Working Paper
By
Peter W. Connors, PhD8165906821
A DIFFERENT ENEMY EVERY DAY
Despite concerted efforts, insurgents in Iraq failed to disrupt the January 2005
national election. There is no doubt, however, that a true insurgency was in full bloom
by early 2005; and denials of an Iraqi insurgency by Bush administration and Coalition
officials had subsided. The insurgency at this point was a loose confederation of Former
Regime Elements, Sunni nationalists, foreign fighters including al-Qaida (AQI), Shia
militias, and criminal groups. Sunni insurgents were united in their desires to derail the
new Iraqi government and to drive out the Coalition, while Shia militiamen opposed the
Coalition presence and Sunni-Shia reconciliation. Insurgents, who by this time had
learned not to confront Coalition forces in direct combat, were resorting to ambushes and
the use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack US troops and Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF). AQI was deemed responsible for the high-visibility, deadly, attacks on
Shia civilians and Coalition/Iraqi forces. These high-profile attacks were intended to
raise questions among Iraqis regarding the competence of their new government and its
ability to provide adequate security for the people. During the winter of 2005, the
number of daily insurgent attacks increased to nearly twice that of the previous year.
1
Attacks against the ISF and Shia retaliation strikes against Sunnis were also on the
increase. In spite of a significant number of Coalition and ISF offensive operations
intended to kill or capture insurgents, the pace of terrorist attacks in Iraq intensified over
the remainder of 2005. This chapter describes the evolving nature of the Iraq insurgency
in both 2005 and 2006, as well as the composition, motivations, and tactics of the various
insurgent groups. Initially, however, is a brief discussion of the root causes of the Iraqi
insurgency, which began shortly after the fall of Saddam’s regime in April 2003.
Roots of the Insurgency in Iraq
As Operation Iraqi Freedom combat operations officially concluded in April 2003,
Coalition military commanders and US government officials genuinely anticipated that
peace and stability would soon return to Iraq. Although several pre-invasion
assessments predicted limited looting, plundering, acts of revenge, and the possibility of
organized violence, only Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)
planners actually envisioned the rise of an outright insurgency in post –Saddam Iraq.1
Colonel Kevin Benson, Chief of CFLCC Planning, however, discounted the possibility of
a full-blown insurgency, rating it as unlikely.2 As a result, Coalition post-conflict
operations concentrated primarily on humanitarian assistance (restoring electricity and
water, re-opening hospitals and banks) and searching for weapons of mass destruction. A
significant number of US Soldiers had served in Bosnia and Kosovo and could have
easily made the transition to peacekeeping operations in Iraq, however, the
preponderance of Coalition forces were under-prepared to curb the widespread
lawlessness and broad based looting that erupted across the country in April 2003.3
2
Despite near heroic efforts by Soldiers and Marines to protect key facilities in Baghdad
and elsewhere, the magnitude of the looting was overwhelming and impossible to
prevent. Additionally, since US-led invasion forces had destroyed television and radio
transmission facilities in an effort to silence Iraqi Minister of Information, Mohammed
Saeed al-Sahaf (Baghdad Bob), it was impossible for the Coalition to communicate en
masse with the Iraqi people and to express its intention of liberating, not occupying, the
country.4
The much debated issue of adequate troop strength may also be related to the early
days of the insurgency in Iraq. James Dobbins, Director of the International Security and
Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation gave newly-appointed Presidential
Envoy and Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Ambassador L.
Paul Bremer III, a report that estimated that as many as 500,000 troops would be required
to stabilize postwar Iraq. Bremer forwarded a summary of the report to Secretary
Rumsfeld, but never received a response.5 Former head of the Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay Garner, supported
the notion that a larger force was necessary. “The force was not big enough…things
began to deteriorate right away,” Garner explained.6 He described further how the
Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), General Tommy
Franks’ original Iraq invasion plan called for a force of 380,000 and how this figure was
continually whittled down by officials in the Pentagon. General Franks would later point
out that had the 4th ID been able to move through Turkey in March and attack Iraq from
the north, the division would have been in the Baghdad area in April and been able to
3
assist with local security. Franks also believes that had the 1st Cavalry Division been
deployed in accordance with the original Time-Phased-Force Deployment List (TPFDL),
they too would have been in a position to contribute to Phase IV peacekeeping
operations.7 On 21 April 2003, Garner met in Baghdad with V Corps Commander and
commander of US ground forces in Iraq, General William Wallace. Wallace’s troops
were already guarding 272 static targets that he had never planned on having to protect.
“It was eating up his entire force,” Garner noted.8 Relatedly, Colonel Kevin Benson’s
CFLCC ECLIPSE II plan for post-hostilities Iraq called for a total of 20 brigades –
approximately 300,000 combat, combat support, and service support troops - in the Phase
IV troop-to- task analysis.9 Adding to the complexity of the situation was the fact that
many Coalition units were still engaged in combat operations and, thus, unable to focus
attention on less serious looting issues. Finally, Soldiers were unprepared and in most
cases unwilling to use deadly force against non-combatant Iraqi civilians who were
simply pillaging former regime facilities and infrastructure. As a result of the chaos that
ensued immediately following the downfall of Saddam’s regime, many Iraqis began to
question the Coalition’s motives and its ability to establish authority and to maintain law
and order. This skepticism among Iraqis regarding the Coalition became one of several
causes of the insurgency that emerged in the spring of 2003 and grew for the remainder
of the year and beyond.
Insert stock photos of General Garner and Ambassador Bremer
4
On 16 May and 23 May 2003, respectively, the Coalition Provisional Authority
issued CPA Order Number 1 (De-Baathification of Iraqi Society) and CPA Order
Number 2 (Dissolution of Entities).10 The subsequent banishment of Baathists and the
sudden unemployment of hundreds of thousands of angry, armed, young Iraqi men may
very well have contributed to the inception of the insurgency.
ORHA Director, Jay Garner, who remained in Iraq until 1 June 2003, strongly
disagreed with both Orders 1 and 2. Both General Wallace and Garner were counting on
the availability of former Iraqi soldiers and mid-level Baathists to help rebuild the
country. “We told at least 300,000 soldiers they didn’t have jobs and they were still
armed….we told 50,000 Baathists –‘you don’t have a job,’” Garner later explained.11 In
a heated discussion with CPA Administrator, L.Paul Bremer, Garner tried to soften the
impact of de-Baathification, arguing “it’s absolutely too deep….you don’t want to do
this….you can’t live with the results.”12 CIA Baghdad station chief, Charles Sadell, who 10 “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1.” http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf (accessed 15 December 2007); “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2.” http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf (accessed 15 December 2007). 1 See for example: US Department of State, The Future of Iraq Project (Washington, DC: 2003); US National Defense University, Workshop Report: Looking Beyond Saddam’s Rule (Washington, DC: 2002); Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insight, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Iraq (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003). 2 Colonel Kevin C. M. Benson, interview by Dr. Peter Connors and Lynne Garcia, 6 February 2006, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8.3 Major General (Ret) Buford C. Blount, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 15 February 2006, Washington, DC, 17. 4 Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay Garner, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 6 June 2006, Windermere, FL, 14-15. 5 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 9-10.6 Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay Garner, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 6 June 2006, Windermere, FL, 9. 7 General Tommy Franks, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 23 June 2006, Tampa, FL, 7-9.8 Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay Garner, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 6 June 2006, Windermere, FL, 21.9 Kevin C. M. Benson, “’ Phase IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning” in Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign, ed. Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute), 2005, 187, 198.
5
also met with Bremer, warned him “that you are going to drive between 30,000 and
50,000 Baathists underground before the sun sets in Baghdad.”13 Bremer, however,
refused to back-down, noting that he had his orders and was going to execute them – both
CPA Orders 1 and 2 were implemented shortly thereafter.
Bremer staunchly defended his stance on de-Baathification and disbanding the
Iraqi army. According to Bremer the vast majority of Iraqis viewed de-Baathification in
a favorable light, since it manifestly demonstrated the Coalitions intent to move beyond
Saddam’s oppressive regime by replacing it with a new democratic Iraqi government.14
Similarly, Bremer considered disbanding the Iraqi army to be “absolutely correct,” and
that simply recalling the former army would lead to “political catastrophe.”15 Retaining
the Iraqi army and failing to deal decisively with Baathists “would have led to immediate
civil war and the break-up of Iraq,” in Bremer’s view.16
In September 2003, Ambassador Bremer published seven steps to sovereignty that
described the manner in which the CPA would continue to oversee Iraq until a permanent
constitution was adopted and elections were held. By October, however, Secretary
Rumsfeld had convinced Bremer to close down the CPA by June 2004. Former
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith, would nevertheless suggest that
not turning governance over to Iraqis sooner, i.e. leaving the CPA in control for fourteen
months, was the most significant contributing factor to the rise of insurgency in Iraq.17
6
Major General David Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Division,
described the effects of de-Ba’athification as “tens of thousands of former party members
unemployed, without any salary, without any retirement, without any benefits, and
therefore, to a large degree, without any incentive to support the new Iraq.”18 Also,
newly appointed CENTCOM commander, General John Abizaid, “recognized that the
violence in Iraq was escalating…that groups were organizing in an effort to prolong the
opposition to US presence…that some of them were military officers, former Baathists…
and that a long term resistance was forming.”19 As the Coalition slowly addressed the
unintended consequences of de-Baathification and dissolution during the summer of
2003, many disenfranchised/unemployed Sunni Arabs, who “found themselves politically
and organizationally adrift,” began to affiliate with elements of the mounting insurgency
in an effort to both support their families and to fight what they considered a foreign
occupation.20 “I am a father of nine and I have a wife,” bemoaned Abu Basel, a newly
unemployed former military officer who had fought in the Iraq-Iran conflict and had been
a prisoner of war for ten years.21
As intelligence gathering relative to the insurgency improved during the summer of
2003, the Bush administration began to acknowledge potential miscalculations with
respect to post-Saddam peacekeeping operations and the surprising resistance
encountered from Saddam loyalists, Baathist insurgents, and foreign terrorists.22 At the
same time, however, administration officials down-played the seriousness of the
insurgency. Secretary Rumsfeld, for example, referred to Iraqi insurgents as “dead-
enders – Baath Party loyalists and remnants of the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam and
7
Iraqi Republican Guards,” while special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Lawrence
Di Rita, called them simply “mid-level Baathists holding out hope that the regime can
come back.”23
Initial Coalition optimism resulting from the killings of Uday and Qusay Hussein
by US forces in Mosul in July 2003 soon gave way to further misgivings when insurgents
bombed the Jordanian embassy and the UN headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad.24
Insert photo of bombed out UN building
Insurgent attacks on electrical, water, and oil infrastructure increased during the fall as
did the targeting of civilian workers participating in various reconstruction projects
throughout Iraq. As with the deaths of his sons, the capture of Saddam Hussein in
December was heralded by Coalition leaders as foreshadowing the collapse of the
insurgency. Instead, insurgent violence, inflamed by the Abu Ghraib prison scandal,
intensified in 2004 with an increasing number of attacks on Iraqi security forces and the
abhorrent beheadings of hostages.25 When four contractors were brutally mutilated in
Fallujah, the US vowed to retaliate.
Insert photo of contractors
Marines attacked the city, but were forced to withdraw as a cease-fire settlement was
reached with the insurgents. CPA administrator Paul Bremer noted that had the fight for
8
Fallujah continued, the Iraqi Governing Council would have been lost since the Sunni
members would have all resigned. “In the end, it [the withdrawal from Fallujah] was the
President’s [Bush] decision,” Bremer explained.26 Insurgents throughout Iraq were
encouraged by the turn of events in Fallujah – to them it was a significant victory.
Coalition leaders again believed that the transfer of authority in June from the CPA
to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) headed by former Baathist Iyad Allawi would have
a diminishing effect on the insurgency. Unfortunately, insurgent violence increased in
Ramadi and Samarra, a car bomb killed nearly 50 people in Al-Karkh, a suicide bomber
killed 22 US Soldiers in a Mosul mess tent, those Iraqis who cooperated with the
Coalition or the IIG were increasingly subjected to kidnappings and beheadings, and
Sunni Islamists intensified attacks of Shia civilians in an effort to provoke sectarian
hostilities and disrupt the January 2005 legislative elections.27 As pre-election violence
persisted, the resulting security issues were partially responsible for the withdrawal of
Iraq’s largest Sunni Muslim party (the Iraqi Islamic party) from the campaign.28
Numerous high-profile attacks were intended to dissuade Iraqi citizens from participating
as candidates, poll workers, or voters in the election process. Just days before the
election, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi released an internet message that announced “a bitter
war against democracy and all those who seek to enact it”… and denounced the IIG as a
“tool used by the Americans to promote this lie that is called democracy.”29 Thirteen
electoral commissioners resigned in Anbar province in the face of prolonged insurgent
intimidation. “It is impossible to hold elections in the province…they are kidding
themselves,” Saad Abdul-Aziz Rawi, head commissioner, explained, referring to officials
9
insistent on proceeding with elections in Anbar.30 On the day of the election, ISF and
Iraqi police were assigned primary polling place security responsibility, while US troops
patrolled the streets and served as a behind-the-scenes backup reserve force. Although 45
Iraqis died in election day violence, the anticipated spike in terrorist attacks failed to
materialize.
