Asia Report, Nr. 20: Central Asia - Fault Lines in the New Security … · 2016-05-04 · ICG Asia...

CENTRAL ASIA:

FAULT LINES IN THE NEW SECURITY MAP

4 July 2001

ICG Asia Report No 20Osh/Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA...................................................................................................... i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................ ii

I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................1

II. APPROACHES TO SECURITY: THREAT PERCEPTIONS...............................2A. Uzbekistan: Seeking Order in a Dangerous Neighbourhood.............................3B. Kyrgyzstan: Accidental Target of Islamist Militancy........................................4C. Tajikistan: Containing the Chaos Left by the Civil War ...................................7

III. MILITARY CAPABILITIES...................................................................................10A. Uzbekistan: Building a Regional Power ..........................................................10B. Kyrgyzstan: Mustering Limited Resources .....................................................10C. Tajikistan: Under Russia’s Wing.....................................................................11

IV. PROBLEMS WITH REGIONAL COOPERATION.............................................13A. Incompatible Threat Perceptions .....................................................................13B. Incompatible Political Systems and Domestic Environments .........................15

V. OTHER REGIONAL ACTORS...............................................................................16A. Kazakhstan: A Regional Power in Russia’s Underbelly..................................16B. Turkmenistan: Going It Alone .........................................................................17C. The Russian Federation: Ambivalent Sphere of Influence ..............................17D. China: Stability Above All...............................................................................18E. Afghanistan: Source of Instability ...................................................................18

VI. REGIONAL COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES.......................................................19A. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) ...........................................19B. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation ................................................................20C. External Support ..............................................................................................21

V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................23

APPENDICES

A. The Central Asian Republics At a Glance .......................................................24B. Glossary of Acronyms .....................................................................................25C. About the International Crisis Group...............................................................26D. ICG Reports and Briefing Papers ....................................................................27E. ICG Board Members........................................................................................30

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ICG Asia Report No 20 4 July 2001

CENTRAL ASIA:


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, theindependent states that emerged in Central Asiahad to begin almost from scratch in building bothmilitary forces and security strategies. Theunified position of the USSR was soon replacedby sharply divergent security arrangements,corresponding to the different strategic interestsand paths of development of these new states. Asa result, there has been more confrontation thancooperation. This is particularly true of the threestates that are the focus of this report:Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

There are three ongoing military confrontationsin the region. First, in Afghanistan the Talibanmovement controls more than 90 per cent of thecountry and is fighting against the United Frontto control the remaining territory. Secondly,Islamist rebels based in Afghanistan have beenfighting to overturn the government ofUzbekistan and their incursions have spilled overinto Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Thirdly, inTajikistan although the peace process there haslargely achieved an end to conflict, some armedgroups continue hostilities from within poorlycontrolled parts of the country, including even theoutskirts of the capital Dushanbe, or from theterritory of Uzbekistan. These security problemssuppress economic development and discouragethe countries from embarking on much-neededpolitical reforms.

The Central Asian states have made high-profilemoves toward cooperative regional securitystructures in which outside powers most oftenplay the leadership role, notably the CIS

Collective Security Treaty led by Russia, andmore recently the Shanghai CooperationOrganisation led by China and Russia. Withinthese frameworks, concrete steps toward securitycooperation and joint action on the ground haveamounted to very little. The will and the financialresources needed to implement cooperation havenot been forthcoming, and in some cases maysimply not exist. The stark fact remains that theCentral Asian states have not cooperated wellwith one another, either because they have notmade it a high priority or because they haveperceived it to be in their interest not to do so.

Indeed, rather than cooperating, the Central Asianstates in the post-Soviet decade have engaged in aseries of serious violations of one another’ssecurity interests. The list of points of contentionhas only grown following the increase in Islamistmilitancy in 1999. Uzbekistan allowed orsupported armed incursions into Tajikistan andharboured dissidents whom Tajikistan accuses oftreason. Tajikistan likewise permitted thepresence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(IMU) on its territory, from where it hasconducted repeated incursions into Uzbekistan.While supposedly searching for IMU targets,Uzbekistan bombed Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,causing numerous civilian casualties. Uzbekistanmined undemarcated borders between it and theother two countries, resulting in dozens offatalities. Uzbekistan also tried to force territorialconcessions from some of its neighbours andunilaterally took control of territories to which ithas a marginal claim. In response to Uzbekistan’sactions on the borders, Kyrgyz officials

Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security MapICG Asia Report N° 20, 4 July 2001 Page iii

threatened to reclaim territories that were cededto Uzbekistan in the early Soviet period.

No outside power is sufficiently interested in theregion to make major investments in its security.Their interests are often very limited, focusing onthe potential of this region to propagateinstability in “more important” areas through thedrug trade or the spread of Islamist radicalism.Each also has certain special concerns. U.S.involvement has been partially aimed atstrengthening the capacity and independence ofthe Central Asian states, with the goal ofreducing Russia’s influence, but other U.S.policies have given priority to particularcountries, which has undermined regionalcooperation. Russia’s policy has been orientedtoward maintaining its influence in the region asa means of protecting its security interests. Thishas also resulted in regional divisions, where, forexample, Uzbekistan resists Russian involvementand Tajikistan embraces it. China’s interests inthe region focus around preventing Central Asiannations from being used as a base for Uyghurgroups seeking an independent homeland inXinjiang province. Little regard has been paid tothe broader spectrum of security concerns ofCentral Asian states themselves. As aconsequence, multilateral arrangements havegenerally proven ineffective, and virtually allrelations — cooperative or confrontational —operate mostly on a bilateral basis.

Chronic shortages of resources and a verycomplex regional security environment —wedged between two major powers and sittingnext to one of the most unstable countries in theworld — will remain facts of life for the CentralAsian states. This makes it essential that thesestates give priority to improving intra-regionalrelations and finding common ground for closercooperation. These nations have tended toexaggerate the threats from their neighbours andfrom exiled militant groups while paying toolittle attention to issues such as human rightsabuses, repression of religious freedom andpoverty that all foment unrest at home. Nooutside actor is in a position to resolve any of themajor security problems of the region, yet theengagement of outside governments andinternational organisations can play a vital role infacilitating the building of effective institutionsand reducing some of the major risks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Central Asian Governments:

1. Governments should give the highestpriority to boosting regional cooperation,while avoiding unilateral measures aimed atpressuring or undermining the stability oftheir neighbours such as border closures orcross-border incursions.

2. Governments should reinvigorate jointborder commissions and the multilateralapproaches to border disputes that havebeen successful in solving frontier disputeswith China. There should be no attempt tochange borders by unilateral demarcation.

3. The Central Asian countries should form aregional security structure that includesthem alone and that begins with the modestgoals of information sharing, coordinationof security initiatives and confidencebuilding.

4. Tajikistan should disarm and integratethose field commanders who do not have arole in the coalition government so as toreduce the risk of its territory being used inattacks against its neighbours.

5. Uzbekistan should prevent low-levelofficials in the border control, police andsecurity services from harassing andextorting bribes from people crossingborders or travelling in the country.

6. Governments should work to reducegrievances of their own minorities andavoid intensifying problems with minoritiesin neighbouring countries.

7. Governments should foster moreprofessional, less corrupt armed forces byboosting civilian controls and oversight,enhancing command structures andimproving training.

8. Governments should rationalise theirmilitaries to ensure that troop numbers donot exceed what can be paid for undercurrent budgets and should improveconditions for service personnel.

Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security MapICG Asia Report N° 20, 4 July 2001 Page iv

To External Governments:

9. NATO members and other donors shouldexpand Partnership for Peace and othermilitary exchange and education programsto foster military discipline,professionalism, and observance of conflictprevention principles.

10. European nations, the U.S. and Japanshould carry the strong and consistentmessage that stability depends onguaranteeing human rights and religiousfreedom and give no security assistance togovernments that undermine regionalsecurity by abusing human rights.

Brussels/Osh, 4 July 2001

ICG Asia Report No 20 4 July 2001

CENTRAL ASIA:


I. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union left afragmented security system in Central Asia thatwas divided among the five new states thatemerged there. In 1992, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan beganplanning their own security systems based onremnants of the Soviet military that werehaphazardly scattered across the region. Thesehad been originally developed to defend a singlecountry from a different set of threats and werebuilt with the expectation of a continuing flow ofsupplies, personnel and direction from other partsof the Soviet Union. Military production facilitiesin Central Asia generally contributed only partsto systems that were assembled in the core of theSoviet Union. Similarly, the fragments of themilitary left on the territories of these countrieswere often useless and unstable. In thesubsequent nine years, the Central Asian stateshave struggled to develop infrastructure, trainpersonnel and increase preparedness. Thesenations have also redrawn the military map of theregion as they have defined their new securityconcerns.

The security arrangements of these new stateshave turned out to be as much a reaction tochallenges from one another as from commonthreats from outside the region. Despite a greatdeal of fanfare from their leaders about newlyformed cooperative security arrangements, inreality there is very little will — indeed, oftenvery little basis — for cooperation among thesestates. Some of the obstacles to cooperation stemfrom factors that may diminish with time, such as

the process of establishing sovereignty or theassertiveness of individual leaders, whereasothers may be expected to grow, such asdifferences in political systems and economicstrength.

This report surveys the differing and sometimescontradictory security needs of the three CentralAsian states that ICG assesses as most at risk ofconflict, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan(Part II), the growing military capacities of thesethree states (Part III), the elements of the broadersecurity environment (Parts IV and V), and theattempts to date to adopt a coordinated regionalapproach to security (Part VI).

Each of the countries has been struggling to buildits military capacity. All face considerableobstacles, not least of which are their weakeconomies and competing priorities. Uzbekistanhas made the greatest investment in the military,the security services and border controls.Tajikistan’s military is largely a product of thecivil war, with the former pro-government andUnited Tajik Opposition (UTO) militiascomposing a now largely unified force.Kyrgyzstan invested only a small sum in itsmilitary and border guards until the shock ofincursions by militant Islamists in 1999.1

It has only been in response to the growingregional threat of Islamist militancy that securitycooperation has really come onto the agenda. Yetconflicting approaches and interests undermine

1 See: Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation and RegionalSecurity, ICG Asia Report, No. 14, 1 March 2001. AllICG reports are available at: http://www.crisisweb.org/.

Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security MapICG Asia Report N° 20, 4 July 2001 Page 2

the impulse to build collective security. Theabsence of effective structures for regionalsecurity cooperation means that issues are notdealt with and problems could grow, leading to awider destabilisation of the region. This risk ofinstability has drawn some concern from Russia,the U.S. and China, which have become engagedon a bilateral or multilateral basis to reinforce thesecurity of Central Asian states.

The extent to which these powers are willing andable to assist in ensuring stability is limited. U.S.security interests in the region are dominated byconcerns about terrorism being spread under thesponsorship of the Taliban regime inAfghanistan, as well as the possibility of a broaddeterioration of regional security due to Islamistmilitancy. This is the main concern for Russiaalthough it also views the region as a potentialsphere of influence. Some Russian strategicthinkers consider that the old boundaries of theformer Soviet Union form a more natural line ofdefence than Russia’s long and open border withKazakhstan.

Russia’s strategic interests are also tied tohistorical and economic interests in the regionand the presence of large Russian diaspora,particularly in Kazakhstan, where Russiansconstitute one of the largest components of thepopulation. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are bothgeographically removed, and while Russia is animportant trading partner for them, their trade isnot particularly significant for Russia. WhileRussian troops and border guards have beenwithdrawn from almost all of the former Sovietrepublics, they maintain a significant presence inTajikistan where they played a crucial role instabilising parts of the country following theoutbreak of civil war in 1992.

China’s security interests in the region are adesire for general stability so that it can reduce itstroop levels on its western frontier and acommitment from the Central Asian governmentsto prevent Uyghur separatists carrying outincursion or smuggling arms into the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region.

II. APPROACHES TO SECURITY:THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Since independence, each of the Central Asianstates has followed a very different path,widening divisions that were minor when theywere first transformed from Soviet republics.Gradually, rifts have emerged, stemming fromdivergent circumstances, resources, perceptions,and approaches.

The issue of politicised Islam, for example,stands as a challenge in each country butperceptions and approaches are not only differentbut mutually incompatible. In Tajikistan, formeropposition Islamists have been brought into theregime, setting a precedent and giving Islamism acredibility that causes uneasiness in neighbouringstates. In Uzbekistan, there is no officiallyaccepted role for Islamist politics, and thousandsof people who have a different view have beenarrested -- driving those with this orientationunderground, into exile, and increasingly towardradical militancy. Kyrgyzstan sharesUzbekistan’s impulse to contain Islamism, but atthe same time recognises that a mountingcrackdown on political opposition by itsneighbour will feed the radicalism that mightdirectly threaten Kyrgyzstan.

