, if by chance we understand concurrence of independent causes (we do not refer
here to divine providence which is found at a different level and which covers
everything, since God is the first Cause of the being of all that is).
However, it is not appropriate to attribute causality as such to the chance. Chance
belongs to the so-called improper or accidental causes. This means that whatever
happens has its proper causes, even those things that we say to happen by chance. If we
focus only on the natural causes of phenomena, we can claim that not only there are
fortuitous factors but also that there is plenty of them, and that they contribute in a great
deal to the production of the order which we observe in nature. This, though, does not
mean attributing any causal role to disorder, or chaos. It is also possible to think that
sometimes disorder is the consequence of an excess of order: this happens when various
different types of order concur in the same process63
.
These reflections want to point out the fact that we do not forget that there are many
aspects which are disorderly or chaotic, when we claim that nature has a very subtle and
sophisticated organization. They also help us dismiss some misunderstandings which are
based on too simple ideas about order and disorder; this happens, for instance, when it is
claimed that natural order would have come about by chance from a primordial chaos,
by identifying some violent physical conditions with a chaotic situation64
. In reality, the
fact that some effects could be produced as the result of collisions of millions of
particles in constant motion cannot be referred to as chaos in a strict sense, unless one
says that these collisions, and their effects, do not follow any natural pattern. Science,
though, shows the opposite.
d) The peculiarity of the natural order
63
Cf. P. WEISS, “Some Paradoxes Relating to Order”, in: P.G. KUNTZ (publisher), The Concept of Order, The University
of Washington Press, Seattle-London 1968, p. 16. 64
Cf. E. MORIN, El Método. I. La naturaleza de la Naturaleza, Ediciones Cátedra, Madrid 1981, pp. 76-78 and 82.
Nature appears before the ordinary experience with a very specific type of order.
Scientific progress leads to a much more amazing and precise knowledge about this
order.
Something can be considered specific, in a broad sense, when it refers to a species or to
a particular type. In this sense, everything that exists is specific, since it has a defined
way of being. A more interesting problem is to know whether nature is specific in a
more strict sense, i.e. whether it has singular or exceptional characteristics. To find it
out, the characteristics of the different levels of nature need to be considered, since these
are specifically different from one another.
The astrophysical level. Stars are the result of the same types of processes: thermo-
nuclear reactions of fusion in which hydrogen nuclei are united to form helium nuclei.
The basic pattern is common to all stars; its magnitude, stratification and other processes
depend on the conditions present in each case, and they obey the same physico-chemical
laws. Therefore, the behaviour of almost all matter of the universe concerns the stars and
follows an order that is nothing singular: the same types of processes are repeated in
millions of stars. Moreover, the distribution of the stars in the galaxies follows certain
simple principles: it depends fundamentally on the gravitational forces. The same occurs
with the distribution of the galaxies.
The geological level. Here there is a more specific type of order, at least
according to our present-day knowledge. We do not know of any other planet with the
same characteristics as the ones of the earth. This does not mean that such planets do not
exist; however, even if they existed it would be very difficult to spot them, since they
would be very far and lacking their own light. Consequently, we can truly speak in this
case of a very singular type of order and, for the time being, unique. However, the
existence of other planets similar to the earth would not present a real surprise from the
point of view of the scientific laws. The singularity of the earth consists in the fact that
here there are conditions that are tuned for the thriving of living beings: just small
changes in some of these conditions would be enough to make life, as we know it, non-
viable.
The biological level. This level is even more singular. In this case, the
singularity is not so much in the variety of the living organism, but in the same existence
of life. Just one cell is something much more complex and organized than any entity at
the physico-chemical level. The more developed organisms are the most complex
entities of our universe, and the physico-chemical conditions that make life possible are
very singular.
In the case of man this singularity is huge. Human life is made possible within a
very restricted set of conditions, and the human organism has an enormously singular
character.
The conclusion of this brief excursus may sound amazing. Actually, we can
conclude that our world is very simple from the point of view of its composition and
basic laws; it is very repetitive in the macro-entities of the astrophysical level; it is very
singular in relation to our immediate habitat, and enormously sophisticated in the
organization of the living beings and, especially, of man. Therefore, there are in our
world some basic and relatively simple aspects which co-exist with some enormously
singular results.
We can truly say that our universe is very singular; this is so because its
components and fundamental laws are on one hand relatively simple and, on the other
hand, they make it possible to obtain enormously varied, organized and cooperative
results. In fewer words, it seems that more cannot be done with less effort. Even in
supposing that there are no other intelligent beings in the whole of the universe, even in
supposing that the conditions which make our life possible are the result of an
evolutionary process, yet the existence of thousand of millions of galaxies and stars
would be a very simple and chip expenditure, and maybe even indispensable, for the
possibility of those processes necessary for our existence.
V. THE BEING OF NATURE
We come to know nature through its manifestations in space and time, i.e.
through space-time structures perceived by our senses. Nature, though, cannot be
reduced to these dimensions: it has a kind of power, or energy which is stored in its
structures and which unfolds with time.
We have previously mentioned these two aspects in relation to the
characterization of the natural; we perceive them as intertwined aspects, and it is
precisely this intertwining which is peculiar to the natural. The natural dynamism does
not exist by itself: its existence and its unfolding are intimately related to space-time
structuring.
There is no doubt that the characterization of the natural through dynamism and
structuring is a philosophical approach. We shall proceed with this analysis and use the
concepts of matter and form which, after many centuries, are still a very valuable
instrument for a philosophical analysis of nature.
13. LEVELS OF UNDERSTANDING NATURE
Science provides a detailed knowledge of nature. Philosophy takes this knowledge,
together with the one provided by the ordinary experience, as a basis for its reflections
on nature. Philosophy uses an approach which is different from the one used by the
experimental sciences; however, both complement each other.
13.1 Scientific analysis and metaphysical reflection
a) The scientific perspective
Experimental science was firmly established in the 17th
century with its own
proper methods which implied renouncing to a knowledge of essences and adopting a
perspective that combines the use of mathematics and experiments.
In spite of the huge success of the experimental sciences, one still finds
nowadays widespread interpretations of instrumentalist and conventionalist nature
according to which science would only provide conceptual instruments able to master
nature in a controlled way. Such instruments, they claim, could be considered at best
only as more or less plausible conjectures on the characteristics of the reality.
Problems concerning the scope of science arise from three main issues. First, the
use of mathematics seems to limit the scientific knowledge to the quantitative aspects.
Consequently, some conclude, science would not provide an authentic knowledge of the
reality. Second, the validity of the scientific theories is verified by experimental data
which refer to concrete factual conditions. Hence, some conclude, the truth of theories
can never be established in a definitive way, and these theories will always have a
hypothetical or conjectural character. Third, in order to formulate theories and interpret
the experiments, it is necessary to use man-made constructions which, at least in part,
are conventional and revisable. Hence, some conclude, it seems that theories would have
only an instrumental value.
Nevertheless, experimental sciences provide an authentic knowledge of nature.
Actually, we have plenty of well-proven knowledge which is the basis for high-
precision technology. The difficulties mentioned above, though, are real. Yet, in many
cases a practical certainty can be achieved; this happens for instance when a certain
theory provides good explanations and predictions, especially if they are exact, if they
refer to independent phenomena and if they are coherent with the results of other well-
proven theories.
When we have at our disposal constructions whose formulation and verification
are rigorous in accordance with the above-mentioned criteria, then we can actually claim
that these constructions correspond to reality and therefore are true. However, this
correspondence does not mean that the constructions are an exact replica of nature; we
are here before a truth of contextual type since these constructions make sense only
within a theoretical and experimental context which we define and which implies the
adoption of a particular point of view. It is therefore a partial truth which does not
exhaust all that can be said about nature. This does not stop it from being an authentic
truth which makes us know real aspects of nature. We can therefore understand how
experimental sciences provide a kind of knowledge which is at the same time authentic,
partial and perfectible65
.
Knowledge acquired through experimental sciences does not exhaust all that we
can know about nature: it is limited because of the intentional limitation imposed by the
scientific perspective. The reason which explains the success of experimental sciences is
the very reason which explains its limitations. Actually, the scientific perspective
deliberately excludes those dimensions which cannot be subjected to experimental
control. Therefore, dimensions such as the ontological one which refer to the way of
being of the natural, and the metaphysical one which refer to the ultimate foundation of
nature, the general laws governing being, spirit and freedom of the human person, are
all left out of the scientific perspective.
b) The philosophical perspective on nature
It may seem that science has the monopoly of the study of nature, since
philosophy does not have special methods for achieving a knowledge which is
inaccessible to the scientific method. It would seem that experimental sciences occupy
65
A broader explanation of these problems can be found in Mariano ARTIGAS, Filosofia de la ciencia experimental. La
objetividad y la verdad en las ciencias, op.cit. Ch 6.
the place of the old philosophy of nature, or that the former have absorbed the latter
within their own sphere of competence.
The 19th
century positivism and the 20th
century neo-positivism tried to reduce all
valid knowledge to that obtained from natural sciences, and understood the scientific
laws as simple relations between observable phenomena. However, it is commonly
accepted nowadays that positive science, i.e. science as defined by positivism, does not
exist. One needs creativity, interpretations and evaluations at each step of the scientific
activity. A positivist scientist could be replaced by a computer; however he could only
work under the direction of a non-positivist scientist. Science seeks an authentic
knowledge of nature, and the latter cannot be obtained through automatic procedures.
Experimental science works on some philosophical postulates, and the scientific
progress back feeds on these postulates. Science and philosophy adopt different
perspectives, though they constantly interact with each other at all levels.
Within this context a philosophical reflection becomes necessary first and
foremost in order to evaluate the scientific knowledge. Actually, a reflection on the
scientific methods, on the general postulates of science and on the particular ones in
each case, and on the interpretation of the obtained results, has to take philosophy into
account. A philosophical reflection is also necessary if one wishes to propose any
worldview, i.e. a representation of a nature in which its fundamental characteristics are
reflected. Again, a philosophical reflection becomes indispensable when ontological
problems are tackled which refer to the basic characteristics of the way of being of
nature.
Ontological questions about nature are nowadays posed with the same vigour as
they were in the old times. Broadly speaking, they coincide with the classical problems
of substantiality, causality, qualities, space, time, teleology, and the origin of the
universe. As well as in other epochs, typically metaphysical questions are posed about
spirit, freedom and transcendence. No one would deny the fact that these genuinely
philosophical questions are constantly posed nowadays.
13.2 The metaphysical understanding of the natural
We are now going to tackle some of the problems which the philosophical
reflection on the being of the natural runs into, especially when these are related to
matter and form which are the objects of this chapter.
a) Unity and plurality
Unity and plurality are philosophical problems. We repeat that what
characterizes the natural, in our way of presenting it, is a space-time structuring and the
fact that patterns, or repetitive structures, have a special importance in this perspective.
Actually, the natural order rotates around these patterns which repeat themselves
in numerically different cases. This plurality of realizations of unitary patterns leads us
to investigate the characteristics of a pattern, of its unity and of its concrete realizations
which can be manifold. This again leads us to distinguish the formal determinations
which correspond to the defining notes of the patterns, from the material conditions
which correspond to the numerically different realizations of these patterns.
A particular case is the individual realization of specific ways of being common
to many individuals. Specificity and individuality lead again to the concepts of form and
matter.
b) Dynamism and interaction
We have highlighted the dynamism as a fundamental characteristic of the
natural. Nature is a world of interactions, and what appears to be static is in reality a
state of equilibrium.
Interactions are the result of the dynamism of the natural entities. Dynamism
pertains to the way of being of these entities and unfolds in accordance with this way of
being which is marked by materiality. The being and the activity of the natural are
rooted in material conditions and are realized in space and time. In this sense also, the
consideration of matter and form is important to understand the way of being of the
natural and the activity which is proper to it.
c) The four causes and the con-causality
We are able to understand something if we can answer the questions
characterized by why: this means that we know its causes. Something is intelligible in
the measure in which there are causes which can explain it.
In this context, the Aristotelian theory on causality provides important
guidelines, because it covers the different types of questions that can be posed about the
natural entities. Actually, the material and formal causes refer to their composition and
way of being, the efficient cause refers to their dynamism and the final cause refers to
their directionality. Our questions about nature correspond to aspects of these four types
of causes.
Experimental science provides a broad knowledge about the composition of
matter in relation to the component elements as well as in relation to their structuring
within systems. It also provides knowledge about the activity of matter through the laws
which regulate the processes, and about the directionality of entities and processes in its
twofold aspect of tendency and cooperation. It is therefore a kind of knowledge which
refers to the four Aristotelian causes. In this sense one can say that science provides
authentic explanations about the natural phenomena and that, consequently, manifest the
intelligibility of nature, reaching dimensions which are inaccessible to the ordinary
knowledge. Philosophy, on the other hand, examines this causality in a thematic way
and determines the concept of cause, the different types of causes, and the modality of
their acting.
14. MATERIAL CONDITIONS AND FORMAL DETERMINATIONS
The concepts of matter and form have being employed since ancient times
particularly by Aristotle in relation to the natural. We shall examine them in the light of
the present worldview.
14.1. Dimensions of material type in nature
Let us first consider dimensions of material type, the concept of matter and the
characteristics of what is material.
a) Extension, duration, mutability
Material dimensions are proper to space-time structuring. These are extension
which constitutes the basis of space structuring, duration which constitutes the basis of
time structuring, and movement which establishes a relationship between space and
time66
. We refer now to these three notions because we consider them to be the
fundamental conditions of matter.
In the first place, everything material has extension and therefore a magnitude.
One can imagine material points; actually, this is a widely used device in science.
However, in nature there are no points without extension: all material beings have
extension and magnitude. As a consequence, what is material is divisible; it can be
indefinitely divided, and the resulting parts will never be inextended (in practice, this
divisibility comes up against physical limitations which shift towards ever shorter
distances. On the other hand, it is important to point out that the different ways of being
of the natural entities are accompanied by typical magnitudes: atoms, molecules,
biological macromolecules, cells and organisms have specific magnitudes, or at least
their magnitude is found within certain limits outside which they cannot exist.
Moreover, there is continuity among the parts of the unitary systems: although they may
contain “incrustations”, there is a minimum continuity which is necessary for the
existence of the system.
In the second place, the concept of material implies duration, i.e. a temporal
extension or dispersion. Mutatis mutandis, one can apply here the conclusions of the
previous reflections on spatial extension. Concretely, natural processes have duration
and therefore a temporal magnitude; they can be divided into parts, though the unitary
66
Aristotle stated that “the science of nature deals with the extensions, movement and time”; Physics, III, 4, 202b 30-31.
processes are found in association with typical duration, and there is continuity in them.
They are processes which unfold from an initial to a final point in accordance with
natural tendencies, and depend on specific natural patterns.
In the third place, the concept of materiality implies movement. Any material
being can change and is ordinarily subjected to continuous changes, although at times
almost imperceptibly. Not only can a material being change in relation to accidental
aspects but also substantially if the conditions for its existence disappear. Everything
natural is subjected to becoming. Therefore, mutability has always been considered as
the fundamental characteristic of the material beings. The present-day knowledge
illustrates this mutability; we actually know that there are continuous changes, at least at
the microphysical level, in all entities, including the most stable ones.
b) The concept of matter
In defining matter, the use of terms becomes extremely important. Many
difficulties can be avoided if one distinguishes between the two meanings in which the
concept of matter is used, i.e. as an adjective and as a substantive respectively.
As an adjective, something is «material» if it has material dimensions: extension,
duration, mutability and all the other dimensions which are related to them. A way of
being with these characteristics can be called «material», and the totality of the
conditions which constitute it is referred to as «materiality».
Nevertheless, «matter» is used very frequently as a substantive, in ordinary life
as well as in philosophy, and this may easily create confusion: as a matter of fact, there
is no natural entity made only of a collection of material dimensions, because these do
not enjoy independent existence. They are material dimensions of subjects which have
specific ways of being, and these ways cannot be reduced to a bunch of material
dimensions. When speaking of «matter» one usually makes reference to one or various
concrete beings; these, however, are the subjects of which the adjective «material» can
be predicated: they are the material beings.
We want to emphasize the fact that materiality does not have its own proper
being which is the same as saying that there is no being which is purely material. In
speaking of material beings, we should not think that these are completely reduced to
their material conditions: such a reduction is impossible, since these conditions cannot
be substantialised, they cannot exist in an independent way. Extension, duration,
mutability and all the other conditions related to them can only exist as aspects of a way
of being which is characteristic of the natural entities, and these cannot be reduced to
such aspects.
I shall point out some misunderstandings generated by the concept of matter in
science and philosophy67
.
67
One can find a collection of studies on the evolution of the scientific and philosophical concept of matter in: E.
McMULLIN (editor), The concept of Matter, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (Indiana)1963.
In science matter designates, at times, the totality of beings which the physico-
chemical sciences study. Therefore, living beings are excluded, yet they are material
beings. On the other hand, when physicists speak of matter, they usually refer to sub-
atomic particles: here «matter» is opposed to «energy» and, in an unfortunate way, one
speaks of «materialization of energy» in order to designate processes related to the
equivalence between mass and energy. This gives the impression that energy is
something material (which is nonsense). In other situations the concepts of «mass» and
«matter» are used as if they were equivalent. This confusion begins with Newton
himself, who defined mass as «quantity of matter». It is an unfortunate definition which
has stood for centuries, is still found in textbooks and, de facto, does not find application
in any properly scientific problem. Our own epoch has heard people speaking of an
increasing «de-materialization» of science, a fact that emphasizes the increasing
importance given by the present-day science to explanations based on forces, fields of
forces and energy. Therefore, if one wishes to find out what sciences say about
«matter», it is necessary to distinguish the different uses of this concept and to be aware
of the misunderstandings that this concepts lends itself to.
In philosophy the concept of matter leads frequently to even greater
misunderstandings since the commonly accepted meaning attributed to it derives from
the Cartesian mechanism. According to this meaning, matter is identified with material
conditions on one hand, and with the natural substances on the other. The natural
substances are in this way stripped of their own dynamism. This impoverished type of
matter becomes a passive and inert subject, reduced to pure exteriority. In spite of the
criticism to which it has been subjected, this mechanistic idea of matter has been the
background of many philosophical stands, whose impact is very much felt at present.
The idea of «matter» is usually employed as a synonym of «inert matter», lacking its
own dynamism. This completely inert type of matter does not exist.
b) Proto-matter and second matter
The term «matter» is etymologically related to the Latin «mater» which means
mother and which therefore provides the elements for the formation of a new being. In
the Aristotelian philosophy the concept of matter means in general that out of which
something is made. It corresponds to the idea of the «material», or the «components»,
out of which something is made. Usually a distinction is made between «proto-matter»
and «second matter».
Specifically, the term proto-matter (or «first matter») is used to designate a
substratum common to all bodies which remains even after some substantial changes
have occurred. The term second matter is used to designate the natural substances which
are the substratum that remains after accidental changes have occurred. We shall now
see what kind of meaning can be attributed to these concepts in the light of our
characterization of the natural.
Assuming that changes that occur in nature are real changes and not a series of
creations and annihilations, it is necessary to admit the existence of a permanent
substratum in all of them which initially lacks any kind of form; this form is acquired
after the change has occurred. To determine the nature of this substratum, it is necessary
to distinguish between accidental and substantial changes. In an accidental change, a
substance acquires accidental determinations, it becomes this or that. The remaining
substratum is the substance (its essential way of being does not change, but its
accidental way does). As a subject of accidental changes the substance is called second
matter. A new substance is produced in a substantial change. This change presupposes
the occurrence of accidental changes (configuration, increase, subtraction, composition
and alteration), but through them a new being is produced. The presence of a substratum
is also required here because there is continuity between the starting and the ending
point: if this was not so there would be no transformation but only a succession of
annihilations and creations. In a way analogous to what happens in an accidental
change, the substratum of the substantial changes is called proto-matter. Again, this
substratum is known through analogy: it is related to the substance as the bronze is to
the statue, and the wood to the bed, the shapeless material to a well-shaped thing68
.
The concept of «proto-matter» is very difficult to grasp. I quote three places
where Aristotle illustrates it69
.
In the first he states: “Actually, I call matter the first subject of everything and
every being, out of which, as a constitutive element, something is made or comes to be
as some thing, and not in an accidental manner”70
. It is then an essential factor in the
constitution of substances. This definition comes about as the result of the analysis of
change. In this context, matter is the ultimate substratum of change. What are its
characteristics?
Aristotle speaks of them when he says: “I understand matter as that which by
itself is neither something, nor quantity, nor any of those things which determine an
entity. It is something which is predicated of each of these things and whose being is
different from that of each of the categories (in fact, all the other things are predicated of
the substance, while the substance is predicated of the matter). Hence, matter by itself is
neither something, nor quantity, nor anything else, nor its negations, since even those
would be accidental”71
. This definition refers to predication, and warns that matter is an
undetermined subject, to which no concrete determination can be attributed.
Finally, Aristotle emphasizes the fact that proto-matter is the ultimate subject out
which things are made: “when we say of something that it is not “such a thing”, but that
it is “made of such a thing”….for instance, the box is not made of earth nor is it earth,
but it is made of wood…However, if there is something which is very first and of which
cannot be said, with reference to another, that is made of such a thing, this then will be
the proto-matter”72
.
The Aristotelian proto-matter appears to be like an ultimate substratum related to
the composition of the bodies and to the substantial changes. It is conceived by analogy
68
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Physica, I, 7. 69
ARISTOTLE refers to proto-matter in other places: cf. Physica, IV, 9, 217 a23; De Firmamento, III, 6 and 7; De
Generatione et Corruptione, I, 3, 317 b 16, 23 and II, 4; De Anima, II, 1, 412 a 7, 9. 70
ARISTOTLE, Physica, I, 9, 192 31-33. 71
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VII, 3, 1029 a 20-26. 72
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, II, 7, 1049 a 18-26.
with the substratum of the accidental changes. It does not have its own determinations.
Moreover, it appears to have a potential character: it is pure potentiality, and this is so
because it lacks determinations and can be subject of different acts. What meaning can
this doctrine have in the light of our characterization of nature?
It is possible to interpret proto-matter as equivalent to the materiality of the
bodies73
. Actually, proto-matter is not a determined physical component; rather it is
something which expresses the basic character that all material entities have in common.
The notion of «materiality» expresses the fact that bodies are material
entities, and therefore they have the characteristics which are attributed to matter in
general: extension, divisibility, localization, duration, accidental as well as substantial
mutability. However, bodies have these characteristics insofar as they are real bodies,
with actual determinations. Pure materiality does not exist by itself: existing entities
have a being which is realized within material conditions.
In line with this interpretation, proto-matter designates the «material
conditions» in which natural entities exist. Therefore, these conditions refer to specific
characteristics, while «materiality» simply designates the way of being within which
conditions of this type exist74
. From this perspective, although proto-matter presupposes
a substantive use of the concept of matter, its content refers principally to its use as
adjective.
Consequently, in speaking of proto-matter we refer to a way of being. It is the
way of being common to all natural entities. From this perspective, the Aristotelian
statements about proto-matter have a clear meaning: materiality is a way of being which
essentially belongs to the natural entities (constitutive aspect); it is the sphere in which
material transformations occur (substratum of the substantial changes); it refers to the
material conditions in general and not to specific ways of being (it is an undetermined
substratum); and the material entities can change in principle into any other material
things (pure potentiality).
As it was already said, the notion of «second matter» refers to the substratum of
accidental changes, i.e. to the substance. This does not imply in any way that this subject
is immutable. On the contrary, accidents are determinations of the subject and therefore,
when an accidental change occurs, the subject changes; however, its way of being does
not change essentially, it is not transformed into another type of substance: it changes
accidentally. During accidental changes the substance changes but only accidentally.
This statement is important since it refers to a problem which has led to
misunderstandings. Actually, it would appear that if a substantial substratum remains in
existence during accidental changes, one should conclude that this substratum is
immutable (since it persists throughout the change). On this basis, conclusions are easily
73
A similar interpretation has been proposed by Juan Enrique Bolzán, who concludes that “it seems adequate to speak not
of a «matter» as a substantive –as if it were one of the constituents of the being – but of its materiality as one of its
characteristics”: J.E.BOLZÁN, “Cuerpo, material, materialidad”, Filosofia oggi, 14 (1991), p. 516. 74
This interpretation coincides with the one proposed by Jesús de Garay who states that “matter simply is the relation of
some determined conditions, called material, to the form since these conditions, as such, are also formal”: J. DE GARAY,
Los sentidos de la forma en Aristòteles, EUNSA, Pamplona 1987, p. 219.
reached which empty the content of the notion of substance. Either one says that
substance is just a mental category without any reference to reality, because only an idea
can be absolute and immutable, or one simply denies the validity of the concept of
substance.
On the other hand, «second matter» refers to a natural substance, an entity that
possesses a way of being and some specific virtualities which cannot be reduced to the
material conditions. We have already noted that there are no purely material substances,
because materiality is not a complete way of being: it only expresses some dimensions
of the way of being of the natural.
The latter is also an important statement which could sound shocking if reality is
conceptualized into two completely and mutually exclusive compartments namely,
matter conceived after the Cartesian fashion, i.e. reduced to the material conditions, and
spirit conceived as a subject which will only be able to act on matter «from without».
Hence, if matter is reduced to pure exteriority, the spirit could only act upon it
exteriorly, because no other possibility would be available: in this case, the action of
God in no way would affect the interiority of the natural (since there would be no
interiority), an the action of the human soul upon the body would then be similar to that
of a horse rider or of an helmsman who can only act and guide in an external way. Such
perspective leads to serious difficulties in the fields of anthropology and natural
theology.
The same perspective is also of little satisfaction to the philosophy of nature,
because it strips the natural substances of those dimensions which are related to their
interiority; it would appear that attributing interiority to them would mean to fall into
some kind of pan-psychism or pantheism, since interiority is an exclusive attribute of the
spirit. If one accepts this, he should then forget the fact that natural entities have their
own dynamism; that, in an enigmatic but real way they «know» their own way of being
and that of other beings, and they «know» how to behave in each circumstance; that they
are subjects with tendencies; that these tendencies have sometime a cooperative
character and create the conditions for the existence of morpho-genetic processes in
which new ways of being are produced; that in many natural beings there is a stored
«information» which unfolds through complex and sophisticated unitary types of
processes. One should actually forget a very important part, and maybe the main one, of
the way of being of the natural.
c) Characteristics of the material
Some characteristics of nature and of our knowledge of them will be considered
here which are closely related to materiality.
In the first place, the material conditions are related to potentiality, since
everything material is mutable, i.e. it can change not only accidentally but also
substantially. In this sense, matter is said to be principle of passivity, since it implies the
possibility of receiving new determinations. Aristotle claims that “matter, insofar as it is
matter, is passive”75
, and that material things “if they have a principle of movement, it is
not a principle of moving and acting, but one of passivity”76
. However, these statements
are not opposed to the acknowledged fact that natural beings have their own dynamism.
The previous statements actually refer to “matter insofar as it is matter”, i.e. to the
material conditions considered independently from interiority. They refer to some
generic conditions of materiality and not to the complete way of being of the natural
entities.
Secondly, it is usually claimed that matter is the principle of individuation of the
natural substances. This seems to be problematic because individuality means
determination and realization, and therefore it seems to be opposed to uncertainty and
potentiality. However, when one speaks of matter as «principle of individuation» he
means numerical individuation of the natural entities. Each substance has its own
proper way of being, but any way of being natural is, in principle, repeatable in different
individuals: it corresponds to a generic «type». In this sense, the same «type» exists as
individualized in beings which have some concrete material dimensions in space and
time: although the «type» (the determinations of the way of being) is what characterizes
an individual, the concrete material determinations explain how the same type can exist
in numerically different individuals. Therefore, when speaking of matter as principle of
individuation, it is customary to add that what is meant here is «matter marked by
quantity» (materia quantitate signata). It is the way emphasizing that what is meant here
is not matter as undetermined material conditions but matter determined by a specific
space and time quantity.
Thirdly, it is claimed - and this is easily understood - that materiality implies
contingency, i.e. lack of necessity. This is so because what is material is mutable, and it
is actually subjected to circumstances which can cause changes; on the other hand, this
is also so because this mutability affects also the essence of the material entities which
can stop being what they are and become something else. There is no doubt that material
individuation in the Aristotelian perspective is a path which makes material beings
imitate the incorruptible ones, since the same way of being can perpetuate itself through
numerical multiplication. Living beings transmit their way of being to other individuals
through generation and in this way the species is perpetuated although the individuals
disappear. From another perspective, it is also claimed that matter implies necessity.
However, this necessity is not opposed to the contingency we have just analyzed.
Necessity refers here to determination in the way of acting, absence of freedom. We
shall not expand here on the problems of indeterminism: whatever the solutions may be,
it is evident that self-consciousness and freedom presuppose a way of being which
transcends material conditions.
Fourthly, materiality is related to the existence of chance in nature. Actually,
changes occur easily in the material conditions; in this way a kind of chance is
introduced which is opposed to perfect regularity. Experience shows that our
possibilities in acting are limited by the continuous changes in material conditions.
75
ARISTOTLE, De Generatione et Corruptione, I, 7, 324 b 18. 76
ARISTOTLE, Physica, VIII, 4, 255 b 30-31.
Fifthly, materiality implies on one hand, the existence of limitations in our
knowledge, and on the other hand, the possibility of a measurable and controlled
knowledge. In relation to the first implication, Aristotle states that “matter as such is not
knowable”77
. Actually, something is known through its operations; even properties
which appear to be passive, such as colour, correspond in reality to interactions: colour
can be perceived thanks to the fact that light is reflected by the bodies. Materiality
expresses some exterior conditions, disregarding dynamism and activity; such
conditions are not known by themselves, but by the activity which unfolds through
them. Moreover, although exteriority makes sense knowledge possible (and therefore
the whole of our knowledge), it also imposes limitations: we can know immediately
only those aspects of nature which are accessible to our sense organs; we need to make
recourse to indirect procedures in order to know other aspects.
However, materiality also has a positive aspect in our knowledge of nature, since
thanks to materiality it is possible to study nature in a quantitative and experimental way
which is the basis of our scientific knowledge. Actually, materiality provides the basis
for numbering and for the mathematical study of nature. It is related to dimensions
which have a space-time magnitude and which, therefore, can be divided, summed and
submitted to calculation. The material aspects of nature can be studied in a mathematical
way, while the qualitative ones can be studied in this way only indirectly in the measure
in which they can be related to the quantitative.
Thanks to materiality, experimentation is made possible. What is material can be
studied through experiments because its behaviour appears as a regular activity, i.e. not
free. Scientific experiments must be repeatable, so that changes may be studied in some
aspects of the phenomena in function of the changes of some other aspects, and in
controlled conditions. Obviously, aspects related to the spirit and to freedom cannot be
studied with this method.
All these considerations allow us to understand why the mathematical and
experimental methods can be used to study those aspects of nature which are related to
the materiality and not to other of its aspects which are accessible, though, to
philosophical reflection.
14.2. Dimensions of formal type
We shall now analyze the formal dimensions and the meanings of the concept of
form. One should keep into account the close relationship that exists between the
material and the formal: actually, matter and form are, in the material entities, like two
sides of the same coin. The following analysis will be a completion of what has already
been said about matter and materiality.
a) Configuration, consistency and synergy
77
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VII, 10, 1036 a 8-9.
Space extension, time duration and movement are material dimensions which
refer to the external distension, to the multiplicity of the components. Formal
dimensions, on the other hand, refer to the internal coherence, to the unity: configuration
reflects the space unity of the components; consistency is related to the preservation of
the unity throughout time processes; synergy expresses the character of cooperation of
the different components and processes.
Configuration is space structuring; it is defined as the disposition of the parts
that constitute a thing; the disposition of parts is responsible for the figure of a thing.
Natural entities are extended (partes extra partes); however, the distribution of their
parts is not casual but takes place according to the characteristic configuration (partes
extra partes ordinata) of things. The configuration of unitary systems corresponds to
typical space patterns which are repeated in different individual systems. Configuration
(formal dimension) corresponds to extension (material dimension) and both complement
each other. If there was only extension, nature would be reduced to a disconnected
multiplicity of parts randomly distributed in space. On the contrary, nature is structured
according to space patterns. Our visual knowledge depends completely on the
recognition of such patterns. Experimental science presupposes the existence of such
patterns and confirms them: it tries to know space patterns which are inaccessible to
ordinary experience, and in many cases it manages to do so.
Consistency is related to time duration; it is defined as stable duration. The
stability of natural systems depends on the connection between their parts: if this is
weak, their stability will be feeble. Consistency (formal dimension) corresponds to
duration (material dimension). There is no absolute consistency in nature: everything is
subjected to wear and tear, to interactions, to division. Stability corresponds to an
interior cohesion which is preserved throughout interactions. Living beings have a kind
of organization which make them apt to actively provoke those conditions which are
favourable to their stability.
Synergy refers to space-time organization: it means cooperation. The
organization of natural systems depends on the cooperation of their components in a
functional unity. Synergy (formal dimension) corresponds to movement (material
dimension). Synergy expresses the unity of the different movements which occur in a
system: the greater the cooperation of the component parts of a system and of the
processes which unfold in it, the greater its unity.
b) Meanings of the concept of form
Material and formal are correlative concepts: that is why we can distinguish the
adjective and the substantive uses of form, in the same way and meaning as we do in the
case of matter. There is nevertheless an important difference: within the context of the
material nature, the formal always exists in material conditions; however nothing
prevents the existence of beings which lack matter, i.e. spiritual beings. The two cases
are asymmetrical: the existence of beings reduced to pure materiality is impossible,
while that of beings that do not include material conditions (spiritual beings) is possible.
We shall not deal with spiritual beings here, because what is natural is material;
however, we shall refer to man’s spirituality, since the human person belongs to nature
although he transcends it at the same time.
As «materiality» expresses the fact that something exists in material conditions,
i.e. that it is something «material» (adjective use of the concept of «matter»), so
«formality» refers to the peculiar determinations of the way of being: to be an tom, a
protein, a plant, to be white, a good electricity conductor, etc.
These determinations do not exist outside the material conditions; they do not
exist in an independent way, nor are they united to the materiality in an external way:
the formal and the material are interpenetrated and entwined so as to form a unitary
reality. It is not a juxtaposition of two different and complete realities. There is only one
complete reality which subsists with its own being: the individual substance which has
formal determinations realized in material conditions.
Of course, when one studies the way of being human, it becomes necessary to
introduce further clarifications which may be able to reflect the peculiarities of the
human person and of his spiritual dimensions.
We have already mentioned the asymmetry between the material and the formal
in the concrete case of the spiritual beings. Such asymmetry though is much wider; this
is due to the fact that unlike material conditions which are generic and in a certain way
common to all natural beings (extension, duration, movement), the formal ones are
particular and specific. The essential as well as accidental formal determinations are
different in different beings. It is because of this that we also use a different terminology
in both cases: we speak of conditions in the case of the material, and of determinations
in the case of the formal.
It is important to stress the fact that substantial and accidental forms of the
material entities are not complete beings, they do not have their own substance, and
they are not subjects in a strict sense. If this is taken into account, there is no
inconvenience in speaking of «form» or «forms» with the substantive use. It is
nevertheless convenient not to forget the true meaning of the concept of form. Centuries
long critics of the concept of form (from the times of Descartes) are mostly based on
these misunderstandings which we are trying to clarify: the forms of the material
entities are equivocally understood as entities or parts of entities. For this reason, it
seems preferable to use a terminology, whenever possible which can avoid the danger of
substantialising the forms.
c) Substantial and accidental forms
The concept of form occupies a central place in the Aristotelian philosophy78
.
The term «form» usually refers to the external appearances of something and is related
78
A good study on this topic can be found in the already quoted work by Jesús de Garay, Los sentidos de la forma en
Aristòteles.
to its «figure». This meaning of form actually corresponds to one of the species of the
accident «quality». However, the concept of form has a much wider meaning, since it
designates any determination of the ways of being: if it is a substantial way of being, one
speaks of «substantial form»; if it is an accidental way of being, one speaks of
«accidental form».
At a physical level, form is correlative to matter, since it is what determines the
latter; consequently, a different type of form corresponds to different types of matter.
Specifically, «substantial form» corresponds to «proto-matter», and «accidental forms»
(note the use of plural, since the same substance has different accidental determinations)
correspond to «second matter».
Aristotle’s philosophy claims that the substantial form is the essential act of the
natural species. Material substances have an essence, or a fundamental way of being
which differentiates the distinct types of substances (dog, acacia, water, etc.). These
essences are not simple but composite: they exist in material conditions (proto-matter),
and include those perfections which determine their specific way of being (substantial
form). Matter and form are neither complete entities nor physical parts; they are
principles which behave like potency and act: proto-matter is the potential and
undetermined principle, while the substantial form is the actual and determining
principle.
The substantial form refers to the unitary way of being of the substance and to
the totality of its possibilities of action which correspond to its way of being. It is act,
energy, active nature.
At the same time, and precisely because it expresses its specific way of being,
the substantial form corresponds to the concept and to the definition of substance, i.e. to
the idea which expresses the specific way of being of each substance. Actually, Aristotle
uses two different terms to refer to the form: «morfé» (form) and «eidos» (idea).
Although in a first approximation there is a clear correspondence between the meanings
of these two terms, in reality they are not identical. We shall not expand here on this
exegetical problem which concerns the precise interpretations of Aristotle’s thought. It
is enough for us to note that the substantial form is a real principle, the one which
determines the essence of the material substances; that matter and form are co-
principles of the essence, as potential and actual respectively; and that the idea or
definition of an essence will have to include a reference to both co-principles.
In the Aristotelian perspective, the substantial form is «responsible» for the
unitary structuring of the substances, of their way of acting and of their tendencies.
It is important to note that the substantial form is present only in the natural
entities (which are substances). An aggregation does not have an essential unity, a way
of being one, and therefore does not have a substantial form. Artefacts also lack a
substantial form, since their unity corresponds to an external project, to a human idea,
unless in some cases an authentic substance is produced through artificial processes. The
Aristotelian substantial form corresponds to a central aspect of the reality: the way of
being characteristic of each substance.
The expression «accidental form» is used to designate any accidental
determination. Therefore, any accident can be referred to as «accidental form». Also in
this case there is a danger of «treating accidents as things», and again this danger is
related to the substantive use of the respective terms, when one speaks of «the quantity»,
«the quality», etc. as if these were subjects or entities.
Accidents are determinations of a substantial subject, of an individual substance.
Such a subject has extension, is divisible, is soft, and has a full set of qualities. It would
not make sense to treat accidents as substances or things. The use of an appropriate
terminology can help avoid this danger.
Accidental forms behave as act in relation to the substance which is in potency
respect to the accidental forms. They are determinations, accidental ways of being, and
therefore they refer to a being in act. Because the substance is a subject in act, it is in
potency respect to the different accidental forms which can change without changes in
the essential way of being of the substance. As the substantial form is the act of the
proto-matter, so the accidental forms are the act of the second matter (or substance).
d) Characteristics of the form
We shall now examine some characteristics of nature which correspond to the
concept of form.
First, the form is related to being. We have already stressed the fact that forms
are not complete beings. The classic terminology uses the term ens quod or entity which
(plural entia quae) in order to designate entities or subjects proper; while ens quo or
entity by which (plural entia quibus) is used to designate the constitutive principles of
the entity which are neither entities nor subjects. According to this terminology, the
form is an ens quo, i.e. an entity by which something is, or has being, or has a specific
way of being. This terminology is still substantive, since forms are called «entities»,
while at the same time stressing the fact that they are entities in a special sense: they are
not complete entities, but determinations of an entity. All in all, it is important to stress
the fact that forms do not exist on their own: what exists is the individual substance
which has a specifically determined way of being (substantial form) that is realized in
material conditions (proto-matter).
Insofar as forms are determinations of the way of being, one can say that entities
have being «through» their forms. The classic dictum «the form gives being» (forma dat
esse) should not be understood as if the form had its own being previous to its material
existence and at a certain point would «transmit» it to the matter or to an entity. What
has being, what acts, what is a subject of transformations is the individual substance.
However, it should be added that the form refers to a real being; we can explain how a
cell works, but the living cell has a real being which is not reducible to our explanations:
«to be a cell» is a «way of being», and it is convenient to stress that it is a way of
«being». In this sense, it is true that the form gives being, avoiding substantive
interpretations of this expression. Along the same line, it should be noted that claiming
that the form is cause (the «formal cause») does not mean that the form exercises its
causality in the same way in which the efficient cause, or agent, does. The formal cause
is what determines the way of being. It is nevertheless a real determination of a real way
of being.
Properly speaking, forms are neither generated nor corrupted. A form exists
when the entity to which it belongs begins to exist, and ceases to exist when the latter is
transformed into something else. It is usually said that the material forms are «educed»
from the potentiality of matter; this means that they do not have their own independent
being; they are «produced» in the transformations whose substratum is the matter: they
are the result of these transformations. The present-day knowledge about the «self-
organization» of matter refers to the production of new structures and patterns of
activity which arise as a consequence of the cooperative interactions of the components.
We point out once again that these considerations refer to the «material forms»,
i.e. to the forms of the natural beings which include material conditions, and which
cannot exist outside the latter. In the case of man’s spiritual soul, new considerations
need to be added which reflect the spiritual dimensions and their implications.
Second, form is related to structure. It may be appropriate to ask whether the
form could be identified with the «structure» of the material entities. It may appear
possible to do so, since the structure is related to the way of being of the natural entities,
and it is somehow an «immaterial» factor, since it refers to the organization of the
component parts.
There is no doubt that the structure of the material entities is closely related to
the classical concept of form, and even more so if one considers these entities as
systems. According to the theory, a system is characterized by the totality of the
interrelations among its components; these are integrated in a unitary type of structure.
A system is something more than the juxtaposition of its parts; it has properties which
are not found in its parts, nor do these properties result from the mere addition of the
properties of its parts; it has teleological characteristics, since there are structural laws
which favour the stability of certain of its aspects. All this is particularly evident in
living organisms but present also in some inorganic systems, and even in the atomic
world ruled by quantum laws. These characteristics favour the approximation between
the notions of structure and form.
Nevertheless, it is convenient to clarify two aspects of this relationship. First,
when we talk here of «structure» we refer to the «organization» of a system which
includes not only space structure (configuration), but also time dimensions (cooperative
processes of the parts of the system). Second, this «space-time organization» is not
identified with the form; the form is rather like the «plan» which corresponds to the
totality of space relations and interactions that exist in the system. There is no doubt that
this plan corresponds to the «way of being» of the system; however, the concept of form
refers directly to this way of being, and it is not reduced to its concrete aspects.
Third, forms are related to the ends. In the production of artefacts there is a
«model» according to which a new product is manufactured. Similarly, in nature it can
be said that the form is the model according to which natural entities are produced. In
the generation of the living beings the form of the generator is the principle of
generation in accordance with specific patterns and, at the same time, it is the end of the
generation, since a new being is produced which has the same specific form of the
generator. In the production of non living substances, the form of the product is also the
end, the terminus towards which the process tends.
Consequently, form and end can be identified in the natural processes; they are
identified in living beings since the form of the generator and that of the generated
coincide specifically. They are also identified in the non-living beings since the form is
the end of the tendencies of the components, the end of the process.
It is important to emphasize the close relationship between forms and ends since
critics of the concept of form usually, and to a very large extent, coincide with the critics
of the concept of finality. The acceptance of the reality of the form leads easily to the
acceptance of finality.
Fourth, we ask what type of necessity corresponds to the form. In the Aristotelian
philosophy, some kind of necessity and immutability are attributed to the essences and,
therefore, to the forms. This seems to be at a loggerhead with the present-day worldview
according to which natural entities are the result of contingent processes and in this
sense they are neither necessary nor immutable.
These difficulties are related to the Aristotelian worldview according to which
the world, and somehow the forms, are eternal; changes would consist in individual
generations and corruptions directed by the forms and towards the forms: they arise
from the form and are directed towards the production of forms. In this view, the
number of forms is given in a fixed number once and for all. However, the fundamental
core of the concept of form can be easily separated from these ideas. Actually, this
worldview had been criticized by the 13th
and 14th
century Christian thinkers, and it was
also condemned in the same centuries by some of the ecclesiastical authorities. These
critics referred above all to the alleged necessity and eternity of the world; contingency
and time limitation of the world were emphasized against the Aristotelian worldview.
However, the same reasons, which led centuries ago to claim the contingency of the
world, could be used nowadays to claim the contingency of the forms. Actually, from
the creationist metaphysical perspective, not only the world in its totality but also the
specific natural entities are contingent. In order to hold that the natural entities are not
dissolved in a pure flow of processes and that they have intelligibility, it is not
necessary to claim that forms are eternal. There is no correspondence either between the
eternity of the divine ideas and the eternity of the forms of the natural entities. Here we
are facing two different aspects of the problem.
The present-day world view emphasizes the contingency of the natural entities
which are the contingent result of natural processes; therefore, it emphasizes also the
contingency of the forms. Eternity and immutability of the forms do not correspond to
the present-day worldview. However, they are not indispensable in order to accept the
meaning of form as it has been explained, or to claim the intelligibility of nature, or the
existence of a natural order with a hierarchy which culminates with the human person.
They are not even necessary as a basis for a concept of human nature that may
permit us to claim the existence of stable moral dimensions. Actually, morality is related
to the existence of metaphysical dimensions in the human person, and these dimensions
seat on concrete physical conditions; the fact that these physical conditions are subject
to changes says nothing against its actual existence. In order to be able to claim the
existence of metaphysical dimensions in the human person and in the corresponding
moral dimensions, it is not necessary to claim that the physical conditions on which they
seat have always been there.
15. THE HILEO-MORPHIC STRUCTURE
We have already considered the hileo-morphic structure in relation to matter and
form. We are now going to consider it in relation to their correlation and to its validity.
15.1. Hileo-morphism
We call «hileo-morphism» the Aristotelian doctrine according to which the
essence of the material substances is composed of matte (hylé) and form (morfé); since
we are speaking of the essence of these substances, the matter referred to here is the
«proto-matter», and the form is the «substantial form».
The concept of «matter» is used by Aristotle in different contexts along his work
and it does not have a univocal meaning. There is no unanimity in the interpretation of
the different meanings79
. For instance, doubts have been raised about the authenticity of
the traditional interpretation according to which there would be one proto-matter only,
common to all bodies, purely undetermined substratum which comes into the
composition of all material beings; it has also been said that this interpretation is foreign
to Aristotle.
Along this line, William Charlton has examined the Aristotelian passages which
refer to proto-matter and concludes that they do not give evidence for the traditional
interpretation: in Aristotle’s thinking, matter would always be something concrete and
already determined. He claims that the traditional doctrine has its origin in Plato’s
Timeus80
: it would have come about by joining Plato’s language and Aristotle’s concept
about the material factor, i.e. adapting the Aristotelian substratum so as to suit the
Platonic description. This joining would have taken place with the Stoics, would have
become well established in the syncretistic philosophy of the 1st century B.C. and early
centuries A.D., would have been taken into Christian theology already at the times of St.
79
In relation to this, one can read: L. CENCILLO, «Hyle». Origen, concepto y funciones de la material en el «Corpus
Aristotelicum», Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Madrid 1958; H. HAPP, «Hyle». Studium zum
aristotelischen Materie-Begriff, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1971; W. LESZL, “La material in Aristotele”, Rivista
Critica di Storia della Filosofia, 28 (1973), pp. 243-270 and 380-401; 29 (1974), pp. 144-170. 80
Cf. PLATO, Timeus, 50 b 8 – c 3; 50 e 4-5; 51 a 4 - b 2. In these passages Plato refers to the receptacle which receives all
things and never takes any form, and he adds that it is by nature the matrix of every thing and it is structured in different
ways by the things it receives, that it is found outside of all forms, that it is the mother of everything, invisible and without
form, receptive of everything.
Augustine, and would have become fossilized in Calcidius’ commentary to the Timeus
which was almost the only source of ancient metaphysics till the 12th
century81
.
Of course, Aquinas places his interpretation of hileo-morphism within the
framework of a creationist metaphysics. Aquinas’ concepts are taken mostly from
Aristotle; however, in this case as in many others, what is Aristotelian is interpreted
within a metaphysics which, in some important aspects, is not Aristotelian.
We mention all these problems in order to point out that the interpretation of the
Aristotelian hileo-morphism and of its historical development is not a simple task. On
our part we have examined the hileo-morphism without trying to betray either
Aristotle’s thought or the Aristotelian tradition. We shall proceed with our analysis
along the same line disregarding historical exegesis.
15.2. Correlation and unity between the material and the formal
Matter and form are correlative concepts: something is matter respect to a form
and vice versa. It should be understood that this perfect correlation exists only in
material beings, and that nothing forbids the existence of spiritual beings whose essence
would consist in a form without matter82
.
Therefore, matter and form, in the physical world (material entities), mutually
need each other and complement each other. There is no matter without form: if there
were this would mean that some material conditions (extension, duration, movement)
existed which would not affect any entity, and this is impossible. Moreover, there is no
form without matter: a purely spiritual being does not belong to the physical, or
material, level.
We have stressed the fact that the concepts of matter and form do not refer to
«things». It can be added that, somehow, they express «functions». This means that
something «plays the role of» matter respect to the form, or of form respect to the
matter. This implies that matter and form refer to a specific level: that which plays the
role of form from a specific perspective, can play the role of matter from another
perspective. For instance, the substantial form is form respect to proto-matter but is
somehow matter respect to the accidental forms which determine the accidental level.