Enemy Situation in Iraq 2005 – Campaign of Intimidation
By early 2005, Former Regime Elements (FRE), religious extremists, newly
radicalized Sunni nationalists, foreign fighter such as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), Shia
militias, and various criminal organizations had weakly united to form the Iraq
insurgency, which still consisted mainly of Sunni Arabs.31 Foreign fighters and Sunni
insurgents often engaged in campaigns of intimidation aimed primarily at Shia. In Tal
Afar, for example, Sunni extremists known as Takfirin, terrorized Shia, threatened to kill
them, and branded them infidels for not adopting strict forms of Islam. The insurgency
at this point was not a national movement, but rather a series of semi-autonomous
regional groups loosely connect through family, tribal, and former professional social
networks. There was no national insurgent leader in Iraq, no centralized command and
control, and no shared vision for the future. Fragile networks also existed between
insurgent groups for recruiting, procuring weapons, training, and funneling funds; and
AQI’s network of foreign Salafi jihadists, although small, was the most sophisticated.32
The RAND Arroyo Center described the Iraq insurgency as net warfare perpetrated by
flatter, linear, diffuse, and multidimensional networks, as opposed to traditional
10
pyramidal hierarchies. Autonomy and local initiative prevailed among insurgent groups
and decisions were often made on a decentralized, consensus-building, basis.33
Although these groups were driven by differing objectives, they all agreed that
removing Coalition forces from Iraq and destabilizing the new Iraqi government were
common goals. Many insurgents were also disenchanted with the economic chaos that
existed in Iraq at the time. FRE insurgents were intent on regaining political power in
Iraq, however, they were unable to successfully block or interfere with the 30 January
national elections. The insurgency lacked centralized command and control and operated
primarily in Baghdad, Al Anbar, Salah Ad Din, and Ninevah provinces. Insurgents were
reluctant to confront Coalition forces directly and began employing ambush-style attacks
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs - the number one cause of Coalition casualties in
2004)34 as their primary tactics. Although limited in numerical strength,35 foreign
terrorists, such as AQI, promoted sectarian violence and concentrated on carrying out
high-visibility strikes against Iraqi Shia, the new government, and Coalition forces.
Sunni extremist and Jordanian expatriate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had the blessing of
Osama bin Laden, led AQI and was intent on forming an Islamic caliphate in Iraq.36
Closely affiliated with AQI were two homegrown Sunni religious extremist groups,
Ansar al-Sunna (AS) and its predecessor, Ansar al-Islam. AS claimed responsibility for
the US mess hall bombing in Mosul the previous December.37 Finally, despite setbacks
in 2004, Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army represented a continuing
insurgent threat to Coalition forces and an impediment to Sunni/Shia reconciliation.38
Collectively, these groups met the classic Joint Doctrine definition of insurgency, since
11
each in their own way intended to overthrow the GoI, gain political power for
themselves, and/or drive Coalition forces out of Iraq. Experts at the RAND Arroyo
Center suggested, however, that, since terrorist in Iraq lacked a clear leader, and had no
unifying ideology, center of gravity, or desire to seize and hold territory, the insurgency
did not clearly fit the classical guerrilla warfare/Mao Tse-tung model.39
In March 2005, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also assessed the Iraq
insurgency, noting that re-establishing political power and defending Sunni concerns,
rights, and benefits were powerful motivating factors for insurgents. Controlled
primarily by FRE and Baathist Sunni Arabs, the insurgency was becoming increasingly
interconnected through important religious, tribal, and family groups.40 DIA also agreed
that, although numerically small, AQI was responsible for a significant number of high-
visibility, vicious, attacks on Shia civilians, Iraqi security forces, NGOs, and Coalition
troops. The shrewd implementation of an accompanying propaganda campaign allowed
AQI to gain maximum media and internet exposure for these attacks, thereby raising
doubts in the minds of many Iraqis concerning their new government’s legitimacy and its
ability to provide adequate, long-term, security and to deal with the persistent problems
of unemployment, economic recovery, and rebuilding the country’s infrastructure,
particularly the electricity and oil sectors. Overall, DIA concluded that the Sunni
insurgency grew larger and had increased its reach and range of capabilities by winter
2005. Attacks in the first three months averaged 50-60 per day as opposed to 25 per day
for the corresponding period in 2004. Finally, DIA predicted that, in spite of defeats at
12
the hands of Coalition forces in 2004, Shia militias were likely to re-emerge as threats to
Sunni-Shia reconciliation.
Equally disturbing in 2005, were indications that insurgents were planning and
executing attacks intended to incite civil war in Iraq and to drive a wedge between
various ethnic and sectarian groups.
Turn into call out box “Insurgent Suicide Attack Chronology January – June 2005”
8 February 2005 – A suicide bomber blew himself up in the middle of a crowd of army recruits, killing 21 people.
18 February 2005 – Two suicide bombers attacked two mosques, leaving 28 people dead, while an explosion near a Shia ceremony killed two other people.
28 February 2005 – A suicide car bomber targeted mostly Shia police and National Guard recruits in Hillah, killing 125 and wounding more than 140. Some of the dead and injured were at a nearby market.
10 March 2005 – A suicide bomber blew himself up at a Shia mosque during a funeral in Mosul, killing at least 47 people and wounding more than 100.
24 April 2005 – Insurgents staged coordinated double-bombings in Tikrit and a Shia neighborhood in Baghdad, killing 29 Iraqis and injuring 74.
1 May 2005 – A car bomb obliterated a tent crowded with mourners for a funeral of a Kurdish official in Tal Afar, killing 25 people and wounding 50.
4 May 2005 – A bomb exploded among Iraqi civilians applying for police jobs in Kurdish city of Irbil, killing 60 people and wounding 150.
16 June 2005 – suicide bomber detonated explosives strapped to his body at a gas station near a Shi’a mosque in Musayyib, blowing up a fuel tanker and killing at least 54 people and wounding 82.41
Unfortunately, Sunnis accused the new Iraqi police forces and the new Iraqi army,
whose members were predominantly Shia, of retaliation strikes against Sunni civilians,
13
thereby further inflaming sectarian violence in 2005. Members of the Badr Organization
(Al-Badr Mujahideen) and the Army of the Mahdi (Jaish al-Mahdi) infiltrated the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) and “police officers, who also were militia members, abused
their official powers to pursue personal and party agendas,” according to the US
Department of State 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Iraq.42 This
report further noted that “police torture and ill treatment of detainees was commonplace.
In interviews with 90 prisoners, 72 asserted that they had been tortured or mistreated…by
beatings with cables and hosepipes, electric shocks to earlobes and genitals, food and
water deprivation, and overcrowding in standing-room-only cells.”43 Scattered reports of
abuses by the new Iraqi army also surfaced in 2005 and included detainee accusations of
being beaten, shocked, and hung upside down until losing consciousness.44
Thus, as Iraqi police and army units intensified reprisal activities aimed at Sunnis,
Sunni insurgents expanded terrorist attacks on Iraqi security forces (ISF). This was a
natural evolution in Sunni insurgent tactics, since the ISF was less well-trained and thus
more vulnerable to attack than heavily armed Coalition forces. Also, the increasing
numbers of ISF inherently exposed them to a greater likelihood of insurgents’ locating
and attacking them. Furthermore, in 2005, the ISF began to assume responsibility for a
variety operations typically conducted by the Coalition, thus further heightening their
vulnerability – this at a time when Coalition forces were becoming increasingly proficient
with respect to their own force protection. As a result, US KIAs declined from 107 in
January 2005 to 58 in February and 36 in March.45
14
On 28 April 2005, after being politically deadlocked for three months, President
Jalal Talabani (a Kurd), Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari (a Shia), and the members of
Iraq’s transitional national assembly formed a new Iraqi cabinet that included only six
Sunni Arabs out of 36 total ministerships. Although the Defense Minister position went
to Sunni, Saadoun al-Dulami, the remaining Sunni appointments were to positions of less
importance – Trade, Culture, Women’s Affairs, Provincial Affairs, and Industry.46 The
composition of the cabinet, heavily weighted in favor of Kurds and Shia, further enraged
Sunni Islamists and led to increased ethno-sectarian violence in the late spring and
summer of 2005.
Throughout the remainder of 2005, Coalition and ISF launched a series of
offensive search-and-destroy operations in an on-going effort to suppress the insurgency.
In May, for example, the US Marine Corps initiated Operation MATADOR, which was
designed to eliminate a buildup of insurgents and foreign fighters in northwestern Anbar
province along the Syrian border. Director of Operations for the Joint Staff, Marine
Lieutenant General James Conway, “was not surprised by the strength and capability of
the insurgency being encountered. We know this is a determined enemy, that he has the
skills, ordnance, and weapons to resist fiercely,” Conway explained.47 The following
month, ISF launched Operation LIGHTNING in the greater Baghdad area to stop
insurgent attacks on Iraqi citizens and the duly elected government and to search for
suspected insurgent bomb-making facilities. Elements of the 5th Iraqi Army Division led
this operation with Coalition support from the US 1st Armored Division.48 Over the
remainder of 2005, Coalition forces and ISF conducted a surprisingly large number of
15
additional operations intended to locate and destroy insurgents and to disrupt their
activities:49
Make into call out box “Coaltion and ISF Anti-insurgent Operations 2005”
Operation Moon River Dragon – May, in Al JulaamOperation Rohme – June, in KarabilahOperation Saif – June, between Haditha and HitOperation Muthana Strike – July, near BIAPOperation Bow Country – July, in eastern BaghdadOperation Qmtia – July, in ZaidonOperation Thunder Cat – July, in western BaghdadOperation Hunter – July, in QaimOperation Quick Strike – August, in Haditha, Haqliniyah, and BarwanahOperation Able Warrior – August, west of BIAPOperation Restoring Rights – September, in Tal AfarOperation Zoba’a – September, in RutbahOperation Flea Flicker – September, in ZafaraniyaOperation Kabda Bil Hadid – October, in Sa’dah, Karabilah, and UbaydiOperation River Gate – October, in Haditha, Haqliniyah, and BarwanahOperation Clean Sweep – October, in southern BaghdadOperation Al Hajip Elfulathi – November, in western Al-Anbar provinceOperation Numur – November, in RamadiOperation Dhibbah – November, in northern RamadiOperation Asad – November, in southern RamadiOperation Nimur – November, in eastern RamadiOperation Harba – December, in Ramadi
Despite the relative success of these Coalition/ISF operations, the pace of insurgent
attacks continued unchecked in 2005.50 By year-end, terrorist attacks numbered nearly
100 per day and total attacks increased to nearly 33,000 for the year versus slightly over
22,000 in 2004.51 Also, insurgents gained further tactical knowledge regarding their need
to disperse, maintain a low profile, and avoid direct contact with US forces.
16
Insert Call Out Box “Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from
Figure 21, page 214 of “An Army at War”
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_army/day1.pdf
Another challenging issue facing the Coalition was estimating the overall size of
the insurgency. Because the insurgency lacked centralized leadership, insurgents
themselves may not have known their total numbers. In February 2005, when chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, explained to the Senate Armed
Services Committee the difficulties involved in accurately estimating the insurgency’s
size, Senator John McCain replied, “I don’t know how you defeat an insurgency unless
you have some handle on the number of people that you are facing.”52 In that same
senate hearing, Senator Carl Levin recalled that during an earlier meeting, MNF-I
Commanding General, George Casey, reported that the Coalition had killed or captured
15,000 insurgents in 2004.53 Four months later, CENTCOM commander, General John
Abizaid, acknowledged in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that
“the overall strength of the insurgency remains about the same level it was a year ago…
and that a greater number of foreign extremists were coming into Iraq from nearby
countries.”54 General Abizaid estimated that insurgents represented less than one-tenth
of one percent of Iraq’s population or approximately 20,000 participants.55 Michael
Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, consultants on Iraqi military affairs at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, suggested a much larger number, noting that as many as
100,000 Sunni Arabs could be either insurgent combatants or members underground
support networks.56 Finally, several insurgency experts agreed that, in 2005, AIQ and
17
other foreign fights in Iraq numbered between 1,000 to 2,000 operatives.57 Irrespective of
its numerical strength, the insurgency managed to easily attract new recruits to replace
those who had been killed or captured.58
Terrorist attacks picked up briefly in advance of the 15 October constitutional
referendum, but dropped off prior to 15 December parliamentary elections, due in part to
a reported de facto insurgent cease-fire during the balloting and the Sunni Iraqi Islamic
Party’s support for certain aspects of the new constitution.59 Also, potential insurgent
attacks were prevented by strict security procedures that prohibited vehicles from
approaching the polling stations and by utilization of the three ring defensive system
(Iraqi police – inner ring; Iraqi Army – middle ring; and Coalition forces – outer ring) to
surround and protect each polling location. Voting in Sunni areas increased by more than
50% over the January 2005 election turnout.60
Unfortunately, the successful parliamentary elections did little to quell insurgent
attacks and the rise of ethno-sectarian violence. US monthly casualties for the year
averaged 71 killed and 566 wounded. Totals for 2005, however, were lower than those of
2004 at 846 killed and 5949 wounded.61 The death toll among Iraqi civilians in 2005 was
estimated by the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count at slightly more than 6,800 and Iraqi army
fatalities numbered 2,545.62
Insert Table of 2005 vs 2004 casualty figures
61 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, 5. http://icasualties.org/oif/ (accessed 2 January 2008). 62 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, 1. http://icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx (accessed 2 January 2008).
