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Obama’s Pacific Pivot in US Grand Strategy: A Canadian Perspective
This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an article whose final and definitive form, the Version
of Record, has been published in Asian Security 9, 3 (2013) [Copyright © Taylor and Francis],
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2013.832213#.Up1K7dJDuuI.
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Canada sits at a crucial strategic juncture, with the military undergoing an expensive (and
increasingly controversial) process of recapitalization, the government focused on deficit
reduction and departmental budget tightening, including National Defence’s, and a longstanding
military commitment to Afghanistan finally coming to an end in 2014. As a result, a growing
debate has emerged on Canada’s post-Afghan role. Much of this debate is limited to the question
of whether Canada should participate in stability operations, particularly in Africa.1 Discussion
also turns to the future of the Canadian Army, given its operational wartime experience and
counterinsurgency expertise, even though appetite for boots on the ground has dramatically
lessened.2
Yet Canada needs to look further afield when crafting a post-Afghan role. Officials
should not make the mistake of assuming that the next major military commitment will
necessarily resemble the last one, whether involving either sizable ground force deployments or
counterinsurgency operations. Importantly, Ottawa does not have complete autonomy in its
foreign policy and strategic actions. Instead, Canada often uses its superpower patron as a focal
point and adapts its policies in accordance to the strategic preferences that take hold in
Washington. Canada does not merely follow the American lead on strategic issues. But Canadian
security policy is heavily shaped by what goes on south of the border, whether this entails close
accommodation with US policies or greater distancing. As a result, Canada has a definite
incentive to better understand American strategic preferences and the future direction of its grand
strategy.
The purpose of this article is to assess the likely trajectory of Canada’s post-Afghan
security policy in light of the strategic recalibration now underway in Washington. I am
referring here specifically to President Barack Obama’s “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, a move
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meant to shore up America’s force presence and reassure regional allies, with important
implications to the country’s force structure and broader grand strategy. Officials now prefer to
use “rebalance” in reference to this effort. But, as this article shows, the administration is also
strongly inclined towards achieving greater selectivity of commitments in order to preserve
continued preponderance in the Asia-Pacific – a fact that helps to distinguish the current effort
and explains why I prefer making reference to a Pacific “pivot,” in so far as that term implies
pivoting away from other less salient locales. By heralding a more sustained strategic
adjustment, Canada will need to reevaluate its position and perhaps take on a more substantial
role – at least if it hopes to retain some influence in Washington. This would be true even if the
government has other priorities or plans to focus elsewhere, given the extent to which Ottawa
looks south of the border for cues to guide its own strategic behavior.
This article begins by providing an overview on the various elements that make up
Obama’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific, from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. It situates the pivot
in American grand strategy, with a particular emphasis on how fiscal austerity and a more
specialized force structure provides the basis for a more fundamental strategic adjustment to
“selective primacy.” It then turns to the subject of Canada’s security policy and assesses the
extent to which Canadian policymakers will be forced to adapt to this latest strategic initiative to
emerge in Washington. The article concludes with some thoughts on an expanded Canadian
effort at maritime diplomacy and how the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) could be better prepared
for such a role.
Pivoting to the Pacific
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The United States initially hoped to offer some “strategic reassurance” to Beijing.3 Yet
such effort proved remarkably short-lived. Rather than reciprocating Obama’s initial overtures,
Chinese leaders opted for a more uncooperative and assertive position on a range of issues, from
Iran and North Korea to currency manipulation to maritime disputes. As a result, the Obama
administration began to hue towards a firmer line, perhaps most evident in how the United States
has taken a more direct role in the South China Sea maritime dispute.4 In his 2011 trip to the
Asia-Pacific, the president spoke about the need for the United States to “play a larger and long
term role in shaping this region and its future,” and used this occasion to announce a first step –
the deployment of 2,500 Marines on a rotational basis in Darwin, Australia, with negotiations to
ensure greater access for US air and naval assets in the country.5
Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton coined the term “pivot” to describe this renewed
focus, though it should not be construed as solely military in nature. For instance, Obama moved
quickly to reengage the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by signing the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation and joining the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-
Plus). The United States became a member of the East Asia Summit in 2011, even as its effort to
free up regional trade continued with its role in negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TTP). Yet much of this effort is arguably about restricting China’s burgeoning diplomatic and
economic influence in the region, with a strategic logic that goes beyond simply diplomatic
niceties or parochial economic interests. In that sense, it is the military component of the pivot
that represents the hard-edge of this Pacific reengagement – one that has garnered perhaps the
most public attention and is the central subject of this analysis.
Importantly, the president’s pivot is not limited to the redeployment of US Marines –
even if this action reflects the Marine Corps’ growing preference for rotational (albeit persistent)
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presence in the region.6 Perhaps more significant is Washington’s interest in air and naval access
arrangements with Australia, which coincides with Canberra’s potential interest in upgrading its
existing military bases. For example, the Australian Defence Force Posture Review recommends
upgrading naval facilities and services of Fleet Base West near Perth to better handle large
capital ships, not only to support the forward deployment of its future destroyers but potentially
American vessels as well.7 Indeed, Australia recently assented to greater American naval and air
access to its bases, though naval access on the West Coast would still have to wait for port
facilities there to be upgraded.8
The Obama administration is also overseeing a redeployment of US Marines from Japan
to Guam begun under its predecessor, though the total number has been reduced to 5,000 and its
completion pushed back to 2020.9 Plans are also underway to expand the naval facilities and air
fields on the island, though much depends on whether adequate funding is available for these
upgrades or if infrastructure projects are delayed. It has also been boosting its presence in
Southeast Asia, with a small fleet of littoral combat ships to be forward deployed on a rotational
basis in Singapore. Military ties have been strengthened with Vietnam, so far involving naval
exercises and training between both countries, though Washington has indicated interest in
accessing the deepwater naval base at Cam Ranh Bay.10 Relations with Indonesia have been
rehabilitated, with the resumption of ties to the Indonesian Kopassus (Army Special Forces) and
200 joint security engagements in 2012 alone.11 Lastly, the US military is now able to use its
former naval and air force facilities at Subic Bay and Clark airfield in the Philippines, even as
discussions continue on greater American use of base facilities in Thailand.12
President Obama has also followed his predecessor’s footsteps by strengthening
diplomatic and military ties with India. High-level discussions have continued under the Indo-US
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Strategic Dialogue, with a burgeoning number of military exchanges, staff talks, and military
exercises between the two nations, the centerpiece being the large-scale Malabar maritime
exercise.13 Washington sees India as a “provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region”
and a “linchpin” to the Pacific pivot, if not yet a close ally.14 An even more unexpected
development has been the gradual normalization towards Burma (Myanmar), involving the
easing of economic sanctions, start of military-to-military ties, and visits by senior US officials,
which helped pave the way for a presidential visit in November 2012.15 At this early stage, while
much depends on whether the reforms continue, it is clear that Washington hopes to wean the
former pariah regime away from China’s decades-long embrace.