However, there is an exception in the case of proto-matter which dose not play the role
of a form in any case. On the other hand, purely spiritual forms are still determined by
the act of being (we shall not detain ourselves in this important aspect which pertains to
metaphysics).
81
Cf. W. CHARLTON, Aristotle’s Physics Books I and II, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1970: Appendix: “Did Aristotle
Believe in Prime matter?”, pp. 129-145. 82
ARISTOTLE states that “matter is something relative: since, to such a form, such a matter”: Physica, II, 2, 194 b 8-9.
On the other hand, the correlation between matter and form is the same as the
one between potency and act. Actually, form indicates determination and therefore act,
while potency signifies something undetermined which is being actualized or
determined by the form83
.
All in all, matter and form are «correlative» concepts, because one makes
reference to the other; they are «functional» concepts since they do not express things
but functions; they are «contextual» concepts since something can work either as matter
or as form in different contexts or levels of analysis. All this means that matter and form
constitute an authentic unity: they are like two sides of the same coin which correspond
to the «exteriority» and «interiority» of the natural beings respectively.
Consequently, matter and form are not joined as if they were two entities, or
physical parts. The essential way of being refers to some formal determinations
(substantial form) which exist in material conditions (proto-matter); and the accidental
ways of being refer to formal determinations (accidental forms) which affect a substance
(second matter). However, the substance together with its accidents is a unitary whole. It
cannot be said that the proto-matter, or the substantial form, or the substance, or the
accidents exist separately or juxtaposed, as if they all were physical parts.
One can say that the form «in-forms» the matter, it determines it, it actualizes it
(please note that the use of this substantive language should be interpreted with those
nuances previously indicated). It is because of this that the concept of form can be
related to the present-day concept of «information». Actually, in its present-day
meaning information can be understood as «storage» of «instructions» which are found
and expressed in material conditions. However, this presupposes one dimension added
to these conditions; this happens for instance in the case of the genetic information
contained within the structure of the genes. In this sense, information has something to
do with laws, since it is these laws which «regulate» the physical processes and their
results that are «realized» in these processes, but which are not identified either with the
entities or with the processes. The instructions contained in the different entities come to
be «materializations» of the laws.
15.3. Matter and form as causes
In the Aristotelian philosophy, matter and form are considered to be causes: the
material cause and the formal cause84
. Yet, their causal action does not correspond to
what is ordinarily understood as cause, namely the efficient or agent cause. Since they
are not complete entities they do not have their own consistency and do not exercise
their causality in the same way as an agent subject (being a substance) does.
Matter and form are causes insofar as they are «components» of the natural
entities: proto-matter and substantial form constitute the essence of the material
substances, while second matter and accidental forms constitute the substance with its
determinations. If by «cause» we understand that which affects the being of the effect,
83
“Matter is potency and form is act”: ARISTOTLE, De Anima, II, 1, 412 a 9-10. 84
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Physica, II, 3; Metaphysica, V, 4.
we can then claim that matter and form are proper causes, since they constitute the way
of being of the natural substances.
For the same reason, matter and form are «intrinsic» or interior causes, since
they refer to the way of being. This is not at all opposed to the fact that matter is related
to the «exteriority» of the substance. Actually, the material conditions are intrinsic or
interior to the substance, they belong to its own proper way of being; however, they
refer to space extension and time duration and therefore to the exteriority, in an through
which the substance acts85
.
The meaning of material and formal cause refers, therefore, to the causality of
two «factors» which are intrinsic constituents of things, and which relate to each other
as potency and act.
Aristotle expressed the unity and causality of matter and form with a very
explicit statement: “ultimate matter and form are the same, the former in potency and
the latter in act”86
. Matter and form do not co-exist, are not joined, are not different
realities which are related, they do not ask for a unifying bridge, they are not
components after the fashion of physically separated parts. That which has an
independent being is the individual substance whose way of being consists in some
formal determinations which exist in material conditions.
15.4. The validity of hileo-morphism
To say that matter and form are real, intrinsic and constitutive causes of the
essence of the natural substances is equivalent to claiming the metaphysical validity of
the hileo-morphic composition. In other words, such a composition is not only a mental
construction to understand nature, but corresponds to the reality of things, although
matter and form are not complete entities.
It may seem that hileo-morphism gets into trouble vis-à-vis the knowledge
provided by the scientific progress about the composition of matter. One may think that
actually science supplants hileo-morphism with explanations formulated in terms of
components and their configurations. In this case hileo-morphism would correspond to
an obsolete kind of worldview. Scientific knowledge would then be quite sufficient to
explain the natural phenomena, while philosophical explanations would become useless.
In reality we face here two different levels of explanation which are
complementary. Experimental sciences adopt a perspective which is not only legitimate
but also indispensable in order to be able to make progresses in the knowledge of the
composition of matter and of its laws. The philosophical perspective, on the other hand,
focuses its knowledge on the ways of being of the natural and conceptualizes it.
85
“Matter is that out of which something is made and which remains immanently in it”: ARISTOTLE, Physics, II, 3, 194 b
24. 86
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VIII, 6, 1045 b 18-19.
The present-day knowledge about the composition of matter is incompatible not
only with a mechanism which strips matter of its own dynamism and interiority, but also
with a processualism which does not admit the existence of stable subjects. On the
contrary, it favours an image of nature in which a very important role is played by
patterns, dynamism, organization and information. This image is fully coherent with
hileo-morphism.
There is a great variety of patterns in nature which repeat themselves in different
concrete material conditions. Nowadays, many patterns are very well known in the
microphysical as well as in the macro physical and biological levels. All this
corresponds pretty well to the notion of form as a way of being which repeats itself in
different individual material conditions.
On the other hand, at times some claim that energy could be considered as
equivalent to the traditional proto-matter: in this case everything would be made of
energy, and the material entities would be a sort of «concentrated» energy. Some try to
base this idea on certain results in physics, such as the equivalence of mass and energy,
the importance of the «fields» of forces, the transmutation of sub-atomic particles into
one another and the equivalence of the different forms of energy. There is no doubt that
these aspects emphasize the basic character of energy. However, the energy dealt with in
physics is a magnitude which is defined in relation to the methods proper to physics;
therefore, trying to identify it with a philosophical notion is a task that falls outside the
scope of the experimental sciences. It is nevertheless a suggestive idea because there is
no doubt that many aspects of the material reality can be explained in terms of energy.
However, proto-matter, understood as «materiality», refers in a general way to the
material conditions and energy, as a physical magnitude, refers, on the other hand, to
specific characteristics of the activity of what is natural.
15.5. The degrees of the physical being
There are progressively greater levels of organization in nature which, although
realized in material conditions, have progressively accentuated formal dimensions.
Actually, there are degrees of structural integration, process integration, cooperative
action, organization, unity and active potentiality or capacity of action.
Living beings have peculiar formal dimensions. There is an unquestionable
qualitative difference between the living and non-living, and within the living there are
different degrees of life.
The taxonomic ladder shows a progress in the formal dimensions as one climbs
it, and this means a progressive distancing from the pure materiality.
If «immateriality» is understood as accentuation of the formal dimensions, it can
be said that there is an ascending ladder of immateriality. However, in the physical
world this immateriality does not refer to something independent from the material
conditions.
In the case of the human soul the problem of the relationship between
«immateriality» and «spirituality» appears since in this case the formal dimensions
transcend the material conditions. How is it possible for a spiritual soul to be the form of
a material body? In other words, how is it possible for spiritual dimensions to exist in
material conditions? The difficulties met with in trying to conceptualize this fact are not
small but, however big, they should not lead one to deny this fact which can be easily
experienced.
On the other hand, the existence of spiritual dimensions requires a kind of
causality for its adequate explanation which is far above the possibility of the material
entities. A transcendent cause is not only required in the case of the spirituality, but also
at inferior levels. In the case of spirituality though there is something special to add: the
way of being of this level is essentially superior to that which depends on material
conditions.
15.6. Materialized rationality
Hileo-morphism corresponds to different explanatory levels which, although
related among themselves, are not identical. The first of them refers to change, the
second to the constitution of the bodies, and the third to individual multiplicity.
In the first place, hileo-morphism was formulated in order to explain how change
is possible. The necessity of admitting a substratum in all changes seems obvious since
the opposite would lead to the denial of transformations and the admission of
annihilations and creations. Therefore we say that in any change there is a subject which
is in potency towards the acquisition of a form. Change then is precisely the process of
actualization of this potency. The subject plays the role of matter in relation to the form
which it acquires through the process: this subject is the proto-matter in the substantial
changes and the second matter in the accidental ones.
In the second place, hileo-morphism can be applied to the constitution of the
bodies. Natural bodies are essentially mutable or changeable and therefore they must
have the matter-and-form composition which explains, has we have just said, the
possibility of change.
In third place, hileo-morphism explains the multiplicity of individuals within the
same species. If bodies are made of matter and form, form refers to what characterizes
the species, and matter refers to the concrete conditions in which this generic type exists.
One therefore understands how the same type of form can exist in different individuals.
These three explanatory levels refer to the physical world and are related among
themselves. In a fourth place, we can consider another level which refers to the
relationship between the physical and the metaphysical world. From this perspective,
hileo-morphism reflects the existence of a gradation of perfections in function of the
distinct degrees of immateriality. Moreover, in the light of a creationist metaphysics,
nature appears as the realization of a rational project carried out through material
conditions. Information can be considered as materialized rationality, and the different
degrees of being as rungs which make the existence of nature possible, a nature at whose
peak a rational being is found: this being is the human person who exists in material
conditions but who at the same time transcends them.
PART TWO
VI. QUANTITATIVE DIMENSIONS
The being proper to the natural entities includes material conditions which are
intimately related to quantity. The natural is distended in material conditions, i.e. it has
quantity and therefore extension in space and duration in time.
Quantitative dimensions are those related to quantity, e.g. extension,
multiplicity, divisibility, measurability and numerability. We are going to consider now
these dimensions while in the next chapter we shall delve with the concepts of space and
time.
16. PROPERTIES OF AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MATERIAL
ENTITIES
Before examining the quantitative dimension in concrete, we shall do it in a
general way as an introduction. We shall emphasise their accidental character, their
importance for the knowledge of substances, and their connection with the other
properties of a substance.
16.1. The unveiling of the substance through its properties
The accidental ways of being, usually called simply «accidents» are defined in
relation to substance and essence.
Unlike the substance which is the subsistent entity and therefore has «its own
being», accidents do not have their own being and therefore do not subsist: they are
determinations of the substance. For instance, big, small, white, resistant, are not
subsistent entities: they are properties which affect a subject which is a substance. The
substance is the subject, or substratum, of the accidents.
Accidents do not belong to the definition of essence which expresses the
fundamental way of being of a substance (like being a man, a dog, a tree, a protein, an
atom). This does not mean though that accidents are of little importance or that they are
not related to the essence. There is no doubt that some accidents have a secondary
importance and are related to the essence in a distant way; however, other accidents are
closely related to the essence and are greatly relevant: this is the case, as we shall see, of
quantity and some qualities.
In any case, accidents are extremely important because through them substances
and essences are known. Actually, substances and essences are unveiled through the
accidents (magnitude, colour, resistance, etc.), and in this way we know them indirectly
and in a partial way.
Some accidents are determinations of the substance itself while others express
the relation of a substance with other substances; for instance, having a certain size does
not depend on the relation with other substances, but occupying a certain place
expresses a relation with the surrounding bodies: both cases express ways of being of
the substance.
16.2. Quantitative and qualitative
The quantitative and the qualitative are two dimensions always present in the
natural entities. They are accidental dimensions and as such they do not form part of the
essence of the substance. Truly, they cannot ever be absent, they are greatly important to
determine the way of being of the natural entities, and they are closely related.
According to Aristotle’s classification of the accidents, quantity and quality
occupy a prominent place because they are considered as intrinsic accidents, i.e. they
refer directly to the way of being (accidental) of the substances. Actually, material
substances are always extended and have qualities which determine their way of being.
a) The quantitative
The quantitative answers the question: “How much?”. It refers to something’s
magnitude: how much it measures in relation to space; how long it lasts in relation to
time; how fast it is in relation to movement; how many individuals or components or
aspects exist in a system or in a set of systems. Moreover, magnitude is related to
numbers.
Everything natural is quantified, i.e. it has quantitative dimensions and therefore
has magnitude, extension, number. Actually, what is natural is material and this implies
quantitative dimensions: materiality is characterized precisely by its reference to these
dimensions.
Space-time structuring refers to what is material and quantitative: it presupposes
distension in space and time. Therefore, in characterizing the natural in function of
dynamism and structuring, we have emphasised the basic role that the material and the
quantitative play for an adequate representation of nature.
b) The qualitative
The qualitative answers the question: “what?” in the sense of «quality», or way
of being of something: what its characteristics and its peculiarities are.
What is natural has qualitative properties. Actually, what is natural is not
exhausted in the quantitative dimensions: in fact, this is not possible because the
quantitative dimensions do not exist isolated, they do not have their own being.
Quantitative dimensions exist as aspects of the ways of being of the natural entities.
Dynamism is related to the ways of being: it presupposes the existence of some
potentialities or capacities of acting which correspond to specific ways of being.
Therefore, in characterizing the natural in function of dynamism and structuring, we
have emphasised the fact that what is natural has virtualities, i.e. specific ways of being
of qualitative type from where the natural activity arises.
c) Relation between the quantitative and the qualitative
There is asymmetry between the quantitative and the qualitative similar to the
one existing between the material and the formal (and for the same reasons): there is no
obstacle to the possibility of existence of spiritual beings, i.e. being without matter with
qualities also spiritual (and therefore qualities without quantity. On the other hand, the
existence of purely quantitative material beings without any kind of quality is not
possible; in such a case we would be in the presence of purely mathematical, and not
natural, beings.
In the sphere of the natural, the quantitative and the qualitative are
interpenetrated. Any natural entity has space-time structuring, i.e. quantitative
dimensions. The qualitative ways of being do not exist in a pure state, separated from
the quantitative ones: although they refer to aspects which are not directly quantitative,
yet they are realized in material conditions and, for this reason, they are affected by
quantity.
The quantitative and the qualitative are different real dimensions; however, they
are interpenetrated in the natural entities, in the same way in which the material and the
formal are, or the exteriority and the interiority are. Moreover, quantity, as well a
quality, is intrinsically related to the dynamism and to the relations among entities.
Actually, the activity of the natural substances depends on their ways of being
(operations follow being), and the way of being of the substances depends on their
quantitative and qualitative characteristics. Something similar can be said about the
relations of substances among themselves. One should not lose sight of this when
studying quantity and quality separately.
16.3. The quantitative and the qualitative from the mechanistic perspective
Already before Aristotle strong doubts had been cast on the objectivity of qualities. The
Greek atomists claimed that nature is completely determined by quantitative properties
such as extension, figure and local movement, whereas qualities would only be the
effects that matter produces on the sense organs, and would therefore belong to the area
of the subjective impressions. The Pythagoreans also, and somehow Plato, considered
the quantitative to be the basic constituent of nature to the extent that study of
mathematics would be indispensable for an adequate understanding of nature.
With the birth of modern experimental science in the 17th
century the problem of
the objectivity of the sense qualities acquired prominence. The newly born science went
hand-in-hand with a mechanistic perspective which presented itself as the new
philosophy of nature in polemic with the old qualitative physics. The mechanistic
explanations were quantity-based, while qualities were considered as subjective
impressions devoid of objectivity. The triumph of the new science was interpreted also
as the triumph of the mechanistic and quantitative perspective; this became the
philosophy of nature generally accepted until the end of the 19th
century, at least in those
places more related to science.
In this perspective, the reality of the so-called secondary qualities was also
denied (the «sensible proper», object of the external senses: colour, sound, etc.), while it
was claimed that only the primary qualities are real (those related to quantity:
magnitude, figure, movement). Secondary qualities would only be subjective
impressions caused by the primary qualities in subjects equipped with a specific
perceptive apparatus. The Aristotelian forms, considered as occult qualities, were
rejected as useless: they could only be considered like labels presented as explanatory
tools but in fact explaining nothing, leading rather to error and hindering the progress of
science.
The Empiricism of the same period held the same doctrine. For instance, John
Locke (1632-1704) wrote: “the ideas of the primary qualities of the bodies are
similarities of these qualities, and their models really exist in the same bodies; however,
there is no similarity whatsoever in the ideas produced in us by the secondary qualities.
There is nothing in the same bodies which are similar to our ideas. There is only a power
to produce in us the sensations of bodies which we name according to the ideas we have
of them; and what is sweet, blue or hot according to an idea is nothing in the so-called
bodies but volume, form and movement of the insensible parts of the same bodies”87
.
In the subsequent epochs, the reality of the qualities continued to be denied,
basing this denial on the progress of the mathematical science of nature.
We shall focus our attention on the concrete aspects of the quantitative
dimensions. The analysis will make us appreciate the fact that the quantitative does not
exist separately from the qualitative, and this will prepare the way to determine the
objective character of the qualities.
17. DIMENSIONAL EXTENSION
87
J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book II, Ch. VIII, No. 15. The text was taken from the Spanish
version: Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano, Editora Nacional, Madrid 1980, vol I, pp. 209-210.
We shall now show how quantity is an intrinsic accident found in all natural
substances but not identified with the latter, and how its effect, or main manifestation, is
the extension which is related to the body dimensions.
17.1. Extension as the basic property of the natural substances
a) Substance, matter, quantity
Natural substances exist in material conditions. We have represented this «materiality»
through the classical concept of «proto-matter» which refers to the material conditions
in general.
Materiality is part of the essence of the natural substances, i.e. it is included in the basic
way of being of these substances.
Materiality refers to the conditions in space, conditions in time and their
combination in the movement. Materiality refers to them, though, in a general way: to
say that something is material means only that it exists in this type of conditions.
When we refer to these conditions in a concrete way we speak of extension,
magnitude, localization, duration, etc. It is easy to note that these concrete dimensions
can vary at least within certain limits, without any change in the essential way of being
of the substance. In order to represent these quantitative accidental dimensions in a
unitary way the concept of «quantity is used» and one speaks of the «quantity» of the
natural substances.
We now say that quantity is an accident of the natural substances and this
statement implicitly includes two more: quantity is a real way of being, and this way of
being is not identified with the way of being of the substances.
First, quantity is a real way of being. On the one hand, all natural substances
have space dimensions; if this were not so they would be reduced to a point without
extension: however, points without extension, such as those dealt with in mathematics,
only exist in our mind, they are never real entities. On the other hand, natural substances
also have time dimensions. Again, one can think of «instants» without duration.
However, even in this case, when we apply the concept of «instant» to becoming, we are
actually idealising a real duration. We can conclude that natural substances have real
space-time dimensions. However, when we speak of «quantity» we are actually
indicating the fact that substances have a way of being which includes this type of
dimensions: it is therefore a real way of being.
It may seem that this way of being is not only real but that it also belongs to the
essential aspect of the substances; after all, materiality is what is proper to the natural
substances. Nevertheless, we say that quantity is an accidental way of being. Actually,
we have already indicated that when we speak of quantity we refer to the concrete
material conditions of the substances, and that these dimensions can vary without a
change in the essential way of being: they are therefore found at the level of the
accidents.
It is necessary to add that, although quantity expresses an accidental way of
being, it is an accident which affects directly the way of being of the substances, and it
is always there in any material substance precisely because it refer to the concretion of
the materiality. In this sense it is usually said that quantity is an intrinsic accident unlike
other accidents (such as purely external relations, or localization respect to other
bodies). One may also add that it is an accident which derives from matter: we say this
in order to emphasise the fact that it refers to the material conditions of the substances.
It is usually said also that quantity is the first accident of the natural substances.
This primacy refers to the character of basic «substratum» which quantity has, and
signifies the fact that the other accidents affect the substance «through» the quantity. For
instance, colour, hardness, sight, or any other characteristic of the natural substances
exist in material conditions, affect extended parts, act through organs and processes
distended in space and time. In this way also the interpenetration between the
quantitative and the qualitative is emphasized.
b) Extension
According to the classic definition, that which is extended has parts outside one
another (in Latin, partes extra partes). It is easy to note that this definition is almost a
tautology, since the idea of parts mutually external explicitly states what is already
implied in the idea of extension. It is inevitable though that this be so; actually,
extension is a primary concept which can hardly be explained by more known concepts.
The idea of extension is related to sense experience, in particular to all that
which comes from sight, hearing and tact. We apply it above all to entities, but we
extend it also to all that, in the ordinary life, implies distances in space. In this more
ample sense it becomes more closely linked to the concept of space which we will
analyze later.
In this area almost all the philosophical discussions are focused on the concept of
space, while it does not seem possible to say much about the concept of extension. Yet,
we want to emphasise an aspect which is hardly mentioned in the discussions, and
which is very important, i.e. space structuring.
We have emphasised from the very beginning the fact that structuring is a basic
aspect of the natural entities and also that, although not everything is patterns, yet
everything in nature articulates around patterns. In relation to space, these patterns are
the configurations. These ideas play an important function for a faithful representation
of the natural. Actually, if we consider only extension in a general way we obtain an
undifferentiated image of nature which, on the contrary, has very specific ways of being,
and the latter appear mostly as space configurations. We shall now refer once again to
Descartes’ philosophy so as to appreciate the importance of this issue.
17.2. The Cartesian reductionism
Descartes reduced the material substance to extension since extension was, from
his perspective, the clear and distinct idea which we can have about the material
substance. Qualities, on the contrary, would be just effects produced in the knowing
subject as a consequence of the structure of his way of knowing; therefore qualities
would not really be objective in the same way quantity is, and the latter can be studied
by using mathematics.
We have already seen how the denial of the sense qualities accompanied the
birth of experimental science. Galileo denied the objective reality of the sense qualities
because they vary in the different subjects, because they are not necessary for a
mathematical study of nature, and because we can conceive the corporeal substance
without qualities, but not without figure and movement88
. For Descartes, the corporeal
substance is reduced to extension, any change is reduced to local movement, and the
only real properties of the bodies are the figures and the local movements which can all
be object of mathematical study89
.
Mechanism identified corporeal substance with extension. Consequently, nature
was reduced to the quantitative undifferentiated dimensions which had to do nothing
with the qualitative. This view led to the simple denial of qualities and their objectivity
which were reduced to alterations provoked in the knowing subject by a «qualitatively
neutral» nature. The mechanistic reduction provided the bases for the denial of any non-
quantitative dimension, and was presented as something supported by the mathematical
science of nature which, on the other hand, would be the only way to achieve an
authentic knowledge about nature.
On the contrary, we say that the reduction of the corporeal substance to
extension does not match either our experience or the progress of science. It is clear that
it does not match our experience since we know natural entities through their sense
qualities. In science we are aware that what is material adopts, at all levels of its
organization, very specific configurations; therefore this does not match the
«undifferentiated» image presented to us by the mechanism which corresponds to a
fairly poorly developed stage of physico-mathematics.
These considerations show that there is a close relationship between the
quantitative and the qualitative. They are equivalent to saying that real extension
articulates around specific patterns, and that a «homogeneous» or «undifferentiated»
extension actually corresponds to an idealization.
88
CF. GALILEO GALILEI, Il saggiatore, in: Opere, Ed. Barbera, Firenze 1899-1909, Vol. VI, pp. 347-348. 89
Cf. R. DESCARTES, Los principios de la filosofia, 2nd
part, No. 64 (in: Oeuvres, published by Ch. Adam and P. Tannery,
Vrin, Paris 1996, tome VIII-1, pp. 78-79); Meditationes de prima philosophia, med. 3, nn. 45-46 (ibid., vol. VII, pp. 43-44).
17.3. Characteristics of the extended entity
We shall now consider four characteristics related to extension: continuity, divisibility,
measurability and individuation.
a) Continuity
In studying the meaning of quantity90
, Aristotle says that what is quantitative is
divisible in integrating parts. One speaks of discrete quantity in relation to something
which is divisible into discontinuous parts; if it is finite, it is called number and, in this
case, one speaks of numerical quantity. One speaks of continuous quantity in relation to
something which is divisible into continuous parts; in this case one speaks of
dimensional quantity, because it refers to the extension of the bodies. The discrete
quantity originates the number, while the continuous quantity originates the line, the
surface, the volume, time and place; here we are in the presence of the so-called
magnitude which, in one dimension, is the longitude (line), in two dimensions, is the
latitude (surface) and in three dimensions, is the depth (body). In the case of the discrete
quantity, the parts are separated and they do not coincide in any common limit. In the
case of the continuous quantity, the parts coincide in a common limit: the parts of a line
coincide in a point, those of a surface in a line, the present time coincides in the past and
in the future.
In this perspective, extension refers to the continuous quantity. A substance has
unity, and everything which the substance is made of, constitutes a continuum.
However, the parts of a substance can be heterogeneous; think for instance of the
different tissues and organs of a living being. Nevertheless, this qualitative
heterogeneity present in the parts of a specific substance which form a substantial unity,
is not an obstacle for the case of a quantitative continuity since all the parts together
constitute the unitary way of being proper to the substance.
b) Divisibility
Since extension consists in having parts outside parts, it follows that anything
which is extended is also divisible. Actually, one cannot understand how it could be
possible to obtain non-extended parts by simple division, or how could there be a non-
extended material being.
We are obviously referring to divisibility «in principle». In practice, it is possible
to come across limits by which it becomes impossible to carry on with a dividing
process. Such practical limitations always exist although we may be able to obtain
smaller and smaller parts. It is also possible to come across some insuperable limits to
90
ARISTOTLE, Categoriae, 6, 4 b 20 – 6 a 35; Metaphysica, V, 13, 1020 a 7-32.
physical divisibility; however, not even in this case one could claim the case for an
absolute indivisibility. What is material is extended and, as such, is always divisible in
principle even if in the case in which, due to physical conditions, it is not possible to
continue with the process of division.
A classical objection to the above is the following: if what is extended can be
indefinitely divided, this would mean, then, that it is made of an infinite number of parts
each of which would also have infinite extension. The statement, however, entails
contradiction. This apparent paradox is usually presented as the divisibility of the
continuum. The answer to it is also classical and consists in distinguishing «potential
divisibility» which can always go on indefinitely, and «actual division» which would
always provide a finite number of parts. We shall never reach parts which, in principle,
are indivisible so that it will always be possible to keep on dividing without ever
obtaining, at any moment, an infinite number of parts in act.
c) Measurability
What is quantitative is also extended, it has parts and, consequently, it can be
divided and also measured. Divisibility implies measurability.
Before measuring anything a unit of measure has to be established which is
taken as standard. After this, one needs to check how many times this unit is contained
in that which one wants to measure. This can always be done in principle when things to
be measured are extended.
The problem arises when one wants to measure something which, as such, is
neither quantitative nor extended. This is the case of the spiritual realities but also of
material qualities. Nevertheless, insofar as the spiritual and the qualitative can be related
to the material, they can become object of indirect measurements: what is properly
measured is the quantitative; however this measurement can provide information,
although indirectly, about those qualitative aspects associated with the quantitative.
Actually, what gave a boost to the systematic birth of the experimental sciences
in the 17th
century was also the progress in the indirect measurement of qualities during
many centuries.
d) Individuation
Any quantified reality is also automatically individuated because is extended,
and has individual parts one outside the other: this aspect is related to quantity.
The individuation of material entities depends on materiality and quantity. With
a classical expression it can be said that the principle of individuation of material entities
is matter marked by quantity (materia quantitate signata). This means that even
supposing, in a hypothetical way, that two material entities have a completely identical
way of being, they will nevertheless be different because this way of being is present in
two numerically different individuals: each of them has its own individual space-time
conditions, its own quantity.
18. PLURALITY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD
We have already mentioned the Aristotelian distinction between discrete and
continuous quantity; the latter coincides with the dimensional quantity and refers to the
extension of the bodies which has been the main object of our reflections in the previous
section. Let us now examine the discrete quantity which we speak of in relation to
something divisible into discontinuous parts which originates the number and the
numerical quantity if this something is finite.
18.1. Unity and multiplicity
We refer to numerical or discrete quantity (here «discrete» means «separated»)
whenever we use numbers to indicate material units: for instance, when we speak of two
trees or three atoms, etc.
«Plurality» is opposed to «unity», because numerical plurality refers to a specific
number of beings and not to one. Certainly each one of these beings has a specific unity;
actually, if we can speak of two trees, this is so because both are individuals, because
each one of them is «one» three. No plurality of beings could exist unless each of the
individuals of that plurality had its own unity.
In the previous reflection we have used the term «unity» with two distinct,
though related, meanings which are usually called transcendental and predicamental
unity.
Transcendental unity refers to the unitary character of a being, to its internal
unity by which it is precisely «one» being; it is called so in metaphysics because it is
attributed to any being which really is «one» being whether material or spiritual. It is
«transcendental» since it is a concept that applies to any being and transcends the
distinction among beings. For this reason it is an object proper to metaphysics where it
is studied as one of the transcendental properties of being.
Predicamental unity is the dimensional unity which the material beings, the
substance and the unitary systems have. Each substance has its own extension which is
the predicate «quantity»; a substance has an extension which is separated from the
extension of other substances.
As it is evident, both meanings are related to each other. Aquinas, while
commenting on Aristotle, points out that the notion of unity is analogical since it is said
with partially identical and partially different meanings. Transcendental unity is
applicable to all unitary beings (and therefore also to the spiritual beings), while
predicamental unity is the principle of number in the material and quantitative field.
18.2. The number
The number is the measure of the discrete quantity (the Greek word for
«number» is «métron» which means «measure»). In order to measure a unit of
measurement is needed together with a multiplicity to which the unit is to be applied: a
number expresses how many times this unit is contained in the multiplicity which is to
be measured.
It is appropriate to ask whether the number can be used also to measure the
continuous quantity, i.e. the extension. It may seem appropriate to say ‘yes’; actually,
don’t we measure the length of lines? or the area of surfaces? or the magnitude of
volumes?
The fact is that in this case we reduce the continuous quantity to a discrete
quantity in order to measure it: we divide it into real or imaginary parts applying to them
a numerical procedure. It is because of this that the measure of the continuous is never
precise. On the contrary, when we measure a discrete quantity we just count beings
numerically different, and these can be counted exactly.
The number of things which are being counted is usually called numbered
number, while the abstract number which is used to count or to number is called
numbering number. Numbers are abstract because they do not refer to any concrete
entity; they are a procedure to count entities and maybe to measure continuous
quantities.
There are different types of numbering. The most basic one is that of the natural
numbers which are obtained by abstraction of the quantities of a group: for instance,
from the existence of three or five sheep the numbers «three» and «five» are obtained
which are used to count any type of being. Natural numbers constitute the basis for more
abstract mathematical abstractions.
Actually, mathematical constructions related to numbers have been expanded.
From the numbers more directly related to experience, such as digits and positive
fractions which refer to the number of things which exist (two, three, five) or to their
fractions, the number zero has appeared together with the negative numbers, the
irrational numbers (which cannot be expressed as digits or fractions of digits), the
complex numbers (which include a real part and an imaginary part, or «i» which is the
square root of minus one) and other types of numbers whose definition and use are
objects of mathematics.
18.3. The quantitative infinite
One of the problems related to quantity that pops up is that of the infinite. What
we find in our ordinary experience are finite quantities; however, nothing prevents us
from thinking a limitless type of quantity in the area of the continuous as well as in the
one of the discrete quantity.
Infinite can be conceived as actual or as potential. The actual infinite refers to an
infinite quantity which exists in act. The potential infinite refers to an indefinite
quantitative succession in which each of its parts is finite but with the possibility of
going on with the succession indefinitely.
There is no doubt hat there is a potential infinite: this is shown by the divisibility
of the continuous quantity. As we have already seen, in dividing an extended body we
shall always obtain extended parts and this operation can be repeated, in principle,
indefinitely, since anything which is extended can be further divided (we leave aside the
issue of the physical possibility of carrying out such divisions). This does not mean that
extended bodies have an infinite number of parts; they can be divided indefinitely but
we shall always obtain a finite number of parts.
The existence of the actual infinite has been an object of discussion from ancient
times especially in relation to extension and duration of the universe. The ancient
worldview used to represent the universe as finite; it was also thought that the fact of
having limits was a quality of the perfect physical realities. Modern experimental
science has introduced a worldview which presents the universe as infinite in extension.
Presently, the relativity theory proposes the image of a finite universe although
unlimited in extension. The scientific cosmology is also in favour of a universe which
was formed in an initial instant; however, there are discussions about the possibility of a
universe with limited duration although without boundaries in time. Truly there are
many attempts being made at completing the image of «our» universe with the possible
existence of «other» universes and in this way the problem of finiteness or infinitude
reappears time and again whether it is related to space or to time.
Such problems present great difficulties which perhaps the human mind is
unable to tackle. However, what is most important from a philosophical perspective is
the fact that the quantitative finiteness or infinity of the universe is not very important
for establishing the ultimate foundation of the universe. Actually, even though the
universe were really infinite either in relation to space or to time, this would not change
the fact that it is not self-sufficient: self-sufficiency is not a matter of magnitude but of a
distinct order of perfection. This was clearly pointed out by Aquinas when he wrote:
“Had God created a corporeal being infinite in act which would then have infinite
dimensional quantity, it would still be a nature necessarily determined in its species and
therefore limited precisely because being a natural thing; consequently, it would not be
the same as God, whose being and essence are infinite in all senses”91
. For this reason
Aquinas always claimed that a universe which had an eternal duration would still be
created by God although, by Revelation, a Christian knows that the universe had a
beginning.
91
AQUINAS, Quodl., IX, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.
The infinite has an important place in mathematics where one finds a number of
theories which distinguish different types of infinity. However, when mathematics is
applied to physics, physicists have to recur to tricks in order to eliminate infinite
quantities when these appear in the results.
19. QUANTIFICATION IN SCIENCE
Experimental sciences lean in a special way on the quantitative dimensions of
nature: they make recourse to mathematics for the elaboration of their theories, and
make use of experiments which include measurements, in order to verify the validity of
the theories. We shall examine the main characteristics of this method and its validity.
19.1. Mathematics, experiments, measurement
In order to carry out a scientific experiment the system under investigation needs to be
isolated in such a way that it becomes possible to ignore any non-controlled interference
and so to observe what happens in well-controlled and repeatable conditions.
In most cases one of the most important aspects of the experiment is measuring.
In a typical experiment the intention is to determine how a variable of the system
changes when other variables change; for instance, to determine how temperature
changes when the values of pressure and volume change. Even in a simple situation, the
fact of observing something usually goes together with the determination of numerical
values, at least in those most developed branches of science.
Measuring requires the adoption of units, the establishment of rules to interpret
the results provided by the instruments and the planning of those instruments to be used
for measuring. All this demands the use of mathematics, and not in any way: it is
necessary to establish stipulations or conventions by which theoretical concepts and
rules used in practice may be formulated.
To be more specific, we are going to see what the physico-mathematical
magnitudes are and how they are used. To simplify it, we shall speak of physico-
mathematical magnitudes; however, the following reflections are valid for all those
magnitudes which are used in the experimental sciences. Therefore, they are valid not
only for physics, but also for chemistry, biology, etc.
19.2. The physico-mathematical magnitudes
A scientist asks questions to nature, but nature does not speak. It is therefore
necessary to set up a language for this purpose so that nature may answer with its own
language: with facts. The scientific language which allows us to dialogue with nature
leans on concepts which, together with their theoretical aspect, make reference to the
results of the experiments. These concepts are the so-called magnitudes.
Usually three great types of scientific concepts are distinguished: the
classificatory, the comparative and the quantitative. Through classificatory concepts,
such as cells, amino-acids, ions, potassium, etc., we divide systems and properties into
classes according to specific characteristics. Through comparative concepts we establish
an order; for instance by comparing masses with the aid of a scale we establish criteria
in order to determine when a system has a mass greater than another. By fixing scales
and units of measurement, we obtain quantitative and metric concepts, also called
magnitudes: these are defined in relation to mathematical theories and repeatable
experiments. For instance, in the case of mass one has to specify that this is a scalar and
additive magnitude (mathematical aspects), and has to specify the method of its
measurement (experimental aspect). In this way the concept of mass ceases to be an
intuitive concept and becomes a theoretical construction which can be used to define,
whenever possible, the above mentioned aspects. Concretely, we can not only speak of a
mass of the ordinary bodies, from which the intuitive concept of mass originated, but
also of a mass of ions and, in general, of the subatomic particles which are entities very
much removed from ordinary experience.
The sequence “classificatory-comparative-quantitative” does not mean that
classificatory concepts are just a first step towards the facilitation of the construction of
magnitudes. Actually, many classificatory concepts (such as the already mentioned
cells, amino-acids, etc.) are not taken from ordinary experience; they are constructed by
using the theoretical and experimental results of different disciplines, and are the
consequence of a type of work in which quantitative concepts come in. Consequently,
different definitions of potassium can be given in function of physical and chemical
properties which, in their turn, are defined in function of a knowledge which is in a
continuous state of progress. Some definitions look quite clear respect to a specific level
of problems, while at the level of basic investigation there are problems which are not
yet solved.
It is reasonable, at this stage, to ask a question: are the concepts of the
experimental sciences univocally defined in such a way that the different possible
definitions correspond ultimately to one which contains all of them? The answer
requires some detailed analysis. Actually, any discipline in its beginnings formulates
definitions which are not very precise: these become more accurate as the discipline
progresses and develops. A typical example which may illustrate this is the concept of
acid, one of the most important concepts in chemistry as well as in biology. Robert
Boyle was the first to give a definition in 1663 by making use of empirical data. Svante
Arrhenius, in 1884, proposed the first conceptual definition. J.N. Brönsted and T.M.
Lowry, in 1923, defined an acid as a molecule or an ion which can donate protons; this
concept includes the acids as defined by Arrhenius, but also cations and anions, and
characterises acids in terms of their behaviour in the chemical reactions. In that same
year, G.N. Lewis defined an acid as any substance which contains an ion, or a molecule
capable of accepting any couple of external electrons donated by a base; at the same
time, a base was defined as any substance which contains an ion, or a molecule, in
which there are a couple of external electrons which can establish a covalent bond with
another ion, or molecule. Lewis’ definition is the most general one; moreover, it
includes some acid-base processes which do not fit in the previous definitions. Each of
the above mentioned definitions is interesting from the point of view of the problems
which are intended to be resolved. This situation shows the fact that a number of
different definitions of the same term (acid, in this case) can co-exist. Different terms
could be used for each definition; however, this could create more inconveniences than
advantages for the scientific activity.
What is really important here is to understand that each concept has a meaning
which encompasses the notes which are attributed to it and a reference which indicates
what type of entities are represented in the concept. As it was shown in the concept of
acid, the same scientific term can have various meanings which coincide only partially,
and also a number of references which hardly coincide. This, though, is not a problem
for science, as long as the distinct meanings and references are delimited in an adequate
way, and as long as the way of applying each concept in the different situations is
established.
As the basic concepts of a discipline are being deeply investigated problems
become more acute owing to the fact that there are limits to the possibility of
formulating definitions at theoretical as well as experimental level. In order to define a
concept other concepts need to be used and so on and so forts until one should reach
first concepts which define themselves. These first concepts, one may say, could be
reached through experiments. Limits, though, exist also at this level since any
experiment requires certain assumptions. One then may have the impression of having
reached a road without exit so that it seems impossible to define basic scientific
concepts in a rigorous way and, therefore, also those which can be derived from them. Is
this really so?
This appears to be so from a purely logical perspective. If we try to establish the
experimental science on firm grounds, in which the simple fundamental concepts are
simple products of pure facts and of logical inferences, we actually face impassable
limits. The consequence of this is greatly important, i.e. the founding of the experimental
science necessarily entails agreements, conventions and stipulations. However, those
stipulations which are necessary for the establishment of scientific concepts are not
arbitrary.
The construction of scientific concepts requires interpretations; it does not come
as a simple result of applying formal logic to pure facts. Let us now examine in which
measure this fact affects the conclusions of the experimental sciences.
19.3. Achievements of the physico-mathematical method
We have already emphasised the fact that the construction of scientific
magnitudes requires a good dose of interpretation. Interpretation, though, does not mean
arbitrariness: the stipulations which are adopted, must lead to coherent theories and to
experimental results compatible with the data obtained from the experiment.
The necessity of making use of stipulations does not prevent the achievement of
highly rigorous demonstrations. If we limit ourselves to purely logical considerations we
could conclude that experimental science does not achieve certitude in knowledge;
actually, this slightly relativist interpretation is widely spread in the present-day
epistemology. However, it is possible to avoid this relativism if we understand that there
are criteria used by scientists, many times in an implicit way, and that these criteria
sufficiently guarantee the validity of the results obtained.
These criteria can be reduced, in the last analysis, to the following five ones
commonly used in scientific practice: the explanatory capacity, the predictive capacity,
the precision of explanations and predictions, the variety of independent proofs and the
mutual support among different theories. Though they do not guarantee the truthfulness
of the scientific constructions in all their aspects, yet it is very difficult for a false
construction to satisfy them. Their application leads to scientific constructions which
although approximate and perfectible nevertheless get progressively closer to truth.
In order to correctly interpret this approximation to truth it is necessary to keep
in mind that a scientific truth is always contextual and, therefore, partial. Actually,
although they correspond to reality our theories are not a simple copy of the reality: they
are expressed through concepts which are our own constructions. Consequently, in order
to assess the validity of a theory, it is necessary to take into account the conceptual
context in which it was formulated. Taking into account these precautions, we can state
that through experimental science we can achieve authentic truth, i.e. knowledge which
corresponds to reality.
It is not appropriate, though, to say that experimental sciences allow us know
only the quantitative aspects - and therefore accidental - of nature. There is no doubt that
they use quantitative methods whenever possible; however, we have already seen how
accidents lead us to the knowledge of substances. Actually, through quantitative
methods we have already come to know many aspects of the reality which, otherwise,
we would have never known, such as:
- the movement of the earth around the sun, a fact which implied a radical
change in the worldview and its philosophical implications;
- the nature of the stars which in ancient times were considered to belong to an
independent world identified many times with the divine one;
- the fundamental mechanisms of life which unfolds thanks to a genetic
programme. This has made it possible to dispel many misunderstandings
about similarities and differences between the living and the non living;
- the fundamental components of matter and the basic interactions;
- and many other aspects of nature which can hardly be considered as merely
accidental.
20. PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
Using the number and the dimensional quantity as starting points, arithmetic and
geometry are respectively constructed: it is here where we try to obtain new knowledge
through logical demonstrations. Other branches of mathematics have been developed
since ancient times and they continue being developed at present.
20.1. Interpretations of the nature and purpose of mathematics
The Pythagoreans in ancient Greece perceived that nature has important aspects which
can be represented mathematically; consequently, they attributed to the number and to
mathematics an essential role in the explanation of the reality. This was also the line
somehow followed by the Platonists, who considered mathematical objects as existing in
an ideal world which is participated by the sensible world. According to Aristotle,
mathematics is the abstract study of quantity which, though existing in the physical
world is nevertheless considered by the mind outside the sensible matter.
The pioneers of modern science in the 17th
century attributed a decisive
importance to mathematics. We have already seen how Descartes identified the material
substance with extension, and how this allowed him to justify the irreplaceable role of
geometry in the study of nature. Galileo claimed that nature is like a book written in a
mathematical language. After the consolidation of the experimental science in those
years mathematics kept developing, while at the same time new philosophical
interpretations were being proposed under the influence of rationalism and empiricism.
Rationalism reached the point, in some cases, of attributing to mathematics an a priori
character independent from any experience, while empiricism was stressing the
dependence of mathematics on experience.
In the second half of the 19th
century some important innovations led to
reconsidering the fundamental concepts of physics as well as of mathematics. In
physics, the conviction had found its way that Newton’s physics had a definitive
character and that further progress could only add new elements to an already built
construction. New approaches were soon to undermine these ideas and prepared the
ground for the relativity theory and quantum physics which, at the beginning of the 20th
century, caused a radical change in the way of assessing the physical theories. In
mathematics, the validity of the Euclidean geometry had been admitted since ancient
times and was considered to be the geometry proper to the real world. However, it was
shown that it was possible to construct non-Euclidean geometries logically consistent
and perfectly applicable to the new theories of physics.
This renewal of mathematics, together with the development of symbolic logic,
led to new ideas in the philosophy of mathematics in which not only philosophers but
also mathematicians take their stand. Logicism tried to reduce mathematics to merely
logical principles, and so identifying somehow mathematics with logic. Formalism
stressed the importance of axiomatization, in trying to establish self-founding principles
of mathematics without need of referring to any external intuitive principles. The
famous works of Kurt Gödel around 1931 showed the limits met with every time there is
an attempt of formulating mathematical systems in a totally self-sufficient way, even in
those cases related to simple branches of mathematics. Intuitionism rejected the
Platonism of the logicist: it denied the possibility for mathematical entities to have their
own ideal existence, and stressed the fact that they are the result of our mental
constructions. Because of this, they were also at loggerhead with the formalists:
ultimately, it seems that it would be necessary to turn to certain primitive intuitions.
The above mentioned schools of thought have produced others with blended
ideas and clarifications among their defenders. In general, it is now commonly accepted
that mathematics cannot be reduced to logic; it seems also incorrect to state that
mathematics consists of a set of merely conventional constructions.
There is no doubt that mathematics is man’s construction. Some of its most
elementary notions are closely related to experience such as the positive digits and
fractions. However, insofar as we introduce an abstract mathematical notation and go on
to define operations which are not immediately related to experience, we create a world
which has its own consistency. Actually, once we have defined a specific mathematical
system we can discover many properties and conclusions which appear as they were
expected to be discovered, because they are the consequence of the system we have
constructed. It happens sometimes that conclusions are discovered whose validity is
very clear and yet do not seem to have a known basis: there is no doubt that
mathematical systems have somehow their own life.
20.2. Mathematical constructions and reality
The fact that mathematics has its own life makes it a very interesting subject. Since
ancient times until our own days mathematics was cultivated without looking in it for
something alien to its proper objectives. However, mathematics is applied with success
to the study of nature, and this confers to it a supplementary kind of value.
If we think of mathematical operations which are reduced to more or less intuitive
calculations, one can easily realize how these operations can be applied to the resolution
of practical problems. However, a certain aura of mystery seems to surround the use of
abstract mathematical theories in order to solve problems which are also quite
sophisticated. Can one say that there is isomorphism between mathematics and nature?
Nowadays it does not seem necessary to state, as Galileo did, that nature is like a book
written in a mathematical language, and that it is necessary to use this language in order
to penetrate its secrets. Actually, mathematics has acquired a greater scope since
Galileo’s times; many theories which are hardly intuitive are applied successfully to the
study of nature and it is not possible to establish a clear correspondence between them
and the reality.
It is certain that mathematics is an extraordinarily effective instrument for the study of
nature; however, to explain this success it is not necessary to claim the existence of an
isomorphism between mathematics and nature. The explanation is much simpler.
Mathematics is a powerful instrument to define magnitudes whose values can be
measured experimentally, to relate magnitudes among themselves, and to carry out
logical operations which can relate enunciations to one another. Once we have at our
service mathematical theories which allow us to do all this, the applicability of
mathematics to reality stops being a mystery.
What is really mysterious in the use of mathematics in science is the fact that, at times,
the physico-mathematical theories lead to predictions of effects whose existence would
have never been foreseen in any way, and which are nevertheless a logical consequence
of the theory that can be very easily verified. These types of forecasts are usually
considered, and with reason, one of the most powerful arguments in favour of the
validity of the theory.
When mathematics is applied to science, those aspects which are important for the
mathematician are usually left out since they would be a hindrance for those who work
in the experimental science. Frequently, pure mathematics is quite complex to be
applied as such to real problems and therefore needs to be simplified. A special ability is
required to be able to apply mathematical concepts to empirical problems; part of this
ability consists in simplifying mathematics so that, by preserving its scientific rigor, it
can be handled as a useful instrument.
This is a well know situation. For instance, in the second half of the 19th
century, John
William Strutt (Lord Rayleigh) excelled in his mathematical treatise on problems related
to dynamics, acoustics, optics and electricity. He got a degree in mathematics which he
considered only as an auxiliary tool to set the problems from a physical point of view,
and he explained this aspect in the following way: "While carrying on with
mathematical investigations I used to make use of the methods which are naturally
offered to a physicist. The mathematician will complain, and at times (one has to
acknowledge it) rightly so, because of lack of rigor. However, this issue has two sides:
although it maybe important to preserve a uniformly high level of pure mathematics, the
physicist may find it convenient sometimes to be satisfied with arguments which are
well satisfactory and conclusive from his point of view. To his mentality trained in a
different order of ideas, the more rigorous proceeding of a pure mathematician may
appear not more but less demonstrative”92
. R.B. Lindsay commented in this respect that
the mathematical education which Lord Rayleigh received in Cambridge “was not, in a
pure sense, rigorous mathematics, but a vigorous one”93
.
The recourse to mathematics as such has often the form of a very important strategy. For
instance, in fundamental physics which investigates the basic structure of matter,
symmetries are very important; these, at the same time, refer to physical phenomena and
receive a mathematical treatment full of subtleties in which a prominent place is
occupied by the gauge, or capacity, theories. In this way, an important role is played by
the invariances preserved in passing from a global symmetry to a local one by
introducing new fields: this mathematical operation can be physically interpreted. Such
92
Lord RAYLEIGH, The Theory of Sound, Dover, New York 1945, preface. The quotation is found in: John N. HOWARD,
“Principale contributions cientificas de John William Strutt, third baron of Rayleigh”, in: Rutherford ARIS, Howard T.