Similarly, all three countries remain heavilydependent on Russia as their main source ofarms, but each country has a different vision ofRussia’s role. Uzbekistan has been outspokenlyresistant to Russian involvement, whileKyrgyzstan has resisted Russia’s direct presencewhile maintaining close links, and Tajikistan hasenjoyed the status almost of a Russian client statewith a heavy military presence and close tiesbetween the Russian military and the Tajikgovernment. All countries have been offered anoutstretched hand by the U.S., which seeks towean them away from Russian dominance.Uzbekistan has taken U.S. aid enthusiastically,while Tajikistan has hesitated strongly, due toRussian displeasure. Kyrgyzstan sent its ForeignMinister to the NATO anniversary summit in1999 while simultaneously supporting Russia’s


condemnation of the NATO bombing campaignin Serbia.2

A. UZBEKISTAN: SEEKING ORDER IN ADANGEROUS NEIGHBOURHOOD

Uzbekistan has borders with five countries, eachpresenting different security challenges. Few ofthese are ‘natural’ geographic borders andvirtually none make readily defensible frontiers.Only its short southern boundary withAfghanistan was fortified during Soviet timeswith the remainder generally not even properlydemarcated; now most of the country’s perimeteris coming to be fortified though not alwaysmutually demarcated with its neighbours.

Much has been made of the threat thatAfghanistan poses to Uzbekistan and itsneighbours, with some predicting that, if theTaliban gains control of the north of the country,they can be expected to continue their battlenorthward. The recent contacts which Uzbekistanhas made with the Taliban suggest either thatthey do not actually perceive such a threat, orthey are seeking to negotiate it away.3Meanwhile, the more likely short- to medium-term risks stem from the possibility of a flood ofrefugees if the Taliban conquer the northernterritories, and especially from the use of Afghanterritories as a staging area for incursions intoUzbekistan by that country’s own militants.

On the borders with Uzbekistan’s four otherneighbours, the greatest security threats comefrom the unilateral actions — most often byUzbekistan — to fortify the frontier. This hasresulted in a growing catalogue of incidentsranging from shootings to mine explosions.

A more fundamental challenge derives from theweakness of neighbouring states, particularlyTajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which makesUzbekistan vulnerable to spillover effects.Uzbekistan has taken steps to isolate itself fromTajikistan’s civil war. There are also concernsabout the possible repetition of the outbreaks of

2 ‘Kyrgyz Foreign Minister attends NATO 50thanniversary summit,’ Vechernyi Bishkek, 22 April 1999,p. 5, cited by BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit.3 Central Asia Briefing: Recent Violence: Causes andConsequences, ICG Briefing Paper. 18 October 2000Osh/Brussels, p. 9.

inter-ethnic violence which occurred in 1990between Uzbek and Kyrgyz inhabitants ofKyrgyzstan’s southern territories. Such violencecould spark inter-ethnic and inter-stateconfrontations in the heart of the FerghanaValley, which runs through these three countries.Russia’s continued military role in the region hasprompted additional concern and led Tashkent tosever some ties with Moscow. Most notably, in1999 Uzbekistan dropped out of the CISCollective Security Treaty (CST) and joined theCIS subgroup, GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine,Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), whichconstitutes a counterbalance to Russia’s dominantinfluence within the CIS.

A much more immediate security concern in thecountry is the possibility of domestic oppositionturning to militant action to topple thegovernment. As opposition political parties hadall been repressed or gone into exile in the early1990s, in the latter part of the decade oppositionbecame channelled increasingly throughunderground Islamist movements. On numerousoccasions President Karimov declared that thecountry was seriously threatened by Islamicfundamentalists.4 In response to that perceivedthreat, the authorities launched a broad campaignto apprehend anyone suspected of involvement inor sympathy with any religious oppositionmovement.5 The Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan, (IMU), which has stated its aim toestablish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan throughforce, is considered the most dangerous Islamistmovement.

The IMU fighters number only 2,000-3,000, notall of whom were even engaged in the recenthostilities. The actual impact of their incursions isquite limited and they are not likely to topple theregime soon. But the actions of the IMU havedealt a blow to the government’s prestige as well

4 ITAR-TASS, 14 April 1999 and 15 June 2000; SanobarShermatova, ‘Alliance against the Wahhabis: IslamKarimov secures the support of the Kremlin in the fightagainst Islamic Fundamentalists on the southern flank ofthe CIS,” Moskovskie novosti, no. 18, 10-17 May 1998,cited in FBIS-SOV-98-148, article ID:drsov05281998001145, document ID:0etw144p02u9gqz.5 Pannier, Bruce, ‘Uzbekistan,’ in Ustina Markus andDaniel Nelson, eds., Brassey’s Eurasian SecurityYearbook, 2001 (Dulles, Va.: Brassey’s, forthcoming in2001).


as its image as an invincible keeper of order. Allindications point to a likelihood of newincursions in 2001 on a larger scale and withenhanced military force. These developmentshave served to focus international attention on theproblem of Islamist militancy in the region. Someofficials in Uzbekistan’s neighbours argue,however, that the actual dangers posed have beenexaggerated to justify repression of all forms ofopposition and all non-approved Islamicorganisations.6

While Tashkent has stepped up security measuresto protect the country from an Islamist threat andjustifies its hard-line policies as a necessaryresponse to subversion, there is a generalconsensus among regional observers that theemergence of militant Islamist groups in theregion is a reaction to such policies, and that theyare the cause, not the solution, of the problem.The IMU did not spring up in TalibanAfghanistan, but in Uzbekistan. Tashkent’spolicy for dealing with any potential oppositionwas so forceful that by mid-1998, human rightsgroups such as Amnesty International, HelsinkiWatch, and the Centre for Monitoring CentralAsia were reporting that thousands of people hadbeen arrested on suspicion of subversiveactivities, often on very weak evidence. Thecountry report on human rights practices in 2000issued by the U.S. Department of State indicatedthat 63,000 people are now officially incarceratedin Uzbek prisons, and stories of abuse, tortureand forced confessions in jails are widespread.Talib Yakubov, the General Secretary of theHuman Rights Foundation in Uzbekistan believesthe number of prisoners is much higher than theofficial figure, placing the number at 300,000,and saying that at least 40 per cent of those canbe considered prisoners of conscience.7

6 Tsentral’no-Aziatskoe Agentstvo PoliticheskikhIssledovanii (API), Voenno-politicheskie konflikty vTsentral’noi Azii [Military-political conflicts in CentralAsia] (Almaty, 2000), pp. 53-58; In an interview with theGovernor of Batken Province, Mamat ZaribovichAibalaev on 17 April 2001, the governor said he believedthe IMU threat was greatly exaggerated. Many politicalobservers in Kyrgyzstan feel the Uzbekistan governmenthas been using the issue to justify increased control overthe media and other institutions.7 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy,Human Rights and Labor, Uzbekistan: Country Reportson Human Rights Practices, 2000 [online] (Washington,DC, February 2001), available at:

B. KYRGYZSTAN: ACCIDENTAL TARGETOF ISLAMIST MILITANCY

Prior to the first IMU incursions into southernKyrgyzstan in 1999, the government was sounconcerned by security risks that militarypreparedness was a very low priority. A fewissues loomed, but only as medium- to long-termconcerns, notably the risk of internal ethnicunrest and the unresolved border disputes thathad earlier led to tensions between the SovietUnion and China. In order to address the latter,the Shanghai Five in 1997 resolved most borderissues between China and its former Sovietneighbours (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstanand the Russian Federation).8

Most of the border with China lies in remote andunpopulated territory in some of the highestmountains in the world, and it seemed that thismatter could be dealt with easily until internalKyrgyz opposition to the agreement arose inrecent months following the revelation of a secretdeal under which Kyrgyzstan was obliged tomake major territorial concessions.9 SomeKyrgyz see China as threatening because itspopulation is 250 times larger than that ofKyrgyzstan. As a result, although China hasbecome a major trading partner with annual tradeturnover worth U.S.$177.6 million in 2000,10 and

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/index.cfm?docid+858; “Crackdown against Islam swellsUzbekistan’s prison population,” EurasiaNet [online](New York: OSI), 28 March 2001, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav032801.shtml. Other sources indicate that theconfirmed number of people arrested for politicalreasons is significantly fewer — in the range of 5,000 to10,000. All estimates are open to doubt because thegovernment does not allow organisations like the RedCross to access prisons. What is certain is thatUzbekistan is among the world’s top countries in termsof political detainees per capita. Also Central Asia:Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security. ICG ReportNo. 14 Osh Brussels. 1 March 2001.8 ‘Border agreements ratified,’ RFE/RL Newsline, 15May 1997.9 Some have speculated that Russia put pressure onKyrgyzstan to accept the burden of concessions whenRussia and Kyrgyzstan were together in the commonShanghai Five negotiating team.10 Kabar News Agency (Bishkek), ‘Central Asia: China-Central Asia: Problems in mutual trade can beovercome,” The Times of Central Asia [online](Bishkek), 3 April 2001, available at:http://www.times.kg/?D+print&aid+1015847.


there has been active development of transportlinks over the Tien Shan and Pamir mountains,there also has been some effort to restrict Chinesecitizens and interests in the country. Anotherirritant in relations stems from the presence of alarge Uyghur diaspora in Kyrgyzstan that Chinafears might support the separatists waging amilitant campaign in China.11 Kyrgyzstan,meanwhile, has willingly accommodated China’sdemand to suppress Uyghur oppositionists.12 Inall, there are over half a dozen Uyghur nationalistgroups active in the former Soviet Central Asianstates, particularly in Kazakhstan, but all of thegovernments have denied them any officialsupport and have sometimes cooperated withChina in suppressing their Uyghur minorities.13

Afghanistan, too, presents limited concerns forKyrgyzstan. Though there is no common border,the region’s major drug-trafficking route passesthrough mountainous eastern Tajikistan intosouthern Kyrgyzstan. Corruption, criminality,drug abuse and diseases are major concerns. As aby-product of the flow of opiates through thecountry, Kyrgyzstan is experiencing a sharpincrease in the number of drug users, which stoodat some 50,000 in 2000. Kyrgyzstan’s SecurityCouncil Chairman Bolot Januzakov has claimedthat IMU military chief Juma Namangani and hisfollowers controlled as much as 70 per cent of thedrugs going through the Ferghana.14 That claimcan be dismissed as propaganda since it wouldprovide the IMU with billions of dollars inrevenues, something which is not reflected intheir ability to mobilise a powerful fighting force.Nonetheless, it is widely believed that the rebelsare engaged in drug smuggling.

A more palpable threat to Kyrgyzstan’s securitystems from internal regional and ethnic tensions.

11 Interview with Prosecutor General of Narin Province,Talantbek Akyshov, 6 May 2001.12 The conviction in 2000 of several Uyghurs formysterious bombings which took place in Osh severalyears earlier are widely considered to be trumped upcases, but this action has been explained by localobservers as an accommodation to pressures from Chinato suppress possible separatist activity.13 Institute for Russia and China, Ekstremizm vTsentral’noi Azii [Extremism in Central Asia] (Almaty,2000).14 Kanai Manayev, ‘Narcotic flood threatens to washaway Central Asian stability,’ The Times of Central Asia[online] (Bishkek), 28 December 2000, available at:http://www.times.kg/ times.cgi?D=article&aid=1013664.

The 1990 clashes between ethnic Uzbek andKyrgyz inhabitants of the cities of Osh, Uzgenand Jalalabad left Bishkek with a lingeringconcern of renewed conflict. The FerghanaValley holds 51 per cent of the country’spopulation on 40 per cent of its territory. About30 per cent of inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan’ssouthern provinces are non-Kyrgyz. Uzbeks arethe largest minority at about a quarter of the totalpopulation while Russians and Tajiks make uparound 2-3 per cent each.