18
In an independent scientific study funded by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and the Center for Refugee and Disaster Response of the Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health, researchers Gilbert Burnham et al. examined post-
invasion excess Iraqi deaths as a consequence of the war. They concluded that an
additional 600,000 more Iraqis died from March 2003 to July 2006 than would have
otherwise due to the violence, primarily gunfire and car bombings.63 Roughly
extrapolated, excess violent Iraqi deaths would have approached 500,000 by December
2005, using Burnham’s methodology. Although Bush administration officials quickly
denounced the study, the possibility that the death rate among Iraqi citizens could be
much higher than previously reported fueled a continuing debate regarding overall post-
invasion casualties in Iraq.64 Eventually, a larger epidemiology study, conducted jointly
by the World Health Organization and the Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group and
based on door-to-door surveys of more than 9,000 households, estimated the number of
violent deaths among Iraqi civilians at approximately 150,000 for the period March 2003
to June 2006. This figure tracks more closely with Iraqi Health Ministry estimates that
were based on 100 bodies per day arriving at morgues and hospitals and represents about
125,000 violence-related deaths for the period March 2003 – December 2005.65
By the end of 2005, despite concerted efforts, Iraqi insurgents had been unable to
achieve their primary objectives of disrupting the democratic process and inciting
nationwide ethno-sectarian violence. Failure to reach these goals was mainly attributable
to appeals for restraint from prominent Iraqi officials; closer cooperation between
19
Coalition/ISF commanders and local leaders, tribal chiefs, and religious clerics; and a
substantial expansion of intelligence data willingly supplied by the general populace.
Insurgent attacks continued, however, in an ongoing attempt to terrorize religious leaders,
politicians, and those citizens who cooperated with the Coalition, and to cripple economic
development, foreign investment, reconstruction activity, and NGO involvement.
By this time, Coalition assessments characterized the insurgency as principally
Sunni Arab in nature and focused regionally in Baghdad, al-Anbar, Salah ad Din, and
Ninevah provinces. Four separate, yet interlaced, insurgent elements were identified as
terrorists and foreign fighters, Sunni rejectionists, Saddam loyalists, and criminals.
Numerically, insurgents still represented only a very limited percentage of the overall
Iraqi population.66 Bob Kitrinos, who at the time was assigned to JCS J-2, but on loan to
the State Department as the Iraq desk officer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, noted
that the insurgency was merely symptomatic of the deeper, more worrisome, issue of
Sunni discontent and the desire of FRE to win back political power. Kitrinos also pointed
out the improbability of defeating the insurgency militarily, since the Coalition lacked
sufficient troop strength to physically control Iraq. This, coupled with the insurgency’s
ability to easily replace killed/captured fighters thereby making it partially impervious to
attrition tactics, and the insurgents’ uncanny knack for re-emerging even after decisive
defeat (the whack-a-mole syndrome), made outright Coalition military victory unlikely.67
Also, according to Kitrinos, the expanded authority of Shias and Kurds was the principal
driving force behind the Sunni insurgency, not the Coalition occupation. Similarly, the
majority of insurgents tolerated AQI’s presence in Iraq primarily for its shock value.
20
Thus, as 2005 ended, the Sunni Arab insurgency persisted – flexible, adaptive, diffuse,
and integrated.68
Changing Face of the Insurgency 2006
In early 2006, subtle differences within the Iraqi insurgency began to emerge.
Core elements, consisting of rejectionists (IRZ), Saddamists (SDM), and terrorists and
foreign fighters (T&FF), remained steadfast in their opposition to the new Iraqi
government and the Coalition occupation. Iraqi rejectionists, by far the largest insurgent
group, were primarily Sunni Arabs and simply desired to regain the advantages they
enjoyed under Saddam. They rejected the Coalition and the government of Iraq and
attempted to re-establish power through violence. Many IRZ, however, were beginning
to see some merit in reaching their goals by joining the political process in Iraq. In
contrast, Saddamists, who were fewer in number and mainly former high-ranking regime
officials, were intent on reinstating a Baathist style autocracy and continued to strongly
oppose both the Coalition and the Iraqi government. SDM influence, however, was
weakening and many Saddamists began forming allegiances with IZR and T&FF
factions. Terrorists and foreign fighters, who were motivated by extreme religious
ideology, generally embraced the fanaticism advocated by AQI and were determined to
wreak havoc throughout Iraq, to provoke civil war between Sunni and Shia, and
eventually to create a Middle Eastern Caliphate.69 A significant number of actual AQI
members were Iraqi, while foreign terrorist fighters were typically Middle Eastern or
North African, infiltrated primarily through the Syrian border, and received financial
21
support from several surrounding countries. In total, foreign terrorists in Iraq were still
few in number at approximately 2,000 combatants. However, Coalition and ISF
commanders believed that a substantial percentage of the over 500 suicide car and suicide
vest bombings since 2003 had been conducted by these foreign cells. Overall, insurgents
continued to attack refineries, pipelines, electrical grids, and other infrastructure in 2006
as part of an ongoing effort to disrupt essential services, destabilize the new Iraqi
government, and undermine international assistance.70 Finally, CENTCOM continued to
classify radical Shia militias and extra-governmental armed groups, such as Muqtada al-
Sadr’s Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) and the Badr Brigade, as likely enemy groups, since they
had infiltrated the ISF and Iraqi police and represented an ongoing threat to the legitimate
government of Iraq.71 Collectively, the combination of Sunni insurgent groups, T&FF,
radical Shia militias, along with rising sectarian violence, became known as the four wars
concept.
Call Out Box Here With Following Info
“Insurgent Practices and Motives 2006”
A few large groups were beginning to dominate the insurgency. Groups were better organized and employ sophisticated communications techniques to disseminate their message.
The insurgency was taking on a stronger Sunni Islamic identity, held together by a unique combination of Salafism and patriotism.
Many insurgents refused to participate in the political process and remained averse to the occupation and the GoI.
Insurgent groups were becoming more conscious of their public perception. Loathsome acts of violence were reduced. Insurgents accused Shia, ISF, and Coalition forces of violence against civilians, thereby shifting blame away from the insurgency.
22
Insurgents were slow to articulate a plan for the future of Iraq. They presented no comprehensive programs for addressing political issues in Iraq other than opposing the GoI and the Coalition presence.
The insurgents thought that they were winning. To them, the jihad was legitimate, while the GoI was not. They believed that they would prevail in the war of attrition against the United States.72
Also by 2006, three separate Iraqi intelligence agencies were functioning in the
country. The Iraqi National Intelligence Service concentrated on domestic issues, while
the Police Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Defense Intelligence Agency focused
on police and military intelligence, respectively. These agencies, along with Coalition
commanders and State Department officials, identified three prominent terrorist groups
that were operating in Iraq:
Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR): Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaida of the Jihad Organization in the Land of Two Rivers), is most clearly associated with foreign terrorist cells operating in Iraq and has specifically targeted Coalition forces and Iraqi citizens. In a July 2005 letter to al-Qaida deputy Zawahiri, Zarqawi outlined a four-stage plan to expand the Iraq war to include expelling U.S. forces, establishing an Islamic authority, spreading the conflict to Iraq's secular neighbors, and engaging in battle with Israel. The United States also refers to the group as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI).
Ansar al-Sunnah (AS): Ansar al-Sunnah (also known as the Followers of the Tradition) is an Iraqi extremist group dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq based on Sharia law. Sa’d bin Abi Waqqas is an affiliated group that has claimed responsibility for attacking Coalition vehicles in Baghdad.
Kongra-Gel/PKK: The Kurdistan Workers Party (Kongra-Gel/PKK) is a Marxist-Leninist group with roots in Turkey seeking a pan-national Kurdish state carved out of majority Kurdish populated areas. The existence of Kongra-Gel/PKK operatives in northern Iraq continued to be a source of friction between Turkey and Iraq.73
23
The following additional insurgent organizations were identified by MNF-I and other reliable sources as also operating in Iraq in early 2006:
Secret Islamic Army (SIA): SIA was led by Muhammed Hila Hammad Ubaydi, also known as Abu Ayman, a former member of Saddam’s intelligence service. SIA operated in Babil province and was suspected in the February 2005 kidnapping of Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena.74
Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI): After first emerging in 2003, IAI was one of the largest and most sophisticated insurgent groups. IAI promoted itself as a more conventional substitute for AQI or AS.75
1920 Revolution Brigades (1920 BDE): Also known as the Iraqi National Islamic Resistance, this group operated primarily west of Baghdad and desired to rid Iraq of foreign military and political occupation. 1920 BDE has claimed responsibility for the deaths of dozens of US Soldiers, the bombing of several US armored vehicles, and the shooting down of two US helicopters.76
Sheibani Network (SN): Named for Abu Yaser al Sheibani, the SN received support, weapons, and training from Iran. Iranian explosively formed penetrators (EFP) were smuggled into Iraq by SN and distributed to other insurgent groups.77
Army of the Guardians (AoG): This is an Iranian military organization known by its full name – Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. Elements of AoG may have been operating clandestinely in Iraq and providing funding, training, intelligence, and supplies to Shia militias.78
Jaysh Muhammad (JM): Otherwise known as the Army of Muhammad, JM consisted primarily of former Ba’ath Party members and military officers. JM claimed responsibility for UN headquarters bombing in August 2003.79
Gangs of Iraq (GoI): Twenty-three separate death squads and militias, including the Badr Corps and the Mahdi Army, were operating in Baghdad during the summer of 2006.80
Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance (JAMI): A sophisticated, nationalistic, public relations organization that serves other insurgent groups. Has a website and publishes a monthly magazine.81
First Four Caliphs Army: This group has six operational brigades and a website.
Victorious Group’s Army: This group issues weekly update and has three brigades.
Mujahidin’s Army: This group issues weekly updates and has a website.
24
Islamic Resistance’s Movement in Iraq: This group joined with the 1920 Revolution Brigades.
Swords of Justice Brigades: This group claims responsibility for November 2005 kidnapping of four peace activists in Iraq. May be affiliated with Ansar al-Sunna.
Mujahidin Brigades: This group operates in Kirkuk and threatens retaliation against Iraqi police and ISF.82
God’s Wrath: Based in al-Basrah, this anti-Coalition Shia group fought against British troops in 2004.
Vengeance Detachments: This group hunts down and kills former Saddam regime security and intelligence officers in Baghdad and Tikrit.
National Front for the Liberation of Iraq: The Front, made up primarily of nationalist and Islamists, has ten organized resistance groups operating in Arbil, Kirkuk, Al-Fallujah, Samarra, Tikrit, and Basra.83
The Return: This group operates in Samarra, Tikrit, Al-Dur, and Mosul, and is made up of former Iraqi intelligence officers.
Imam Ali Bin-Abi-Talib Jihadi Brigades: This Shia group threatened to assassinate members of the GoI and to attack US fprces in Al-Najaf and Karbala.
Assadullah Brigades: This group claimed the right to kill or capture any infidel that enters Iraq.
Other small insurgent factions operating in Iraq during 2006 included: the Iraq Liberation
Army, the Awakening and Holy War, the White Banners, the Al-Haqq Army, the
Hamzah Faction, the Islamic Retaliation Movement, the Islamic Anger Brigades, the
Khalid-Bin-al-Walid Brigades, Iraq’s Martyrs Brigades, the Black Banner Group, the
Clans of the People of Iraq, and the Lions of Unification Brigades.84
Ascertaining which insurgent and militia groups were functioning where, in what
timeframe, and in what numbers was a difficult undertaking. Many groups came and
went quickly, while others assumed new names or combined amongst themselves. Dr.
25
Ahmed Hashim, the International Crisis Group, and Human Rights Watch identified
several additional secular, nationalist, tribal, and religious insurgent groups in Iraq;
however, CENTCOM and the US Department of State considered those listed above
most critical in early 2006.85 Although many of these groups cooperated with each other,
they all competed for resources in a fundamental struggle for power as well. AQI hoped
to render Iraq ungovernable and continued to attack ISF, Coalition forces, and Shia
civilians to provoke sectarian backlash and incite civil war.
Al-Askariya Shia Mosque Bombing
On 22 February 2006, the al-Askariya Shia mosque in Samarra was severely
damaged by explosions that destroyed the shrine’s four main supporting pillars, causing
its golden dome to collapse. The mosque, one of the most renowned shrines in Iraq,
contained the tombs of the 10th and 11th imams and was held in the highest regard by
Shia pilgrims from around the world because of its religious, cultural, and historic
significance.