DAVIS and Roger H. STUEWER (publishers), Resortes de la creatividad cientifica: ensayo sobre fundadores de la ciencia
moderna, Fondo de cultura económica, Mexico 1989, p. 154. 93
Ibid. The phrase is taken from the introduction of Lindsay to the work of Rayleigh, quoted in the previous note. The
humorous character of this appreciation is emphasized, owing to the similarity between rigorous and vigorous.
strategies imply the adoption of a whole set of stipulations, but at the same time appear
to be very fertile. Something similar happens with the re-normalization which is a
procedure used in order to eliminate infinite quantities that appear in certain field
theories. The use of this procedure in the 40's’ made it possible to adjust the theoretical
values of certain magnitudes, such as the magnetic moment of the electron, to the
observed values with a level of precision never achieved in the history of physics.
If on the one hand such strategies appear to pose limits to objectivity because of the
conventional aspects they entail, on the other hand permit to study phenomena which are
very far from ordinary experience through inter-subjective procedures. What appears at
a first glance to limit objectivity is, in another sense, its guarantee. In other words, it is
precisely because of the use of theoretical constructions of high level, with all that is
conventionally implied in it, that it is possible to formulate theories with a high degree
of inter-subjectivity. When mathematics is applied to physical problems, some of the
mathematical rigor can be lost, yet this is not an obstacle to inter-subjectivity and to
achieving truth.
Although mathematics is not a simple translation of the reality it is nevertheless a
powerful instrument to study anything which can be related to the quantitative aspects
and, as such, is an essential part of the experimental sciences.
VII. SPACE AND TIME
We have proposed a characterization of the natural in terms of its own mutually
intertwined dynamism and space-time structuring. We shall now continue with our
consideration of the quantitative dimensions by examining other dimensions which are
related to space and others which are related to time. We shall finally consider the close
relationship existing between space and time.
21. LOCALIZATION AND SPACE
The two basic space characteristics are extension which refers to the internal
aspect of the natural entities, and localization which refers to the relationship of natural
entities among themselves. We have already studied extension and the characteristics
related to it. We shall now examine localization and also the concept of space which is
an abstract concept closely related to extension and localization.
21.1 Local presence
Localization, or allocation of a «place», involves always relation of bodies with
other bodies since «where» a body is depends on its relations with the surrounding
bodies. Nor is this localization always easy in ordinary experience; actually, we learn
how to localise bodies through a variety experiences which have a very limited value.
For example, we easily make important mistakes when we try to localise far distant
objects. Science provides procedures to establish reliable localisations in many cases in
which it is difficult, if not impossible, to do so through ordinary knowledge.
Localisation however refers always to some frame of reference. It seems logical,
therefore, to state – as it has always been traditionally done - that the accident «where»
(in Latin ubi, from which the Spanish «ubicación», or the Italian «ubicazione» for
English «localisation») is an extrinsic accident.
a) Aristotelian notion of localisation
Aristotle claimed in his worldview, according to which the earth stood still in the centre
of the universe, that the four elements (fire, air, water and earth) tend towards their
«natural places» by their own very nature. The natural region of fire is the superior part
of the sub-lunar world which borders with the stars; that of the air is the intermediate
region between the previous one and the earth; that of the water is on the surface of the
earth; that of the element «earth» is found in the centre of the earth. Each element tends
to move towards its natural place and the sub-lunar bodies, made of the four elements,
move towards one or the other places according to their composition. On the other hand,
it was commonly thought that the celestial bodies were made of a matter different from
the four elements (the so-called «quintessence»), and that they had a greater perfection
since they participated somehow in the divine. It was thought that they could not be
generated, were incorruptible and would move perpetually in a circular manner within
their own spheres; these were concentric, with the earth in the centre so that the last
sphere would be the one containing the «fixed stars». Although stars move at a great
speed, they are so far away from the earth that changes in their relative position can be
perceived only after centuries: that is why they seem to be always in the same position
on a sphere which rotates around the earth. In reality, this appearance is due to the
rotation of the earth around itself every 24 hours.
This worldview has been very influential for two thousand years; it was heavily
criticised and made obsolete by the new science of the 17th
century. From then on, the
concept of «natural place», and of «place» in general, lost philosophical interest. In
science, of course, it is very important to determine the localization of bodies; however,
it is a problem which has to be tackled with conceptual and experimental instruments
which are proper to science. What is important from the point of view of science is not
to establish an «absolute» localization but one in relation to systems of reference.
Nevertheless, the Aristotelian idea of localization corresponds to ordinary
experience and expresses a real characteristic of the natural entities. Actually, to find
oneself in a specific place is something accidental, nevertheless real. It is not the same
thing to be in one place or in another one. Even from a purely practical point of view,
localization can have very important consequences.
It is not necessary to admit the Aristotelian worldview in order to perceive that
localization is something real and that Aristotle’s idea of «place» preserves its interest
even when we disregard his four elements and their natural places.
Aristotle defined place as the still surface of the body container immediately
contiguous to the localized body94
. This concept preserves its validity, as long as one
takes into account that this definition does not presume to be in line with the scientific
ones, and that the stillness mentioned here is always a relative one. It is an idea very
close to ordinary experience. And so, a fish in water is said to remain in the same place
if it does not move, although the water which surrounds it actually moves. It is obvious
that some point of reference is always assumed for instance a rock, or the coast and the
sea bottom in the case of the fish. Therefore, the stillness of the surrounding surface is
not absolute. Without doubt, the Aristotelian definition would have great importance if
the Aristotelian worldview were true; since it is not, its importance is minor. However,
in the measure in which «localization» is real, the concept of «place» also has a certain
reality.
b) Localization as an accidental way of being
When we attribute a localization to bodies we refer to something real although
accidental. We can say that the allocation of a place, i.e. of what is traditionally called
94
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Physica, IV, 4, 212 a 20.
«accident ubi» (or «where»), refers to a real, accidental and extrinsic way of being
which consists in a real determination of a body in relation to the dimensions of other
bodies.
It is something real because localization presupposes the fact that a body is in
contact with the dimensions of other bodies. If one accepts the fact that the change of
place, local movement or displacement is something real, one has to accept also the fact
that localization is a reality without which it would be senseless to speak of change of
place.
It is an accidental way of being because it does not affect the essential way of
being of a substance. Of course, the fact of occupying a certain place can have important
consequences and can also be the cause of a substantial change; however, this can occur
in particular circumstances.
Besides being real and accidental, «ubi» is an extrinsic way of being, because it
is predicated of a body in relation to other bodies. What is extrinsic to a substance is the
fact of having dimensions. The fact that these dimensions are in contact with the
concrete dimensions of other bodies is something extrinsic which does not affect, by
itself, the internal constitution of a substance.
Anyhow, localization in general is a way of being proper to all material
substances. The natural exists in material conditions and one of them, and a very
important one, is the circumscribed presence in a place. By its own very nature the
natural occupies some place.
Localization is closely related to quantity and somehow can be considered as a
consequence of the latter. Nevertheless, since quantity is an intrinsic accident, it seems
more appropriate to consider localization as an accident distinct from quantity.
b) Ways of non-localized presence
Besides the circumscribed localization, i.e. the occupying of a place in relation to
the dimensions of other bodies, there are other ways of being present: some refer to the
material substances and are related to local presence; others refer to spiritual creatures
and to the presence of God in the created world. Although the study of the latter is
proper to metaphysics, we shall also mention them because their consideration helps us
obtain a more complete view of the issues we are studying95
.
In the first place, something can be present in some other thing as the
quantitative part in the whole of which it is a part: and so, the heart is contained in the
body of a man or of an animal. Obviously, this is the case of a circumscribed
localization which, moreover, refers to a superior unity that contains different parts
related among them. This is very important when one considers space-time structuring
proper to the natural. Actually, nature is organized around specific patterns, and this
95
AQUINAS treats this issue in his commentary to the Physica of Aristotle: cf. In Phys., IV, lecture 4.
implies the existence of equally specific relations among the positions which the
different parts occupy in the whole.
In a second place, something can be present in something else as an act in its
subject. For example, an accident can be said to be present in a substance in this way,
actualizing the latter in a real although not essential way. This type of presence is, by
itself, not local or circumscribed. It can also be said along this line that the substance is
in each of the parts of the body, while it is not localized in any of them concretely. In
speaking of the human soul, one can say that it is whole in the whole body and whole in
any of its parts. Therefore, it is senseless to look for a physical point in which body and
soul are united; this point, or place, does not exist since the soul, as the substantial form
of the body, informs the whole body and each one of its parts. This way of being present
is called, with a classical terminology, presence after the manner of the substance (per
modum substantiae) which indicates precisely that it is in this way that the substance is
present in all of its physical dimensions. Although it is not a kind of circumscribed
presence, it is said to be accidentally circumscribed, because it refers to a localized
body. It is therefore possible to say that the soul is present in the dimensions by which a
body is circumscribed, and that it «moves» when the body moves.
These ideas are applicable in the field of theology when the real presence of
Christ is considered in the Eucharist. Christ is present in the Eucharist with his divinity
as well as with his humanity and, therefore, with his extensive quantity. However, this
presence is not localized in a circumscribed manner: in a miraculous way the
dimensions of Christ’s body do not establish contact with the dimensions of the
surrounding bodies, and the presence of Christ is realized, in this case, after the manner
of the substance. This allows us to understand somehow how Christ can be present in a
real way, but not in a circumscribed way, in many different places under the sacramental
species, and that he is present in each part of the sacramental species when these are
divided.
In a third place, something can be present as an individual which forms part of
an orderly whole. In the case of material substances, this type of presence is closely
related to the first case already considered, and to the existence of structures and space-
related patterns. However, here we consider complete individuals and not only parts of
them; moreover, this type of presence can be applied to spiritual substances.
In a fourth place, something can be present in all that falls under its power. It
can be said that someone with authority is present somehow in that which falls under his
authority. For instance, the legislative authority is present in all that is regulated by the
laws which it enacts in the measure in which these laws make possible, or promote, the
existence of specific situations. Since the whole creation depends on God, author of the
being of all that exists, God is present in the whole of creation. This presence includes
the founding action by which God gives being to everything, as well as the providence,
or care, of all the beings in accordance with his plan.
In a fifth place, there is a presence based on causality by which the cause is
present in the effect it produces, and the effect is present somehow in its causes. And so,
the artist is present in his works of art, what is known is present in the knower, the
beloved is present in the lover and the other way around. Along this line, God is present
in the whole creation as its First Cause, i.e. as the author of being; it is the most intimate
type of presence since it extends to the whole being of all entities as cause of the same
being. For this reason, and taking into account the fact that the being of God is distinct
from the being of entities, it can be said that God is more intimate to each thing than the
latter is to itself.
Therefore, it can also be said that creatures are present in God, and the spiritual
ones in a very special way because of their close relation to God. Along this line, some
authors of our times defend a panentheism which does not have anything to do with
pantheism. Panentheism, as its name expresses it, (pan-en-theism) means that
everything is present in God. This is true and coincides with what St Paul stressed in his
discourse in Athens, provided the distinction between God and creatures is kept. On the
other hand, pantheism (pan-theism) means that somehow everything is God, or part of
God, or manifestation of the same God, and this is false and impossible. However, some
forms of pantheism do not seem to respect sufficiently the distinction between God and
creatures when, in order to explain the action of God in the world, present us with an
image of God which is confused. They speak for instance of a «bio-polar god» who,
without ceasing to be God, would be subject to change, suffering, etc. This type of
reasoning is found in some versions of the «process philosophy» and «process
theology».
In a sixth place, something is in the presence of someone when it is in his sight
or, in general, under his knowledge. Things or persons can be present to us in a specific
moment insofar as they fall under our knowledge. Even in this sense, used in ordinary
life, every created being falls under the knowledge of God, since He knows everything
perfectly well as the first cause of their being. We can also have this kind of presence of
God when we know we are seen, heard and lovely attended by Him96
.
d) The non-locality of contemporary physics
Presently, problems related to localization have reached their heyday because of
their connection with physics. Discussions about «locality» and «non-locality» in
quantum physics have scientific as well as philosophical repercussions: they are related
to the possibility of physical actions which propagate at a speed much faster than the
speed of light, and to the interpretation of quantum physics97
. The problem is to know,
in few words, up to which point and in what way events are connected which are
96
AQUINAS speaks, in this respect, of the omnipresence of the Creator in the universe by essence, by power and by
presence: cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 8, aa. 1, 3 and 4. 97
This is a very difficult and very discussed problem, on which there is no unanimous agreement among scientists. There is
an ample bibliography, and one can read for instance: M. REDHEAD, Incompleteness, Nonlocality, and Realism, Oxford
University Press, Oxford 1987. Important repercussions, scientific as well as philosophical, are attributed to this problem in:
A. SUÁREZ, “Unentscheidbarkeit, Unbestimmtheit, Nicht-Lokalität. Gibt es unverfügbare Kausalverbindungen in der
physikalischen Wirklichkeit?”, in: H. REICHEL –E. PRAT (publishers), Naturwissenschaft und Weltbild. Mathematik und
Quantenphysik in unserem Denk- un Wertesystem, Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien 1992, pp. 223-264.
apparently independent from one another. Some experiments seem to indicate that, in
some cases, there are correlations which do not correspond to intuitive ideas98
.
Although it is admitted that physics adopts a perspective different from
metaphysics and natural theology, some interpret the present-day results which refer to
the non-locality in quantum physics, as a bridge which could also shed new light on the
divine action in the world99
.
From a philosophical point of view, these are topics of debate. In any case, the
existence of such correlations seems to suggest new perspectives on the unity of nature
and on the structural connections among its components. Therefore, once again we come
across facts which are the opposite of an analytical mechanistic image.
21.2 Space
From the notion of extension of the bodies and of distance among them, we
construct a general notion of space which has been an object of several interpretations in
science as well as in philosophy. Let us consider first some interpretations of space
which have had great importance. We shall then determine what kind of reality
corresponds to space, and we shall finally examine the nature and meaning of the
mathematical spaces.
a) The notion of space
In the ancient worldview, where the universe was represented as a «locked» set
of beings
with some kind of fixed limits, the concept of space had little importance. What were
really important were the «places» that bodies occupied or tended to. However, when
physico-mathematics firmly established itself in the 17th
century the situation was turned
around: the universe was represented as contained in the homogeneous and infinite
space of the Newtonian physics and the problem of natural places stopped being
relevant.
On Newton’s authority, and on the basis of an experiment which he considered
conclusive (although it was not), the fact was commonly accepted that there was an
«absolute» space, with its own existence independent from its content. Within this
98
The most quoted experiment in this sense is the one carried out by Alain Aspect and his team in Paris, in 1982. It is a
version of the ideal experiment proposed by Einstein in 1935, in relation to the first discussions on the quantum theory, and
known as EPR experiment because of the initials of the authors of the article where it was proposed in 1935. A short and
popularized introduction to this issue is found in M. ARTIGAS, El hombre a la luz de la ciencia, Palabra, Madrid 1992, (
chapter “El microcosmo y el hombre”), pp. 47-70. 99
Cf. Alfred DRIESSEN and Antoine SUÁREZ (publishers), Mathematical Undecidability, Quantum Nonlocality and the
Question of the Existence of God. Kluwer, Dordrecht 1997.
context, the problem was presented of the possibility of the existence of an «absolute
movement» respect to this fixed point of reference. Absolute space was also identified
somehow with the divine immensity which would be a kind of divine sense («sensorium
Dei») which would perform the function of a bridge between the world and God. This
was one of the famous topics discussed in the famous correspondence Leibniz-Clarke in
which Leibniz criticized Newtonian doctrines and Clarke defended them100
.
Owing to the enormous success of the Newtonian physics, the idea of absolute
space was generally admitted in science during more than two centuries, and had
important philosophical repercussions. For instance, it had great influence in the
formulation of Kant’s philosophy. Kant perceived correctly that the absolute space could
not possibly have its own existence. However, convinced of the definitive truth of
Newton’s physics, Kant maintained that this space was one of the two «a priori» forms
of our sensitivity. According to this, our cognitive apparatus would be built in such a
way that the disorderly sensations captured by our senses would be integrated, in a
preliminary phase, by the two forms of space and time. Being «a priori» meant that their
validity did not derive from experience. Because of the influence of Kant, space was
thought to be a basic condition for our knowledge.
Towards the end of 19th
and beginning of 20th
century, serious doubts were
raised in the scientific circles about the absolute character of space (and time). The
experiment of Michelson-Morley, and the later formulation of the special relativity
theory by Albert Einstein in 1905, showed that the concept of absolute space was
inadequate. One of the consequences of the special relativity is that distances do not
have the same value when they are measured by observers who are in different systems
of reference. Moreover the concepts of space and time in relativity fuse somehow in a
space-time continuum. This new scientific situation provoked the rising of new
approaches which flowed also into the field of philosophy.
The situation got complicated once again when, in 1915, Einstein formulated the
general relativity theory. Actually, the general relativity has been interpreted as a
«geometrization of physics», because it replaces physical forces with changes in the
space-time curvature. It would seem, then, that the concept of space would not only
recover a scientific leading role but would also become the basic weave of nature.
However, one can see how it could be also possible to speak (and perhaps more
appropriately) of «physicalization of the space». Actually, the equivalence between
space-time curvature and forces shows how the space-time we are talking about is a way
of representing physical interactions.
The present-day theories on the origin of the universe are based on the general
relativity, and try to combine them with quantum physics (that is why they are called
theories of the «quantum gravity»). According to some hypotheses, space and time
would lose their intuitive meaning in the first instants of the universe: some speak of a
kind of original state of «quantum vacuum» (which is not «nothingness» but a physical
state). In this state there would have been some «topological transitions» in which for
the first time space-time structures would have been formed. It is from these structures
100
The five letters from Leibniz and the corresponding answers from Clarke can be found in: Eloy RADA (publisher), La
polémica Leibniz-Clarke, Taurus, Madrid 1980.
that matter would have originated. Such theories are very hypothetical and speculative
and it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to determine the meaning of a space-time
structure without any kind of matter, and how it could be possible for matter to arise
from structures of this kind.
b) The reality of space
In the ordinary experience the notion of space is used to designate relations of distance
among bodies. In this sense we speak of space covered by a moving body, and of space
which separates two bodies. These relations of distance are real. Bodies have extension
and therefore there are real distances among their parts and among different bodies.
If we consider the dimensions abstracting from the bodies we obtain purely
dimensional relations such as those which refer to lengths, surfaces and volumes, such
as for instance the distance between two points as a straight line, the volume of a body,
etc. These relations of distance are real; however, when considered in an abstract way,
disregarding the concrete matter, we obtain a notion of space which, although based on
reality, is an ideal concept with no direct correspondence to any natural entity.
Therefore, the concept of space arises from a broadening of the concepts of
extension and distance and properly speaking is an idealization; what exists in reality
are bodies with extension and interactions which extend up to certain distances. Through
the concept of space a kind of «container» is represented where these realities are found.
However, were this container to be a physical reality, it would also consist of bodies and
interactions, and therefore it would not be a container distinct from the latter. Hence,
space is not a physical reality independent from bodies and interactions; it is and
«ideal» entity, a «relation of reason» which exists only in our mind, though there is a
foundation in reality which allows us to construct such a concept. The foundation of the
concept of space is the real extension of the bodies and the relations of distance.
The so-called absolute space, independent from its physical content, would be a
kind of empty receptacle used to localize the bodies contained in it. This is the kind of
space presented by Newton: an empty, homogeneous and infinite space, place of the
whole corporeal universe and of each of its components. However, this kind of space
does not exist in reality; it is the result of a mental process which first abstracts the
dimensions and considers them without relation to the concrete material entities; then
constructs a notion in which these dimensions are considered as indefinitely extended.
Physics does not need this kind of space; it is sufficient for physics to define systems of
specific co-ordinates and use them as systems of reference. Moreover, there is no proof
whatsoever that can make us state its existence. From a philosophical point of view, this
space cannot be a substance since it is the container of all substances. It cannot be an
accident either; actually, space is conceived as independent from anything material. One
cannot say what kind of reality it is.
A space conceived as an a priori form of our knowledge – as Kant proposed it –
is also inexistent. Actually, space is not a notion independent from experience. It is, as
we have already indicated, a relation of reason with foundation in reality, i.e. the real
extension of the bodies and the relations of distance. Kant identified the content of the
notion of space with the space of the Euclidean geometry, endowed with the properties
attributed to it by Newton’s physics (of whose definitive truth he was convinced). The
further development of mathematics with non-Euclidean spaces, and of physics, where
these spaces have been applied, shows that Kant’s concept of space is not really a part,
or a consequence, or a demand of science.
The present-day speculations about space and time in the first instants of the
universe are, as we have already indicated, highly hypothetical. In any case, it seems
possible to make three observations. On the one hand, space, as well as time, depends on
the physical reality, it accompanies it as one of its aspects. Therefore, if the material
conditions at the beginning of the universe had been very different from the present
ones, this should have been reflected and observed in the space and time relations which
would have been different from those of our ordinary experience in our present-day
circumstances. However, and on the other hand, it does not make any sense to claim – as
it is done in some occasions – that in those conditions there could have been processes
such as time inversion (trips to the past or temporal anteriority of events known as
posterior). Finally, it does not make any sense to postulate the existence, at the
beginning, of a space-time without matter which would have come about from
nothingness as a result of a quantum process. Actually, apart from the lack of sense
implied in a creation without a Creator, it does not seem possible to attribute a character
of reality to a space-time without matter.
Space cannot be identified with a kind of ontological vacuum which, in
principle, would be nothing and could not exist as something real. The term «vacuum»
is used in experimental sciences to indicate a state in which there are hardly any
detectable properties. However, this does not exclude the existence of any material
property; on the contrary, the vacuum of science is defined in accordance with specific
properties; the term also includes different types of vacuum such as the «classic
vacuum» and the «quantum vacuum» which are studied with physical theories. The
existence of an empty space, in which there is absolutely nothing, does not make any
sense.
In conclusion, space is not a real entity: it is an entity of reason with foundation
in reality (the relations of distance which are found in reality) and does not have its own
reality.
c) The notion of space in science
Traditionally, that branch of mathematics which deals with space relations is called
«geometry». Geometrical entities, such as lines, surfaces and volumes, offer a wide
spectrum of relations which are studied in geometry. The Euclidean geometry,
rigorously formulated since ancient times, seems to describe in a special way the real
relations among the geometrical figures which exist in the physical world.
However, we have already mentioned the construction of non-Euclidean geometries
which took place in the 19th
century as an attempt to see what would happen if the fifth
postulate of the Euclidean geometry was denied. This postulate states that through a
point outside a straight line another, and only one, straight line can be drawn parallel to
the given line. It was proved that, by disregarding this postulate, different geometries
could be obtained as consistent as the Euclidean one. If for instance an infinite number
of parallel straight lines, or no straight line at all, are drawn through that point different
geometries are obtained in which the sum of the internal angles of a triangle becomes
less or more than 180o respectively.
Although these results appear to be anti-intuitive at first, it is easy to understand how
they can be fully coherent. It is sufficient to think of a curved type of geometry, for
example, a geometry in which the figures are found on the surface of a sphere. In this
case the shortest distance between two points is not a straight line but a specific curve,
and the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is greater than 180o.
This example makes us understand how it is not only possible to construct different
geometries, but also how these can incorporate, in different ways, properties of the real
world. For instance, a curved type of geometry, such as the one already mentioned, is
the geometry we need to apply on earth when we calculate long displacements along its
surface: the shortest trip from Paris to New York is not a straight line but a curved one,
and the triangles are also curved. This type of considerations became relevant when the
use of a non-Euclidean geometry in the relativity theory produced better results than the
ones obtainable with Euclidean geometry in classical physics. Moreover, it is easy to
perceive that in our ordinary experience we do not see objects as they are represented in
the Euclidean geometry, since our images depend on perspective and distances.
On the other hand, the concept of space has been generalized in mathematics in such a
way that it is applied also to constructions which do not refer to geometrical figures. For
instance, spaces of infinite dimensions are constructed, and quantum mechanics can be
formulated by using a kind of formalism which makes recourse to the «Hilbert’s space».
In these cases, the problem of establishing a correspondence between space and reality
does not even arise; such spaces are our constructions and usually very abstract ones
which, frequently, are good mathematical instruments for the study of those aspects of
nature which are very far from ordinary experience.
22. DURATION AND TIME
We have considered the space dimensions of the natural. Let us now examine the time
dimensions which also constitute an essential part of the way of being natural. Actually,
it is proper to natural entities to exist in time conditions: their being is not completely
realized in an instant, but successively.
Temporality is an accidental determination since a substance does not change its
essential way of being for the simple fact of being subjected to the passing of time.
However, it is a characteristic which deeply marks every natural entity and whose
analysis is indispensable in order to understand human life. In fact, our life is marked by
the combination of temporality which results from our belonging to nature, and
transcendence of the same temporality proper to the spiritual beings.
The two basic time-related characteristics are duration which refers to the
permanence in being of the entities as well as to the magnitude of the processes, and
temporal situation which expresses the time relations respect to some frame of
reference. We shall now consider these two characteristics together with the concept of
time which, like space in relation to extension and localization, is an abstract concept
constructed from the notions of duration and time relations.
22.1. Duration
Duration refers to temporal succession. The idea of temporal succession is based
on our immediate experience; it is a primary type of idea which cannot be explained by
having recourse to other more known ideas. The temporality of the material world,
including that of our own material being, appears immediately to our experience.
Our existence is not exhausted in one instant, it rather extends in a temporal
succession, and the same occurs with all natural entities. Duration is something real.
Moreover, duration refers to a temporal succession which has one direction only and is
determined: the present leaves behind the past which remains only in the memory and
through its consequences.
Experimental sciences find it useful to conceptualize time as a magnitude used
as a point of reference to construct other magnitudes. For example, velocity refers to a
distance covered within a certain time, and acceleration refers to the changes of velocity
in time. Many scientific enunciations express how other magnitudes change with the
passing of time. The experimental science was born in the 17th
century thanks, to a large
extent, to the fact of having found theoretical methods able to define velocities and
accelerations, and also thanks to the manufacturing of clocks able to measure time in a
reliable way. The great progress in the manufacturing of mechanical clocks from the
14th
century was one of the factors which made the further progress of science possible.
Experimental science has considered time as an «independent variable» from the
17th
to the 20th
century; time flows in a uniform manner without being affected by the
processes which unfold within it. Its direction is also indifferent: the equations of
classical physics are correct whether it is assumed that time flows from the past towards
the future or in the opposite direction. In this context, it is said that the processes
described by these equations are «reversible».
There is no doubt that such a perspective is legitimate and appears to be fruitful
when applying mathematics to the study of nature. However, real duration depends on
the physical conditions and has a direction which goes from the past to the future.
Scientific progress has highlighted the directionality of the real temporal succession,
showing that the reversibility of time is a theoretical artifice which does not reflect the
irreversibility of the real phenomena. This was already highlighted by the second
principle of thermodynamics and by the evolutionist theories of the 19th
century; it has
also been particularly emphasised in the 20th
century by scientific studies on the
irreversible processes.
In the field of philosophy, Bergson strongly emphasised the central role that real
duration plays in the representation and interpretation of nature. It is not necessary to
accept the whole philosophy of Bergson to see that he was right on this point. It is an
aspect which is acknowledged to be of great importance in the present-day worldview
and which, once again, shows the connection between the quantitative and the
qualitative. Actually, real duration cannot be reduced to a simple undifferentiated
quantitative succession; on the contrary, it presupposes physical activity, emerging of
new things, unrepeatable situations.
The intertwining between the temporal and the qualitative is shown in a typical
way in the existence of natural rhythms. Rhythms are temporal patterns, and are found
everywhere in nature, in a special way in living organisms: the processes which unfold
in the organisms depend essentially on rhythmic or periodical patterns. This means that
natural processes hinge around typical patterns. Once again, the scientific progress
shows the importance of the qualitative factors against the analytical perspective which
had reduced time to a mathematical, homogenous, undifferentiated and reversible
magnitude. However, through this perspective many particular pieces of knowledge
have been obtained. This has led, in the strictly scientific field, to a synthetic perspective
in which the qualitative characteristics of the real duration have been recovered.
22.2. Temporality, being and becoming
Temporality is a fundamental characteristic of the natural entities. Anything natural has
duration and it is found in association with processes. Let us now consider the
temporality proper to a natural being first in relation to the duration of other entities and
natural processes, and then in relation to the spiritual entities.
a) Temporal situation
One of the nine Aristotle’s accidents is quando (in English when) which refers to
the temporal situation. This category expresses the temporal way of being of the natural
entities, in relation to their being as well as to their operations. This accident makes
reference to the past, present and future. Everything which is said of the natural entities,
includes a temporal reference of this type.
Similarly to the ubi in the case of the space, quando is a relative determination
since it is possible to speak of it only respect to some reference. It is therefore an
extrinsic determination, since it does not express the proper way of being of the entities
to which it is applied. It is nevertheless a real characteristic because real are the
temporal relations which constitute its foundation.
The extrinsic and relative character of «quando», similarly to what happens with «ubi»,
is shown when considering the concrete temporal relations: we always place something
in time in relation to other processes or events. However, this fact does not diminish the
reality of the temporal situation; it simply shows that its concrete determination has to
be done in relation to what happens around.
If, moreover, we wish to measure a duration we need to define units of time and
determine how these units are used to carry out the measurement. Therefore, it is
necessary to introduce stipulations. However, the duration on which the measurement is
based, is something real, and the progress in the manufacturing of clocks and in
processes of measuring, make it possible to obtain extraordinarily accurate
measurements.
b) Levels of being and duration
In a strict sense, the accident «quando» is only found in the natural entities whose being
unfolds in a successive way through changes. However, in an analogical way it can be
applied to the created spiritual beings which also pass from potency to act according to
their peculiar way of being. On the other hand, it cannot be applied to God in any way
since He is Pure Act and does not have duration of any kind.
If we consider duration as permanence in being we can speak of degrees and ways of
duration which are correlative to the degrees and ways of possessing being.
The basic distinction is evidently in this respect that between God and the created
beings. God is his own Being and therefore is his own duration which is called eternity.
On the other hand, created beings are not their own being: they have a way of being
limited to a specific essence, and their potentialities unfold in a successive way. For this
reason they are always in potency under some aspects and different therefore from God
who possesses being totally and is the source of all being.
Eternity is proper to and exclusive of God and it is found at a level different from the
one of any created being. Even in supposing that there were a created being without
beginning or end not because of this it would be eternal. In having being in a limited and
not absolute way it would be always in potency respect to a possible change, and it
would have therefore duration according to a before and a afterwards. On the other
hand, eternity which is proper to God lacks any type of succession, since the total and
simultaneous Being is present in it without change or succession of any kind, in a sort of
«eternal present»
Ordinary language identifies «eternity» with the simple «indefinite duration»; however,
this identification easily leads to misunderstandings, since the eternity of God is then
thought of as being similar to the duration of creatures with the difference of simply
adding to it the indefinite character of such a duration. This way of thinking easily
forgets that God is Pure Act who not only possesses being but also is his own Being.
Hence, another misunderstanding is generated which affects the notion of creation when
it is claimed that the universe could have existed from always and that consequently it is
not necessary to admit a divine creation. At this point one confuses the essential
«dependence in being» of every creature respect to God with the beginning in time.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to admit God as permanent source of the whole being,
independently from the limited or unlimited duration of the created being. Aquinas
dedicated a whole brief treatise in which he keeps arguing that the temporal beginning
of the universe is something which we only know by divine revelation, and that nothing
would have prevented God, if He had wanted so, from creating the universe «from
always»101
.
When one identifies divine creation and origin of time, the tendency arises to identify
the proofs of the existence of God with the alleged proofs - that do not exist - of the
limited duration of the universe. One can easily conclude then, in an erroneous way, that
the existence of God cannot be proved. This confusion is found latent in many critics of
the proofs of the existence of God. Some ignore that this confusion had been already
denounced centuries ago: Aquinas warned the Christians in the 13th
century that, if they
intended to establish the limited duration of the universe as a basis for the proof of the
existence of God, they would become the laughing stock of the non-believers who know
that the limited duration of the universe cannot be proved, and who could think therefore
that the Christians accept the existence of God on the basis of insufficient reasons.
More confusion arises from the attempts of explaining how God can really «be
involved» in the becoming of creatures, as if the divine action on the world demanded
somehow that God changes as well. «Process philosophy» and «process theology» have
reacted against the excesses of the «deism» which reduces God to the role of provider of
the final explanation of the existence of the world and denies Him, at the same time, any
interest or intervention in the world once this is in existence. In trying to explain how
God is committed with his creation, these currents of thought claim that God, although
being eternal, must have a certain degree of mutability. If this were not so, they claim,
one could not understand how God is really involved in whatever happens in the world
and in the persons. In this context God is thought of as a «dipolar God» who would be at
the same time eternal and immutable. However, it does not make any sense to attribute
mutability to God who possesses being in a full manner. Though it is difficult to explain
the relationship between God and his creatures, it is necessary to respect, as a basis of
the explanation, the total perfection and transcendence of God; thinking otherwise
would introduce features which are incompatible with the divinity. Divine revelation
provides a new key to understand this relationship through Incarnation. However, the
mystery of the transcendence of God persists; it is in, in any case, a «logical» type of
mystery because one understands that God has to be necessarily eternal and has to be
completely transcendent to creation.
There are different degrees of being and acting among creatures and therefore different
degrees of duration. Spiritual beings participate in the eternity of God, since they are not
subjected to the mutability of what is material, and are naturally immortal. Once
created, they never lose their being. However, they are not eternal in a proper sense,
since they do not fully possess their being and experience those changes proper to the
spiritual operations (for instance, a certain succession of intellective acts). This special
type of duration is usually called eviternity by the theologians. The eviternity of the
angelic creatures is a type of intermediate duration between that of the material entities
and the divine eternity.
101
Cf. Josep I. SARANYANA, “Santo Tomás. «De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes»”, Anuario Filosófico, 9 (1976),
pp. 399-424, where one can find the text of this brief treatise with introduction and comments.
Material beings are subjected to temporal duration and to substantial changes.
Materiality precisely implies a radical potency by which any material substance can be
transformed into another one or others. Moreover, the duration of the material entities
implies the fact that it is realized successively through the actualization of potencies.
There are degrees of being and temporality within the field of material beings. Living
beings have an individuality and tendencies by which they have a history in a sense
higher than the one in non-living beings. Living beings realize their potentialities in a
successive way so that one can speak of development and perfecting process in this
context. Among living beings, those provided with knowledge have a higher level of
ontological density since they can preserve memory of the past and, in a way, foresee
the future and also anticipate it. Obviously, the human person is found at a new level of
temporality which includes at the same time the characteristics of the material and of
the spiritual. A human person participates, because of being material, in the
characteristics proper to the duration of the natural entities and, at the same time,
transcends them because of his spirituality. Being a person, man is able to discover the
radical meaning of what happens, has a moral responsibility which transcends the today
and now, formulates projects which also transcend the conditions of the present
moment, and is called to participate in the divine eternity proper to the spiritual beings.
Human temporality, whose study is a topic of anthropology, originates history in which
specifically human aspects find their place such as tradition and progress. The sense of
history is also a call to man’s responsibility, since man’s freedom implies the fact that
there are no necessary historical laws: man’s future is in his own hands and depends on
his moral responsibility. Human temporality is related to divine eternity because each
human person is called to participate in the divine life. Human temporality is found at
the border between time and eternity, and temporal realities acquire their full meaning
when contemplated in the light of the divine plan.
22.3. Time
From the temporal dimensions an abstract notion of «time»is constructed which is used
in ordinary life as well as in science and in philosophical considerations. We shall now
examine, as we did in the case of the notion of space, the notion of time in three
sections: the characterization of the notion of time, in what way this notion corresponds
to something real, and how time is used in the experimental sciences.
a) Notion of time
When we say that a certain length of time has gone by we always imply that the concept
of time refers to the measure of some movement, and this is true in ordinary experience
as well as in science. In ordinary life, a reference to a subjective feeling may be
sufficient to say that a certain duration «has been short or long». Frequently, though, it is
necessary to refer to objective measurements of time. This is always done in the
experimental science because only in this way it is possible to use an inter-subjective
concept of time.
In order to measure time it is necessary to choose a movement characterized by uniform
regularity; from this movement units are taken to which any other movement is going to
be referred. The division of time in years, days, etc., for instance, is based on the
rotational movement of the earth around itself, and around the sun, although presently
recourse is made to more regular and more precise procedures based on movements
related to atoms102
.
Aristotle defined time as the number of movement according to a before and an
afterwards («numerus motus secundum prius et posterius»)103
. This definition
emphasises the fact that time measures how long a movement lasts; therefore, as a
measure, time corresponds to something real (the duration of a movement) and, at the
same time, it implies the presence of a subject who carries out the measurement104
.
Movement possesses a certain quantity which flows, i.e. is continuous and successive: it
is not the dimensional quantity related to the extension but a plurality of successive
parts.
Insofar as it is a continuum, time shows analogies with space. As space is related to
extension so time is related to duration; extension, as well as duration, is something real
and continuous which can be divided indefinitely. It is always possible to identify
smaller parts in extension as well as in duration, and this does not imply that there are an
infinite number of parts in act.
Time can be said to be an accident of movement since it is its measurement in which
movement has successive quantity.
The history of the concepts of space and time largely coincide105
. In some sense, the
concept of time is analogous to that of space. And so, Newton defined an absolute time
which, the same as the absolute space, was independent from any material content. Kant
allocated to this absolute time, together with space, the function of a previous and
permanent condition for all sensible experience. The relativity theory assumed the
concepts of time and space to be relative. Presently, there is a notion of space-time
structures in circulation according to which these structures would have their own kind
of existence, independently from matter. We shall now examine what type of reality can
be attributed to the reality signified by the concept of time.
102
Presently there is a web of artifacts distributed all over the world: they are atomic clocks made of cesium which are
controlled through procedures involving radio signals, television and satellites. The data are received and analyzed by the
International Office of Weights and Measures of Sèvres, nears Paris, and from there the signals are transmitted which are
received and transmitted by the radios. 103
ARISTOTLE, Physica, IV, 11, 219 b 1-2. 104
Cf. J. CONILL, “¿Hay tiempo sin alma?”, Pensamiento, 35 (1979), pp. 195-222; El tiempo en la filosofía de Aristóteles.
Un estudio dedicado especialmente al análisis del tratado del tiempo (Physica, IV, 10-14), Facultad de Teologia San
Vicente Ferrer, Valencia 1981. 105
Cf. G.J. WHITROW, Time in History: Views of Time from Prehistory to the Present Day, Oxford University Press,
Oxford 1989.
b) The reality of time
Time is a general and abstract concept which presupposes a broadening of the concepts
of duration and temporal relation: it encompasses all the durations and all the temporal
relations. Abstract time has a certain character of totality since the mind relates to it all
the events, past, present and future.
In this context one can say that only the present exists; actually, the past does not
exist any more and the future does not exist yet. We can conceive past and future in our
mind; yet outside our mind only the present exists. It is evident that past events have
repercussions on the present ones, and present events have repercussions on the future
ones. However, what exists now, independently from any mental consideration, is the
present with some relations respect to the past and future events.
Taking into account the parallelism, partial though important, between the
concepts of space and time along history, we can apply some reflections, already made
in connection with the concept of space, to the concept of time with the appropriate
clarifications,.
Concretely, time does not correspond to a real entity: what is real is duration and
temporal relations, and time does not have an existence independent from them.
Therefore, the observations made regarding the concept of space in relation to Newton’s
physics, are valid also for the concept of time. Newton claimed that together with an
absolute space there is an «absolute time» independent from its content. We claim that
this absolute time cannot exist because, in order to define it, it would be necessary to
rely on a kind of movement also absolute, and this is really impossible.
On the other hand, time is not a condition (after Kant’s fashion) of our
knowledge because there is no such a thing as homogeneous time conceived as an empty
receptacle where events are placed. Kant stated that space and time are a priori
conditions of the sensible knowledge. Kant perceived that the absolute time of Newton
could not possibly exist in reality; however, being convinced of the truth of Newton's
physics, he transferred this absolute time, together with its properties, from the reality to
our knowledge. Time, in this view, would not depend on experience since it would be
one of the conditions of possibility of this experience. It is true that we always place our
experience within a time-framework; however, there is no reason to identify this time
with the properties that Newton and Kant attributed to it. There are reasons, on the other
hand, to think that our concept of time corresponds to real experiences and that this time
depends on the latter.
Nor does it seem possible to speak, as it is done in some present-day theories, of
a space-time independent from matter, as if this were an entity with own existence
which could have begun to exist when nothing material yet existed. Even in supposing
that a scientific theory along this line could be formulated, one should still admit the fact
that duration and temporal relations have a kind of reality which is not identified with
physico-mathematical models. This consideration leads us to examine how the concept
of time is used in the experimental sciences.
c) The use of time in the experimental science
As in the case of space, time is conceptualized in experimental science in
accordance with the general objective of this type science, i.e. achieving a knowledge of
nature which can be submitted to experimental control. Consequently, since the 17th
century time has been defined as a magnitude which can be an object of mathematical
treatment and can be measured in an empirical way.
Newton in his mechanics distinguished between «absolute» time which flows in
a uniform way independently from the material world, and «relative time» which refers
to specific processes. Owing to the great success that Newton’s mechanics had enjoyed
for many centuries, this distinction was preserved in physics until 1900, at the time
when it started facing a crisis. In 1905 it became obsolete because of Einstein’s special
relativity theory where time appears to be a magnitude whose measurement does not
always give the same value since it depends on the system of reference which is
adopted. Moreover, the relativity theory is interpreted in such a way that space and time
are not completely independent magnitudes any more; it is admitted, on the contrary,
that phenomena unfold in a space-time where the three space dimensions are united to
the time dimension.
The relativity of the measurements of time in relation to the systems of reference
(and therefore in relation to the physical state of the subject who measures and of the
object being measured) seems to highlight an aspect which had already been emphasised
in ancient times and then forgotten under the pressure of Newton’s physics, i.e. the
existence of a specific time relative to each specific process. In accordance with the
already mentioned Aristotle’s definition, although standard systems of measuring time
can be adopted, strictly speaking each type of movement has its own time. Against the
absolute, homogeneous and undifferentiated kind of time postulated as something real
by Newton’s physics, and as a condition of our way of knowing by Kant’s philosophy,
there is presently once again an awareness that the real time dimensions are related to
the specific way of being of the entities and processes. There is no doubt that it is
possible to adopt standard systems to measure time; however, the natural is marked by
temporal structures and patterns which determine their specific characteristics to such an
extent that the measurements of time are seen as affected by the physical state of the
subject who measures and of the object which is being measured.
There have been moreover other scientific developments which have had
repercussions on time-related problems. We shall mention three of them especially
relevant.
First, the development of classical thermodynamics in the 19th
century led to the
general acceptance of the so-called «second principle of thermodynamics» which seems
to suggest the existence of a «time-arrow». Physical processes can proceed in one
direction but not in the opposite one. As a whole, the entropy of an isolated system
which measures the degree of disorder of a system, increases: if greater order is
produced in some places this must happen at the cost of some disorder in its
surrounding. In thermodynamics this principle is expressed in more accurate ways;
when it is applied to the universe as a whole it seems to suggest a future thermal death
since, as a whole, physical disorder tends to increase.
Second, great strides have been made in the physics of «irreversible processes»,
i.e. those processes which occur in one direction. A reversible process is that which can
occur in any of the possible directions. Classical physics was mainly a physics of
reversible processes where the direction of time did not play any relevant role. In our
own days irreversible processes have been dealt with scientifically; they are the real
processes (in classical physics it had become necessary to convert real irreversible
processes into a sum of reversible ones, brushing over important aspects of the
problem). These progresses are also related to the «time-arrow» and explain how order
can be produced in nature from states of disorder, and for this reason they are very
important in the evolutionary worldview.
Third, evolution theories - cosmic as well as biological - refer to a gigantic
process in which successive degrees of organization have appeared. Time is here the
centre of the explanations, and the problem is even posed about the origin of time in a
scientific way.
We could add more references to the ones already mentioned which refer to
other areas of scientific progress; they all show how time is presently at the centre of
attention of the scientists. Let us now develop more in depth one of the aspects that the
scientific progress highlights: the unity between space and time.
23. UNITY BETWEEN SPACE AND TIME
We have already made reference to the unity between space and time as it appears in the
relativity theory; this fact has also other consequences which affect space and time. We
re going to highlight some of the implications of this unity.
23.1. Space and time in the relativity theory
Space and time are not only related to each other in the relativity theory but they are also
somehow united to form a space-time continuum. This idea corresponds to the
intertwining which we have already emphasised, of the spatial and temporal with the
real physical conditions and therefore, their own intertwining.
Although space and time relations correspond to reality, no trivial difficulties
arise when one tries to measure them. The special relativity theory pointed out such
difficulties. Einstein indicated concretely that the measures of the intervals of space as
well as of time depend on the situation of the observer, and formulated those equations
which allow the determination of durations in different cases.
This difficulty seems to be logical and corresponds also to ordinary experience.
For example, we shall obtain different values if we measure the duration of a
phenomenon from a relative situation of rest or from a train which passes at a great
speed through that place where this phenomenon occurs. Something similar occurs in
relation to distances. When phenomena unfold at great speed changes in the
measurements are also great; in these cases it is necessary to use the formulas of the
special relativity.
New problems have been posed on this basis in connection with the temporal
situation: they refer to the simultaneity and to the relationship between past and future.
A disquieting question is asked in relation to simultaneity: “Is it possible to claim
the existence of really simultaneous events? Actually, it may look impossible to claim
the existence of a real simultaneity since any time measuring will refer to particular
conditions of the observation and the different measurement will not coincide. However,
the difficulty only affects the concrete measurements and not the real existence of
simultaneity. Although it may be impossible to determine the simultaneity of very
distant phenomena through measurements, it is yet possible to claim the existence of this
simultaneity in each moment. At present many simultaneous phenomena are occurring
in different parts of the earth and of the universe independently from the difficulties
which we can meet when we try to determine this simultaneity in a quantitative way. If
you prefer, instead of speaking of «simultaneity» we could speak of «co-existence» or of
«contemporariness», to emphasise the fact that time measurements are affected by the
physical conditions. It would be really impossible for us to determine simultaneity
through physical methods. However, this relativity in the measurements of time does not
mean that such measurements are arbitrary; on the contrary, once the conditions in
which the observer operates are established the theory permits us to calculate the value
to be obtained when measuring time intervals.
The problem of simultaneity has generated the so-called twins’ paradox. Of two
identical twins, one remains on earth while the other travels at a great speed in a space
ship. When the space ship returns to earth, as the durations measured in the ship and the
ones measured on earth are different, the twins will be of different age, and therefore of
different looks. There is no doubt that this paradox highlights the fact that, as we have
already indicated, the real duration is intertwined with concrete physical conditions:
different conditions will produce different effects. However, the interpretation of this
paradox is not simple; different authors, including the same Einstein, warn that in order
to correctly interpret this possible situation, factors have to be taken into account which
eliminate the possible paradoxes: for instance, the fact that the space ship travels in
different directions when it moves away from the earth and when it comes back so that
the relative durations, including the physical effects of both routes, could be
compensated.
Other problems refer to the relationship between past and future. We have
emphasised the irreversibility of the real time successions. Actually, it has been claimed
that the relativity effects could permit, for instance, «trips to the past» which would
include the unusual possibility of causing changes in events of the past and, therefore, in
the real situations of the present. This strange possibility has been connected to the
«time tunnels» which would be related with the exotic physical conditions present for
instance in the black hole. It seems that in this case theoretical constructions of the
physico-mathematics are confused with real time successions. Actually, possibilities
contained in mathematical models cannot be identified with real possibilities and, in this
case, it is of no use to make appeal to the success of the scientific theories. We have
already pointed out, for instance, that classical physics treats time as if it were
reversible; in reality, this is not certain, but this does not prevent classical physics from
being applied successfully in a number of cases: applicability of a theory does not mean
that all the aspects of the models it utilizes reflect reality as it is. These observations are
valid also in the case of the present-day theories: natural processes are irreversible and
no mathematical theory can change their real time succession. This cannot be denied by
leaning on the relativity theory: in this theory, the temporal order of events is preserved
whenever causally related events are considered.
23.2. Space and time as material conditions of the reality
From the very beginning we have considered space-time structuring as one of the great
characteristics which we use to characterize the natural. After examining space and time
with great attention, one is able to discover the meaning of this characterization with
greater depth.
It is obvious that the claim that the natural is characterized by its own dynamism which
exists and unfolds in space-time conditions, implies the claim that these conditions are
real. Our conceptualization of space and time includes our own constructions in ordinary
life as well as, and even more, in the experimental science. Concepts constructed in this
way correspond to reality in different degrees and with specific modalities. However,
extension, duration and their reciprocal relationships are something real.
It is important to emphasise that in our characterization of the natural we do not only
refer to space and time: we are actually speaking of space-time structuring. This permits
us to distinguish the natural from the spiritual which can be intimately related to space-
time (as in the case of a human person) but which does not include, in its own way of
being, space- time structuring: intelligence, will, freedom, responsibility, morals, are all
closely associated, in our case, with material conditions; however, such material
conditions are not primary in the order of importance in these human dimensions.
Moreover, space-time structuring is a characteristic of the natural which acquires a
progressively greater relevance in the understanding of nature. Scientific progress
opens new panoramas always centred in the space-time patterns, i.e. in configurations
and rhythms which can be repeated and, actually, are repeated countless times in each
case with its own variations.