After Kyrgyz Batken was established as aseparate province from Osh in 1999, thepercentage of Uzbeks in the remaining part ofOsh Province became considerably higher.Statistics are not available for the number ofUzbeks in Osh Province after it was split, but it islikely to be at least a third of the population andpossibly as much as half.15

Until recently, in Kyrgyzstan’s ‘southern capitalcity’ of Osh the largest population group wasUzbek, though the balance has shifted in favourof Kyrgyz in the post-Soviet period. Tensionspersist between the two groups, though no majorclashes have occurred since the 1990 riotingwhich left at least 171 dead, and possibly over1,000.16 The Uzbeks believe they have beenincreasingly discriminated against sinceindependence, and indeed the overwhelmingnumbers of positions in governmentadministration in southern Kyrgyzstan are

15 Nancy Lubin and Barnett R. Rubin, Calming theFerghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in theHeart of Central Asia (New York: Century FoundationPress, 1999), p. 37; Grigory Pyaduhov, ‘Reform inKyrgyzstan as reflected in the mentality and behaviour ofthe non-titular population,’ in ContemporaryEthnopolitical and Migration Processes in Central Asia(Bishkek: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,1998), p. 174; The National Statistical Committee of theKyrgyz Republic, Results of the First NationalPopulation Census of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1999 [online](Bishkek, 2000), available at:http://nsc.bishkek.su/Eng/Home/Start.html.16 Official figures cite deaths of 120 Kyrgyz, 50 Uzbeksand one Russian (see Valery Tishkov, ‘“Don’t kill me,I’m Kyrgyz!”: An anthropological analysis of violence inthe Osh ethnic conflict,’ Journal of peace research, vol.32, no. 2, p. 134-35, 1995). According to unofficialsources cited by the UNDP/Kyrgyzstan, PreventiveDevelopment in the South of Kyrgyzstan, ‘Village LevelEarly Warning Report’ (September 2000) more than1,000 people were actually killed.


occupied by Kyrgyz.17 The police are almostexclusively Kyrgyz, as are judges and keyofficials. In Osh the small number of lawyerswho work as public defenders are all Uzbek andthey complain that their ethnic compatriots arediscriminated against by the local authorities,most of whom are Kyrgyz.18 While there is aprevailing sense that both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks aredoing their best to avoid another outbreak ofviolence, there is sufficient tension based ondiscrimination, differential access to resourcesand the memory of past conflict to make thereoccurrence of such clashes a distinctpossibility.19

Following the incursions by the IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan in 1999, instabilitygrowing out of militant Islamism virtuallyeclipsed all other security concerns. The activitiesof the IMU in Kyrgyzstan clearly represented adanger to the country, though not particularlybecause the IMU had any designs on bringingdown the government of Kyrgyzstan. Rather, theincursions unleashed a chain of events thatendangered Kyrgyzstan’s citizens and interests asmuch through their impact on perceptions ofstability and through Uzbekistan’s potential andactual reactions as through the IMU operationsthemselves.20

Although the IMU’s military chief Namanganihas not given any interviews, the political leader,Tahir Yuldash told the BBC in April 2000 thatthe IMU’s goal was to establish an Islamicemirate in the Ferghana Valley and to overthrow

17 Alisher Khamidov, ‘Frustration builds among Uzbeksin southern Kyrgyzstan,’ EurasiaNet Human Rights[online] (New York: OSI), 26 March 2001, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav032601.shtml.18 ICG interview with Makhmudov Sodykzhan, lawyerand representative of ‘Luch Solomon’ in Osh, December2000.19 Antonina Zakharova and Nick Megoran, ‘Osh tenyears on: Positive developments in ethnic relations,’Eurasia Insight (New York: OSI), 18 September 2000,available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091800.shtml.20 At an OSCE briefing in Osh on 2 March 2001, the UNRegional Coordinator for South Kyrgyzstan, Bruno deCordier, noted that people in Batken were more worriedabout how Uzbekistan would react if the IMU renewedits incursions than about the IMU itself.

Karimov’s regime in Uzbekistan.21 LikeNamangani and Yuldash, most of the IMU’srank-and-file is composed of Uzbeks who havefled to Tajikistan in order to avoid arrest inUzbekistan, which began a broad crackdown in1992-93 on Islamist activists.22 Those Uzbekshave close contacts with leaders of the UnitedTajik Opposition (UTO). For example,Namangani and Mirza Ziyayev, now TajikMinister of Emergency Situations, foughttogether against the government of Tajikistanbefore the 1997 peace accord.23

The IMU forces gathered in Tajikistan numbereda couple of thousand, including families. Theirpresence began to be a diplomatic issue betweenUzbekistan and Tajikistan, prompting pressuresto expel them which ultimately led to the IMU’sfirst incursions into Kyrgyzstan in August 1999.As part of a demobilisation of combatants in theTajik peace process, Namangani’s fighters werepressured to give up their arms.24 Uzbekistanresponded to the incursions with an offer to sendin troops, which Tajikistan declined. The Uzbekgovernment’s offer to send in its air forcereceived no public official reply before bombingraids were carried out. The bombs apparentlymissed their intended targets but causedcasualties among the civilian population andlivestock in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, sparkingofficial protests from both governments.25

In the aftermath of the 1999 incursions, the threegovernments declared their intention tocoordinate their response to new incursions more

21 API, Voenno-politicheskie konflikty…, p. 14.22 See Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation and RegionalSecurity, p. 2.23 Continued active support from former UTO membersto the IMU is denied. See ‘Mirzo Ziyoyev:“Representatives of the former UTO don’t fighting [sic]in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan”,’ Asia-Plus Blitz(Dushanbe), no. 576, 28 August 2000.24 Vitalii Strugvets, ‘U terrorizma net natsional’nosti[Terrorism has no nationality],’ Krasnaia zvezda(Moscow), 31 August 2001; Rafis Abazov and UstinaMarkus, ‘Kyrgyzstan: In search of a regional securitysystem,’ in Ustina Markus and Daniel Nelson, eds.,Brassey’s Eurasian & East European Security Yearbook,2000 (Dulles, Va.: Brassey’s, 2000), pp. 537-554. Achronology of IMU activity in 2000 through October canbe found in API, Voenno-politicheskie konflikty …,pp. 36-53.25 Bruce Pannier, ‘Kyrgyzstan: Uzbek militants’presence causes concern,’ RFE/RL Magazine, 31 August1999.


closely, but despite this, Kyrgyzstan refusedoffers of joint military operations when the IMUbegan fighting again in August 2000. Tensionsbetween Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan flared againwhen Uzbekistan imposed tight restrictions onborder crossings for Kyrgyzstan’s citizens andwent so far as to lay landmines in undemarcatedareas of their common border, resulting innumerous casualties.26

While it cannot be said that the IMU was widelywelcomed in Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan’s citizenswere not targeted by the IMU and some evenviewed the presence of the fighters favourably, asthey paid good prices for supplies and services inan otherwise dismal economy. Some Kyrgyzofficials say privately that Uzbekistan has soughtto take advantage of the IMU incursions tostrengthen its dominance in the region. MostWestern observers are sceptical of rumours thatthe Karimov government in Uzbekistan is itselfbehind the IMU but rather see thesedevelopments as playing into the hands of thosein Uzbekistan who favour greaterauthoritarianism, an increased role for the armyand security services and a wider regional role forthe country.

C. TAJIKISTAN: CONTAINING THE CHAOSLEFT BY THE CIVIL WAR

Unlike in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where themajor security concern is to avoid allowingIslamist movements to gain a foothold, inTajikistan such groups are already represented inthe government as a result of the peace accordwhich ended the civil war in 1997. In Dushanbe,the perception is that there is more to worry aboutfrom the actions of neighbouring Uzbekistan,than from the IMU, which has been allowed tokeep bases in the Tavildara District of Tajikistanintermittently. There is also awareness thatdespite the relatively uneventful elections in2000, the peace concluded in 1997 remainsprecarious. The government in Dushanbe has fewresources to expend on developing its economyas a way of defusing the threat of civil unrest, andin particular on reintegrating former combatants.It is also unable to build up its armed forces

26 Briefing by UN Regional Coordinator based inBatken, Bruno de Cordier, at the OSCE in Osh, 2 March2001.

sufficiently to guard its own border withAfghanistan, which is continuously crossed bynarcotics, arms and militants.

Russia maintains an ambivalent presence inTajikistan, with the 201st Motorised RifleDivision (MRD) stationed in the country alongwith a contingent of the Russian Border Guards.In Russia, there is little popular support for basesin Tajikistan and little interest in serving there,and it is only through generous commissions toRussian soldiers and local recruitment that forcescan be mustered.27 Though an agreement wassigned in 1999 that would allow Russia toestablish a larger long-term base, Moscow hasnot stepped up its military presence there.28

Although the 201st MRD supported Tajikistan’sPresident Emamali Rahmanov during thecountry’s civil war, there are concerns thatdependence on the large Russian militarypresence would ultimately mean de factooccupation. Many of Tajikistan’s citizens havebecome disillusioned with Russia’s peacekeepingforces, feeling that they give Moscow undueinfluence over the country. There is a widespreadbelief that Russia has profited from the country’sgold and precious stones, while denyingDushanbe any benefits from those assets. Inaddition, members of the Russian forces havebeen implicated in the burgeoning drug tradefrom Afghanistan.29

The most significant external threat is seen ascoming from Afghanistan, but not because theTaliban have designs on Tajik territory. Rather, itis the Taliban’s offensive against Ahmed Shah

27 ICG interview with senior Russian officer, Dushanbe,May 2000.28 Oleg Panfilov, ‘Russian military base in Khujand:Ambition or necessity?’ Eurasia Insight [online] (NewYork: OSI), 12 June 2000, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061200.shtml; Bruce Pannier,‘Russia/Tajikistan: Pact likely to bring mixed results,’RFE/RL Magazine [online] (Prague), 8 April 1999,available at:http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/04/f.ru.990408131051.html.29 Interview with Anton Surikov, Chief of Staff of StateDuma Committee on Industry, Construction andAdvanced Technology, in Moskovskiye novosti, 29 May2001.


Massoud and the United Front30 that could causeproblems for Tajikistan. The fighting has beentaking place along its border, and there is alwaysthe possibility that it could spill into Tajikistan ifMassoud, an ethnic Tajik, were to take refugethere. Dushanbe has itself been trying to maintaina non-confrontational relationship with theTaliban. Yet Russia’s pro-United Front policycomplicates Tajikistan’s non-confrontationalposition, since Moscow uses Tajikistan’s territoryto deliver weapons to Massoud. There areconcerns over where Massoud would go if hewere defeated, although most locals believe hewould take refuge in Iran, which has beensupportive of the United Front, rather thanTajikistan.

The fighting also causes a massive refugeeproblem. The September 2000 offensivereportedly drove a mass of 150,000 refugeestoward the border with Tajikistan.31 Tajikistan,facing a severe drought and struggling with itsown underdeveloped economy, turned down anurgent appeal from the UNHCR in January 2001to accept 10,000 refugees stranded on a borderisland in the Amu Darya.32

As in Kyrgyzstan, the drug trade emanating fromAfghanistan has overwhelming consequences forTajikistan. In 1999 Afghanistan became theworld’s largest producer of heroin and opium.Under pressure from the internationalcommunity, the Taliban has taken steps to endopium cultivation, and at the beginning of 2001 itwas reported that almost no poppies were beinggrown.33 Nonetheless, the stockpile of drugs inAfghanistan has ensured that drug smugglingwould continue to be a problem. The amount of

30 The United Front, a coalition of anti-Taliban,Mujaheddin forces, is sometimes also referred to as theNorthern Alliance,.31 ‘Up to 150,000 Afghan refugees head for Tajikistan,’Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 13 September 2000,available at:http://www.cacianalyst.org/Sept_13/news_bites_sept13.htm32 ‘Tajikistan rejects UNHCR plea to admit Afghanrefugees,’ Agence France-Presse (AFP), 24 January2001.33 James Callahan, Director of the U.S. StateDepartment’s Director of Asian and African narcoticsprograms, affirmed that the Taliban’s ban on poppycultivation has been 99 per cent effective (Sved TalatHussain, ‘US official praises Taliban’s measures: Poppyeradication,’ DAWN Internet Edition, 5 May 2001).

drugs confiscated in Tajikistan rose sharply fromthe late 1990s. In the first six months of 2000,740 kilograms of opium was seized. Apart fromthe confiscated narcotics, Tajikistan’s borderguards killed 30 drug smugglers over that sameperiod and arrested another 150. Officialsbelieved the drug trade had increased ten-foldfrom the previous year.34

While there has been little direct threat toTajikistan from the Taliban or IMU militants,there have been serious tensions with Uzbekistanover its policies for dealing with militants.Uzbekistan, with its much larger military,demanded that drastic action be taken against theIMU, and sent bombers to attack villages wherethe IMU was believed to be hiding.35 These raidsdamaged homes in both Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan, and also caused a number of fatalitiesand other casualties among the civilianpopulation. Both Dushanbe and Bishkekdemanded an explanation from Tashkent,indicating that the raids may not have beencleared by authorities in those two countries asUzbekistan claimed. Although Tajikistan did notbreak off relations with Uzbekistan over theincident, it further damaged their already strainedties.

These incidents revived the very serious tensionswhich arose in November 1998, when a dissidentarmy officer, Colonel Mahmud Khudaiberdiyev,led a large armed incursion into northernTajikistan. Rahmanov accused Uzbekistan ofsupporting this attack. Uzbekistan has alsoallegedly harboured Abdumalik Abdullajanov,former governor of Tajikistan’s northern SughdProvince (formerly Leninabad), and Rahmanov’sformer rival for the presidency, now wanted oncharges of treason for complicity inKhudaiberdiyev’s incursion. Periodic accusationsby President Karimov of Uzbekistan thatTajikistan has supported the IMU have also nothelped to alleviate strains in the relations.36

34 Erika Dailey, ‘Governmental and internationalresponses to human rights abuses at Tajikistan’s bordercrossings,’ EurasiaNet Human Rights [online] (NewYork: OSI), 15 March 2000, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/hrr051600.shtml.35 ‘Bombing raids on Tajikistan continue,’ RFE/RLNewsline, 6 October 1999.36 Marat Mamadshoyev, ‘After a brief thaw, new chillhits Tajik-Uzbek relations,’ Eurasia Insight [online]


In May 2000, under pressure from its neighbours,Tajikistan expelled the IMU from Tavildarawhere it had been based for several years. MirzaZiyayev, a leading UTO commander who becamethe Minister for Emergency Situations in thepost-1997 power-sharing government, has closelinks with the IMU militants from the time ofTajikistan’s civil war. He negotiated withNamangani to leave Tajikistan, ultimatelyescorting the militants to Afghanistan.37

However, this did little to quell Uzbekistan’scriticism. Karimov saw the failure to apprehendthe militants as an indication that Dushanbe wasindeed protecting his opponents.