Insert photo of bombed out mosque
The location of the mosque, known alternatively as the Golden Domed mosque or the
shrine of the Two Imams, was unusual, given that Samarra’s population were nearly 90
percent Sunni. Since the attack occurred early in the morning, there were no injuries;
however Coalition commanders and GoI officials feared the bombing would inflame
26
sectarian violence and propel the country toward civil war. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani issued three fatwas later in the day calling for calm, peaceful demonstrations, and
week-long mourning period. Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari also pleaded for
restraint, telling Iraqis to “close the door to all those who are fishing in the troubled
waters.”86 The GoI recalled all ISF back from leave to their respective duty stations,
expanded security around mosques and shrines, and imposed night-time curfews in
Samarra and Baghdad. The next day, seven mosques were attacked and two Sunni
imams and one shiekh were killed.87 By 26 February, numerous additional mosques had
been attacked and damaged, and an estimated 200 Iraqis had been killed in the aftermath
of the Samarra bombing.88 The International Crisis Group described the sectarian
violence as the worst yet during the US occupation and put the resulting Iraqi death toll at
800 as of 1 March.89 The Shia on Sunni violence marked a suspension of Shia restraint,
as once growing cooperation between the two groups temporarily came to an end. “The
war could really be on now,” noted Abu Hassan a Samarran Shia. “This [bombing of the
Golden Mosque] is something greater and more symbolic than attacks on people…this is
a strike at who we are.”90 Similarly, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), warned of potential retributions,
explaining that “if the government can’t protect us then we will have to do it ourselves.”91
Finally, Juan Cole, a specialist in Islam, also predicted reprisals, indicating with regard to
the aftermath of the Samarra attack “this could be a tipping point…it’s an apocalyptic
moment.”92
27
Coalition commanders were quick to focus blame for the Golden Mosque bombing
on AQI. In a 23 February press conference, Major General Rick Lynch, MNF-I Deputy
Chief of Staff, described a seemingly unrelated earlier operation near Ramadi, in which
AQI letters and thumb drives were discovered. The letters suggested that attacks on
small villages were turning local citizens against AQI and that a change in tactics, e.g.
shifting attacks to major cities, may be beneficial. Another AQI objective noted in the
captured letters was the notion of driving the wedge deeper between Shias and Sunnis
who were beginning to cooperate in forming a unified Iraqi government. Lynch
contended that destroying the mosque in Samarra was the first salvo in AQI’s attempt to
incite sectarian violence by attacking things of symbolic significance to Shias rather than
attacking Shias themselves. “Let’s attack the Golden Mosque in Samarra,” Lynch said,
speculating as to what AQI leaders might have been thinking. “That’s what we
experienced yesterday, he suggested.93 Iraq’s National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-
Rubaie, agreeing with Major General Lynch’s assessment, blamed AQI and Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi for the Golden Mosque attack. “The blueprint of al-Qaeda in Iraq is there…
they want to drive a wedge between the Sunni and the Shia,” al-Rubaie said in an official
denial that the ensuing violence was a harbinger of civil war between the two religious
groups.94 As one might expect, each faction blamed the other for the Samarra bombing.
Shias accused Sunni insurgents, while Sunnis pointed to Shias and the Mahdi Militia,
accusing them of sabotaging the Golden Mosque, then blaming Sunnis for the attack,
thereby justifying further retaliatory violence. A T&FF insurgent group circulated a
28
statement indicating that the GoI’s growing relationship with Iran had been the root cause
of the bombing. This was followed by a television broadcast by Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s in which he blamed the attack on the United States and Israel.
Over the next several weeks, no group, insurgent or otherwise, came forward to either
accept responsibility for or to take credit for the Golden Mosque bombing.95
The security environment in Iraq continued to deteriorate during March 2006,
prompting Iraqis and US officials to offer divergent opinions as to whether the Samarra
attack would provoke civil war. Americans began referring to the heightened ethno-
sectarian violence as a “low-level civil conflict,” rather than using the term “civil war.”96
In pointed contrast however, former Iraqi Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, exclaimed “It is
unfortunate that we are in civil war…we are losing each day 50-60 people throughout the
country…if this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is.”97
Immediately following the Golden Mosque bombing, Major General Rick Lynch
had seen the situation differently. “We are not seeing civil war ignited in Iraq,” Lynch
stressed. “We are seeing a competent, capable, Iraqi government using their security
forces to calm the storm.”98 Similarly, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice discouraged
further discussion of civil war, adding “I don't think we do the Iraqi people any good, or
really that we are fair to them, in continually raising the specter that they might fall into
civil war."99 Sectarian and militia violence continued throughout the spring. A Sunni
insurgent car bomb killed ten Iraqis near the holy Imam Ali mosque in Najaf, and eighty
29
more were killed by suicide bombers at the Baratha shrine, SCIRI headquarters in
Baghdad.
Insert photo of Baratha Shrine bombing
Despite the upturn in attacks following the Golden Mosque bombing, the Department of
Defense officially declared in the May 2006 report “Measuring Stability and Security in
Iraq” that the strife in Iraq did not amount to civil war. The possibility of civil war
increased after sectarian violence rose following the Golden Mosque bombing. Also,
polling of Iraqi civilians by the US State Department Office of Research indicated an
increased risk of civil war. True civil war in Iraq, however, never officially broke out,
since several classic indicators, e.g., unrestrained sectarian strife, self-sustained strife
across multiple provinces, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and forced population
movements, did not occur to a large extent. The DoD report concluded that “some of
these conditions exist within Iraq, especially in and around Baghdad, and the percentage
of Iraqis concerned about civil war has increased in recent months. However, the
insurgency and sectarian strife do not currently constitute a civil war.”100
The Spread of Ethno-Sectarian Violence in Iraq
30
Speculation regarding the significance of the Golden Mosque bombing persisted.
Despite the likelihood that AQI orchestrated the bombing, ethno-sectarian violence did
escalate after the Samarra attack, which by any measure was a crucial setback for Sunni-
Shia reconciliation. However, Samarra was simply one more in a series of events, pitting
Shias against Sunnis, which began in late 2004 after the second battle of Fallujah. Many
Sunni refugees settled in insurgent-controlled west Baghdad after Fallujah was destroyed.
Violence erupted in the western suburbs of al Amriya and Ghazaliya as Sunnis brutally
evicted the few remaining Shia families and seized their homes. Shias quickly retaliated
in the Shia dominated Shaab district, where Sheikh Safaa al-Tamimi and Mahdi army
soldiers organized the first of many Shia death squads. Unrestrained ethnic cleansing
soon spread across Baghdad as the cycle of violence intensified. Sunnis were targeting
Shias for being Shia not for their support of the GoI or the Coalition. Similarly, Shias
turned on Sunnis, not because many were insurgents, but for simply being Sunni. Ethno-
sectarian violence became a war within a war that smoldered beneath Coalition and ISF
efforts to root out terrorists and insurgents.101 The Samarra bombing was just one of
many in this fight, and was neither the beginning of sectarian strife, nor the start of civil
war.
Shia militia groups, which were now better equipped and more professionally led,
continued to be problematic for the Coalition in 2006. Militias regularly participated in
illegal activities against Sunnis, such as extortion, executions, assassinations, and
kidnappings, while at the same time providing protection and security for Iraq’s Shia
population. The Badr Corps, associated with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s SCIRI
31
religious organization, and the Mahdi army, Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) led by Muqtada al-
Sadr, were the two most well known militias operating in Iraq at the time. Both of these
organizations refused to disband, thereby violating the requirements of CPA Order No.
91 (Regulation of Armed Forces and Militia Groups in Iraq) as well as stipulations in the
new Iraqi Constitution. Many militia fighters joined the ISF; however, JAM members,
who had been involved in actions against the Coalition, were excluded. The prevalence
of Shia militias prompted Sunni leaders to form their own small militia groups to provide
neighborhood security.102 Finally, Coalition commanders continued to accuse Iran of
supplying Shia militias in Iraq with weapons, equipment, and training. “We do know that
Shia extremist groups have received training through some sort of third element
associated with Iran…we do know that weapons have been provided,” explained Major
General William Caldwell, MNF-I spokesman in Baghdad.103 Nearly two years later,
accusations regarding Iran’s involvement persisted. Addressing US troops at Camp
Arifjan in Kuwait in January 2008, President Bush continued to press the issue: “Iran has
supported extremist groups [in Iraq] with training and lethal aid.”104 MNF-I
Commanding General, David Petraeus, who accompanied Bush to Kuwait, added “The
overall flow of weaponry from Iran into Iraq appears to be down, but attacks with
roadside bombs, called ‘explosively formed projectiles,’ linked to Tehran are up by a
factor of two or three in recent days.”105
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Killed in Hibhib
32
On 7 June 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of AQI, and his spiritual advisor,
Sheik Abdul Rahman, were killed in a Coalition air strike at Hibhib, five miles west of
Baquba in Diyala province.
Insert photo of Zarqawi
A US Air Force F-16C dropped two precision-guided bombs, a laser-guided GBU-12 and
a GPS-guided GBU-38, on the safe house in which Zarqawi, Rahman, and four other
associates were meeting.106 The attack was in all likelihood controlled by a direct action
US Special Mission Unit, since President Bush congratulated Army Lieutenant General
Stanley McChrystal, commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, for the
successful operation, noting “special operations forces, acting on tips and intelligence
from Iraqis, confirmed Zarqawi’s location and delivered justice to the most wanted
terrorist in Iraq.”107 MNF-I spokesman, Major General William Caldwell, described
locating and killing Zarqawi as resulting from “tremendous work by coalition forces,
intelligence agencies, and partners in our global war on terrorism, that all came together
feeding different parts and pieces that allowed us to build that puzzle…a painstaking
process that occurred over several weeks.”108 Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-
Maliki, acknowledged that tips from Iraqi citizens in the Hibhib area were instrumental in
tracking down Zarqawi; and Army Lieutenant General Dell Dailey, Director of the
Center for Special Operations at the time, believed similarly that Iraqis turned on Zarqawi
because of his brutal treatment of civilians.109
33
Zarqawi’s mission was to establish a caliphate in Iraq where he had been declared
Prince of Al Qaeda by Osama bin Laden. With a $25 million Coalition bounty on his
head, Zarqawi was believed to be responsible for a series of ruthless beheadings, suicide
attacks, car bombings, and assassinations, along with the destruction of the UN
headquarters in Baghdad and the bombing of three hotels in Amman. The Jordanian-
born Zarqawi fought the occupying Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989, and, later, formed his
own al-Qaeda training base near Herat in 2000. He fled to Iran after the US invaded
Afghanistan, then relocated to Iraq in 2002, where he vowed to foment civil war and to
obstruct the democratic process. In 2004, Zarqawi was captured in Fallujah, but released
by mistake.110 He was nearly captured again in February 2005 and may have been
wounded in a fire fight the following May. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declared
Zarqawi’s death “a stunning shock to the al-Qaeda system,”111 but warned that the
violence in Iraq was far from over. MNF-I commanding general, George Casey, and US
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad echoed Rumsfeld’s concerns, with Casey cautioning
“although the designated leader of al-Qaeda is now dead, hard fighting in the war lies
head…this is just a step in the process.”112 A message on al-Qaeda’s website praised
Zarqawi as a martyr and confirmed the terrorist organization’s intentions of continuing
holy war in Iraq.
