Asia - Security Review

Studies & Comments 9Klaus Lange (ed.)

Security in South Asia:Conventional and Unconventional

Factors of Destabilization

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Contents

Klaus LangeIntroduction .......................................................................................................................... 5

Hans-Georg WieckIndien – Perspektiven und Risiken seiner Stabilität und Sicherheit ..................................... 7

Michael ChandlerTerrorism: difficulties faced by national governments and theinternational community in countering the threat ................................................................ 13

Vinod AnandNaxalite ideology, strategy and tactics ................................................................................. 19

Animesh RoulIslamic terrorism in India: organizations, tentacles and networks ....................................... 33

Hein G. KiesslingDer pakistanisch-afghanische Problemverbund ................................................................... 43

Liping XiaStability in South Asia: a view from China .......................................................................... 51

List of authors ....................................................................................................................... 63

Introduction

Klaus Lange

The publication at hand contains selectedpapers presented at an international confer-ence organized by the Academy of Politicsand Current Affairs of the Hanns SeidelFoundation which took place in WildbadKreuth on 16-18 June 2009.

The subject of the conference was "Securityin South Asia: Conventional and Unconven-tional Factors of Destabilization".

The significance of South Asia in terms ofsecurity aspects is usually underrated inEurope, particularly when that geographicalarea is viewed in a global context. It is alsooften overlooked that South Asia holds adominant position among the growth regionsof the world. Moreover, South Asia com-mands an incomparable historical and cul-tural "sounding board" with the potential toresonate far beyond regional boundaries.

With the Indian subcontinent as its centre,South Asia is at the same time saddled withmanifold risks to its stability, risks whichcover a broad spectrum ranging from ex-treme social polarization and religious an-tagonisms, through to numerous forms ofterrorism. When the situation is subjected tocloser scrutiny, the impression arises that thegovernments of the region are often soovertaxed when it comes to containing thecurrent risks to their security and stabilitythat any prognosis of the future developmentof South Asia must be accompanied by nu-merous question marks. Moreover, it has tobe taken into account that South Asia con-stitutes a system of interdependence and so

there is little justification for compartmen-talized research which focuses on individualstates in isolation from each other.

Today South Asia is one of the key regionswhere the question of global development asa whole will be decided. This issue, with allits accompanying risks and opportunities,makes it imperative as well as appropriate todirect a searchlight on the regional securityof South Asia.

The contents of this publication do not claimto provide comprehensive coverage of all therisks to stability in South Asia. The topicshere discussed do, however, constitute the-matic poles around which any future system-atic analysis would have to be structured: itcan hardly be disputed that India and itsproblems of stability would have to be con-sidered an essential and central subject, aswould the entire interconnected complex ofthe Pakistan-Afghan problem.

At the same time it would also make senseto take another look at the phenomenon ofglobal terrorism, this time from the vantagepoint of recent developments since 9/11.Finally, any attempt to calculate or predictthe future prospects for stability in SouthAsia must in the long term take into accountthe Chinese factor.

This publication will have more than ful-filled its purpose if it results in drawing moreattention to a region, the importance ofwhich is in inverse proportion to the noticeit currently receives.

Indien – Perspektiven und Risikenseiner Stabilität und Sicherheit

Hans-Georg Wieck

1. Die Fragestellung

Indien fällt bei der Bewältigung oder Ein-dämmung der internationalen Bedrohungenein erhebliches Maß an Verantwortung undGewicht zu, auch wenn das Land in vielenFällen nicht in erster Linie oder ausschließ-lich betroffen ist.

Die Verantwortung für die Bewältigung derinneren Bedrohungen liegt bei den Akteu-ren der demokratischen Kräfte und derstaatlichen Institutionen im Lande selbst.

Die innere und äußere Sicherheit und diepolitische Stabilität Indiens angesichts un-übersehbarer, zum Teil existenzieller Risi-ken hängen meines Erachtens daher vorallem von folgenden Punkten ab:

– von der Glaubwürdigkeit und Zukunfts-fähigkeit der indischen Demokratie,

– von der Handlungsfähigkeit ihrer staat-lichen Institutionen und

– von der Antwort auf die Frage, in wel-cher geostrategischen Konstellation dasLand seine äußere Sicherheit sucht undfindet.

2. Die Antworten

Die Wahlen vom Mai 2009 – Renaissancevon Demokratie und Handlungsfähigkeit?

1. Die Ergebnisse der indischen Parla-mentswahlen vom 16. Mai 2009 sind imLande und weltweit mit Erleichterung auf-genommen worden und haben die Erwar-

tung stabiler Mehrheitsverhältnisse für diefünfjährige Regierungsperiode aufkommenlassen – nicht ohne gute Gründe.

Die Kongress-Partei verfügt nun über206 Sitze und stellt in der von ihr ange-führten United Progressive Alliance mit262 Sitzen die größte Partei. Andere Parla-mentsgruppen haben sich der Regierungs-koalition angeschlossen. Diese verfügt nuninsgesamt über 330 Sitze im indischen Par-lament (Lok Sabha).

Die Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, national-hinduistische Partei) eroberte bei den Wah-len 116 Sitze. Insgesamt verfügt die vonder BJP angeführte National DemocraticAlliance über 159 Sitze.

Überraschend schlecht hat das linke Wahl-bündnis Third Front mit insgesamt nur79 Sitzen im indischen Parlament abge-schnitten.

2. Der überzeugende Sieg der Kongress-Koalition (United Progressive Alliance), zudem gewiss auch die massiven Hilfspro-gramme für die ländliche Bevölkerung bei-getragen haben, hat denjenigen politischenKräften im Lande Auftrieb gegeben, dievon der Notwendigkeit überzeugt sind, denStaat nicht nur nach den Regeln der Verfas-sung als säkularen Staat zu führen und zugestalten, sondern auch pro-aktiv den poli-tisch organisierten Kräften zu begegnen, diestaatliche Institutionen zu Brutstätten religiö-ser Eiferer und Intoleranz, vor allem hindu-istischer Natur, werden lassen wollen oderdie den Staat im Wege eines militantenislamischen Fundamentalismus untergrabenwollen.

8 Hans-Georg Wieck

Diese Gefahren bestehen und können nurim Wege politischen Dialogs, politischerVision und in Konfliktfällen durch die Ur-teile unabhängiger Gerichte gebannt wer-den. Die beiden großen Parteien haben aufdiesem Felde in der Vergangenheit gesün-digt.

3. "Good Governance" hat jetzt wieder eineChance. "Good Governance" ist der Schlüs-sel zur Bewältigung der Glaubwürdigkeits-krise der indischen Demokratie

Der Wahlsieg der Kongress-Partei wirdvon vielen Beobachtern nicht nur als eineBestätigung des Ministerpräsidenten Man-mohan Singh, der ein ausgewiesener underfahrener Fachmann für alle finanz- undwirtschaftspolitischen Fragen ist, angese-hen. Sonja Gandhi, die Parteivorsitzendeund der "spiritus rector" der Regierungs-politik, und Manmohan Singh müssen nunnicht mehr ihre Energie im Ringen mitden Kommunisten verschleißen, die ja dieManmohan Singh-Regierung von außenstützten und somit tolerierten, aber Schlüs-selentscheidungen ver- und behinderten.

Der Erfolg der Kongress-Partei ist vor allemauf den Umstand zurückzuführen, dass, ei-ner Abstimmung in der Familie folgend, mitRahul Gandhi der landesweit gehegte My-thos der positiven Rolle der Nehru-Gandhi-Familie für das Wohl und Wehe Indienserneut Gestalt angenommen hat. Rahul istder Hoffnungsträger der Nation, vor allemder Jugend.

In Uttar Pradesch gelang es ihm, eineneindrucksvollen Wahlsieg einzufahren. Erführte demokratische Wahlen in der Ju-gendorganisation dieses Bundesstaates ein.Rahul Gandhi ist einer der zwölf General-sekretäre der Kongress-Partei und hat dieJugendarbeit übernommen. Die Verjüngungder Parteikader ist im Gange und lässtHoffnung aufkommen, nicht nur in derPartei, sondern auch im Lande.

Rahul Gandhi hat die Jugend des Landesaufgerufen, sich für dieses Land zu engagie-ren (Kennedy-Komplex). Dieser Appell istglaubwürdig. Er wurde in Uttar Pradeschsehr kräftig von seiner Charisma ausstrah-lenden Schwester Priyanka Gandhi Vadraunterstützt. Die Verjüngung der Führungs-kräfte ist angesichts der gegenwärtig dieMacht verwaltenden Altenriege unerläss-lich, die sowohl in der Regierung als auchin der Opposition immer noch dominant ist.Für diese Verjüngung steht Rahul Gandhi –und mit ihm auch die Sehnsucht nach Visi-onen für die Zukunft, wie es bei seinemVater Rajiv der Fall gewesen war.

Rahul Gandhi selbst weiß um den Vorwurfder Korruption, der auf der Kongress-Parteiund seinem Vater lastet, und um den Mangelan partei-interner Demokratie. Analog zusozialdemokratischen Vorstellungen setzter sich für ein sozial abgesichertes Wirt-schaftswachstum ("inclusive economicgrowth") ein.

4. Kongress-Partei und BJP haben im letz-ten Jahrzehnt die Kraft und Anziehungskraftverloren, aufstrebende, auf Mitgestaltungdrängende politische Gruppierungen, vorallem aus den sozial schwachen Teilen derBevölkerung, an sich zu binden. Diese auf-strebenden Kräfte der Dalits und Adivasiserobern seit Jahren mit eigenen Parteigrün-dungen politische Positionen in den Bun-desländern und sind als Koalitionspartnerder beiden großen Parteistrukturen schwie-rige Partner.

Kongress-Partei und BJP konnten in Jahre2004 und 2009 nur 48,97% bzw. 48,67%der Stimmen im ganzen Land auf sich ver-einen – also jeweils nur fast die Hälfte,aber eben nicht mehr. Das reicht nicht fürlandesweit auftretende nationale Parteien.

5. Zu erinnern ist auch daran, dass der Füh-rer der BJP, L.K. Advani, der im Dezember1992 als führender BJP-Politiker die Ver-antwortung für den Sturm auf die Moschee

Indien – Perspektiven und Risiken seiner Stabilität und Sicherheit 9

in Ayodhya trug, in den Augen großer Teileder Öffentlichkeit für das Konzept einesentsäkularisierten Staates steht. Das ist einelebensgefährliche Perspektive für den multi-ethischen und multi-religiösen Staat Indien.Als Nachfolger im Vorsitz der BJP wird derMinisterpräsident von Gujerat, NarendraModi, gehandelt, der Mann, dem die Ver-antwortung für die hinduistischen Rache-akte an der muslimischen Bevölkerung nacheinem Muslim-Angriff gegen einen Eisen-bahnzug mit hinduistischen Pilgern im Jah-re 2002 zur Last gelegt wird.