The IMU did not remain in Afghanistan long.They reportedly cooperated with the Taliban inoperations against Massoud, but soon renewedtheir incursions into the Ferghana in August2000. Uzbekistan responded with renewed vigourand began mining its borders with Tajikistan andKyrgyzstan, claiming that the action wasnecessary because its weaker neighbours wereincapable of controlling their borders. Dushanbeagain complained. By February 2001, some 30civilians and much livestock had been killed bymines.

Tajikistan is also unhappy about Kyrgyzstan’sborder activities. Not only has Kyrgyzstan minedits frontiers with Tajikistan, but it has also blownup mountain passes to make them impenetrable.38

The relationship between Dushanbe and Bishkekhas been a nervous one since Tajikistan’s civilwar, when Kyrgyzstan was concerned by theprospect that the conflict could spill onto Kyrgyzterritory, and in fact was the recipient ofsignificant numbers of refugees. The prominentrole of Islamists in the government of Tajikistan

(New York: OSI), 20 October 2000, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav102000.shtml; NizomiZamon, ‘Is Juma Namangani a trump card in amysterious geopolitical game?’ Eurasia Insight [online](New York: OSI), 8 February 2001, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020801.shtml.37 Asad Sadulloyev, ‘“SOS”: “‘Jaga” is going out,’Central Asian News from Ferghana.Ru [online] 2February 2001, available at:http://www.ferghana.ru/news/english.html.38 ‘Nuzhen li Tsentral’noi Azii “poias bezopasnosti”?[Does Central Asia need a ‘security belt’?],’ MoskovskiiKomsomolets, 15-22 March 2001.

is a matter of concern for Bishkek, as are thecontinued political rifts that sometimes lead toshootouts and assassinations. Bishkek has beeninclined to insulate itself from Tajikistan, ratherthan pursue cooperation. Kyrgyzstan’s latestactions to curb IMU incursions from Tajikterritory have pushed the two countries furtherapart, and these events, rather than prompting aunited front against Uzbekistan’s domination,have deepened the rifts between the CentralAsian states.39

39 API, Voenno-politicheskie konflikty…, pp. 76-79.


III. MILITARY CAPABILITIES

While the Central Asian countries may haveadopted different political and economicstrategies, all countries have expanded theirmilitary capabilities in recent years. Most of themilitary capacity has been oriented towardsthreats not from outside the region, but fromneighbouring Central Asian countries and fromdomestic sources.

A. UZBEKISTAN: BUILDING A REGIONALPOWER

Uzbekistan’s military machine is considered themost potent and capable in the region. Withreserves, Tashkent can muster a force of almost130,000. Active forces amount to some 80,000 —50,000 in the Army, 9,100 in the Air Force,18,000 in Interior Ministry units, and 1,000 in theNational Guard.40 In February 2000, the NationalSecurity Council approved a new militarydoctrine which aimed to adapt the country’sarmed forces and paramilitary forces to respondto the new threats facing the region stemmingfrom criminal organisations and extremistmovements. In practice, that meant Uzbekistan’sforces would be trained in anti-terroristoperations, and would be organised into mobile,rapid reaction units.

While the officer corps had been overwhelminglyRussian when the country gained independence,less than 20 per cent of current officers are nownon-Uzbek, and almost all generals are ethnicUzbeks. Like other state institutions in thecountry, the Defence Ministry is beholden toPresident Karimov who appoints top-levelofficials and has the final word on policydecisions. In 2000, Kadir Ghulamov, a civilian,replaced Lieutenant General Yuri Agzamov asMinister of Defence in September 2000, and thepress reported that measures were being taken toenhance the military’s effectiveness. Among thereforms was a stricter separation of the military’sadministrative and operational organs. TheDefence Minister was to be responsible for themilitary’s administration, while the Unified

40 International Institute for Strategic Studies, TheMilitary Balance, 2000/2001 (Oxford, UK: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001), p. 177.

Armed Forces Staff, made up of senior militarycommanders, was to be responsible foroperational and strategic planning. The staff wasto assume control over all of the country’smilitary and paramilitary units, including troopsfrom the Border Guard, the Interior Ministry andthe Ministry of Emergencies.41

Despite Tashkent’s decision in 1999 not to renewits membership in the CIS Collective SecurityTreaty, Moscow continued to be an importantsecurity partner. In 2000 an agreement wassigned with Russia to upgrade Uzbekistan’s airdefence system. Russia also agreed to providesniper and officer training, and Tashkent remainsdependent on Moscow for the maintenance andsupply of military hardware.42

The military is regularly extolled by Uzbekistan’sgovernment-controlled media and negativereports are not disseminated. The only person toviolate this policy was President Karimov himselfwhen he criticised the military’s performanceagainst the IMU in 2000.43 Despite the positivecoverage, there is evidence that the armed forcesare plagued with the same problems of hazing,lack of equipment, poor morale and corruption asother post-Soviet militaries. As a result, militaryservice is viewed with more dread than pride bymany in the country.44

B. KYRGYZSTAN: MUSTERING LIMITEDRESOURCES

The country’s limited resources constrain howmuch the armed forces can be built up, but the

41 ‘Radikal’nye voennye reformy v Uzbekistane [Radicalmilitary reforms in Uzbekistan],’ Nezavisimaia gazeta(Moscow), 11 October 2000; Interfax, 29 September2000.42 Galina Zhukova, ‘Civilian takes charge of UzbekArmy,’ Reporting Central Asia [online], No. 25, 18October 2000 (London: Institute for War and PeaceReporting), available at:http://www.iwpr.net/archive/rca/rca_200010_25_3_eng.txt.43 Charles Fairbanks et al, The Strategic Assessment ofCentral Asia (Washington DC: The Atlantic Council andCentral Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2001), pp. 53-56.44 Jennifer Balfour, ‘Many families fear for sons’ safetyin Uzbek military,’ Eurasia Insight [online] (New York:OSI), 15 June 2001, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061501.shtml.


defence budget was doubled over two years froma mere U.S.$14 million in 1999 to U.S.$29million in 2001.45 Most of the funds areearmarked for improving and acquiring betterequipment rather than expanding the size of themilitary. Kyrgyzstan had in 2000 approximately20,000 troops in all of its military andparamilitary formations. The Interior Ministryaccounted for 3,000 of these; the National Guard,1,500; the Ministry for Emergencies and CivilDefence, 2,000; and the Ministry for NationalDefence, 1,000. The remaining 12,500 troopsbelong to the armed forces with almost 10,000 inthe Army and the remainder in the Air Force.46

Although the military wanted to change thebalance between conscripts and contract soldiers,increasing the percentage of the latter to 60 percent, in reality at the end of 2000 over 97 per centof the servicemen were still conscripts.47 In thefighting against the IMU, troops from all militaryand paramilitary organisations were used,including the Defence Ministry, Interior Ministryand Ministry for Emergencies.48

That small military was beset by moraleproblems and was not effective. President AskarAkaev had not made the military a priority in thefirst years of independence owing to its roleduring the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow.As a result, Kyrgyzstan was slow in setting up anational Ministry of Defence and its annualbudget until 1999 was miserly. During the 1999militant incursions, the government undertook abroad mobilisation including pleas throughnewspapers for volunteers, underlining howunderstaffed the military was. This resulted in anoverreaction, and in fact the army did not havethe capacity to train and manage the rapidlyenlarged ranks.49 Reports in the press in 2001mentioned that the military had been pressingpeople into the armed forces, using unlawfulrecruiting methods. That did not help esprit decorps, which already suffered from poor

45 ICG interview with U.S. defence attaché toKyrgyzstan, March 2001; IISS The Military Balance,2000/2001, p. 172.46 API, Voenno-politicheskie konflikty…, pp. 62-65.47 ICG interview with U.S. defence attaché, March 2001.48 Kanai Manaev, ‘Combating terrorism in Kyrgyzstan,’The Times of Central Asia [online] (Bishkek), 10 August2000, available at: http://www.times.kg/times.cgi?D=article&aid=1012714.49 ICG interview with official in the security service forsouthern Kyrgyzstan, June 2001.

provisioning and equipment and other problemscommon to post-Soviet militaries. Contractsoldiers were being paid 2,000-2,500 söms in2000, or about U.S.$50 per month and that sumwas due to double in 2001. Soldiers complainedthat they were paid only partially or not at all.Key counter-terrorist operations are carried outby contract soldiers.50

The military was not well-armed when the 1999conflicts erupted. Despite aid from foreigncountries and a large increase in the country’sown defence spending, it remains poorlyequipped. The army had insufficient MI-8 andMI-24 helicopters to ensure that enough troopscould be airlifted if there were coordinatedattacks on several areas at once. The Air Forcewas effectively non-existent as none of thebombers or fighters among the 50 planesinherited from the Soviet Union were operational.The helicopter force was also in poor condition,with dated equipment in constant need of repair.51

C. TAJIKISTAN: UNDER RUSSIA’S WING

Tajikistan had the smallest military of the CentralAsian republics, although its civil war has leftarms in the hands of many in the widerpopulation. The peace process was meant toproduce a unified army integrating bothgovernment and opposition forces. This hasmeant that some units owe their loyalty more tocivil war commanders than the government and itis difficult to assess how much Dushanbe cancount on them to follow orders.

Few consider President Emamali Rahmanov tohave much of the country under his control;indeed he is often brushed off as “the mayor ofDushanbe.” Since the UTO were officiallyallocated 30 per cent of government positions,52

50 Svetlana Suslova, ‘Kyrgyz press gangs,’ IPWRReporting Central Asia [online], no. 40, 15 February2001, available at:http://www.iwpr.net/archive/rca/rca_200102_40_5_eng.txt51 Igor Grebenshchikov ‘Kyrgyz army in crisis,’Reporting Central Asia [online], No. 44, 14 March 2001,available at:http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200103_44_2_eng.txt; API, Voenno-politicheskie konflikty…,p. 65.52 The 30 per cent power sharing was stipulated in the1997 Peace Accord, though it was never actually


Rahmanov does not have the same degree offreedom in policy or personnel decisions as otherregional leaders. These constraints aredemonstrated by the murky picture surroundingthe IMU presence in the country. Themovement’s leaders had cooperated with theUTO during the Tajik civil war and it is widelybelieved former UTO commanders now providethem with protection in Tajikistan. Both Tashkentand Bishkek insisted that Dushanbe should domore to prevent IMU activities in Tajikistan, butRahmanov would have to compromise on otherissues with the former UTO in order to ensuretheir compliance on this.

Discipline has been a serious problem within thearmed forces, leading the government to launch acampaign against errant soldiers in 2000.Dushanbe announced that military units whoseservicemen engaged in criminal activities wouldbe exiled from the capital.53

Following the signing of the 1997 power-sharingagreement the armed forces numberedapproximately 6,000, with an additional 1,200border guards. The UTO had its own forces of5,000. Those were to be integrated into thenational armed forces or disarmed. As of 2001,the two forces had been largely integrated and thecountry’s military stood at 8,000-9,000.Approximately 1,000 former UTO fighters hadnot been given positions in the national military,however, and there are concerns over how theywill behave since many control territory and areknown to prey on travellers passing through thoseareas.54 In June 2001, one such roguecommander, Rahman Sanginov, popularly knownas ‘Hitler,’ took fifteen aid workers hostage inTavildara.55 Though the hostages were releasedafter an intervention by former UTO leaders,

implemented in some levels and areas of government,and following the elections of 2000, the number ofpositions allocated to former UTO members has beenreduced (Rashid Abdullo, ‘Implementation of the 1997General Agreement: Successes, dilemmas andchallenges,’ in K. Abdullaev and C. Barnes, eds.:Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process,Accord, vol. 10 (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001),p. 51).53 Charles Fairbanks et al, The Strategic Assessment ofCentral Asia, pp. 43-45.54 ICG interview with U.S. defence attaché toUzbekistan, May 2001.55 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ‘Roundup: Hostages freedin Tajikistan,’ 17 June 2001.

shortly afterwards Sanginov laid siege to theeastern outskirts of Dushanbe.