It is easy to find illustrative examples of this in contemporary science. In a paradoxical
way, the theories of the determinist chaos emphasise the existence of a certain
indeterminism in nature; however, and at the same time, they show the existence of
patterns associated with new phenomena. Fractals are actually patterns which are
repeated in different scales. The great importance presently attributed to this scientific
field shows that the deepest knowledge of nature leads to a noticeable combination of
repetition and subtlety. In this particular field which encompasses many different
phenomena, we find that enormously varied and complex results with a great organizing
capacity are the result of repetitive applications of relative simple resorts. Once again,
we can admire how so much can be done with so little.
The image of nature which results from these considerations is very different from that
presented by mechanism which used to consider nature as the result of mechanical
clashes between portions of a matter which lacked internal dynamism and reduced it to
the model of a mechanical machine. It is also very different from that present by the
evolutionist ideology which, going much beyond the data provided by science, tries to
reduce the whole reality to a result of blind forces. If nature is built in a very subtle way
around space-time patterns it is easy to note the fact that we are in the presence of a
materialized rationality which is the result of a very powerful dynamism; this unfolds in
accordance with time patterns, is stored in space patterns and is combined in a thousand
ways producing new enormously sophisticated space and time patterns.
23.3. Interpenetration between the spatial and temporal
Frequently we think of space and time as if they were completely separated dimensions;
however, this idea does not correspond to reality. We have already pointed out that both
dimensions are united in the relativity theory. We shall now add some concluding
considerations.
We can grasp the close relationship that exists between space and time through a fairly
simple example which mesmerizes those who have never finished considering it: it
refers to our viewing of the stars. It is a well-known fact that stars are enormously
distant from the earth. The closest one is four light-years distant (a light-year is the
distance covered by the light in one year, while travelling at 300,000 kilometres per
second); other stars are ten, hundred or thousand light-years distant. This means that,
when we look at a star which is 700 light-years distant, the light that reaches our eyes
left that star seven hundred years earlier. Therefore we see that star now as it was seven
hundred years ago, i.e. in the Middle Ages. When we look at the stars we see them as
they were ten, hundred or thousand years ago. Moreover, the impression we have of the
stars as if they were fixed on a sphere and as they are represented in the drawings of the
constellations of ancient times, does not correspond to reality: we see the stars as if they
did not change their relative position because they are enormously far away from us, but
they move very rapidly and are found at different distances from the earth.
Although we can distinguish between space and time dimensions, these are tightly
intertwined in nature. Space configurations are not just static realities; when stable, their
stability is the result of a dynamic equilibrium. On the other hand, rhythms depend on
configurations; potentialities are stored in space structures and their actualization,
realized in accordance with temporal rhythms, depends on these configurations.
A very adequate example of all this is the genetic information contained in the DNA of
the living organisms. The space and time intertwining is manifest in the processes of
transcription and translation in which proteins are produced, together with the
duplication of the very DNA during cell division.
Nature is built and functions around configurations and rhythms which are closely
related. In this perspective, space and time are not mere abstract concepts, objects of
complex scientific theories and of abstract philosophical reflections, but basic conditions
of nature; these exist in interrelated and highly sophisticated structures which open the
door to a deep understanding of nature.
VIII. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS
The natural world appears with specific ways of being which, although realised
in quantitative dimensions, are not reduced to the latter. We have already mentioned the
relationship between the quantitative and the qualitative aspects. Now, after having
examined in detail the different aspects of the quantitative dimensions, we are in a better
position of analysing the meaning of the qualitative properties of the natural world in
more depth.
Quantity is a dimension proper to the material beings. On the other hand,
qualities are found not only in the material but also in the spiritual beings. For this
reason the study of qualities is part of metaphysics.
Philosophy of Nature studies only the qualities of the physical world; however,
this study is important to metaphysics because it provides the basis on which
metaphysics can build in a reliable way a general explanation of those qualities which
can also be considered in the spiritual realities.
We shall consider first the qualities of the material substances, analyse their
types and examine the way we know them. We shall then consider once again, and in
the light of the newly acquired perspective, the relationship between quantity and
quality particularly in all that makes reference to the quantitative study of the qualities.
24. QUALITATIVE PROPERTIES
Qualities are accidental ways of being or determinations of the substance. Natural
entities do not have only quantitative dimensions; for example, magnitude does not have
its own isolated existence but it exists as magnitude of a substance and of its qualities.
Quantity exists as a condition of the way of being of the natural entities.
The essential way of being of substances is expressed by their substantial form.
However, there are also accidental ways of being which can change without any change
in the essence of the substance and which are usually called qualities.
24.1. Qualitative virtualities of the natural entities
Firstly, we want to point out that qualities determine the substance in relation to its
substantial form, and that some of them are properties which, without forming part of
the essence, accompany it necessarily.
a) Substance, form and qualities
Dynamism refers to a fundamental characteristic of the natural world, i.e. the existence
of virtualities, which unfold through interactions. This unfolding corresponds to the way
of being of the substances, to the specific characteristic of each substance and, therefore,
to their substantial form. However, it is not identified with the latter. Actually, the same
substance, without changing its essence, can unfold some virtualities and not others, and
can unfold in distinct degrees; if it were not so, all substances would be unfolding all
their possibilities of interaction at all times, and this is not what really happens. It is not
even possible that this may happen since the unfolding of virtualities is realized in
function of the present circumstances in each case and these may be very varied. It is not
possible for all the possible circumstances to be all present at the same time.
These virtualities, or accidental ways of being, are usually called «qualities». In the case
of quantity, the use of the singular expresses the unity of the extended substance; on the
other hand, in the case of qualities we use the plural to express that in any substance
there are different qualities.
We also speak of «virtualities» because these are properties which are present in the
substance as possibilities or potentialities whose actualization depends on the
circumstances. This terminology expresses capacity of acting as well as capacity of
receiving the action of other substances. Although in the first case they are usually
called «active» qualities and in the second case «passive» qualities, from a general point
of view all of them unfold through interactions which include two or more subjects,
independently from whether one or the other could be considered «agent» or «patient».
All in all, qualities are accidental ways of being because they do not have their own
independent existence, nor are they identified with the essence of the substances. They
are ways of being which are related to the substantial form, because they are particular
determinations which correspond to the specific way of being of each substance. They
also determine the substance «through» quantity because they are ways of being which
are realised in quantitative conditions. The magnitude of a substance, its space
configuration, the time structuring of the processes which exist in it and, in general, the
material conditions, are like the backdrop against which qualities exist; however, it is a
backdrop which is intertwined with the actors and with which it forms one reality only.
The quantitative conditions impose limitations to the qualitative aspects which exist
within the boundaries of these conditions.
b) Qualities as intrinsic properties of the substance
We may also add that qualities are intrinsic accidents because they refer to ways
of being which are proper to the substance. Although accidental ways of being, qualities
express determinations of the substance as such and not of the substance in relation to
others. However, as we shall show shortly, some qualities are more closely related to the
essence of the substance than others are. Moreover, although they are intrinsic
determinations, qualities are manifested through interactions with other substances and
with the subject who knows them so that it is necessary to determine in each case what
is really objective in each quality and what corresponds to the interactions with other
substances and with the subject who knows them.
As ways of being, two basic types of qualities are usually distinguished:
properties, which do not belong to the essence but necessarily accompany it, and the
purely «contingent» qualities which can be present or not in a specific substance. For
instance, purely chemical substances have well-determined properties which distinguish
them (atomic mass, fusion or vaporization points, etc.) but also other qualities which
are not characteristics of them (for example, the fact of appearing with a certain colour,
or of being in a solid, liquid or gaseous state).
Properties are used to define the substances. Actually, we do not know the
essences either in a direct or in a complete way and, therefore, we determine their ways
of being and their definitions through their properties.
We also distinguish active and passive qualities. The former refers to the ways of
operating, while the latter refers to the way of receiving actions of other subjects.
However, we have already seen how this distinction corresponds to partly conventional
criteria because actions as well passions are interactions and a substance is called agent
or patient according to specific points of view; for instance, according to whether it is a
living being or an inorganic substance, whether it is a substance of a greater or smaller
size, etc.
24.2. Types of qualities
There are many types of qualities, and not all of them are found in all substances.
We have already spoken of those qualities which necessarily follow an essence and
which are called properties, and of others which can be or not in a specific type of
substance and which are called, therefore, contingent qualities.
We shall now consider other ways of classifying the different type of qualities.
We shall refer in the first place to the four types of qualities identified by Aristotle; we
shall then examine virtualities and dispositions; finally we shall refer to those qualities
which can be perceived by the senses and which play, for this reason, a basic role in our
way of knowing nature.
a) Four types of quality
In analysing the meaning of quality106
Aristotle called it with a name derived
from the pronoun poiós which means «of this or of that class». Quality is that by which
entities are called this or that. He seems to claim that the qualitative is what is present in
the substance besides the quantitative.
106
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Categoriae, 8, 8 b 25 – 11 a 38; Metaphysica, V, 14, 1020 a 33 – 1020 b 25.
For Aristotle, nature has quantitative and qualitative characteristics and both are
real. The quantitative is the first determination of what is material while the qualitative
determines entities through quantity; for instance, whiteness affects the surface of a
body. The quantitative has a kind of supremacy since all the other accidents affect the
substance through quantity. However, the qualitative is real, because it expresses the
way of being of entities.
This perspective is in line with the realism of ordinary knowledge. Moreover, it
determines the way of studying nature: in an Aristotelian context, primacy is granted to
the qualitative against any stand which claims primacy of mathematical (quantitative)
approach in the study of nature. Actually, any knowledge is based on ordinary
knowledge which in turn is based on the quality of the bodies.
According to Aristotle, the first and most appropriate way of speaking of a
quality is to say that it is the difference of the substance which is usually called specific
difference. For example, «rational» being is the specific difference, which defines man
respect to the other animals which are not rational.
Aristotle distinguishes four types of qualities. He warns that maybe some other
type could be there; however, the following are those which are more appropriately
called qualities: state and disposition, capacity and incapacity, affective qualities and
conditions, figure and form.
The qualities of the first type are state (or habit) and disposition which are
different because of being more or less stable: habits, or states, are more stable than
dispositions. States are also dispositions while dispositions are not necessarily states.
Aristotle speaks of «having a certain state» and «being in a disposition». These ideas are
applied not only in the philosophy of nature but also in other fields such as ethics and
moral theology when one speaks, for instance, of virtues as stable habits, of the state of
sanctifying or habitual grace, or of moral dispositions.
Qualities of the second type are natural capacity and incapacity (or potency and
impotency). They consist in having a natural capacity to do something. For example, in
anthropology one speaks of intellect, will and senses as potencies of the soul since they
are intellectual or volitional capacities to act which a human being has.
Qualities of the third type are the emotional qualities (patibilis qualitas), and
conditions (passions). Here, the terms «affective» and «conditions» take their meaning
from the verb «to affect» and refer to those qualities which affect the senses and change
during natural alterations. Qualities, which are studied in the philosophy of nature,
belong, in general, to this type: they are material, or corporeal, qualities related to
physical changes, such as colour, weight and density.
Qualities of the fourth type are figure and form: triangular, straight, curved, etc.
Obviously, these qualities also come under the consideration of the philosophy of nature
and it is easy to see how they occupy a very important place since they refer to the
space-time structuring of the natural world.
b) Virtualities, dispositions and tendencies
All qualities can be considered as «virtualities» because they are possibilities which can
be actualized in function of the circumstances. Moreover, any virtuality is equivalent to
a real possibility, to a specific potentiality which may be more or less near its
actualization. According to the degree of this proximity, one can speak of less and more,
of simple «virtualities» or «capacities», of «dispositions» or of authentic «tendencies».
Taking into account the fact that the actualization of virtualities depends on the
circumstances, which permit or drive it, the attribute of a quality as virtuality, capacity,
disposition or tendency will also depend on these circumstances. For instance, the
affinity of chemical substances refers to their tendency to combine and this is different
in different circumstances. A quality is usually considered as virtuality, capacity,
disposition or tendency in relation to the habitual circumstances, or to the most relevant
ones in a specific context.
The existence of tendencies is particularly evident when the agents form part of a
stable unitary whole. Actually, in these cases those conditions are present which favour
or provoke the actualization of some specific virtualities. It is important to note that such
a case occurs very frequently in nature, and it is a manifestation of their highly specific
and tendencial character.
The tendencial character of the qualities has been denied, frequently, because of
its connection with finality; yet, it is a central aspect of nature.
c) Sensible properties and non-observable properties
The distinction of qualities into those which are sensible and those which are not so is
very important to us. Actually, our knowledge of nature depends completely on sensible
qualities which are the condition of what can be known through our senses.
On the other hand, the distinction is irrelevant in view of determining the way of
being of the natural, since this would remain the same even if men disappeared (here,
we disregard the effects of our action on nature).
Our senses have a very limited reach and their functioning refers, before
everything else, to the necessities of practical life. It is not surprising therefore that the
progress of science, through which we know many aspects of nature which are
inaccessible to ordinary experience and which are very far from it, appears as an
astonishing fact. Such a progress is made possible thanks to a peculiar combination of
conceptualization and experiments. The scientific method, based on this combination, is
one the principal manifestations of the human intellect since it presupposes a high
degree of idealization necessary to build theoretical models, and the capacity of relating
the theoretical constructions to the experimental results by conceiving and carrying out
very sophisticated types of experiments. All this presupposes a capacity of interpretation
and reasoning.
However, the whole body of experimental science depends on data provided by
the senses. Even the most abstract theories need to be verified through experiments
whose interpretation depends, inevitably, on the data provided by ordinary experience.
Other living organisms can perceive qualities which are not accessible to us, or
to a degree which goes beyond our possibilities. In any case, the fact of being related to
our knowledge leads directly to the problem of the objectivity of qualities.
24.3. The objectivity of qualities
In Aristotle’s view, quality refers to a way of being, i.e. to an accidental form
which represents an aspect of reality, an accidental determination which cannot be
reduced to the quantitative dimensions. Quantity without form would be, so to say,
blind. To deny the qualitative is equivalent to denying the existence of real ways of
being.
However, although one may admit that there are real qualities in nature, there are
some issues which seem to affect the objectivity one may attribute to these qualities:
how do we know them? Can we say that things have qualities just as we perceive them?
In which measure is our knowledge conditioned by our particular way of gaining access
to reality?
a) Primary and secondary qualities
In the Cartesian mechanism and in the post-Cartesian empiricism a terminology
was coined which has survived up to our own times. Quantitative characteristics, such as
magnitude, figure and local movement would be primary qualities, which are real
properties of nature. On the other hand, sensible qualities, such as colour, taste, sound,
etc. (the direct objects of our senses) would be secondary qualities which are not real
properties but effects that things produce in our senses. A dichotomy was therefore
established between what is quantitative, which would be objective and could be studied
with mathematics, and qualities which would exist only in the subject who knows them.
This dichotomy is usually presented as endorsed by the quantitative method of
the experimental sciences which manage to study the primary qualities in a inter-
subjective way while this is not possible in the case of secondary qualities.
In order to clarify this problem it is important to understand the function of
mathematics in the study of nature. Mathematical concepts, and especially the most
abstract ones, are our own constructions. It is possible to apply mathematics in natural
sciences because we define magnitudes in relation to mathematical formulations and to
experiments. The fact that these constructions are successful says nothing about the
existence of qualities.
The scientific progress permits us to know physical processes which take place
in a sensation, such as electromagnetic phenomena related to light and vision, and the
cerebral mechanisms related to perception. Taking into account the present-day
knowledge, it is not difficult to see the differences between extreme realism and
subjectivism which are two extreme conceptions about the objectivity of sensations and
qualities.
The extreme form of realism about qualities, i.e. the doctrine according to which
sensible qualities exist in reality just as we perceive them, does not seem to be
sustainable. Our sense organs receive signals which are codified and translated, and the
result is the production of sensations generated in accordance with out cognitive
apparatus. Therefore, what we perceive and as we perceive it exists only in ourselves.
The pure subjectivism about qualities according to which there is a radical
heterogeneity between the sensation and the physical reality does not seem to be
sustainable either. It underestimates the fact that qualities correspond, somehow, to
properties of the object.
The solution to the problem is found along an intermediate way. On the one
hand, the sensation and its content are found only in a subject provided with a specific
organism. However, and on the other hand, there is continuity between sensation and
external reality. It is usual to say that through sensation, we perceive real properties in
accordance with our way of knowing. In order to determine in detail the characteristics
of these properties scientific investigation is required, and in this field science plays an
irreplaceable role. However, this very science would not be possible if the basic
objectivity of sense knowledge were not admitted since science constantly uses it and
there is no substitution for it.
For example, sight corresponds to a set of interactions of physical and
physiological character. A sensation is subjective insofar as it is a personal experience;
however, it has correspondence to reality and can be an object of inter-subjective
verification. In stating that something has colour, something real is predicated although
such a predication is mediated by our sense mechanisms and by the physical
circumstances. That colour corresponds to something real is verifiable because, when
we observe something, in each circumstance one perceives well-determined effects107
.
On the other hand, the so-called primary qualities (size, figure, position,
movement, velocity) also depend on our conceptualization and on the physical
circumstances. Insofar as they are perceivable, primary qualities are as real and
subjective as the secondary ones: both are the result of data which are processed and
interpreted.
107
Cf. K. NASSAU, “Las causas del color”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 51, December 1980, pp. 56-72; A. TREISMAN,
“Características y objetos del procesamiento visual”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 124, January 1987, pp. 68-78.
b) The knowledge of qualities
We have said that quantity is the first accident of a corporeal substance. This means that
the other accidents affect the substance through quantity, and this better explains the
primary character of the quantitative; however, one may be bale to appreciate the fact
that reducing everything to the quantitative is an unjustified extrapolation.
Nature is composed of entities with ways of being (forms, qualities) whose
existence leans on a quantitative basis. In the ordinary experience we perceive both
aspects in our own way whereas scientific and philosophical studies aims at knowing
them better.
We are provided with a sensory equipment which permits us to have a
representation of nature which is contextual (it depends on our cognitive equipment) and
partial (we perceive some aspects and not others), nevertheless authentic (we perceive
real characteristics in our own way). This knowledge takes place through experience and
is related to practical purposes: the recognizing of objects, orientation, action, nutrition,
etc. Moreover, this knowledge provides also a basis, partial though reliable and
indispensable, for a further reflection which can be scientific as well as philosophical,
and directed towards the knowledge of aspects of nature which are not clearly visible.
It does not make any sense to criticise the validity of ordinary knowledge in the
name of science since ordinary knowledge is the basic assumption of science. Without
ordinary knowledge no scientific problems could be posed, and no observation and
experimental verification would be possible.
Moreover, scientific progress justifies retroactively the validity of ordinary
knowledge, it widens it, and eventually contributes to specify it (for example, by
eliminating some inadequate assessments of experience); what scientific knowledge
cannot do is to render ordinary knowledge obsolete or to substitute it.
Experimental sciences do not always provide photographic representations of the
reality as if they were a mere translation of the external world. They make use of
symbolic languages which are our own constructions. However, through these
constructions we know in a contextual and partial way, yet authentic, real
characteristics. These characteristics refer, in one way or another, to ways of being and
can be catalogued consequently as qualities.
According to their nature and to the context of the problems which are studied,
these characteristics can be catalogued as virtualities, capacities, dispositions and
tendencies108
. It is not difficult to frame them within the classical species of qualities. It
is not just a question of forcing them within a mould which would be of no interest
whatsoever, but to be aware of the fact that they correspond to the classical idea of
quality and that, consequently, this idea preserves its validity.
108
Cf. R. HARRÉ, “Powers”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 21 (1970), pp. 81-101; I.J. THOMPSON,
“Real Dispositions in the Physical World”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39 (1988), pp. 67-79.
c) Reductionism and emerging properties
There are two great types of reductionism, i.e. ontological and epistemological:
the former refers to nature and to its different levels while the latter refers to science, i.e.
to our knowledge of nature.
Ontological reductionism is the doctrine according to which the superior levels
of nature are no more than a simple sum of the elements of the inferior levels and,
therefore, the former can be reduced to the latter. The most radical type of ontological
reductionism claims that, ultimately, everything can be reduced to physical entities and
processes. Since the physical can be identified with what is material, this type of
reductionism can be identified with some kind of materialism: it says that ultimately the
whole reality is reduced to what is material.
Epistemological reductionism claims that sciences are ultimately reduced to the
most basic ones. And so, biology is reduced to physics and chemistry in such a way that
in reality biology is no more than physics and chemistry applied to the living organisms.
The most radical form of epistemological reductionism claims moreover that sciences
are reduced ultimately to a combination of sense experiences.
There are serious difficulties in both doctrines. It is certain that in the
epistemological area the scientific progress permits the stretching of bridges able to
connect more and more some scientific disciplines with others, and all of them with
physics. However, it is also certain that it is not possible to reduce the knowledge of one
level from the knowledge of an inferior level. Nor is it possible to reduce chemistry to
physics, and within physics there are theories whose harmonization is difficult. In the
ontological area there are different levels of organization that are not reducible to one
another just like that. For example, it is certain that living organisms are made of the
same types of materials which are studied in physics and chemistry; however, it is also
certain that there are in living organisms many types of organization and function which
do not exist in the other levels and which therefore claim a specific perspective different
from those adopted in physics and chemistry.
The term emergence is used frequently these days to express the irreducible
aspect of some levels to others. This term had already enjoyed some popularity in the
first half of the 20th
century. At a first glance the term means exactly the opposite of
reduction, i.e. it means that there are emerging characteristics in the superior levels of
nature and science which spring up from or stand above the inferior levels. There are
some doctrines which present themselves as a kind of non-reductionist materialism or
non-reductionist physicalism in the attempt of avoiding the difficulties of reductionism;
however, at the same time they claim that ultimately everything is explainable in terms
of evolution of the material or physical. Actually, it is possible to hold an emergentist
stand which acknowledges the existence of new properties at different levels of nature
and at the same time to claim that these new properties arise simply from the inferior
levels through successive processes of organization.
In any case, it is important to emphasise that really new properties appear in the
successive level of organization of nature. Calling them emergences is nothing but
sticking a label to them, which, by itself, explains nothing. They need to be explained by
science or philosophy. Although science manages to explain how a new property arises,
this does not eliminate further philosophical questions. We can ask ourselves, for
instance: Why are there physico-chemical laws so specific that are able to produce such
a sophisticated organisation in nature? How is it that superior levels of organization are
produced which contain virtualities for the successive production of more and more
astonishing types of organisation?
25. QUANTITY AND QUALITIES
There is a very close relationship between the quantitative and the qualitative. In the
material beings all qualities are affected by quantity: they exist within specific
dimensions and are bound to specific space and time structures.
After analyzing different aspects of quantity and qualities we are now in better
position to understand the types of relationship that exist between these two dimensions
of the natural entities.
25.1. Quantitative dimension of the qualities
In considering specific natural entities we note that the relationship between the
quantitative and the qualitative is not something general and abstract but very concrete.
Actually, the ways of being of the natural entities are strongly conditioned by the
quantitative dimensions. For example, insects, birds and primates have characteristics
which are related to the magnitudes of their organism and to the proportion between the
sizes of their organs.
The basic designs of the natural entities are neither many nor arbitrary. There is a great
variety of specific designs; however, they are the combination of a much more reduced
number of basic designs. And so, in a study on these issues one can read: “Our study
will focus on designs and forms which appear in the natural world. These designs appear
to be particularly limited so that the immense variety of forms that Nature creates arises
from the elaboration and re-elaboration of a reduced number of basic themes. Such
limitations are the ones which confer harmony and beauty to the natural world… In
matter of design we observe that Nature has preferences among which we find spirals,
the winding and sinuous forms, the branchings and the 120o joints, designs which are
repeated time and again. In this sense, Nature works as a theatre producer who would
present every evening the same actors but in different forms according to their distinct
role… A glance behind the footlights reveals that Nature does not have preferences
when the time comes of assigning roles to the actors. Its productions are limited by the
scarcity of means and by the restrictions imposed by the tri-dimensional space, as well
as by the relationships existing between the distinct sizes of the objects and by a peculiar
sense of austerity. Within the domain of Nature only five types of regular polyhedrons
can be formed, and no more. In the same way, only seven crystalline systems exist and
an eighth one never appears. The absolute size determines the fact that a lion cannot fly
and that a robin cannot roar. All the elements which form part of the distinct actions
which occur in the Universe and each one of them must abide by the established
rules”109
.
Along the same lines we read: “Each form has its own field of dimensions and it is
superiorly as well as inferiorly limited. Now, the distinct forms establish associations
and act together with other forms of their same characteristics in order to originate
greater structures and superior levels of organization”110
. The author of this quotation
refers to D’Arcy Thompson who published in 1917 a study which is considered as
pioneer. The study may contain controversial and even obsolete ideas because of the
progress in this field; they nevertheless point at a central idea which is now gathering
more and more strength. D’Arcy Thompson expressed it in the following terms: “We
then come close to the conclusion which will affect the whole rest of our argument
along this book, i.e. there is an essential qualitative difference among the phenomena of
the form, according to whether the organisms are big or small”111
. And also: “To begin
with, we have discovered that the scale has a pronounced effect on the physical
phenomena, and that the increase or diminution of the dimensions may mean a complete
change in the static or dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we begin to become aware of the
fact that there are discontinuities in the scales which define the phases in which different
forms and different conditions predominate”112
.
The scientific progress discovers new kinds of relationship between the quantitative and
the qualitative. Natural entities and processes are the result of multiple combinations of
elements which are not many in number and which can combine in very specific ways
producing a great variety of results. Think for instance of the 92 types of atoms which
are the basis of almost the whole of our world; think of the three sub-atomic particles
which are the basic constituents of these atoms and of the whole matter; think of the
combinations which are formed by taking the carbon atom – the backbone of life as we
know it - as building unit; think of the DNA – the store of the genetic programme of any
living being – which is assembled by using a combination of 4 nucleotides as bricks, etc.
Fractals are an especially interesting discovery along this line. They are forms with the
same structure at any scale of enlargement so that they are similar to themselves: small
parts of it have the same structure as the whole. This permits to understand how, on the
basis of few structures which are repeated in a thousand of ways, an enormous variety of
natural forms is produced.
All in all, we can claim that specific magnitudes and mathematical forms correspond to
distinct natural forms. The qualitative ways of being are not only related to the
quantitative but also closely depend on the quantitative forms and combinations. At the
109
Peter S. STEVENS, Patrones y pautas en la naturaleza, Salvat, Barcelona 1986, pp. 1-2. 110
Ibid., p. 26. 111
D’Arcy Wenworth THOMPSON, Sobre el crecimiento y la forma, Hermann Blume, Madrid 1980 (original edition of
1917), p. 35. 112
Ibid., pp. 45-46.
same time, the quantitative is not an amorphous and undifferentiated reality: the nature
we know is the result of the combination of very specific mathematical forms113
.
25.2. The measurement of the qualitative intensity
Because quantity and quality are so closely related and intertwined in the natural
world, it is possible to study the qualitative with mathematical methods. Although
qualities as such cannot be measured nevertheless, because of their specific realisation
within quantitative dimensions, they can be studied mathematically. In this sense one
may usually speak of indirect measurement of the qualities.
Actually, the advances in the indirect measurements of the qualities developed
with great difficulties (because being a novelty) in the past centuries was one of the
factors which made it possible for the experimental science to be born in the 17th
century. Along this line, special importance is to be attributed to the works carried out in
Paris and Oxford in the 14th
century. There were precedents: for example, Roberto
Grosseteste had insisted on the fundamental importance of mathematics for the studies
of the physical phenomena, and he had applied geometry to optics, boosting the
scientific orientation in Oxford. The studies of Nicholas Oresme in Paris in this field
were also important. The contribution of Oresme to physics includes the graphic
representation of the qualities and the application of this representation to the study of
the uniformly accelerated movement. Oresme’s supremacy is unquestionable in two
central aspects: the extent of the problems to which he applied the mathematical method
and the use of coordinates for the graphic representation of the changes in qualities and
in movement114
.
The measurement of qualities is the basis for the application of mathematics to
the study of the qualitative properties of the bodies. Physico-mathematical sciences are
based, to a large extent, on the indirect measurement of qualities; since these sciences
seek a kind of knowledge of the reality which may permit the use of quantitative
concepts, and taking into account the fact that our knowledge of the bodies is made
possible because of their qualities, one can easily see how the ground of the physico-
mathematical knowledge is made of enunciations in which the qualitative aspect is
related to the quantitative one.
25.3. Qualities and magnitudes
We have already examined how scientific magnitudes are constructed and what the
reach of the physico-mathematical method is. We shall now analyse a particular issue
related to qualities. Actually, if qualities are real properties, and if one admits that
113
This idea is greatly emphasized, for instance, in: Ian STEWART and Martin GOLUBITSKY, ¿Es Dios un geometra?,
Crítica, Barcelona 1995. 114
Cf. Mariano ARTIGAS, “Nicolás Oresme, gran maestre del Colegio de Navarra, y el origen de la ciencia moderna”, op.
cit.
experimental science provides an authentic knowledge of the reality, one should come
across concepts in science which are related to qualities.
It is not really a problem to ascribe qualities to entities studied by science when
the aspects under consideration are easily observable, as is the case for example with
many biological phenomena. On the other hand, when non-observable aspects are
studied, as it happens in micro-physics, the problems become bigger since in these cases
we need to make recourse to mathematical models which are not a snapshot of reality.
However, even in those cases one comes to know virtualities, capacities, dispositions
and tendencies which entities have in accordance with their own natures. There is no
doubt that in some cases it is difficult to reach certain conclusions about the ontological
status of the entities and their properties; however, this is due to the limitations of our
knowledge. Not admitting that nature is constituted by entities which have a nature and
some properties of their own would mean that the scientific investigation does not make
any sense, and the same would be true in the case of scientific enunciations. This is
incompatible with the abstract character of many scientific formulations and with the
existence of difficulties met with to determine their concrete ontological reach.
One of the ways in which qualities are manifested to the scientific investigation
is the so-called dispositional ends which point at the existence of tendencies to act in
specific ways in certain circumstances. There has been a lot of discussion about the
reality of these ends. Sometimes it is said that they are not necessary and that do not
play any essential role in science: they could be replaced by purely operational terms.
However, in real life the scientific activity does not work in this way, and a dispositional
vocabulary is frequently used: this is equivalent to attributing qualities to the scientific
entities. Experimental science makes frequent recourse to dispositional properties; think
for instance of properties such as electrical resistance, electrical sensitivity, density,
solubility, chemical affinity, and many others. They are authentic scientific magnitudes,
which refer to qualities, because they express virtualities, capacities, dispositions and
tendencies.
Those who state that experimental science cannot speak of virtualities or
tendencies frequently use arguments such as the following: they say that enunciations,
which express tendencies, cannot be submitted to experimental control. They add that it
is possible to speak of tendencies only in the field of human intentionality, and that
attributing tendencies to the natural entities would be equivalent to admitting a kind of
pan-psychism, i.e. that everything has life and intentions. It is also claimed that a
reference to tendencies lends itself to metaphysical abuses because it would end up in
seeing finality where there is none, and to pose problems which arise from an undue
anthropomorphism115
. An example that is usually presented is the one which refers to
situations without detectable effects and which, in accordance with the defenders of
tendencies, would be explained through an equilibrium of real tendencies. This is the
case, for instance, of two teams which pull a rope in opposite directions so that the rope
does not move: if an explanation of this is given using the concept of tendencies, one
will say that there are tendencies in action but they balance each other.
115
A similar kind of reasoning can be found, for instance, in: Q. GIBSON, “Tendencies”, Philosophy of Science, 50 (1983),
pp. 296-308.
However, the existence of real tendencies seems to be undeniable. At a scientific
level the problem refers to the possibility of constructing concepts which permit to
represent tendencies and that they may be able to explain things.
Those who defend the existence of tendencies summarise the problem in the
following terms: in nature, there are different tendencies or active potencies, which
correspond to the nature of things. They act in a combined way and in order to detect
them one has to make recourse to experiments in which the effects of the particular
tendencies are isolated. Nature is an open system in which different tendencies interfere
with one another; in order to know them, it is necessary to produce closed systems in
which only the factors we can control are present. In the closed systems, i.e. in the
experiments in which the undesired interferences are eliminated, natural laws can be
obtained which express constant sequences. Once these laws are made available to us
we can proceed to explain what happens in the open systems of the world in terms of
laws which are the expression of tendencies116
.
According to Rom Harré, a tendency is a power which is, as it were, suspended,
on its way of being exercised or manifested117
. Harré claims that this concept plays a
central role in the philosophical reflection on science: “I try to show how the concept of
power can play a central role in a metaphysical theory according to a realist philosophy
of science…; I will show how powers are not only indispensable in the epistemology of
science, but also how they are the authentic heart and key of the best metaphysics for
science. In doing so, I will show that the concept of power is neither magical nor occult
but as empirical as one can wish it and also richer in capacity than the concepts which it
follows…; we need to have the concept of power if science must make sense”118
.
In Harré’s analyses the concept of power expresses active potency, capacity,
force, energy, and is related to the concepts of disposition, propensity, trend, tendency,
and to passive potency or capacity of intervening in actions which are provoked by the
active potencies (liability). All these express aspects which are related to capacity and
directionality.
According to Harré, to claim the reality of a power does not mean to
categorically claim the presence of a quality: it is just a generic conditional or
hypothetical enunciation, because it does not specify which type of specific issue it is
applied to. It is an enunciation accompanied by subjunctive conditionals that refer to
cases in which it has not been manifested and which has the form: «if it were subjected
to such conditions, then this effect would arise». Harré claims that entities have powers
even if they do not exercise them. The difference between that which has power to
behave in a specific way and that which does not have it does not refer to their actual
acting or not since it can happen that this power is never exercised. The difference refers
to what entities are: it is a difference in their intrinsic nature.
116
A similar kind of realism can be found, for instance, in: Roy BHASKAR, A Realist Theory of Science, Leeds Books,
Leeds 1975, pp. 33-36; Rom HARRÉ, The Principles of Scientific Thinking, MacMillan, London 1970. 117
Cf. Rom HARRÉ, The Principles of Scientific Thinking, op. cit., p. 278. Harré uses here, and in many other places, the
term power which can be used in the sense of potency; it is clearly a a kind of active potency or capacity of acting. 118
Rom HARRÉ, “Powers”, op. cit., pp. 81, 83 and 85.
In this context, power corresponds to the classic concept of active potency while
the opposite concept (liability) to passive potency. Harré points out that these two
concepts are the extremes of a whole spectrum in which there are different degrees.
Harré observes that, according to a realist perspective, there is necessity in
nature, and that whatever happens corresponds to the way of being of the entities. On
the other hand, empiricism considers legitimate only to affirm the existence of a
concomitance among events and denies the possibility of knowing real causal
connections which correspond to the nature of things. However, the two perspectives
lead to two different types of scientific investigation: the empiricist one will look for
new cases of concomitance, while the realist one will try to know causes and their
effects in a better way; and the scientific investigation is carried out in accordance with
the realist perspective.
Harré’s conclusions basically coincide with the Bhaskar’s stand. Both defend a
realism according to which, in order to justify intelligibility in science, it is necessary to
admit that the order discovered in nature exists independently from man’s activity. Such
order consists in the structure and constitution of the entities and in the causal laws. In
order to justify the scientific activity an ontology is required able to provide a schematic
answer to the question: how should the world be so that science may be possible?119
Bhaskar and Harré clearly emphasize the fact that an ontology coherent with the
present-day scientific knowledge must include, as fundamental ingredients, the
existence of causal relations which are based on dispositions, tendencies and capacities,
the fact that these characteristics correspond to the way of being proper to the entities,
and that it is necessary to admit this natural order in order to justify the scientific
activity120
.
The constructions made by science cannot just be considered as real
characteristics of nature. However, the basic assumptions of the experimental science
include the existence of natural entities which have their own way of being manifested
through dispositions with a tendencial character. The scientific progress justifies these
assumptions and widens their reach. Actually, the present-day scientific worldview
provides a wide basis for the concepts of virtualities, capacities, dispositions and
tendencies all of which reflect the qualitative dimensions of nature.
25.4. Real aspects of the physical magnitudes
We shall now complete our analysis of the scientific magnitudes and of their
relationship with reality.
119
Cf. R. BHASKAR, op. cit., pp.27-29. 120
Bhaskar’s and Harré’s analyses are in the line of experimentalism which is also represented by Ian Hacking (cf. I.
HACKING, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1983). These analyses are not without
difficulties. We limited ourselves to point out some important coinciding points.
A magnitude, in a scientific-experimental sense, is a concept defined in such a way that
it can be submitted to mathematical treatment and to which quantitative values can be
assigned in relation to the results of the experiments. These are, among many, the
scientific concept of «mass», «velocity», «temperature», «entropy» and «electrical
potential».
There are magnitudes of many different types. Some are directly related to the
experimental results and can be measured through instruments (for instance, mass and
temperature); others, on the other hand, have a pretty instrumental character, i.e. they are
magnitudes which are introduced in order to facilitate conceptualization and calculation
without presuming of having a direct correspondence to reality (for instance the
Hamiltonian or the Lagrangian).
Some magnitudes are related to properties and concepts of ordinary experience at least
initially (mass, force, energy, etc.), while others originate from theories very far from
ordinary experience. However, in all cases magnitudes are defined and used within the
context of specific scientific theories. Therefore, in order to be able to interpret the real
meaning of a magnitude, it is indispensable to take into account the context within
which that magnitude is defined and used.
Let us consider, as an example, a case which usually originates a number of
misunderstandings: the transformation between mass and energy, admitted in physics as
a consequence of Einstein’s relativity theory. This is usually brought up in order to
claim that the concept of substance is not valid any more because, after all, everything is
concentrated energy; or also to claim that it is possible to produce matter from a state in
which there is no matter but pure energy. This reasoning is usually stretched to the point
of claiming that the creation of the universe is possible starting from nothing through
purely physical processes without the necessity of a Creator. In reality, the relativity
theory only establishes a quantitative relationship between two magnitudes, i.e. between
mass and energy, claiming that in some specific processes a specific quantity of mass is
lost and a specific quantity of energy is produced, or the other way around. They are
natural processes in which there is nothing mysterious and they do not justify
conclusions such as those mentioned. In the case of some of these processes physicists
speak of creation or annihilation of particles; however, they do not use these terms in
their philosophical or theological meaning. Mass and energy are defined in physics in
relation to mathematical and experimental procedures, and physics only claims the
existence of specific quantitative relations between such magnitudes in specific physical
processes.
In order to determine the real meaning of the magnitudes one has to take into account as
a basis its definition and use in the corresponding scientific theories, avoiding pseudo-
scientific extrapolations. For example, the concept of matter is not identified with the
concept of mass. Mass in physics is a magnitude defined in a very specific way. This is
a scalar magnitude to which numbers are assigned unlike vectorial magnitudes, such as
velocity, which have also a direction and sense. Mass is an additive magnitude: this
means that the masses of various bodies can be summed up through a simple
arithmetical operation, while this is not possible with vectorial magnitudes whose sum
includes geometric operations; nor is this possible with other scalar magnitudes such as
temperature since temperatures of contiguous bodies cannot be summed up. Every time
one wishes to determine the real reference of a scientific magnitude, or of an
enunciation which relates scientific magnitudes, one needs to take into account this type
of characteristics. To proceed in any other way would only lead to speculations devoid
of rigor.
25.5. Quantity and quality in the knowledge of the natural
In conclusion, we claim that our access to nature is entirely conditioned by our
knowledge of qualities. This knowledge has a subjective aspect (sensation), but at the
same time permits to perceive objective aspects of the reality. There are real qualities in
the natural entities, and we know them in a contextual and partial, nevertheless
authentic, way; the scientific progress permits us to know many qualitative aspects of
nature more in depth.
A purely quantitative world would be unobservable. The experimental science
transcends the field of ordinary knowledge, but has to take it into account as a basic
point of reference. In any case, experimentation is inconceivable without a minimum
dose of realism about qualities as they appear to ordinary knowledge.
Scientific magnitudes make us know properties and natures of the bodies. The
knowledge provided by the experimental science is not reduced to the phenomenal or to
the purely quantitative aspects. Through science we come to know about the existence
and characteristics of many entities, as well as properties and processes of the natural
world which otherwise would remain inaccessible. However, scientific enunciations are
not always a snapshot of the reality; therefore, in order to assess their reach, it is
necessary to analyse the concrete context of the theories which are being used in each
case.
On the other hand, knowledge provided by the experimental science does not
exhaust our knowledge of nature and therefore is not the only way to know it. There is
no doubt that scientific knowledge is peculiarly reliable owing to the rigor of the
theoretical proofs and of the experiments which are used; however, this is not a
sufficient reason for denying the validity of ordinary knowledge which is the backdrop
of science, or of the philosophical or theological knowledge, although these must take
into account the data provided by science when reflecting on the natural world.
Scientism, which considers experimental science as the only valid knowledge of reality,
or at least as the model which any other type of knowledge should imitate, lacks any
scientific ground, and insofar as it is presented as scientific, or as a scientific conclusion,
is an illegitimate pseudoscientific extrapolation. Actually, no science in particular, or all
of them together, can judge the validity of what falls outside science.
IX. ACTIVITY AND CAUSALITY OF THE NATURAL ENTITIES
Causality is a topic not only of the philosophy of nature which studies its
relationship with the physical world, but also of metaphysics which studies it globally,
including its realisation in the spiritual world.
From the very beginning we have considered dynamism as one of the basic
characteristics of the natural world. We have then considered the ways of being,
substantial as well accidental which are at the same time source of this dynamism and
result of its unfolding. Now we are going to consider how the natural dynamism unfolds
through physical action. This will take us to examine the topic of causality as it appears
in nature.
26. CAUSALITY AND PHYSICAL ACTION
Dynamism unfolds through actions of the physical systems. We shall show how every
action is an interaction; we shall distinguish the different types of interactions and
consider efficient causality which is the type of cause directly related to activity.
26.1 Natural dynamism and physical interactions
If we admit that natural entities have their own dynamism we should conclude that
physical activity is not just one more aspect of the world: it is something which deeply
permeates the whole nature. We meet actions everywhere. Even that which appears
more static is, properly speaking in a state of equilibrium: in this case different
dynamisms are in action but their effects are balanced.
Properly speaking, natural activity consists of interactions: it is never the work
of a completely isolated agent; it always implies the action of some beings or
components on other beings or components.
If we take into account the central role played in nature by the unitary systems or
substances we can see how it is especially interesting to relate interactions to substances.
Actually, interactions correspond to the actions of substances, of their components or of
their aggregate parts. Therefore, it seems logical to focus the study of the natural activity
on the actions of its subjects, i.e. on the agent or efficient causes
We can state that the dynamism proper to the natural is the cause of the
interactions of the physical beings. Actually, each physical being has a capacity of
acting in different ways according to different circumstance. Its dynamism is a capacity
of acting which is not exhausted in some specific results but unfolds in very different
ways in function of other dynamisms which intervene in each specific case. Therefore,
in each singular case a confluence of dynamisms unfold to produce specific interactions.
The enormous variety of possible results is what makes it necessary, in order to study
the natural dynamism, to artificially provoke situations in which we can observe and
experiment with particular aspects after separating them from other aspects.
At the same time, natural dynamisms are the result of physical interactions.
Actually, different interactions produce new systems which have new types of
dynamism, either because this type of systems and dynamisms did not exist before or
because new cases are produced of something which existed before.
26.2 Modalities of the natural transformations
Physical interactions produce natural changes. What is natural is mutable.
Mutability is a basic condition of the natural entities which have their own dynamism
that is realised and unfolds in space-time conditions, i.e. space configurations which are
produced and change, and temporal rhythms which mark the succession of the physical
states.
In relation to the effects produced we can distinguish two great modalities in the
natural transformations: substantial and accidental transformations. In substantial
transformations changes in the essential ways of being occur: one substance ceases to
exist and a different one is produced, or a new substance is formed from others which
combine to form a new unity, or a substance breaks up originating in this way various
different substances. In accidental transformations the same substance is preserved as
such while some of its accidents change. There is no doubt that substances change
during accidental changes; however, they only change accidentally. This clarification is
important if one takes into account the fact that many objection against the concept of
substance proceed from the idea according to which substances would be what remains
through changes, as if they were a kind of immutable substratum.
We have already considered these modalities of natural changes or
transformations while examining the natural processes. We have also emphasised that
there are only three possible accidental changes: the change of place or local movement,
the change in quantity usually called increase or diminution, and the change in quality
usually called alteration. We have also said that there is a hierarchy among these
changes: the most basic one is local movement, then we have the quantitative change,
and finally the qualitative one. Now we can better understand why this is so and what it
means. Actually, we have seen that quantity and quality are intertwined, and that
quantity is the basic space-time frame within which qualities exist. Therefore, any
physical change implies some change of place, and any qualitative change implies some
quantitative change. On the other hand, there is no change in the accident quando, or
temporal situation, since time is precisely the measure of any change. There is no
change in the accident relation either which is nevertheless the consequence of some of
the already mentioned changes. There is no change in action and passion either because
these accidents, as we shall see, accompany all changes.
In relation to duration, one usually distinguishes between instantaneous and
successive changes. The successive change appears when there is a succession along the
change as usually happens with changes related to material beings which are affected by
quantitative dimensions (space and time). Typical instantaneous changes are the
substantial ones. Although ordinarily preceded by successive accidental changes which
end up by causing a substantial one, this type of change in itself occurs in an abrupt
way: some types of substances cease to be and at the same time other types of
substances begin to exist as it happens in a special way in the generation and death of
the living organisms.
26.3 The physical order and the four causes
To look for the cause of something means to try and explain why that thing exists
and has its characteristic way of being. Looking for explanations is, to a large extent,
looking for causes.
What is a cause? A classical definition of cause is the following: a cause is the
principle on which something depends in its being and in its becoming. A cause is a
principle though not any principle as a simple beginning could be. It is a principle which
really affects the being of what exists or the production of transformations.
The systematic study of causality properly belongs to metaphysics; however, as
it happens with other topics, the basic modalities of causality are those which are found
in nature. We are going to focus our attention on them.
In the first book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle analyses what the previous
philosophers had said about causes and presents his doctrine on the four causes, i.e.
material, formal, efficient and final. It is indeed an enormously influential doctrine
which is still in use because it takes in the basic modalities of causality. Aristotle found
a treatment of the first three causes in the works of his predecessors and considered a
glorious achievement the fact of having gone in depth in an original way into the fourth
type, i.e. the final cause.
We have already mentioned causality when speaking of material and formal
causes. We shall presently expound on those ideas which are necessary in order to offer
a systematic perspective of the four causes and develop more in detail that which
corresponds to the topic of this chapter, i.e. the efficient cause.
Material and formal causes are intrinsic causes since matter and form are the
constitutive co-principles of the natural beings. On the other hand, efficient and final
causes are extrinsic because they do not refer to the being of the natural entities but to
the agent which produces a process and to the end which leads its action. Let us examine
how each of the four causes is usually characterised in accordance with the classical
scheme.
Material cause is that from which something is made, and remains within the
thing made. It is wood in the case of a door, glass in the case of a window, etc. One
speaks of second matter when the material cause is the substance which changes only
accidentally. On the other hand, one speaks of proto-matter in order to indicate the
materiality common to all natural entities and which can be considered as a substratum
present in every change including the substantial change.
Formal cause is that by which something has a specific way of being. It is either
the accidental form, i.e. that accidental way of being which changes in the accidental
changes, or the substantial form which expresses the way of being of the substances and
which does not change during accidental changes. The different accidents are accidental
ways of being and therefore can be expressed as accidental forms. On the other hand,
what is usually called form in ordinary language corresponds to form and figure which
we have already referred to while speaking of the fourth species of quality in Aristotle’s
philosophy.
At the substantial level, proto-matter and substantial form are the material and
the formal cause respectively. However, they are causes as constitutive principles of the
essence of the substance: they are not complete things or beings, or pieces or parts of
things but constitutive principles of beings as potency (matter) and act (form). At the
accidental level, the substance behaves as matter or subject (second matter) while the
accidents as forms (accidental forms), and they are also related as potency and act.
Efficient cause is that from which an action arises which affects the being or the
becoming of another thing. This is what one commonly understands as «cause» in
ordinary language. It is for instance the hitting of something and causing its
displacement. Efficient causes are agents or subjects of the actions. Final cause is that in
view of which something is done. It is the objective or the end sought by the agent in a
conscious or unconscious way when it acts.
We have considered the material and formal causes in the previous chapters at
substantial as well as at accidental level. We shall consider the final cause later on. Let
us now examine the efficient cause.
26.4 Efficient causality: classical notion
The activity of the natural entities corresponds to their ways of being. The
classical aphorism operatio sequitur esse means that an entity can carry out those
actions which correspond to its way of being and, therefore, to its substantial and
accidental forms. An agent is a natural subject which acts always in accordance with its
way of being. We shall focus our attention on the action as actualisation of the
virtualities possessed by the agents or efficient causes.
The efficient cause is one of the four Aristotelian causes. Material and formal
causes constitute beings intrinsically while the efficient cause produces movement and
the final cause indicates its direction. Aristotle summarises his doctrine with the
following words: “In a primary sense the immanent matter from which something is
made is called cause, for example, bronze is the cause of the statue and silver is the
cause of the chalice and also the genera of these things. In a different sense, the species
and the model are causes; and this is the enunciation of the essence and its genera (for
instance, of the musical octave, the relation to two and one and, in short, the number),
and the parts which are in the enunciation. Then comes that from which the first
principle of change or rest proceeds; for example, he who gave an advice is cause of the
action, and the father is cause of his son; in short, it is the agent of what is done, and that
which produces the change of that which suffers it. Then comes that which is as the end;
this is that for which something is done; for example, health is the cause of going for a
walk. Why do we actually go for a walk? We say: in order to be healthy. And in saying
so, we think we have given the cause. And how many other things with different movers
are done with a beginning and an end! For instance, health is the cause of slimming, but
also a laxative, or medicines, or the instruments of a physician. Then all these things are
for the cause of the end and are different among them because some are instruments and
others are works”121
.