The United States has made some progress in forging an implicit link between the Indian
and Pacific Oceans, in what then Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt
Campbell described as “the next challenge” in American strategic thinking.16 Indeed, with
greater access to air and naval bases in Darwin and Perth, the United States would have a
stronger capacity to project power into the Indian Ocean, and therefore strengthen an Indo-
Pacific strategic linkage. Of course, such access would also provide an important anchor for an
“Oceania” strategy, in which a smaller naval fleet-in-being could coalesce “just over the
horizon” from both the Chinese mainland and the “main shipping lanes of Eurasia.”17 More
broadly, however, there are ample reasons to doubt that Washington is actually pursuing such a
radical offshore force posture. One need only look at America’s growing interest in the South
China Sea dispute and recent push to strengthen its position in Southeast Asia, to say nothing of
its continued presence in Northeast Asia. With the exception of moving some US Marines from
Okinawa to Guam and elsewhere, the United States shows little sign of fundamentally altering its
commitment to and force presence in South Korea and Japan. In fact, Obama has been keen to
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strengthen ties with both allies, including expanded military exercises with Seoul, re-emphasis
that the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands fall under the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security, and engagement with Seoul and Tokyo on nuclear deterrence issues.18
Lest dispersal be mistaken for force reduction, the administration also codified the need
to maintain a robust regional military presence in its 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance.19 Then
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has spoken about the need to enhance America’s “presence,
power projection, and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific,” and promised to achieve a 60/40 split in
naval assets between the Pacific and Atlantic by 2020.20 In a recent speech by his successor,
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel expanded on this goal to include a 60/40 split in US Air Force
assets as well, including tactical aircraft, bombers, and space and cyber capabilities.21 Even
ground forces contingents, including the US Army I Corps and the 25th Infantry Division and III
Marine Expeditionary Force, have been removed from worldwide service rotation for assignment
to the Asia-Pacific.22 Officials have also made clear that the onset of sequestration will not
impact this effort, despite resulting in an additional $600 billion in defense cuts over ten years.23
The United States has not eschewed high levels of diplomatic and economic engagement
with China, most notably in the expansive Strategic and Economic Dialogue. But, as noted by
David Shambaugh, “In virtually every subject area of the two governments’ 60-plus dialogues,
substantive differences and frictions are now evident.”24 This is not to deny that an improvement
in tone is now evident under Beijing’s newly appointed leadership. Obama has worked hard to
establish a personal rapport with his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping. And, despite
rising tension and mutual accusations over cyber espionage, both countries were able to come
together at the recent summit to set up a working group on cyber-security. Still, the
administration has put relatively greater weight on balancing China rather than simply trying to
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engage with it – though much depends not only on China’s reaction to this effort but also the
long term sustainability of the pivot itself at a time of fiscal tightening.
Grand Strategy and Fiscal Realities in Obama’s Pivot
Much like his predecessors, President Obama has eagerly maintained American primacy
in the Asia-Pacific. But there is an important qualifier to this point. Yes, strategic preponderance
remains as important as it ever was in a region where the threat of a near-peer competitor is
considered acute. At the same time, the administration appears more willing to reduce its level of
engagement elsewhere. Selective engagement will be pursued in less strategically vital regions,
even as the pivot ensures primacy is maintained in the one region where it matters the most.25 As
two observers conclude, the United States “has prioritized seeking continued dominance in the
Pacific basin at a cost to power projection elsewhere.”26 The administration now prefers to use
the more innocuous term “rebalancing,” in an apparent effort to avoid the appearance of pivoting
away from other commitments.27 Yet this seems to obscure more than it reveals, in so far as
America’s actions and stated intentions seem to indicate a much greater willingness to retrench
from some of its less strategically salient commitments. It is this fact that provides Obama’s
Pacific pivot a potentially transformational character fundamentally different from previous
efforts.
Hints at greater selectivity can be found first in Europe, where the withdrawal of two
Army brigades and two air squadrons will reduce the US military commitment there by 15
percent to a low of 68,000.28 Sequestration promises to only undercut the rationale of this still
sizable force presence, especially on ground forces designed to deal with the threat of a land
invasion that no longer exists – a fact noted by the head of US European Command Admiral
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James Stavridis, who suspects that the “downward trajectory over time will probably continue.”29
The same is even true in the Middle East, where the US has already suffered a setback by failing
to reach a postwar agreement with Iraq for a residual force presence and base access. The
Pentagon hoped to use Kuwait as a possible replacement, but it recently closed down a logistical
hub there in late 2012 and scaled its force presence back to 13,500 troops.30 Of course,
Washington still places “a premium on U.S. and allied military presence” in the Mideast.31 But,
if sequestration cuts continue, the US may be tempted to scale back its ground forces in Kuwait
to save costs. US air assets and naval patrols in the Persian Gulf might be in a safer position. But
even these are not necessarily sacrosanct, as shown by the Navy’s recent decision to retain only a
single carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf.32
Some officials speak as if the administration has embraced a grand strategy of “restraint”
or “offshore balancing.”33 There is a kernel of truth to this position. President Obama has pivoted
away from land wars in Southwest Asia and often preferred to employ limited naval and air
power (and covert operations) elsewhere, as shown in Libya and Mali – or pursued an even more
hands off approach in the Syrian civil war, for example. Yet offshore balancing involves a more
abject rejection of America’s global role, including the withdrawal of all forward deployed
military forces, abrogation of alliance commitments, and wholesale “buck-passing” to the likes
of Germany and Japan.34 In contrast, the United States seems little inclined to relinquish its
preponderance in the Asia-Pacific, though a much lighter military footprint is increasingly
possible in Europe and the Mideast. Even the US Navy (USN) does not envision either pulling
back from its substantial naval presence abroad or dismantling its basing infrastructure, despite
occasional comments in support of an offshore position.35
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Still, questions have been raised as to whether the pivot will be adequately funded,36
particularly since the defense budget will be increasingly squeezed by the growth of entitlement
spending. Many of the pivot’s initial proponents are no longer in office, including Hillary
Clinton, Kurt Campbell, and Leon Panetta, which has generated concern that the new Secretaries
of State and Defense John Kerry and Chuck Hagel may not be wedded to the pivot as their
predecessors.37 Yet selective primacy has an underlying strategic and fiscal logic that is difficult
to discount. True, defense spending cuts can perhaps endanger the military basis of this pivot.
But, at a time of budgetary austerity, Washington must pay greater attention on prioritizing
different interests, of which the need to manage China’s rise arguably looms largest. As a result,
the United States has greater urgency to become selective in its commitments, so that “more
military assets and spending can be assigned to the region.”38 In that way, US fiscal constraint
actually underwrites rather than negates the Pacific pivot. Another factor is the deciding role of
the president himself. It would be premature to think that officials could do away with this
initiative without considering the president’s own views – and there is little indication that
Obama has lost interest in the Pacific pivot.
A better description of America’s current grand strategy might be “selective primacy,”
where Obama’s pivot reflects a narrower application of primacy and retrenchment elsewhere is
used to safeguard continued preponderance in the Asia-Pacific. As a component of this grand
strategy, the Pacific pivot implies a broader blueprint in how to deal with future defense
spending cuts, starting with the principal long term goal of maintaining preponderance in the
Asia-Pacific. Washington could in turn pivot away from its commitments elsewhere to safeguard
this higher order priority, first with its sizable force presence in Europe, and then by a drawdown
from the Middle East if necessary. If correct, additional cuts to America’s force presence in both
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regions may soon be in the offing, likely to disproportionately impact ground forces than more
flexible naval and air force deployments.
Selective primacy also envisions a military force structure attuned to both greater
selectivity and a continued force presence in the western Pacific to counter China’s burgeoning
anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.39 With an A2/AD threat envelope, Beijing
would finally have a capacity to contest the maritime and aerospace domains in its immediate
littoral zone and beyond, whether by anti-access missile attacks on US naval and air bases in
region or by naval operations to contest American command in this theatre – in a manner similar
to how the Soviet Union pursued a “line in the ocean” strategy to “push back U.S. carriers by
establishing defensive maritime perimeters.”40 China’s line would include much of the near seas
(Yellow Sea and the East and South China Seas) and potentially extending past the first island
chain (composed of the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines).
Washington needs to prioritize naval and air power in order to buttress its preponderant
position in this region. With the important exception of Korea, American ground forces would be
relegated to a secondary role. This implies a reversal of the military service priorities that existed
under the previous administration, when both the US Army and Marine Corps expanded to
prosecute land wars in Southwest Asia. Already, the US Army is expected to lose much of its
recent troop increases, with an active duty force shrinking to 490,000 over the next five years.