Russian forces in the country were larger thanthose of the Tajik government. The 201stMotorised Rifle Division stands at 8,200servicemen, and there are also 14,500 RussianBorder Guards. Most of the Russian BorderGuards are actually local conscripts commandedby Russian officers. Many Tajikistanis preferservice with the Russian Border Guard becauseof the higher pay. By 2001 the Tajikistani armedforces were organising a small air forceconsisting of helicopters.56

The government of Tajikistan’s dependence onRussian military support began during the firstyear of the civil war. That aid played a decisiverole in the victors’ consolidation of power andhas grown steadily since. In March 1993 Russiaagreed to help Tajikistan build up its militarywhen the two signed a Treaty on Friendship andCooperation. Tajikistan’s first Defence Ministerwas an ethnic Russian, Aleksandr Shishliannikov.At that time the Tajik Air Force also had onlyRussian pilots, and Russian advisors were activethroughout the military ranks in support ofRahmanov. In February 2001 Tajikistan’sDefence Minister Sherali Khairullayev met withhis Russian counterpart Igor Sergeev to discussmilitary cooperation. That same month theRussian Duma ratified military agreements withTajikistan allowing for long-term basing rights inthat country that could entail as many as 50,000Russian troops. Nonetheless, owing to the cost ofRussia’s war in Chechnya, and the unpopularityof service in Tajikistan amongst Russianservicemen, there is a strong possibility thatMoscow will not ultimately set up such a base inthe country.

Since the IMU began making incursions fromTajikistan’s territory into Kyrgyzstan andUzbekistan, the armed forces of Tajikistan havegiven a higher profile to their exercises withRussia as well as regional joint manoeuvres. InMarch 2000 Tajikistan hosted that year’s‘Southern Shield’ exercises involving the CentralAsian states and Russia. Turkmenistan did notparticipate as it refrains from all military

56 IISS, The Military Balance, 2000/2001; JamestownFoundation’s Monitor, vol. 7, no. 36, 21 February 2001;Panfilov, ‘Russian military base in Khujand….’


alignments, and Uzbekistan’s forces carried outtheir operations within the exercise separatelyfrom a joint command. In the first three monthsof 2001 a series of military exercises were stagedby Tajikistan’s armed forces, including fourseparate exercises held in the southern part of thecountry in January.57

57 ‘Large-scale military exercises held in northernTajikistan,’ The Times of Central Asia [online](Bishkek), 7 February 200, available at:http://www.times.kg/times.cgi?D=article&aid=1013614;Jamestown Foundation’s Monitor, vol. 7, no. 36, 21February 2001.

IV. PROBLEMS WITH REGIONALCOOPERATION

Since the IMU began its attacks in 1999 there hasbeen a substantial increase in high-level meetingson regional security cooperation in Central Asia.But despite the flurry of security meetings andmilitary exercises, and the formation of severalregional structures for security cooperation, thecountries in the region have not formed any tightsecurity alliance, and are often at odds with eachother over defence issues. This results both fromconflicting views of security interests and from arange of other incompatible aspects of the severalcountries’ political systems.

A. INCOMPATIBLE THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Uzbekistan is often behind the lack of securitycooperation between Tashkent, Bishkek andDushanbe.58 Kyrgyzstan has a considerablenumber of serious points of contention withUzbekistan, apart from the problems withTashkent over its bombing of Kyrgyz villagesand its policies which are perceived asradicalising the Islamist underground throughoutthe region. The two states have 140 or moreunresolved border disputes. In February 2001, anewly printed map of Uzbekistan drew thatcountry’s borders into Kyrgyzstan’s territory, andeven showed a land corridor from Uzbekistan toits enclave Sokh in Kyrgyzstan although no suchlink had been agreed. A secret meeting had givenTashkent reason to hope that they would getterritorial concessions but Uzbekistan’s high-handed manner antagonised the Kyrgyzparliament, which would have to ratify anagreement, and heightened public distrustbetween the neighbours.59

While the map drew criticism in Bishkek,Tashkent was not shy about its demands.Uzbekistan’s deputy Prime Minister RustamYunusov did not attempt to hide his country’sambitions on Kyrgyzstan’s territory when he

58 ‘Unichtozhat terroristov budut poka na kartakh’Nezavisimaia gazeta, 21 March 2001.59 The controversial memorandum on the Uzbek-Kyrgyzborder signed on 26 February 2001 by the primeministers of the two countries was printed inObshchestvennyi reiting (Bishkek), 26 April-2 May2001.


acknowledged the link between Uzbekistancutting off gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan and theborder issue. According to Kyrgyzstaniparliamentarian Alisher Abdimunov, Yunusovtold the Kyrgyzstan delegation negotiating borderissues that if Bishkek agreed to cede the corridorto Sokh, then Uzbekistan would resume gasdeliveries.60

Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan claimed Uzbekistanowed it U.S.$180 million for rent on its territoryand exploitation of its gas fields.61 Kyrgyzstanhas also sought to link the issue of gas with watersupplies as Uzbekistan depends on its neighbourfor free irrigation. Uzbekistan has resisted anylinkage between gas and water provisions despiteinternational support for the country’s to trade.62

In August 2000 Tashkent introduced a visaregime for Kyrgyzstan’s citizens. People living inthe border areas can still travel to Uzbekistanwithout visas as long as they do not stay in thecountry longer than three days. Those needing tostay longer now must pay a fee and presentjustification for their visit. The generalconsequence of Uzbekistan’s tightening of bordercontrols has been a burgeoning of corruption byborder control officials, who take bribes fromthose attempting to violate the border controlregime and equally from those who attempt toadhere to the rules. In Kyrgyzstan, there is aperception that terrorists and drug traffickers canfind ways across the borders more readily thanlaw-abiding citizens.

60 Arslan Koichiev, ‘Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan map outtheir differences,’ Eurasia Insight [online] (New York:OSI), 5 March 2001, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030501.shtml.61 Zamir Osorov, ‘Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan: Borderdisputes,’ The Times of Central Asia [online] (Bishkek),3 August 2000, available at:http://www.times.kg/times.cgi?D=article&aid=1012660.62 USAID has been pushing for a solution which linkswater and energy, which Tashkent has foundunacceptable. A high-level OSCE initiative to resolveregional water disputes, led by Britain’s Foreign andCommonwealth Office in 1999, encounteredintransigence from the leadership Uzbekistan andTurkmenistan, which apparently felt that there was noneed to compromise their own position by involvinginternational actors which could negotiating strength toweaker countries from whom they currently receivesummer water releases for their agriculture at no cost.

Tajikistan’s internal strife made the country aproblematic strategic partner for its neighboursand it did not develop close relations with any ofits neighbours after independence. Tajikistan hasbeen very inwardly oriented, preoccupied withproblems of regional disputes over power and thebuilding of integrated institutions in the aftermathof the civil war. Indeed, Tajikistan has been aconduit for destabilising influences to itsneighbours. There has also been some concern inChina that the Uyghur separatists might use thecountry as a route into Xinjiang.

Relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan inthe post-Soviet period have been marked bynearly continuous tensions. Uzbekistan has beenseen as sponsoring the aspirations of the northernprovince of Sughd (formerly Leninabad) toregain the dominance of Tajikistan’s political andeconomic structures that it had during Soviettimes. This issue came to a head after theincursions into northern Tajikistan byKhudaiberdiyev, which Rahmanov attributeddirectly to Uzbekistan’s sponsorship, and to thenorthern political figure then in exile inUzbekistan, Abdumalik Abdullajanov. InTajikistan, further proof of Uzbekistan’smeddling is seen in the fact that Khudaiberdiyevreportedly fled to Uzbekistan and yet neitherAbdullajanov nor Khudaiberdiyev has beenturned over to Tajikistan to stand trial.63 Someobservers claim that the incursions conducted byNamangani were a direct answer by authorities inTajikistan to the Khudaiberdiyev incursion.64

For much of the post-Soviet period, Tajikistanhas felt itself under siege by Uzbekistan, whichhas maintained a blockade of sorts to contain theperceived threat of spreading instability.Tajikistan is almost exclusively dependent onUzbekistan for transport links to the outsideworld, and yet in crossing into Uzbekistan,citizens of Tajikistan are often humiliated andforced to pay bribes. Similar problems exist forTajikistan citizens travelling through Kyrgyzstanand Kazakhstan, where it is often impossible toget across the country without having all of theirassets confiscated. Though much of this is

63 Segodnia, 11 November 1998.64 Arkadii Dubnov, ‘Uzbekskii dzhikhad [Uzbek jihad],’Vremia MN (Moscow), 30 September 1999, p. 1, 6(reprinted at:http://www.ferghana.ru/news/kirgiz46.html).


undoubtedly not a specific state policy, it issupported by the general system of corruptionexisting in the region, and in Uzbekistan, it iscombined with a tacit endorsement through theofficial policies whereby containment ofinstability translates into an ethos of dominationby the stronger neighbour.

All attempts at regional cooperation run upagainst problems of resources and priorities.While it is evidently a high priority to beperceived as promoting cooperation, as expressedthrough high-profile summits, the practical workof cooperation is often not covered in budgets.For example, though all three countries signedonto the regional Anti-Terrorist Centreestablished in Bishkek in December 2000 as ofJune 2001, none of them followed through ontheir financial commitments.65 Given that there isa general expectation that new IMU incursionsare imminent, the lack of funding reflects a viewthat the centre is not likely to produce results forwhich it is worth finding money.

Cooperation is also hindered by differentperceptions of the proper role for outside powers,with Russia and the U.S. sometimes underminingregional cooperation by encouraging bilateralrelations and discouraging participation inregional structures. The U.S. appears satisfied,for example, that Uzbekistan has left the CISCollective Security Treaty (CST) and joinedGUUAM. Washington has cast a sceptical eye onparticipation in the Shanghai CooperationOrganisation, which increasingly appearsoriented against the U.S. and the West. Russiahas sought to play a dominant role in the regionalgroupings in which it participates, such as theCST and the Eurasian Economic Community.The Central Asian states themselves haveprioritised bilateral relations over regionalstructures, and there has not been any attempt, forexample, to employ regional institutions toaddress border delimitation issues, as theShanghai organisation was used to resolveChina’s border issues with former Soviet states.

65 ‘CIS Antiterrorism Center not operational,’ Monitor(Jamestown Foundation), vol. 7, no. 108, 5 June 2001.

B. INCOMPATIBLE POLITICAL SYSTEMSAND DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTS

Cooperation between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstanand Tajikistan is not only difficult because oftheir divergent security concerns. There are alsodifferences in the way the three states aregoverned that make effective cooperation elusive.In Uzbekistan, the media and dissemination ofinformation are tightly controlled and there islittle political pluralism. Political parties areillusory, having been set up by the regime to givethe appearance of democracy. President Karimovhas sought to gain legitimacy by appearingstrong, and sometimes this has entailed belittlinghis neighbours. In a February 1999 radiointerview, he accused Akaev of being unable to‘do much of anything apart from smile.’66 Thishad predictable effects on public opinion inKyrgyzstan, where parliamentary deputiesdemanded that cooperation with Uzbekistan bereduced and measures be taken to defend thedignity of the country. President Karimov alsofrequently broadcast invective aimed atTajikistan and its president, reducing further thealready dim prospects for friendly relations.

Deputies in Kyrgyzstan were critical of Akaev’srefusal to stand up to Karimov’s abuse and werefurther annoyed by his reluctance to useKyrgyzstan’s leverage as a supplier of water to itsneighbour. There has also been a widespreadoutcry in response to Uzbekistan’s efforts to seekterritorial concessions. Though relations betweenthe two presidents warmed a bit in the fall of2000 in the run up to the Kyrgyz presidentialelections, this was widely seen in Kyrgyzstan as acynical move to strengthen Akaev’s candidacy byboosting his support among ethnic Uzbeks andshowing others that he was capable of handlingKarimov. The sharp differences between themedia cultures and the political cultures of thetwo countries make cooperation often difficult orimpossible.

The more open societies in Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan present a challenge to Karimov, whofeels that he must discredit his neighbours in

66 Nick Megoran, ‘The borders of eternal friendship,’Eurasia Insight [online] (New York: OSI), 19 December2001, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav120899.shtml.


order to validate his own authoritarian style ofrule. The presence of a legalised Islamist party inTajikistan presents a particular problem, since theapproach in Uzbekistan is to harass, jail and eventorture those in that country who would aspire tothe same goal. Uzbekistan severely restricts thefree flow of information but many issues that itconsiders sensitive are openly discussed inbroadcasts from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and, toa lesser extent, Tajikistan. Karimov’s dealingswith Tajikistan are further complicated by thefact that some of the Islamists in the currentgovernment are very close to Juma Namangani,Karimov’s sworn enemy, and he certainly cannotcount on them to support his aspiration toannihilate the IMU.

The economic differences present additionalchallenges. Uzbekistan, due to its non-convertiblecurrency, erects barriers to trade with itsneighbours, driving most commerceunderground. In Kyrgyzstan there is a relativefree market economy while Tajikistan isdominated by the black market, corruption anddrug trafficking. Because of these factors, thesecurity services are given also the task ofimposing restrictions on the flow of goods andpopulation across the borders, further inhibitingregional cooperation.