Isert the al-Qaeda message in arabic
34
Several additional Islamic extremist groups, under the umbrella of the Mujahedin
Shura Council, were waiting in the wings to take a leadership role in the insurgent fight
against Coalition forces, the ISF, and the legitimate government of Iraq. By mid-June,
AQI announced that Egyptian Islamic Jihad militant Abu Ayyub al-Masri had replaced
Zarqawi as its leader.113 As summer approached, the rates of insurgent attacks and
Coalition/ISF casualties did not abate as a result of Zarqawi’s death. One US Soldier was
killed and two captured by insurgents at a vehicle checkpoint south of Baghdad. The
beheaded remains of the two abducted Soldiers were later discovered in the town of
Yusufiyah.114 Also, kidnappings of Iraqi officials – as opposed to ordinary civilians -
increased dramatically. In July, the chairman of Iraq’s Olympic Committee, a female
Sunni legislator, a consular official, and the Minister of Electricity were all seized for
ransom by gunmen wearing military or police uniforms.115
The Insurgency Grows in Scale and Complexity
Over the remainder of 2006, the nature of the Iraq war continued to gradually shift
from a Sunni-dominated insurgency to a battle for economic and political power among
ethnic, sectarian, and tribal groups. Violence increased in both scale and complexity
during this period as Shia fought amongst themselves, as well as against Sunnis and
Coalition forces. Sunnis and al-Qaeda attacked Shias, ISF, and the Coalition.116
Although Coalition forces were the primary target of most attacks, Iraqi civilians
sustained the most casualties.117 Twenty civilians were killed and more than100
wounded, for example, in a June bombing of the Kirkuk courthouse.118 Attacks against
35
Iraqi civilians averaged approximately 85 per week in 2006, while the weekly casualty
rate among civilians exceeded 550 – thus averaging nearly seven Iraqi civilian casualties
per attack. Comparable weekly attack/casualty data for ISF and Coalition forces in 2006
were as follows:
ISF Coalition
Weekly Attacks 160 525
Weekly Casualties 185 144
Casualties per Attack 1.2 0.3
During the three-month period of October – December 2006, Coalition forces, ISF,
and Iraqi civilians endured more attacks and more casualties than any comparable period
since 2003 and the rate of attacks in Baghdad reached 45 per day. Also, sectarian
murders as defined and compiled by MNF-I rose from less than 200 in January 2006 to
nearly 1,300 in December, and totaled more than 10,000 for the entire year.119 In
aggregate, nearly 17,000 Iraqi civilians and 2,112 ISF were killed in 2006. By year end,
822 Americans had been killed and 6, 298 wounded.120
Although a relatively low level of violence continued in remote areas, such as
Basrah, Kirkuk, Tal’Afar, and Mosul, the majority of attacks (80%) were concentrated in
Baghdad, Anbar, Salah ad Din, and Diyala provinces. Limited fighting in the southern
provinces typically involved the Badr vs. JAM power struggle, attacks on coalition
forces, and tribal rivalries. Ethnic and sectarian competition for economic/political
control and ongoing Sunni extremist attacks exemplified the nature of the conflict in
36
northern Iraq. In Anbar province, however, AQI and Sunni insurgents continued
attacking ISF and Coalition forces. Yet, attempts by extremists to coerce local citizens
into establishing an Islamic state were resisted by tribal leaders and Sunni Sheikhs. In ar-
Ramadi, for example, local Sunnis began openly challenging AQI in what would become
a broad-based political coalescence known as the “Sunni Awakening.” In 2006, Sheikh
Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi, head of the Abu Risha tribe, founded the Sahawa al
Anbar (Anbar Awakening Council), which eventually grew into a forty-two tribe alliance
pledged to fight AQI.121
Insert photo of al-Rishawi
Meanwhile, in Baghdad, AQI and JAM battled for control and authority. These
groups seldom confronted each other head-to-head, however. Instead, AQI attacked Shia
civilians and JAM attacked Sunnis in a deadly give-and-take campaign of sectarian
violence. Both Sunnis and Shias were displaced from their respective Baghdad
neighborhoods. AQI and foreign fighters would strike any group (Coalition, GoI, ISF,
Shias, or Sunnis) that attempted to prevent them from establishing a radical Islamic state
in Iraq. By late 2006, DoD considered Sunni insurgents, AQI, and JAM the key
destabilizing elements in Iraq and identified their respective goals as follows:
Insert “Goals of Key Destabilizing Elements in Iraq”
http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/9010_March_2007_Final_Signed.pdf, page 16
37
Finally, Syria and Iran continued to provide support to anti-Coalition and anti-GoI
groups in Iraq. Politically, Syria opposed Coalition activities in Iraq, persisted as the
principal point of entry for foreign jihadists, and offered safe haven and logistical support
to former Ba’ath Party expatriates. Iran continued to train, finance, and equip Iraqi Shia
militia groups, primarily JAM and the Badr Organization. In all likelihood, EFPs were
produced in Iran, since the sophisticated manufacturing techniques required to produce
them were not available in Iraq.122
On 29 December 2006, President Bush announced the execution by hanging of
former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Saddam’s trial had begun on 19 October, the Iraqi
High Tribunal convicted and sentenced him to death on 5 November, and the Appellate
Chamber upheld his conviction on 26 December.
Insert photo of Saddam on the Gallows
During the course of the trial, insurgents killed three of Saddam’s defense attorneys.
“Saddam’s death should serve as a new beginning for the nation,” Iraqi Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki proclaimed.123 President Bush, however, was more cautious, noting that
“bringing Saddam Hussein to justice will not end the violence in Iraq, but it is an
important milestone on Iraq’s course to becoming a democracy that can govern, sustain,
38
and defend itself…many difficult choices and further sacrifices lie ahead.”124 As with
previous milestones in post-conflict Iraq - killing of Uday and Qusay, capturing Saddam,
the 2005 elections, death of al-Zarqawi - Saddam’s execution failed to quell the mounting
violence.
Improvised Explosive Devices – Wearing Down the American Will to Fight
Explosive materials used to produce improvised explosive devices (IED) were
widely available in post-Saddam Iraq. Nearly one million tons of explosives, along with
blasting caps and hundreds of miles of detonation cord, were hidden in thousands of
unsecured munitions caches scattered throughout the country. Also, many disbanded
former Iraqi military officers were proficient and experienced in the use of explosives.
CENTCOM Commanding General, John Abizaid, described the situation bleakly, noting
“there’s more ammunition in Iraq than any place I’ve ever been in my life, and it’s not
securable…I wish I could tell you that we had it all under control, but we don’t.”125 “The
entire country is one big ammo dump…it’s just a huge, huge problem,” observed
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in early 2007 shortly after assuming office.126
IEDs quickly became the weapon of choice for insurgents in Iraq. These explosive
devices were triggered at first by a variety of unsophisticated mechanisms, such as egg
timers, washing machine timers, automobile key fobs, doorbell buzzers, and remote
controlled toy cars.127 Insurgents emplaced IEDs in fake guardrails or inside road kill,
often along main supply routes, or close to Coalition forward operating bases (FOBs).
39
By fall 2003, IED attacks numbered more than 100 per month, leading Colonel William
Adamson to conclude, “The concept of a front line, or line of battle has vanished in Iraq,
giving way to 360-degree warfare.”128 US forces used scrap metal to fabricate “hillbilly
armor” for their Humvees. Soon “uparmored Humvees” and the more-protective
interceptor individual body armor began arriving in Iraq. A cat-and-mouse game
developed in which nearly every IED countermeasure adopted by the Coalition was
quickly overcome by deadly technical device improvements created and introduced to the
fight by insurgents.
Insert stock IED explosion photo
Mounting IED casualties led the Army to establish an official IED Task Force in
fall 2003 under the direction of Brigadier General Joseph Votel, who had commanded the
75th Ranger Regiment during recent tours in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Votel set up shop
at the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon basement and nailed a sign on the door
that epitomized the task force mission: “STOP THE BLEEDING.”129 Task force field
teams deployed to Camp Victory to analyze the IED phenomenon in depth and to train
Coalition forces in locating and defeating the devices. Unfortunately, by spring 2004,
IED attacks had risen to nearly 100 per week, prompting General Abizaid to declare
IED’s “the greatest casualty producer” in Iraq.130 Significantly, however, and as a direct
result of the IED Task Force’s efforts, the actual rate of casualties attributable to IED
attacks began to decline. In July, DoD expanded the task force’s role, renaming it the
Joint IED Task Force. Brigadier General Votel now reported directly to Deputy Defense
40
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and had the resources of all the services at his disposal.
Despite a continued increase in IED attacks during the remainder of 2004, the casualty
rate remained relatively flat. Coalition forces began to attack bomber cells and the IED
Task Force announced an enhanced jammer strategy that called for deploying as many
systems as possible to Iraq. The electromagnetic spectrum became the new battle space.
However, the proliferation of jammers in theater interfered with standard Coalition
tactical radio communication channels and with radio signals to UAVs and Blue Force
Tracker . Almost immediately, insurgents switched to higher frequencies and higher-
powered remote controlled IED triggering devices that were not always susceptible to
Coalition jamming.
By 2005, Bush administration officials and senior US military leaders began to
view the insurgent’s use of IEDs as a serious strategic issue – one intended to sap the will
of the American people and erode support for the war in Iraq. Insurgents, meanwhile,
relentlessly upgraded their IED capabilities. For example, the explosively formed
penetrator (EFP), which first appeared in Basra the previous May, was jammer-proof
since it incorporated passive infrared triggering technology – referred to by Coalition
troops as the “Eye of Allah.”131 When detonated, EFPs fired several pounds of semi-
molten copper that easily punctured armored vehicles, sending a barrage of hot metal
throughout the crew compartment. In August, a new, highly explosive, underbelly IED
destroyed an armored personnel carrier, killing 14 Marines in Haditha. A device this
powerful could easily wipe out any armored vehicle in the US inventory. “You can’t
41
armor your way out of this problem,” declared an Army Brigadier General when asked
about protecting Coalition forces from EFPs and underbelly IEDs.132
Insert photo of Cpt. Combs from pg.6
www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/IraqReport06.2.pdf
Throughout 2005, insurgents switched technologies and modified their tactics to
stay ahead of Coalition IED countermeasures. They wired explosives together, for
example, in a daisy chain effect to create a larger kill-zone. Insurgents also tracked UAV
takeoffs and landings at Balad airbase and restricted IED planting activities to down
times or bad weather, no-fly, days. Terrorist bombers also became more adept at
implanting devices quickly, thereby reducing exposure time. As Coalition jammers and
passive infrared countermeasures became more effective, insurgents returned to simpler
triggering mechanisms, such as pressure plates, walkie-talkies, cell phones, cordless
phones, and basic wire connections. Passive infrared triggers were also modified with
radio-controlled telemetry that permitted the bomber to activate and de-activate the IED
as necessary while waiting for a lucrative target. Gasoline, propane, or chlorine gas were
added to basic IED bomb making materials to enhance the explosive effect; and
insurgents began to excel at booby- trapping Iraqi houses often with anti-tampering
trigger devices. Insurgents concealed IEDs in drainpipes, flowerpots, imitation
curbstones, car wheel wells, mannequins dressed in Coalition uniforms, and either in or
under the bodies of dead Iraqis. 2005 also saw the increased use of vehicle-borne IEDs
(VBIED) which terrorists employed to attack civilian markets, mosques, and police
42
stations. Finally, Coalition or ISF convoys hit with IEDs were often then attacked by
insurgent small arms or mortar fire, as the fighting in Iraq grew increasingly complex.
In December 2005, Brigadier General Votel, after skillfully guiding the task force
for more than two years, returned to combat duty, this time with the 82nd Airborne
Division in Afghanistan. Retired Army General Montgomery Meigs assumed
directorship of the task force, which was re-named the Joint IED Defeat Organization or
JIEDDO. General Meigs was former commander of NATO peacekeeping forces in
Bosnia and had earned a doctorate from the University of Wisconsin, where he wrote his
dissertation on the Manhattan Project. Meig’s charge was to attack the entire insurgent
IED system – both right of boom and left of boom – and to concentrate on the overall
network, not just the device. He developed a three-pronged mantra: attack the network -
defeat the device – train the force, and his new battle cry for JIEDDO became “I’ll find a
way or make one.”133
Since the US invasion of Iraq nearly three years earlier, more than 32,000 IED
attacks had taken place. The eleven thousand IED attacks in 2005 killed 408 US
servicemen and women.134 Insurgent IED networks were broad-based and included Sunni
rejectionists, Sunni Baathists, AQI, and Shia militia members. A financier, bombmaker,
emplacer, triggerman, spotter, and an occasional cameraman made up a typical insurgent
IED cell.135 Cell members were often independent contractors, paid by-the-job or given
bonus payments for successful IED attacks. General Meig’s “left of boom” strategy
emphasized neutralizing these IED networks and disrupting the chain of events that occur
43
prior to emplacement. To this end, a classified project referred to as Cerberus was
initiated in 2005 to specifically track down and eliminate IED network bombmakers.
“The whole idea is to get the darn thing never to go off, never to be emplaced…that is
where we want to focus the majority of our energy,” Meigs
explained. 136 “Right-of boom,” on the other hand, involved targeting emplacers and
triggermen after an attack, quickly attending to the wounded, collecting/analyzing
forensic evidence, and implementing a variety of law enforcement techniques.
With respect to defeating the device and training the force, JIEDDO continued to
develop new technologies, such as reprogrammable/reactive jammers, drones, ground
penetrating radar, microwave emitters, and infrared sensor decoys, to counter the IED
threat and to train US forces in identifying and disarming IEDs before they exploded. In
2006, General Meigs, with assistance from Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael
Mullen, brought 300 Naval Electronic Warfare officers to Iraq to help US Army and
Marine Corps units in the field deal more effectively with the complex electromagnetic
environment. Still, more than 17,000 IED attacks occurred in Iraq in 2006, killing 427
Americans.137 To JIEDDO’s well-deserved credit, however, the casualty-to-explosion
ratio dropped significantly in 2006 and, by yearend, 45 percent of all IEDs were being
discovered and disarmed before detonating. “Three years ago, practically every IED
incident created some kind of casualty…now the enemy must create six incidents to
cause a casualty,”138 observed Brigadier General Anthony Tata, Deputy Director of
Operations at JIEDDO. Despite heroic efforts by the JIEDDO Task Force, insurgent
bombers remained cunning and elusive as EID attacks persisted with 1500 more in
44
January 2007. IEDs were the number one killer of US forces in Iraq. “For every move
we make, the enemy makes three…the enemy changes techniques, tactics, and
procedures every two to three weeks,”139 declared Brigadier General Joe Ramirez, Deputy
Commanding General of the US Army Combined Arms Training Center, during a
roadside bomb conference at Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Add “Iraq IED Incident Trends” Graph pg 15 JIEDDO Annual Rpt 2006 on R
drive
Insurgency Changing in Character, Scope, Dynamics, and Lethality
Sectarian violence continued to escalate in Iraq as 2006 came to an end. In
November, more than 100 Shias and Sunnis were kidnapped from the Departments of
Scholarship and Culture at the Iraqi Higher Education Ministry facility in Baghdad.