Discussion is also underway on further reductions arising from sequestration, which could limit
the active force to 400,000-425,000 and cut the reserves by tens of thousands.41 Unlike his Army
colleagues, Commandant General James Amos has so far been unwilling for the Marine Corps to
go below a planned 182,000-strong force, preferring that procurement take the brunt of any
further reductions.42 Yet even this outcome could prove optimistic, especially if the United States
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opts for a smaller ground presence in Europe and elsewhere. Potential cost-savings should not be
discounted. According to a RAND paper, for example, the United States would save $107-126
billion over ten years by eliminating six Army brigade combat teams and 13,500 Marines from
the Europe-Mediterranean region.43
In contrast, the US Air Force (USAF) and USN will likely emerge from sequestration in
comparatively better shape, if not completely intact. The USAF is still expected to rely on the F-
35 Lightning II program to fulfill its principal next-generation fighter requirements, despite cost-
overruns and production delays – though fewer numbers of F-35 aircraft will likely be procured
in the current fiscal climate. Still, the United States has the option of either accelerating the
development of next-generation unmanned vehicles or procuring greater quantities of less
advanced (but still formidable) aircraft, such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, which could help
safeguard its plans for a new long-range strike bomber. The USN, in turn, only expects a modest
increase in fleet size to 300 ships, though this goal could also prove overly optimistic after
sequestration. Notably, the Navy has at least emphasized maintaining its inventory of Aegis
destroyers, nuclear attack submarines, and carrier strike groups; precisely those platforms that
would help ensure its command of the maritime commons.44 Even with a modest decrease in
size, the United States would still have a comparatively large fleet composed of extremely
formidable ships, with the option of surging these forces to a particular region, if required.
Undoubtedly, both services are under growing budgetary pressure that could impact their
readiness, deployments, and even procurement plans – even if not to the extent proposed by
more alarmist accounts that underplay expected delays in procurement and overlook the likely
formidable size of America’s air and naval fleets.45 Still, the Air Force might discover that its
next-generation fighter aircraft and strike bombers are unaffordable, leading to an even more
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radical restructuring of its future fleet, while the Navy could find maintaining eleven carrier
strike groups far too ambitious and cut back on some of its capital ships. Yet, unlike their ground
counterparts, the USN and USAF play a crucial role in buttressing America’s military presence
in the Asia-Pacific. For Washington, this creates an additional incentive to let any defense cuts
fall disproportionately on the ground forces, since manpower can be regenerated relatively
quickly in contrast to large capital projects.46
The USN and USAF can also compensate for capital shortfalls in other ways. On one
hand, both services have been intent on renewing their operational partnership through the
AirSea Battle concept, designed to construct a capacity for “Networked, Integrated Attack-in-
Depth” to disrupt, destroy, and defeat A2/AD threats. Yet this concept is also about improving
America’s “power projection capabilities in smarter, more cost-effective ways.” By emphasizing
networking and integration, it envisions increasing cross-service synergy that would “improve
the ability of existing platforms to operate or deliver effects,” which could better preparing the
USN and USAF to deal with smaller budgetary outlays.47 On the other hand, given its intention
to pivot away from other locales, the United States could reposition naval and air assets from less
vital positions to ensure a robust military presence in Asia. For example, even if the USN’s fleet
modestly shrinks, it could still reposition naval assets in such a way as to retain much of the core
strength of the US Pacific Fleet. Indeed, the USN has the means to relatively quickly surge assets
from one theatre to another, thereby reducing (if not eliminating) some of the risks associated
with a more selective American overseas naval presence.
A Canadian Contribution to the Pacific Pivot
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Canada has made some recent moves to reinvigorate its engagement in the Asia-Pacific.
In 2010, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government finally acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation. Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird was also particularly active in the
region, whether by taking the lead in engaging Myanmar, pushing for bilateral free trade
agreements, including with South Korea and Japan, or committing C$10-million in funding to
ASEAN-related projects.48 The Canadian government also formally joined the TTP negotiations
as a full partner and indicated interest in the East Asia Summit, though it has more limited
negotiating rights in the former (like other late entrants) and has yet to be invited to the latter.49
Ottawa has also shown a greater willingness to expand its security role as leverage to join
the region’s institutional architecture. Of particular importance is the ADMM-Plus, widely seen
as a stepping stone to join the East Asia Summit.50 Indeed, senior officials led by then Defence
Minister Peter MacKay have begun to make more regular appearances at the Shangri-La
Dialogue, with an eye towards gaining an invitation to ADMM-Plus. Canada is negotiating a
mutual logistics support agreement with Japan and shown interest in a logistical support hub in
Singapore, likely to include a cross-services agreement and access to facilities.51 One can also
point to Canada’s role in the 2012 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational exercise, where it
deployed a relatively strong 1,400-strong contingent and occupied key command positions.52
Yet it remains to be seen whether the government’s current reengagement will be
sustained in the long term. With only a few exceptions, much of Canada’s post-Cold War interest
has been focused on trade, exemplified by Team Canada trade missions to China. Even this
economic engagement lacked much of a “strategic dimension.”53 Attention also fluctuates based
on the particular proclivities of the government in power. A good example is Prime Minister
Harper’s decision to spurn talk of a “strategic partnership” with China for reasons of human
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rights, then to reverse course soon afterwards.54 With that in mind, Canada may find it
unexpectedly difficult to be treated as a long term regional player or be invited for a seat at
ADMM-Plus, let alone the East Asia Summit. This was recently brought home at the 2013
Shangri-La Dialogue, where Peter MacKay publicly broached the issue of participating in
ADMM-Plus only to be politely rejected by his Singaporean counterpart.55
Clearly, a core deficit has been Canada’s lack of a strategic rationale in the Asia-Pacific.
It partly arises from the privileged position of North America and Europe in Canadian security
policy. At a more fundamental level, it is a consequence of how Canada traditionally follows
America’s lead on politico-military issues, owing to its strong “adaptive” or “responsive”
tendencies.56 This fact helps to explain why Canada places greater priority on continental and
trans-Atlantic ties, the former in recognition that Washington saw bilateral cooperation as
necessary to secure North America from Soviet attack, the latter coming from the need to cement
America’s security guarantees to Europe within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
One can also look to when Canada last played a strategic role in East Asia, from its
involvement in Korea (militarily) to Indochina (diplomatically) until the early 1970s. Then,
officials were largely focused on adapting to the ebb and flow of America’s interventions, which
distracted attention from the Central Front and even raised the possibility of nuclear war – a
concern only put to rest with Washington’s post-Vietnam disengagement and the onset of Sino-
American rapprochement.57 Canada then expanded economic and trade links to the region, but its
involvement on regional security matters remained modest or sporadic at best – essentially
limited to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s short-lived North Pacific Cooperative Security
Dialogue and funding of the South China Sea Dialogue in the 1990s. Yet Obama’s pivot may
soon make this situation untenable. After all, the United States now has a strong incentive to
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strengthen regional alliances, share more of the burden of this effort, and to look further afield
for new partners, already apparent in the emerging alignment between Washington and New
Delhi. If it continues, Canada will find its modest role in the region under greater scrutiny.
Of course, Canada could opt to instead backstop the receding American military presence
in Europe and the Mediterranean, as a means of indirect support. Much depends on how
amenable the pivot is to Canada and the extent to which both countries preferences converge – a
subject to be discussed shortly. Yet it is important not to overstate such concerns. Canada has a
strong preference for more direct forms of cooperation with the Americans, especially if their
interests coincide. As such, Canada is unlikely to play too distant a role on issues that our ally
sees as important, any more than it was willing to settle for a role in North America when
Washington was fixated on the Central Front in the Cold War. It might not be in Canada’s more
parochial economic interest to do so either, given the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific
compared to that of Europe and elsewhere. As noted in a recent report, if it hopes to make
economic inroads, Canada needs to pursue full-scale engagement across “multiple domains,”
including on security, rather than rely on a “one-legged (read economic) strategy.”58 As such,
Canada’s participation in the Pacific pivot may soon become the only strategic game in town, so
to speak.