Aristotle doe not use the expression «efficient cause» whose history is
complex122
. He speaks of «that from which the first principle of change or rest
proceeds», «the first source of change or rest», «the principle of movement». It is
therefore the «moving cause» or the «agent cause».
The fundamental core of the Aristotelian doctrine preserves its validity. Actually,
the natural activity corresponds to a dynamism whose «source» is found in the
«interior» of the natural entities: it corresponds to their essential way of being, to their
virtualities or qualities. This dynamism unfolds in function of the internal tendencies
and external circumstances which make their actualisation possible.
Movement, as actualisation of potentialities, presupposes always the existence of
subjects provided with their own dynamism, and of circumstances which condition their
unfolding. All in all, movement requires some causes which can produce it, i.e. some
subjects of the natural dynamism. These subjects are the unitary systems or substances,
and the aggregations of substances.
26.5 Efficient causality vis-à-vis science
That there are agent causes is a fact that can be easily verified if one relies on the data of
ordinary experience. However, it seems that the scientific progress has introduced a new
dimension which compels the posing of the problem about the real existence of agent
causes once again. We shall now consider some objections which can be posed against
the classical conception of efficient cause in the name of science.
a) Agents and interactions
121
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, V, 2, 1013 a 24 – 1013 b 4. An almost identical text can be found in: Physica, II, 3, 194 b 23
– 195 a 1. 122
On the history of this concept, one may read for instance: E. GILSON, “Notes pour l’histoire d ela cause efficiente”,
Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 37, (1962), pp. 7-31.
Experimental science has created in this field a slightly paradoxical situation: it
is claimed, on the one hand, that science deals only with the material and efficient cause
and rejects other causes; but also the notion of efficient cause, on the other hand, is
called into question. Actually, science seeks laws which permit to determine the
behaviour of the bodies under the action of forces; however, these forces do not
correspond to agents but to interactions. For example, at the level of fundamental
physics explanations are focused on the standard model of the four fundamental
interactions which are studied through the field theories (gravity, electromagnetism, and
the two nuclear forces). Therefore, the classical distinctions between agent and patient,
motors and mobiles, seem to shade off, and science replaces them with a focus on the
determination of phenomena under general laws.
However, the usual representation of actions in terms of agent subjects preserves
its validity because interactions presuppose, in one way or another, unitary systems
which are their subjects. This is clear in the case of subjects with a high level of
organisation. This is especially true in the case of living beings, but subjects of actions
exist also in the field of non-living beings: it is the case of particles, atoms, molecules,
macro-molecules and also aggregations which, although not unitary systems, behave as
unitary subjects of interactions. In order to explain movement science uses models
which at times do not seem to make reference to agent causes: for instance, «waves»,
«forces», «fields of forces», «energy», «field intensity». Nevertheless, it is always
assumed that there are subjects of interactions, and frequently reference is expressly
made to them.
b) Action and contact
Aristotle claimed that in nature an agent cause always acts through contact: “it
moves the mobile by precisely acting on the mobile insofar as it is a mobile. But it does
so by contact so that at the same time it receives and action. Because of this we can
define movement as the actualisation of the mobile insofar as it is mobile, the contact
with that which can move it being the cause of this attribute so that the motor also
receives an action. The motor, or agent, will always be the vehicle of a form, either this
or that form which, when moving, will be the source and cause of the change; for
instance, a fully formed man engenders a man from what is potentially a man”123
.
However, he also claims that contact can be understood in a wide sense: for
example, the change produced by a stone which is thrown and crashes, is due to the
agent which threw it. Moreover, there are special cases: the celestial bodies act on the
sub-lunar ones, and the magnet on that which is attracted.
Disregarding ancient examples, we can claim that, according to the present-day
knowledge, the existence of a contact is required for a natural action. Centuries-long
discussions have dragged along on the possibility of «distance action» without physical
contact, and the «field» theories appear to support this possibility since they refer to
123
ARISTOTLE, Physica, III, 2,202 a 5-12. Cf. also ibid., VII, 2: the entire chapter is dedicated to the study of this
problem. It is interesting to note that, in the text quoted, it is stated that in each action there is an interaction.
interactions which sometime (the electromagnetic and the gravitational one) are
influential at great distances. However, even in these cases the existence of a certain
contact is being claimed: interactions propagate at a finite speed, they do not exercise
any influence until they have covered a specific length of time necessary to «reach» the
place where they act; moreover, they lean on physical «particles» which work as
«mediators» of the interaction124
.
Another objection against the necessity of contact for the physical action could
come, as we also saw when speaking of space and localisation, from those
interpretations which claim a non-locality in quantum physics. The difficulty of these
problems leads us to emphasise the fact that, although we claim the necessity of contact,
there are not a few questions on what this means and how it is realised. The necessity of
contact does not mean that the physical actions are reduced to «pushing» and
«dragging», as is suggested by our ordinary experience; nor does it mean that reality
needs to be represented necessarily by making recourse to corpuscular images. If we ask
for the «ultimate» way of representing the activity of the physical world, perhaps we
should answer that, in spite of the progress of our knowledge an ultimate answer to this
question is still very difficult to give.
c) The principle of causality
Generally speaking the principle of causality states that everything that exists must have
a proportionate cause which can explain its existence. If one wants to apply this
principle in a complete way he should take into account all those causes which intervene
in each case. Here we shall limit ourselves to examine how this principle can be applied
to the problem of the agent cause, and to the explanation of movement.
From this particular perspective this principle could be expressed by claiming
the necessity of an agent in order to explain movement. It is convenient to note from the
very beginning that a complete explanation of actions and transformations will have to
take into account also the founding divine action which gives being and the capacity of
acting to everything that exists. Moreover, our knowledge is very limited even in
science because our cognitive apparatus, although it empowers us to reach conclusions
which may seem extraordinary, hardly permits us to give an exhaustive explanation of
nature. Therefore we should not be surprised if once again we stumble in the limits of
our capacity of representation and explanation.
One of the problems which arise from this issue refers to Aristotle’s claim
according to which everything that moves is moved by something else125
. Aristotle gives
a lot of attention to it since it has an important place in the proof of the existence of the
First Mover and therefore in the connection between physics and metaphysics. In order
to demonstrate it he proposes three arguments which are partly related to difficult
124
Each of the four fundamental interactions has some intermediate particles associated with it: electromagnetism with the
photon, gravity with the hypothetical gravitons, the strong nuclear force with the gluons, and the weak nuclear force with
the W and Z particles. 125
Aquinas formulates it in a lapidary language: quidquid movetur ab alio movetur, and uses it in the reasoning of his first
way to prove the existence of God: cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c.
aspects of his worldview126
. The affirmation seems to oppose the principle of inertia of
the classical physics according to which an external action does not necessarily provoke
movement but only acceleration or change of movement. However, one may say that
movement is caused, at one stage or another, by some agent and that its permanence is
due to physical circumstances. Moreover, according to Mach’s principle inertia is due to
the interactions of a body with the rest of the universe, and the relativity theory explains
this in function of the distributions of masses. If this is so, inertia is an effect arising
from physical interactions and it does not mean that bodies keep their movement
independently from external causes. This interpretation appears to be pretty coherent.
We can also ask ourselves how a dynamism proper to natural entities and the
necessity of external agents in order to provoke movement can go together. To answer
this we shall recall that in every action there is an interaction: the unfolding of the
dynamism depends on the circumstances and therefore on the interactions. Consequently
and in any case there are actions which accompany the activity of the natural subjects. In
the case of the living beings any action presupposes physical interactions within the
organism, and between the organism and the surrounding environment (sensations,
neuronal processes, etc.). Moreover, if we stretch our question to the limit we shall
stumble with the necessity of making a «metaphysical leap» by claiming the necessity of
the founding divine action which ultimately explains the existence and the activity of
some beings that do not have in themselves their ultimate reason of being and of acting.
This seems to be the deep meaning of the first way of Aquinas in order to prove the
existence of God. This way acknowledges the fact that the activity of the creatures
presupposes always a passing from potency to act, and that causal chains formed by the
creatures can only be ultimately understood if the existence of a Being is admitted which
is Pure Act, source of all being, radical foundation of the dynamism of all created
entities. Similarly, the second way of Aquinas considers how the agent causes remit,
ultimately, to a First Cause which is the foundation of their activity.
26.6 Action and passion
The study of the agent cause takes us by hand to the consideration of two of the
nine accidents of Aristotle: action and passion.
a) Action and passion as accidents
Insofar as we can distinguish unitary subjects of interactions it makes sense to
speak, as Aristotle did, of the accidents action and passion. For example, in the case of
us human beings it is clear that we are active subjects of the actions we carry out and
passive subjects of the actions of other beings. One can say something similar in the
case of the other living beings which have a well-defined unity and individuality. This
126
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Physica, VII, 1, 241 b 24 – 242 a 16; VIII, 4, 254 b 24 – 256 a 3; VIII, 5, 257 b 6 – 13. Aquinas
presents and uses these arguments in the Summa contra Gentiles, book I, Ch. 13, where he sets out at length the proof which
is synthetically presented in the first way of the Summa Theologiae.
consideration can be extended to the field of non-living beings insofar as we deal with
substances which are individual unitary systems, and also to the interactions between
living and non-living beings, and between parts of these beings.
This conceptualisation is applied also to the study of those phenomena which are
very far from ordinary experience such as atomic particles. Actually, one speaks of
particles subjected to the action of fields produced by the activity of other systems.
Particles interact and interactions are precisely mutual actions.
From the point of view of the philosophy of nature action is an accident which
consists in the actualisation of the active potency of a substance. The natural is
characterised by having its own dynamism. However, this dynamism is not completely
actualised in all its possibilities: some possibilities are actualised in accordance with the
present circumstances in each particular case (i.e. in accordance with the presence of
other dynamisms). For this reason action is an accident: it is something real present in a
subject, it is the actualisation of some of its potentialities without any change in the
essential way of being of the subject.
We refer here to the predicamental action, i.e. action considered as a predicate or
category, as one of the accidents. One can easily become aware of the reality of this
accident by considering what would happen if it were denied. In this case we should
admit that all subjects are continuously actualising all their potentialities which is
evidently false. Admitting the reality of action is equivalent to acknowledging that, in
nature, subjects act by unfolding every time only part of their potentialities.
We can say that through action, i.e. by acting - by actualising potentialities - a
subject (substance or second matter) which has the capacity of acting (active potency,
first act, way of being), actualises this capacity (passes to a second act).
The aphorism operatio sequitur esse expresses the fact that every agent-subject
acts according to the potentialities that are proper to it and which correspond to its way
of being. For this reason the way of being of the subjects is known through their actions.
The more perfect a being is the more perfect are the actions that it is able to carry out.
It is also certain that actions perfect the subject which carries them out at least
from the ontological point of view since this is equivalent to the unfolding of the
potentialities of the way of being of the subject. Evidently it may happen that an action
be prejudicial to the subject because it is not adequate to its nature. Moreover, from the
ethical point of view, although an action may have a certain ontological goodness, it
may be globally evil because it is ill-oriented in relation to the ultimate end.
On the other hand, when these considerations are transferred to the human field,
it is especially important to realise that actions are accidents. Actually, much as these
accidents can either perfect or be prejudicial to the person who carries them out, this
person always has, as such and independently from his actions, the dignity that
corresponds to each person. His human rights need to be always acknowledged and he
always has the duty of acting in accordance with his dignity as a person.
Passion in a subject which receives it corresponds to the action of an agent. We
may say that passion is an accident which consists in the actualisation of the passive
potency of a substance under the action of an efficient cause.
Actions and passions in the physical world imply changes since somehow they
always presuppose a material contact. Agents change when acting and subjects also
change when receiving actions.
There are different levels of causality in natural entities which have active
potencies of different types, and therefore are able to carry out different types of actions.
Non-living beings have potentialities which are studied in physics and chemistry. At the
fundamental level the present-day knowledge remits to the four basic interactions
already mentioned which give origin, in the successive levels of organisation, to
different modalities of interaction, e.g. affinity which causes the chemical bonds among
atoms, the inter-molecular forces, the activity of the bio-chemical macro-molecules such
as proteins and nucleic acids, etc. Living beings have, besides the physico-chemical
ones, potentialities which refer to life actions such as nutrition, reproduction, sense
knowledge and sense tendencies.
b) Transient and immanent actions
The consideration of the actions of living beings allows us to distinguish two
broad types of action which are called transient and immanent.
Transient actions are those which have an effect external to the same agent.
These are typically the physical actions which constitute the predicate or accident
action, to which we have almost exclusively referred up to now. In a classical
terminology the term action, without specifications, is used to designate transient
actions.
Immanent actions are those whose terminus is the same agent which therefore
perfects itself while acting. Knowledge and love are usually considered to be typically
immanent actions. Obviously, there are actions which include at the same time transient
and immanent aspects. It can also be said that among natural entities any immanent
operation has material dimensions and therefore includes transient actions. However,
actions such as seeing, hearing, thinking, reasoning, intellectually perceiving a truth,
loving the good, are usually considered as immanent operations which remain within the
subject and perfect it, although they entail a physical action as a basis. Life, and
especially spiritual life, is characteristically immanent activity; it presupposes a way of
being and acting in which there is a specific autonomy and a kind of perfection which is
greater than in any of the other levels.
With the immanent operations proper to the human beings we reach a level that,
although closely related to nature, transcends it in a special way. In a special way,
intellectual knowledge and love of friendship rise above the limitations of what is
material; unlike the latter which is always found particularised and can only be
participated by division, intellectual knowledge and the love of friendship can be
multiplied indefinitely without diminution. Actually, they increase in depth and dignity
when they are participated in a greater measure.
26.7 Causality and the emergence of novelties
We have already mentioned the problem of emergence in the previous chapters.
In nature we come across different levels of organisation each of which has new
characteristics which did not exist in the other levels and which are usually considered
as emerging respect to the less organised levels.
The emergence of novelties demands the existence of causes which may make
them possible. The natural processes which lead to the production of these novelties are
becoming better known; as a matter of fact, an important part of the present-day
scientific progress is related to this type of processes which are usually grouped under
the name of complexities.
Two types of natural causes need to be present for new characteristics to emerge.
On the one hand, there must be potentialities that can be able to emerge; for example,
for the development of a tree there must be some seeds which contain the elements
which make the development of the tree possible. On the other hand, the confluence is
needed of those agent causes which are necessary for the actualisation of these
potentialities. In the case of the seeds, it is necessary that all those factors (humidity for
water, adequate soil for the necessary nutrients, etc.) which are necessary condition for
the actualisation of the potentialities contained in the seed be present simultaneously.
The scientific progress shows that these potentialities exist, to a large extent, as
information, i.e. as programmes of possible activity which are engraved and stored, as it
were, in physical structures. We know how the biological information works, and we
can also speak of information in a wider sense in the case of non-living beings.
Therefore we can understand how the potentialities of nature can unfold when the
appropriate circumstances are present producing new types of organisations. Almost
always these are new individuals of already existing species; however, nothing prevents
that new species be also produced, i.e. new types of ways of being.
Natural causes do not eliminate the problem of the radical foundation of nature.
As a matter of fact the opposite occurs. The better we know the natural causes the more
clearly we see that nature has a very efficient, complex and subtle rationality whose
explanation remits to a causality which transcends nature and, at the same time, is
immanent to it because it places into it those potentialities and conditions necessary for
their actualisation. Only God, as First Cause which gives being to all that exists, can
provide the radical foundation to natural causality without lessening its value. On the
other hand, natural causes appear to be the ordinary way of the divine action which
wants to count on them and, for that, it gives them potentialities necessary for their
actualisation and arranges the confluence of those conditions necessary for this
actualisation.
27 CONTINGENCY OF NATURE
The study of the activity of the natural entities leads us to pose some questions in
relation to the necessity and contingency of this activity: do natural laws have an
absolute necessity, or do they only express generic regularities? Is there really chance in
the natural processes?
Moreover, these questions take us by hand to pose in a general way the problem
of necessity and contingency of nature which is one of the basic problems we need to
tackle if we really want to understand the being of the natural.
Since our knowledge of nature is not a simple copy or snapshot of the same
nature, we shall begin our analysis by presenting the kind of relationship that exists
between scientific laws and natural laws. We shall then examine the types of necessity
and contingency present in nature, as well as the problems of determinism and chance.
27.1 Scientific laws and natural laws
Natural activity unfolds around dynamic patterns. Science formulates laws which
refer to these patterns, and when these laws are well proved we can claim that they
reflect somehow the natural laws.
a) Scientific laws
Experimental science seeks a knowledge of nature which can be submitted to
experimental control. It achieves this aim to a large extent through those enunciations
which are called laws.
Scientific laws are enunciations which refer to different aspects of the natural
phenomena. When these laws are formulated mathematically they establish relations
between magnitudes which can be measured directly or indirectly. For example,
experimental laws establish relations between magnitudes whose values can be
measured directly, and the general principles, such as the distinct principles of
conservation (energy, electrical charge, etc.), express general conditions which are
present in all processes or in some concrete type of processes. Other laws are not
expressed mathematically; however, they constitute the basis for mathematical
formulations. The case, for instance, of the relativity theory can be taken as an example:
this theory postulates that scientific laws are expressed in the same way although
different systems of reference may be used.
When well proved, the scientific laws express aspects of the reality. However,
they make reference to reality through theoretical constructions (concepts and relations),
and are not just a simple snapshot of nature. For example, by saying that force is equal
to mass multiplied by acceleration, results of possible measurements are actually
anticipated in particular conditions. This law expresses therefore a relationship between
magnitudes whose definition and measurement are not given by nature but depend on
conceptual and experimental contexts constructed by the scientists.
Scientific laws express regularities which really exist in nature in accordance
with the modalities proper to each type of law (experimental laws or general principles,
determinist laws or probabilities, etc.). Since our knowledge is very limited we cannot
claim that scientific laws, no matter how well proved they are, coincide completely with
the natural laws. However, if well proved, we may claim that they are not purely our
mental constructions but a reflection of a real natural order.
Scientific laws have an approximate and perfectible character: it is always
possible to better describe those phenomena which the laws refer to, for instance, by
constructing new concepts and by improving the precision of our formulations. This
does not mean, though, that they will be mere hypotheses or conjectures. Many
scientific laws describe natural phenomena in a correct way, although it is always
possible to achieve better conceptualisations or greater precision. Each scientific law has
a validity which is determined by the context of concepts and availability of adequate
instruments. When a law is well proved within the area of specific phenomena, we can
claim that it will continue to be valid within this area although we may be able to
formulate more exact or deeper laws and theories in the same area or in others.
b) Natural laws
The term law refers, in its most proper meaning, to rules of human behaviour. In
this context one can speak of obeying or abiding by a law, or of the fact that we are
subjected to specific laws. By analogy, this concept is applied also to the activity of the
natural agents because of the much regularity that characterises this activity. One can
then speak of natural agents obeying or abiding by a law.
There is no doubt that there are regularities in the activities of nature. Since
purely natural beings do not enjoy freedom we tend to think that all the actions of the
natural agents are realised by following pre-established regular patterns with total
necessity. Leaving for later the analysis of this issue, we can say that the laws of physics
are an expression of the regularities that characterise the activity of the natural agents.
Although there is much regularity, there are also many factors that intervene in
the unfolding of the natural processes and therefore it is very difficult, not to say
impossible, that the same circumstances be repeated exactly in different processes. It can
be said that properly speaking, there are no laws in nature. The concept of law, when
applied to the behaviour of nature, corresponds to an abstraction. It is not just the
question of being aware of the fact that scientific laws are not just a simple snapshot of
nature. The problem is much deeper: in reality, nature is made of entities (and their
properties) and processes, and laws are abstract enunciations by which we express
structural and repeatable aspects of the natural.
In a strict sense, in nature nothing repeats itself in an exact way. There is no
doubt that there is much regularity which can be considered as repetitions when
considering certain specific effects. However, the repetitions are only approximate
though at times the approximation is very precise.
We are easily led to think that what is exactly repeated is what, in ordinary life
or in the scientific practice, is pretty stable. We do not realise that the configuration of
the constellations of stars changes, or that the sun is exhausting its fuel, or many other
changes which are imperceptible to ordinary experience and also to science. We cannot
even be sure that the best-proven scientific laws remain exactly the same with the
passing of time. These problems lead us to pose the question about the degree of
necessity of the natural activity.
27.2 Necessity and contingency in nature
The concept of contingency is opposed to that of necessity. What is contingent
can be in one way or another, can be or not to be. On the contrary, what is necessary
cannot cease to be what it is, or cannot cease to be at all.
There are different modalities of necessity and contingency. Let us now examine the
concepts of necessity and contingency which refer to the level of being and to that of
acting.
a) Necessity and contingency in being
All the substances of the physical world can be subjects not only of accidental
changes, in which they change accidentally while preserving their essential way of
being, but also of substantial changes when they are transformed into another or more
substances. The substance - or the substances - which existed before ceases to exist and
is changed into another or more substances. In this sense all material beings are
contingent since they are subjected to generation and corruption: they begin to exist
through substantial changes and they can cease to be what they are.
Actually, we can currently provoke transformations also of those natural systems
which are more stable in a natural way; this is the case of the atomic nuclei and of the
sub-atomic particles which are more stable and which can be transformed into other
micro-physical systems in an artificial way. The most organised physico-chemical
systems can be easily broken down, and living organisms show their contingency when
they begin to exist by generation and cease to exist with death.
Consequently, contingency in being extends to all levels of nature and to all
individual systems. It is logical that this be so since they are material beings which, in
principle, can change into others. It is because of this that one can say that the root of
this contingency is materiality which implies space-time structuring and, therefore, the
possibility of accidental as well as of substantial changes.
We may ask ourselves if this contingency in being also affects the universe as a
whole; actually, it seems that transformations of systems into others do not affect the
existence of the universe as a whole but only its parts. However, we can also claim that
the universe as a whole is contingent since, in this case, if the universe were necessary it
should have characteristics proper to the divinity. If something existed in a completely
necessary manner it would exist by itself, independently from what could happen to
other beings; it would depend on no other being and therefore it should have being by
itself; however, this can only be attributed to God. If one claimed that the universe has
being in a necessary way one would be admitting some form of pantheism since he
would identify the universe with God which is impossible and does not correspond to
what experience shows.
In any case, there are many types of necessity in the world. Although there is no
absolute necessity yet there are many types of relative necessity. Specifically, the
universe as a whole will not cease to exist, unless it is annihilated (the Christian doctrine
in this regard teaches that the world will be transformed and not annihilated). There are
also many beings which have a relative, though quite strong, physical necessity and this
occurs in individuals as well as in species and in certain types of organisation. For
example, the protons which constitute ordinary matter are not transformed
spontaneously into other particles or at least they do it so only in rare occasions. In the
present-day conditions of our world the most stable sub-atomic particles and many
nuclei of atoms are not disintegrated; bacteria have been existing and multiplying for
many millions of years defying all sorts of changes in the environment, and the present-
day organisation of our world is pretty stable.
There is no doubt that existence of many things in our world, including us
human beings, depends on circumstances which could change because of pretty simple
causes such as the collision of a big meteorite with the earth. However, if no big
catastrophes occur, the organisation of the world, as we know it in its basic aspects, is
pretty stable.
Spiritual beings have a much stronger type of necessity since they are not
composed of material parts and therefore are not subjected to decomposition or
substantial changes. A personal being cannot be transformed into another
(transmigration of souls, or reincarnation, is impossible). In the case of purely spiritual
beings, such as the angels (whose existence can only be known through divine
revelation), once in existence they cannot die; annihilation is required for them to cease
to be, and this can only occur as the result of a God’s action. Human beings, made of
matter and spirit, have the necessity of the spiritual beings so that, once in existence,
could cease to exist only through annihilation by God. However, we are subjected to
death which implies the separation of the spirit from the matter; the spirit in such a new
situation begins a somehow mysterious life which corresponds to the type of necessity
proper to the spiritual realities. Obviously, only God exists with a complete and proper
type of necessity since he and his own being are identical, without depending in any way
on anything outside him. What exist outside God are creatures which depend completely
on God for their being although they may have different degrees of necessity in being.
We have so far referred to necessity as a perfection: the more consistent
something is in its being the more perfect it is, and less it depends on the changing
circumstances. However, it is possible to refer to necessity in another sense, as
something proper to the more imperfect beings, i.e. as a sign of imperfection. We have
said, for instance, that those particularly simple beings (such as some sub-atomic
particles, nuclei of atoms or bacteria) have an especially strong consistency precisely
because of their material simplicity. On the other hand, we can now add that especially
perfect beings, such as is the case of superior living organisms in general and of man in
particular, are greatly fragile in their material being. Actually, they require a very
sophisticated type of organisation which can easily cease to exist owing to a number of
circumstances which can cause death.
b) Necessity and contingency in acting
More dependence on matter means more necessity in acting: this is a sign of
imperfection. The more perfect beings have a greater independence respect to material
conditions owing to the fact that they have knowledge and sensitivity. In the case of man
there is authentic freedom because of his spirituality. In this context necessity is usually
opposed to freedom. Man performs many actions in a necessary way and precisely those
which correspond to the automatic unfolding of his material dynamism. On the other
hand, he acts necessarily in his spiritual dimension in relation to those things which
necessarily derive from his way of being (for instance, he necessarily looks for
happiness, although he may make mistakes in the way of looking for it), and he acts
freely in those things over which he has dominion. These references to an issue that
transcends the proper object of the philosophy of nature seem to be sufficient. A more
complete study would include for instance the consideration of the possibility of going
wrong while acting freely, a fact which is not properly speaking a perfection since
freedom achieves its authentic perfection when it used to act well.
Material beings do not have freedom and in this sense one may say that they act
in a necessary way. However, a number of varied circumstances happen to converge
into material actions so that the necessity of the material acting does not imply as such a
determinist type of acting. In other words, lack of freedom is not equivalent to a
completely uniform kind of acting in any circumstance. We shall now examine therefore
this problem related to determinism.
27.3 Determinism and uncertainty
Before anything else we shall show how frequently, when speaking of
determinism or necessity of the natural activity, one only intends to highlight the fact
that, unlike the rational and free human actions, natural agents act in a way determined
by laws, instincts or tendencies. There is no doubt that this way of speaking is correct, it
corresponds to reality and does not pose special problems. In this sense one can say that
the natural activity is univocally determined (determinatio ad unum).
Difficulties arise, on the other hand, when we wish to be more precise in trying
to determine what constitutes the necessity of the natural activity. Does it mean that
everything happens in accordance with a rigid determinism? Is there some type of lack
of determination in nature?
Determinism in its classical form was expressed in a famous passage of a work
published by the French physicist Pierre Simon de Laplace in 1814: “So then, we need
to consider the present-day state of the universe as the effect of its previous state and as
the cause of the state which will follow. An intelligence which in a specific moment
could know all the forces which animate nature, as well as the respective situation of the
beings that constitute it, and could be enough wide to be able to analyse such data, could
summarise in one formula only the movement of the biggest bodies of the universe as
well as the lightest atoms. Nothing would appear uncertain to it and past and the future
would be present to its eyes”127
. Of course, Laplace acknowledges later on that the
human spirit “will always remain infinitely remote” from an intelligence like that.
However, this limitation of our knowledge will coexist with a completely rigid
determinism in nature: in principle, any future state of nature could be foreseen with all
precision by a sufficiently powerful intelligence by simply applying physical laws.
In the first half of the 20th
century, quantum physics seemed to discredit this
opinion. The uncertainty principle, formulated in 1927 by the German physicist Werner
Heisenberg, states that there are limits in the micro-physical world which prevent the
measuring of the values of couples of conjugated magnitudes (such as position and
moment of a sub-atomic particle, or energy and time) simultaneously and with all
precision. However, there are still discussions going on whether these limits only refer
to the possibilities of measurement, or they also affect the way of being of the micro-
physical entities128
. It is interesting to point out that, according to the uncertainty
principle, what cannot be done is to measure at the same time two conjugated
magnitudes like the ones already mentioned; however, nothing prevents any one of
those magnitudes from being measured with enormous precision.
In the last decades of the 20th
century the theories of the determinist chaos have
shed new light on the problem and posed, at the same time, new questions. These
theories show that, even if one admits that the physical laws are determinist, small
changes are enough in the initial conditions of the systems to be able to produce very
different results. Therefore, determinism and uncertainty could coexist. We have
actually pointed out that conditions are never completely identical. Therefore, a
basically determinist behaviour can produce unpredictable results. However, this
unpredictability is also relative: given some specific set of conditions, the fact is that
there is also a set of some specific possibilities. Actually, the theories of chaos do not
claim the existence of a pure chaos. It may also sound shocking to hear someone
speaking of determinist chaos; however, this name expresses a reality: new laws
127
Pierre Simon DE LAPLACE, Ensayo filosófico sobre las probabilidades, Alianza, Madrid 1985, p. 25. 128
The bibliography on this issue is immense. One may read for instance: N. CARTWRIGHT, “Philosophical Problems on
Quantum Theory”, in: L. KRÜGER – L.J. DASTON – M. HEIDELBERGER (publishers), The Probabilistic Revolution,
The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.): vol. II, Ideas in Sciences, 1989, pp. 417-435; S. DELIGEORGES (publisher), El
mundo cuántico, Alianza, Madrid 1990; S.L. JAKI, Chance and Realityand other Essays, University Press of America,
Lanham 1986, pp. 1-21; F. SELVAGGI, Causalità e indeterminismo, Università Gregoriana, Rome 1964.
previously unknown have been determined which are verified in those phenomena that
these theories study.
It is difficult to propose a definitive solution to the problem of uncertainty in
nature. In any case, it seems possible to state something very important in order to avoid
equivocations: concretely, causality is not equivalent to determinism. On some
occasions the existence of hints in favour of uncertainty is interpreted as if the very
concept of causality had failed, and some speak of the possibility of events without
causes. Nothing is more remote from reality if we take into account the fact that
causality includes the different types of causes which we have already considered, and
that nothing can begin to exist in nature unless produced by proportionate causes. On the
other hand, it is certain that there is uncertainty in the natural activity, so that completely
determinist laws cannot be formulated which may permit an exact prediction of the
future in the sense presented by Laplace. Some of the implications which this situation
can have in other fields, especially when one thinks of the existence of a divine plan
which governs nature, will be examined later after analysing the concept of chance.
27.4 Chance, order and complexity
We have already examined the existence of chance in nature in the chapter dedicated to
the natural order. We shall recall now those ideas which were presented there, and we
shall apply them to the problems we are now dealing with, i.e. the activity of the natural
agents, determinism and the metaphysical problems which pop up within this area of
investigation.
It is usually admitted that chance is the result of the confluence of independent
causal chains. We now claim that something happens casually, or by chance, when this
is not the effect expected from a cause: its existence is due to the concomitance of
causes which have no reason to coincide. For this reason we usually distinguish proper
causality (causality per se in the classical terminology) and accidental causality (cause
per accidens). All agents produce effects in accordance with their way of being and
which are the consequence of their natural activity: they are the effects proper to such
agents. Moreover, different agents co-operate in a unitary way and produce also co-
operative effects which are classified as proper effects. However, it frequently happens
that different causes coincide without any reason for this to happen, and produce effects
which, so to say, fall out of the proper tendencies of those causes which intervene. It is
in these circumstances then that accidental effects are produced as a consequence of this
fortuitous concomitance: in these cases we speak of chance.
The characteristic of chance is that those causes which act together are
independent from one another, i.e. there is no reason why they should coincide and
ordinarily they do not coincide. Chance is found in the field of accidental causes; this
means that, properly speaking, chance is not a cause; it presupposes the existence of
proper causes which coincide to produce the effect. However, such a coincidence is
fortuitous or accidental because nothing says that it should necessarily happen.
Understood in this sense chance does really exist in nature. Moreover, it plays
an important role in the unfolding of many natural processes. Actually, the coincidence
of independent causes is very frequent owing to the great variety of causes which exist
in nature. Chance is not due solely to our ignorance by which we are unable to
determine the causes which have produced a specific effect. Sometime, though, it is like
that since the ignorance of the intervening factors can induce us to think of a casual
coincidence which in reality is not so.
Chance is related to the uncertainty of the natural activity. Many are the causal
factors which can intervene in the natural processes, and it is not possible to foresee
which of them will intervene in each specific case. For this reason the uncertainty of
nature can be considered as a real characteristic in the same way in which chance is and
for the same reason. It is not just the question of the difficulty or impossibility of
foreseeing the future because of the limitations of our knowledge, it is the question of
the complexity of nature which makes this prediction very difficult or impossible since
factors intervene in each particular case which may be absent in other cases.
In order to know the natural patterns experimental science provokes situations in
which few factors are isolated so that their behaviour can be studied, and assumes that
the other factors existing in nature do not play any role. In this way we can know
isolated natural patterns which, in reality, are combined with many other factors. For
this reason it is difficult at times to explain very familiar phenomena in a scientific way;
in this way, on the other hand, an exact knowledge is obtained of the most hidden
aspects of the reality. The determinism of nature depends on the production of stable
situations in which some types of behaviour are uniform or regular.
Chance plays a role in the production of successive levels of complexity in
nature. There are fortuitous coincidences and they can be important for the production
of some effects and not of others. This is particularly important in the study of the
evolution and of the role that chance plays in the evolutionary process. We shall deal
with this issue later on while studying evolution.
However, there is no chance for God. As the first cause of the being of all that
exists, every thing is manifested to God, past as well as present and future. God is
outside time and these temporal distinctions do not affect him. Moreover, everything
completely depends on God in their being. Consequently, although chance does really
exist from the point of view of nature and of man, this does not affect the knowledge
that God has of everything, or the providence with which he governs everything.
In the present-day perspective it is usually admitted that there is a degree of
uncertainty in nature so that evolution is, in a certain way, a creative process. It is also
admitted that future is not completely determined by the past. This perspective is
compatible with divine providence which does not direct the course of nature in the
same way in which natural causes do, but being the foundation of their being and acting,
it makes them possible. Moreover, the disregard of providence and divine governance
makes it difficult to understand how some natural virtualities can exist whose unfolding
produces, at successive levels of organisation, always new virtualities whose
actualisation, in very varied circumstances, leads ultimately to a nature which displays
an amazing organisation at the top of which man is found.
The disjunctive «either an unforeseeable chance or a rigid determinism» does not
exhaust the possibilities. Another possibility can be added to the disjunctive «our
number has come up in the Montecarlo roulette» by Jacques Monod and «God does not
play with dice» by Albert Einstein». This new possibility is that «God plays with rigged
dice». If one thinks of God as a being which is much more intelligent than ourselves -
Laplace’s superior intelligence - who acts like us but with an enormously greater
capacity, then one would not be able to understand how the existence of a divine
providence can go together with the reality of uncertainty and chance. However, this
representation of God is inadequate: it would correspond to a kind of demiurge, or
superior being, who would not really be God. A personal God creator, conceived as the
First Cause of the being and of acting of everything that exists and acts, does not find
any problem in governing a nature in which there is uncertainty and chance. Actually,
God knows everything in a perfect way, in a way which is different from ours, and
encompasses in his knowledge and in his power absolutely everything down to the
minutest detail.
X. THE LIVING BEINGS
We shall study in this chapter the characteristics and origin of the living beings
which occupy a central place in nature and manifest, in an especially adequate way, the
characterisation of the natural through the intertwining of a proper dynamism and space-
time structuring.
28. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE LIVING BEING
We have characterised the natural as the union of the dynamism proper to a
natural entity with space-time structuring. We have seen how nature can be considered
as a big system of systems in which a prominent place is occupied by those unitary
systems traditionally called «substances». The living beings are the most important
examples of natural substances with a very special type of dynamism and organisation.
We shall now examine the characteristics proper to the living beings and the problem of
their origin. We shall first comment on the impact that the progress of biology has on
philosophy.
28.1. Biology and philosophy
The huge strides made by biology since the second half of the 20th
century have
had important consequences for the present-day worldview and for the philosophy of
nature. We shall now refer to some of these consequences.
a) Physics, biology and philosophy of nature
Living beings occupy a central place in nature. The ancient worldview, together
with its philosophical reflections, acknowledged this. Living beings feature prominently
in Aristotle’s philosophy; one can say that “the substances properly called in Aristotle
are the living beings, to such an extent that the understanding of being in general has its
roots in the understanding of the living being”129
. Actually, at times it has been said that
Aristotle’s philosophy is very biological, as if it could be applied easily to the living
beings but difficult to do so to the rest of nature.
129
Alfredo MARCOS, Aristóteles y otros animales. Una lectura filosófica de la Biología aristotélica, PPU, Barcelona 1996,
p.192.
The systematic birth of the modern experimental science in the 17th
century
began, logically, with physics which is the science that studies the most general and
basic characteristics of nature. At the time when physics had already made huge strides
ahead, biology was still in its infancy; this is also logical since the progress of biology
requires the previous progress of physics and chemistry which provide the foundations
which biology needs. Consequently, supremacy was granted to physics and at times
living beings were explained in function of the physical in a kind of reductionist way.
Even when the specific character of the living beings was emphasised, philosophy of
nature was still quite conditioned by the concepts and problems of physics.
When physics and chemistry were sufficiently ahead in the 20th
century, there
was an authentic explosion of biology, a fact which had a great impact on the present-
day worldview and on philosophy of nature. Living beings have recovered the
prominent place which had always corresponded to them, and the categories proper to
biology have been strongly emphasised. In this context, the central ideas of Aristotle’s
philosophy have acquired new strength.
This has happened, for instance, with the concepts of substance, form and
finality. Although the existence of substances is admitted in the non-living world, it is
clear that the notion of substance is realised in a primary way in the living beings which
have an especially strong unity and individuality. In a similar way, the concept of form
acquires special relevance when the organisation proper to the living beings is
considered. The concept of finality is the one that features more prominently.
Mechanism had taken, as a mould, a part of physics and declared that finality did not
exist; moreover, it tried to explain the finalist dimensions of nature in terms of
mechanical categories. However, contemporary biology has highlighted these finalist
dimensions since finality appears everywhere among living organisms.
On the other hand, the biological theories about the evolution of the species, i.e.
the origin of some species from others through natural processes, have had an important
impact in the philosophy of nature and in other branches of philosophy. We shall refer to
them later on.
b) Life from the perspective of molecular biology
The question « what is life? » is a very complex one for biology since there is an
enormous variety of living organisms and there are many different levels of life. On
the other hand, scientists do not need a simple and unequivocal answer to this
question: they only need to study the characteristics of the different living beings.
Moreover, biologists, take, as starting point, common ideas that all of us have about
the living organisms, and these ideas are a sufficient basis for the construction of
biology as science.
However, molecular biology has provided a kind of knowledge which has placed
our ideas about life at a new level unknown before. In their quest for physico-chemical
material which may be responsible for heredity, scientists direct their attention to the
nucleus of cells and, concretely, to the chromosomes. Before 1900 it had already been
established that the chromosomes of the majority of the organisms contain proteins and
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It was thought for sometime that the proteins were the
ones containing the genetic material since only proteins were sufficiently complex to
carry out this job. However, evidence in favour of DNA as genetic material had started
accumulating around 1940. By 1950 a lot of knowledge about the chemical structure of
DNA was already available. Finally, James Watson and Francis Crick proposed in
1953 the model of the double-helix structure of the DNA; this structure has been
confirmed by further works and constitutes one the most important advances in
modern science.
Since then, discoveries have multiplied: the genetic code, the manufacturing of
proteins, the information which directs the development of the living beings, the
structure and function of genes, and other related topics. The progress of molecular
biology which studies the structure and functions of the molecules which make up the
living beings, have led to the knowledge of other important aspects of the living beings
such as cell communication. This progress has fostered the development of new ideas
about the characteristics of the living beings.
Unicellular organisms are made of one cell only while the multicellular ones are
made of many of them. All cells have DNA as genetic material which contains the
information for the replication of the living beings and for the manufacturing of many
of their principal components. There is an exception in the case of some viruses whose
genetic material is RNA (ribonucleic acid, similar to the DNA but different in some
aspects of its composition). Unlike the «prokaryotic» cells which do not have a nucleus
(it is the case of bacteria), the DNA of the «eukaryotic» cells is contained in a nucleus
surrounded by a nucleus membrane.
Life, as we know it on our planet, is characterised by the DNA as genetic
material; the RNA which plays a role in the translation and transcription of the DNA
of the nucleus into proteins which are manufactured in the ribosomes of the cells; and
proteins (macromolecules made of amino-acids) which exist in a great variety, adopt
very specific space structures and carry out functions which are also very varied.
The present-day knowledge places the problem of life in a new perspective: on
the one hand, because for the first time in history an important part of the physico-
chemical mechanisms of life is known in detail, and this leads to look at the living
organisms from a new perspective; on the other hand, because now we know that an
important portion of the living beings is made of very primitive beings. Actually,
bacteria have perhaps played a central role in the origin of other organisms, and
certainly play an essential role in the biosphere. However, they can hardly be described
with the same terms which we use when speaking of those living beings which are
accessible to ordinary experience. A number of clarifications need to be made when
speaking of an organism, or of growth and development, and also of death, in the case
of bacteria. Therefore, although the present-day scientific knowledge can give new life
to classical philosophical concepts, it is also clear that we shall be able to obtain a
rigorous description of the types of living beings and of their functions only if we take
into account the knowledge provided by biology, a knowledge that takes us much
further than what ordinary experience does.
Besides what has been said, we can also mention that, according to the
opinion of some scientists, the frontiers of life will have to be placed at the level of
molecules rather than at that of the cells. This is certainly appropriate if we take into
account the fact that some of the main characteristics we consider as belonging to life
are also found in viruses. Not only, but also in some proteins called «prions»
(«infectious protein particles») capable of replication. Prions can cause a change in the
configuration of proteins and turn them almost identical to themselves; moreover, this
change propagates successively to new proteins130
.
c) Genetics and its implications
Genes are the hereditary units and are made of pieces of DNA. The number of
genes found in the chromosomes varies a lot in different organisms; and so, the
«genome» of a bacterium can contain 3,000 genes, while that of human organism
contains 100,000 genes. The entire genome is found in each cell of an organism;
however, only some of the genes are «expressed» (are active). Therefore, «the
regulation of gene expression» is very important; internal factors join external ones to
determine which genes are expressed in which circumstances from the beginning of the
development of an organism to each one of its stages.
Processes and methods involved in the control and expression of the genes which
are fairly sophisticated structures, are being known progressively better. These processes
involve not only those genes which are expressed but also regulatory genes which
control the expression of other genes. This takes us to the problem of «differentiation»:
how to explain the fact that along the development of an organism so many different
cells are produced?
As a fertilised egg-cell develops different cells are produced which go to occupy
their own place and carry out their specific functions. This fact is summarised by Tim
Beardsley in few words: “During the development of an organism, cells move, migrate
following their complex strategies, change their form and end up by associating
themselves with one another to constitute specialised tissues. A human being, for
instance, has more than 250 types of different cells and each one of them has to be and
function in the appropriate place (hepatic cells would be of no use in the brain).
However, each one of them has the same genes in its DNA”131
.
We have known for a long time that in these processes genes are activated and
inactivated. Only now we are beginning to know the mechanisms of the process, i.e.
how the activity of the genes is harmonised so that at a precise moment different cells
are formed and perform their function in the appropriate place. With Beardsley’s words:
“Hundreds of experiments show that the control of the expression of most genes of an
organism is carried out almost always through regulation of transcription, a process
130
They are the agents involved in the sickness of the «mad cows»; cf. Stanley B. PRUSINER, “Príones”, Investigación y
cíencia, No. 99, December 1984, pp. 22-32; “El príon en la patología”, Investigación y ciencía, No. 222, March 1995, pp.
14-21. 131
The quotations by Beardsley included in this section are taken from: Tim BEARDSLEY, “Genese inteligentes”,
Investigación y ciencía, No. 181, October 1991, pp. 76-85.
whose end is to copy the genetic information contained in the DNA into RNA; these are
the molecules by which millions of proteins are manufactured and which make cells
noticeably different from another one”. Beardsley points out the fact that “the main
teaching of molecular biology in the last 20 years is the control of gene expression
through regulation of transcription”.
Eric H. Davidson has been one of the protagonists of these advances in
molecular genetics; he speaks in this regard of «intelligent genes» and of the «brain» on
the intelligent gene. This «brain» is a complex aggregation of proteins, a kind of
computer, “where signals are combined and where decisions are taken on whether to
activate a gene or not”. It is clearly an anthropomorphic type of language since
biochemical entities are presented as intelligent with capacity of integrating information
and capacity of decision. Beardsley captures the following statement made by François
Jacob and Jacques Monod who shared the Nobel prize for medicine in 1965 for their
contribution to molecular biology: “The genome contains not only a series of drafts but
a fully co-ordinate program for the synthesis of proteins and means of controlling their
execution”. The same Beardsley writes that “the cells of a complex organism need to
know where they are installed in order to decide which genes are going to be expressed.
These cells should also be able to respond to situations of emergency such as an
aggression or the sudden presence of an hormone”.
The progress of genetics is interpreted at times with the bias of a genetic
determinism which, if considered in a rigid way, would hardly leave room for any
freedom. However, this alleged determinism has two limitations. On the one hand,
although the basic programme of instructions is contained in the genome of an
organism, the expression of the genes depends on multiple factors among which one
finds factors which are external to the history of the very organism. There is no doubt
that there is some kind of determination in the genes, but there is also a variety of
functions of the distinct factors which intervene in the complex biological processes.
Therefore, not even from a biological point of view is it possible to speak of rigid
determinism. On the other hand, in the case of a human person freedom allows that
person to act for rational motives and determinations of the will, although obviously our
activity unfolds on the basis provided by our genetic peculiarities. A genetic
reductionism which forgot or doubted the decisive importance of human intelligence
and will, would be unduly extrapolating some biological factors - no doubt important -,
and forgetting the decisive function of the superior capacities of the human being132
.
d) Directional information
We have already pointed out the fact that the progress of contemporary biology
has taken to the forefront the concept of information. Concepts taken from cybernetics
and from the theory of information are constantly used in biology. The genes contain the
genetic information where the «instructions» are found for the development of an
132
An interesting critique of the present-day biological reductionism is found in the article: “Biology isn’t destiny”, The
Economist, 14th
February 1998, pp. 97-99.
organism, so that the manufacturing of proteins, the formation of new organs and many
other life processes are directed by this information.
The existence of a genetic information takes us by hand to the admission that
there are realities in the living beings which correspond to the concepts of programme,
design and plan. There is an immanent directionality which the scientific progress
clarifies more and more every day. We are not talking here of those tendencies called
psychic and which are very important. We are speaking here of physico-chemical
tendencies which are inscribed in the space-time structures of the living beings.
We have just pointed out that the biological directionality should not be
identified with determinism. It is a real directionality however complex and at the same
time compatible with increasing degrees of spontaneity which, at human level, is
completed with new dimensions of spiritual nature which transcend the space-time
scope of the natural.
The directionality we find in the living beings provides new elements for the
teleological argument which takes us from the «unconscious intelligence» of the natural
up to the conscious intelligence of the personal God creator. However, this requires
further reasoning which will be done later.
28.2. Characteristics of the living beings
Life is usually spoken of as a reality with a special type of spontaneity: self-
movement, indeed beneficial to the very subject that moves. It is also usual to distinguish
in the living beings a series of functions some of which are found at all levels of life
while others are proper only to some organisms. All these are based upon two
fundamental characteristics of the living beings, i.e. life organisation and functionality.
We have already pointed out that a very important portion of the living beings is
represented by bacteria; perhaps virus should be added together with some self-
replicating proteins. Consequently, it is obvious that the ideas that follow cannot be
applied to the most primitive living beings exactly in the same way in which they are
applied to those that are more complex. It is interesting to note, however, that the
characterisation of the natural by the intertwining of one’s own dynamism and space-
time structuring, as we have proposed from the very beginning, appears to be especially
adequate when it is applied to the living beings.
a) Life organisation and functionality
If we admit that the natural is characterised by its own dynamism closely related to
a space-time organisation, one will also admit that this characterisation achieves its
ultimate and paradigmatic expression in the case of the living beings. This is logical if
one takes into account the fact that living beings occupy the central place among the
natural beings.
It is undeniable that living beings have their own dynamism. More precisely,
living beings are usually characterised by their capacity of self-movement. We have
already expressly emphasised the fact that, in claiming that the natural has its own
dynamism, we were not claiming a kind of pan-psychism. This clarification is necessary
owing to the fact that self-movement is so deeply entrenched in living beings that it is
very easy to establish a kind of identity between them. At this stage it is convenient to
point out also that frequently, in characterising living beings, one usually tends to
oppose living beings to any thing which is different from them. This opposition is
usually expressed with negative terms such as the «non-living», the «inert», that which
behaves in a passive way and does not have in itself a principle of movement, the
«inorganic» or that which lacks the organisation proper to the living beings. The use of
such negative terms can lead to confusion because there is nothing really in nature that
is purely passive or inert, or that does not have some type of space-time structuring.