Insert photo of kidnapping site
The audacious abduction, which took place in broad daylight, was carried out by men in
commando uniforms driving Ministry of Interior trucks.140 The kidnappers were never
identified or apprehended; however, according to the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, in congressional testimony in November
2006, the Iraqi police and the Ministry of Interior had been infiltrated by militia
45
members from both Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi army and the SCIRI’ Badr
Corps.141 “We assess that sectarian violence is now the greatest threat to Iraq’s stability
and future…Iraq today is very far from peaceful…no single narrative is sufficient to
explain all the violence we see today,” Director, Central Intelligence Agency, General
Michael Hayden, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15 November.142 During
the same senate hearing, Lieutenant General Maples provided further detail, noting that
“The conflict was unquestionably complex and difficult…was changing in character,
scope, dynamics, and lethality…and was increasingly an intra-Arab sectarian struggle for
power and authority.”143 The overall Sunni insurgency continued to consist of an
intermingled hodgepodge of ex-military officers, former Baathists, Iraqi nationalists,
Jihadists, foreign fighters, and al-Qaeda. Shia militia groups and wide-spread criminal
networks also played significant roles in Iraq’s deteriorating security and stability
environment in late 2006.
As 2007 began, the ever-changing enemy situation in Iraq shifted subtly once
again. According to intelligence estimates in the 2007 CENTCOM Posture Statement,
insurgent groups still had differing motivations for inflicting violence in Iraq, yet they
were steadfast in opposition to the Coalition presence and their rejection of the GoI.
AQI, despite loosing favor among the overall Sunni Arab community, continued to attack
Iraqi civilians in an ongoing effort to provoke sectarian violence. Shia militias, some
supported by Iranian operatives, persisted in their efforts to retain political power by
undermining confidence in the ISF and GoI. Infiltration of the Iraqi Police by Shia
militia was an ongoing, troublesome, dilemma; and in Baghdad, Shia death squads
46
committed the preponderance of sectarian attacks against Sunnis.144 The insurgency was
still comprised primarily of Sunni Arabs, some acting directly, others in supporting roles.
Although Sunni Arabs represented only 17% of Iraq’s population (roughly 28 million
total by 2007 with Shia Arabs, Sunni Kurds, and Turkmen/Christians comprising the
remainder at 60%, 17%, and 6%, respectively), they still felt strongly that Iraq belonged
to them, since they alone had led it; and therefore, they opposed both the Coalition
occupation and the legitimate GoI. Shia Arabs, who had supported the overthrow of
Saddam’s regime, were fundamentally Iraqi nationalists and, as such, also had mixed
feelings regarding the Coalition presence. For Shia, halfheartedly supporting the
occupation was a means-to-an-end for them to gain political power for the first time.
Nevertheless, the two principal Shia militia groups, Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps,
continued to engage in insurgent attacks against US troops in central Iraq and against
British forces near Basra. Foreign fighters, intent on engaging in holy war against
western invaders, continued infiltrating Iraq, primarily by crossing the Syrian border. As
was the case earlier in the conflict, these non-Iraqis represented only a small percentage
of all insurgents and by 2006-2007 recruits were typically younger Islamic militants from
a variety of Middle Eastern and European nations. Indigenous Sunni Arab insurgents
often distrusted the foreign jihadists and disavowed their notion of comprehensive
Islamic rule for Iraq. Conversely, many foreigners never felt welcome in Iraq and feared
that local citizens were all too willing to turn them over to ISF/Coalition forces. By early
2007, Coalition commanders were defining the enemy in Iraq as being comprised of four
separate, yet interrelated, insurgent organizations.145
47
Four Major Insurgent Groups as of 2007
Baathists and former regime members remained Iraq’s largest insurgent group and
consisted primarily of military and intelligence officers from the pre-conflict Iraqi
Republican Guards Corps, the Special Republican Guards, and the Fida’yin Saddam
(Those who sacrifice for Saddam). After Saddam’s execution in December 2006, Izzat
Ibrahim al-Duri was named leader of the Baath Party. A subgroup of the Baath Party,
Fida’yin Saddam, was now its military arm and espoused both Iraqi nationalism and
strong Islamist beliefs. Jaysh Muhammad (Muhammad’s Army), also a militant
subgroup, was affiliated with Arab Baath Socialists and zealously promoted Islamist
ideology.
Nationalist-Islamists represented the second major insurgent organization in Iraq.
This group resisted the Coalition occupation on both patriotic and strong anti-western
Islamist grounds. Many former Baathists, some still irritated by Iraq’s failure to more
forcefully defend itself against the Coalition invasion, along with middle-class Iraqi
intellectuals and influential Sunni tribal sheiks from al-Anbar province formed the
leadership element of this insurgent group.
The third major insurgent organization in Iraq in 2007 was made up of Iraqi
Salafist Islamists, who advocated strict adherence to Shari’ah law, disavowed any
government founded upon democratic principals, abhorred western values, and strongly
objected to the Coalition presence. The largest subgroup of Salafists was the Jaysh al-
48
Islami fi al-Iraq (Islamic Army of Iraq/IAI) and included a smaller element, al-Fatihin,
that began targeting Coalition forces and Shia militias in 2006. IAI unified loyalists,
nationalists, and Islamists to resist the Coalition, the GoI, and all infidels in an attempt to
convert Iraq to an Islamic state. Another Salifist subgroup at this time was Ansar al-
Sunnah wa al-Jama’a (AS), which was organized into brigade size units and fought
against ISF/Coalition forces in al-Anbar and Diyala provinces. The 1920 Revolution
Brigades (1920 RB), also known as the Iraqi National Islamic Resistance, remained
dedicated to the insurgency during this period, and consisted of ex-Baathists, nationalists,
and Islamists deployed in combat brigades. 1920 RB, which had ties to centrist Sunni
politician and activists in Baghdad, split into two separate elements in 2007, one retaining
the original name and the other assuming the title HAMAS-Iraq. Also affiliated with
Salafist Islamists was the Jaysh al-Mujahidin (Army of the Mujahidin), which operated in
al-Anbar and Ninevah provinces. Al-Mujahidin, IAI, and AS combined operations in
2007, forming the Joint Resistance Front (JRF) to concentrate on attacking the Coalition,
while refraining from attacking each other and Iraqi civilians, and to distance itself from
AQI’s brutal methods.
Finally, AQI, Iraq’s fourth major insurgent organization, merged with several
affiliates in 2006 to form the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), headed by Emir Abu Umar al-
Baghdadi. Of all the insurgent organizations, ISI was by far the most dogmatic in strictly
observing Salafist Islamist doctrine and was most radical in its rejection of the Shia-led
GoI. Under its former leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed by a US air strike
in June 2006, AQI/ISI was known first as as al-Qaeda fi Balad al-Rafidayn (Al-Qaeda in
49
the Land of the Two Rivers) and later as the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC). Despite
the series of name changes, AQI relentlessly attacked Iraqi civilians, Shia militias, ISF,
and Shia shrines during the early days of 2007.146
Insert group photo of AQI fighters
More detailed information regarding foreign fighters in Iraq came to light after US
Special Operations Forces captured the records of 700 infiltrated terrorists during a raid
near Sinjar in Ninavah province. The resulting data were subsequently analyzed by the
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the US Military Academy. CTC researchers
determined that the vast majority of foreign fighters were Saudi Arabians (41%) and
Libyans (18%), a significant number of whom had crossed from Syria to Iraq near the
border town of Albu Kamal. Collectively, their average age was 24-25 years old as of
January 2007, and most had been students (43%) prior to being recruited as either suicide
bombers (56%) or fighters (42%).
Insert graph “Foreign fighters by Country of Origin” on pg 8 and pie chart
“Foreign fighter Recruited Roles” pg 18 of Al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf
By early 2007, AQI/ISI had been unsuccessful in reconciling the secular interests of Iraqi
insurgents with the Salafist Islamist interests of foreign fighters, to the extent that
firefights between the two factions became a regular occurrence. AQI’s barbaric
50
methods and religious fervor antagonized potential Iraqi recruits, and AQI/ISI began to
lose favor throughout the country.147
Growing Iranian Influence 2007
147 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 December 2007, 1-30. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf (accessed 4 January 2008). 11 Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay Garner, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 6 June 2006, Windermere, FL, 18.12 Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay Garner, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 6 June 2006, Windermere, FL, 18.13 Charles Sadell’s comments noted in Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay Garner, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 6 June 2006, Windermere, FL, 18.14 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 45; L. Paul Bremer, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 20 April 2006, Chevy Chase, MD, 3.15 L. Paul Bremer, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 20 April 2006, Chevy Chase, MD, 5. 16 L. Paul Bremer, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 20 April 2006, Chevy Chase, MD, 5.17 Douglas J. Feith, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 18 January 2008, Bethesda, MD, 14.18 Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, interview by Catherine Small, 17 February 2006, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12.19 General John P. Abizaid, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 10 January 2007, Tampa, FL, 2.20 The CPA established the Interim Governing Council (IGC) dominated by Shia Arabs on 13 July 2003; Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2006), 20; General William S. Wallace, interview by Lynne Garcia, 22 May 2006, Fort Monroe, VA, 12.21 Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2006), 27-28.22 See comments regarding problems with peacekeeping operations in Iraq from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman General Richard Myers, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Pentagon Defense Policy Board member Richard Perle, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Miscalculated Security for Iraq; Post-Saddam Resistance Unforeseen, Officials Say,” Washington Times, 28 August 2003, A.01. 23 Jim Garamone, “Bremer Calls on People to Keep Perspective on Iraq,” Armed Forces Press Service, 25 June 2003, 1-2. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28829 (accessed 18 December 2007); US Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing – Mr. Di Rita and General Abizaid,” 16 July 2003. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2845 (accessed 14 November 2007). 24 Brigadier General Frank Helmick, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, Arlington, VA, 15 February 2006, 5; Jim Garamone, “Attacks Reveal Nature of Terrorism, Bush Says,” Armed Forces Press Service, 25 August 2003, 1-2. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28568 (accessed 19 December 2007). 25 “Militants Behead American Hostage in Iraq,” FoxNews.com, 11 May 2004, 1. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,119615,00.html (accessed 19 December 2007). 26 L. Paul Bremer, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 20 April 2006, Chevy Chase, MD, 10-11.27 “Car Bomb Kills 47 Outside Baghdad Police Headquarters,” Chinadaily, 15 September 2004, 1-4. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-09/15/content_374447.htm (accessed 20 December 2007); Brigadier General Carter F. Ham, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 28 June 2006, Arlington, VA, 10.28 Karl Vick, “Sunni Party Pulls Out of Iraqi Vote as Doubts Grow,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 28 December 2004, A01; Also, many Iraqi Islamic party members simply boycotted the elections.
51
As AQI’s influence in Iraq wavered, Iranian intervention in Iraqi affairs loomed
ever larger. Attacks by Iranian-backed militia groups on Coalition forces, ISF, GoI
officials, and Sunni Arabs in Iraq increased dramatically by late 2006 and early 2007.148
The Quds Force from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF) organized,
trained, funded, and equipped both Shia and Sunni insurgent elements, through a series of
29 Quoted in “Purported al-Zarqawi Tape: democracy a Lie,” CNN.com, 23 January 2005, 1-3. http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/23/iraq.main/ (accessed 21 December 2007). 30 Quoted in Jackie Spinner, “After Threats, Iraqi Election Board Resigns,” The Washington Post, 10 January 2005, A12.31 According to a 2005 CIA study, Saddam Hussein released tens of thousands of criminals before the war began in 2003 as described in Walter Pincus, “CIA Studies Provide Glimpse of Insurgents in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 6 February 2005, A.19. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A1508-2005Feb5?language=printer (accessed 31 December 2007). 32 General John Abizaid, “2005 Posture of the United States Central Command,” 3 March 2005, 11. www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test05-03-03Abizaid.doc (accessed 14 November 2007), Mahan Abedin, “Iraq’s Divided Insurgents,” Mideast Monitor 1, no 1 (February 2006): 1-8. 33 RAND Arroyo Center, A Campaign-Quality Army-Annual report 2005 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 10-11.34 General John Abizaid, “2005 Posture of the United States Central Command,” 3 March 2005, 13. www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test05-03-03Abizaid.doc (accessed 14 November 2007). 35 A 2005 CIA study described foreign fighters as “lesser elements but still a source of danger,” as reported in Walter Pincus, “CIA Studies Provide Glimpse of Insurgents in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 6 February 2005, A.19. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A1508-2005Feb5?language=printer (accessed 31 December 2007). 36 Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2006), 43, 47.37 National Counterterrorism Center, “Ansar al-Sunna (AS),” 1. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/as.htm (accessed 22 December 2007); Jonathan Schanzer, “Ansar al-Islam,” The Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004, Volume XI, Number 1, 1-8. http://www.meforum.org/article/579 (accessed 22 December 2007). 38 General John Abizaid, “2005 Posture of the United States Central Command,” 3 March 2005, 10-14. www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test05-03-03Abizaid.doc (accessed 14 November 2007). 39 RAND Arroyo Center, A Campaign-Quality Army-Annual report 2005 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 10. 40 Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Hrg. 109-61, 16 February 2005 (GPO: Washington, DC, 2005), 52. http://intelligence.senate.gov/threats.pdf (accessed 22 December 2007). 41 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2006), 27, revised working draft dated 22 June 2006. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060622_insurgency.pdf (accessed 15 November 2007). 42 US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq 2005,” 8 March 2006, 2. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61689.htm (accessed 27 December 2007). 43 US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq 2005,” 8 March 2006, 4. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61689.htm (accessed 27 December 2007).44 US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq 2005,” 8 March 2006, 5. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61689.htm (accessed 27 December 2007).45 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2006), 30-31, revised working draft dated 22 June 2006.