Der säkulare Staat sieht sich demnach wei-terhin einer großen Herausforderung durchdas von erheblichen Bevölkerungsteilenunterstützte Hindutwa Konzept für Indienausgesetzt. Der Staat muss in allen"kommunalen" Fragen Toleranz, Dialogund Gewaltlosigkeit sowie die Unpartei-lichkeit der staatlichen Organe und derGerichte durchsetzen – in den Dörfern, indenen Brahmanen und Grundbesitzer überDalits und Adivasis herrschen, ebenso wiebei der Quotenregelung, um die sozialeIntegration der traditionell ausgegrenztenBürger (250 Millionen Menschen) zu er-reichen.

6. Das Wahlergebnis vom 16. Mai 2009 isteine Chance, gibt Hoffnung auf einen Neu-anfang, um die gegenwärtig stattfindendeschrittweise Aushöhlung der staatsbürgerli-chen Dimension der Verfassungsordnungund der politischen Kultur des Landes zubremsen und zu korrigieren.

"Gewalt und Gewaltfreiheit in Südasien",hat vor kurzem anlässlich seiner Berufungder junge Indologe Werner Wessler an derUniversität Bonn zum Thema seiner An-trittsvorlesung gemacht. In der Begründungfür die Wahl des Themas führt er aus:"Frieden und Stabilität der einzelnen Staa-ten wie auch der Region Südasien als gan-zer entscheiden sich an der Frage, ob esgelingt, die tief eingewurzelten multi- undinterkulturellen Erfahrungen der Menschen

in einen kritisch-reflexiven Modernitätsdis-kurs einzubinden. Dies hatte schon Mahat-ma Gandhi (1869-1948) mit seiner Pro-grammschrift 'Hind Swaraj' angestrebt, dievor hundert Jahren (1909) erschien. Gan-dhis Klassiker des Antikolonialismus undder gewaltfreien Aktion entstand keines-wegs auf einer Insel der Seligen, sondern inder komplizierten tagespolitischen Gemen-gelage und vor dem Hintergrund einer Ge-schichte Südasiens, deren Blutspur nichtweniger überwältigend ist als die von ande-ren Weltregionen."

Die Dimension dieser Aufgabe ist unvor-stellbar groß.

7. Angesichts des hohen Ansehens derals Verfassungsorgan verankerten Wahl-kommission wird auch in diesem Jahr mitguten Gründen von einer im Ganzen fairenund freien Wahl in Indien gesprochen. Aberder Vorwurf und die Vermutung von fi-nanzieller Korruption wird immer wiedererhoben und in Einzelfällen nachgewiesen.Nach den Erhebungen von TransparencyInternational nimmt Indien den Rang 85 inder Rangfolge der 185 Staaten und Gesell-schaften ein, die untersucht werden – alsoeine Position in der Mitte der Gesamtliste.China steht etwas besser da – auf Position 72.

In den Analysen des Bertelsmann Transfor-mation Index 2008 nimmt Indien im Status-Index (Mittelwert bei Politischer Transfor-mation und Wirtschaftlicher Transformation)die Position 24 (von 119 Ländern) undbeim Management Index (Bewertung derManagementleistung der politischen Ent-scheidungsträger) die Position 32 ein.

Das sind beachtliche Positionen für einenStaat von der Größe und der KomplexitätIndiens. China kann in keinem dieser Indi-ces glänzen.

Der "Freedom House Index 2008" ordnetIndien unter den freien Ländern ein. Dashat der Freedom House Index nicht immergetan!

10 Hans-Georg Wieck

8. Auf das Engste mit dem Erfordernis derGlaubwürdigkeit und Stabilität der Demo-kratie sowie der Handlungsfähigkeit derstaatlichen Institutionen ist die Ernsthaftig-keit und Effizienz der staatlichen Politik zurÜberwindung der strukturellen Armut (25%der Bevölkerung) und des Analphabe-tentums (mehr als 40% der Bevölkerung)verbunden. Dabei ist nicht nur die sozialeund menschenrechtliche Dimension vonBedeutung, sondern auch die Lebensfähig-keit der Megastädte in Indien selbst, die Ge-fahr laufen, von den ständig wachsendenSlums in eine existenzielle Krise gerissenzu werden, da sie den Nährboden für Epi-demien und Pandemien und vielleicht aucheinmal für gewaltsame soziale Unruhendarstellen.

Die geostrategische Einbettung Indiens

Die regionale Sicherheitslage Indiens istheute von der inneren Schwäche, ja Labili-tät seiner Nachbarn im SAARC-Rahmengeprägt. Der indische PolitikwissenschaftlerAmitabh Mattoo charakterisierte die Lagemit den Worten, dass Indien in der Nach-barschaft gescheiterter Staaten lebe – mitanderen Worten: Indien gleicht einer Inselin einem Meer von Gewalt:

– Auf Sri Lanka wurde jetzt erst ein25 Jahre währender Bürgerkrieg mitfast 100.000 Opfern beendet.

– In Birma herrscht die älteste Militär-diktatur der Welt.

– Nepal ist gekennzeichnet von Bürger-krieg und Systemwechsel mit der Per-spektive weiterer Unruhen.

– Pakistan, Bangladesch und Afghanistansind von der Gefahr einer islamischenRevolution bzw. Talibanisierung be-droht, die auch Teile der islamischenBevölkerung in Indien erfassen könnte.Im afghanisch-pakistanischen Grenz-gebiet arbeiten US- und Pakistan-

Streitkräfte im Kampf gegen Talibaneund Al Qaida-Zellen zusammen. Indienstellt das tatsächliche Engagement Pa-kistans in diesen existenziellen Fragenin Frage. Indien hat sein finanziellesund politisches Engagement in Afgha-nistan verstärkt. Die Lage in Pakistan/Afghanistan ist kritisch, nicht zuletztwegen der Gefahr, dass pakistanischeNuklearwaffen in die Hände und unterdie Kontrolle der Talibane kommenkönnten.

Das gesamte Umfeld Indiens, also der ge-samte benachbarte SAARC-Raum, ist voninternen Unsicherheiten und Instabilitätengekennzeichnet. Das muss Indien zu ver-stärkten Anstrengungen veranlassen, im bi-lateralen Prozess zur inneren Stabilität die-ser Länder beizutragen – eine der Quadraturdes Kreises gleichende Aufgabe.

In dieser von Unsicherheiten und Gefahrenbestimmten Lage bemüht sich Indien ausguten Gründen um einen "Modus vivendi"mit China, dem größten HandelspartnerIndiens. Gleiches versuchte vor mehr als50 Jahren in einer idealistischen Visionauch Jawaharlal Nehru. Er scheiterte damals,wie er nach der chinesischen Invasion imNordosten Indiens im Jahre 1962 bekennenmusste.

Bestehen heute bessere Aussichten auf Er-folg? Das lässt sich nicht mit Bestimmtheitsagen. Aber der Versuch muss auf jedenFall unternommen werden.

Indien ist aber auch bereit und interessiert,über die schon mit den USA auf dem Ge-biet der friedlichen Nutzung der Nuklear-technologie und der rüstungspolitischen Zu-sammenarbeit getroffenen Vereinbarungenmit den USA hinaus eine internationaleFunktion bei der Sicherung des Seeverkehrsim Indischen Ozean und der angrenzendenSeewege (Golf von Aden, Straße von Ma-lakka) zu übernehmen und entsprechendeVereinbarungen mit den USA zu treffen.

Indien – Perspektiven und Risiken seiner Stabilität und Sicherheit 11

Die Zusammenarbeit mit den USA sollauch der Sicherung indischer Interessenbei US-Engagements in den benachbartenStaaten, vor allem im Raum Afghanistan/Pakistan, dienen. Den USA werden wohlauf der Basis der Gegenseitigkeit gewisseStationierungsrechte in indischen Häfeneingeräumt werden. Der Vertrag liegt be-reits seit zwei Jahren unterschriftsreif vor.Die Seeüberwachung wird eine gemeinsa-me Aufgabe werden. Die Seewege durchden Indischen Ozen und die angrenzendenSeegebiete, über die zwei Drittel der welt-weit stattfindenden Öltransporte und einDrittel des globalen Containerverkehrsgehen, werden derzeit vor allem durch Pi-raterie gefährdet, könnten aber in genuininternationalen Spannungen auch anderenBedrohungen ausgesetzt werden. Auch suchtIndien wie die USA eine generelle Über-wachungskapazität aufzubauen – nicht zu-letzt wegen der aufkommenden chinesischenMarinepräsenz im Indischen Ozean.Gleichzeitig will Indien Vereinbarungen mitden Anrainerstaaten des Indischen Ozeanseinbeziehen.

Die Zusammenarbeit mit den USA ist inIndien nicht unumstritten. Angesichts derinstabilen politischen und sicherheitspoliti-schen Lage in der Region muss Indien abereine stabile, auch strategisch relevante Zu-sammenarbeit mit dem benachbarten Chinaund mit den USA – allerdings mit unter-schiedlichen Schwerpunkten – suchen.

Vor diesem regionalen Hintergrund der Si-cherheitsklage Indiens verbietet sich aller-dings eine geostrategische, implizit gegenChina gerichtete strategische Zusammen-arbeit mit den USA, also eine gegen Chinagerichtete Allianz mit den USA.

Eine andere, vor allem von Moskau und zumTeil von Beijing geförderte geostrategische

Vorstellung, nämlich engste Zusammenar-beit zwischen Indien, China und der Russi-schen Föderation anzustreben – und zwarimplizit mit einer anti-amerikanischen Per-spektive – dürfte heute in Indien kaum aufGegenliebe stoßen. Allerdings gibt es durch-aus dahin gehende Vorstellungen einigerindischer Politiker und Sachverständiger.

Indien nimmt jedoch wie andere Staaten inAsien auch als Beobachter an der Schang-hai-Gruppe teil.

3. Schlussfolgerungen

Sicherheit und Stabilität Indiens sind alsoim Lande wie auf der internationalen Bühneerheblichen Gefahren und Risiken ausge-setzt: zum einen durch den hinduistischenund den islamischen Fundamentalismus imLande selbst und zum anderen durch deninneren Zerfall der benachbarten Staatenmit der Folge möglicher grenzüberschrei-tender gewaltsamer Konflikte mit internati-onalen Auswirkungen.

Im Inneren braucht Indien eine Renaissancedes säkularen und demokratisch verfasstenintegrativen Staates und eine sozial veran-kerte Wirtschaftsentwicklung.