Of course, Canada has traditionally been inclined to skirt between close cooperation and
maximizing distance in its relationship to its superpower ally – a tendency likely to shape how
the country actually responds to America’s Pacific pivot. Some important conditions seem to
impact the relative balance between these contradictory impulses towards accommodation and
distancing in Canadian grand strategy.59 Among the most basic is whether the United States
actually prioritizes a particular initiative. After all, American proposals periodically emerge
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without substantive support or funding, a good example being initial plans for an ambitious
continental air defense perimeter with little official support from Washington in the mid-to-late
1940s.60 Equally important is for Canada’s participation or endorsement of an initiative to be
valued, thereby creating an incentive for the United States to turn its attention on its northern
neighbor.
On the first condition, the United States seems ready to prioritize military commitments
in the Asia-Pacific. As outlined earlier, rather than a modest and short-lived recalibration,
Obama’s pivot actually presages a more fundamental strategic adjustment likely to deepen in
coming years, due to America’s fiscal problems and the constraints of a more specialized force
structure. The question then becomes whether Washington will soon put some pressure on
Canada to support its effort in the region. The answer here is more ambiguous. The United States
has so far been intent on emphasizing burden-sharing with its immediate allies in the region.
However, as Washington’s fiscal tightening continues, there is also reason to suspect that
American officials would turn their attention to other allies, including Canada. Admittedly, the
United States could encourage its allies to commit towards greater burden-sharing elsewhere, as
a way to facilitate its retrenchment from other locales and enable a semblance of continued
global engagement. Yet such concerns are also likely to fall to the wayside, pulled under by the
combined weight of a growing Chinese military challenge and the consequent difficulty of
maintaining preponderance at a time of budget cuts. Selective primacy places a premium on
prioritizing the Asia-Pacific at the expense of other commitments – a logic that creates an
incentive to emphasize burden-sharing for this region among countries best able to contribute.
European countries that lack sufficient power projection capabilities may be asked to buttress the
18
American presence in their own region; the same cannot be said of a blue-water, extra-regional
power like Canada.
Other conditions will then help shape Canada’s policy response. For instance, Canada
prefers to avoid cooperation when it involves significant controversy that could generate political
headaches at home, whether from the initiative in question or through guilt by association to an
unpopular administration. One example is Ottawa’s aversion to join the controversial Strategic
Defense Initiative of the 1980s, which the Liberal opposition was quick to disparage as space
weaponization.61 It can also be seen in the controversy attached to President George W. Bush’s
missile defense deployment, though rejection in this case was more closely associated with
anxieties about the administration itself.62 Equally important is for both countries to share the
sense of threat that underpins the initiative, which would help to smooth possible wrinkles to
emerge from bilateral cooperation and make Ottawa more willing to accept any perceived sense
of subservience to emerge from it. For instance, Canada had little objection to the militarization
of the NATO alliance in the 1950s, due not least to concerns over direct Soviet conventional
aggression after the Korean War.63 Without such convergence, Canada could very well see
greater benefit in adopting more implicit, arms-length forms of support.
Yet Canada is unlikely to find much controversy in the pivot’s close association with the
current US administration. Indeed, compared to his almost vilified predecessor, President Obama
has proven exceptionally popular in this country, with polls just prior to the last election showing
that two-thirds of Canadians would vote for him if possible, including “79 per cent of Quebecers
and 71 per cent of Canadian women.”64 Indeed, with Obama’s popularity higher than the prime
minister’s, the government could even discover that it has little choice other than to support
American preferences on this matter, if only to forestall any domestic political repercussions.
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More uncertain is how Canada might perceive the Pacific pivot itself. Canadian political
leaders will likely be wary of action that could potentially jeopardize economic ties with this
rising Asian power. Another possible problem is that Obama’s pivot is closely tied to America’s
alliance system in East Asia. There, compared to the multilateral norms that hold sway across the
Atlantic, the United States has historically preferred bilateral alliances under the San Francisco
“hub-and-spokes” system. It can even be extended to regional alliances often mistaken for being
multilateral, like the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).65 Yet Ottawa strongly
prefers placing ties with the United States within a multilateral framework, at least when
cooperating beyond the confines of North America. So the prospect of operating in a strictly
bilateral setting might not be so appealing.
The first point depends on whether Canada necessarily sees eye-to-eye with the
Americans on China. As such, it is closely associated with the relative convergence or
divergence between the two countries on the China threat, in so far as a higher sense of threat –
more similar to that which is prevalent in the United States – would make it less controversial to
both participate in the pivot and risk economic ties with China. Canada might have grown
concerned about Chinese industrial espionage, cyber attacks, and foreign influence, but there is
relatively little discussion on “the strategic implications of China’s military rise.”66 Still, Canada
also has little chance of siding decisively against Washington on this issue. As Bruce Gilley
notes, Canada lacks structural or normative incentives to bandwagon alongside China. Simply
put, there is no possibility of Canada pushing for an “Asian third option” any time soon. If
tensions increase between Beijing and Washington, Canada will be strongly inclined to become
more closely aligned with the latter, even if continuing bilateral differences with Washington
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could provide a possible way to justify a “bridging role among allies” and indeed with China
itself.67
On the second point, it is important to recognize that the San Francisco system has begun
to evolve. Japan signed a bilateral intelligence sharing agreement with South Korea, and both
countries now undertake joint exercises with the United States in the Yellow Sea, with current
discussion focusing on a trilateral dialogue between them. It might be premature to envision a
Korea-Japan alliance, given the distinct lack of mutual trust and domestic/structural impediments
to greater cooperation.68 But, clearly, one can also no longer say that there is “no apparent
connections between the ‘spokes.’”69 Even closer bilateral ties are evident between Australia and
Japan, with an important turning point taking place in 2005, when Australia dispatched hundreds
of additional troops to protect Japanese soldiers deployed in Iraq.70 Afterwards, both countries
signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007, followed quickly by an Acquisition
and Cross-Servicing Agreement to increase military interoperability. Intelligence sharing, joint
military exercises, and Japanese involvement in Australia’s Collins submarine replacement
project are possible next steps, with some discussion raising the possibility of an Australia-Japan
alliance.71
Ministerial-level discussions have also expanded between Australia, Japan, and the
United States under the Trilateral Security Dialogue. These high-level discussions were briefly
superseded with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that had India as a member, in an apparent
reaffirmation of when India joined a “core group” to coordinate disaster relief in the immediate
aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami – though this arrangement also shared a similar fate to the short-
lived core group.72 All four “Quad” countries held occasional quadrilateral meetings and, with
the inclusion of Singapore, participated in the Malabar maritime exercise in the Bay of Bengal in
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2007. But Australian and Indian interest in this new framework suddenly cooled, due not least to
concern about unduly alarming China.73 It might have been dealt a final blow with the 2007
resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the strongest proponent of this arrangement
– though his return as prime minister in 2012 does potentially auger well for deepening
quadrilateral ties.