V. OTHER REGIONAL ACTORS

A. KAZAKHSTAN: A REGIONAL POWERIN RUSSIA’S UNDERBELLY

Kazakhstan is the only former Soviet CentralAsian republic that could balance Uzbekistan’sdominance in the region. Yet Astana is loathe tocarry the costs of such a policy, preferring toensure its security through its relations with otherregional powers rather than committing itself to aCentral Asian security alignment. The republic issheltered by the territories of Kyrgyzstan andUzbekistan from the major conflicts inAfghanistan and Tajikistan, and did not need tobecome engaged militarily in those conflicts.Kazakhstan has been a relatively loyal participantin Russian-led regional groupings, such as theCIS Collective Security Treaty and the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation. It remains veryvulnerable to its northern neighbour due to thelong, indefensible border and the presence of alarge number of Russians in the country.

Recent events have changed the regional securityenvironment and led Kazakhstan to take a moreactive position regarding military and securityissues. In January 2000, border guards fromUzbekistan were caught unilaterally marking outtheir border allegedly deep into the territory ofKazakhstan. Kazakhstan responded with adiplomatic protest. A joint Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan commission, which had been set up in1999, held an emergency meeting to discuss theborder dispute and Karimov issued a statementthat Tashkent had no territorial claims on any ofits neighbours. By the middle of the year,however, the commission had agreed on thedelimitation of a mere 40 of around 2,000kilometres of the border.67 Moreover,Uzbekistani border guards were frequentlycaught carrying out unilateral demarcations.68

Kazakhstan has recently become increasinglyconcerned about the spread of Islamistextremism, particularly in the southern regions ofthe country near Uzbekistan which share the

67 ‘Kazakhstan i Uzbekistan podpisali soglashenie...[Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have signed anagreement…],’ Panorama, 14 July 2000.68 ‘Granitsa na grani [Border on the brink],’ Express-K, 7September 2000.


stronger orientation towards Islam common to thesouthern Central Asian republics. This hasprompted Kazakhstan to say that it wishes tofollow cooperative approaches to security, thoughsuch declarations have yet to be followed withmuch action.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has occasionally adopteda dominant stance, particularly in relations withKyrgyzstan. For example, when Kyrgyzstanbecame the only Central Asian state to beadmitted to the World Trade Organisation,Kazakhstan responded by imposing severerestrictions on trade with its weaker neighbour.

B. TURKMENISTAN: GOING IT ALONE

Upon independence Turkmenistan declared itselfneutral and resisted joining any military blocs.That precluded security cooperation with itsneighbours if it meant any type of militarycommitment. Instead, Ashgabat’s policy was toinsulate itself from regional conflicts rather thanto cooperate in any regional security system.

Relations between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistanhave been tense and there have been shootingincidents on their border. President SaparmuratNiyazov called for the construction of borderfortifications in the problem areas and reinforcedthe border guard with an additional 500servicemen. Those incidents have led Ashgabatto view its relationship with Tashkent aspotentially more volatile than its relations withKabul.69

In fact, the government in Ashgabat does nottreat the Taliban as a significant threat and hasmaintained ties with both the Taliban and theopposition United Front led by Ahmad ShahMassoud. In 2000, Ashgabat hosted informaltalks between the warring Afghan factions andrepeatedly called on the UN and internationalcommunity to work towards resolving the Afghanconflict.70 Turkmenistan’s reliance on Moscowfor the transport of its energy has led it to seek

69 Nikolai Mitrokhin, ‘Turkmenistan’s open surveillanceof foreigners caps policy of isolation,’ Eurasia Insight[online] (New York: OSI), 6 March 2001, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav071000.shtml.70 ITAR-TASS, 10 December 2000; Vremia novosti, 14December 2000.

alternative transport routes. That is one of thereasons behind Ashgabat’s positive attitudetowards the factions in Afghanistan. It was hopedthat if the conflict there subsided it would bepossible to build a pipeline through Afghanistanto major Asian and world markets, as well ashighways that would increase access to Chineseand Pakistani markets. While the other fourformer Soviet Central Asian republics have mademoves to set up an economic union and acollective security system to stem the flow ofinsurgents, arms and narcotics from Afghanistan,Turkmenistan has refrained from joining either ajoint economic space with its neighbours or anyregional security system.

C. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:AMBIVALENT SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

Russia’s major interest in the region is articulatedas a fear of the spread of Islamist extremism.Russia is engaged in hostilities in Chechnya,where its opponents, it argues, are supported byan international network of Islamists that extendsto Central Asia and particularly Afghanistan.Russia is surrounded on the south by Muslimcountries and Muslims make up a majorcomponent of its own population (13 per cent),which it fears is susceptible to outside influences.Russia has threatened to conduct bombing raidson Taliban targets in Afghanistan in response tothis threat.

Russia also has a broader interest in engagementin the region to preserve stability on itsvulnerable southern frontier, to defend itself fromthe negative effects of the narcotics trade, and tolimit the influence of other parties that might seekto expand their role: the U.S., Iran, Turkey,Pakistan, and China.

Yet there is ambivalence in regard to Russia’sengagement in Central Asia. The prospect ofcommitting more Russian troops — alreadybogged down in a costly war in Chechnya — isnot appealing to the Russian public or leadership.Nor is there readiness to contribute major fundsto build up the Central Asian states’ defences,since Russia’s own citizens are experiencingserious hardship. While it was unrealistic forMoscow to simply wash its hands of the region,the nature of its involvement in regional security


arrangements is an issue being debated.71

Following the IMU incursions in 1999, Russiaoffered equipment and training to Kyrgyzstan’sarmed forces, but refrained from committing itsown armed forces to actions there. It hascontinued to be active in military exercises in theregion, however, and the Central Asian states areheavily dependent on Russia for weaponry andtheir maintenance.

There is also ambivalence from the side of theCentral Asian states. While they look to Russiafor support and many have signed on to Russianinitiatives and blocs such as the CST, therepublics also are wary of Moscow’s intentionsand concerned that dependence on Russia cancompromise their sovereignty. Prominent figuresin Russia have regularly argued that they shouldnot give up their dominance over the formerSoviet space, and many policy-makers in Russiawould clearly prefer to limit Central Asian states’economic and political engagement with othercountries (as illustrated by the pipeline issue,where Russia seeks to maintain Central Asia’sdependence on its monopoly). As neither Russianor the Central Asian republics have clearlydefined what their interests are in relation to oneanother, their policies are often contradictory.

D. CHINA: STABILITY ABOVE ALL

There are three factors driving China’s CentralAsia policy. First, there is an economic interest.Chinese trade with the Central Asian statesincreased several-fold since independence andthere is potential to develop those marketsfurther. Secondly, Beijing is interested to developfriendly relations, which would allow it todecrease forces deployed along its borders withCentral Asian states. The primary vehicle forcooperation in building military confidencebetween those countries is the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation. Third, China isconcerned about the activities of Muslim Uyghurseparatists seeking independence for China’sXinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Overall, those interests complement the CentralAsian countries’ interests in China. The People’s

71 Dmitri Trenin, ‘Central Asia’s stability and Russia’ssecurity,’ Program on New Approaches to RussianSecurity Policy Memo Series, no. 168.

Republic of China (PRC) became a major tradingpartner for those countries in the 1990s. Giventheir limited military capabilities, the newlyindependent Central Asian republics havepreferred to see their Chinese bordersdemilitarise. Finally, concern over the activity ofextremist organisations over the 1990s has led theCentral Asian states generally to adopt a policy ofno tolerance for such groups.

While China has refrained from taking a leadingrole in the region’s security cooperation,deferring to Russia as the major power in the areait has provided aid. This has included lethal aid,and was given free of charge, unlike Russianassistance. China also participates in meetings onregional security, using those to make sure itsinterests in fighting Uyghur separatists arerespected.

E. AFGHANISTAN: SOURCE OFINSTABILITY

Afghanistan is a country without a functioningstate, and consequently constitutes a source ofinstability for all neighbouring countries. Aftertwenty years of civil war, Afghanistan’s economyis totally devastated and the controlling Talibanmovement adheres to an extreme Islamistideology which causes alarm among all of thestates in its vicinity with the partial exception ofPakistan which helped bring the Taliban intoexistence. The continued war to wrest control ofthe country’s northeast worries its neighbours,since the fighting threatens to create a massexodus of refugees into Tajikistan, Uzbekistanand beyond. The Taliban also provide somesupport to militant Islamists — and particularly,the IMU.

In spite of the country’s political and ideologicalisolation, toward the end of the 1990s there was atrend in the region toward a limitedrapprochement with the Taliban. Central Asiangovernments are pursuing this as a potentialstrategy to further the goals of promoting greaterstability, containing radical Islamism, reducingdrug trafficking, and returning refugees. Russia,however, has taken a firm position againstcontacts with the Taliban, alleging thatAfghanistan trains and supplies Chechenseparatists. This has been one of the few majorissues on which Russian and U.S. policy-makerscurrently see eye to eye, because of the Taliban’s


refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden for trial foranti-American terrorist activities. Both sides havesought to make the most of this given the currentconflicts over other issues such as NATOexpansion and America’s pursuit of a missiledefence system. In addition, Moscow is reportedto be a major source of military support forAhmed Shah Massoud and the United Front,allowing a prolongation of the war.

VI. REGIONAL COOPERATIVEINITIATIVES

A. THE COMMONWEALTH OFINDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

Given the dependence of Central Asian states onmilitary support from Russia and the inevitabilityof Russia’s extensive security interests in theregion, the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST)might have seemed the logical vehicle forregional cooperation. Yet efforts towards this endhave had very little success. The non-CentralAsian states in the pact, Belarus and Armenia,have stated flatly they would not be sending theirforces to fight in distant lands that hold littlesignificance for them. Within the region itself,Turkmenistan refused to join the collective andUzbekistan dropped out of it in 1999. The effortsat joint peacekeeping in Tajikistan, in whichCentral Asian states played only an ancillary roleto Russia’s, only underlined how unwilling theCentral Asian republics were to expendmanpower or resources on collective security.When it comes to broad security policy, eachcountry gives clear priority to its nationalinterests over regional cooperation. As aconsequence, virtually all significant stepstowards security cooperation are taken on abilateral basis. A multi-lateral security system isnot only elusive, but may be impossible untillimiting factors are overcome, such as thecompetition for regional dominance byUzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the reluctance tomake budgetary outlays.

While the CST does not provide for a regionalsecurity system, its participants continue to holdjoint military exercises within its framework andthe countries’ defence ministers meet annually todiscuss defence and security cooperation. Insome areas such as air defences, the independentstates were unable to establish their own systemsand need the CST to maintain the former Sovietsystem. In addition, the CST is still a usefulvehicle for discussion and information exchange.Thus it continues to exist, although more as aforum for talk and loose cooperation than as atight military alliance.

Despite the shortcomings of the CIS CollectiveSecurity Treaty as a military alliance, Russia hascontinued to promote it and to try to draw in CIS


states that have remained outside it. At the May2001 CST meeting, an agreement on the creationof rapid deployment forces (RDF) was ratified.Each of its six members is to contribute onebattalion to the force. The agreement includedplans to deploy such a force in Central Asia byAugust 2001, as well as a similar force made upof Russian and Armenian troops in theCaucasus.72 That in itself indicates the RDF willnot be a full CIS force, but will operate indifferent parts of the CIS through regionalgroupings. Since neither Uzbekistan norTurkmenistan belong to the CST, whileKazakhstan is inclined to take care of its ownsecurity and not become entangled in itsneighbours’ problems, it is uncertain how muchthe RDF in Central Asia can expect from thecountries in the region in terms of personnel andbudgetary contributions.

Another major recent initiative of the CIS hasbeen the creation of an Anti-Terrorist Centre(ATC) to be based in Bishkek. This was one ofthe first initiatives of Vladimir Putin as president,initially proposed at the January 2000 CISsummit, and formally established at the CISsummit of December that same year. However, asof the CST summit of May 2001, it was officiallyadmitted that the Centre is a long way from beingoperational, despite the prospect of new Islamistincursions. Very few of the participatingcountries have made promised budgetary outlays(only Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have paidup on part of their commitments, whereasKyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan amongothers have paid nothing). The ATC is alsoconstrained by a very limited mandate, since,contrary to Russia’s efforts, it has not beenauthorised to operate freely without additionalauthorisation on the territory of the Central Asianstates.73 In the best case, it is expected that theCentre could become operational by December2001, though it could go the way of otherinitiatives which have attracted more interest asideas than realities.