However, there is no doubt that the living beings have their own peculiar
dynamism which corresponds to a particularly strong unity and individuality. They are
clearly subjects different from other subjects; they have parts organised in a co-operative
way in an organism which has its own needs, goals and tendencies. The dynamism
proper to the living beings includes the activity of different parts which co-operate in the
realisation of the goals of the living being: these parts perform functions which are
integrated in a unitary way, and co-operate in the maintenance, development and
reproduction of the organism.
All in all, own dynamism and space-time structuring correspond, in the living
beings, to self-movement which includes functional co-operation of the parts of a
unitary and individual organism. It is unusual to speak of «organism» in the case of
primitive living beings; however, and in any case, these beings are unitary and
individual, they have a very specific organisation and, in adequate conditions, perform
an enormously specific function: reproduction. This function requires the orderly and
unitary co-operation of different parts in carrying out the perpetuation of this subject and
of its activities. This is true not only in the case of bacteria but also of viruses and of
some proteins such as the prions.
b) Immanence and spontaneity
Self-movement is a characteristic of the living beings. Although everything natural
has its own dynamism, there are dynamic equilibriums which in many cases hide this
dynamism from ordinary experience. However, the dynamism of the living beings
appears clearly and it is usually considered as a fundamental characteristic of these types
of beings.
The dynamism of the living beings appears as a kind of spontaneity which.
Spontaneity can be attributed to all that is natural; however, it has peculiar
characteristics at biological level because its subjects are clearly unitary and individual
beings which actively seek what is appropriate to their keeping in being and to their
development. There is no doubt that an atom, or a molecule, has its own dynamism and
a unitary space-time structuring. They are also stable and have certain tendencies;
however, it does not make any sense to say that they actively seek to keep in their being,
and even less to develop and reproduce. The activity proper to the living being is at a
different level from that of the physico-chemical entities.
The peculiarities of this activity can be expressed by the term immanence. Living
beings, insofar as they are unitary and individual beings which act seeking their own
perfection, have a kind of activity whose effects remain within themselves and which,
for this reason, are called «immanent».
The immanence of the living beings means that, somehow, they act having
themselves as ends. They are the «beneficiaries» of their own actions. This does not
exclude the fact that other beings may benefit by their actions, and that their activity
may have ends outside themselves.
We have already distinguished between transient and immanent actions when
considering the natural activity. We have seen that transient actions are physical actions
which have an effect external to the agent, and that immanent operations have an end in
the very agent which therefore perfects itself in acting. Living beings perform actions
whose effects remain within them and contributes to their perfection; although in many
cases these actions are also transient, since they produce detectable physical effects, they
nevertheless revert to the agent which performs them. Moreover, when we reach the
level of knowledge, a peculiar type of immanence is involved. In the case of the human
beings, intelligence and will are at a level essentially superior to that of other natural
beings, and at this level we find a unique degree of immanence by which a human being
achieves his specific perfection.
c) Phenomenological aspects of the living being
We have already said that a great number of living beings are micro-organism.
Consequently, when we speak of phenomenological aspects of the living beings we
refer, in a strict sense, only to those which can be observed in the ordinary experience.
However, we expand this idea so that it may include the main characteristics of all living
beings: these are self-movement, organisation, generation, development, reproduction
and death.
We have already mentioned self-movement and we have emphasised that it is the
dynamism characteristic of living beings. Although every natural entity has it own
dynamism, living beings in particular are beings with a strong unity and individuality
and their dynamism is such that their activity contributes, as a result and to a large
extent, to the keeping and development of the very being of the subject which performs
it. Moreover, the self-movement of living beings is manifested in two aspects which are
typical of them, namely development and reproduction.
The organic makeup is another characteristic typical of many living beings. We
do not say that it is a characteristic of all because, as we have already pointed out, it is
unusual to speak of «organisms» when we refer to primitive living beings; however,
even then we find complex co-operative structures which correspond to the idea of
organisation proper to the living beings. In relation to the organic makeup we can
mention some characteristics which make it possible to keep the living beings in their
being; such is the case of metabolism, or the set of chemical reactions in which energy is
produced that the organism needs in order to keep living and to perform its functions;
and of homeostasis, or the keeping of some characteristics at a constant level against the
changes of the external environment. They are very general characteristics to which
many particular functions could be added which are present in different types of living
beings.
Generation refers to the beginning of the existence of the living being which is
formed as an individual and unitary being from other living beings. In many living
beings generation is followed by a gradual development which leads to the realisation of
the specific type in accordance with established patterns and, finally, by death or
disappearance of the living being which ceases to exist as such and is changed into a
lump of inorganic material.
Reproduction is one of the basic characteristics of the living beings which
transmit, from generation to generation, the characteristics typical of the species.
Moreover, heredity constitutes the basis of mutations which make the evolution of
species possible.
28.3 Explanation of life
Experimental science seeks explanations which can be submitted to experimental
control and which, therefore, refer to components and structures that follow repeatable
space-time patterns.
Since ancient times discussions have taken place on whether living beings can be
explained by taking into account only explanations of this type, or whether it is
necessary to introduce other principles as a point of reference. These discussions are still
going on thanks also to the stimulus of the progress of contemporary biology.
The discussion focuses around two antagonistic stands which are traditionally
called mechanism and vitalism. Mechanism in the proper sense was defended by
Descartes who held the view according to which all natural entities, including the living
beings (with the exception of the human soul) are mere mechanical machines. This
version of mechanism is clearly insufficient and has been replaced by more
sophisticated explanations which portray the living beings as cybernetic machines. It is
claimed that it is useless to look in living beings for something which falls outside the
scope of the experimental science. On the other hand, vitalism emphasises the peculiar
characteristics of the living beings, and postulates some meta-empirical factor, some
type of vital principle which should be necessary to justify the being and acting of living
beings.
Although there are different interpretations, yet it is presently and generally
admitted that living beings have specific characteristics which are not found at other
levels of the natural world. There is no doubt that they follow the laws of physics but
they transcend them.
Aristotle’s philosophy provides concepts which shed light on this problem.
Actually, when Aristotle speaks of a «soul» of the living beings he refers to their way of
being which truly has peculiar characteristics. In his second treatise On the Soul
Aristotle proposes a general definition of soul through three steps. First, he says that “we
usually refer to life as feeding, growing and getting older” and he asks what is that
makes a living natural body different from one which is not living. He claims that the
difference is not in the body since there are bodies that are alive and bodies that are not.
He concludes that the soul is “the specific form of a natural body which has life in
potency” (here, “specific form” is the translation of the Greek word eidos). Second,
Aristotle adds that to have life is anterior to exercising it, and therefore he claims that
“the soul is the first act of the natural body which has life in potency”. Immediately
afterwards, he comments that a body of this type which has life in potency, is an
organism. Then he concludes that the soul is “the first act of the organized natural
body”133
. Aquinas accepts these same ideas in his commentary on Aristotle134
.
WE have already seen what the concepts of «substantial or specific form», «first
act» and «potency» mean. We have seen how the essences of the natural beings are not
simple but composed: they exist in material conditions (proto-matter) and how they
include perfections which determine the specific way of being (substantial form). Matter
and form are not complete entities, or physical parts: they are principles which behave
as potency and act respectively. Proto-matter is a potential and undetermined principle,
while the substantial form is the actualizing determining principle. If we apply these
ideas to the living beings we can say that the soul is their substantial form, the
actualising principle of their essence, their first act which expresses the essential
perfections proper to each type of living beings.
We have said that the substantial form refers to the unitary way of being of the
substance and to the totality of the possibilities of acting which correspond to the way of
being: it is act, energy or active nature. In the living beings the substantial form, or soul,
is their first act: it expresses their essential way of being which is always in act as long
as the living being exists. In order to act the living being has to pass from potency to act:
it has some active potencies or vital faculties which empower the living being to act;
however, they need to be actualised in each specific case. When a living being actualises
one of its faculties, or active potencies, it passes to second act which is the action or
operation expressed by the verb “to act”. Operatio sequitur esse: the being in second act
which is action, is realised in accordance with the way of being of each living being, i.e.
that which is first act and which is expressed by its substantial form or soul.
We should be aware of the fact that the term «soul» has a long history not only
in philosophy but also in religion and theology. Later on we shall expressly consider the
human soul and its spirituality. For the time being we shall refer only to the soul of the
133
ARISTOTLE, De anima, II, 1, 412 a 9 – b 6. 134
AQUINAS, In Aristotelis librum De Anima Commentarium, 5th
ed., Marietti, Turin 1959; book II, Ch. 1, pp. 60-62 (nn.
219, 221, 229, 230, 233).
living beings in general, and at the same time claim that Aristotle’s ideas can be
presently applied, with the clarifications made, when speaking of the substantial form.
We have emphasised the fact that the living beings have a specific type of unity
and individuality. Although some of them live in colonies, living beings are typically
individual, have a very specific material organization and their own dynamism which is
manifested in their life functions. All this corresponds to the Aristotelian idea of soul as
essential first act of an organism which refers to the substantial form, to the original
energy which corresponds to the way of being of each living being. Of course, there are
very many types of living beings; however, they all have in common what is expressed
by the general idea of soul. Moreover, the idea of substantial form expresses in a very
adequate way the fact that this soul forms one thing only with the material conditions in
which it exists: what properly exists is the living being, while the soul does not express a
physical part or its simple structure. We repeat that for the time being we do not refer to
the spirituality of the human soul which is a case apart.
The philosophical conceptualisation of the soul of living beings is not only
compatible with the progress of biology but it also expresses in an adequate way the
peculiar way of being of the biological entities. Philosophy of nature should not be a
substitute for biology; its explanations are not like the ones of the experimental science.
In the philosophy of nature we try to represent the way of being of the natural entities as
faithfully as possible and, in our case, that of the living beings. Living beings occupy a
central place in nature; they correspond, in a particularly faithful way, to the
characterization of the natural world through the intertwining of its own dynamism and
space-time structuring. This characterization of the living beings corresponds to the
basic ideas expressed by Aristotle whose philosophy especially focuses on the living
beings.
We have also emphasised that the progress of contemporary biology highlights
the importance of directionality in the living world. In the case of individual living
beings, the existence of an immanent finality is a fact which can be illustrated by
abundant examples and which increase as the scientific progress advances. However,
natural finality has to face a challenge of different type when we examine, as we are
going to do, the issue of the evolution of the living beings.
29. THE ORIGIN OF LIFE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPECIES
One of the more prominent aspects of the present-day worldview is the
importance attributed to the theories on the origin of the world, of the living beings and
of man. For the first time in history we have theories generally accepted by the scientists
which claim the existence of a great process in which successive levels of the
organization of nature would have been produced in a gradual way.
We shall now examine the biological evolutionism according to which the
present living organisms proceed from more primitive ones through successive
transformations. This idea began to acquire popularity during the 19th
century as
evidence started accumulating which were based on fossils and on studies of
comparative anatomy.
Lamarck proposed the first transformist idea in his book Zoological Philosophy
published in 1809. Transformism became quite widespread in the scientific and cultural
circles in 1859 when Charles Darwin published The Origin of the Species. The progress
of genetics in the 30’s contributed to the formulation of the neo-Darwinism also known
as synthetic theory of evolution. Presently biologists agree on admitting the fact of
evolution although there is no unanimity about the specific explanations of its
mechanisms.
If nature is considered from the point of view of the intertwining between
dynamism and structuring, evolution appears as a collection of morphogenetic processes
at the different natural levels. At each stage of evolution there are some virtualities
which are actualized in function of the intervening factors. New types of organization
are produced with new types of dynamism and virtualities whose unfolding and
actualization produce, in their turn, other levels of organization, and so on and so fort.
All this can be looked at as the unfolding of an original information which, at successive
levels of organization, originates new information patterns of increasing complexity.
Two are the main problems posed by biological evolution, namely the origin of
the first living organisms, and the subsequent origin of some species from pre-existing
ones. Although the latter clashes with no trivial difficulties, the former is perhaps even
more difficult.
We shall now examine the scientific explanations about the origin of life and of
its subsequent evolution; we shall add some reflections on the philosophical
implications which these problems raise.
29.1 The origin of life
A-biotic biogenesis means that the first living beings were formed at the physico-
chemical level through natural processes. It is a process which is not observed presently
in nature, and which cannot be reproduced in the laboratory for the time being. What we
know presently is that living beings originate from other living beings.
The ancients claimed that in some cases (such as putrefaction) there was
spontaneous generation, i.e. the generation of some imperfect living beings from
inorganic material. This opinion was held, for instance, by Aquinas135
. However,
Pasteur’s experiments in 1860 showed that there is no spontaneous generation in our
world, and that the experiments which seemed to support it, were due to an insufficient
isolation of the material being used. When the products were adequately isolated,
135
One may read: AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 71, a.1, ad 1m; I, q. 91, a. 2., ad 2m. These texts support the
generation of the imperfect living beings from putrefaction under the action of the celestial bodies, and deny that perfect
animals, in whose generation semen intervenes, can be generated in this way.
avoiding the communication between them and the micro-organisms of the external
environment, there was no generation of any living being.
However, the problem of the a-biotic biogenesis was posed once again later on
and in a new way when evolutionism got a firm foothold. The question was now the
origin of the first living beings, a process which would have taken place historically in
accordance with natural processes in very remote times, i.e. some 700 million years after
the formation of the earth.
It is usually admitted that the earth was formed some 4,500 million years ago,
and that the most ancient fossils belonging to living being are 3,800 million years old.
There is no doubt that 700 million years is a very long time; however, if one takes into
account the enormous complexity of the living beings respect to the inorganic matter
this time appears to be quite short for the first organisms to be formed in a casual
way. Different types of explanations have been proposed for the possible chemical
origin of life. However, the complexity of the living beings, no matter how elementary
they are, is still a challenge to the understanding of how casual processes could have led
to such sophisticated structures in which there is interdependence of parts. There is no
unanimous agreement among scientists in this field, and discrepancies affect all the
dimensions of the problem.
As for the environment where life arose, the most widespread interpretation
(which is frequently presented as the most certain) claims that there may have been a
«primitive soup» in the ocean whose water surrounded volcanic islands which contained
those chemical elements most indispensable to life. The first living beings would have
originated in this kind of situation, such as unicellular bacteria capable of
reproduction136
. However, some scientists warn that this explanation presents
difficulties, and they offer other types of possible explanations; for instance, the
presence of clay crystals which would have acted as row kind of material in which the
first organisms could have been formed137
.
As for those processes which would have led to the production of the first
organisms, the main difficulty consists in explaining the formation of the first systems
capable of self-replication in the absence of those mechanisms which presently permit
that replication. Actually, replication occurs in the present-day living organisms through
the cooperation of the nucleic acids (DNA and RNA) and proteins. However, proteins
are produced in processes which are directed by the nucleic acids, while the activity of
the nucleic acids requires the intervention of proteins. Therefore, it seems that we are in
vicious circle.
The way out of this circle could be found in the hyper-cycles. These are
processes in which one entity produces the factors necessary for its own replication
through a cyclic process. There are already feed-back circuits which make this «self-
136
Cf. R. GORE, “Our Restless Planet Earth”, National Geographic Magazine, vol. 168, No. 2, August 1985, p. 151: this
article is an example on how this hypothesis can be presented as a certainty. 137
Cf. A.G. CAIRNS-SMITH, “Los primeros organismos”, Investigación y ciencía, No. 107, August 1985, pp. 54-63.
catalysis» possible138
. It has been proposed, along this line, that the RNA is the original
precursor of life as we know it. This possibility is based on the existence of different
types of RNA, and in its capacity of self-replication by combining its catalytic function
with that of «mould»: the RNA can direct the replication as well as the reproduction of
the factors necessary to it139
.
However, there are other possible explanations for the origin of life. We have
already mentioned some of them, but there are more. Although it is frequently claimed,
particularly in some books of general information, that the origin of life has already
been unravelled - and as a matter of fact there are theories which enjoy a certain success
-, the enigmas which still wait for an answer are neither few nor small140
. Some
scientists consider as enormously improbable the fact that life could have been formed
on earth in a spontaneous way, and postulate the possibility that life, or at least some of
its basic organic components, could have reached the earth from the outer space or from
some inhabited planet141
. However, this does not solve the problem and the questions
are only taken a step further.
29.2 The evolution of the species
Evolutionist theories claim that all living beings were formed through natural
processes from some few first ones. Nowadays there is a widespread consensus among
biologists on the fact of evolution although there are also disagreements, and sometime
serious ones, about its explanation.
Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1774-1829) in 1809 defended the hypothesis of
biological transformism, i.e. the origin of the species through transformation of other
more primitive ones. He tried to explain it through the heredity of acquired characters.
The neck of the giraffe is a typical example: because of the giraffe’s effort to reach food
placed at progressively higher altitudes, its neck became longer and these variations in
the neck’s length were transmitted to the descendants. This explanation was rejected
later on, although some scientists claim that in some cases there are quasi-Lamarckian
processes involved.
138
This kind of processes is explained by applying them to the origin of life, in: M. EIGEN – W. GARDINER – P.
SCHUSTER – R. WINKLER-OSWATITSCH, “Origen de la información genética”, Investigacíon y ciencía, No. 57, June
1981, pp. 62-81. Eigen and Schuster proposed this explanation in 1977. 139
Cf. R.F. GESTELAND – J.F. ATKINS (publishers), The RNA World, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, Plainview
(New York) 1993, where the different aspects of this model are studied together with the arguments which support it. 140
The difficulties are reflected in: John ORGAN, “Tendencias en evolución. En el principio…”, Investigación y ciencía,
No. 175, April 1991, pp. 80-90, where the panorama of the different proposed explanations is studied. The subtitle of this
article says that “there are very divergent points of view on when, where and, above all, how life begun on earth”. One may
perceive that the explanations which usually appear in the textbooks, have been seriously questioned. The different
proposals are analyzed and, in a schematic summary, it is said that “it is a Penelopes’ loom where new data wreck the
already established ideas”. 141
The hypothesis of the «panspermia», according to which there are germs of life in the space from which they would have
reached the earth, is ancient. In our days, Francis Crick (Nobel prize together with James Watson for their discovery of the
double-helix structure of the DNA) speaks of a «directed panspermia»: germs of life, or perhaps bacteria, could have been
sent to our planet in an intentional way: cf. F. CRICK, «Forward», in: R.F. GESTELAND – J.F. ATKINS (publishers), The
RNA World, op.cit., p.xiv.
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) published The Origin of the Species in 1859, a
work which contributed in a decisive way to a progressively greater acceptance of the
theory of evolution. Darwin’s explanation focused on natural selection. It is assumed
that in the living beings there are small hereditary variations some of which confer
advantages to their owners for the struggle for survival; according to this view, the best
adapted individuals would have more descendants and, in the long run, the small
advantages would accumulate through a gradual process until they would produce new
types of living beings, i.e. new species.
When Darwin formulated his theory almost nothing was known about the
variations he postulated, or about their inheritance. Genetics, the science that studies
these problems, was not yet born. Gregory Mendel (1822-1884) formulated his laws
which constitute the basis of genetics, at the same time in which Darwinism was getting
a foothold. However, these laws were known and valued only since the beginning of the
20th
century. Without any support in genetics Darwinism was in difficulties. However,
the progress of genetics contributed to the support of the evolutionist idea. Around 1930
the so-called synthetic theory of evolution –also referred to as neo-Darwinism - was
formulated. Thanks to this theory, it was possible to connect Darwin’s ideas with the
progress of genetics and the study of populations. Later on molecular biology provided
other basic ingredients to the evolutionary theories.
Neo-Darwinism claims that the variations which constitute the basis of evolution
are the genetic mutations, i.e. changes in the DNA which are produced for various
reasons but always «by chance» (because they do not correspond to an intention of
nature). There are many types of mutation and most of them produce anomalies which
render the new being non-viable. However, some mutations can be viable and
beneficial: these are the ones which are preserved. Since genetic mutations affect the
hereditary material (the genes) they are transmitted to the offspring. In this way, the
effects of the beneficial mutations would be amplified because their carriers would be in
an advantageous situation in the struggle for survival. A «natural selection» is produced
which is called because of the analogy with the artificial selection by which man tries to
improve the characteristics of animals and plants through appropriate crossings.
Possibly, this amplification could provoke, by the accumulation of many small changes,
the appearance of new types, or species, of living beings. All in all, according to the
Neo-Darwinism evolution can be explained by the combination of chance mutations and
natural selection142
.
Many are the problems posed by the evolutionism. Therefore, it is surprising
that, although there is a wide consensus among the biologists about evolution as a fact,
there are also disagreements about the many specific explanations. We shall mention
some of them.
One of the disagreements is about the scope of natural selection. Darwinism
interprets the different biological characteristics in terms of adaptive advantages or
142
One may find a collection of studies on evolution, interpreted in the light of the neo-Darwinism in: AA.VV., Evolución,
Labor, Barcelona 1982. On the basic principle of the neo-Darwinism cf. F.J AYALA, «Mecanismos de la evolución», ibid.
pp.13-28.
disadvantages through natural selection. However, the theory of neutralism (proposed
by Motoo Kimura) claims that many changes in the DNA, and even the majority of
them, do not have any adaptive meaning: they are «neutral» in this regard143
.
Another disagreement is about the gradual character of evolution. Darwinism
interprets evolutionary changes as the result of a slow accumulation of small changes: it
is a «gradualist» theory. However, the «leap», or of punctuated equilibriums, theory
(proposed by Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge) claims the existence of abrupt
changes which do not correspond to a slow accumulation of variations, but to other
types of mechanisms144
. In this way one can understand how the fossil record shows
important lacunae in the gradual changes postulated by Darwinism.
Moreover, it seems logical to suppose that there should be some laws or
principles of organization for an evolution which proceeds from the most primitive
organisms up to man. These laws and principles which are for the time being unknown,
should be able to «guide» such a complex process up to its present form. There have
been attempts made in this direction in which no much importance is given to selection
and chance. However, the present-day knowledge is insufficient to tackle these
problems which are objects of controversy and speculation, with certainty.
For instance, two field of research are being known better and better, and they
can provide important clues for a better understanding of evolution. On the one hand,
gene regulation, i.e. the existence of programmes which regulate the genes expression,
could explain how one change only in a regulatory factor can cause the appearance of
new plans of organization. On the other hand, as a result of new knowledge about self-
organization, the appearance of new characteristics could also be explained in function
of the virtualities and tendencies inscribed in the natural world. These two fields are
related to each other and one can hope that they will contribute to the progress of our
knowledge of the biological evolution145
.
The evolution of the evolutionist theories goes on relentlessly; every day new
syntheses are made which usually include new perspectives146
. This does not mean that
these theories are not very rigorous, and that a philosopher can disregard them. The
situation is similar to that we find in other branches of science, and the discussions
usually refer to the mechanisms of evolution, not to evolution as a fact. On the other
143
Cf. M. KIMURA, “Teoría naturalista de la evolución molecular”, Investigación y ciencía, No. 40, January 1980, pp. 46-
55. 144
Cf. for instance: S.J. GOULD, “The meaning of punctuated equilibrium, and its role in validating a hierarchical approach
to macroevolution” in: R. MILKMAN (publisher), Perspectives on Evolution, Sinauer, Sunderland (Mass.) 1982, pp. 83-
104. 145
One may read for instance: Stuart A. KAUFFMAN, The Origins of Order. Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution,
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1993. The author penetrates into the difficult areas which may require scientific and
philosophical clarifications; however, in any case, his work constitutes a manifestation of those problems which the present-
day evolutionist theories have to face, and of some possible directions for their solution in the line of self-organization. 146
One may read for instance: G. Ledyard STEBBINS – F.J. AYALA, “La evolución del darwinismo”, Investigación y
ciencía, No. 108, September 1985, pp. 42-53. The authors conclude the article with the following words: “Whatever may be
the new agreement may arise from the investigation and present-day controversy, it is not probable that it may demand the
rejection of the basic program of the neo-Darwinism and of the theory elaborated half way through this century. The
synthetic theory of the 21st century will distance itself considerably from that which was elaborated some few decades ago;
however, his appearing will entail more a kind of evolution than of a cataclysm.
hand, the fact of being aware of the limitations of the present-day explanations is the
only way of progressing. Claiming that the present-day explanations with all their many
lacunae are definitive and complete is in reality equivalent to placing obstacles to the
scientific progress.
29.3 Evolution: science and philosophy
Biological evolution and the philosophical perspective are complementary.
Actually, the scientific theories refer to evolution as a fact and to its mechanisms, while
the philosophical reflection focuses on the meaning of evolution: it analyzes its
conditions of possibility and its implications
a) Evolution and creation
The conditions of possibility for evolution remit to the problem of creation. In
order to show it we shall mention three conditions of possibility for evolution which
refer to its very assumptions, i.e. to the requirements which must have been there for
evolution to be possible.
First, for evolution to be possible it is essential that there be some entities and
some basic laws as its basis.
Second, these entities and laws must be very specific because they need to have
some virtualities (or possibilities, or potentialities) from which new entities can be
formed with new types of organization. These new entities should have new virtualities
to allow the process to go on and on along the big evolutionary ladder.
Third, the conditions which have made the actualization of the virtualities
possible, must have been there at each phase of evolution,.
Here is an analogy represented by a written work (a novel, a drama, or a work of
any other genre) which can help understand the problem. The existence of a written
language is essential for the work to exists, i.e. an alphabet, or collection of signs with a
specific meaning, plus a rule which can determine the union of these signs in
meaningful words and phrases. Moreover, it is also necessary that letters, words and
phrases, be united so as to form an intelligible whole. If it is a quality work, it will also
be necessary that the whole and each one of its parts have unity, interest and elegance.
Similarly, basic physico-chemical components are required (particles and
fundamental forces) so that organisms, as we know them, may be produced through
evolutionary mechanisms. These components must have specific properties able to
permit the formation of the subsequent levels of organization (nuclei, atoms, molecules,
macro-molecules) till reaching the first living beings. It is also necessary that new
combinations may be produced at biological level which may lead to new forms of
organization. The result is already known: the ladder of the living beings at the top of
which man is found, and this result has an enormously sophisticated organization.
Therefore, those virtualities which were present in the basic components from the very
beginning must be very specific. Finally, there must have been at each evolutionary
stage precise circumstances and a co-operation which made it possible for the different
factors to be integrated in order to produce new structures.
In conclusion, evolutionary theories do not explain everything. They lean on
some assumptions or conditions of possibility, i.e. the existence of a matter and of some
very specific laws whose virtualities have permitted the subsequent production of a
whole series of organisms which form an enormously varied ladder whose final result is
the human organism.
If we move further on with these considerations we finally reach the problem of
the divine creation of the world. Science can study how some entities are formed from
pre-existing ones, but it cannot give a reason for the very existence of the world and
of its basic properties. One may say, therefore, that the problem of creation is a
metaphysical one which transcends the possibilities of the scientific method, and which
refers to the conditions which may make evolution possible.
We claim that there is no contradiction between evolution and creation.
Moreover, we claim that the reflection on the conditions of possibility of evolution leads
to the problem of creation. There are some misunderstandings in this area owing to two
extreme stands. On the one hand, some defend a type of evolutionism which goes much
further than what science actually permits, and which denies creation, or divine action in
the world. On the other hand, some religious fundamentalists deny the possibility of a
biological evolution in the name of the Bible. However, both stands are illegitimate:
neither science can deny divine action, nor religion is competent to oppose truly
scientific arguments.
b) Evolution and finality
Evolution is also related to the problem of finality. Actually, the existence of
series of levels of organization every time more complex which culminates with a
human organism, suggests the existence of an «orientation», or «direction», in the
evolutionary process. Therefore, looking for causes which may permit us to understand
evolution in a complete way, leads us to the question on whether there is a superior level
which directs the evolutionary process.
It has been claimed sometime that there is a «global orthogenesis», i.e. an
«evolutionary trend» which has produced the results we know, and that it is possible
therefore to prove scientifically that evolution is a «directed»147
process. It is quite
147
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin tried to prove that there is a kind of ascending directionality in evolution. His arguments are
based on the existence of ascending levels of organization which culminate in the nervous system and in the formation of
the brain, and these are united to a progressive increase of consciousness. On this basis, he thought he had enough authority
to claim, as if it were a scientific conclusion, that evolution is «directed». Cf. P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, El fenómeno
humano, Taurus, Madrid 1967, pp. 173-178. It is a kind of theist version of the «elan vital» of Bergson: cf. H. BERGSON,
La evolución creadora, Espasa Calpe, Madrid 1985 (original of 1907).
evident that there is actually a series of levels of organization in which, not always but
yes under some important aspects, one can distinguish a progress in the organisation. It
is also evident that this fact requires an explanation. However, it does not seem possible
to conclude that there is a trend which has necessarily led to the results we know on the
one hand, because our world is contingent, and on the other hand, because, even in
claiming the existence of a divine plan, this plan can include forward and backward
movements, explosions of life and mass extinction. Nothing obliges to identify all this
with a linear and always progressive process.
Frequently some deny the existence of a divine plan by arguing precisely that the
evolutionary process is not always progressive, i.e. it includes successes and failures (for
instance, the majority of the species is extinct). They also add that many evolutionary
results do not seem to correspond to a plan but to opportunistic adaptations. Moreover,
they emphasise the fact that chance plays an important role in the process, and this does
not seem to be compatible with the existence of a plan. However, these difficulties
would be incompatible only with a completely «linear» plan, always progressive which
unfolds in a completely necessary way. However, it has already been pointed out that
there is no reason to think that the divine plan has to fit this model; it is more congruent
to think that, if God has wanted to produce the living beings through an evolutionary
process, this process will include all those contingencies proper to a gigantic process
which unfolds during a very long time and contains many fortuitous factors.
Elsewhere some say that the existence of a divine plan would be incompatible
with the scientific spirit which tries to explain phenomena through natural causes. In
reality a divine action is not only compatible with the natural laws but it also founds and
makes its actualization possible; moreover, it permits to understand the rationality of an
evolutionary process which, if it were only due to blind forces, would remain wrapped
in a great mystery.
The question of the existence of a divine plan is found outside the scope of the
evolutionist theories: science can study the fact and the modalities of the evolution, but
the possibility of existence of a divine plan is beyond the possibilities of its method.
Consequently, the same reasons which prevent us to scientifically claim the existence of
a superior plan prevent us also from denying its existence in the name of science.
However, the knowledge provided by science invites us to pose the question about a
divine plan.
One may understand, therefore, how Christian de Duve, Nobel prize, has replied
to Jacques Monod, also Nobel prize, who claimed that “man knows now that he is alone
in the indifferent immensity of the universe from where he arose by chance”, with the
following words: “This is clearly absurd. What man knows – or at least he should know
– is that, with the time and quantity of matter available, not even something similar to
the most elementary cell, not to talk of man, could have originated by blind chance if the
universe had not carried it already in its bosom”148
.
148
Christian DE DUVE, La célula viva, Labor, Barcelona 1988, p. 358. Some interesting reflections about these issue are
found in: Ernan McMULLIN, “Contingencia evolutiva y finalidad del cosmos”, Scripta Theologica, 30 (1988), pp. 227-251.
c) Evolution and emergence
For evolution to occur, proportionate causes must exist. In this sense, a classical
objection against evolution consists in claiming that the more cannot arise from the less,
i.e. that the effect cannot be superior in perfection to its cause. How is it possible that
along the evolutionary process new perfections are produced which did not exist before?
The emergence of new perfections is explained, in the first place, by the
integration of new factors in a new unitary system. As a matter of fact, there are many
processes at physico-chemical level in which new systems are formed and endowed with
holistic characteristics and emerging properties. At the biological level, genetic
mutations cause changes in the genetic information and, if viable, they will produce new
characteristics. Mutations have specific causes, and the unfolding of the genetic
programme is the cause of the new characteristics. In this way it is possible to explain
how novelties can appear in the organisms.
However, in living beings structural novelties are associated with their peculiar
way of being, i.e. with an «interiorness» whose relationship with a structural
«exteriorness» is a bit mysterious; in other words, there is a close relationship between
the tendencies proper to living beings and the psyche of the animals. There is no doubt,
it seems, that there is a parallelism between the degree of organization and the
interiorness of the living beings. It is also clear that, as the knowledge of the biological
structures progresses, the specific aspects of this parallelism are better determined.
However, the interiorness of the living beings is still more an object of wonder than of
understanding.
It is therefore understandable how evolutionary theories find limitations in this
area. The more directly can a scientific explanation be verified through experimental
control, the more rigorous that explanation is. However, it is difficult to submit the
interiorness of the living beings to experimental control; science must be content with
studying the connections between this interiorness and the space-time structures to
which it relates.
d) Evolution and divine action
We may conclude that biological evolution is not only compatible with divine
action, but also that divine action places us in a very adequate vantage point in order to
understand the conditions which make evolution possible.
Some authors claim that the combination of chance mutations with natural
selection is enough to explain everything: mutations are a source of variety, while
natural selection is the source of order because it is a filter which permits steps ahead
only for those organisms which are better equipped. There is no reason, therefore, to
make recourse to other types of explanation. In some cases these authors only try to
emphasize the fact that philosophy and theology should not invade the scientific field.
However, in other cases the legitimacy of philosophy and theology is denied together
with the implicit or explicit claim that science does not leave room for philosophical or
theological questions; these questions would really be badly posed questions since the
only legitimate method for the study nature is the scientific one. Those who uphold a
stand of this type are really upholding a case for scientism149
.
The thesis according to which genetic mutations and natural selection are enough to
provide a complete explanation of evolution faces serious difficulties. Actually, if
natural selection can carry out the function of putting order in nature, it cannot be the
proper cause of this order. Selection consists in letting in part of the candidates while
letting out others and, in this sense, it produces a more orderly situation. However, in
order to do that it is necessary that the candidates already exist: it impossible to select
some positive properties if these have not been previously produced. In any case,
properties must be produced by proper causes: the eyes, the brain, the radar of a bat and
the genetic information are the result of positive causes and not of a filter of selection.
One may well say that these causes are the genetic mutations which are not
produced in view of a end (they are not directed towards an end) but by chance.
However, although containing part of the truth this statement can also be a source of
misunderstandings if it is interpreted as a complete explanation. Actually, although
many fortuitous mutations are produced, only few of them will be viable, and
specifically those which can be functionally integrated within a very complex
programme which is already in operation. The fact that there is the possibility of these
subsequent enormously subtle integrations which lead to increasingly complex levels,
leaves the door open to questions about virtualities, tendencies and their ultimate
explanation.
Ultimately, the combination of mutations and selection can explain some aspects of
the generation of living beings, but it is insufficient as a total explanation of the holistic,
directional and cooperative aspects which exist in evolution.
When the legitimacy of the philosophical questions is denied in the name of
science, a scientist stand is adopted according to which there is only one way to know
nature: the one used by the experimental science. In reality, scientism corresponds to
motivations which are not scientific but philosophical and also theological. In the case
of evolution, it usually corresponds to the desire of claiming that the explanations
provided by the theories of evolution do not leave any room for a God who is creator
and provident, as if this were a scientific conclusion or a conclusion based on scientific
evidence150
.
149
Jacques Monod, Nobel prize for biology, is a paradigmatic example of this kind of attitude (cf. his work El azar y la
necesidad, Barral, Barcelona 1971) which has been subsequently defended very vigorously by Richard Dawkins, biology
profesor at the Oxford University in his work El relojero ciego, Labor, Barcelona 1988. 150
The case presented by Dawkins is clear: his book wants to show how it is not necessary to make recourse to God in order
to explain evolution. It has already been said that the existence of a clock remits to a clockmaker; however, Dawkins tries to
show that a recourse to natural selection is enough, but this is a «blind clockmaker»: “Natural selection, that automatic
process, blind and unconscious discovered by Darwin, and which we now know to be the explanation of the existence and
of the form of every type of life with an apparent purpose, does not have any finality in mind. It does not have either a mind
or an imagination. It does not plan future. It does not have any vision, or prediction or eyesight. If one may say that it
performs the function of clockmaker in nature, it is a function of a blind clockmaker…; the «designer» is the unconscious
natural selection…; our present hypothesis is that the work was done by the natural selection, in gradual evolutionary
stages”: El relojero ciego, op. cit. p. 4, 27 and 28.
However, such a claim is illegitimate because it is presented as scientific when in
reality it is not. Scientism is a kind of reductionism which arbitrarily denies those
problems which do not fit into its narrow mould.151
.
We have already seen how in other occasions some claim that evolutionary theories
are sufficient not because the legitimacy of the philosophical problems is denied, but
because of a desire of avoiding philosophical discussions in the scientific field152
. In this
case one’s claim is not prompted by a scientist stand, but by the desire of distinguishing
what belongs to science and what corresponds to other types of perspective. This
distinction is reasonable and also necessary, and is not in any way opposed or against
our conclusions. However, it is arguable, from a scientific and epistemological point of
view, whether the present-day theories are sufficient to completely explain evolution,
even if only at the level of scientific explanations.
However, it is important to emphasise that, independently from the achievements of
science, in order to obtain a complete perspective on evolution the scientific
explanations must take into account the metaphysical dimensions of the problem,
namely those which refer to the creation of the universe and to the existence of a divine
plan which governs it. This is not at all opposed to science because the claim of the
presence of a divine action - which gives being to all that exists in nature and governs it,
making the unfolding of the natural dynamism and the production of emerging novelties
possible - does not refer to the mechanisms specifically studied by science but to its
radical foundation; it is an issue which is posed at a level different from the one of
science, and which complements the latter.
29.4 The origin of man
The problem of the origins reaches its apex when the origin of man is considered.
This is obvious not only because it is the problem which more directly affects us, but
also because we have spiritual dimensions which transcend the natural level to which we
also belong.
We shall now consider in the first place the hominisation process, a term used to
refer to the evolutionary origin of the human organism. We shall then analyse the
151
Even in this aspect, the case presented by Dawkins is paradigmatic. He claims that, if there is something complex which
we still do not understand, we hall be able to understand it in terms of more simple parts which we already understand. He
adds that, if an engineer, in providing explanations of this type, “started to bore me telling me that the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts, I would stop him: This does not concern me, only tell me if it works”, cf. R. DAWKINS, El relojero
ciego, op. cit. p. 9. Obviously, this stand is a kind of reductionism, as the same Dawkins acknowledges (although he tries to
justify his perspective by saying that he admits a hierarchy of natural levels). He only takes into account the explanations in
terms of components and working, and leaves aside any philosophical question. It is legitimate to limit oneself to a specific
method; what is not legitimate is to deny anything which cannot be studied through this method, and this leads to an
incomplete and arbitrary perspective. 152
One may find an example of this type in: M. DELSOL – P. SENTIS – R. PAYOT – R. LADOUS – J. FLATIN, “Le
hazard et la selection expliquent-ils l’évolution? Biologie ou métaphysique”, Laval théologique et philosophique, 50 (1994),
pp. 7-41. The authors claim that the neo-Darwinism completely explains evolution at a scientific level which is arguable.
However, they claim, at the same time, the legitimacy of the philosophical questions on evolution and provide a basis for
them, particularly when they emphasize the existence of very specific potentialities in nature as a condition for evolution.
specifically human characteristics and their relationship with the evolutionary
process153
.
a) The process of hominisation
It is frequently claimed that the human organism originated from that of other
living beings by using the expression “man originates from a monkey”. Obviously, this
claim, in its literal meaning, is false: man does not originate from any of the primates
which presently exist, and no scientist claims this. The evolutionary theories claim the
existence of a remote common ancestor from which man, as well as the pongids, or
anthropoid monkeys (chimpanzee, orang-utan, and gorilla) may have originated.
The identity and characteristics of this common ancestor, as well as its antiquity,
are matters of discussion. It may have existed some 20 million years ago. Another object
of discussion is the time at which the two evolutionary lines may have separated. The
progress of molecular biology leads to dates which are more recent than the ones
previously thought. There is no unanimity either on the separation of the two lines: there
are various hypotheses which are object of scientific debate, although it is usually
admitted in general that the chimpanzee is the anthropoid which is closer to man.
As for the phylogeny of the hominids which reaches up to the present man, the
following sequence is taken as plausible: «Australopithecus» (four million years ago),
«Homo habilis» (from 2.5 million to one million years ago), «Homo erectus» (from 1.6
million to 200,000 years ago), «Homo sapiens» (130,000 years ago). The present-day
man would have been in existence for some 30,000 years.
As for the specific details of the process, difficulties and differences of opinion
among scientists are also found in this area154
. All in all, the difficulties in the
reconstruction of the origin of man are still very big. However, this is not an obstacle to
a generalised scientific consensus on the existence of the process as a whole. There is an
almost total unanimity among the scientists on the fact, i.e. on the origin of the present-
day man from those mentioned ancestors. But there are also important disagreements
about the specific explanations, i.e. when and how the different branches originated, and
when can one say that a specific fossil corresponds to a human being in a full sense. It is
clear that the «Australopithecus» was not a human in a proper sense; however, opinions
differ at the moment of establishing which one would be truly the first human being.
153
One may find a good summary of the scientific data on the hominization together with interesting reflections on the
philosophical and theological aspects which include an original proposal of the author, in: R. JORDANA, “El origen del
hombre. Estado actual de la investigación paleoantropológica”, Scripta Theologica, 20 (1988), pp. 65-99. 154
One can read a propos, for example: S.L. WASHBURN, “La evolución de la especie humana”, in the collective work
Evolución, Labor, Barcelona 1982, pp. 128-137; D. PILBEAM, “Origen de los hominoideos y homínidos”, Investigación y
ciencia, No. 92, May 1984, pp. 48-58. Although there are more and more data available, Pilbeam concludes: “at the same
time, doubts have increased about the degree of reliability which any report on human evolution can inspire. What kind of
precision and reliability can these reconstructions achieve? The cake, i.e. the different primitive stages of human evolution,
is for now very hard to digest”. These difficulties persist presently: it is very difficult to obtain reliable conclusions,
generally admitted, on the details of the process of hominization.
Some suggest the «Homo habilis», although it had a skull capacity inferior to the one of
the present-day man155
, while others are in favour of much later beings.
The study of the mitochondrial DNA which is inherited from the mother, has
been used to support the idea according to which an African woman of 200,000 years
ago is our common ancestor. Her descendants would have substituted other primitive
humans who existed in other places. However, these data seem to lead only to a specific
population and not to an individual woman, and some palaeontologists do not share this
conclusion156
.
It seems that it is not an easy job to clear the above mentioned question marks
completely, although the future advances of science may be able to provide data which,
for the time being, are unforeseeable.
b) Man and animal
The controversies on evolutionism have always been particularly centred on the
difference between man and the other animals. The main point of discussion is whether
man has a nature essentially superior to that of the other animals, or it is just a difference
of degree.
These controversies have a long history behind; actually, they go back to Charles
Darwin. In his Origin of the Species, Darwin did not expand sufficiently on the theme of
man. He tackled it in 1871 in his work The Descendants of Man and Sex Selection. The
chapters 3 and 4 of this work are entitled Comparison of the Mental Faculties of Man
with those of the Inferior Animals. From the beginning Darwin states his basic thesis
according to which, from the point of view of the intellectual capacities, there is no
fundamental difference whatsoever between man and the superior mammals. After
examining the main human characteristics, including language, abstract thought and the
moral and religious sense, Darwin concludes that, no matter how considerable is the
difference between man and the superior animals, it is only a difference of degree and
not of species.
Discussions continue nowadays. For example, Stephen Jay Gould claims that the
difference between man and animals is only a difference of degree and continues: “We
are so much bound to our philosophical and religious inheritance that we keep on
looking for some criteria of sharp differences between our capacities and those of a
chimpanzee…Many criteria have been tested, and they have failed one after another.
155
This opinion may be found in: R. JORDANA, “El origen del hombre. Estado actual de la investigación
paleoantropológica”, op. cit. The skull capacity of the «homo habilis» could reach the 775 cc., against the 1,345 of that of
the «homo sapiens»; however, it has been suggested that the former had the necessary physiological conditions to be able to
speak and that, therefore, it could have had the main human characteristics: cf. P.V. TOBIAS, “Recent Advances in the
Evolution of the Hominids with Especial Reference to Brain and Speech”, in: C. CHAGAS (publisher), Recent Advances in
the Evolution of Primates, Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, Città del Vaticano 1983, pp. 85-140. 156
Both stands are presented in Investigación y ciencia, No. 189, June 1992: A.C. WILSON and R.L.CANN (“Origen
africano reciente de los humanos”, pp. 8-13) argument in favor; A.G. THORNE and M.H. WOLPOFF (“Evolucion
multiregional de los humanos”, pp. 14-20) argument against.
Their only honourable alternative is to admit the existence of a strict qualitative
continuity between the chimpanzees and us. And what do we lose with our way out? We
lose only an old-fashioned concept of soul in order to gain a more humble view, and
even exciting, of ourselves and of our unity with nature”157
.
There is no doubt that there is continuity between man and the other animals.
However, even admitting that man’s organism comes from other organisms through
evolution, the specifically human characteristics continue being real: it is enough to
think of the intellectual knowledge, of the capacity of self-reflection, of the capacity of
arguing, of the sense of evidence and truth, freedom and ethical values.
Actually, the problem is not to find some criteria able to show that there is a
basic difference between man and the other animals. That this difference exists is very
clear, as it can be demonstrated, for instance, by reflecting on the assumptions and
implications of science.
It is interesting to note that science, in whose name the essential difference
between man and the other animals is at times intended to be wiped out, is one of the
clearest evidences that this difference exists since science is possible only because man
has a theoretical and argumentative capacity which is not found in other living beings.
c) Human spirituality
The uniqueness of man corresponds to some dimensions which are usually
referred to as spiritual to distinguish them from the material conditions. Human
spirituality means that the human person has some characteristics which transcend his
material conditions.
Some seem to think that it is necessary to criticise the evolutionist theories in
order assert the spirituality of man. However, problems about the spirit can be posed
even by disregarding evolutionism. Actually, we know for certain that the organism of
each one of us began its existence as one cell, of course, a living human cell,
programmed to produce our whole organism, but after all one cell. To claim the fact that
man has spiritual dimensions is to transcend the biological level. Whether we think of
each man as existing nowadays, or refer to the origin of the first human beings, the
claim of a human spirituality is based on the existence of specific characteristics in the
human person, whatever may be the origin of our organism.
The spiritual dimensions require a real substratum which is usually called soul.
Moreover, if one takes into account the fact that these dimensions transcend the field of
what is natural, they also require a special intervention of God by which he creates a
spiritual human soul. This claim is not at all opposed to the natural laws or to the
scientific spirit; it simply says that, together with those dimensions which can be studied
by the experimental science, there are others (the spiritual ones) which, being
transcendent respect to what is natural, are also transcendent respect to science.
157
S.J. GOULD, Desde Darwin, Hermann Blume, Madrid 1983, p.53.
However, they are real dimensions which must be admitted in order to explain the data
from experience and the existence of science.
Finally, it may be appropriate to mention the issue of monogenism, i.e. the
doctrine according to which all men descend from one original couple. Sometime it is
said that, by admitting evolution, monogenism would become unsustainable, while
polygenism would really be the answer, i.e. the origin of man from a number of
primitive human beings. However, the issue is more complex. Polygenism is not as
simple as it looks at a first glance. Would different beings have managed to become
truly human over a full period of time? Of course, we do not have any scientific
evidence in favour of this. It is difficult to reach definitive conclusions in this respect in
the strictly scientific area. However, it is interesting to note that, from the point of view
of science, there is no reason whatsoever which may force one to admit that the origin of
the human organism by evolution implies polygenism, and there is no difficulty in
principle in explaining the origin of the present-day mankind from one first couple.
29.5 The frontiers of evolutionism
The boundaries of the experimental science are determined by the limitations of the
experimental control. Spiritual realities and dimensions, in principle, cannot be
submitted to experimental control. This does not mean that their reality cannot be
proved; it only means that the evidence required in this case is of metaphysical nature.
This evidence leans on the data provided by experience, but uses reasoning to establish
the conditions of possibility of what we know through experience.
If we apply this idea to the evolutionist theories, three basic problems can be
pointed out which we come across far beyond their boundaries.
The first is the creation of the universe. In a strict sense, creation refers to the
production of a universe which did not exist before in absolute. This issue is totally
outside the scope of science. How could this be verified through experiments and
observations? It would be necessary to observe the nothingness, or the very creation:
however, both are impossible. Hence, the problem of creation falls within the scope of
metaphysics. The fact that creation must have happened can be proved; however, the
reasoning which supports it falls far beyond the possibilities of the experimental science.
The second problem is that of the human soul. Only that which is material can be
submitted to experimental control following the laws of matter. Experiments imply
always observations through our senses and instruments. However, the spirit is invisible
and cannot be submitted to scientific experiments. Spirit is interiorness, personality,
self-awareness, love, freedom. We well know what all this means. The spirit is what we
know best; it has been an object of in-depth study since ancient times, whereas it has
taken thousands of years to begin to know matter somehow in a detailed way. Spirit is
completely real. However, it cannot be known by submitting it to experimental control
which is the way proper to science. Therefore, the boundaries of the theories of
evolution are illegitimately trespassed if they are extended into the field of the spirit,
whether in order to assert its existence or to deny it.
The third one refers to the problem of the action of God in the world. Science
formulates laws about the world; however, the existence of the world and of its laws
does not depend on our science. Nature has its own dynamism. We may intervene in
order to provoke transformations always, though, in accordance with the natural laws.
Science leans on this dynamism and on these laws; if they did not exist, science would
not exist either. Moreover, the method of the experimental science is not apt to decipher
the key to the existence of nature, to its dynamism and to its laws. The metaphysical
reflection can claim that this key is found in the action of God who gives being to all
that exists, gives it its own laws and makes the functioning of nature possible. It does
not make any sense to deny this divine action in the name of science. It is an issue that
goes beyond its boundaries.