52
contacts known as the Sheibani network, in an effort to defeat the Coalition and to disrupt
the democratic political process in Iraq. Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah advisors
provided Ansar al-Sunnah Sunni insurgents and Jaysh al-Mahdi Shia militiamen with
advanced training and a variety of weapons systems, including rockets, mortars, sniper
rifles, and explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs as previously described). The IRGC-QF
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060622_insurgency.pdf (accessed 15 November 2007). 46 Glen Rangwala, “The Interim Government of Iraq from 2003-06,” 1-10. http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqministers.html (accessed 29 December 2007). 47 Lieutenant General Conway quoted in Donna Miles, “Operation Matador Helping Flush Insurgents from Western Iraq,” Armed Forces Press Service, 10 May 2005, 1-2. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31688 (accessed 30 December 2007). 48 Mathew Webster, “Operation Lightning: Iraqi Soldiers Strike at Terrorists in Taji,” Defend America-Army News Service, 10 June 2005, 1-3. http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/june2005/a061005pj1.html (accessed 30 December 2007). 49 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2006), 36-38, revised working draft dated 22 June 2006. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060622_insurgency.pdf (accessed 15 November 2007).50 For example, Operation Steel Curtain, which involved US units along with 1,000 Iraqi army soldiers, helped clear AQI from the Euphrates River Valley and pave the way for Iraqis in Anbar province to vote in the December Parliamentary elections. 139 insurgents were killed, 256 captured. See “Operation Steel Curtain Concludes along Iraq-Syria Border,” American Forces Press Service, 22 November 2005, 1-2. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18236 (accessed 31 December 2007). 51 MNF-I, “Overall Weekly Iraq Attack Trends,” unpublished briefing slides on file at the US Army Combat Studies Institute; David Walker, Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq (Washington, DC: GAO, 2007), GAO-07-1048R, 3. http://www.gao.gov/news.items/d071048r.pdf (accessed 31 November 2007). 52 Senator McCain’s comment quoted in Walter Pincus, “CIA Studies Provide Glimpse of Insurgents in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 6 February 2005, A.19. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A1508-2005Feb5?language=printer (accessed 31 December 2007). 53 Walter Pincus, “CIA Studies Provide Glimpse of Insurgents in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 6 February 2005, A.19. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A1508-2005Feb5?language=printer (accessed 31 December 2007); the 15,000 insurgent figure also appears in Glenn Robinson and Kalev Sepp, “Current Insurgency in Iraq in the Context of Historical Islam,” unpublished presentation to the Conference on Understanding Terrorist Networks and Organizations, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 7 April 2005, 3. 54 General John Abizaid quoted in Bryan Bender, “US General Says Troops Question Support,” Boston Globe, 24 June 2005, 1-3. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/06/24/us_general_says_troops_question_support/ (accessed 14 November 2007). 55 Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffery White, “Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency,” Military Review 86, no 3 (May/June 2006): 34-35. 56 Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffery White, “Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency,” Military Review 86, no 3 (May/June 2006): 34-35. 57 See for example Robert Kitrinos, “The Insurgency in Iraq: An Overview (December 2005) Part II, unpublished US State Department briefing presentation last edited 12 December 2005, 9, on file at the US Army Combat Studies Institute; Glenn Robinson and Kalev Sepp, “Current Insurgency in Iraq in the Context of Historical Islam,” unpublished presentation to the Conference on Understanding Terrorist Networks and Organizations, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 7 April 2005, 4; James Baker and Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006),
53
also established a series of Hezbollah-like secret cells in Baghdad to gather intelligence
regarding Coalition and ISF operations and to facilitate clandestine missions.149 Iranian-
backed Shia extremist elements that had broken away from radical Shia cleric Muqtada
al-Sadr’s Mahdi army were by early 2007 referred to as “special groups.”150 Iranians also
paid Iraqi insurgents rewards and bonuses for shooting down US aircraft, bombing
10. 58 Kalev Sepp, Assistant Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Post Graduate School, implied that recruiting of new insurgents in Iraq was relatively easy when he noted, “Every week [we] kill more and capture more, yet there are more insurgents than there were when we started.” Quoted in George Packer, “The Lessons of Tal Afar,” The New Yorker, 10 April 2006, 3. 59 Richard Boudreaux and Borzou Daragahi, “Referendum in Iraq: Sunnis Join Millions for Iraq Charter Vote,” Los Angeles Times, 16 October 2005, A.1. 60 US Department of State - Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 28 April 2006, 4. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64344.htm (accessed 3 January 2008). 63 Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, and Les Roberts, “Mortality after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: a Cross-sectional Cluster Sample Survey,” The Lancet 386, no 9545 (21 October 2006): 1421-1428.64 Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 450-451.65 Amir Alkhuzai, et al., “Violence-Related Mortality in Iraq from 2002 to 2006,” The New England Journal of Medicine, 31 January 2008, 484-493. http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMsa0707782 (accessed 10 January 2008). 66 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” Report to Congress in accordance with Conference Report 109-72, October 2005, 18-19. www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20051013_publication_OSSRF.pdf (accessed 8 November 2007). 67 Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt described the whack-a-mole operational concept (fighting insurgents over and over again in the same location) in Donna Miles, “Iraqi Security Forces Steadily Improving, but Still Need Support,” American Forces Press Service, 29 November 2005, 1-2. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18207 (accessed 20 November 2007). 68 Robert Kitrinos, “The Insurgency in Iraq: An Overview (December 2005) Part II,” unpublished US State Department briefing presentation last edited 12 December 2005, 46-49, on file at the US Army Combat Studies Institute. 69 General John Abizaid, “2006 Posture of the United States Central Command,” 14 March 2005, 9-10. http://www2.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/General%20Abizaid%20Statements/PostureStatement2006.htm (accessed 26 September 2007).70 US Department of State - Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 28 April 2006, 4. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64344.htm (accessed 3 January 2008).71 General John Abizaid, “2006 Posture of the United States Central Command,” 14 March 2005, 10. http://www2.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/General%20Abizaid%20Statements/PostureStatement2006.htm (accessed 26 September 2007).72 International Crisis Group, “In their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency,” Middle East Report No. 50, 15 February 2006, i-ii. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953 (accessed 28 November 2007).73 US Department of State - Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 28 April 2006, 5. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64344.htm (accessed 3 January 2008). 74 David McKeeby, “Iraqi, Coalition Forces Capture Top Insurgent Leader,” Current Issues, 6 April 2006: 1-2. http://www.usembassy.org.uk/iraq331.html (accessed 8 January 2008). 75 Evan Kohlmann, “Islamic Army in Iraq: A Response to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi,” GlobalTerrorAlert, 5 April 2007, 1. www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0407/iaionisi0407.pdf. (accessed 8 January 2008).
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vehicles, and killing Coalition Soldiers. Locating and destroying Iranian-sponsored Iraqi
militias became a major focus of Coalition combat operations in 2007.151
76 Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi, “An inventory of Iraqi Resistance Groups: Who Kills Hostages in Iraq?,” Global Policy Forum, 19 September 2004: 2-3. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/resist/2004/0919overview.htm (accessed 8 January 2008).77 Sara Wood, “Petraeus: Interrogations Reveal Iranian Influence in Iraq,” American Forces Press Service, 26 April 2007, 1. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32963 (accessed 8 January 2008). 78 US Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Designation of Iran Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” 25 October 2007, 1-6. http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp644.htm (accessed 8 January 2008). 79 Bob Drogin, “Report: Iraq Insurgents Seeking Chemical, Germ Weapons,” The Seattle Times, 10 October 2004.80 Frontline, “Gangs of Iraq: The Anatomy of Civil War,” America at a Crossroads. http://www.pbs.org/weta/crossroads/about/show_gangs_of_iraq.html (accessed 8 January 2008). 81 International Crisis Group, “In their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency,” Middle East Report No. 50, 15 February 2006, 2. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953 (accessed 28 November 2007). 82 Kathleen Ridolfo, “A survey of Armed Groups in Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 June 2004, 3-4. https://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iraqsurvey.pdf (accessed 19 October 2007). 83 Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi, “An Inventory of Iraqi Resistance Groups: Who Kills Hostages in Iraq?” Global Policy Forum, 19 September 2004, 1-7. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/resist/2004/0919overview.htm (accessed 8 January 2008).84 International Crisis Group, “In their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency,” Middle East Report No. 50, 15 February 2006, 3. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953 (accessed 28 November 2007); Samir Haddad and Mazin Ghazi, “An Inventory of Iraqi Resistance Groups: Who Kills Hostages in Iraq?” Global Policy Forum, 19 September 2004, 1-7. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/resist/2004/0919overview.htm (accessed 8 January 2008). 85 See for example Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2006), 171-176; International Crisis Group, “In their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency,” Middle East Report No. 50, 15 February 2006, 3. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953 (accessed 28 November 2007); and Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Insurgent Groups Responsible for War Crimes,” 17, no 9 (3 October 2005): 13-34. http://hrw.org/reports/2005/iraq1005/iraq1005.pdf (accessed 21 November 2007). 86 Quoted in Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Terrorists Strike Shiite Shrine, Leaders Urge Restraint,” press release 23 February 2006, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1533&Itemid=128 (accessed 9 January 2008). 87 Major General Rick Lynch, “Operational Update, February 23,” MNF-I press briefing, 23 February 2006, 3. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2122&Itemid=128 (accessed 9 January 2008).88 Michael Howard, “Sunni-Shia Schism Threatening to Tear Iraq Apart, Says Conflict Group,” The Guardian, 27 February 2006, 24.89 International Crisis Group, “Crisis Watch Search Results: Iraq, 1 March 2006.” http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=cw_search&l=1&t=1&cw_country=51&cw_date= (accessed 28 October 2007); For an even higher estimate of Iraqis killed see Ellen Knickmeyer and Bassam Sebti, “Toll in Iraq’s Deadly Surge: 1300,” The Washington Post, 28 February 2006, A.1.
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Conclusion – Different Faces of the Same Totalitarian Threat
“Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat,” President
Bush proclaimed in describing the enemy situation in Iraq during his 2007 State of the
Union Address, in which he also announced a troop surge of more than 20,000 additional
90 Quoted in Dan Murphy, “Attack Deepens Iraq’s Divide; Blast at a Major Shrine Set Off Widespread Shiite Protests,” The Christian Science Monitor, 23 February 2006, 1.91 Quoted in Dan Murphy, “Attack Deepens Iraq’s Divide; Blast at a Major Shrine Set Off Widespread Shiite Protests,” The Christian Science Monitor, 23 February 2006, 1.92 Described in Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 444; Quoted in Dan Murphy, “Attack Deepens Iraq’s Divide; Blast at a Major Shrine Set Off Widespread Shiite Protests,” The Christian Science Monitor, 23 February 2006, 1. 93 Major General Rick Lynch, “Operational Update February 23,” MNF-I Press Briefing, 23 February 2006, 7-8. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2122&Itemid=128 (accessed 14 November 2007). 94 Quoted in “Official Says Iraqis Resisting Civil War,” CNN.com Interview, 26 February 2006, 1-2, accessed 11 January 2008 at http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/26/alrubaie.interview/index.html. 95 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2006), 51, revised working draft dated 22 June 2006 accessed 15 November 2007 at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060622_insurgency.pdf. Later in 2006, Coalition commanders concluded that Haitham Sabah Shaker Mohammed al-Badri had been the mastermind behind the Golden Mosque bombing. Al-Badri was a high-value target and al-Qaeda’s emir in Salah ad Din province. He was killed by US Special Forces in August 2007, see Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, MNF-I Press Conference, 20 January 2008, 7-8. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16576&Itemid=131 (accessed 20 January 2008).96 Edward Wong, “Shiites Say US is Pressuring Iraqi Leader to Step Aside,” The New York Times (International), 28 March 2006, 1-2, accessed 29 October 2007 at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/international/middleeast/28cnd-iraq.html. 97 Quoted in Scott Peterson, “In Iraq, US Influence Wanes as Full Scale Civil War Looms,” The Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 2006, 1-2, accessed 10 January 2008 at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0320/p10s01-woiq.html. 98 Quoted in Johnathan Finer and Bassam Sebti, “Sectarian Violence Kills Over 100 in Iraq,” The Washington Post Foreign Service, 24 February 2006, A01, accessed 21 October 2007 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/23/AR2006022300216.html. 99 Quoted in Bradley Graham, “US Looks to Baghdad to Deal with Violence,” The Washington Post, 24 February 2006, A11 100 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, Report to Congress in accordance with Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006 (Section 9010), May 2006, 38, accessed 8 November 2007 at http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/Index.html. 101 Nir Rosen, “Anatomy of a Civil War,” Boston Review, November/December 2006, 16-21, accessed 9 January 2008 at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR31.6/rosen.php; See also Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 447-448.102 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, Report to Congress in accordance with Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006 (Section 9010), May 2006, 29-31, accessed 8 November 2007 at http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/Index.html. 103 Quoted in Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 449. 104 Terence Hunt, “Bush Could Switch on Drawdown,” The Kansas City Star, 13 January 2008, A15.