Auf der internationalen Bühne braucht In-dien eine stabile Beziehung mit China undmit den USA – mit jeweils unterschiedli-chen Schwerpunkten, jedoch ohne gegenden einen oder den anderen Partner ge-richtete Allianzen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund muss Indien selbstauf bilateralem Wege zur Stabilität in denbenachbarten SAARC-Staaten pro-aktivbeitragen.

Terrorism: difficulties faced by national governmentsand the international community in countering the threat

Michael Chandler

1. Introduction

Tragically, some of the issues raised in thispaper have been made on a number of pre-vious occasions. I have talked about thesedifficulties in presentations and in my book"Countering terrorism: can we meet thethreat of global violence?" The points arereflected in the reports submitted to the UNSecurity Council by the Monitoring Groupwhich I had the privilege to chair from 2001to 2004.

The word "tragically" is used quite inten-tionally because time and again we see adistinct lack of progress in both national andinternational efforts to counter the threat.Some of the difficulties will be touched uponand the paper will also explore other reasonsfor this lack of progress: they are usuallyperceptions – often ill-founded ones – due toan inability to know and understand thatmost fundamental aspect of dealing withterrorism, namely the threat.

This paper deals primarily with countries inSouth Asia: those with a direct interest inthe region and others which have influencewith the regional actors. The paper alsoconcentrates on the importance of this area,with respect to the most overt internationalterrorist threat, a fact highlighted in the la-test report to the UN Security Council of theAnalytical Support and Sanctions Monitor-ing Team: "…When the Team last reported,in March 2008, the critical importance ofthe border area between Afghanistan andPakistan in terms of the threat from theTaliban, Al-Qaida and other associatedgroups … was already apparent. Since thenit has become even more so. Although there

are threats elsewhere, there is no other areaof the world where the success of counter-terrorism measures will mean more, andtheir failure have greater consequences,than in South Asia …"1

2. Pakistan and South Asian security

The geopolitical location of Pakistan is piv-otal to the broader security situation in theSouth Asia region. Currently it is experi-encing its own insurgency from the PakistanTaliban. At the same time the Taliban areconducting an insurgency inside Afghanis-tan, using the areas of Pakistan as a safe ha-ven and a springboard for these operations.The long-running sore of the disputed re-gion in Kashmir or Jammu and Kashmiralso remains unresolved after many dec-ades, providing grounds for tension betweenPakistan and India. Attacks inside India bymilitants and extremists are a regular occur-rence. Despite India having a plethora ofdomestic terrorist or insurgent groups,2

whenever there is a major terrorist attack,such as the attacks on the Bombay/Mumbaihotels, railway station and Jewish Centre,Pakistan is immediately accused even be-fore the dust has settled. As it happens, inthis case there was a connection and theevent was enough for tensions between thetwo countries to be raised yet again. How-ever, in many other cases it is other dispa-rate groups, often non-Muslim ones thatprove in the end to be responsible for ter-rorist atrocities in India.

The proximity of the Middle East and Iranare also key to the security situation. Many

14 Michael Chandler

of the "foreign fighters" associated withAl-Qaida who went to Iraq to wage jihadagainst the US and its coalition allies havemoved into the Pakistan border regions andjoined the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan –their so-called cause in Iraq having lost im-petus. Also, their presence in Iraq has be-come no longer acceptable to the majorityof Iraqis, even many of the Sunni alongsideof whom they were fighting.

In addition, the seat of Islam and the Ara-bian peninsula are, by modern standards oftravel and influence, but a stone's throwaway. Saudi Arabia had played a significantsupporting role, through Pakistan, to themujahideen in their ousting of the Soviettroops from Afghanistan, and along withPakistan and the United Arab Emiratesmaintained close ties with the Talibanmovement in Afghanistan in its attempts to"Islamize" the country between 1994 and2001. On the sidelines is a resurgent Russiaand a rapidly developing China, presentinga new flavour to the former Great Gamethat was played out in the late 19th centuryby the major powers of the day.

But just how pivotal is the situation in Pakis-tan was emphasized by the Analytical Sup-port and Sanctions Monitoring Team ofthe UN Security Council in their Report of13 May 2009, in which the team went on tostate that: "While they have not developedunified plans or objectives, the Talibangroups in Pakistan continue to test the limitsof their power. The outcome of theirstruggle with the authorities in Pakistan,which has now extended well beyond theFederally Administered Tribal Areas, iscrucial to the future of Al-Qaida, whosepresence in the border area relies on theirsupport. The Team has not been able toverify reports of the Pakistan Taliban plan-ning attacks outside the country, but if thelink with Al-Qaida becomes stronger, it ispossible that a new energy may infuse theglobal threat from terrorism."

Recent events in Pakistan have brought thisstatement into even sharper focus. For along time Pakistan was obliged for verygood domestic reasons to walk a tightropebetween responding to requests from theUSA to deal much more robustly with theTaliban and Al-Qaida (who are one and thesame to US domestic audiences) and acqui-escing to a large Muslim population. Sig-nificant numbers of Pakistani Muslims havea greater empathy towards the Taliban, onaccount of them being fellow Pashtuns andMuslims, than towards the 'infidel' USA,which had seemingly abandoned them andover 2.5 million Afghan refugees after theSoviet Army had been ousted from Af-ghanistan in 1989. Now the tables havebeen turned, and quite dramatically at that.

The reality of Islamist extremism is four-square on Pakistan's front door. There wasthe protracted engagement between Pakis-tan's security forces and Islamist militants atthe Red Mosque; a variety of serious gov-ernmental and security-related issues in theNorth West Frontier Province (NWFP); andconflict in some of the Federally Adminis-tered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in Waziris-tan which border Afghanistan and in whichthe Taliban and Al-Qaida have unimpededfreedom of movement and sanctuary basedon a life-long established culture of 'hospi-tality to the traveller'. But the worst of theseissues relates to events in the Swat Valley.This case is of crucial importance to ademocratic Pakistan, in that the country hasfound itself embroiled in a major insur-gency. Some may argue that it brought it onitself by not being in a position to recognizeand deal robustly with the threat.

3. Terrorism as a tactic

The key point is that "terrorism" per se is atactic utilized by militants and extremistsand not just Islamist militants and extrem-ists (although they are the primary threat in

Terrorism: difficulties faced by national governments and the international community 15

this discussion) in attempting to achievetheir goals. But a careful assessment of how,why and where militant groups associatedwith Al-Qaida and/or the Taliban are car-rying out terrorist attacks has revealed that anumber of countries are actually experienc-ing or facing insurgency and the terroriststhen become insurgents, which is a moreaccurate description.

By definition, for example according toPrinceton University's lexical database, aninsurgency is "an organized rebellion aimedat overthrowing a constituted governmentthrough the use of subversion and armedconflict".3

This is somewhat at odds with the definitionof terrorism, a problem that still exists for asmall number of countries despite realisticattempts by the United Nations to obtain aconsensus in 2005 with the following defi-nition: "any action … that is intended tocause death or serious bodily harm to civil-ians or non-combatants, when the purposeof such an act, by its nature or context, is tointimidate a population or to compel a Gov-ernment or an international organization todo or to abstain from doing any act".

Although most UN member states acceptthis definition, a small number of Arabcountries and Iran do not agree with it. Thedissenters have always wanted an amend-ment that recognizes the activities of Israelagainst the Palestinians as "acts of terror-ism" and naturally there are key players onthe world scene who in turn will not acceptthis approach. Why? Because in the first in-stance it is the Palestinians that resorted toacts of terrorism, not just directly against Is-rael, but to make their point they took their"acts of terrorism" to many other countries,with aircraft hijackings, attacks on airports,against diplomats and even the OlympicGames in Munich 1972. Here again we seeterrorism being used as a tactic to try andachieve a political end, in this case so farwithout success.

However, the most important point in thisdiscussion is knowing with what you aredealing. In Iraq, the US-lead coalition soonrealized that the attacks against them werecoming primarily from Iraqis inside Iraq, inthe form of guerilla warfare, and that it wasan insurgency that had to be understood andtackled as such. Terrorist groups were in-volved, but then so were significant num-bers of the indigenous folk.

4. Continuing mistrust betweenIndia and Pakistan, andAfghanistan and Pakistan

The mistrust between India and Pakistan isdeeply rooted in the problems of Jammuand Kashmir. Pakistan feels that it went along way on this issue while General PervezMusharraf was President and that India hasfailed to reciprocate. India for her part con-siders that Pakistan still does not do enoughto reduce the threat to India from Islamistmilitants based in Pakistan.

In relation to its current military operationin the Swat Valley, Pakistan will say that itis now tackling the Taliban head-on. How-ever, this has only been possible becausePakistan is now a democracy and not amilitary dictatorship. The country has anindependent judiciary and proudly boasts alively and dynamic free press and media:there are now over 50 independent televi-sion stations in Pakistan. The PakistanArmed Forces are now seen as under demo-cratic control. A 'cross-party' consensus hasbeen achieved in the parliament that non-state actors will not be tolerated within thecountry's borders, especially when theychallenge the legitimate authority of theelected government.

But it is not an easy task. The PakistanArmed Forces have to a large extent beenorganized for conventional warfare and notasymmetric warfare. The US also learnt the

16 Michael Chandler

difference at great cost after it invaded Iraqin 2003 and then found itself fighting ontwo fronts, Iraq and Afghanistan. The UKfound the adjustment less of a problem,perhaps because it had far more experienceover past decades of conducting low-inten-sity operations around the world. In fact inthe early days of the so-called invasion ofIraq in March 2003, British units in andaround Basra in south-east Iraq applied thewell-established practices of "hearts andminds" in an effort to convince the localpopulation that they, the UK Forces, reallywere there to rid the country of tyrannicalrule. Pakistani Army officers have revealedin conversations that they know the size ofthe task. It does not require a military gen-ius to see what a daunting challenge facesthe Pakistan Armed Forces. Simply the ter-rain of the Swat Valley presents enormousdifficulties for counter-insurgency operations.Within the Pakistan army there are officerswho know the importance of reaching out tothe population, who know the importance of"hearts and minds".

The reason why the Pakistan Armed Forceshave been organized on conventional linesis that the main threat to the country wasalways perceived to be India. This particu-lar threat was also the explanation for Paki-stan's sympathy and support for the Taliban.In addition to being Pashtun, like the ma-jority of the tribes that occupy Pakistan'seastern border regions with Afghanistan,southern Afghanistan was seen as providingPakistan with "strategic depth" in the eventof an Indian invasion. Even if a little am-bivalent, well-informed Pakistanis will tellyou now that India is not a threat. If that isthe case, then it should now be possible tostart reorganizing, re-equipping and re-training at least a significant proportion ofthe Pakistan Armed Forces for asymmetricoperations. The success of such a reorgani-zation will, however, depend on how far thethreat to the country is appreciated and un-derstood. That is a fundamental and crucialaspect of countering terrorism.