Other border problems refer to finality and chance. In this case science can say
something, but they are problems which can be tackled with a certain rigor only from a
philosophical perspective. For example, the partisans of the so-called antropic principle
emphasise the fact that the existence of man is possible because the basic laws of
physics, and the subsequent structures in the physical, chemical and biological levels,
are very specific. There is no doubt that these considerations are useful for examining
the natural finality; however, they need to be completed with reflections which permit to
tackle the problem of finality at its proper level which is philosophical.
To claim that science has boundaries is not a way of undervaluing it. The
progress of science depends, to a large extent, on the deliberate choice of a particular
method which limits itself to the study of those dimensions of the natural which can be
put submitted to experimental control.
On the other hand, a metaphysical perspective makes it possible to understand in
all its depth the meaning of nature in the human life; this would not be possible if one
adopted a naturalist and reductionist stand. The obvious exaltation of science and of
nature by scientism and naturalism leads, if developed in a consequential way, to an
impoverished view in which the authentic meaning of the human life is lost, being
reduced to an accident within an evolutionary process devoid of finality. On the other
hand, the metaphysical perspective founds a view of nature which is framed within the
anthropological and ethical dimensions of the human existence.
XI. ORIGIN AND MEANING OF NATURE
We shall now examine those problems related the origin and meaning of nature,
taking into account the knowledge presently provided by science. As a conclusion, we
shall consider the relationship that exists, on one hand, between nature and the human
person, and, on the other hand, between nature and God.
30. ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE
Cosmogonies have been conceived since ancient times whose intent was to
represent the history of the universe but without an adequate scientific basis. They also
posed philosophical problems about the ultimate explanation of the universe158
.
In modern times some scientific hypotheses were formulated which are
considered as the forerunners of the present-day ideas. Kant proposed the idea according
to which the universe was formed from a primitive nebula159
. Laplace used this idea
later on and suggested that the sun was formed by the contraction and cooling of an
incandescent nebula, while the planets originated from fragments detached from the sun
and the satellites came from the planets160
. Such explanation left intact the problem of
the creation of the universe and referred solely to physical processes which were not a
substitute for creation161
. On the other hand, a still limited knowledge of the
composition of the universe was available at that time, and it was very difficult to
submit these theories to empirical verification.
For the first time in history in our own times rigorous scientific theories were
formulated about the origin and evolution of the universe. These theories have renewed
the interest for philosophical problems about creation.
30.1. Scientific cosmology
Scientific cosmology is a branch of physics which studies the origin of the universe. It is
a relatively recent discipline. Evidence about the existence of galaxies different from
ours became substantial only around 1920, while the model of the Big Bang was not
accepted until 1964.
158
An extensive study on this issue is found in Juan Jose Sanguineti, El origen del universo. La cosmologia en busca de la filosofia,
Buenos Aires 1994. The study includes the history of the issue, the scientific data and the appropriate philosophical reflections. 159
In his Universal Natural History and Theory of Heaven, or study of the constitution and of the mechanical origin of the
universe according to Newton’ principles, a work published in an anonymous way in 1755. 160
In his work The System of the World, published 1796. 161
Kant admitted, for instance, in the work mentioned, that there is in the universe a finality which implies the existence of
a creator.
The Big Bang model is based on the general relativity theory which was
formulated by Einstein in 1915. The equations of this theory permit to perform
calculations of the local movement of matter under the action of gravity. For this reason
they are appropriate to describe the universe on a large scale since, in this perspective,
the universe can be considered as a physical system made of objects with a big mass,
such as stars and galaxies which are separated by huge distances. At the same time the
evolution of the systems is determined by the force of gravity.
Einstein applied his theory to the universe as a whole in 1917. The resulting
model was a dynamic universe (which evolves with time). However, Einstein, disgusted
by this idea, modified it by introducing, in an arbitrary way, a constant whose purpose
was to provide a static model of the universe (later on he declared that this had been the
worst mistake of his life). On the other hand, the works of Willem de Sitter in 1916-
1917 and of Alfred Friedmann in 1922-1924 presupposed a dynamic universe. This idea
got a foothold when Edwin Hubble formulated in 1929 the law which bears his name,
according to which galaxies would move away from one another at a speed proportional
to their relative distance (the greater their distance, the greater the speed at which they
move away from each other)162
.
The first version of the model of the Big Bang was formulated by Georges
Lemaître, a Belgian astronomer and a Catholic priest, in 1927. He assumed that the
universe was formed from the explosion of a kind of primitive atom, and coincided with
Hubble’s law in postulating the expansion of the universe. George Gamow reformulated
this theory in 1948. However, the model of the Big Bang was not accepted by the
majority of the scientists immediately. Even in 1948, Hermann Bondi and Thomas Gold
formulated a different model of the universe, the theory of the so-called stationary state;
they postulated that the universe shows the same aspect in any epoch and, in order to
explain its expansion, they suggested a continuous creation of matter so that, when the
galaxies separate from one another, new matter is formed in-between them. In order to
keep the density constant, the creation of one milligram of matter per cubic meter every
one billion years would be enough. For years the model of the Big Bang and of the
stationary state were presented as alternative hypotheses. In 1960 the origin of the
universe was still an issue and the concern of few scientists, while the existing models
were studied as a curiosity.
The situation changed radically when, in 1964, Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson
discovered the background radiation of the microwaves whose characteristics were
congruent with the predictions of the model of the Big Bang. From then on, this model
has been generally accepted by the scientists, and the model of stationary state was
abandoned. The progressive consolidation of the model of the Big Bang is due also to
the confirmation of other predictions made on the basis of this model. Specifically, it
provides an explanation coherent with the expansion of the universe, it proposes an age
of the universe which is in accordance with the data about the age of its components,
and its predictions on the relative abundance of light atoms in the universe is in
agreement with the data of observation.
162
The Hubbles’s law leans on the interpretation of the sliding of the spectrum of the galaxies towards the red color, as a
result of the Doppler effect.
Since 1981, the model of the Big Bang has been completed with the theory of the
inflationary universe proposed by Alan Guth. This theory refers to the enormous
expansion that would have occurred during very short instants immediately after the Big
Bang, producing very important effects for the subsequent evolution of the universe.
According to the model of the Big Bang, the evolution of the universe would
have followed a scheme which, in an approximate and simplified way, would be the
following. The universe is 15,000 million years old. At the beginning, it was in a
concentrated state at high density and temperature. As a consequence of the explosion,
an expansion was produced which was accompanied by a progressive cooling. In the
first second, the temperature was 10,000 million degrees. At this stage there were only
radiations and some particles among which there were very violent interactions. At the
end of three minutes, the lowering of the temperature permitted the nucleo-synthesis, or
formation of nuclei of the lightest atoms. After 300,000 years, when temperature had
gone down to few thousand degrees, the recombination, or formation of atoms, took
place; then, the radiation of photons was separated from matter and expanded freely,
equally in all directions and at a temperature which went down with the passing of time,
originating the «fossil» isotropic radiation which Penzia and Wilson detected for the
first time. Later on, the gravitational force caused the condensation of big masses where
thermonuclear reactions were produced. In this way, stars and galaxies were formed. In
the nuclear reactions within the stars, the heaviest atoms are produced which are spread
throughout the space when stars explode, and they are the material from which planets,
such as the earth, are formed.
30.2. Creation: physics and metaphysics
The newly acquired scientific knowledge has not only contributed to the formulation of
a new image of the world, but has also caused a re-posing of the problem of creation.
a) Creation as a metaphysical problem
With the model of the Big Bang, for the first time in history we have realistic
calculations of the age of the universe. There is no doubt that this will give room to
discussions about the problem of creation; actually, if it is possible to attribute a specific
age to the universe, it looks like a demonstration of creation has been produced.
Actually, the model of the stationary state was at times used in order to avoid attributing
to the universe an unlimited age, with the connotations that this seems to have in favour
of creation.
However, physics cannot determine the age of the universe in an absolute way.
Physics can claim, for instance, that the universe comes from a kind of primitive atom;
however, it can continue inquiring for the origin of this atom and assume that it was
formed from previous physical states. At its own proper level, a physicist can always
postulate, although as a hypothesis, the existence of physical states previous to any state
of the universe. Therefore, scientific cosmology cannot demonstrate the creation of the
universe.
The problem of creation does not refer to the origin of a physical state from a
previous one, but to the radical foundation of the universe, i.e. to the production of its
being. Experimental science studies the transitions between physical states, and its
methods do not allow for the study of the radical foundation of the universe. Therefore,
physics cannot say anything about God or creation, and the use of scientific arguments
to tackle these problems is non-viable. All in all, creation is not a physical but a
metaphysical problem. The philosophical problem of creation consists in determining
whether the universe can be self-sufficient or if, on the contrary, it is necessary to claim
a cause that has produced it by giving it its being.
Christianity claims that God created the universe out of nothing (ex nihilo,
according to the classical Latin expression)163
. This means that the divine creative act
produces being totally, without leaning on something pre-existing. It is not a simple
transformation of something which already existed164
.
It is appropriate to ask whether the creation of the universe is only a content of
religious faith or can also be rationally demonstrated. The Catholic doctrine claims that
the existence of God creator, principle and end of all things, can be known with
certainty through the light of natural reason from the created things, so that the human
intellect can find an answer to the question of the origins165
by its own powers.
The rational evidence of creation remits, ultimately, to a dilemma: either the
universe is self-sufficient, i.e. it exists by itself and there is nothing outside it to explain
its existence, or it asks for a cause which is different from the very universe, and which
has produced it and given being to it. The first possibility is, in reality, an impossibility:
if the universe were self-sufficient, it should have divine characteristics which in fact
does not have. Material beings are limited, change, are generated and corrupted, they
have a being which cannot give a complete account of itself. These difficulties are not
solved by making recourse to an infinite chain, i.e. by assuming that the universe has
always existed; actually, the insufficiency of what is material to give an account of itself
subsists even though the causal chains are multiplied indefinitely: it is not a question of
numbers, but of causality. The way of being of the material entities includes lack of self-
sufficiency and to these effects it is the same whether we consider one being only, or
many, or an infinite series of them.
Therefore, the physical universe remits to a superior cause which has given it its
being. Only a personal God can have the characteristics proper to the divinity. The
particular beings, limited and changeable, remit to a Being which has being by itself and
which, for this reason, can give being to other beings in a limited and specific way: it is
what we call «participation in being». This does not mean that creatures have a part of
163
Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, nn. 279-301 164
Cf. G. COTTIER, “La doctrine de la création et le concept de néant”, Acta Filosofica 1 (1992), pp. 6-16. 165
Cf. H. DENZINGER – A. SCHÖNMETZER, Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et
morum, 36th
ed., Herder, Barcelona, Freiburg, Roma, 1976, nn. 3004 and 3026; Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 286.
the divine being, but that they have, in a partial and limited way, the being they have
received from God.
The claiming of a divine creation of the universe is not concerned with when and
how the universe began to exist. As for when, the creation of the universe, reason tells
us, has nothing to do with its duration. As for how, this is also irrelevant: the issue of
creation is relevant not only in case the universe was at the beginning an imperceptible
quantum bubble, but also in case there were already much more organized entities and
processes. In any case, both issues have originated ample discussions, and for this
reason we will now analyse them more in depth.
b) Beginning in time and creation
It seems that it is not possible to demonstrate that the universe is of a limited age
because it is always possible to assume, even if in a hypothetical way, the existence of
states antecedent to any specific state of the universe. This had already been emphasized
by Kant in the first cosmological antinomy in his Critique of Pure Reason which deals
with the scientific impossibility of demonstrating whether the universe is temporally
finite or infinite. Many centuries before, Aquinas had already tackled the problem in a
radical way when in his brief treatise On the Eternity of the World he claimed that, if
one leans only on rational arguments, he cannot not exclude the fact that the universe
has had an indefinite duration, and that he can know that this was not so only because of
a supernatural revelation166
.
Aquinas asks whether it is possible for a created being to have always existed.
He examined the opposing arguments and after refuting them he concluded that we
know the origin of the universe in time only because of divine revelation. All in all, he
emphasised that the problem of the creation of the universe is not identical with that of
its origin in time, so that it is possible to know through reason that the universe must
have been created by God, but reason cannot prove that the same universe had a
beginning in time: a Christian knows that the universe had an origin in time only by
divine revelation167
. In any case, indefinite duration is not the same as eternity in a strict
sense; eternity means the perfect possession of being, above time and duration, and it is
only given in God, while the duration of the natural beings refers to the successive
existence proper to a temporal and mutable way of being168
.
Of course, if it were possible to prove that the universe had an absolute
beginning, before which it did not exist, then one should really say that the universe had
been created; unfortunately, a proof of this kind does not seem possible. However,
independently from the problem of the beginning in time, the universe is not self-
sufficient, and this is enough to establish that it must have been created by God.
166
Cf. J.I. SARANYANA, “Santo Tomàs: «De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes»”, Anuario Filosofico, 9 (1976), pp.
399-424. 167
In this context, Aquinas added that if the Christian claims the origin of the universe in time through rational arguments,
could give an opportunity for teasing to a non believer, who knows about the illegitimacy of such arguments: cf.
AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 46, a. 2, c. 168
AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 44, a. 1; I, q. 45, aa. 1 and 2; I, q. 46, aa. 1 and 2; Summa contra gentiles, II, c.38.
None of the proofs that Aquinas presented in order to demonstrate the existence
of a God creator presupposes the fact that the world had a beginning. However, in the
discussion about creation frequently both ideas go together. This way of reasoning
easily leads to misunderstandings. For this reason it is important to emphasise that the
problem of the origin of the world in time cannot be identified with that of its creation.
The problem of the creation of the universe refers to the radical foundation of its being,
and this can be solved by leaving aside the problem of its duration.
c) The beginning of the universe
According to the model of the Big Bang, the universe existed 15,000 million
years ago in a primitive state whose study seems to remit to a peculiarity to which the
laws of physics would not apply. Different hypotheses have been proposed to tackle the
study of this initial state. It is a difficult problem and, for the time being, it is not even
sure that the ways of tackling it nowadays are correct.
According to a hypothesis which enjoys a certain popularity, the universe would
have began to exist as a kind of «quantum bubble», said in a more technical way, as a
«fluctuation of the quantum vacuum». Schematically, what is claimed here is that the
quantum fluctuations of the gravitational field would have produced space-time
structures from which material particles would have been produced through the
fluctuations of the quantum vacuum. The rest of the universe would have been produced
from these particles in accordance with the physical laws169
.
This hypothesis is at a very speculative stage. It remits to the «quantum gravity»,
a theory which hopes to unify quantum physics and gravity, and about which there are
serious problems and not few disagreements170
. However, it is possible that the universe
began to exist in a tenuous way, almost imperceptible, just as this hypothesis proposes.
On the other hand, it does not make any sense to claim an alleged self-creation
of the universe, i.e. an authentic creation but without Creator171
. Does this strange
possibility make any sense? It looks like a contradictory one, and it is really so. Some
considerations on the nature of the physical concepts will allow us to pinpoint the
misunderstandings implicit in this claim.
In the first place, it is important to note that physics usually speaks of the
creation of matter in an improper way, and this can lead to confusion. Actually, one of
169
Cf. D. ANDRESCIANI, “Lo studio dell’origine dell’universo nel contesto dellacosmologia quantistica”, in Excerpta e
dissertationibus in Philosophia, vol. III, Facultad Eclesiastica de Filosofia, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona 1993, pp. 9-
88. 170
Cf. C.J. ISHAM, “Quantum Theories of the Creation of the Universe”, in: R.J. RUSSELL – N. MURPHY – C.J. ISHAM
(publishers), Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature, Vatican Observatory Publications, Vatican City State 1993, pp.
49-89. 171
Proposals of this kind can be seen, for instance in: Paul DAVIES, God and the new Physics, Dent, London 1983;
Quentin SMITH, “The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe”, Philosophy of Science, 55 (1988), pp. 39-57; Peter W.
ATKINS, Como crear el mundo, Grijalbo, Mondadori, Barcelona, 1995.
the consequences of the special relativity theory, formulated by Einstein in 1905, is the
equation which establishes the equivalence between mass and energy. When certain
phenomena occur to which this equation is applied, it is usual to speak of creation of
particles from energy or, in the opposite process, of annihilation of a couple of particles
and production of energy. These are though physical processes in which transformations
take place which are analogous to those of any other physical process; it does not make
any sense here to take the term creation in its philosophical and theological meaning,
i.e. as a creation from nothingness.
On the other hand, the physical concept of vacuum (which appears to be close to
the concept of nothingness), refers to specific physical states. Actually, physicists
distinguish two types of vacuum, according to the theories and methods in use; one
speaks, for instance, of classic vacuum and of quantum vacuum. Therefore vacuum
cannot be identified with nothingness172
.
The quantum vacuum is a physical state with a complex structure. Its study
pertains to quantum physics, a field in which there are discordant interpretations
particularly about causality. At times it is claimed that in a quantum world events
without causes occur. Once the misunderstanding is cleared, it is easy to acknowledge
that any process, even at a quantum level, demands the existence of causes to explain
their production, although the causality involved here is of non-determinist type.
The general relativity which is the basis of the cosmological models, interprets
gravity as a curvature of the space-time and for this reason presupposes somehow a
geometrization of physics. In the field of quantum gravity which tries to unify the
general relativity and quantum physics, one speaks of topological fluctuations which
would explain the appearance of space-time structures. Somehow and in a confused
way, it is usually claimed that quantum fluctuations may exist through which space-time
structures may appear in a non-causal way from which, later on, material particles may
be produced. However, without denying the scientific interest in topological transitions,
it is not difficult to note that the existence of a space-time without matter, and the
appearance of matter from a pure space-time do not make any sense if these concepts
are used in their habitual meaning.
If we put together the above mentioned misunderstandings, we reach the
conclusion that it is possible to claim the self-creation of the universe. However, this
claim is based on illegitimate extrapolations173
which intend to extract from physics
something that this science, because of its own method, is incapable of providing, since
its ideas are meaningful only within an empirical context when there are procedures able
to relate them to real or possible experiments. All this is not possible in the case of the
problem of the absolute origin of the universe from nothing. The method used to obtain
these unlikely conclusions consists in attributing a metaphysical meaning to the
physical theories on space, time, matter, energy and vacuum, a meaning that cannot be
172
Philip YAN, “Aprovechamiento energético del punto cero”, Investigacion y ciencia, No. 257, February 1998, pp. 42-45.
On can read the following in page 42: “the energy of the vacuum is just real. According to modern physics, vacuum is not
the same as nothingness”. 173
One may find a critical analysis of this proposal in: William L. CRAIG, “God, Creation and Mr Davies”, The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 37 (1986), pp. 163-175; Mariano ARTIGAS, “Fisica y creacion: el origen del
universo”, Scripta Theologica, 19 (1987), pp. 347-373.
attributed to them since these ideas are defined in physics in accordance with
mathematical theories and experimental data. Because of all this, these ideas necessarily
refer to entities, or properties, or physical processes and in no way can they be applied to
events such as creation from nothing which, by its own nature, is not a process which
relates a physical state to another state also physical174
.
Those proposals which present a self-creation of the universe as a scientific
possibility are just some of the present-day manifestations of the pseudo-scientific faith
in naturalism. The properly scientific problem is totally different. It pertains to science,
in this context, to decide whether the far history of the universe remits to an almost
imperceptible quantum phenomenon, or to other different states. For the time being, it is
not easy to provide solid arguments on this issue.
30.3 The implications of creation
We shall now deal with some implications contained in the notion of creation. They will
help us understand its true meaning, its relationship with the scientific theories and its
consequences so as to obtain a complete understanding of nature.
Creation is necessary to found the being of creatures; it does not refer to some
particular aspects of the created entities, but to the totality of what they are. The being of
creatures depends radically on God not only in order to begin to exist, but totally:
consequently, divine action is necessary as the foundation of the created being even after
this being has began to exist. The founding divine action extends to all that exists in any
of its aspects and, therefore, even to the activity of what already exists, and to the new
beings which are produced through the natural processes. Consequently, the creation of
the universe cannot consist in a simple «setting off» something which later on will be
self-sufficient.
Creation is not only necessary to explain that something has begun to be. The
divine action extends to all that is, is produced, is preserved and originated. The limited
being of creatures remits to the Being which has being by itself and which, therefore,
can give being to creatures without losing nothing of what it is. Moreover, creation takes
into account the fact that the God who creates has to be infinitely wise, almighty and
good (because he has the fullness of being). It is clear, then, that the created universe
must correspond to a divine project: it must be rational and be governed by God.
The divine action is not only necessary to explain some aspects of nature which
could not be explained otherwise; the very existence of the natural activity in all its
aspects demands it. Divine creation does not correspond to that false image of God
which has been called the «god of the gaps», i.e. it is not a recourse for «filling the
174
However, it is not infrequent to find good scientific expositions on these themes intermingled with philosophical
reflections which give the impression of taking physics much beyond its possibilities, as is the case, for instance, of
Jonathan J. HALLWELL, “Cosmologia cuántica y creación del universo”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 185, February 1992,
pp. 12-20.
gaps» of our ignorance; it is a rigorous conclusion to which we arrive when we try to
explain, in a rational way, the existence of the natural world.
Moreover, the divine action does not interfere with the natural at its own level: it
rather founds it. It is not a cause placed along the line of the natural causes, no matter
how excellent it may be. It is the cause that makes it possible for all the natural causes
and their effects to be. To claim the necessity of a founding divine action is not to
belittle the importance of the natural, or to claim that it is a substitute for it. It is
precisely this divine action that gives being to everything natural, together with its own
dynamism and virtualities.
It is easy to see how the claim for a divine creation implies a very specific
perspective of the natural world, and how it is possible to reach completely different
ideas about the being and the meaning of the natural world when creation is either
admitted or denied.
For example, the claim for a divine creation gives us the possibility of
understanding not only the existence of the universe, but also its rational character.
More specifically, it gives us the possibility of understanding the existence of an
information in which dynamism and structuring are intertwined in such a way that the
subsequent unfoldings of the dynamism produce systems every time more organized
and, ultimately, the global system of nature with all its levels which culminate in the
human organism. If divine creation is denied, we must say that the organization of the
system of nature is the accidental result of blind forces, and this is completely
unrealistic. Although there are forces which may somehow be qualified as blind, and
although we may admit that accidental coincidences play a very important role in the
unfolding of the natural processes, to claim that these factors are the ultimate
explanation is equivalent to denying a rational and coherent explanation of a nature
which is, on the contrary, permeated by rationality in all its dimensions175
.
31. FINALITY IN NATURE
Finality in nature occupies a central place in the reflections on nature. From ancient
times up to our own days, the main differences of opinion in the philosophy of nature
refer, to a large extent, to this problem. The «finalists» claim there is directionality in
nature which should be interpreted as finality. This stand corresponds to the natural
approach of man to nature, and it connects easily with the claim of a divine providence
which governs the course of the natural phenomena. On the other hand, the «anti-
finalists» deny the existence of finality in nature or, at least, the fact that we cannot
175
Edgar Morin, for instance, claims that the organization of the universe would arisen from chaos, conceived after
Heraclitus’ fashion: an “original chaos from which the logos arises”: E. MORIN, El método. I. La naturaleza de la
naturaleza, Ediciones Cátedra, Madrid 1981, pp. 76-78. It seems that Morin identifies the primitive state of the universe
and, in general, of the micro-physical world, with chaos in a strict sense. However, this identification is very problematic
because the micro-physical world, even in its primitive state, should have those virtualities whose actualization has
provoked the formation of more organized structures. Physics assumes always the existence of laws, and actually manages
to formulate them; therefore, it seems unlikely that, before a philosophical reflection, the present organization of nature
comes from a chaos in the proper sense of the word which lacks any type of structure or of laws.
know it; they also usually rejected the notion of a divine providence. Their arguments
frequently seek support in the progress of science.
Let us try to delimit first what we mean by «natural finality». Afterwards we shall
analyse the dimensions of finality which exist in nature. We shall then try to show that
there is finality in nature, determine its scope, and examine the implications of the
present-day worldview with respect to the problem of the natural finality.
31.1. The concept of finality
The notion of «end» has three main meanings: «the end of a process», «the goal of a
tendency» and «the objective of a plan».
In the first place, end designates the «conclusion» of something. In the case of
entities, it refers to their physical limits (the end of a book, the end of a road, for
instance). In the case of processes which unfold over time, end designates the last stage
at which they stop or are finalised (for instance, the end of reading a book, or the end of
a trip). These two types of ends are aspects of the same reality, considered in its static
and dynamic aspects respectively: the end of a process is a thing, or a state of things
which is arrived at through the process. It is interesting to emphasise here the dynamism
and activity; in this sense, finality means, «end of a process».
In the second place, end is the «goal» towards which and action or a process
«tends». This meaning is added to the second: not every end is a goal; however, every
goal is the end of a tendency. The concept of finality is closely related to that of
«tendency» which is used as a criterion for recognising the existence of finality. In this
sense, finality means «goal of a tendency».
In the third place, when the end is achieved through a voluntary action, the end
becomes the goal of a deliberate project, the objective sought through one’s action. This
third meaning presupposes the first two and adds to them the intention of the subject.
Irrational living beings are able to act in this way by following their natural inclinations.
In the case of intelligent and free subjects, capable of establishing objectives, this
meaning of finality is the same as the «objective of a plan».
Our considerations are focused on the finality of the second type as it exists in
the activity of the natural entities, not caused by knowledge either because they are
beings without any kind of knowledge, or because they are processes which, although
existing in beings capable of knowledge, are carried out in an automatic way, without
the intervention of any knowledge. Therefore, we shall distinguish between «subjective»
finality provoked by the knowledge of an end, and «objective» finality which is
independent from this knowledge. Our considerations will be limited to those actions
and processes which are not the result of a deliberate plan on the part of the agent and,
therefore, to the objective finality of tendencial type. Left out of our consideration are
those actions which depend on a previous knowledge, and also the instinctive actions of
the animals. We adopt this stand for two reasons: first, because the analysis of these
actions would require us to go into the field of animal psychology, and this would take
us too far away from our purpose; second, because we want to place the problem of the
natural finality in that field which is closest to empirical verification.
Finality is opposed to chance. We said that something happens by chance when
it is the result of accidental, i.e. unforeseen coincidences which do not seem to have a
specific cause. On the other hand, finality implies the fact that there are tendencies
which explain the effects; the effect is the direct result of proper causes and not of the
accidental coincidence of these causes.
31.2. How finality is manifested in nature
Natural finality is manifested mainly in three ways: directionality, co-operation,
and functionality. Directionality refers to the existence of tendencies in the natural
processes. Co-operation refers to the capacity that entities and processes have to be
integrated within unitary types of results. Functionality expresses the fact that many
parts of nature create with their activity the conditions for the existence and activities of
those systems of which they form part.
a) Directionality
Let us consider first the notion of directionality. Natural processes do not unfold
in an arbitrary way. On the contrary, they originate from specific entities and unfold
according to dynamic patterns. The natural dynamism unfolds following «privileged
channels». Of course, there is a great variety of possible processes in function of the
concurrence of the different dynamisms; however, processes move around specific
patterns. As we have already pointed out, in nature everything articulates around
patterns, although not everything in nature is pattern.
This occurs from the lowest levels of organization to the most complex ones. At
the fundamental level, the four basic interactions have a well-defined intensity and
effects, and condition the unfoldings of all the natural processes. Something similar
occurs with the activity of the atoms and molecules, and with the biochemical activity in
the life processes. When we go deeper into the field of the living organisms,
directionality reaches its peak and it is really amazing: the unfolding of the genetic
information, the intracellular activities, the intercellular communication, the life
functions, are all manifestations of a clear and specific directionality. There are specific
and directional dynamisms which also unfold in the earth and in the stars. The existence
of dynamic patterns, even in those processes which are usually qualified as chaotic, is
every time more evident.
Science presupposes the existence of a directionality in nature and actually tries
to determine its modalities. Its success implies a progressively more specific knowledge
of the directionality of the natural processes.
We can say without hesitation, therefore, that the natural dynamism unfolds in a
directional way, and it is enough to claim the case for a weak type of directionality
which, though being real, yet does not guarantee the achievement of specific goals. Can
we make a step further, and claim the case for a strong type of directionality, i.e. for the
existence of tendencies towards specific goals?
We meet here with a formidable difficulty since the specific unfoldings of the
natural dynamism depend on very varied circumstances which, to a large extent,
correspond to accidental coincidences. In other words, although the natural dynamism
moves around patterns, the results of its unfolding are not determined because different
dynamisms concur in the processes and nothing guarantees that specific results are
going to be achieved. This is equivalent to acknowledging that the results are not
necessary but contingent. In these conditions, how can we claim that there are
tendencies towards specific goals?
This difficulty is insurmountable if we think of goals which are achieved in an
absolutely necessary way. If we make directionality to be the same as tendencies which
necessarily lead towards specific goals, we should then conclude that this directionality
does not exist.
At a first glance this conclusion seems to shatter any hope of finding a
foundation for the natural finality. However, it is not so. We are simply obliged to
introduce a clarification which is decisively important at the time of establishing
conclusion about the existence and scope of the natural finality. This clarification
concerns those conditions which guarantee the goals of the directionality. There are
specific goals only insofar as some factors intervene which, so to say, «impose their
laws». In many cases, either because of the existing organisation or because of the
intervening factors, the achievement of specific goals is guaranteed within a wide
margin of circumstances. There are many situations in which there is a stable
organization and, therefore, there are tendencies towards specific goals176
.
One can speak, in this sense, of degrees of directionality in function of the
factors which intervene in a situation. It may just be the case, for example, of simple
potentialities, of capacities closer to their actualisation, or of authentic tendencies which
will lead to specific results. All in all, they are always potentialities whose actualisation
is either only possible, or probable, or certain.
b) Co-operation
Co-operation is a particular case of directionality. Specifically, it is a potentiality
which refers to the integration of different factors into a unitary result. In speaking of
«unitary result», we refer to a holistic system, to emerging properties, to new types of
176
This statements is not prejudicial to the problem of indeterminism. We are speaking of tendencies which are compatible
with the existence of a kind of indeterminism: it is in the field of quantum physics where this problem arises, and where
probabilistic laws are formulated. However, also the theories on chaos point out the existence of specific tendencies.
dynamism, i.e. to the appearing of new types of structuring and dynamism which are not
just reducible to the juxtaposition of the initial factors.
The knowledge of many modalities of co-operation in nature is one of the main
achievements of modern science in which synergy, or co-operative action, occupies an
important place.
Holistic systems occupy a central place at all levels in nature; they are systems
formed thanks to the co-operative action of their components. In the micro-physical
world, protons, neutrons and electrons are integrated according to specific interactions,
so that atoms are formed whose electrons are placed at energetic levels also very
specific, determining in this way the chemical properties of the atoms and, therefore,
their capacity of being integrated into greater systems. Starting from this level, there are
many other types of co-operation which reach their apex in the organisms of the living
beings.
Thanks to this co-operation, morphogenesis - or the production of specific holistic
pattern -, which is the basis of the specificity of nature, is made possible.
If co-operation is considered from the diachronic perspective of the evolutionist
theories, it is easy to see how successive integrations lead to new types of organisation
which, in turn, open new possibilities and shut others.
As organisation progresses, new routes are opened which did not exist before. In
this regard, we may emphasises the inconsistency of some critiques which are opposed
to evolution arguing that it is highly improbable that all the components of a new
organism, or all the variations which are needed to make new organism appear, may
coincide by chance. Actually, the improbability is huge if we think of a random mixing
of completely independent factors, as it would be the case of random mixing the letters
or words which make up a literary work. On the other hand, probability increases in a
noticeable way when the components are not independent, when there are co-operative
tendencies, and when each achievement results in new co-operative potentialities which
did not exist before and which are more and more specific. Probabilities are even
greater, when one takes into account the fact that, besides the simple co-operation, there
is a greater degree of directionality in which there can be regulatory factors whose
variations permit perhaps to explain the simultaneous production of a whole collection
of co-ordinated changes. This greater degree of directionality is what we call
functionality.
c) Functionality
We usually speak of «functionality» to express the fact that a part plays a certain
role within a greater whole. Nature is organized in such a way that there are systems
with a notable level of functionality. Moreover, one can speak also of the functionality
of nature as a whole insofar as it provides those conditions which make human life
possible.
There is a close relationship between structure and function, because the function
of a part obviously depends on its structural characteristics. In our case this is
particularly relevant because our analysis focuses on the natural structuring which
provides the basis for a high degree of functionality.
The existence of functionality in the living beings is evident. Any treatise on
biology is actually a systematic exposition of the functionality in the living beings.
Can one speak of functionality at the physico-chemical level? Obviously, the
systems of this level do not have the typical characteristics of the living beings;
therefore, it does not seem logical to claim that they have the same type of functionality
of the living beings. For instance, it makes sense to speak of the functions of the red
blood cells, or of the liver or of the nervous system; however, it sounds paradoxical to
speak of the functions that an electron performs in the atom, or that an atom performs in
the molecule. The reasons for this difference are evident: a living being has typical
tendencies whose realization is made possible thanks to the functions that its
components perform. On the other hand, it does not seem possible to attribute similar
tendencies to physico-chemical entities.
However, it is possible to speak of functionality even in the case of physico-
chemical entities if one takes into account their twofold type of integration with the
biological level, as components and as environment. The functionality of the living
beings depends on their physico-chemical components, and the exercise of this
functionality is only possible when there is an environment which offers the
indispensable, or convenient, conditions. In the first case (components), one may speak
of «internal functionality», while in the second case (environment), one may speak of an
«external functionality».
We can take our reflections much further if we consider that different natural
systems are integrated into greater systems. Insofar as a whole collection of natural
entities can be considered as an authentic system, its components can be said to have an
«internal functionality». It is the case, for instance, of the ecosystems in which there are
living beings (the various species which live in it) and non-living beings (the
environmental factors); or of the biosphere whose components extend to the lithosphere,
atmosphere and oceans, besides the living beings. One can also speak of the total system
of nature since there are close relationships of dependence among many of its parts
(these relationships are especially close from the evolutionary point of view).
These reflections are useful to solve a problem which is usually mentioned when
speaking of finality. Actually, it is usually said that many cases of apparent finality, in
reality, are no more than examples of an «external usefulness», and cannot be used for
arguing in favour of finality. This objection is partly right; it would not be correct, for
instance, to speak of «natural» finality in relation to a climate or a vegetation favourable
to certain species. However, many cases of «external usefulness» become cases of
«internal functionality» if they are conditions which become integrated, as components,
into greater systems. If we continue with the previous example, specific climatic
conditions and the existence of plants are indispensable for the human existence;
therefore, in considering systems which include human life, climatic conditions and
plants become components with an authentic internal functionality.
Of course, there are degrees of functionality. For example, some functions are
completely necessary for the survival of the organisms in which they take place, while
others, on the other hand, are only convenient. Something similar occurs when we
consider greater systems.
Functionality is the dynamic aspect of structuring. The structuring of the
organisms and of their parts is the basis of their functionality, and this is a manifestation
of an intertwining between dynamism and structuring. It is not necessary to consider
more examples which are everywhere in the living beings. On the other hand, it is
convenient to consider the functionality of the different natural levels since some are
conditions of possibility for others.
Actually, to say that there is continuity among the different levels of nature
means that some are conditions of possibility for others (not in all their aspects, but only
in some or as a whole). The physico-chemical level provides the components of all the
others. The astrophysical level provides the components of the geological one which
performs, in part, a similar function with respect to the biological one. The astrophysical
and the geological levels provide the necessary environment for the existence of the
biological one. At biological level, some organisms are conditions of possibility for
others: for example, plants are indispensable for the life of the heterotrophs, i.e. for all
the other living beings.
If we now look at the conditions of possibility of the human life, we easily see
how the organisation of the natural levels acquires an obvious meaning. We are not
trying to say that the existence of each component of nature should be explained in
function of particular human conveniences: this would be a naïve and unsustainable
anthropocentrism. However, there is something like a legitimate anthropocentrism
which considers the human person as the apex of nature, and which acknowledges the
fact that the existence of man is possible only because there is a grand functionality in
which all the other levels of nature are involved. Therefore, if one acknowledges the
great value of human life, it is then possible to attribute a meaning to the organisation of
nature in function of the human life.
There is not only functionality in nature, but also a noticeable one. We shall not
delve with particular examples which are, in all other respects, very many. The progress
of molecular biology has contributed to the appreciation of the huge level of
sophistication of the biological structures and of their respective functionality177
. These
are co-ordinated in such a way as to involve whole series of processes, and this co-
ordination is carried out with an admirable precision. One can claim that, in many
aspects, the functional organisation of nature far exceeds human realisations in variety,
richness, harmony, efficiency, simplicity, beauty and imagination.
177
Jacques MONOD provides, in his already mentioned Chance and Necessity, abundant examples which were multiplied
in the subsequent decades. What he denies is the fact that this functionality corresponds to a plan; however, his work points
out the fact that even those who oppose the existence of a superior plan admit that there is in nature a very notable degree of
directionality, cooperation and functionality, and that the scientific progress highlights, ever more widely, the existence of
these characteristics in nature.
31.3. Existence and scope of natural finality
Can we claim that there is finality in nature? And if the answer is yes, what does it
consist in, and what is its scope?
If we take into account the previous considerations it is not difficult to answer
these questions. Actually, we have analysed the issues of directionality, co-operation
and functionality which exist in nature; now we are just left with the task of carrying out
a synthesis of the results of this analysis and of examining its implications.
There is directionality in nature, in the weak sense as well as in the strong one.
The existence of a weak directionality means that natural processes articulate around
patterns, and that there are, therefore, general tendencies whose actualisation depends on
the factors which intervene in each case. When processes unfold in organised systems
which are sufficiently stable, there is, besides, a strong directionality, i.e. tendencies
towards well-defined specific goals.
There is also a special type of directionality called co-operation. Natural entities,
as well as processes, manifest a co-operation which is able to integrate them into new
unitary results. Moreover, this co-operation extends to all levels of the natural
organisation.
Finally, there is functionality in all unitary systems and processes. The
components mutually co-operate rendering the activity of each one of them and of the
whole possible. This functionality is evident in the case of individual organisms, but it
also extends to greater systems and to the total system of nature as well owing to the
continuity and mutual dependence that exists among the natural levels. When one
considers nature as condition of possibility for the human life, one can claim that the rest
of nature has functionality with respect to man.
This synthesis expresses the meaning and scope of natural finality, as we
understand it here. We shall now add some considerations in order to specify the scope
of our conclusion.
One may think that natural finality, as we have just characterised it, is just a
collection of characteristics of nature whose existence is evident. Actually, this is so.
However, there is another problem related to natural finality, i.e. the problem of its
explanation. This problem requires further considerations which enter the fields of
metaphysics and natural theology; we shall mention these considerations when tackling
the proof of the existence of God which starts from nature. For the time being, we have
limited ourselves to examining, in a rigorous and objective way, the dimensions of
finality in nature in order to establish the basis on which a further reflection can be
carried out. Therefore, if we have managed to include in our conclusion only those
aspects with which everyone agrees, this is certainly an indication of the fact that we
have succeeded in our intent.
It is important to note now that directionality, co-operation and functionality are
dimensions which refer to the way of being of the natural entities and processes: they
correspond to their dynamism and structuring, they are not something added on the top
of them, nor are they accidental results; they are constitutive dimensions of the natural
world. Properly speaking, they are ways of acting which manifest ways of being. One
can speak of directionality and co-operation because there are specific potentialities of
tendencial type whose actualisation is not realised in a necessary way but in function of
the circumstances. Functionality corresponds to the unfolding of these tendencies when
those circumstances which permit the existence of a stable organisation, are present.
We can say, all in all, that the concept of natural finality, as we have described it,
represents real dimensions of nature, and that these dimensions refer to the way of
acting of the natural world and, therefore, to its way of being. We add now that these
dimensions have to be taken into account if one wants to have a reliable representation
of nature, since these dimensions express important characteristics of the natural world.
If they are disregarded, it will not be possible to have an adequately realistic picture of
the dynamic and tendencial character of nature which leads to the appearance of systems
whose organization has a high degree of functionality.
31.4 Natural finality vis-à-vis the present-day worldview
Three are the main fields in which the natural finality meets with challenges and
confirmations in the present-day worldview: cosmology, evolution and self-
organization.
a) Finality and cosmology
The model of the Big Bang and the present-day physics clearly show how the existence
of nature, as we know it, depends on a whole series of coincidences and equilibriums. If
the proportions of matter and anti-matter at the beginning of the universe had been
slightly different, or if the mass of the neutron were not slightly greater than that of the
proton, or if there were no specific physico-chemical properties at present as well as in
the past, life on earth and our own existence would not have been produced.
On this basis, the so-called antropic principle has been proposed. In 1955, G.J.
Whitrow emphasised the fact that scientific explanations which are incompatible with
those results that have produced our world, are inadmissible. Robert H. Dicke used this
idea in 1957, arguing that the biological factors pose conditions to the values of the
basic physical constants. In 1974, Brandon Carter proposed the expression antropic
principle, stating that man does not occupy
a central place in the universe but, yes, a privileged one. John D. Barrow and Frank J.
Tipler published a book in 1986 where they expound on a long defence of the antropic
principle178
.
One usually distinguishes between a weak formulation of the antropic principle
and a strong one. In its weak, or moderate, formulation this principle claims that the
178
John D. BARROW and Frank J. TIPLER, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986.
initial conditions of the universe, as well as its laws, must be compatible with the
existence of the nature which we observe, including ourselves. The conditions necessary
for the existence of the human life encompass a wide collection of physical, chemical,
geological, astronomical and biological factors which are very specific. This moderate
version simply claims that there must have been - and are still there -, the conditions
necessary for our existence which is a certain fact. This formulation of the antropic
principle can be useful as a heuristic guide in order to exclude, in the scientific study,
any thing which is incompatible with the characteristics which, in fact, nature has.
In its strong version, this principle postulates, somehow, the existence of a
finality which encompasses the whole process of formation of nature. There is nothing
objectionable to this claim if it is formulated as a philosophical reflection based on the
data provided by science. However, at times, those who defend some of the strong
versions of this principle seem to try to present it as if it were part of science, against
which not few scientists protest and rightly so. In some occasions, a strong version of
this principle is defended without admitting, on the other hand, the existence of a
personal God; this has originated a confused stand with a more or less pantheistic
character.
In any case, the popularity of the antropic principle nowadays shows clearly that
it is quite difficult to leave aside the dimensions of finality in nature.
b) Finality at biological level
Although the progress of biology makes it possible for us to know more and more about
the dimensions of finality in nature, one of the main objections against the natural
finality comes from the theory of evolution. We have already mentioned this problem
when studying evolution. We shall now add some complementary considerations.
The argument against finality posed by evolutionism stems from the fact that,
according to evolutionism, the origin of living organisms can be explained in terms of
efficient natural causes through evolution from less organized forms, and more
specifically, as the result of the combination of fortuitous variations and natural
selection. Novelties would be produced by chance, and the adaptive competition would
cause the survival only of the fittest organisms, giving the impression of a programmed
progress.
According to widespread interpretations, evolutionism can remove finality from
the biological world which was its last redoubt. Evolution would render useless any
finalist explanation because the apparent finality of the living beings can be explained
through their evolutionary origin. Moreover, one cannot claim that man is the end of
evolution since evolution depends on fortuitous and unforeseeable factors. Finally,
evolution would also invalidate the teleological argument (divine plan) which can be
substituted by naturalist explanations (the combination of chance and necessity)179
. We
179
We shall not detain ourselves more in details on the evolutionist theories because we have already analyzed them
previously. We have also referred here to the scientist stands of Jacques MONOD (in his work Chance and Necessity) and
shall now examine these three objections with the intent of showing that evolution does
not eliminate finality.
First, evolution does not provide a complete explanation of natural finality.
Actually, evolution does not explain how there may be in nature some very specific
virtualities whose actualisation leads to new virtualities which are also very specific, and
so on and so fort. Evolution becomes unintelligible if one does not admit the existence
of tendencies and co-operation. Evolution does not explain what constitutes the natural
dynamism which is highly specific and which forms its basis, nor does it explain where
this dynamism comes from. The explanation of the origins is only one part of the
explanation of finality. On the other hand, be it as it may, organisms show a high degree
of finality, and the recourse to the binomial chance-selection is not sufficient to
completely explain the production of such a sophisticated, coordinated and functional
organization.
Second, evolution is not incompatible with the notion that man occupies a
central place in nature. There is no doubt that man, as the goal of evolution, is a
contingent result. If we consider the natural conditions which make the human existence
possible, there was a time in which they did not exist, there will be a time in which they
will not exists, and they could have never existed. However, man is at the apex of the
evolutionary process, not under any aspect but in relation to the subtlety of the material
organization and, without doubt, in relation to the spiritual dimensions which transcend
the field of the natural world. Moreover, nothing is opposed to the fact that man may
have been the goal foreseen by a superior plan which, although acting through natural
causes, nevertheless is above them.
Third, evolution is compatible with the existence of a God creator and with a
consequent divine plan for creation since evolutionism is placed at a different level.
This is acknowledged by almost all evolutionists, though they may be agnostic.
Evolution may be incompatible only with a «static creation» (according to which nature
may have been created in its present state) or with a «linear plan» (evolution may be
always linear, progressive and perfect under any aspect). One understands how only
some fundamentalists may deny the compatibility between evolution and divine plan
who hold quite a literal interpretation of the biblical story, and some scientists and
philosophers who hold scientist stands. We may say also that the evolutionary process
cannot be easily understood unless there is some kind of direction or plan involved. This
process presupposes the existence of very specific initial potentialities whose subsequent
actualizations over an enormously long period of time lead to new potentialities which
are again very specific, and so on and so fort many times. Moreover, the coincidence of
many adequate factors was necessary to permit this enormous chain of actualisations of
potentialities.
c) Finality and self-organisation
of Richard DAWKINS (in his work The Blind Clock); they are two representatives of anti-finalism which is presented as
being supported by biology. According to the radical anti-finalism defended by Monod, science is based on the postulate of
objectivity which excludes any type of «project» or superior plan: if to this scientism is added, one can conclude (as Monod
does) that there is no plan. Dawkins reaches the same conclusion, and emphasizes the directing role of the natural selection
in the evolutionary process; he claims that this factor is enough to explain the present organization of the living beings.
The new paradigm of the self-organisation which has become widespread nowadays
encompasses a collection of different theories relative to the different levels of nature.
The basic idea - from which the name ‘self-organisation’ is taken -, is the spontaneous
formation of order from states of lesser order.
This paradigm can be summarized in few words in the following way: matter has
its own dynamism which, in adequate conditions, originates synergic and cooperative
phenomena through which an order of superior type (more complex and more
organized) is produced. The universe would have been formed in this way with all its
parts.
What is emphasised here is, therefore, the fact nature has its own dynamism
which unfolds in a directional way. Actually, self-organization is based on the existence
of tendencies and co-operation.
However, contingency is also emphasised. The actualisation of tendencies
depends on fortuitous circumstances. The results do not appear in a necessary way: other
results could appear if the circumstances were different. The complexity of the real
processes clearly shows the contingency of the subsequent stages of the evolutionary
process.
A key element in the new paradigm is the central role played by information: the
natural dynamism unfolds structurally according to patterns. This unfolding produces
new space structures which, in turn, are sources of new dynamisms. All this works
through an information stored structurally, and unfolds through processes in which the
information is coded and decoded, transcribed, translated and integrated. Information
becomes in this way a materialised rationality, because it contains and transmits
instructions, directs and controls, and all this is done through space-time structures.
In this way philosophy of nature finds newly opened horizons: it is not only
possible to pose the main philosophical problems and give the old answers once again,
but also to formulate them in a different way and to expand them into a much richer
context. Finality occupies a central place in this perspective because it emphasises the
importance of the dynamic, holistic and directional factors, as well as the role played by
information.
Self-organisation is understood at times as a kind of «naturalist pan-Darwinism»
which would definitively eliminate the problem of the radical foundation of nature:
nature would be a self-sufficient reality. However, the rigorous reflections on the
present-day worldview do not have anything to do with such naturalism. Experimental
science owes its progress to the adoption of a method which has some precise limits: it
does not study the philosophical dimensions of nature thematically, but it presupposes
them and at the same time it provides elements for a more in-depth study of them.
Moreover, the consideration of the philosophical dimensions remits to the questions
about the radical foundation of nature.
32. NATURE AND THE HUMAN PERSON
We have characterized the natural as the intertwining between a dynamism specific for
each entity and space-time structuring which articulates around patterns. We have
pointed out that this characterization permits to distinguish the properly natural from the
specifically human whose dynamism transcends the space-time structures. We shall now
consider the relationship between the human person and nature.
32.1. The human singularity
Man belongs to nature but, at the same time, transcends it. He is immersed in the
physical world, but he is a personal being with immaterial dimensions as well.
a) Characteristics of the human person
The human person, has he appears before our experience, shows specific characteristics
which distinguish him from the rest of the natural beings.
First and foremost, man is a person, i.e. a subject which can act voluntarily and
is responsible for its own acts. The dynamism proper to a person refers to an interior
principle for which no one, except the very individual person, can be responsible.
Persons can be replaced by other persons; however, no one can substitute anyone else
when the strictly personal dimensions of human life are considered, such as the ethical
behaviour, friendship, love.
The personal character of man is closely related to self-consciousness. His
intelligence is not limited to some capacities to act, but it incapacitates the person to
interiorise his own life, and the world which surrounds him, through a reflection on his
own acts. Man’s immanence has an intentional character; this means that it has an
opening which makes the person capable of relating with other beings.