Indeed, regional ties have only deepened in recent years. Trilateral discussions continue
between Japan, Australia, and the United States. Meanwhile, Australia has pursued bilateral 2+2
meetings with Japan and South Korea, involving their respective countries’ defence and foreign
ministers. New Delhi has also steadily strengthened ties not only with Washington, but also both
Japan and Australia, “the northern and southern anchors of the Western alliance system.”74 With
Japan, for instance, India signed a Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global
Partnership in 2007, followed by a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation one year later,
which initiated naval talks, a defense policy dialogue, and military exercises.75 India and
Australia also signed agreements in 2006 and 2007 on “joint naval exercises, enhanced maritime
security cooperation, increased military exchanges, and joint training.”76 True, relations between
both countries took a quick downturn following Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s refusal
to sale uranium to India. Yet Canberra now shows greater willingness to lift its ban on uranium
sales and expand military-to-military cooperation.77
Rather than solely a bilateral hub-and-spokes system, one can see at least the beginnings
of a more diffused network emerging in the region, what Dan Blumethal calls a “point to point”
or networked “model of alliances.”78 True, America’s bilateral alliances remain at the core of this
system. But bilateral ties between the spokes are now an important supplement, in addition to a
growing number of trilateral and quadrilateral discussions between different sets of countries, in
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what can be called “mini-lateral” arrangements.79 This does not mean that a formal multilateral
alliance is on the horizon, to say nothing of the multilateral norms and institutions that Canada
finds so familiar across the North Atlantic. The fate of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
provides a sobering lesson on this point. Still, Ottawa will likely find it easier to accept closer
bilateral Canada-US cooperation when it is situated in an emerging network marked by mini-
lateral ties. As a result, Canada has the opportunity to not only enhance cooperation with
Americans but also do the same with many of allies and partners (for example, Japan, India, and
Australia), thereby strengthening the network and diffusing some of the controversy close ties
with the superpower seems to engender in the country.
One can therefore surmise that Canada will prove supportive of the United States in its
Pacific pivot. Washington will still likely need to show at least greater interest for it to do so, at
least for Canada to go beyond its current levels of engagement – unless Canadian officials prove
unexpectedly proactive. Cooperation rather than distancing will be the dominant tendency in
Ottawa. Yet, without greater convergence on the China threat, Canada will likely prefer more
modest ways to support the United States. Indirect support will likely prove a step too far, for the
reasons already addressed. Instead, Canada will likely prefer more direct forms of support –
sufficient to placate the Americans and give the government a façade of independence, but
limited enough to minimize the risk of damaging economic ties with a rising China.
Canadian Maritime Diplomacy: A Way Forward?
One fruitful avenue of Canada-US cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is maritime diplomacy.
Such activity seems ideally suited in a theatre where key players are expanding their naval
capabilities and could be involved in regional maritime flashpoints, whether the Taiwan Straits,
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South China Sea, or the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.80 It would also complement the military’s post-
Afghan emphasis on defense diplomacy, as outlined in the Department of National Defence’s
Global Engagement Strategy.81 Indeed, by expanding its naval role in such a way, Canada would
be able to more convincingly argue for its inclusion in ADMM-Plus, and eventually the East
Asia Summit. For example, ADMM-Plus has an Expert Working Group to facilitate cooperation
in maritime security, which would be the natural loci for an expanded Canadian naval effort.82
Other working groups also explore non-traditional security issues heavily tied to the maritime
domain, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and counter-terrorism. If necessary,
naval forces would also be equally useful way to demonstrate commitment on traditional security
concerns like sea control, for example – a possibility that should not be discounted given that a
competitive naval element is increasingly part of the East Asian strategic landscape.83
The RCN already has a history of making naval port calls to the Pacific since 1995, under
a rolling five-year deployment pattern called WESTPLOY “designed to ensure a consistent and
predictable Canadian naval presence in Asian water.”84 Even then, WESTPLOY is limited to
alternating visits to Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Moreover, with the exception of
RIMPAC, Canada often settles for ad hoc participation in the regional military exercises, such as
the trilateral naval exercise between Japan, the US, and Canada during the WESTPLOY
deployment in 2008.85 Yet more needs to be done. For example, Canadian frigates or destroyers
could be permanently integrated into US carrier battle groups operating in the western Pacific,86
similar to how it commits warships to the Standing NATO Maritime Group (and the Standing
Naval Force Atlantic before that). With the high levels of interoperability between RCN and
USN, this could be done relatively easily – so long as sufficient RCN vessels are available.
Canada should also balance such bilateral ties by establishing closer naval ties with America’s
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key allies and partners, such as Australia, Japan, and even India. This would include not only
“show the flag” port calls but also more frequent maritime exercises with allied navies. RIMPAC
remains one of the most important venues for maritime diplomacy, which necessitates a strong
Canadian presence. But RCN could also be involved in additional bilateral or mini-lateral
exercises, not all of which need to involve the USN.
Canada should also not be averse to joining any multinational deterrence patrols and
future naval task forces, which could provide a means to “work with non-traditional coalition
partners” on a range of different issues, from terrorism and piracy to weapons of mass
destruction.87 When placed alongside more varied maritime ties, it would even help reduce the
perception that Ottawa is simply falling in line behind Washington in its Pacific pivot. As such,
Canada’s actions would increase the level of cooperation with the Americans but would do so in
a relatively low-key manner. Canada could ensure that maritime diplomacy also includes
overtures to the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN), including participating in bilateral or
trilateral maritime exercises with this rapidly modernizing naval force. This could further
minimize the perception of Canada’s subservience to Washington while also helping to reassure
China that the RCN’s maritime reengagement is not part of any purported containment or
encirclement effort.
Yet this discussion on the Canada’s maritime diplomacy only raises another question.
Does Canada have the military means to fulfill such a role? The answer here is more mixed.
Canada could benefit from placing more of its naval forces on the West Coast than the East,
rather than the current 55/45 division favoring the latter.88 Equally useful would be to forward
base some vessels or air assets in the western Pacific, whether in Guam or even Singapore, which
could ensure a more regular force presence and reduce some of the logistical difficulties of
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operating in this theatre. With a mid-sized blue-water fleet, the RCN would only have the means
to modestly increase its presence in the Pacific, even with a more favorable deployment scheme.
But such a redeployment would be an important first step in signaling Canada’s resolve to
support America’s Pacific pivot, while also providing a increased (albeit still limited) capacity
for maritime diplomacy. Of course, much also depends on how the RCN proceeds with its fleet-
replacement plans. Further delays in procuring replacements for its auxiliary oil replenishment
(AOR) ships and guided missile destroyers could result in a temporary loss of key capabilities,
thereby degrading Canada’s ability to play a supporting role in the short-term, or at best induce
an expensive effort to maintain and modernize increasingly aging ships.
More problematic is the question of capital funding for fleet-replacement. On one hand,
Canada needs to ensure that the actual size of its blue-water fleet is maintained, including a
suitable number of replacements for its destroyers, frigates, and AOR ships – the first two
coming under the Canadian Surface Combatant project and the last coming under the Joint
Supply Ship project (essentially an AOR+). If the size of the fleet declines further, Canada will
find it very difficult to reprioritize its fleet to the Pacific. Indeed, it might be hard enough just to
maintain the current number of naval assets stationed in Esquimalt, British Columbia, to say
nothing of increasing it. Moreover, in the absence of enough ships, Canada will likely find it
difficult to either expand its Pacific deployment scheme beyond WESTPLOY or be invited to
participate in military exercises there, let alone increase naval ties with regional partners.
On the other hand, the RCN needs to have the necessary capabilities to operate in the
western Pacific. Fortunately, as specified in its recent draft Horizon 2050 naval strategy, the
RCN seems to recognize the challenge posed by “inter-state maritime armed conflict” and
“sophisticated area denial capabilities,” in what Elinor Sloan views as an implicit reference to
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China’s A2/AD capabilities.89 Yet it remains to be seen whether the RCN will have the requisite
capabilities to join with its American (and allied) counterparts in confronting such challenges.