5. The importance ofunderstanding the threat

Having a clear understanding of the threat isfundamental to being able to effectivelycounter it. If the threat is not understoodthen it is not possible to develop the appro-priate strategy and tactics to counter thethreat and decide on the correct resources toachieve the goals defined by the strategythat is adopted. Understanding the threatdemands political will and this is an impor-tant ingredient that is missing time andagain from the counter-terrorism efforts ofthe international community.

Despite the outward sympathy that mostcountries and states expressed to the USAin response to the 9/11 attacks in the USA,it soon became apparent that many coun-tries had reservations concerning the im-plementation of measures called for unani-mously by the UN Security Council underChapter VII resolutions. Specifically,Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001("Threats to international peace and securitycaused by terrorist acts") and all relevantresolutions, starting with Resolution 1267 in1999 concerning sanctions against Al-Qaidaand the Taliban, their supporters and sym-pathizers have presented many governmentswith dilemmas. This process has improvedwith time, but it continues to be hamperedby interpretation of the Listing versus "dueprocess". This is invariably a nationalproblem and even when countries have up-held sanctions measures against listed indi-viduals and entities, other august bodieshave upheld the appeal of the individuals –the different attempts of Yussef al-Qadi(a.k.a. al-Kadi) are just one such case inpoint. This has proved counterproductive inthe international effort to counter terrorismand has only encouraged weaker govern-ments not to fully implement the requiredsanctions measures.

Another reason for these less than compli-ant attitudes has been revulsion on the part

Terrorism: difficulties faced by national governments and the international community 17

of many people to the so-called "global waron terror". The use of this phrase, the GlobalWar on Terror (GWOT), to define the threatas perceived by the Bush Administrationwas unfortunate. Notwithstanding the factthat Osama bin Laden "declared war"against the Jews, the 'crusaders' (USA) andtheir Allies, the use of this phrase provedto be counterproductive and repugnant tomany countries which were initially sup-portive following the 9/11 attacks in the US.Most prefer to speak about "combatingtransnational terrorism", if in fact the term"terrorism" is to be used at all. The key pointis that terrorism per se is a tactic utilized bymilitants, in this case Islamist militants, inattempting to achieve their goals. It is notpossible to wage war against a tactic.

This brings us back to the question as towhether the "Global War on Terror" inSouth Asia can ever be won. This wouldappear to be a non-question. Whatever thenature of the particular threat with whichwe are faced collectively, it has to be dealtwith effectively. But wars are somethingthat has to be won. This would infer a vic-tory and a foe who has been vanquished.And so in this case to call it a war is incor-rect. What remains the single most impor-tant fact is that the threat must be appreci-ated and understood in order for the cam-paign to be successful. The threat in thecase of the Taliban, whether in Pakistan orin Afghanistan, and their Al-Qaida associ-ates, is that they are staging an insurgency.

This is particularly relevant in the case ofPakistan, because the Taliban are intent onchanging the legal basis of the state inwhich they live as well as trying to under-

mine the legitimacy of the government. Theseinsurgents are using terror as one of theirtactics, both against the villagers whosehospitality they have demanded and againstwhat they perceive to be legitimate targets,whether police stations, politicians, hotelsor mosques.

6. Conclusion

It is fundamental for national governmentsand the international community to under-stand the threat if the right strategy, tacticsand resources are to be deployed, evenwhen this carries cost implications andmeans that the local armed forces may haveto be retrained.

"Hearts and minds" are an important part ofan effective counter-insurgency campaign.It is crucial to harness the will of the popu-lation against the insurgents or, sometimes,to persuade the insurgents of the futility oftheir perceived cause, ideology or evenplain simple criminal behaviour. It is oftenthe case that terrorist acts are murder andmayhem, nothing more than crimes com-mitted against people and property.

The final significant pillar of countering in-surgency is intelligence – sound, accurate,timely intelligence to enable the "forces ofgood" to triumph over the "forces of evil".This is also another reason why developingthe "hearts and minds" aspect of the cam-paign is so important, because when the ci-vilian population is supportive of the secu-rity forces then it is much more inclined toprovide information which in turn becomesessential intelligence.

Notes

1 See paragraph 4 of UN Security Council docu-ment S/2009/245 dated 13 May 2009. The Team'sreport of March 2008 is document S/2008/324.

2 See www.satp.org – India terrorist groups.

3 See http://wordnet.princeton.edu.

Naxalite ideology, strategy and tactics

Vinod Anand

Left-wing extremism (LWE) is one of thethree ideological streams in India which haveemployed terror tactics in varying degrees,the other two being Islamism and ethnicity-based movements in India. Also known asMaoism or Naxalism, LWE is based onthe belief that terrorism is the only viablestrategy for revolutionary movements onbehalf of the weak in the Third World,among others in countries such as Malaysiaor Vietnam. It had surfaced in Europe andelsewhere, especially since the late 1950s.The Red Army Faction in West Germany(also known as the Baader-Meinhof Group),the Red Army Faction of Japan, the Weath-ermen and Black Panthers in the USA, theTupamaros of Uruguay and several otherleft-extremist terrorist groups sprang upduring the 1960s in different parts of theworld at the same time as the Naxalites andMaoists in India.

LWE or Naxalism as it is called in Indiatook its roots from a village called Naxal-bari in West Bengal. The movement wasstarted in 1967 by an extremist break-awayfaction of the CPM, the Communist Partyof India (Marxist). This extremist factionhad a fairly extensive following among thetea-garden labourers of the peasantry in thearea. In order to address their grievances,Naxalites resorted to violence in accordancewith their ideology of a peoples' revolution-ary movement. By 2004 there were severalNaxalite/Maoist groups operating in differ-ent parts of the country and adhering to aradical and extremist ideology. That sameyear in a very significant development twoof the major groups – the Peoples' WarGroup, operating in Andhra Pradesh, andthe Maoist Communist Centre in Bihar andadjoining areas – merged to form the Com-munist Party of India (Maoist). Since then,

the CPI (Maoist) has been seen as the mostactive and strident front of Naxalism in thecountry.

It is an accepted fact that Naxalites typicallyoperate in the vacuum created by the func-tional inadequacy of field-level governancestructures, they espouse local demands, andtake advantage of the prevalent dissatisfac-tion and feelings of perceived neglect andinjustice among the under-privileged andremote segments of the population. Simul-taneously, systematic efforts are made bythem to prevent the execution and imple-mentation of development projects, to de-liberately target critical infrastructure likerailways, roads, power and telecommunica-tions, and to try and create an environment,through violence and terror, where the gov-ernance structures at field levels are shownas being ineffective.1

Assessing the root causes of Naxalism, aPlanning Commission document outlineseight reasons for the growth of the resis-tance movement: sale and transfer of triballand to other people; indebtedness resultingin the sale of land for inconsequentialamounts; eviction of tribals by non-tribalpeople or government authorities; conver-sion of land from community ownershipto individual ownership; treatment oftribal people as encroachers on forestland, depriving them of their traditionalsource of livelihood; failure to give titledeeds for government land distributed totribal people; developments that disturbthe environment in tribal areas and forceindigenous people to move out; and large-scale displacement because of developmentprojects such as multi-purpose irrigationprojects, power plants, mining projects andurbanization.2

20 Vinod Anand

India's political leadership is confrontedwith the challenge Naxalism poses to inter-nal stability and economic development.There is also a wide degree of recognitionin the polity that it is not merely a law en-forcement problem but the phenomenon hasits root causes in socio-economic depriva-tion. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh hasobserved that: "In many areas, the phe-nomenon of Naxalism is directly related tounderdevelopment. It is not a coincidencethat it is the tribal areas that are the mainbattleground of left-wing extremism today.Large swathes of tribal territory have be-come the hunting ground of left-wing ex-tremists. Exploitation, artificially depressedwages, iniquitous socio-political circum-stances, inadequate employment opportu-nities, lack of access to resources, under-developed agriculture, geographical isola-tion, lack of land reforms – all contributesignificantly to the growth of the Naxalitemovement".

After taking over the reins a second time, hefurther observed in June 2009 that if LWEcontinued to flourish in areas which havenatural resources of minerals, the climate forinvestment would certainly be affected. Heresolved to implement a two-pronged ap-proach to tackle Naxalism by ensuring thedevelopment of regions breeding LWE whilemaintaining law and order.

According to several estimates, a total of170 districts and 14 states are afflicted withthe menace of 'red terror'; some to a lesser,others to a greater degree (see Figure 1 formap of the Naxal-affected areas). Lately,there has also been a resurgence of Naxalismin three tribal districts of West Bengal wherethe incidence of Naxalism had declined inrecent years. From January to the first weekof June 2009 alone, there were over 900 in-cidents of red terror resulting in the death of123 Naxals and 155 security forces personnel(see Figure 2 detailing fatality figures).

Figure 1: Naxal-affected areas

Naxalite ideology, strategy and tactics 21

The casualties have been evidently morethan the violence-related casualties either inJammu and Kashmir or in the North East. Inthe recent past there has been a concentrationof violent incidents and casualties mainly insome districts of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhandand, to some extent, in parts of Bihar andOrissa. According to the 2008 report of theMinistry of Home Affairs, these four statestogether accounted for 80% of all incidentsof Naxal violence in the last three years.

Furthermore, the new government in itsaction plan for the next 100 days and beyondhas included eliminating Naxalism as oneof its prime objectives. Statistical evidenceprovides support to the Prime Minister's re-cent assertion that Naxalism is the greatestthreat to security in India. Institutionaliza-tion of Naxalism across Central India is ex-pected to challenge the state over the nextdecade or more.

Figure 2

Naxal violence: fatality figures

Data up to June 9, 2009

States Civilian SecurityForces

Naxal Total

Andhra Pradesh 5 0 7 12

Bihar 12 18 13 43

Jharkhand 28 24 33 85

Karnataka 0 0 0 0

Chhattisgarh 39 56 45 140

Maharashtra 5 34 15 54

Orissa 15 18 10 43

West Bengal 18 5 0 23

Uttar Pradesh 0 0 0 0

Tamil Nadu 0 0 0 0

Total* 122 155 123 400

Note: compiled from news reports and provisional.