The human person has a way of being and of acting which place him above the
other natural beings. Intellectual knowledge is characteristic of the human being; this
type of knowledge allows man to pose questions about being and meaning, and it is
closely linked to the capacity of choosing and loving. Man determines himself to want
and love in a voluntary way, and this is possible only in a being which has intellectual
knowledge. The free activity of man is founded on judgements of value which
presuppose the knowledge of good.
The distance which separates man from the purely physical nature is evident.
However, the natural-physical is a constitutive part of man. The physical dimensions are
not something external or accidental to the person, but a basic aspect of the human
being. However, the person is not exhausted in the natural-physical dimensions. The
peculiarity of the human person consists in the fact that his nature belongs to the
physical and to the spiritual world at the same time.
The reality of a personal I, endowed with spiritual dimensions, is undeniable.
The problem is not solved by finding some singular man’s activity which may confirm
this spirituality: our experience is full of it. The problem is that by denying it, we
necessarily make violence to a whole collection of deep convictions, followed by the
adoption of impossible practical attitudes. We have an ample and clear experience of
what spirituality means: personality, creativity, friendship, capacity of arguing and
criticizing, ethical action, freedom, the appreciation of values, responsibility.
The simultaneous material and spiritual character of the human person entails
aspects which are difficult to conceptualise; however, it corresponds faithfully to the
experience we have. The physical aspects of man are human and not animal aspects;
they are interpenetrated with the spiritual dimensions which are characteristic of the
person. At the same time, the spiritual life is realised together with the psychic,
biological and physical capacities. Everything human is incarnated and spiritualised at
the same time. Man is at the same time material and spiritual.
b) Scientific creativity and human singularity
The progress of the experimental science shows in an especially clear manner the
existence of the specific dimensions in the human person. We shall now analyse the
meaning of this statement by considering the scientific activity, its methods, its results
and its assumptions and conditions of possibility.
The scientific activity is directed towards a twofold objective: the knowledge of nature
and a controlled power over it. Neither of the two is sought after separately, but both
together in a peculiar combination: what is sought after is a kind of knowledge which
can be submitted to experimental control.
The scientist adopts a very special attitude towards nature. He has the desire to know it,
but he faces a fundamental difficulty: nature does not speak. Therefore, in order to know
those aspects of nature which do not appear to the ordinary experience, he must find a
way to get its «secrets». The scientific method is essentially the way that man has found
to ask questions to the nature so that nature may answer back.
The scientific method is extraordinarily subtle, and one should not be surprised that it
has taken centuries for it to develop systematically. Actually, it did not establish itself
until the 17th
century. Sometimes it is said that the scientific method consists in
observing nature, gathering the data carefully and systematising them into laws.
However, this is a caricature of the method really used by science. The method consists
in formulating hypotheses and submitting them to experimental control; however, this is
only possible if concepts are used which can be defined mathematically and which can
be related to procedures of measurement. This complicates the problem extraordinarily.
In order to realise this it is enough to think of the most simple scientific concepts, such
as mass, velocity, time and temperature. We all have an intuitive idea about these
concepts. However, to be useful in science they have to be defined in such a way as to
form part of mathematical relations and, at the same time, concrete values have to be
assigned to them in accordance with the results of the measurements. How can we
manage this? There are no automatic procedures. A creative, as well as an
argumentative, capacity is needed.
Let us consider the theoretical aspect. How are magnitudes summed up? In the case of
the mass it is an arithmetical kind of sum: mass is a scalar magnitude. On the other
hand, velocities are vectorial magnitudes and, as such, added up with the rule of the
parallelogram. Temperatures are not added up in any of the two previous ways.
However, these rules are not obtained by simple observation of facts or through a pure
mental exercise; a creative work is required whose results have to be submitted to
experimental control.
As for the experimental control, the problems are no less difficult. In order to measure
one needs units of measurement, and the definition of unit faces to no trivial difficulties.
For example, to determine the values of time we need to have a movement which is
repeated periodically at equal intervals, and to take a fraction of this duration as unit.
However, how do we know that a specific movement is periodical, if we still do not
know how to measure time? The difficulty involved is real. In the case of temperature,
we need a law to measure it able to relate the values of temperature to the values of
some magnitude which we can observe directly, such as the expansion of the volume of
a liquid or of a gas. However, again, how do we know that this law is correct if we still
do not know how to measure temperature?
These are authentic difficulties, and they increase considerably when we consider more
abstract magnitudes as it is done continuously in the experimental science.
On the other hand, even though one may assume that we have a good hypothesis and
know how to measure the values of the magnitudes, how can we be sure, through
experimental control, that this hypothesis is true? Although we may be able to verify
that in many cases it corresponds to the data of experience, it will always be possible to
come across new cases in which the hypothesis does not work: the history of science can
provide countless examples of this type.
Therefore, experimental science requires a strong dose of creativity, interpretation and
argumentation. With all this, science is a fact and its progress notable. This is possible
only because the human person has characteristics which have permitted him to develop
highly sophisticated methods, thanks to which he can study aspects of nature which are
very far from any possibility of direct observation. This is possible because man can
formulate very elaborate hypotheses and submit them to experimental control through
no less sophisticated techniques.
Consequently, the analysis carried out on the nature of experimental science manifests
the completely singular character of the human person, since science presupposes some
capacities which are not present in other natural beings. Science is a way of confronting
nature, of studying and dominating it which is made possible only because we have that
creative capacity which permits us to create methods and concepts, that argumentative
capacity which permits us to evaluate solutions, that sense of evidence which is implicit
in the argumentative capacity, and that capacity of self-reflection, without which all the
other already mentioned capacities would not be possible. Moreover, these capacities
are combination of the rational with the empirical which shows the intertwining of both
aspects in the human person.
All in all, the progress of the experimental science manifests the presence of material as
well as rational dimensions which are interpenetrated in the human person. Materialism
and empiricism on one extreme side, and the idealism and a-priorism on the other side,
cannot justify the fact of the experimental science and, as a matter of fact, run into
insoluble difficulties when they try to propose an image of science which should
corresponds to the real scientific activity and its achievements180
. The reflection on the
characteristics of the experimental science shows how only an anthropology which
acknowledges the interpenetration of material and rational dimensions in the human
person will be able justify the scientific activity and its real achievements.
32.2. Matter and spirit in the human person
Man’s level has continuity with the inferior levels of nature. However, the
human person has peculiar characteristics which are found at a level qualitatively
superior to the one of the other natural entities. This is a clear fact and it seems logical
to use a specific term in order to designate this type of characteristics.
The use of the term spiritual in this context does not pose any problem since it is
just the way of referring to those specifically human qualities whose existence is
evident. Problems arise when we try to establish the nature of the relationship between
man’s spirituality and his material conditions. We shall now examine this problem.
a) The material and the spiritual: four problems
Let us now consider four problems which arise from the relationship between
man’s spirituality and his material conditions. The first problem is epistemological and
refers to the possibility of observing specific manifestations of man’s spiritual
dimensions. The second is ontological and refers to the characterisation of the way of
being proper to the spiritual, and to the co-existence of the spiritual and of the material.
The third is metaphysical and refers to the necessity of admitting a divine action in order
to justify man’s spirituality. The fourth is existential and refers to the persistence in
being of the human spirit after death.
As for the epistemological problem, if we admit the unity of the human person, it
is futile to look for manifestations of man’s spirituality which are not related in any
possible way to the material conditions. The existence of spiritual dimensions is evident,
but it is also evident that the man’s activity is mediated by his material conditions.
180
This idea is extensively illustrated in: Stanley L. JAKI, Angels, Apes and Men, Sherwood Sugden, La Salle (Illinois)
1982.
Searching for dimensions which are not mixed with the material is equivalent to
searching a ghost located in some holes of the man’s organism, and this ghost does not
exist. However, the spiritual dimensions proper to man are manifested throughout his
whole conscious activity, and the progress of experimental science is one of its best
examples: our creative and argumentative capacity, which reach a very noticeable level
in the experimental science, clearly show the fact that we form part of nature but, at the
same time, we transcend it.
As the ontological problem, the way of being proper to the person includes, as a
constitutive part, the natural way of being but, at the same time, it transcends it. The
person has his own dynamism which goes beyond the possibilities of the space-time
patterns as it is shown, for instance, in his capacity of posing questions and in desires
which fall outside the field of space-time, and its capacity of free self-determination on
the basis of his knowledge of ethical values. However, the dynamism of a person is a
unitary one and, therefore, the problem of the interaction between the spiritual and the
material corresponds to a false approach. The posing of this problem presupposes
somehow the fact that in a human person there are two different realities which interact
in an external way; however, this does not correspond to reality. The person has one
being only and, although his way of being includes material and spiritual dimensions
with specific manifestations, both are interpenetrated within a unitary way of being.
The metaphysical problem does not pose any difficulty different from the ones
we have met in the case of the purely natural entities. It is necessary to admit the
existence of a divine founding action in the case of the person as well as in the case of
the natural entities. When one speaks of a special creation of the human soul, what is
special is the result of the divine action, i.e. the spiritual dimensions of the person.
However, it is necessary to admit a divine founding action in all cases and not only in
the case of man. Therefore, special creation does not mean, so to say, an alteration of the
ordinary course of nature, as if this nature were independent from the divine action
which would take place only in the case of man. God gives being to all that exists in
nature; what is peculiar in the case of man is the fact that the result of the divine action
has an «ontological density» which goes beyond the way of being proper to the natural
entities. Moreover, the way of being of the human person is possible because there are
very specific natural conditions; therefore, also under this point of view one may note
that the special creation of the human soul is in continuity with, and not in opposition to,
the ordinary course of nature. All in all, the spirituality of the human soul requires that
each soul be created directly by God, since the spirit cannot proceed from a
transformation of matter; however, this does not mean that the natural world does not
need a divine founding action181
.
There is no doubt that the existential problem which refers to the persistence in
being of the human soul after death is more difficult. However, if it is true that the
human person has ontological dimensions which presuppose a participation in the being
181
Cf. what was said in the chapter 10, section 29.4.c. In relation to this, one may read: Roger VERNEAUX, Filosofia del
hombre, Hereder, Barcelona 1971, pp. 219-220; Ricardo YEPES, Fundamentos de antropogia. Un ideal de la excelencia
human, 2nd
ed., EUNSA, Pamplona 1997, pp. 474-479; Mariano ARTIGAS, Las fronteras del evolucionismo, 5th
ed.,
Palabra, Madrid 1991, pp. 163-69, 171-177 and 198-200. One may find an analysis of the scientific context of this theme, in
which one can conclude the divine creation of the human soul, in: C. ECCLES, Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self,
Routledge, London and New York 1991, p. 237.
proper to God, and if it is true that his being depends on the divine action, it seems
logical to claim that, when the natural conditions make it impossible for the human life
to continue completely in its way of being, the person continues living in his spiritual
being. Otherwise, for the spirit to cease to exist, an annihilation would be required, i.e. a
divine action which seems to contradict the creative action. The main difficulties come
from the difficulty of representing human life not in its natural conditions; however,
these are minor difficulties because they are due only to our limited capacity of
representing a situation of which we do not have experience.
b) The spiritualist hileo-morphism
Man’s peculiarity is a clearly evident; problems constantly arise when one tries
to explain it. They are problems which have been tackled and discussed since ancient
times.
According to the materialist monism, man is not made of matter and spirit;
everything is actually matter and different manifestations of material phenomena. The
so-called emergentist materialism, which is a more sophisticated version of materialism,
admits a mental reality in man which is reduced to the physico-chemical. It claims that
that the mental reality is something qualitatively different from the physical but, at the
same time, claims that it is a reality which emerges from neuronal processes. By making
recourse to the theory of the systems, it claims that the interaction of the components
can explain, in a sufficient way, the existence of emerging properties without any need
of admitting immaterial realities which, on the other hand, could not produce observable
effects or interact with the material components.
Emergence means that a system has properties which its components did not
have. They are system properties which are the result of the interaction of the
components. There is no need to make recourse to new causes in order to explain an
emergence; it is enough to take into account the fact that the interactions of the
components - in this case the neurones -, result in the appearance of truly new properties
which are only present in the systems. However, claiming that the mind is an emergence
is not equivalent to providing an explanation of its specifically human characteristics.
Emergentism does nothing but claiming that these characteristics really exist, and adds
at the same time and against all evidence that material properties are sufficient to explain
them: it denies human spirituality and, because of it, has to make violence to a whole
collection of fundamental data of experience.
Materialism cannot be defended by seeking the support in the progress of
experimental psychology; this progress only shows that there is a relationship between
the human psyche and the material conditions in which this psyche exists and operates.
The so-called interactionist dualism claims that together with materiality there is
also in the human person a kind of immaterial reality which is called, according to
different authors, mind, or spirit, or soul, and that this immaterial reality interacts with
the material conditions. However, this interactionism has to face the difficulties related
to the classical problem of the communication of substances posed, in modern times, by
Descartes, and which has been a central issue in the post-Cartesian philosophy, being
left with no satisfactory answer. How can two so heterogeneous realities relate to each
other, when they are considered mutually external? Moreover, the problem of the origin
of the mind persists. The recourse to evolutionist explanations does not solve the
problem. And so, a partisan of the interactionist dualism, such as Karl Popper, claims,
on the one hand, that evolution by natural selection can explain the emergence of the
immaterial dimensions of the person182
. However, and on the other hand, he admits that
it is a problem whose ultimate explanation is shrouded in mystery: “I want now to stress
how little is said when it is claimed that the mind is an emergence of the brain. It
practically lacks explanatory value and is equivalent to something hardly more than
placing a question mark in a specific place of the human evolution. Nevertheless, I
believe that it is the only thing we can say from a Darwinist point of view” 183
.
This uncertainty is inevitable when one does not admit metaphysical
explanations and only makes recourse to evolutionist explanations which, in principle,
cannot justify the spiritual dimensions of the human person. Popper is aware of the
limitations of the evolutionist explanation, yet he does not open other doors, and
therefore he has to be content with a semi-darkness shrouded in the most obscure
mystery: “Clearly, evolution cannot be taken in any sense as the ultimate explanation.
We have to resign ourselves to the idea that we live in a world in which almost
everything important must remain essentially unexplained…ultimately, everything is
left without explanation: especially everything related to existence”184
.
The concept of hileo-morphism was used by Aristotle in order to explain the
basic way of being of the natural substances, and was classically formulated by Aquinas.
This concept characterises man as composed of body and soul, emphasizing the unity of
the compound and the spirituality of the soul. Man is conceived as one substance only
against the dualism of Cartesian type since, although spirit and matter are different
realities, the soul is the substantial form of the body. Man is not a body to which a soul
is added as a juxtaposed reality, but soul and body form one reality only; this does not
prevent the soul from persisting in being after death, owing to its spiritual character.
This doctrine is not simple, but is not a surprising one either if one takes into
account the fact that man is not a simple being. It tries to reflect some facts and some
rational demands without suppressing what is mysterious in man which is not little. It
puts together the data of experience and what is required by an intellectual rigor,
avoiding the simplification of the complexity of human existence.
Experience and reasoning show how material as well as spiritual dimensions are
present in man, and how both constitute one person only. Man is not made of two
juxtaposed substances which interact with each other: man is one substance only, and
this is reflected in the concept of hileo-morphism, when it claims that the union between
soul and body is like the union between form and matter. Form and matter are not
complete entities. Spirituality requires a subject, the soul; however, the soul is not a
182
Cf. Karl R. POPPER, “Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind”, in: G. RADNITZKY – W.W. BARTLEY III
(publishers), Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality and the Sociology of Knowledge, Open Court, La Salle (Illinois) 1987,
pp. 139-155. 183
Karl R. POPPER – John C. ECCLES, El yo y su cerebro, Labor, Barcelona 1980, p.622. 184
Ibid.
complete subject added to the body. As form of the matter, the soul expresses the
characteristic way of being of the person. On the other hand, the spiritual dimensions
cannot be derived from matter; therefore, it is necessary to claim the divine creation of
the soul which, although being the form of the matter, does not depend on the latter
since it is spiritual, and it persists in being once the disintegration of matter provokes
death. According to this perspective, one cannot properly speak of interaction between
soul and body since both soul and body constitute one substance only.
32.3. Nature and the human life
Man is a synthesis of the material and of the spiritual world. He is above the rest
of the physical world. He participates in the physical which is inscribed in his nature as
a constitutive part, but his reality is not exhausted in the physical dimensions. He has the
capacity of knowing and dominating the world.
A theo-centric kind of worldview sees man as God’s creature, made by God in
his image and likeness, placed above the reset of nature which he uses to achieve his
end. This anthropocentrism is coherent with the present-day scientific worldview, and it
may also be said that the present-day knowledge corresponds to the anthropocentric
perspective in a much better way than it did in the ancient worldview.
According to the present-day worldview, nature appears to us as the unfolding of
a dynamism which gets organised according to patterns. Natural processes unfold in a
directional and selective way, although the actualisation of the natural potentialities
depends on fortuitous factors. The natural systems have holistic characteristics. Thanks
to the co-operation of specific dynamisms, the formation of single systems, as well as of
the total system of nature, is made possible. Nature has a strong unity which is
manifested in the continuity among its levels and in the integration of the most basic
levels into those levels of greater organization.
This worldview does not have, as such, metaphysical implications. However, it
provides a very adequate basis for an ontological and metaphysical reflection which
leads to the re-posing of the classical issues about transcendence and human person.
Man appears in this perspective as the crowning achievement of nature. His
existence is made possible because nature has some highly specific characteristics. The
scientific and technological activities show in a clearly evident way the central place
occupied by man in nature. The analysis of the conditions of possibility of science
shows that the human person has peculiar characteristics which reflect a synthesis of the
material and of the spiritual.
The fact that the earth has lost its central place in the universe does not weaken
the claim that the person occupies a central place in nature. This is, in fact, an issue of
secondary importance. We can also think that the immensity of the universe that we
know is necessary for the formation of the earth, with its highly specific conditions
which make the human life possible.
The possible origin of the human organism from inferior living beings is not a
difficulty either in order to claim the fact of the human singularity whose spiritual
characteristics shine forth clearly. The theories of evolution can only be used to support
naturalism, if their scope is distorted by using them to solve problems which, in reality,
are outside of the scope of the experimental science.
The hypothetical existence of other intelligent beings in the universe does not
contradict the previous claims since we refer to the central place occupied by man
respect to the material nature, and this is compatible with the existence of other beings
which could also be found in a similar situation with respect to nature. For the time
being, there is very little that one can say about the existence of life and intelligence in
other parts of the universe. Some claim that this is very probable, while others claim that
it is highly improbable that life may exist in conditions different from the ones that we
know. For example, Roman Smoluchowsky, of the Council of Science and Space of the
United States, has written: “The question on whether there might be other forms of life
in other conditions has not yet been answered in a decisive way; however, the answer
will probably be negative”185
. On the other hand, the possible existence of life in other
places would highlight even more the specific and singular character of nature with its
clearly defined tendencies able to produce, in different places, such an enormously
sophisticated and specific phenomenon as life is.
The human activity, whose highest manifestation is the ethical behaviour,
includes material dimensions as fundamental elements, and has to take them into
account for its full realization. Nature makes human existence and the unfolding of its
potentialities possible. The human person, as synthesis of the material and of the
spiritual, occupies a special place in nature; he participates in the personal character
proper to God, author of nature, with whom he is in a unique kind of relationship of
personal character. If the whole nature corresponds to an unfolding of the effects of the
divine action, this unfolding results in unique characteristics in the case of man whose
relationship with the rest of nature can be contemplated in continuity with the divine
action. The theological perspective sees the human person as a being carrying out a task
which God has entrusted to him in the world, and nature in this task plays a central role.
33. NATURE AND GOD
A philosophical study of nature would remain incomplete without tackling the
problem of its radical foundation. The radical explanation of nature has been one of the
central problems of philosophy in all the various epochs of history, and is still an object
of major attention at present. The basic question is: “Is nature self sufficient? Can it
explain itself completely? Or the alternative one: “Should a foundation which transcends
nature and ultimately explains its being and activity, be admitted?
The detailed examination of these questions corresponds to Natural Theology
and requires a systematic study. Here we shall only highlight the fact that present-day
scientific worldview, together with the philosophical reflections about it, provide
elements which can be useful for the arguments of Natural Theology.
185
Roman SMOLUCHOWSKI, El systema solar, Prensa scientifica-Labor, Barcelona 1986, p. 50.
33.1. Science and transcendence
Science and Natural Theology adopt different perspectives. However, it is possible
to integrate them into each other, provided that one respects their differences and adopts
the perspective proper to each of them in each type of problems.
Each scientific discipline adopts a particular perspective which can be called
objectification, because it refers to the way in which the discipline constructs and studies
its own object. By doing this, a cut is performed on reality, and the study of that
discipline is focused on some particular aspects. Obviously, any objectification of this
type has an historical character since it depends on concepts and instruments available at
a particular time in history186
. In this way, scientific inter-subjectivity is achieved which
presupposes the adoption of definitions and operational criteria that have in part a
conventional character. This way of operating permits the achievement of a truth which
is contextual and partial, nevertheless authentic.
Since each scientific discipline operates within a particular objectification, the
scientific method leaves the possibility open to a study directed towards the radical
conditions of being. No matter what metaphysical stand is adopted, it is compulsory to
acknowledge that there is always a methodological leap between the scientific
perspective and the metaphysical one.
However, it is also frequently claimed that both perspectives need to be related to
each other through a dialogue, and that science leads to questions which are at
borderline with theology. It is claimed that they are “issues that arise from science and
which insistently demand for an answer but which, by their own nature, transcend the
competence of science”187
.
These problems can arise in two ways. First, they arise from scientific problems
which provoke metaphysical questions in those subjects who study them; it is
understandable that this may happen, and how this may affect the scientist only as an
individual person. Second, they arise from the general assumptions of science and from
the implications of its achievements: these last ones are the best candidates for the title
of borderline issues. Among these borderline issues we may mention the intelligibility of
nature and its rationality: they form an important part of the assumptions of the
scientific activity which could not exist or make sense if these assumptions were not
certain. There is no doubt that there is a long journey from the implicit admission of
these assumptions by the scientists up to their philosophical articulation. However, they
are issues that can be studied in an objective way, and which are indicators of important
points of confluence between the scientific activity and metaphysical ideas188
.
186
The epistemological aspects of this problem are more extensively treated in: Mariano ARTIGAS, Filosofia de la sciencia
experimental. La objetividad y la verdad en la sciencias, op. cit. 187
John C. POLKINGHORNE, “A Revived Natural Theology”, in: J. FENNEMA- I. PAUL (publishers), Science and
Religion. One world: Changing Perspectives on Reality, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1990, p. 88. 188
An extensive study on this theme is found in: Mariano ARTIGAS, The Mind of the Universe (Templeton Foundation
Press: in printing)
In any case, the claim of the existence of God and of a divine plan which governs
nature, goes beyond the level proper to science, and remits to metaphysical reasoning.
However, for the same reason, it is not legitimate to deny the existence of a divine plan
in the name of science. Science does not permit us either to claim or to deny a divine
plan for nature, because it is something that falls outside of its method. Science provides
knowledge about the manifestations of the ontological and metaphysical dimensions of
nature; however, the explicit study of these dimensions requires the adoption of a
perspective which is properly metaphysical. Actually, one may find all sorts of
philosophical and theological stands among scientists, and this shows that these stands
are not determined only by science189
.
The possible attitudes before the issue of God as the ultimate explanation of the
universe are basically five: atheism, agnosticism, pantheism, deism and theism. The first
four pose notable difficulties. This is easily perceived in the case of atheism, since there
are no proofs, nor can they exist, of the non existence of God. With its stand of
renouncing to tackle the issue of God, agnosticism is, at least, poorly coherent with the
scientific and rational spirit which tires to seek explanations of all that exists, though our
answers may always be limited and partial. Deism justifies the existence of the universe,
but it is not coherent when it claims that an infinitely good, almighty and intelligent God
gives existence to the universe only to abandon it to its own destiny. Pantheism tries to
give answers to the ultimate questions which we pose about the universe; however, even
admitting the active presence of God in the whole universe, it is not possible to identify
God with any creature or with all of them as a whole, since all the dimensions of the
creatures are limited and, therefore, cannot be identified with something divine in a
strict sense.
Hence, theism appears to be the only rigorous option for him who does not
renounce to seek an explanation of the universe. Neither the universe as a whole nor
some of its partial aspects can be identified with something properly divine. However,
the rationality of the universe strongly suggests its connection with a divine intellect.
We do not try to claim that the experimental science can demonstrate the existence of
God: experimental science as such does not permit either to claim or to deny the
existence of God. However, a rigorous reflection on the achievements of science
provides a very adequate basis for reaching God as the radical foundation of nature.
The present-day scientific worldview can be easily related, above all, to the
teleological argument which proves the existence of God and of his providence over the
world from the consideration of natural finality. For this reason we shall now examine
some aspects of the teleological argument.
33.2. Theology and transcendence
The present-day worldview emphasises the existence of dimensions of finality in
nature, and in this way it widens the base of the teleological argument.
189
This diversity is reflected, for instance, in: Henry MARGENAU – Roy Abraham VARGHESE (publishers), Cosmos,
Bios, Theos: Scientists reflect on Science, God, and the Origins of the Universe, Life and Homo, Open Court, Peru (Illinois)
1992.
a) The teleological argument
The teleological argument has always occupied a prominent place in history, and
also nowadays, among the proofs of the existence of God.
It was developed with a special intensity by Aquinas who used the ideas of
Aristotle but placing them within a new context. Aquinas proposed several formulations
of the argument among which the prominent fifth way for the demonstration of the
existence of God.
The following is the text of the fifth way: “The fifth way is taken from the
government of the world. We actually see that some things which lack knowledge, and
specifically the natural bodies, work in view of an end. This is manifested by the fact
that they always, or very frequently, operate in the same way in order to obtain the best,
from which it is clear that they achieve their end not by chance but intentionally.
However, beings without knowledge tend towards their end directed by some being that
is intelligent and knows, in the same way in which the archer directs the arrow. Hence,
there is an intelligent being by whom all natural things are ordained to their ends, and
we call this being God”190
.
The fifth way, and other parallel texts in the works of Aquinas, has been the
object of countless number of studies191
. We shall now focus our attention on some
aspects which are especially relevant in order to specify its meaning and value.
The fifth way makes reference to the natural bodies (corpora naturalia) which
lack knowledge. It includes, therefore, the whole natural activity which unfolds
independently from the knowledge, and in a particular way that of the non living beings
but also that of the living ones which does not depend on knowledge (the organic
activity with all is functions).
It is claimed that the natural bodies operate in the same way «always or almost
always» (semper aut frequentius). It is a claim supported by the ordinary experience and
as such does not present any difficulty; it is a true claim in the case of the living beings
as well as in the case of the other natural beings. Aquinas takes his stand within the
ordinary knowledge; however, his claim can be extended to the whole nature, as it is
portrayed by the present-day scientific worldview, without difficulties.
190
AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c. 191
One may read, for instance, M. ARTIGAS, “Ciencia, finalidad y existencia de Dios”, Scripta Theologica, 17 (1985), pp.
151-189; M. DUQUESNE, “De quinta via: La preuve de Dieu par le gouvernement des choses”, Doctor Communis, 18
(1965), pp. 71-92; S. KOWALCZYK, “L’argument de la finalité chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin”, Divus Thomas (PIazenza),
78 (1975), pp. 41-68; P. PARENTE, “La quinta via di S. Tommaso”, Doctor Communis, 7 (1954), pp. 110-130; F. van
STEENBERGHEN, “La cuinquième voie, «ex gubernatione rerum», in: L. ELDERS (publisher), Quinque sunt viae,
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Cittá del Vaticano 1980, pp. 84-108; L. Vicente BURGOA, El problema de la finalidad,
Universidad Complutense, Madrid 1981.
The constancy in its way of operating shows how the natural activity
corresponds to tendencies which arise from the nature of the bodies. The regularity of
the natural activity permits us to claim its character of finality. The possibility for the
natural bodies to achieve their end by chance is excluded because they achieve it by
operating always, or almost always, in the same way, while the effects of chance are not
regular. The natural dynamism is tendencial, and tendencies are directed towards the
achievement of an end which is identified with something good.
The reference to good is the central point of the argument. It is claimed that the
natural bodies operate in view of an end (operantur propter finem), achieve their end
(perveniunt ad finem) and tend towards the end (tendunt in finem), and this end is
somehow the best. This reference not only to the good but to the best is fundamental:
without it the argument would not permit us to claim the existence of God. The present-
day worldview provides a new basis for verifying the value of the natural activity and of
its results. Actually, it makes it possible to know in details the perfection of the natural
mechanisms in the individuals, and the organization of nature at the different co-
operative levels which make the human existence possible.
We are in the presence, therefore, of a highly directional and rational activity
which is carried out by beings which lack knowledge. The natural bodies cannot have
such directionality by themselves since they lack an intellect. Hence, it is necessary to
make recourse to an intellect able to justify the natural tendencies and their ordination to
good. Consequently, it must be an intellect which is completely far above nature, and
even more, an intellect which has foreseen the way of being of the natural and of the
tendencies which derive from it. Only a personal God creator can give their being and
their ways of operating to natural entities.
Actually, an intellect which puts order corresponds to the Being who orders all
natural things towards their ends (a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur in finem). It
must be therefore not only a being different from nature but precisely that Being who is
the author of nature, since only this Being can produce some tendencies which are
inscribed in the very interior of the natural bodies. It is not enough, therefore, to make
recourse to a being which puts order to the bodies «from outside» by giving them some
kind of movement: we actually reach a God who is personal and creator.
It seems possible to claim that the fifth way is still valid nowadays, since all the
aspects which have been mentioned are coherent with the present-day scientific
worldview. It can also be said that the scientific progress notably widens the scope of
those facts which are the basis for the considerations contained in the fifth way. In this
sense, the fifth way is strengthened by this progress.
The fifth way focuses on individual finality proper to each body. Other Thomist
formulations of the teleological argument emphasise the co-operation of different agents
towards the same end: the order of nature as a whole192
. The core of the argument,
though, is the same in both cases, whether this issue is considered at individual or at
cooperative level. However, in relation to the scientific knowledge, the consideration of
192
Cf. AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles, I, c. 13; III, c. 64; De potentia, q. 3, a. 6, c; Coimmentary to the Metaphysics of
Aristotle, book XII, Ch. 10, lectio 12; Commentary to the Gospel of St John, prologue; Commentary to the Symbol of the
Apostles, article 1.
the co-operative order is especially strong in view of the fact that it occupies a central
place in the present-day worldview.
Some Thomist formulations of the teleological argument are more encompassing
than the fifth way, and include a detailed philosophical analysis of the natural finality
which is also fully timely. For instance, Aquinas refers to those who try to explain
nature making recourse only to material and agent causes; he points out that these
causes intervene in the production of the effects, but are insufficient to explain their
goodness193
.
It is interesting to emphasise why, in the Thomist arguments, the explanations
which make recourse only to necessity and chance are considered insufficient. The
reason is different in the two cases. Insofar as the material and agent causes are
concerned, one can say that a certain necessity corresponds to them, hence they permit
us to understand how the activity of the bodies is realised in a constant way, but they are
unable to explain how the best result is achieved. As far as chance is concerned, it is
claimed that chance does not explain how the activity of the bodies is realised in a
constant way: chance is blind respect to the constancy of the activities. Finally, one does
not get a sufficient explanation either by combining necessity and chance; actually,
although this combination may partially explain the formation of nature, yet it is
insufficient to explain the perfection of nature and, moreover, does not explain its
radical foundation, since it always remits to previous physical situations194
.
All in all, the natural finality which is a habitual tendency towards something
which is best, asks for an intelligence because, to relate, to direct and to order towards
an optimal end which is achieved in a habitual way, are all operations proper to an
intelligence. If one takes into account the fact that this direction affects the natural
tendencies and, therefore, the way of being of the natural, it is logical to claim the
existence of a personal God who is creator. The present-day worldview provides the
teleological argument with a basis which is more complex than the one provided by
ordinary experience, but it goes much further than the latter does in depth and precision.
b) Nature and providence
The final cause acts in two ways: as the objective foreseen by the agent and as a
tendency towards a specific objective. All beings have tendencies which correspond to
their ways of being; however, only intellectual agents can establish objectives in a
conscious and free way.
The first part of the teleological argument states that the natural beings which
lack knowledge have constant tendencies whose actualization produces optimal results,
and that the constancy in the tendencies shows how these beings do not act by chance
193
Cf. AQUINAS, De veritate, q. 5, a. 2. 194
This possibility which is insistently proposed in our days in relation to evolutionism, may seem curious to a modern
reader; yet it was considered expressly by Aquinas, who just gathered what Aristotle had already about this many centuries
before; cf. AQUINAS, Commentary to the Physics of Aristotle, book II, Ch. 8, lectio 12.
but in accordance with the necessity characteristic of the agent causes. Then it adds that
the production of optimal results shows how these results are an objective foreseen by
an intellectual agent. Therefore, there is a double reference to chance: it is denied that
the natural tendencies correspond to chance, and it is also denied that the goodness of
the results can be due exclusively to the fortuitous confluence of necessary causes. This
double reference corresponds to the two levels of finality. Consequently, when natural
finality is denied, one has to specify which aspect this denial refers to, i.e. if one denies
that there are no natural tendencies, or if one denies that there is a superior finality
which is related to the divine government of nature.
If one denies that there are tendencies, he has to clash not only with the very
ordinary experience, but also with the achievements of the scientific progress which
emphasise abundantly the existence of a directionality in nature.
What is frequently denied is not so much the existence of particular tendencies in
nature, but the existence of a global tendency in evolution. It is claimed that evolution
proceeds by an opportunistic «zigzagging», in a way which looks more like a bricolage
than a premeditated plan. In such conditions, how could one still speak of a divine plan?
However, this difficulty disappears if we pay attention to the fact that the divine
plan does not imply a rectilinear evolution, always progressive and without accidents: it
is more logical to assume that God counts on the complexity of the natural causes to
carry out his plan. The existence of a divine plan is fully congruous with the complex
character of evolution. Moreover, the complexity of the universe acquires in this way
new importance. One can understand, for instance, how God may have wanted the
existence of millions of galaxies for the possibility of existence of the earth and of man.
Actually, the present-day cosmological theories claim that the heaviest atoms were
produced in the interior of the stars, and this may have happened millions of times so
that finally one planet could be produced with the specific characteristics of the earth.
The existence of millions of galaxies and stars which otherwise would appear
unnecessary, may have resulted necessary for the appearance of human life through
natural processes.
There is not just a simple harmony between the divine action and the activity of
nature. If the natural activity corresponds to a divine plan, one must say that God does
not only respect it, but that he positively wants it, although God can also produce effects
which go beyond the ordinary course of nature. Therefore, it is congruous for the divine
plan to count on the unfolding of the natural dynamism. In this perspective, one can
understand, for instance, how the divine plan is compatible with a zigzag unfolding of
the natural dynamism which can produce results destined to disappear, and with the
existence of mechanisms in which, necessity and chance, and variation and adaptation,
are combined. Claiming the existence of a divine plan is not the same as claiming that
everything that happens in nature is good from all points of view.
The existence of a superior plan permits us to understand in depth the existence
of nature. There is no doubt that this is a bit mysterious, but it is the kind of mystery we
meet before the divine. On the other hand, if one denies the existence of a divine plan,
nature remains shrouded in an irrational mystery, and there comes the serious danger of
reducing to an absolute the partial explanations provided by science.
c) Evil in nature
The existence of evil is the main difficulty which faces the teleological argument.
Aquinas paid a lot of attention to this problem in his writings. He concisely gives his
answer to the problem of evil in few words in the Summa Teologiae while developing
the five ways for the demonstration of the existence of God: “God permits evil in view
of the preservation of greater goods”. This idea is applicable to two different cases: the
moral evil, due to the bad use of freedom that the human person makes, and the physical
evil which is the one more properly related the natural finality.
As for the moral evil which is sin - or evil understood in its radical sense -, it is
not easy to explain how its elimination could be compatible with human freedom.
Therefore, one may understand how God permits it because the possibility of the moral
evil corresponds to the existence of the human freedom which is an even superior good.
Physical evil which is the one properly related to the teleological argument, can
be justified in two ways; first, by taking into account that physical evil is only a relative
one which can be ordained to a superior good which is the spiritual good; second, by
realising that the particular physical evils can be integrated into superior goods even in
the physical order. The existence of physical evil is not opposed to divine goodness: it
seems inevitable that conflicts may exist among different particular goods; however,
these can be integrated into a superior good.
Aquinas claims that the world is not only good, but also very good. This claim is
partly related to an obsolete worldview according to which the movements of the
physical bodies could be considered good because they are related to their natural places
which determine an order in the structure of the universe. However, the fundamental
idea is still timely. Aquinas claims that the intention (intentio) of everything that moves
is a tendency towards an act, or perfection, and adds: “There are degrees in the acts of
the forms. Actually, proto-matter is primarily in potency respect to the form of the
element. However, by existing under the form of the element, it is in potency respect to
the form of the compound and, because of this, the elements are the matter of the
compound. Considered from the point of view of the compound, proto-matter is in
potency respect to the vegetative soul, since the soul is the form of the body of this kind.
Moreover, the vegetative soul is in potency towards the sensitive soul, and the sensitive
towards the intellectual….However, after this form, no more dignified and subsequent
form is found among what is generated and corrupted. Therefore, the ultimate end of all
generation is the human soul, and matter tends towards it as its ultimate form.
Consequently, elements exist because of the compounds, compounds exist because of
the living beings and, among the latter, plants exist because of the animals, and the
animals exist because of man. Therefore, man is the end of all generation”195
.
This text shows what Aquinas intends when he claims that the natural bodies
“act always, or very frequently, in the same way to achieve the best”. It is a very timely
point of view. Natural entities are found at hierarchical levels. Their activities consist in
195
AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles, III, c. 22.
the unfolding of directional capacities which correspond to their proper way of being.
The unfolding of these capacities makes it possible for levels of higher organization to
exist and, finally, they make the existence of man possible. All in all, the tendencial
activity of the natural entities creates the conditions for the existence of man.
Aquinas expressly claims that God created the universe in view of man. He
reminds us that finality can be spoken of in two ways: as a natural tendency or as a plan
of an intelligent agent, and says that man is the end of creatures in all senses196
.
In order to claim that God created the universe in view of man it is necessary to
make recourse to a type of reasoning which transcends the scope of the teleological
argument. However, this statement is fully congruous with the existence, at all levels of
nature, of natural cooperative tendencies which make human life possible. In this
perspective, the application of the notion of good to nature implies a legitimate
anthropocentrism which reflects the central place that man occupies in the universe.
33.3. The intelligibility of nature
The knowledge, that ordinary experience and science provide, presents us with a
nature endowed with an intelligibility which becomes fully manifested when we look at
the system of nature in the light of its radical foundation and of the human life.
a) Unconscious intelligence
In the light of finality, the activity of nature appears as a work of an
«unconscious intelligence»: nature does not deliberate; however, it seems to act as if it
really had a rational capacity.
The expression «unconscious intelligence» is contradictory if interpreted in a
literary sense, since it contains two incompatible terms. Therefore, it can only be used as
a metaphor. However, the metaphor has a real basis197
: the operations of nature are
directional and, moreover, co-operate in the production of results which, in many
aspects, go far beyond what can be achieved through the most sophisticated type of
technology. In this sense, nature goes beyond the capacities of human reason which, on
the other hand, can only produce artefacts insofar as it knows and uses the laws of
nature.
196
Cf. AQUINAS, Commentary to the sentences, book II, distinction I, question II, article III, body. 197
“Taken in a literal way, the formula intelligence without conscience is a contradiction, a pure absurd and, yet, still has a
certain meaning if taken as a metaphor. Understood in this way, it means the capacity of adjusting one’s behavior to a
specific end, in spite of not having any idea of it, i.e. as if the corresponding idea was being known by the being who acts.
In this sense, it would be a capacity which can be stated without incurring into any anthropomorphism, since it does not
imply the absolute identification of the human behavior with the non human one, but only an analogy between the two. The
whole being of liking is the tension towards an end, being conscious of it or not. This is what in Greek is called orexis, from
which the adjective orectic, a term used in the present-day terminology as a synonym of what can also be called tendential,
i.e. related, or relative, to a tendency”: A. MILLÁN-PUELLES, Lexico filosofico, Rialp, Madrid 1984, p. 452.
Sometimes there have been attempts to explain nature by taking into account its
composition and laws exclusively: order would then be the result of fortuitous
combinations of processes, and finality would then only be apparent. In this perspective,
and starting from the opposition between chance and finality, the more the function of
chance is emphasised the less space is left for finality. However, the opposition between
chance and finality is not absolute because chance demands finality. Actually, one could
not even speak of chance if directionality did not exist, nor would it make any sense to
speak of disorder if there were not any type of order.
Critiques against teleology usually assume that there is an absolute contradiction
between chance and finality; consequently, the explanations which make use of chance
are considered to be arguments against finality. However, there is no absolute
contradiction between chance and finality. By claiming the existence of finality we do
not try to say that there is no chance whatsoever. We simply emphasise the fact that
chance and, in general, any combination of «blind» forces, cannot be considered as a
comprehensive kind of explanation.
For instance, in order to explain the origin of a phrase which has a meaning in a
specific language, it is not enough to verify that there is some probability that this phrase
may have been produced through a chance combination of letters. If a language does not
exist before, together with its alphabet, its dictionary and its grammatical rules, no
combination of letters could result in meaningful terms. There must be an intellect at the
beginning. This is equally valid with respect to nature. The claim that supporting the
existence of finality is equivalent to claiming the intelligibility of nature is founded,
ultimately, on an intelligent activity. An unconscious intelligence must be based on a
conscious one.
b) Nature from a metaphysical perspective
In commenting on Aristotle’s ideas about natural finality, Aquinas proposed a
kind of definition of nature from the point of view of its radical metaphysical
foundation. It is very original and goes deeply ahead of Aristotle’s ideas. Moreover, it is
surprisingly coherent with the present-day worldview. He says: “Nature is precisely the
plan of a certain art (concretely the divine art) imprinted in things, by which the very
things move towards a specific end: as if the artisan, who makes a ship, could endow the
wood with the capacity of moving itself in order to form the structure of the ship”198
.
Three aspects of this «definition» deserve special attention, i.e. the rationality of
nature, its connection with the divine plan and the emphasis placed on the self-
organization.
First, the rationality of nature is being emphasised as the plan of an art (in the
original Latin ratio cuiusdam artis). Actually, the scientific progress shows, up to
unsuspected extremes, the efficiency and subtlety of nature. The success of the scientific
198
AQUINAS, Commentary to the Physics of Aristotle, book II, Ch. 8, lectio 14.
activity contributes to widen more and more our knowledge of the rationality of nature.
Although the products of technology may be superior to some aspect of nature, yet they
are always based on the materials and laws which nature provides us with, and therefore
nature always goes ahead of us, in a long run, in many aspects of great importance.
Second, the connection of nature with a divine plan expresses the radical
foundation of nature: nature is a manifestation of a divine plan and, therefore, of a
supremely wise plan. Moreover, the divine action does not direct the natural activity
from outside: the divine plan is inscribed in things (the original Latin says ratio
cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus). The natural has ways of being,
accompanied by the corresponding tendencies which lead towards optimal results. One
can understand, therefore, that there is no opposition between natural activity and divine
plan; on the contrary, the divine plan includes the tendencial dynamism of the natural
and is realised through its actualisation.
Third, there is a reference to self-organisation as a basic characteristic of nature.
The example given is very graphic: “as if it were possible to endow pieces of wood with
the capacity of moving by themselves to build a ship”. This idea corresponds, in a way
which could not be suspected when it was written more than seven centuries ago, to the
present-day knowledge about the self-organization of nature. It is a fact which implies,
moreover, a great level of co-operation among nature’s components, laws and the
different systems which are produced in the subsequent levels of organisation. The
directionality of nature is, in this way, emphasised even in its energetic aspect, and the
idea of emergence of new systems and properties is hinted at as a result of the synergic
or co-operative action.
On the other hand, the implications of the Thomist characterisation of nature also
deserve special attention, for instance: the positive value of nature as a result of the
divine plan; the articulation between necessity and contingency since, on the one hand,
nature is contingent insofar as it is the result of the free action of God and, on the other
hand, it has a strong consistency in accordance with the way of being God has inscribed
in the natural entities; the articulation between unity and multiplicity because the
perfection of the universe is achieved through the cooperation of its components and,
ultimately, is ordained towards human life, since nature offers those conditions which
make the existence of the human person and the unfolding of his capacities possible.
Finally, one can appreciate the articulation between being and becoming, since God has
placed some virtualities in nature which make its progressive evolution possible, and
counts on the co-operation of man, through his work, in order to lead nature towards an
always more perfect state.
All in all, the Thomist «definition» expresses the core of the metaphysical
perspective on nature and is of great importance in order to appreciate its value within
the context of the present-day worldview.
c) The autonomy of nature
The claim that nature remits to a divine plan does not underestimate the autonomy of
nature, on the contrary, the opposite is true. It is precisely the perfection of nature which
demands, as an adequate explanation, the existence of a creative divine plan.
The claim of God as the radical foundation of nature coincides with the pre-
Socratic view of nature as a reality impregnated with something divine, with the
Aristotelian upward movement which reaches a Pure Act starting from the analysis of
movement, with the teleological argument based on the directionality of nature, with
Leibniz’s arguments which emphasise the basic dynamism of the natural and the
harmony of nature, and with other arguments which have been proposed in every epoch.
We can claim that our present-day scientific worldview is coherent with the existence of
a foundation which transcends nature. Of course, for that coherence to be upgraded to
proof, one must make recourse to philosophical reasoning: nature claims a metaphysical
foundation because the natural dynamism is not self-sufficient and its unfolding
produces eminently rational results which ask for a superior intelligent cause.
The boundaries between the physical and the metaphysical are at time placed
between matter and life, at other times between life and the spirit, and at other times
between nature and the spirit. On some occasions the existence of these boundaries is
denied because the metaphysical is denied. These boundaries do not exist in a strict
sense; this, though, is not due to the fact that the metaphysical does not exist, but to the
fact that the whole natural world includes metaphysical dimensions. The metaphysical
foundation is necessary to explain the origin of nature, and also to explain its dynamism,
its structuring and the intertwining between the two at all levels.
The world appears before ordinary experience as a cosmos with metaphysical
dimensions. The pre-Socratic reflections and the ancient culture reflect a universe which
is enchanted and mythical, in which the natural is intertwined with the divine. The
perspective of the experimental science objectifies nature and neutralises its
metaphysical dimensions. It is a legitimate perspective, as long as one does not make it
an absolute. When it is claimed that this perspective exhausts everything which can be
known about nature, natural philosophy is destroyed and, therefore, the bridge between
nature and metaphysical reflection with it. However, this process of absolute-making is
an illegitimate extrapolation which has no grounds and is further removed from the rigor
proper to the scientific method.
Presently, the new scientific worldview provides the basis for a true re-
assessment of nature which goes beyond the contradictions of scientism and naturalism.
Actually, it provides a very enticing basis to look at nature under a new light.
In the perspective of its radical foundation nature appears as the unfolding of a
dynamism which comes from a superior cause that creates, sustains and directs it. In
speaking about unfolding we refer to the effects of the divine action; it is, therefore, an
unfolding which is fully coherent with the divine transcendence and immutability. This
idea corresponds to an intuition which has been articulated in many different ways: one
can think, for instance, of the unfolding of Hegel’s absolute, of Bergson’s elan vital, of
Teilhard de Chardin’s ascending evolution. However, this correspondence refers only to
specific aspects of this intuition, and does not have anything to do with the formulations
which, on the other hand, link it to pantheism.
We could say that the divine action unfolds through the channels of the natural
dynamism and structuring: it makes the existence and the activity of these channels
possible and, through these channels, divine action flows in an ordinary way. Therefore,
somehow the unfolding of the effects of the divine action is proportional to the natural
channels although it is not limited by them in a necessary way. God can act bypassing
the natural laws of which He is the author. However, precisely because he is the author
of the natural channels, one may say that the divine action not only respects them, but
also accommodates itself to them, without being really conditioned by them.
This perspective permits us to understand how it is possible to combine the
autonomy of nature with the existence of its radical foundation. It is not just a mere
compatibility; the divine action provides the conditions of possibility of the natural
dynamism and of all its particular unfoldings. The channels of the natural dynamism
have their own consistency and an intelligibility which is the result of a superior rational
plan.
The unfolding of the natural dynamism is directional. The directionality of
nature is real and corresponds to a simple linear process: the unfolding of the natural
dynamism originates multiple accidental coincidences. In this sense, chance plays a real
role; however, this role is integrated within a comprehensive plan.
The emergence of real novelties corresponds to the unfolding of the natural
dynamism; however, this dynamism includes the effects of the divine action which
make its existence, its unfolding and the production of its results possible. The
proportionality between the effects of the divine action and the natural channels is
manifested in the gradation of nature: a greater level of organization causes a greater
level in the unfolding of the effects of the divine action.
The highest level of natural organization creates the conditions for a new
participation in being which is essentially far superior to that of any other natural entity
because it implies a personal way of being. The human person has unique metaphysical
dimensions which, although transcending nature, yet are interpenetrated with the natural
conditions. This peculiar unity between the natural and the metaphysical levels present
in the human person provides the key for the understanding of the meaning of a nature
which provides the conditions for the existence of the human person, the unfolding of
his potentialities and the achievement of his end.