For example, even with its historic area-air defense role, the RCN has given little indication
about adding the Aegis combat system to its future vessels, which offers an important capability
against China’s anti-access missile threat while permitting the RCN to support key defensive
missions envisioned in the US AirSea Battle concept. Aegis could be required for Canada’s navy
to maintain interoperability with the USN and its many regional partners (Australia, South
Korea, Japan), all of which are rapidly expanding their fleet of Aegis warships.90 It could also
provide a means for Canada to realize the full potential of its planned acquisition of the F-35
Lightning II. After all, many regional allies are acquiring both F-35s and Aegis ships, and the
interconnected networked sensors of these fifth-generation aircraft could be mated with the
Aegis system under its launch-on-remote concept, thereby creating “an integrated air-sea sensor
net for deployed fleets.”91
Little discussion is also underway on the possible contributions of anti-submarine warfare
(ASW), highly valued by Americans and others to ensure sea control in the face of China’s
growing undersea fleet. The RCN could also potentially leverage an ASW capability to cement a
naval partnership with other regional partners. One possibility is the Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Force, which operates a large and sophisticated undersea and surface ASW fleet and has
shown growing willingness to contemplate strategic relations beyond its traditional America ally,
including Australia. The RCN has historically undertaken area-air defense and surface
ASW/escort missions, so this defensive role would be quite familiar. Indeed, its Victoria diesel
submarines could prove a very useful platform for ASW missions, in a return to when the RCN
briefly acquired an undersea ASW capability after refurbishing its older Oberon submarines in
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the 1980s.92 It would also allow Canada to avoid some of the more troubling “offensive” aspects
of AirSea Battle, even if it raises uncomfortable questions on replacing Canada’s aging Aurora
maritime patrol aircraft, and eventually its submarines.
Yet, in the absence of sufficient funding, the RCN will likely discover the natural trade-
off between fleet size and ensuring that these ships maintain their qualitative edge. Canada has
already scaled back the Joint Supply Ships’ capabilities and settled for only two vessels, which
could very well curtail its operational sustainment capability – and at the very least displays a
marked under-appreciation on the need for at-sea replenishment, especially in an expansive
maritime environment like the Pacific.93 The same could eventually be said of the Canadian
Surface Combatants. Critics already question whether Canada’s National Shipbuilding
Procurement Strategy’s C$33 billion budget envelope is sufficient to recapitalize naval and coast
guard fleets, especially with rising platform costs and possible capital budget shortfalls.94 With a
decades-long procurement process, one can imagine a future government someday deciding to
scale back capital spending. In such a situation, Canadian defense planners may have to envision
a more specialized military force structure.
The full implications of such a force structure are beyond the scope of this article. But
one should at least recall that some degree of military specialization is not totally unfamiliar to
the Canadian Armed Forces. One can see it in how the RCN evolved into a specialized (albeit
flexible) surface-oriented ASW force for much of the Cold War, or in how Canada’s military
finally shed its nuclear role by the 1980s. Even Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan has only
facilitated de facto specialization in “land-centric missions.”95 As such, Canada may need to face
some hard choices about its military force structure and the relative priority assigned to its three
services. To ensure a robust naval fleet, Canada may simply have to follow the Americans by
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cutting personnel numbers and accepting that such an outcome would adversely impact the Army
over more capital-intensive services. With a more balance capital-to-personnel ratio, one can
better ensure greater funding is allocated for equipment renewal and fleet replacement.96 Such
specialization might be necessary for Canada to maintain high-end combat-capable naval and air
forces into the future. If not ideal, it may also be the only way for the RCN to ensure that it has
the numbers to reposition to the Pacific and capabilities to operate in an anti-access environment.
Importantly, this outcome would not reduce the RCN to a niche naval role for the Pacific, in so
far as naval vessels are inherently flexible and can be redeployed or surged into other theatres,
some of which face an A2/AD challenge as well, not least the Persian Gulf.
Conclusion
Canada has already made some limited effort at reengaging in the Asia-Pacific. Yet even
this progress will likely prove insufficient in coming years, especially as the United States
reduces its global commitments to sustain a preponderant position in the Pacific. Such an
outcome remains only in the realm of a conjecture. However, there are strategic and fiscal
reasons to believe that Obama’s pivot heralds a more significant strategic adjustment towards
selective primacy. It seems to be only a matter of time before renewed attention on burden-
sharing is finally brought to bear on Canada.
Ottawa is also unlikely to be intransigent when it comes to adapting to American
preferences here, so long as key factors points to cooperation rather than distance. Simply put,
irrespective of the government’s own plans and proclivities, Canada’s strategic behavior has
often been heavily shaped (if not determined) by what takes place in Washington – a reactive
tendency that has proven especially difficult to overcome. Importantly, as this article shows,
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Canadian support for the Pacific pivot will not prove terribly controversial, even if some qualms
can be expected due to the limited convergence on the need to counter China’s growing military
power. This means that Canada should prepare to increase its cooperation with the United States,
even if care must be taken to minimize its consequence on the country’s economic and trade
links with China. Such modest distancing would also have the ancillary benefit of demonstrating
Canada’s resolve in maintaining a semblance of independence, while making closer cooperation
with the Americans more domestically palatable.
Maritime diplomacy seems to provide the best way to achieve such a balanced approach.
Naval assets have a natural suitability to this heavily maritime theatre. Indeed, by using the RCN
as the centerpiece of its reengagement effort, Canada would be offering capabilities ideally
suited to buttress America’s own position and contribute to possible military contingencies,
whether in the Taiwan Straits, the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere. Such assets also have a
number of different uses, ranging from power projection and sea control to logistical support,
which gives them a flexible and potentially non-intrusive character. Importantly, maritime
diplomacy is also inherently amenable to modest forms of distancing from the United States,
whether by engaging in the loose maritime network emerging in the region, including ties with
regional navies and even the PLAN, or by providing a means to support Canada’s participation
in the region’s broader security architecture. If required, Canada has the option of reducing its
naval involvement. But, if Canada’s sense of threat from China increases, the government can
also turn to more robust demonstrations of support, by increasing ties with America and her
allies and/or minimizing its attempts to assuage Chinese concerns.