22 Vinod Anand

2008


Naxal Total


Bihar 35 21 15 71


Karnataka 3 1 3 7



Orissa 24 76 32 132



Tamil Nadu 0 0 1 1

Total 210 214 214 638

2007


Naxal Total


Bihar 23 21 5 49


Karnataka 1 1 6 8



Orissa 13 2 8 23

West Bengal 6 0 1 7


Total 240 218 192 650


2006


Naxal Total


Bihar 16 5 19 40


Karnataka 0 0 1 1



Orissa 3 4 16 23



Total 266 128 348 742

1. Naxalism:ideology-oriented terrorism

What is the ideology of LWE and what isits genesis in India? The movement startedalmost 40 years ago by the charismatic per-sonality Charu Mazumdar may have lost itsintellectual and ideological moorings be-cause of the way it has become criminalizedand yet it has now spread to around 170districts all over the country. Its ideologicalbase has diminished and it now includesmany lumpen elements. But it also seems tohave some support from deprived andalienated sections of the population. Themovement had its origins in the small vil-lage of Naxalbari in West Bengal where onthe basis of the 'land-to-tiller' programme ofthe state government, the poor peasants andlandless labour who expected to get only athird of the produce (let alone some land)were denied their just dues. From a smallincident in Naxalbari in May 1967 which

was ruthlessly suppressed by the police, themovement based on Charu Mazumdar'sideas of agrarian revolution has now be-come a force of worrisome proportions. ThePrime Minister has repeatedly referred to itas the biggest threat to internal security.

Charu Mazumdar was greatly influenced byMaoist ideology and wanted to bring aboutan armed revolution based on the ideologyand methods of the Chinese Communistswhich had led them to victory in China. Infact, during the height of the CulturalRevolution in China, the People's Daily de-scribed the uprising in May 1967 as "a pealof spring thunder". He authored a series ofarticles in the mid-sixties which formed thebasis of Naxalism and were referred to asthe "Historic Eight Documents". He andhis party, the Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist) i.e. the CPI-ML, hadrunning fights with the Communist Partygovernment of West Bengal on ideology

24 Vinod Anand

and methods to implement his revolutionaryideas. A respected figure in the Naxalitemovement, his death in a police station inJuly 1972 led to a temporary collapse ofcentral authority. There was continued pres-sure to curb Naxal activities during 1975when a state of emergency was declared byIndira Gandhi. Meanwhile, there were manysplits and mergers within the Naxalitegroupings and left-wing parties.

After the 2004 merger of the two majorMaoist parties – the People's War Group(PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre(MCC) – into the CPI(M), a document titled"Party Programme" was issued which con-tains the ideological basis of the merged en-tity. The document is replete with the erst-while diatribes and jargon of the Maoistbrand of communism reminiscent of MaoistChina. Some of the important aspects ofMaoist ideology, thought processes and pre-cepts are given in the following paragraphs.

The Party Programme document avers that"The domination and control of the imperi-alist finance capital in every sphere of ourlife – economic, political, military and cul-tural – continued to increase further andfurther. Actually, the imperialists controlthe key sectors of the Indian economy andeven the administration ... Recently, thestranglehold of imperialist finance capitalover agricultural sector also continued totighten along with other sectors becauseof WTO and imperialist globalization ...Hence, India continues to be a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under theneo-colonial form of imperialist indirectrule, exploitation and control".3

According to the Maoists, globalization is awar on the people and it is the ideology ofmarket fundamentalists. Market fundamen-talists are destroying everything the nationhad possessed and preserved for centuries.Further, they consider the Indian bureau-cratic class to be one of the chief instrumentsfor imperialist exploitation and control over

India. Thousands of big imperialist multina-tional corporations (MNCs) and transna-tional corporations (TNCs) have been al-lowed to operate. Through these policies im-perialism is increasingly moving towardstrampling so-called sovereignty underfoot, inthe neo-colonial manner of semi-colonialcountries. Maoists further expound that thereare four major contradictions in their coun-try, namely:

1. Contradiction between imperialism andthe Indian people;

2. Contradiction between feudalism andthe broad masses of the people;

3. Contradiction between capital and la-bour;

4. Contradiction among the ruling classes.

The first two of these four major contradic-tions are basic contradictions. These twocontradictions have to be resolved duringthe current stage of the new democraticrevolution, and they also play the major ordominant role in chalking out the overallstrategy for the current stage of the Indianrevolution.4

Further, Maoists consider the caste system tobe a specific form of social oppression andexploitation affecting the oppressed castesof the country. Most adivasis (aborigines/tribals) are in the process of developing asnationalities and the overwhelming majorityof them are the most suppressed and re-pressed sections of Indian society. Maoistsenvision that the new democratic revolutionwill smash this imperialist and feudal ideol-ogy and culture and will establish the newdemocratic culture and socialist ideology.And this is how they will do it: "For this itwill be necessary to smash the state ma-chinery and all other centres of power of theruling classes thoroughly and build up thedemocratic power of the people based on aworker-peasant alliance. In this way, ourrevolution will follow the path of the Chi-nese Revolution".


In addition the Maoists also consider urbanstruggles to be very important, particularlythose of the working class. Their long-termobjective is to capture the big cities, the'fortresses of the enemy'. During the lastphase of the so-called New DemocraticRevolution, Maoists aim to build a four-class united front comprising all theseclasses – the working class, peasantry, pettybourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie – un-der the leadership of the working classbased on a worker-peasant alliance. The ul-timate objective is to promote and establish"Socialism and Communism on a worldscale" in India. Victory in revolution is tobe achieved through a three-pronged strat-egy (termed the three 'magic weapons'):5

1. A strong revolutionary party based onMarxism-Leninism-Maoism as its guidingideological basis in all matters;

2. A strong and well-disciplined people'sarmy under the leadership of such a party.The people's army will primarily be builtthrough the armed agrarian revolution andfrom among the landless poor peasants, agri-cultural labourers and the working class;

3. A united front of all revolutionary classesunder the leadership of the proletariat basedon the worker-peasant alliance and on thegeneral programme of the people's demo-cratic revolution. This united front will bebuilt in the course of advancing the armedstruggle and for the seizure of politicalpower through armed struggle.

In essence, the basic pillars of the Maoistideology are the annihilation of class ene-mies, and violence as the means of securingits goals. Recently, Koteshwar Rao aliasKishanji, the deputy leader of India's CPI(Maoist), observed that "the Islamic up-surge should not be opposed as it is basi-cally anti-US and anti-imperialist in nature.We, therefore, want it to grow". He alsotook pride in the fact that he had personallyordered the attack on the West Bengal Chief

Minister in November 2008 which did notsucceed because at several places mice hadchewed up the cable connected to the im-provised explosive device (IED).6 Earlier,the ideologues of CPI (Maoist) have con-sidered the Islamic upsurge as a progressiveanti-imperialist force in the contemporaryworld. In their view it is wrong to describethe struggle that is going on in Iraq, Af-ghanistan, Palestinian territory, Kashmir,Chechnya, and several other countries as astruggle by Islamic fundamentalists or as a"clash of civilizations". In essence, Maoistideology avers that all these are nationalliberation wars notwithstanding the role ofIslamic fundamentalists in these struggles.

2. Strategy and tactics

In order to put their ideology into practice,Naxalites have been following the basictenet of Mao that "political power grows outof the barrel of a gun". In their Congressheld in 2007 they resolved to intensify andextend the "people's war" to all fronts bytaking the guerrilla war to a higher levelof mobile warfare in areas where it hadalready reached an advanced stage and toexpand their areas of armed struggle to asmany states as possible.

An important element of this strategy wasthe use of targeted violence to oppose theestablishment of Special Economic Zones(SEZs) which were considered to be "neo-colonial enclaves on Indian territory". Ac-cording to Maoist precepts, SEZs are notonly seizing the fertile farmlands of thepeasants but are transforming the entirecountry into special zones for the unhin-dered ruthless exploitation and control byimperialists and the big business houses. Itis ironical that in order to promote its eco-nomic growth the Indian government hademulated this idea from the land of Maowhere such radical ideology has long beendiscarded. And that is why there has been aspate of violent protests in Singhur and

26 Vinod Anand

Nandigram in West Bengal and at otherplaces in states where SEZs are beingestablished or land is being acquired for bigprojects and MNCs. This is particularly soin West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa andChhattisgarh.

Economic targets were identified as themain focus of the organization in the Febru-ary 2007 Congress of the Maoists: "The 300planned SEZs (Special Economic Zones)are all set to create de facto foreign enclaveswithin our country by grabbing lakhs ofacres of prime agricultural land by the for-eign and local sharks. The Unity Congressof the CPI (Maoist) calls on the people toresist the seizure of their lands and housesand beat back the demolition hordes bywhatever means possible".7 This strategywas fostered in various ways with reports ofinvolvement of Naxal workers in rioting inWest Bengal's Special Economic Zone(SEZ). The Naxals had tried to justifytheir opposition to SEZs by describing theconcept of an economic zone as a modernversion of the old 'zamindari' system. Theminutes of the Congress meeting show theMaoists planned to arm locals where SEZswere proposed. The Annual Report ofthe Central Military Commission of CPI(Maoist) had outlined the plan to disruptseveral proposed infrastructure projects,steel plants and mining projects. They alsoplanned to transform their current 'guerrilla'units into 'mobile wings' capable of strikingin various parts of the country and then dis-appearing.8

As part of the shift to increased mobile war-fare, they have launched operations againstsecurity units by deploying major forces of200 to 300 guerrillas. This has led to heavycasualties, economic disruption and large-scale destruction. Some areas of Orissa,Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh illustrate thefirst stages of this phase of mobile warfare.Government buildings and infrastructuresuch as jails, police stations and railwaystations have been targeted. Attacks on rail-

ways have been classified by the railwayauthorities as catastrophic node failures whichhave destroyed the station, office, railway lineor cable. There are many more disruptivenode failures which do not lead to substantialdamage and hence go largely unreported.9

For instance, Naxals continued their strat-egy of targeting jails by damaging on 28January 2008 a jail under construction inOrissa. Bihar has seen ten incidents of jail-break in 2007 in different jails throughoutthe state, including at Beur, Motihari andSasaram. The Naxals have found railwayinfrastructure a lucrative target. Thus, theEast Central division of Indian Railwayswhich covers the states of Bihar, Jharkhandand West Bengal has reported a rising trendof Naxal attacks on railways. The statisticsof the last three years indicate that there hasbeen an almost hundred percent increase inattacks on vital infrastructure.

Furthermore, the focus on economic war-fare serves two purposes: it keeps develop-ment beyond the reach of the common manand increases the Naxals' access to financethrough extortion and ransom. On the macrolevel, a Hindustan Times report quoting theIndian Defence Yearbook claimed thatNaxalites in Jharkhand earned an annuallevy of 3.2 billion rupees or 10 percent ofthe state's total revenue in a year. The mal-aise is particularly rampant in Jharkhand,Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal, Biharand Andhra Pradesh. Given that most ofthese states are rich in minerals, the Naxalsimpose a levy on businesses, transportersand contractors including those collectingtendu leaves, an industry which is the mainsource of agricultural income for the poor.Rs 70,000 per annum are charged from coalfirms and Rs 25,000 per annum from trans-porters. Political parties are also known topay Naxalite protection money. The salarypaid to Naxals is said to be Rs 1,000 to Rs3,000 per month, with an insurance cover ofRs 1.25 lakh if they die in encounters.Home Ministry figures suggest Naxalites


have a strength of 10,000 guerrillas and alarge number of modern arms and equip-ment.