72 Haroutiun Khachatarian, ‘Creation of rapiddeployment force marks potential watershed inCollective Security Treaty development,’ Eurasia Insight[online] (New York: OSI), 30 May 2001, available at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav053001.shtml.73 ‘CIS Antiterrorism Center not operational,’ Monitor(Jamestown Foundation)…

B. SHANGHAI COOPERATIONORGANISATION

At its inception in 1996, the Shanghai Five,recently renamed the Shanghai CooperationOrganisation, was a means for China and itsneighbours to build confidence and work towardreducing the armed forces along those borders. Inthat respect it has been quite effective. In the late1990s it was recognised that those states hadmore issues in common between them than justborder demarcation and defence. China was alsoworried about radical Muslim movements andfound the grouping useful for cooperation on thisissue. The original Shanghai Five (China, Russia,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), becamethe “Shanghai Forum” when Uzbekistanparticipated as an observer in Dushanbe in 2000,and the “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”when Uzbekistan became a full member in June2000. Although that country did not share aborder with China, Tashkent was interested ininvolvement with the forum due to its concernabout Islamist radicalism.

While the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation(SCO) allows the participants to meet and discussvarious regional security issues, it does not havea military dimension. Since the Islamistincursions of 1999 and 2000, however, the SCOhas been taking on a more active role regardingsecurity cooperation. In 2000 at a ShanghaiForum meeting, the group declared it would setup a counter-terrorist centre, but apart fromlocating it in Bishkek there were no otherconcrete decisions as to how much each countrywould contribute financially, what the centre’smandate would be, and how it would be staffed.At the June 2001 SCO summit, more detailsabout the centre were made public and it wasannounced that it would operate within theframework of the CIS Collective SecurityTreaty.74

For all of the fanfare surrounding the SCO andthe ambitious projects that the grouping hasannounced, it is still far from a tight alliance.China has been pushing the group to take a strongstand against the United States’ plans to developa missile defence system and amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). Uzbekistan,

74 Kabar News Agency (Bishkek), 18 June 2001.


which only became a member of the SCO at theJune 2001 summit, has not been supportive ofthat initiative and Karimov warned that the SCOshould not become an anti-American bloc.75

Russia, in turn, finds Karimov an unreliablepartner as the Uzbek president makes no secret ofthe fact that he wishes to limit the influence ofregional powers over policies in his owncountry.76

The issue of China’s role in any Central Asiansecurity organisation is also uncertain. The latestsummit produced an agreement stipulating thatChina could send troops to the Central Asianrepublics if they requested it, but it is almostunthinkable that any of them would want Chinesetroops on their territory.77 China’s overwhelmingsize and population and the history of tensionsfrom Soviet times and earlier makes the region’spopulation deeply suspicious of involvement withtheir larger neighbour.78 While that has notprecluded diplomatic cooperation, there is littleroom for joint military cooperation. China itselfhas also refrained from pressing for suchcooperation as it could complicate an alreadytense situation in Xinjiang, and it has beendeferential to the primacy of Russia’s interests inthe area. Essentially that leaves the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation as a forum fordiscussion and not a potential regional bloc.

C. EXTERNAL SUPPORT

In addition to support coming to the regionthrough such Russia- and China-led regionalforums as the CST and the SCO, externalinvolvement in Central Asian security has takenadditional, mainly bilateral forms.

75 ‘Uzbek head warns Shanghai Forum must not turn intobloc,’ The Times of Central Asia [online] (Bishkek), 18June 2001, available at:http://www.times.kg/times.cgi?D+ article&aid+1023001.76 ‘Russia has misgivings about Shanghai CooperationOrganization,’ The Times of Central Asia [online](Bishkek), 21 June 2001, available at:http://www.times.kg/?D+print&aid+1023355.77 ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization ends summit,’The Times of Central Asia [online] (Bishkek), 17 June2001, available at:http://www.times.kg/times.cgi?D+article&aid+1022998.78 ICG interview with Procurator General of NarinProvince, Talantbek Akyshov, 6 May 2001.

The most significant external engagement in theregion, apart from Russia’s substantial presencein Tajikistan, took the form of the United NationsMission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT).Though never a large force and without amandate for combat, this mission of militaryobservers served from 1993 to 2000 to monitorthe conflict and provide strategic information tofacilitate the peace process. UNMOT wasremoved after the official declaration that theprovisions of the 1997 Peace Accord werecompletely implemented, and the UN kept in itsplace a small office, the United NationsTajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP).Also important for Central Asia is the UnitedNations Special Mission to Afghanistan(UNSMA) based in Islamabad, which has beenseeking to facilitate a peace process inAfghanistan, so far without much success.Increasingly, UNSMA is engaging the regionmore broadly, as there is a recognition that thesecurity problems affecting the entire region aretightly interlinked and as Central Asia statesrecognise that a solution to their securityproblems hinges on ending the conflict inAfghanistan.

The U.S. has taken an active interest in theregion, largely in support of strengthening thesovereignty and capacity of the new states, with aview to reducing the region’s orientation towardRussia. An assessment of U.S. interests in CentralAsia by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the AtlanticCouncil and the Central Asian and CaucasusInstitute found that the United States does nothave vital interests in the area, only strategicones. On a practical level, that means thatCongress would not be inclined to approve anymajor security assistance package for thecountries.79 Nonetheless, U.S. interests weredeemed sufficient to justify some aid. The U.S.has provided non-lethal military equipment toUzbekistan, and units of Uzbekistan’s armedforces trained with U.S. mountain combat units.In all, military aid to Tashkent amounted to over$10 million in commitments by the year 2000. Inaddition, in April 2000 the U.S. promised morethan U.S.$3 million in aid through the CentralAsian Security Initiative program.

The U.S. has also been a major donor of militaryaid to Kyrgyzstan, providing as much as U.S.$4-6

79 Fairbanks et al, Strategic Assessment of Central Asia


million worth of aid, apart from the U.S.$3million promised for the Central Asian SecurityInitiative. That aid was also in the form of non-lethal equipment. Mostly that meant radios, nightvision equipment, and the like. There was somedisappointment in Kyrgyzstan when it wasdiscovered that the electronic equipment wasincompatible with existing equipment, and alsothat no weapons were provided.80 Other countriesthat offered Kyrgyzstan aid following the IMUattacks included Turkey and Germany. In 2000Ankara promised Bishkek U.S.$150,000 toreinforce its southern border, and an additionalU.S.$1 million grant for fighting terrorism.Turkey’s aid was non-lethal, as was that from theU.S., and included wet suits, all-weather gear andtraining in counter-terrorism.81

NATO continued to engage the Central Asianrepublics in Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities.It held its annual CENTRASBAT militaryexercises in Central Asia in September. Troopsfrom Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstanparticipated in the drill that was geared towardscounter-terrorism training. In January 2001 ahigh level U.S. military delegation met withTajikistan’s defence officials to discuss militarycooperation, including Dushanbe’s participationin NATO’s PfP program.82 While participants inthe meeting agreed that it is desirable forTajikistan to be involved in PfP, the economicrealities in the country limited its abilities toengage in many of the program’s joint exercises.Although Kyrgyzstan continued to participate inNATO’s PfP program, it too found it was limitedin how far it could develop its ties with thewestern alliance because of its financialconstraints. Despite NATO subsidies for many ofthe PfP programs Kyrgyzstan defence officialsdecided against having a liaison officer to NATOwhen they found that the post would costU.S.$50,000 per year.83

80 ICG interview with U.S. military attaché toKyrgyzstan, March 2001; Grebenshchikov, ‘KyrgyzArmy in crisis.’81 ICG interview with U.S. military attaché toKyrgyzstan, March 2001.82 AP, 17 January 2001.83 Grebenshchikov, ‘Kyrgyz Army in crisis’; ManaKerimov, ‘NATO trains Kyrgyzstan for war,’Transcaspian Project [online] (Moscow), 8 March 2001,available at: http://www.transcaspian.ru/cgi-bin/web.exe/eng/12668.html.

Relations between Tajikistan and Iran haveimproved over recent years. During the civil warthe government in Tehran had supported theUTO making Rahmanov hostile to Iran. Since thecease-fire, however, the two countries have beencooperating over the issue of Afghanistan andboth have been trying to resolve that conflict as ithas affected them in a similar way. Iran also has aserious problem with refugees from Afghanistan,which have remained in the country since theSoviet invasion. It is also the most active state inthe region fighting the drug trade coming out ofAfghanistan. Both Iran and Tajikistan have takenpart in the Six-Plus-Two group that also includedAfghanistan’s other neighbours — Pakistan,China, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — as wellas the U.S. and Russia. That grouping soughtsome political solution to the continuing civil warin the country. Tajikistan was inclined torecognise the Taliban government or have theTaliban form some coalition with the UnitedFront so that hostilities could cease.84

As a security partner China was not prepared tobecome involved directly in the regions’conflicts, but in 2000 Beijing providedKyrgyzstan with U.S.$600,000 worth of aid,mostly offering the country army gear and tents.85

It also gave Uzbekistan military aid, and thatassistance included lethal aid in the form ofsniper rifles. That makes China and Russia theonly two states involved in the region’s securitythat have provided weaponry to the Central Asianrepublics.86 Since the IMU incursions beganBeijing has participated in Central Asianconferences and forums on the problem ofterrorism through the Shanghai CooperationOrganisation, although those meetings producedfew concrete results other than sweepingcondemnations of terrorism.

84 ‘Iran and Tajikistan urge broad based Afghangovernment,’ IRNA (Tehran), 12 March 2001; ‘Talksbetween Iranian, Tajik officials fruitful,’ IRNA (Tehran),13 March 2001.85 Aziz Soltobaev, ‘Central Asian armed forces preparefor militant intrusion,’ CACI Analyst [online](Washington, DC: Central Asia and Caucasus Institute),28 February 2001, available at:http://www.cacianalyst.org/Feb_28_2001/central_asia_armed_forces.htm.86 ICG interview with U.S. defence attaché toUzbekistan, May 2001.


V. CONCLUSION

Serious conflict is already a feature of the CentralAsian security landscape, and the situation couldwell deteriorate further. The impact of the two-decade long civil war in Afghanistan is integral tothe security situation of the countries to the north:any possible scenario for developments inAfghanistan carries great dangers for CentralAsia, regardless of whether the civil warcontinues or the Taliban drive the United Frontout with an ensuing exodus of refugees andcombatants. The fragile peace that has lasted fouryears in Tajikistan may not be the end of fightingbut rather an interlude. There is every indicationthat Islamist militancy targeting Uzbekistan is onthe rise and it threatens to combine forces withmuch larger, and until now quiet, undergroundmovements that could threaten the Karimovgovernment.

The Central Asian nations and the internationalactors in the region may have already missed theopportunity to build effective security strategiesand institutions to head off conflict. There is alsoa probability that these urgent needs will not beaddressed, and instead the countries of the regionwill be preoccupied with petty struggles whichcould be resolved through cooperation andaccommodation, but instead are only increasingthe likelihood of a more serious deterioration insecurity.

Given the number of contentious points betweenthe Central Asian republics — territorial claimsand border tensions, payment arrears for gas andwater, ethnic divisions that extend acrossboundaries, militant groups operating onneighbouring territories — there is a growing riskthat any combination of these issues could sparkinter-state violence on a regional scale.

Realistically, the international community canplay only a limited role in addressing the region’ssecurity problems. The interests of outsideplayers in the area are limited. Central Asianstates enjoy no enduring security commitmentsfrom states beyond the CIS, and CIS structuresare very limited in what they currently offerCentral Asian security. The limited aid that goes

to the region not only stands to strengthen thecountries’ armed forces, but also has the potentialto add to instability in the region, due toperceptions of outsiders’ intentions andcontradictory bilateral relations. In the best case,assistance cannot be expected to eliminate thefactors leading to instability in the area, whichdepends first and foremost on the nationalgovernments themselves. It will be only throughthe resolution of such issues that real stabilitywill come to the region. Military build-up, in theabsence of the resolution of outstanding issues,could have the opposite effect.

Military and economic assistance to the CentralAsian republics has been linked to reduction inhuman rights violations, which are seen as thecause of instability in some areas, notablyUzbekistan. Yet, while the weaker states ofTajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are more susceptibleto such pressure, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan areless so. The international community also has alimited ability to influence policies that hinderregional cooperation and work against the goal ofconflict prevention. Since the levels of assistancewhich donors are currently likely to give are notgreat, effective economic incentives for regionalcooperation are unavailable. This situation callsfor greater cooperation among internationalactors to ensure that their efforts are mutuallyreinforcing rather than pursuing potentiallycontradictory agendas. All security assistancemust be carefully crafted to ensure that it doesnot exacerbate the potential for conflict, as it canif it bolsters authoritarian controls, encouragesaggressiveness toward neighbours or heightenstensions over access to resources.

While all of the Central Asian governmentsexpect imminent renewed IMU incursions, theyhave -- rather than putting aside difference inorder to enable closer cooperation -- beenpursuing their internal interests to the detrimentof regional stability. Any action that underminesthe fragile security situation in Central Asia riskspushing the region toward broad and devastatingconflict, and it is crucial that all partiesunderstand what is at stake.