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1 Brian Stewart, “Time for Canada to get back to peacekeeping,” CBC News, December 3, 2012. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/11/30/f-vp-stewart-peacekeeping.html. Also see Louis Delvoie, “What Next for the Canadian Forces? Not the Congo,” On Track Vol. 15, No. 4 (Winter 2010/11): pp 28-29. 2 Eugene Lang and Eric Morse, “World-class Canadian military now at Ottawa’s disposal,” Toronto Star, June 11, 2011. 3 Aaron Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing: An Alternative to U.S. China Policy,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 91, No. 5 (September/October 2012), p 52. 4 For example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke about the need for any resolution to take into account exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, in an implicit rebuff of China’s historical claims. See Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US-China Strategic Rivalry,” The Washington
Quarterly Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring 2012), p 148. 5 The White House, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” November 17, 2011, and Craig Whitlock, “U.S., Australia to Broaden Military Ties Amid Pentagon Pivot to SE Asia,” Washington Post, March 26, 2012. 6 Robbin Laird, “The US Marine Corps in the Pivot to the Pacific,” The Diplomat, May 24, 2013. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/24/the-us-marine-corps-in-the-pivot-to-the-pacific/. 7 Australian Government (Allan Hawke and Ric Smith), Australian Defence Force Posture Review (March 30, 2012), pp 32-33. 8 Jonathan Pearlman, “Australia to allow greater US naval access to west coast,” Strait Times, November 13, 2012. 9 Alex Frangos, “Plan to Shift U.S. Forces in Pacific Hits Speed Bumps on Guam,” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2013. 10 William Wan, “Defense Secretary Leon Panetta highlights U.S. ties to Vietnam during visit,” The Washington
Post, June 3, 2012, and Gopal Ratman, “Cam Ranh Bay Lures Panetta Seeking Return to Vietnam Port,” Bloomberg News, June 4, 2012. 11 Murray Hiebert and Jeremiah Magpile, “Comprehensive Partnership Nudges U.S.-Indonesia Relations to New Levels of Cooperation,” Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th & K Streets, September 27, 2012, p 3. 12 Manuel Mogato, “The US military pivot to Asia: when bases are not bases,” Reuters, November 14, 2012. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/14/us-usa-asia-military-idUSBRE8AD05Y20121114. Craig Whitlock, “U.S. eyes return to some Southeast Asia military bases,” The Washington Post, June 22, 2012. 13 See K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto, “India-US Security Relations: Current Engagement,” CSR Report for Congress (November 13, 2012), pp 1-33. 14 United States, Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January 2012 (hereafter the 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance), p 2, and Pentagon transcript. Available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5054. 15 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Obama Visit Reflects Myanmar’s Key Role in US Pivot to Asia,” World Politics
Review, November 27, 2012. Available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12523/obama-visit-reflects-myanmars-key-role-in-u-s-pivot-to-asia. Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Moral and Strategic Blindspot in Obama’s Pivot to Asia,” New Republic, November 20, 2012. 16 Quoted in Mark Manyin et al., “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Towards Asia,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (March 28, 2012), p 5. 17 Robert Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 89, No. 3 (May/June 2010), p 40. For this strategy to be effective, the United States would need to establish a more permanent military presence near Perth for a carrier strike group, an expensive proposition given that the estimated cost of a nuclear carrier-capable port ranges from $1-5 billion. David Berteau and Michael Green (directors), US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012), p 74. 18 This involves the US-Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee and the US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue. 19 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance, p 2. 20 Pentagon transcripts. Available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4953, and http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681. 21 Karen Parrish, “U.S. Following Through on Pacific Rebalance, Hagel Says,” Armed Forces Press Service, June 1, 2013. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120186. 22 “Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, US Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before the House Armed Service Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” Hearing: The Posture of the U.S. Pacific Command
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and U.S. Strategic Command, House Armed Service Committee, March 5, 2013, pp 30-31. Available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130305/100393/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-LocklearUSNA-20130305.pdf. 23 David Beitelman, “America’s Pacific Pivot,” International Journal Vol. 67, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), p 1088, and “Asia rebalance remains U.S. priority amid fiscal woes: Pentagon,” Reuters, February 27, 2013. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/28/us-usa-fiscal-pentagon-asia-idUSBRE91R02O20130228. 24 David Shambaugh, “Conceptualizing the U.S.-China Relationship,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers), p 21 (emphasis in original). 25 For more on selective engagement and primacy, see Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” International Security Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp 5-53. 26 David Carment and Simon Palamar, “Canada Grapples with Asia Dilemma,” The Diplomat, February 10, 2012. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/10/canada-grapples-with-asia-dilemma. 27 Richard Weitz, “Pivot Out, Rebalance In,” The Diplomat, May 3, 2012. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/03/pivot-out-rebalance-in. 28 Donna Miles, “Force Changes in Europe to Preserve Strategic Edge,” American Forces Press Service, May 7, 2012. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116221. 29 Jeff Schogol, “European troop cuts may be deeper than expected,” Army Times, March 19, 2013. Available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/2013/03/air-force-armed-services-031913. 30 Kenneth Katzman, “Kuwait: Security, Reform, and US Policy,” CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, December 6, 2012), 16. 31 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance, 2 32 Lolita Baldor, “US to cut carrier fleet in Persian Gulf to 1,” Associated Press, February 6, 2013. Available at http://news.yahoo.com/us-cut-carrier-fleet-persian-gulf-1-212704370--finance.html. 33 See John Barry, “Historic Shift in US Strategy Will Have Major Impact on Europe,” European Affairs, April 2012. Available at http://www.europeaninstitute.org/EA-April-2012/historic-shift-in-us-defense-strategy-will-have-major-impact-on-europe.html. 34 Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security (Summer 1997), pp 86-124. 35 See James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the Indian Ocean,” Asian Security Vol. 8, No. 1 (2012), pp 1-26. 36 On the first concern, see Dan Blumethal, “The U.S. Response to China’s Military Modernization,” in Ashley Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2012-13:China’s Military Challenge (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), p 324. 37 Michael Auslin, “The Asian Pivot Under New Management,” Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2013. 38 Benjamin Schreer, “Planning the unthinkable war: ‘AirSea Battle’ and its implications for Australia,” Strategy Report (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2013), p 15. 39 Of particular concern in the latter is China’s regional missile force, including 1,000-1,200 short-range ballistic missiles, 75-100 road-mobile medium-range ballistic missiles, 200-500 second-generation land-attack cruise missiles, and a new medium-range anti-ship ballistic missile. In recent years, China’s navy displays a much greater capacity for anti-ship and area-air defense missions, with the acquisition of 23 advanced diesel-electric submarines, 4 Russian Sovremenny destroyers, and upwards of 50 indigenous major surface combatants, with more undergoing serial production, including advanced warships like the Luyang II and Luyang III destroyer and Jiangkai II frigate. It has also recently commissioned a revamped Russian aircraft carrier as the Liaoning, with indigenous carriers expected to be launched in coming years. See United States, Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2013), and Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress (December 10, 2012). 40 Blumethal, “The U.S. Response,” 317. 41 C. Todd Lopez, “Odierno: Sequestration could lead to hollow Army,” Army News Service, May 17, 2012. Available at http://www.army.mil/article/80058/Odierno__Sequestration_could_lead_to_hollow_Army/. 42 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Budget cuts seen squeezing Marines’ capacity, programs,” Reuters, September 10, 2012. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/10/us-marines-aircraft-idUSBRE88912Y20120910. 43 Stuart Johnson et al., A Strategy-Based Framework for Accommodating Reductions in the Defense Budget, Occasional Paper (RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2012), pp 37-38.