Since 2008 there have been increasing signsthat the Maoists would continue to focus oneconomic targets, given the upsurge in in-vestment in the mineral-rich states ofChhattisgarh and Jharkhand. According togovernment sources in 2007, Chhattisgarhhad succeeded in garnering Rs 107,899crore (1 crore is equal to 10 million rupees)of new investment.10 It is apparent that theMaoists want to target this investment par-ticularly since local aspirations remain un-fulfilled, given that development is takingplace only in terms of the extraction of ironore and other minerals without any tangibletransfer of benefits to the local population.

In order to realize their goals of expandingtheir struggle to new areas, the Maoistshave attempted to draw new states likeJammu and Kashmir, Gujarat, Rajasthan,Himachal Pradesh and Meghalaya into theirfold. These are prosperous areas with large-scale growth and development wherecontracting can attract heavy levies for theNaxals. Karnataka is emerging as anotherarea of concern. The once peaceful Malnadregion is wracked with the threat of Naxal-ism. Regional, zonal and state committeestargeting urban cities and towns are report-edly being set up. Two principal industrialbelts have been reportedly identified for ur-ban mobilization – Bhilai-Ranchi-Dhanbad-Kolkata and Mumbai-Pune-Surat-Ahmed-abad.11

The destruction of economic infrastructureserves a dual purpose, that of obliteratingstate authority and threatening companieswith extortion. In October 2008 Maoists setfire to the tower of Airtel, a private telecomcompany, in the Dhotawa area of Katkam-sandi in Bihar. Maoists had targeted thistelecom company as the management hadrefused to pay them a levy of Rs 1 lakh over

the previous two years. They blasted high-tension power lines in Bastar in June 2008,which led to an eleven-day power outage insix districts that affected mining operationsand the movement of ore from Bailadillamines. The National Mineral DevelopmentCorporation is reported to have incurred aloss of Rs 9 crore a day. Days after the'Bastar blackout', the Maoists blew up thecontrol station of a mini hydel power gen-eration unit at Sileru in the Donkarai area ofEast Godavari District.12

As part of their larger strategy, Maoists alsoenforce economic blockades, some of whichare inspired by a series of strikes (called"chakka jams" – traffic blockades – in localparlance) organized by the Maoist party inNepal. Naxals have carried out blockadeson several occasions; recently at the end ofApril 2009 in Latehar. On such occasionstrain services across the states have beenadversely affected. While major incidentswere avoided, some of the blockades havenot been without their share of bloodshed.Maoists struck at two places late June 2008,holding up traffic on national highways 33in Jharkhand, and 42 in Orissa. Such block-ades cripple economic activities, especiallyin the transport sector. With businessmenhaving low confidence in the law enforce-ment agencies, they usually think it prudentto withdraw trucks and other commercialvehicles.13

According to the Maoists' list of targets,projects identified by the Naxals on their hitlist include the bauxite mining project of theJindals group in Visakhapatnam, the Po-lavaram irrigation project, steel plants pro-posed by Tata Steel, Essar and Jindals steelgroup companies in Chhattisgarh, the Cen-tre's proposed railway line in the Rajhara-Raighat-Jagdalpur sector, Posco's steel plants(under construction) in Orissa, power plantsproposed by Reliance in Uttar Pradeshand the Kosi irrigation project in northernBihar.14

28 Vinod Anand

The rural sector is also not being ignored.Pamphlets pasted in villages carried awarning addressed to tribals in Bastar tostop all farming activities in the region. TheNaxals have instructed peasants to join thestruggle instead of supporting private andpublic sector companies which were said tobe harming the economy. Peasants who re-sisted have been brutally killed.

Moreover, the Naxalites seem to be repeat-ing some of their tactics from the 1969-72period of attacks on political opponents, inaddition to attacking the police. For in-stance, in West Bengal they have startedtargeting specific CPM (the current rulingparty in West Bengal) functionaries at locallevels where such local leaders were mobi-lizing support against the Naxalites. Theirtargets are not confined to the familiarNaxalite-affected districts of West Mid-napore, Purulia and Bankura. During 2005-08, a number of CPM party functionarieswere attacked and killed in the districts ofNadia, Burdwan, Birbhum, Murshidabad,etc. where the Naxalites were known to bepresent in the 1970s. It shows that they havebeen regrouping in some of the areas wherethey had earlier influence in 1969-72. Thistrend is likely to extend to other areas also.Another element of Naxalite strategy hasbeen to disrupt elections so as to stall thedemocratic process, especially in Chhattis-garh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar.15 Duringthe polls in April 2009 a number of attackswere carried out to discourage the commonpeople in Naxal-affected areas, especiallyby taking advantage of the thinning out ofsecurity forces for the national elections.The objective again was to show the erosionof the government's authority and the con-solidation and enlargement of their owncontrol and influence amongst the populace.As a perception management exercise theyhad earlier warned the people to boycott thepolls.

Meanwhile the Maoists developed some ex-pertise in the use of landmines and impro-

vised explosive devices (IEDs) which causedvery significant casualties among police andother security personnel. The IEDs havebeen increasingly used by the Naxalites inwell-planned attacks on even high-securitypersonalities in addition to other targets likepolice stations and police vehicles. On arough estimate and in what is quite a dis-turbing phenomenon, the Naxalites have sofar caused nearly 100 landmine explosionsevery year, with considerable loss of life ofstate security personnel and police.

There has been an increasing militarizationand simultaneous acquisition of sophisticatedfirearms and ammunitions by the Naxalites.Their arsenal now boasts of self-loadingrifles (SLRs), AK series of rifles and INSASrifles. It is believed that currently the Maoistshave also gained access to the technology offabricating rockets and rocket launchers. Agovernment report estimates that there are9000-10,000 armed cadres with access toabout 6,500 firearms and in addition theremay be further 40,000 full-time cadres.16

Naxalites have also been able to establish abasis in the Dandakaranya forest, spanningMadhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa andparts of Maharashtra. This area which isalso known as Abuj Mand is a 10,000 squarekilometre zone of unexplored forest with ameagre population of 20,000 and hardly anysurface communications. This area is the sizeof a small country such as Israel or Belgium.Law enforcement agencies have hardly en-tered this area. It is fast becoming a firmbase for the Maoists and its central locationfacilitates the launching of operations, pro-vision of training as well as rest and recu-peration. Training camps in the area arespread across three to four square kilome-tres and even concrete bunkers have beenfound there. The central government inconcert with the respective state govern-ments has announced its intention to carryout operations against the Maoists in thisarea after the 2009 monsoons.17


3. Government counter-strategy

The real key to fighting the Naxalites isreliable and timely intelligence. Thus, ef-fective integration of strategic and tacticalintelligence and information at police stationlevel is of vital importance. The approachof the governments at both central andstate level is based on the triple pillars ofstrengthening the police forces, promotingdevelopment and improving the socio-economic conditions of the affected areasthrough a number of schemes.

In March 2006, the then Union Home Min-ister outlined a 14-point strategy to dealwith the Naxal problem. Conceding thatNaxalism was not merely a law and orderproblem, the government was to addressthis menace simultaneously and in a holisticmanner in the areas of political security, de-velopment and public perception manage-ment. A collective and coordinated ap-proach, improved police response and nodialogue with the Naxalites unless theyagreed to give up violence and arms weresome of the points stressed in the strategydocument. Faster socio-economic develop-ment, distribution of the land to the poorand speedy implementation of land reforms,restoration of government machinery, resto-ration of people's faith in the governmentand efficient use of mass media to highlightthe futility of Naxal violence and loss of lifeand property were other key areas of atten-tion in the government's strategy paper.However, when strategy is often articulatedwithout being implemented it starts to ac-quire the status of mere rhetoric and re-peated platitudes.

There have been attempts to overcome thedifficulties of coordination and adopting aunified approach by different state govern-ments and the centre by setting up an 'Em-powered Group' of Ministers headed by theHome Minister and tasked with closelymonitoring the spread of the Naxal move-ment, reviewing special measures to be

taken and improvement of inter-state coor-dination in an exchange of intelligence, per-sonnel and any other kind of assistance. AStanding Committee of Chief Ministers ofconcerned states under the chairmanship ofthe Union Home Minister has been estab-lished to work out a coordinated policy andspecific measures to deal with the Naxaliteproblem on the political, security and de-velopment fronts.

An inter-ministerial group has also beenformed to review and coordinate the workbeing done to provide livelihood andamenities to the deprived population. Theministries of rural development, environ-ment and forests, Panchayati Raj and thePlanning Commission have their repre-sentatives on the committee, with the mainobjective of bringing the alienated peopleinto the mainstream.

Development and security have beenmerged under the aegis of the Naxal Man-agement Division in the Union Home Min-istry. It monitors the Naxal situation andcounter-measures being taken by the af-fected states with the objective of improv-ing ground-level policing and developmentresponse in accordance with the location-specific action plans formulated or to beformulated by the affected states. It also re-views whether the various developmentschemes of the ministries and departmentsfor the Naxal-affected areas are being prop-erly implemented and if the funds releasedunder such schemes are being optimallyutilized.

The government had also started a Back-ward Districts Initiative in 2003-2004 underwhich 55 of the worst-affected districtswere to receive considerable funds over aperiod of three years. But for numerous bu-reaucratic reasons there have been problemsin the utilization of these funds. This notonly highlights the apathy of the state gov-ernments but also their inability to imple-ment governmental strategy. Weak govern-

30 Vinod Anand

ance, political expediency and unwilling-ness or reluctance of the police to enter for-ested areas and strongholds of Naxals alsoimpedes the development activities. Similarconditions prevail in other states.

Furthermore, since the Naxal problem isdirectly related to the tribal and forestedareas, the government has been also makingefforts on the legislation front in the direc-tion of recognizing the right of forest-dwellers to forest produce. Another impor-tant area on which central government hasbeen pushing the states is the introductionof land reform. This remains a political is-sue and various states have implementedland reforms with mixed success. The stateswhich have effectively implemented landreforms, for instance West Bengal and Ker-ala, have witnessed a significant decline ofNaxalism.