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US forces.152 Sectarian violence had continued to grow in magnitude and intensity during
2006, prompting the National Security Council (NSC) to conclude that “the situation in
Iraq is unacceptable…our current strategy is not working. We did not have enough
forces before…it requires additional troops to deal with sectarian violence and bring
security to the people of Baghdad.”153 Meanwhile, Iraqi civilians were becoming
105 Terence Hunt, “Bush Could Switch on Drawdown,” The Kansas City Star, 13 January 2008, A15.106 Presentation by USAF Brigadier General Stephen Hoog, MNF-I Weekly Press Briefing, 15 June 2006, accessed 22 January 2008 at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2017&Itemid=128. 107 Michael Hirsh and John Barry, “The Hidden General,” Newsweek.com, 26 June 2006, 1-4, accessed 15 January 2008 at http://www.newsweek.com/id/52445; President Bush quoted in John Burns, “US Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse,” The New York Times, 8 June 2006, 1-6, accessed 15 January 2008 at www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html. 108 Quoted in Steven Donald Smith, “Zarqawi Survived Air Strike, Died Shortly After,” American Forces Press Service, 9 June 2006, 1-2, accessed 15 January 2008 at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16086. 109 Lieutenant General Dell Dailey, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 15 January 2008, Washington, DC, 7. 110 Iraqi Security Forces captured Zarqawi, but did not recognize him and subsequently released him.111 Donald Rumsfeld, US Department of Defense News Transcript, 8 June 2006, 1, accessed 10 October 2007 at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=32. 112 Lieutenant General George Casey quoted in John Burns, “US Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse,” The New York Times, 8 June 2006, 1-6, accessed 15 January 2008 at www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html. 113 Major General William Caldwell, MNF-I Weekly Press Briefing, 15 June 2006, accessed 22 January 2008 at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2017&Itemid=128. 114 Jonathan Finer and Joshua Partlow, “Kidnapped US Soldiers Found Slain,” The Washington Post, 21 June 2006, A1. www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060621/news_1n21iraq.html (accessed 28 January 2008).115 Kimberly Kagan, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Iraq Report: Institute for the Study of War, May 2006 – August 2007, 15. www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/IraqReport06.2.pdf (accessed 15 January 2008).116 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability,” January 2007, 5-7. http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/documents/nie020207.pdf (accessed 17 November 2007).117 Attacks defined as including IEDs, VBIEDs, EFPs, underbelly devices, suicide bombers, indirect fire weapons, small arms and sniper fire. 118 Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, MNF-I Press Conference, 20 January 2008, 8. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16576&Itemid=131 (accessed 20 January 2008).119 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, Report to Congress in accordance with Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Section 9010), March 2007, 17-19. http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/9010_March_2007_Final_Signed.pdf (accessed 8 November 2007). 120 MNF-I data collected and compiled by the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count. http://icasualties.org/oif/default.aspx (accessed 3 December 2007).121 Patricia Butenis and Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, “MNF-I Joint Statement Regarding the Assassination of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi,” 13 September 2007. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13989&Itemid=21 (accessed 17 December 2007).
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increasingly frustrated with Coalition efforts to protect them from violence, regardless of
the source. “Force levels overall in Baghdad have been inadequate to stabilize a city of
its size,” NSC officials surmised in recommending an increase in OIF US troop strength
during an early-January Iraq Strategy Review briefing.154
122 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, Report to Congress in accordance with Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Section 9010), March 2007, 17-19. http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/9010_March_2007_Final_Signed.pdf (accessed 8 November 2007). Highly-calibrated machine tools and 20-ton hydraulic presses were required to form pure copper into the concave discs used in EFPs.123 “Iraq Puts Former Dictator to Death,” MNF-I Press Release, 30 December 2006, 1-3. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8655&Itemid=128 (accessed 25 January 2008).124 George Bush, “President Bush Statement on Saddam Hussein’s Execution,” American Forces Press Service, 29 December 2006, 1-3. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=2557 (accessed 25 January 2008). 125 Quoted in Rick Atkinson, “The IED Problem is Getting Out of Control – We’ve Got to Stop the Bleeding,” The Washington Post, 30 September 2007, A13. 126 Quoted in Rick Atkinson, “The IED Problem is Getting Out of Control – We’ve Got to Stop the Bleeding,” The Washington Post, 30 September 2007, A13.127 General (Ret) Montgomery Meigs, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 17 January 2008, Washington, DC, 4. 128 Quoted in Rick Atkinson, “The IED Problem is Getting Out of Control – We’ve Got to Stop the Bleeding,” The Washington Post, 30 September 2007, A13.129 Rick Atkinson, “The IED Problem is Getting Out of Control – We’ve Got to Stop the Bleeding,” The Washington Post, 30 September 2007, A13.130 Quoted in Rick Atkinson, “The IED Problem is Getting Out of Control – We’ve Got to Stop the Bleeding,” The Washington Post, 30 September 2007, A13.131 Rick Atkinson, “You Can’t Armor Your Way Out of this Problem,” The Washington Post, 2 October 2007, A01.132 Quoted in Rick Atkinson, “You Can’t Armor Your Way Out of this Problem,” The Washington Post, 2 October 2007, A01.133 General (Ret) Montgomery Meigs, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 17 January 2008, Washington, DC, 3.134 Michael O’Hanlon and Jason Campbell, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 21 December 2007, 17. https://www.brookings.edu/saban/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index20071221.pdf (accessed 3 January 2008). 135 Clay Wilson, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures,” Congressional Research Service, 28 august 2007, 2.136 General (Ret) Montgomery Meigs, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 17 January 2008, Washington, DC, 4.137 US Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing,” 1 November 2007. http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/briefingslide/317/071101-D-6570C-005.jpg (accessed 29 January 2008); Michael O’Hanlon and Jason Campbell, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 21 December 2007, 17. https://www.brookings.edu/saban/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index20071221.pdf (accessed 3 January 2008). 138 Quoted in Bobby Ghosh, “The Enemy’s New Tools in Iraq,” Time, 14 June 2007, 5. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1633081-2,00.html (accessed 28 January 2008).
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President Bush endorsed the NSC troop surge recommendation and subsequently
authorized its implementation in mid-January. Specifically, the surge called for two
additional Marine Corps reinforced battalions (4,000 Marines) to clear out al-Qaeda and
Sunni terrorists in Anbar province and five additional US Army brigades to reinforce
units (Coalition and ISF) already in Baghdad – for an increase of 21,000 troops and a
total of approximately 160,000 US forces in Iraq. Also, additional US forces were to be
embedded with ISF units throughout Iraq. In his address, the President also established a
special congressional advisory council on the War on Terror and asked for authorization
to increase the size of the active duty Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 Soldiers and
Marines.
President Bush also encouraged establishing strategic partnerships with moderates
in Iraq, be they Sunnis, Shias, or Kurds. He redefined the enemy as extremists of all
139 Quoted in Bobby Ghosh, “The Enemy’s New Tools in Iraq,” Time, 14 June 2007, 5. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1633081-2,00.html (accessed 28 January 2008).140 “Iraq: UN Calls for Immediate Action to Free Kidnapped Education Ministry Workers,” UN News Centre, 14 November 2006, 1. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20593 (accessed 30 January 2008).141 Lieutenant General Michael Maples, “The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 November 2006, 5. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=2427 (accessed 29 January 2008). 142 General Michael Hayden, “The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 November 2006, 4. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=2427 (accessed 29 January 2008); Quoted in Sara Wood, “Failure in Iraq Would Affect Region, World, Intel Officials Say,” American Forces Press Service, 16 November 2006, 1. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2142 (accessed 30 January 2008).143 Lieutenant General Michael Maples, “The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 November 2006, 3. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=2427 (accessed 29 January 2008). 144 Admiral William Fallon, “2007 Posture of the United States Central Command,” 3 May 2007, 4. http://www.centcom.mil/en/posture-statement/2.html (accessed 17 November 2007). 145 Ahmed Hashim, “Universal Adversary Order of Battle: Disaggregating the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq,” unpublished manuscript received 8 January 2008 and on file at the US Army Combat Studies Institute, 1-6.146 Ahmed Hashim, “Universal Adversary Order of Battle: Disaggregating the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq,” unpublished manuscript received 8 January 2008 and on file at the US Army Combat Studies Institute, 6-10.
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sorts, noting in particular Shia extremists supported by Iran and Sunni extremists assisted
by AQI terrorists intent on forming an Iraqi caliphate. By 2007, the conflict in Iraq had
become one more of moderates vs. extremists, rather than simply Sunnis vs. Shias.
Additionally, continuing Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs led the President to order an
increase in operations against Iranians who were aiding and abetting extremists groups
inside Iraq.155 The United State’s strategic goal in Iraq never changed: A unified
democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an
ally in the War on Terror. Administration officials and Coalition commanders did,
however, sharpen several key objectives in this new 2007 phase of OIF:
Defeat al-Qaeda and its supporters and ensure that no safe haven exists in Iraq,
Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and regain control over the capital,
148 General Michael Hayden, “The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 November 2006, 4. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=2427 (accessed 29 January 2008).149 General George Casey, “Pentagon Press Briefing,” 21 June 2006, 9-10. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1233&Itemid=128 (accessed 20 February 2008); General David Petraeus, “Opening Remarks to Congress,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee attended in-person by Dr. Peter Connors, 11 September 2007; General David Petraeus, “Opening Remarks to Congress: Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq,” 11 September 2007, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13963&Itemid=128 (accessed 19 February 2008); Sean Naylor, “Iran Deeply Involved in Iraq, Petraeus Says,” Army Times, 25 May 2007, 1. http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/05/military_petraeus_iran_070523w/ (accessed 5 December 2007). 150 Brigadier General Michael Milano quoted in Patrick Quinn, “Extremists Attack Baghdad’s Green Zone”, Kansas City Star, 24 February 2008, A16. 151 Kimberly Kagan, “Iraq Report: Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” The Institute for the Study of War, May 2006-August 2007, 1-32. www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/IraqReport06.2.pdf (accessed 15 January 2008). 152 President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address – 2007,” 23 January 2007, 5. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070123-2.html (accessed 6 February 2008).153 “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials,” 10 January 2007, 1-16. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-1.html (accessed 6 February 2007).154 “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” National Security Council, January 2007, 6. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf (accessed 6 February 2008).155 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq,” 10 January 2007, 1-3. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-3.html (accessed 6 February 2008).
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Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter destructive Iranian and Syrian activity in Iraq,
Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong democratic institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and preventing the return of the forces of tyranny,
Foster the conditions for Iraq national reconciliation with the Iraqi Government clearly in the lead,
Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government.156
One year later, President Bush reassessed the enemy situation in Iraq and reflected on his
decision to authorize the troop surge:
In Iraq, the terrorists and extremists are fighting to deny a proud people their liberty, and fighting to establish safe havens for attacks across the world. One year ago, our enemies were succeeding in their efforts to plunge Iraq into chaos. So we reviewed our strategy and changed course. We launched a surge of American forces into Iraq. We gave our troops a new mission: Work with the Iraqi forces to protect the Iraqi people, pursue the enemy in its strongholds, and deny the terrorists sanctuary anywhere in the country.157
In January 2007, however, the hostile environment in Iraq aroused a growing sense
of despair and hopelessness among the Iraqi people. Relentless violence persisted led by
Sunni insurgents, Shia militias, and AQI, all of whom actively resisted the US presence
in Iraq. Unabated clashes and inevitable reprisals between Sunnis and Shias were, by this
time, fundamental threats to peace and stability in the country. Clearly something had to
be done to prevent further deterioration of conditions in Iraq and to preclude a potential
Iraqi government breakdown. Would a surge in US troop strength be the answer? 156 “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” National Security Council, January 2007, 8. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf (accessed 6 February 2008).157 President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address – 2008, 28 January 2008, 6. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128-13.html (accessed 6 February 2008).
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How did Coalition forces fight the Iraqi insurgency in 2005 and 2006? Was “clear,
hold, and build” a successful strategy? Which counterinsurgency tactics worked and
which did not? Overall, coalition efforts fell short of detering the insurgency in Iraq,
despite heroic efforts. Likewise, continued progress on the Iraqi political front was not
sufficient to restrain the ongoing violence. In the United States, the will of the American
people to continue the fight in Iraq was wanning. Also, training Iraqi forces had become
a time-consuming, burdensome, process, and those units that were adequately trained
could not, on their own, stem the violence. A shift in strategy was necessary – a shift to
an updated strategy that placed primary emphasis on ensuring long-term security for
Iraqi citizens, particularly those in Baghdad.
62