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44 United States, Department of the Navy, Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2013, April 2012, p 12. 45 Schreer, “Planning the unthinkable war,” p 14. 46 David Barno, Nora Bensahel, and Travis Sharp, Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, October 2011), p 11. 47 Norton Schwartz and Jonathan Greenert, “Air-Sea Battle, Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty,” The American Interest, February 20, 2012 (emphasis added). Available at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1212. For more on the crucial role of networks and integration in Air-Sea Battle, see Richard Bitzinger and Michael Raska, “The AirSea Battle Debate and the Future of Conflict in East Asia,” RSIS Policy Brief (February 2013), pp 1-8. 48 See Brian Job, “Revitalizing Canada–Southeast Asia relations: The TAC gives US a ticket. . . but do we have a destination?” Canada-Asia Agenda, August 25, 2010, p 3, and Peter MacKay, “New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security,” speech at the 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue Fourth Plenary Session, 2 June 2013. Available at http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/fourth-plenary-session-0f17/mackay-1f8b. 49 Brian Job, “Realizing the ‘Other Half of Diplomacy’ in Southeast Asia: Will Canada’s Efforts Last?” Canada-Asia Agenda, August 7, 2012, p 3, and Hugh Stephens, “Canada’s Asia ‘Pivot,” The Diplomat, July 27, 2012. Available at http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2012/07/27/canadas-asia-pivot/. 50 Campbell Clark, “Mackay presses China to take regional disputes to UN,” Globe and Mail, June 4, 2013. Available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/mackay-presses-china-to-take-regional-disputes-to-un/article12329483/. 51 Job, “Realizing the ‘Other Half of Diplomacy,’” p 5. 52 “Canadians get key posts in huge joint military exercise,” The Canadian Press, July 15, 2012. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/07/15/rimpac-exercise-canadians.html. 53 Paul Evans, “Engagement with conservative characteristics: Policy and public attitudes, 2006–2011,” in Pitman Potter and Thomas Adams, eds., Issues in Canada–China Relations (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2011), p 27. 54 See Wenran Jiang, “Seeking a strategic vision for Canada-China relations,” International Journal Vol. 64, No. 4 (Autumn 2009): pp 891-909. 55 Peter Jennings, “Australia and Canada: the kangamoose wakes,” The Strategist blog, June 12, 2013. Available at http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-canada-the-kangamoose-wakes. 56 Don Munton, “Planning in the East Block: the Post-Hostilities Problem Committees in Canada 1943-5,” International Journal Vol. 32, No. 4 (1976-77), p 706, and Norman Hillmer, “Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Boundaries of Alignment,” in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Norman Hillmer, eds. Activism and (Non)Alignment: The Relationship between Foreign Policy and Security Doctrine (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p 57. 57 David McDonough, “Canada, Grand Strategy, and the Asia-Pacific: Past Lessons, Future Directions,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), pp 273-286. 58 Don Campbell, Paul Evans, and Pierre Lortie, Securing Canada’s Place in Asia: Means, Institutions and
Mechanisms (Vancouver, BC: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, August 2012), p 13. 59 See David McDonough, “Getting It Just Right: Strategic Culture, Cybernetics, and Canada's Goldilocks Grand Strategy,” Comparative Strategy Vol. 32, No. 3 (2013), pp 237-238. 60 This included the Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee’s Appendix A, “Air Interceptor and Air Warning Plan and the US Air Defense Command’s Plan Supremacy. See Joseph Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), Chp. 2-3. 61 James Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence 1954-2009: Déjà vu All Over Again (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), pp 82-84. 62 Donald Barry, “Canada and Missile Defence: Saying No to Mr. Bush,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Vol. 12, No. 3 (2010), p 35. 63 See David Bercuson, “Canada, NATO, and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (But Not For Very Long),” in John English and Norman Hillmer, eds., Making a Difference? Canada’s Foreign Policy in a
Changing World Order (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), pp 103-123. 64 Nahlah Ayed, “Why the world wants Obama to win,” CBC News, November 1, 2012. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/10/31/f-vp-ayed-obama-world.html.
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65 Unlike its trans-Atlantic namesake, SEATO had very weak collective defense commitments, did not negate bilateral commitments or America’s unilateral prerogative, and had little to no institutional structure. Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism” International Organization Vol. 56, No. 3 (June 2002), pp 578-579. 66 James Manicom, “Canadian debates about China's rise: Whither the ‘China threat’?” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), p 289. 67 Bruce Gilley, “Middle powers during great power transitions: China’s rise and the future of Canada–US Relations,” International Journal Vol. 66, No. 2 (Spring 2011), pp 259, 261. 68 Brendan Taylor, “Japan and Korea: The Limits of Alliance,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol. 54, No. 5 (October-November 2012), pp 93-100. For an opposite perspective, see Peter Beck, “A Korea-Japan Alliance,” East Asia Forum, June 9, 2011. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/09/a-korea-japan-alliance. 69 Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2010), p 161. 70 Purendra Jain “Japan–Australia Security Ties and the United States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 60, No. 4 (2006), p 524. 71 Hugh White, “An Australian-Japan Alliance,” Centre of Gravity No. 4 (December 2012), and Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and Japan: Allies in the making,” East Asia Forum, July 30, 2011. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/30/australia-and-japan-allies-in-the-making. 72 John Garver, “China’s Anti-encirclement struggle,” Asian Security Vol. 6, No. 3 (2010), p 254. The core group was quickly dissolved following complaints from China and Europe. 73 Ashok Sherma, “A Quadrilateral Initiative: An Evaluation,” South Asian Survey Vol. 17, No. 2 (September 2010), p 237. 74 Ramesh Thakur, “Japan and Australia: natural allies in the changing Pacific,” Japan Times, March 6, 2013. 75 Garver, “China’s Anti-encirclement struggle,” p 256. 76 Walter Ladwig III, “Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, ‘Look East,’ and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific,” Asian Security Vol. 5, No. 2 (2009), p 101. 77 Purnendra Jain, “Australia plays catch up in India,” East Asia Forum, October 23, 2012. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/10/23/australia-plays-catch-up-in-india/. 78 Dan Blumethal, “Networked Asia,” The American Interest, May/June 2011. Available at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=960. 79 Blumethal, “The U.S. Response,” p 322. 80 See James Manicom, “Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy” CIGI Policy Brief, February 2013, pp 1-8. 81 Lee Berthiaume, “Military carrying diplomatic torch as Foreign Affairs struggles to stay above water,” Ottawa Citizen, 7 Jun 2013, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/story_print.html?id=8495856&sponsor=SOMNIA 82 See Manicom, “Canadian debates,” pp 296-297, and “Canada’s Return to East Asia,” p 4. 83 See Geoffrey Till, Asia’s Naval Expansion: An arms race in the making? (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012). 84 James Boutilier, “The Canadian Navy and the new naval environment in Asia,” International Journal Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter 2002-03), p 195. 85 Canada, Royal Canadian Navy, “International Exercises: Navy makes history in the Far East.” Available at http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a_eng.asp?id=662. 86 Eric Lerhe, “Time for a Canadian Pacific Pivot,” Canadian Naval Review Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2013), forthcoming. 87 Thomas Adams, “Shift to the Pacific: Canada’s Security Interests and Maritime Strategy in East Asia,” in David McDonough, ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategic, Interests, and Threats (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), p 170. 88 Adams, “Shift to the Pacific,” p 168, and James Boutilier, “Grey on Grey: The Critical Partnership between the Canadian and U.S. Navies,” in Paul Taylor, ed., Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, Newport Paper (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2008), p 114. 89 Elinor Sloan, “US-China military and security developments,” International Journal Vol. 66, No. 2 (Spring 2011), p 277. 90 Brad Hicks, George Galdorisi, and Scott Truver “The Aegis BMD Global Enterprise: A ‘High End’ Maritime Partnership,” Naval War College Review Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 2012), pp 73-74. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force operates six Aegis warships, consisting of four Kongo destroyers and two recently commissioned
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Atago warships. South Korea has three Aegis destroyers in service and plans to procure six more in the next decade, while Australia plans to procure three Hobarts destroyers fitted with the Aegis combat system. 91 Robbin Laird, “The Long Reach of Aegis,” Proceedings Magazine, Vol. 138/1/1307 (January 2012). Available at http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-01/long-reach-aegis. 92 Nicholas Tracy, A Two-Edged Sword: The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), p 171. 93 Ken Hansen, “Logistics: Is it central or peripheral to operations?” Broadsides Forum, December 30, 2012, Available at http://www.navalreview.ca/2012/12/logistics-is-it-central-or-peripheral-to-operations/. 94 Eric Lerhe, “The National Shipbuildiung Procurement Strategy: An Update,” Strategic Studies Working Group
Paper (February 2013). Available at http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20National%20Shipbuilding%20Procurement%20Strategy%20-%20An%20Update.pdf. 95 Allan English, “Outside CF Transformation Looking In,” Canadian Military Journal Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring 2011): 14. For example, Canada’s Army benefited significantly from personnel increases and capital acquisitions that arose from operational requirements of fighting the Afghan campaign and/or were geared towards troop mobility, including Leopard tanks, Chinook helicopters, Globemaster strategic-lift aircraft, and tactical airlifters. 96 Eric Lerhe, “Getting the Capital and Personnel Mix Right: Implications for the Future of the Canadian Navy,” in Ann Griffiths and Eric Lerhe, eds., Naval Gazing: The Canadian Navy Contemplates Its Future (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2010), pp 75-77. The author suggests a capital-to-personnel ratio of 24:39 rather than the envisioned 12:51, which could be done by a combination of infrastructure and personnel reductions.