Funds under the Police ModernizationScheme have been given to the states tomodernize their police force in terms ofmodern weaponry, latest communicationequipment, improvement of mobility andother infrastructure including provision foradditional protection and fortification ofvulnerable police stations in Naxal areas.The states are also being supplied withmine-protected vehicles to counter thelandmine and IED attacks. However, theNaxals have devised new means of defeat-ing mine-protected vehicles by placing anextraordinary amount of explosive charge inthe IEDs , as for example in Chhattisgarh.

By the December 2008 yearend review ofthe Naxal situation, the government had putinto effect a number of measures to counterthe growing menace of left-wing extrem-ism. In response to continued violence in2009 the new UPA government is chalkingout a 100-day action plan for all ministriesand departments.18 The stress would be onreorienting and fine-tuning its response toNaxal violence. Improving ground-levelpolicing and acceleration of development

plans would be the two important prongs ofthe new plan in addition to many other ele-ments. Even though Multi-Agency Centreshave been established and operationalized,the fact remains that Naxals are exploitingthe lack of intelligence and coordinationamong the government agencies and thepolice. However, in her outline of the cur-rent government's resolve to meet the chal-lenge of terrorism President Pratibha Patilhas stated that a National Counter TerrorismCentre would be established to coordinatemulti-agency centres (MACs), operations,intelligence and anti-terror measures at thenational level.19 The aim is to ensure that"the centralized agency for collection andcollation of intelligence would be strength-ened to ensure effective intelligence sharingand processing ... Enhanced informationand intelligence sharing on a real-time basiswould be made possible by the creation of anet-centric information command struc-ture". Meanwhile, a succession of Naxalattacks in the second week of June 2009 hashighlighted many flaws in the functioningof the intelligence agencies and securityforces, including their training, arms andtactics. These further underscore the urgentneed to implement the measures suggested.

Additional Central Paramilitary Forces havebeen deployed on a long-term basis to quellthe Naxal violence and in the wake of theMumbai terror attack of 26 November 2008.Up to 135,000 personnel are to be recruitedin a phased manner. A special counter-insurgency force of central paramilitaryforces designated COBRA is also beingraised to counter Naxal violence. India Re-serve battalions have been sanctioned inNaxal-affected states not only to strengthenthe security apparatus but also to weanaway youth from rebel activity by providingthem with gainful employment. Even as theaction plan for the anti-Maoist offensive isbeing finalized, the Ministry of Home Af-fairs is working to significantly strengthenboth infrastructure and the arsenal to coun-ter Naxal forces. The forthcoming budget


will see a major increase in allocation forthis purpose.

There are also plans to set up three to fourspecialized anti-Maoist centres at strategiclocations – mainly at inter-state borders –each equipped with about five helicopters.The centres would be manned by the Cen-tral Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and pilotsfrom the Border Security Force (BSF), Armyand Air Force. The government has evenapproved the use of Indian Air Force assetslike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) forreconnaissance and gathering of intelligencein Naxal-affected areas. An auxiliary forceof ex-servicemen drawn from the Naxal-affected areas is also being formed to carryout duties such as detecting mines and ex-plosive devices laid by Naxalites.

Training the police force is another aspectwhich has been receiving greater attentionin states like Andhra Pradesh and Chattis-garh which are providing special training tocounter the well-trained and motivatedNaxal guerrillas and fighters. Chattisgarhstarted a Counter-Terrorism and JungleWarfare College in Kanker three years agowhere police are given rigorous training inguerrilla warfare and trainees live in the openin the dense jungles of Bastar and learn tolive off the land. Training is modelled onthe Army's Counter-Insurgency and JungleWarfare School at Vairengte in Mizoram.Other states have started sending their po-lice personnel to the college for training.

Even if all of the above were to happen, oneof the weakest areas has been the lack of acoordinated approach by political parties tothe scourge of Naxalism. The events in June2009 in the case of the Maoist resurgence inthe Lalgarh area of West Midnapore districtin West Bengal were a classic example ofpolitical expediency, lack of coordinationbetween various agencies, frictions betweenthe centre and state governments especiallywhen both are of different hues, the sorrystate of training and equipment especially of

the state police forces, and above all a lack ofunified political will in dealing with a men-ace that has been declared the single largestthreat to the security of India. One stark les-son which emerged from the Lalgarh crisiswas that while political parties may playtheir opportunistic games in other arenas, inthe realm of national security this is theequivalent of playing with fire. Those in re-sponsible positions are duty-bound to upholdthe rule of law. The only beneficiaries ofpolitical one-upmanship are those who arefighting against the state. In such a murkygame, political leadership ends up becomingan unintended abettor of the outlaws.

4. Concluding observations

If there is one lesson to be learned fromhistory, it is that economic and social de-velopment cannot take place in an environ-ment of insecurity. Security and develop-ment are intimately related as developmentcannot proceed without security, and lack ofdevelopment becomes a cause for alienationof the people and leads to insecurity. Fur-ther, the abrogation of the government'sown responsibility for governance, as in thecase of the situation in the Dandakaranyaforests (Abuj Mand) where rebels are almostrunning their own parallel government, fur-ther erodes the authority of government andthe faith of people in the government. Inaddition, the Naxals gain respectability,strength and revenue resources to perpetu-ate their vested interests.20

Furthermore, movements such as the anti-Naxalite Salwa Judum may appear to be at-tractive on the face of it, and yet the peopleinvolved in such movements become iso-lated and sitting targets for the Maoists.21

Such people require the protection of thepolice and in the case of this particularmovement, 45,000 to 50,000 people havebeen displaced to become refugees in theirown land, thereby further complicating thesituation.

32 Vinod Anand

Lack of political will to implement landreforms, political expediency and sheerinertia in utilizing allotted funds for de-velopment as well as a disjointed ap-proach to the problems of the populacestill remain the main causes promoting

Naxalism. Although the government withits long experience of tackling insurgencyhas come up with a good strategy to dealwith Naxalism, it is at the implementationlevel where concerted efforts are stillneeded.

Notes

1 The Ministry of Home Affairs in its AnnualReport for 2007-08 has accepted these asreasons for the expanding influence of theNaxalites.

2 http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/stories/20071116501502400.htm

3 Maoist document titled "Party Programme" is-sued after the merger of the two main factionsinto CPI (Maoist), www.satp.org

4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 "We support Islamic terrorism", interview of

Second-in-Command of CPI (Maoist) in: TheHindustan Times, 10.6.2009.

7 Maoist document titled "Call of the UnityCongress-9th Congress of the CPI (Maoist)",http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/callofunity.htm

8 "From CRZ to SEZ: Naxal Reins of Terror", in:Jharkhand News, 23-30.4.2007, http://news.jharkhand.org.in/2007_04_01_archive.html

9 Bhonsle, Rahul: Editor South Asia SecurityTrends, February 2008.

10 Media release by Chhattisgarh Government, in:The Hindustan Times, 27.6.2007.

11 Asian Age report quoted in South Asia SecurityTrends, November 2007.

12 K. Srinavas Reddy: Maoists call for a blockade,in: The Hindu, 22.6.2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/22/stories/2007062250581300.htm

13 Bhonsle, Rahul: Editor South Asia SecurityTrends, July 2007.

14 Col. Rahul K. Bhonsle: Naxal Economic WarfareStrategy, 7.7.2007; Online magazine Boloji.com:http://www.boloji.com/opinion/0366.htm

15 Jain, Bharti: Centre readies plan to flush outMaoists after monsoon, in: The EconomicTimes, 11.6.2009.

16 Second Administrative Reforms Commission,Eighth Report, titled: Combatting Terrorism:Protecting by Righteousness, a Government ofIndia publication, June 2008.

17 Jain, Bharti: Centre readies plan to flush outMaoists after monsoons, in: The EconomicTimes, 11.6.2009.

18 Kumar, Vinay: Naxal attacks: Centre rusheshigh-level team to Jharkhand – Home Ministryreorienting strategy, in: The Hindu, 14.6.2009.

19 Government promises action, not just tough talk,on error, in: The Economic Times, 5.6.2009.

20 See Kishanji's (Deputy Leader of the Maoists)interview in The Hindustan Times of 10.6.2009where he states that most of the leadership isalive and safe in Dandakaranya camps, and withtheir mass base intact they would recover theirinfluence in Andhra Pradesh where it has wanedin recent years.

21 Strictures have been passed against the move-ment and the government by the SupremeCourt; See also: Why still prop Salwa judum,activists ask CM, in: The Hindu, 10.6.2009.

Islamic terrorism in India:organizations, tentacles and networks

Animesh Roul

For decades now, India has been facing vari-ous forms and waves of terrorist violenceranging from separatist and ethnic terrorismto ideological and religion-driven terrorism.With the emergence of new and hybrid terrororganizations and conglomerates, there hasbeen a sea change in the nature of terror tac-tics, technology and the way terror tentaclesand networks have spread in the hinterlandsof India and beyond.

India battles terror violence in three majorgeographical zones: Jammu and Kashmir(jihadi separatist, cross-border terrorism),Northeastern States (separatists, ethno-Isla-mist, cross-border terrorism) and Central-Eastern States (Left-wing Extremism/Naxalism). However, since the 13 December2001 terror attack on the Indian Parliamentin New Delhi that marked the beginning ofthis century, the country has been experi-encing serious menaces from Islamic terror-ist groupings that have infiltrated into Indiamostly from neighbouring countries with thesole objective of perpetrating the so-calledIslamic jihad. With the expansion of terrorbases and sleeper cells across the country,these terror groups are increasing their ac-tivities in the urban centres of India, target-ing strategic infrastructures and financiallifelines of the country in order to cripple it.

Before the December 1992 demolition ofBabri Masjid, a mosque in Ayodhya in thenorth Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, terrorismin India was to some extent synonymouswith the Khalistan movement in Punjabwhich was separatist in nature. Subse-quently, Pakistan-sponsored cross-borderterrorism emerged as a proxy war strategywhich later developed into a systematicterrorist movement against India.

This paper focuses on Islamic terrorism inIndia, with particular attention to the majorgroups operating and perpetrating violencein the country and their operational and lo-gistical linkages with each other.

At least two sets of players are involved interrorism in India. The first set comprisesPakistani and Bangladesh-based terrorgroups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Harkat-ul-JihadiIslami (HuJI). The second set is composed ofa network of disgruntled Muslim youth, stu-dents and criminal elements which largelywork as a support system, e.g. the StudentIslamic Movement of India (SIMI). Pastresearch has shown that a small section ofIndia's Muslims – now called home-grownjihadists – has taken to terrorism and has ac-quired international links in recent times.Terrorism among Indian Muslims appears tohave originated following the Babri Mosquedemolition in 1992. Since then, the potentialfor home-grown terrorism has grown exten-sively throughout the country and was fur-ther aggravated by the 2002 Gujarat com-munal riots.