Brussels/Osh, 4 July 2001


APPENDIX A

THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AT A GLANCE

KAZAKHSTAN

Population: 16.8 millionGDP per Capita: 3,200 USDCapital City AstanaPresident: Nursultan Nazarbayev

KYRGYZSTAN

Population: 4.5 millionGDP per Capita: 2,300 USDCapital City BishkekPresident: Askar AKayev

TAJIKISTAN

Population: 6 millionGDP per Capita: 1,020 USDCapital City DushanbePresident: Imamali Rahmonov

TURKMENISTAN

Population: 4.2 millionGDP per Capita: 1,800 USDCapital City AshghabatPresident: Saparmurad Niyazov

UZBEKISTAN

Population: 23 millionGDP per Capita: 2,500 USDCapital City TashkentPresident: Islam Karimov


APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

201st MRD 201st Motorised Rifle Division (ofthe Russian Army)

ATC Anti-Terrorist CentreCIS Commonwealth of Independent

StatesCST Collective Security Treaty

(including some CIS members)GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,

Azerbaijan, MoldovaIMU Islamic Movement of UzbekistanIRP Islamic Renaissance PartyPfP Partnership for PeaceRDF Rapid Deployment ForceSCO Shanghai Cooperation OrganisationUNDP United Nations Development

ProgrammeUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner

for RefugeesUNMOT United Nations Mission of

Observers to TajikistanUNSMA United Nations Special Mission to

AfghanistanUNTOP United Nations Tajikistan Office of

Peace-buildingUTO United Tajik Opposition


APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is aprivate, multinational organisation committedto strengthening the capacity of theinternational community to anticipate,understand and act to prevent and containconflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research.Teams of political analysts, based on the groundin countries at risk of conflict, gather informationfrom a wide range of sources, assess localconditions and produce regular analytical reportscontaining practical recommendations targeted atkey international decision-takers.

ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officialsin foreign ministries and internationalorganisations and made generally available at thesame time via the organisation's internet site,www.crisisweb.org ICG works closely withgovernments and those who influence them,including the media, to highlight its crisisanalysis and to generate support for its policyprescriptions. The ICG Board - which includesprominent figures from the fields of politics,diplomacy, business and the media - is directlyinvolved in helping to bring ICG reports andrecommendations to the attention of seniorpolicy-makers around the world. ICG is chairedby former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari;former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans

has been President and Chief Executive sinceJanuary 2000.ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels,with advocacy offices in Washington DC, NewYork and Paris. The organisation currentlyoperates field projects in eighteen crisis-affectedcountries and regions across three continents:Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia,Montenegro and Serbia in Europe; Algeria,Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic ofCongo, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe in Africa;and Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Asia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors.The following governments currently providefunding: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland,France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg,the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of China(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. Foundation and private sector donorsinclude the Ansary Foundation, the William andFlora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles StewartMott Foundation, the Open Society Institute, thePloughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation,the Smith Richardson Foundation, the FordFoundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

July 2001


APPENDIX D

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS*

AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria: The Press in Crisis, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999Algérie: La Crise de la Presse, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999The People’s National Assembly, Africa Report N°10, 16February 1999Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 Mois de Législature,Africa Report N°10 16 February 1999Elections Présidentielles en Algérie: Les Enjeux et lesPerspectives, Africa Report N°12, 13 April 1999

The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La Crise Algérienne n’est pas finie, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000

BURUNDI

Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of theSuspension of Sanctions, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Le Burundi Après La Suspension de L’Embargo: AspectsInternes et Regionaux, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Quelles Conditions pour la reprise de la Coopération auBurundi? Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and MultilateralCo-operation, Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor in theBurundi Peace Process, Africa Report N°19, 30 November1999L’Effet Mandela: Evaluation et Perspectives du Processus dePaix Burundais, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of thePeace Process in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,Political Prisoners and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,22 June 2000Burundi: Les Enjeux du Débat. Partis Politiques, Liberté dela Presse et Prisonniers Politiques, Africa Report N°23, 12July 2000Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom ofthe Press and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N° 23, 12 July2000Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, AfricaBriefing, 27 August 2000

Burundi: Ni guerre ni paix, Africa Report N° 25, 1 December2000Burundi: sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadrede négociations, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

How Kabila Lost His Way, DRC Report N°3, Africa ReportN°16, 21 May 1999Africa’s Seven Nation War, DRC Report N°4, Africa ReportN°17, 21 May 1999The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republicof Congo, Africa Report N°18, 20 August 1999Kinshasa sous Kabila, à la veille du dialogue national, AfricaReport N°19, 21 September 1999Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, AfricaReport N° 26, 20 December 2000From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001

RWANDA

Five Years after the Genocide: Justice in Question, AfricaReport N°11, 7 April 1999Cinq Ans Après le Génocide au Rwanda: La Justice enQuestion, Africa Report N°11, 7 April 1999Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa ReportN°15, 4 May 2000Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda: l’urgence dejuger, Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,Africa Report N° 28, 11 April 2001

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July2000Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,25 September 2000

*. Released since January 1999


ASIA

BURMA/MYANMAR

Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?, AsiaReport N° 11, 21 December 2000

INDONESIA

East Timor Briefing, 6 October 1999Indonesia’s Shaky Transition, Indonesia Report N°1, AsiaReport N°5, 10 October 1999Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute, Indonesia ReportN°2, Asia Report N°6,31 May 2000Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Asia Briefing, 19 July2000Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia ReportN°9, 5 September 2000Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, AsiaReport N° 10, 19 December 2000Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross HumanRights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20February 2001Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21February 2001Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia,Asia Report N° 15, 13 March 2001Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, IndonesiaBriefing, 21 May 2001Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, AsiaReport N° 17, 12 June 2001Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? ICG Asia Report No18, 27 June 2001Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,ICG Asia Report No 19, 27 June 2001

CAMBODIA

Back from the Brink, Asia Report N°4, 26 January 1999Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11August 2000

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia ReportN°7, 7 August 2000Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia ReportN°14, 1 March 2001Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty andSocial Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001

BALKANS

ALBANIA

The State of Albania, Balkans Report N°54, 6 January 1999Albania Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 11 May 1999Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March2000Albania Briefing: Albania’s Local Elections, A test ofStability and Democracy, 25 August 2000Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans report Nº111,25 May 2001

BOSNIA

Brcko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report N° 55, 8February 1999Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia &Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 56, 4 March 1999Republika Srpska: Poplasen, Brcko and Kosovo – ThreeCrises and Out? Balkans Report N°62, 6 April 1999Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? BalkansReport N°64, 21 April 1999Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damageand Transformation,Balkans Report N°71, 5 July 1999Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of anIndependent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BalkansReport N°72, 5 July 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: TheAnatomy of Hate and Fear, Balkans Report N°73, 2 August1999

Is Dayton Failing? Policy Options and Perspectives FourYears After, Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion andDiscrimination in a Post Communist Bureaucracy, BalkansReport N°84, 15 December 1999Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, BalkansReport N°86, 23 February 2000European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, HandbookOverview, 14 April 2000Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, BalkansReport N°90, 19 April 2000Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the InternationalCommunity Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans ReportN°103, 02 November 2000Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, BalkansReort N°104, 18 December 2000Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate theCroats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 106, 15March 2001

No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,Balkans Report Nº110, 22 May 2001


KOSOVO

Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward, BalkansReport N°58, 12 March 1999Kosovo: The Road to Peace, Balkans Report N°59, 12 March1999Kosovo Briefing: Atrocities in Kosovo Must be Stopped, 29March 1999Kosovo Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 2 April 1999Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Balkans Report N°66, 17May 1999The New Kosovo Protectorate, Balkans report N°69, 20 June1999Kosovo Briefing: Who Will Lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?28 June 1999The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo,Balkans Report N°74, 6 August 1999Who’s Who in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°76, 31 August 1999Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo,Balkans Report N°79, 18 October 1999Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Balkans ReportN°78, 2 November 1999Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Balkans ReportN°82, 26 November 1999Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,Balkans Report N°83, 10 December 1999Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s UnfinishedBusiness, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report N°88, 3 March2000Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica,Balkans Report N°96, 31 May 2000Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 27 June 2000Elections in Kosovo: Moving toward Democracy? BalkansReport N°97, 7 July 2000Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing,10 October 2000Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001

MACEDONIA

Challenges and Choices for the New Government, BalkansReport N°60, 29 March 1999Toward Destabilisation? Balkans Report N°67, 21 May 1999Macedonia Briefing: Government Holds Together, EyesFixed on Upcoming Presidential Poll, 11 June 1999Macedonia Briefing: Update of Recent PoliticalDevelopments, 14 June 1999Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections, BalkansReport N°77, 18 October 1999Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, BalkansReport N°98, 2 August 2000Macedonia government expects setback in local elections,Briefing Paper, 4 September 2000The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, BalkansReport N°109, 5 April 2001

Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report N°113, 20 June 2001

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro Briefing: Milosevic to Move on Montenegro, 23April 1999Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm, 19 August1999Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans ReportN°89, 21 March 2000Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?,Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the NationalTemperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, BriefingPaper, 23 June 2000Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30November 2000Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans ReportN°107, 28 March 2001Montenegro: Time to Decide, Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001

SERBIA

Sidelining Slobodan: Getting Rid of Europe’s Last Dictator,Balkans Report N°57, 15 March 1999Milosevic’s Aims in War and Diplomacy, Balkans ReportN°65, 11 May 1999Yugoslavia Briefing: Wanted for War Crimes, 1 June 1999Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,Balkans Report N°70, 28 June 1999Transforming Serbia: The Key to Long-Term BalkanStability, Balkans Report N°75, 10 August 1999Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May2000Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop,Balkans Report N°93, 5 June 2000Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the SeptemberElections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)and of Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19September 2000Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’sMoment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Briefing, BalkansBriefing, 10 October 2000Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, BalkansBriefing, 20 December 2000A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for regional Stability,Balkans Report N° 112, 15 June 2001

REGIONAL REPORTS

War in the Balkans, Balkans Report N°61, 19 April 1999Balkan Refugee Crisis, Balkans Report N°68, 1 June 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting BalkansPeace, Balkans report N°108, 26 April 2001


ISSUES REPORTS

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Issues Report N° 1, 19June 2001Eu Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes forConflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report N°2, 26 June 2001The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): CrisisResponse in the Grey Lane, ICG Briefing Paper, 26 June 2001


APPENDIX E

ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Martti Ahtisaari, ChairmanFormer President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-ChairmanFormer U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, PresidentFormer Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton AbramowitzFormer U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; formerU.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth AdelmanFormer U.S. Ambassador and Deputy PermanentRepresentative to the UN

Richard AllenFormer Head of U.S. National Security Counciland National Security Advisor

Hushang AnsaryFormer Iranian Minister and Ambassador;Chairman, Parman Group, Houston

Louise ArbourSupreme Court Judge, Canada;

Former Chief Prosecutor, International CriminalTribunal for former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias SanchezFormer President of Costa Rica; Nobel PeacePrize, 1987

Ersin AriogluChairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy AshdownFormer Leader of the Liberal Democrats, UnitedKingdom

Zainab BanguraDirector, Campaign for Good Governance, SierraLeone

Alan BlinkenFormer U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma BoninoMember of the European Parliament; formerEuropean Commissioner

Maria Livanos CattauiSecretary-General, International Chamber ofCommerce

Eugene ChienDeputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley ClarkFormer NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques DelorsFormer President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-JensenFormer Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot ErlerVice-President, Social Democratic Party, GermanBundestag

Mark EyskensFormer Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi FunabashiJournalist and author

Bronislaw GeremekFormer Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.GujralFormer Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-JooFormer Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin TalalChairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne HeibergSenior Researcher, Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs

Elliott F KulickChairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-AckermanNovelist and journalist

Todung Mulya LubisHuman rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachenFormer Deputy Prime Minister of Canada


Graça MachelFormer Minister of Education, Mozambique

Barbara McDougallFormer Secretary of State for External Affairs,Canada

Matthew McHughCounsellor to the President, The World Bank

Mo MowlamFormer British Secretary of State for NorthernIreland

Christine OckrentJournalist

Timothy OngChairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne OwensPresident, Center for Middle East Peace andEconomic Co-operation

Cyril RamaphosaFormer Secretary-General, African NationalCongress; Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel RamosFormer President of the Philippines

Michel RocardMember of the European Parliament; former PrimeMinister of France

Volker RuheVice-President, Christian Democrats, GermanBundestag; former German Defence Minister

Mohamed SahnounSpecial Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William ShawcrossJournalist and author

Michael SohlmanExecutive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George SorosChairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo SteinFormer Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär StenbäckFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald StoltenbergFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O TaylorChairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van ThijnFormer Minister of Interior, The Netherlands;former Mayor of Amsterdam

Simone VeilFormer Member of the European Parliament;former Minister for Health, France

Shirley WilliamsFormer British Secretary of State for Educationand Science; Member House of Lords

Grigory YavlinskyMember of the Russian Duma

Mortimer ZuckermanChairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and WorldReport

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