In recent times, JeM and LeT along with theHuJI-Bangladesh are collectively utilizingIndia's porous eastern border for anti-Indiaactivities by establishing 'surrogate bases' inneighbouring Bangladesh, Nepal and in theMiddle East for the movement of trainedcadres and finances for their operations.These groups are recruiting Indian youths,sending them to Pakistan for training andre-inducting them via Bangladesh to carryout terrorist attacks in India's heartland.Many recent terror strikes like the serialblasts in Delhi, twin blasts in Varanasi,mosque and market blasts in Hyderabad and

34 Animesh Roul

the Mumbai carnage are the results of thecollective efforts of these groups.

The Union Ministry of Home Affairs ofthe Government of India has noted in itsAnnual Reports that involvement by JeM,Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Bangladesh-based HuJI has been observed in most ofthe terror strikes in the country. And the re-cent emergence of Indian Mujahideen (IM)as a home-grown, indigenous jihadi organi-zation with active support from all Pakistan-based terror groups has created new fearsin the Indian security establishment. Mostdisturbingly, these groups have been usingtheir sleeper cells to carry out urban andmass casualty attacks.

1. Major terror organizationsoperating in India

1.1 Lashkar-e-Taiba

Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) is themost deadly Pakistan-based terror organi-zation that has been perpetrating the maxi-mum number of attacks in India's heartland.Apart from its traditional area of operationin Jammu and Kashmir, the group hasspread its tentacles from Western Gujarat tothe eastern border of Manipur and WestBengal, and from the southern state of Ker-ala to Jammu and Kashmir in the North.

The LeT is the military wing of the erstwhilereligious organization, Markaz Da'wat wa'lIrshad (MDI), which later changed its nameinto Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD) following the9/11 events in the USA when the Lashkargroup was banned and declared a ForeignTerrorist Organization by the United States.Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is the chief ofLashkar-e-Taiba. Some of the prominentLeT operatives are Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi,Yahiya Mujahid (spokesman), AbdullahMuntazer Gaznavi (media handler) and AbuHamza.

LeT's presence in J&K was first detected af-ter many Pakistani and Afghan mercenariesinfiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC)in tandem with the Islami Inquilabi Mahaz, aterrorist group then active in the Poonch dis-trict of J&K in the early 1990s. However, thefirst ever attack was reported in August 1992when LeT militants killed nearly 19 IndianArmy soldiers in J&K.1 At a meeting held atTehran in 1993, the LeT had forged an un-derstanding with the Jammu and KashmirPeople's Conference (JKPC) and Al Barq.This paved the way for their joint operationand mission in J&K.

The JUD/LeT and their leaderships are af-filiated to the Ahle Hadith school of thought,a reformist Islamic movement.2 The objec-tives of LeT are to establish Nizam-e-Mustafa (God's government) in the worldand the merger of J&K with Pakistan. At thebehest of Pakistan's ISI, it later added anti-India goals: to destabilize India and impedeits economy. LeT has introduced fidayeenmissions (suicide tactic used by terrorists) inJammu and Kashmir and has intermittentlystruck in India's heartlands with its tactics ofindiscriminate shooting and grenade attacks.

Pakistan's July 2009 dossier admitted for thefirst time that the LeT carried out the 26 No-vember 2008 multiple Mumbai attacks. Thedossier named senior LeT operative Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi as the mastermind. Amongmany of its signature acts, LeT operativescarried out the October 2005 serial bomb ex-plosions in Delhi and the December 2005attack on the Indian Institute of Sciencecampus in Bangalore. With a penchant forattacking security forces, especially theparamilitary Central Reserve Police Force(CRPF), LeT carried out an audacious attackon a CRPF recruitment centre in Rampur,Uttar Pradesh, on 1 January 2008.3 This NewYear's Day attack on the CRPF recruitmentcentre was considered to be the dress re-hearsal for the Mumbai mayhem later thatyear, and it came just over a month after theNovember 2007 multiple blasts in court

Islamic terrorism in India: organizations, tentacles and networks 35

premises in three major cities of UttarPradesh: Lucknow, Faizabad and Varanasi.4

1.2 Jaish-e-Mohammed

Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of the Prophet) isa Pakistani-based terrorist grouping mainlyactive in Jammu and Kashmir in its initialphase, but later collaborating with LeT forterror acts beyond J&K. Maulana MasoodAzhar is the supreme leader of JeM which isa splinter group of Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami(HuJI), an Islamic organization that wasformed in the early 1980s to fight the waragainst the former Soviet Union in Afghani-stan. JeM's leader Maulana Masood Azharwas a member of HuJI before he establishedhis own organization on 31 January 2000 inKarachi in Pakistan.5 Before that, Azhar wasone of the three jailed terrorists releasedfrom prison in India in December 1999 inexchange for hostages in the hijacked IndianAirlines Flight IC-814.6

In common with other J&K-centric organi-zations, this group believes in the secessionof the state with the ultimate aim of mergerwith Pakistan and the destabilization of In-dia. The group claims that each of its officesin Pakistan would serve as schools of jihad.Most of the Jaish-e-Mohammed terror actsare fidayeen (suicide terrorist) attacks inwhich terrorists of the organization storm ahigh-security target, including securityforces' bases, camps and convoys before theyare killed by retaliatory action.

The unit is closely linked through the Bi-noria madrassa in Karachi with the formerTaliban regime of Afghanistan and its pro-tégé Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaidanetwork. The JeM is also reported to havelinks with Sunni terrorist groups operating inPakistan such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Paki-stan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).Supporters are mostly Pakistanis andKashmiris, but also include Afghans andArab veterans of the Afghan war. Its activity

has been expanded to many other parts ofthe country, including the Indian Parliamentattack on 13 December 2001. Prior to this,JeM had perpetrated a similar kind of suicideoperation in storming the J&K LegislativeAssembly in October 2001 and killing nearly35 persons, including 10 security force per-sonnel.

1.3 Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami

Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami, the 'Movement ofIslamic Holy War', has emerged as the larg-est international Sunni Islamic jihadi organi-zation created in and by Pakistan after theLashkar-e-Taiba. It is broadly based in twocountries as HuJI-Pakistan and HuJI-Bangladesh (HuJI-B), whereby the latter ismore potent than the former. HuJI-B cadresare active in India and they are mostly in-filtrated from India's eastern corridors. Theorganization has perpetrated attacks in col-laboration with other Pakistani-based groupssuch as JeM, LeT and home-grown radicalsfrom the Student Islamic Movement of India(SIMI). HuJI has existed in the subcontinentsince the early 1980s with active supportfrom Pakistan-based Deobandi religiousbodies, including the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islami (JuI), and most recently it has set upIndian units in Uttar Pradesh. It also hasbases in Rajasthan, Karnataka, Maharashtraand Andhra Pradesh.

With direct logistical help from LeT, JeMand SIMI, HuJI has coordinated many at-tacks in India in the recent past including theMarch 2006 Sankatmochan Temple blast inVaranasi. HuJI's involvement in the May2007 twin blasts in Hyderabad and in theserial bomb blasts of May 2008 in Jaipurcame to light during the investigations.

HuJI defined itself as the second line of de-fense for every Muslim.7 Its initial objectivewas to organize relief camps for the Afghanmujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war.Afterwards, it began to recruit and train

36 Animesh Roul

mujahideen with support from ISI and grewas a terrorist grouping. Since it has differentunits in different countries, it has multipleobjectives and activities. HuJI contingentsoperating in Pakistan or Jammu and Kash-mir initially focused on liberating J&K, butits current mobilization outside J&K dem-onstrates its present strategy to spread ter-rorism across the country and destabilizeIndia with support from the proscribed Stu-dents Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),ISI and other Islamist extremists.

Apart from having a base in Bangladesh,Pakistan, J&K and some other pockets inIndia, by 2005 the group had spread itstentacles to almost 24 countries, includingChechnya, Fiji, Iran, Ireland, Malaysia,Myanmar, Philippines, Tajikistan, Uzbeki-stan, the United Kingdom, the United States,and parts of Africa and the Middle East.8 InMarch 2008, the US blacklisted Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) forattacks in India and other countries, as a"global terrorist organization".9

1.4 Indian Mujahideen

Indian Mujahideen (IM) has emerged as awell-organized jihadi terrorist group in In-dia, claiming responsibility for a number ofterror attacks perpetrated in various urbancentres of India during 2007-2008. Eventhough the exact moment of IM's formationis not known, the recent arrest of a numberof IM operatives has revealed its possibleexistence and involvement in terror strikesin India as far back as late October 2005.The name "Indian Mujahideen" was report-edly conceived at a terrorist conclave at-tended by top leaders of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami(HuJI) in Pakistani-administered Kashmirin early May 2008.

IM came into the open for the first time inNovember 2007, when simultaneous bombblasts targeted lawyers in court premises in

three Uttar Pradesh cities: Varanasi, Faiza-bad and Lucknow. IM described the attacksas "Islamic raids" and justified them as re-venge against lawyers who had allegedlyassaulted a couple of Jaish-e-Muhammadterrorist suspects. IM also alleged that thelawyers had refused to take cases involvingother alleged terrorists, including suspectedHuJI leader and Phulpur-based Islamic clericMuhammad Waliullah, the alleged master-mind of the March 2006 Sankatmochantemple blasts in Varanasi.

Basically, members of IM are mainly drawnfrom proscribed organizations such as theStudents Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),the Pakistan-based LeT and the Bangladesh-based HuJI. IM's email statements indicatetheir ties with SIMI when they put forwarddemands for the release of SIMI cadres un-der detention or serving jail terms. However,the newly emerged IM continues to deny anyconnection with Pakistan, Bangladesh, orany of their agencies (e.g. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] and Bangladesh'sDirectorate General of Forces Intelligence[DGFI]). It also denies any links with terror-ist groups such as LeT and HuJI.

The Indian Mujahideen has been trying togarner support from India's teeming Muslimpopulation, often by raising indigenousissues in its manifestos. Since the UttarPradesh court attacks, IM, as a home-grownjihadi unit, has claimed responsibility for atleast four major terror strikes in 2008 thattargeted civilians. Each attack came withprior emails to the media citing a list of anti-Muslim atrocities in the country. The groupjustifies the violence by tagging the terrorcampaign as the "rise of Jihad" and the re-venge of "Gujarat".10

The top leaders have been identified as Ri-yaz Bhatkal, Abdul Subhan Qureshi AmirReza, Iqbal Bhatkal, Muhammad Khalid,Shahzad Ahmed, and Ariz Khan. The mostsurprising revelation has been the many ITprofessionals found to be involved in IM's


activities, including wealthy professionalsAsghar Peerbhoy, Salman Kadar Shaikhand,and Asif Bashiruddin Shaikh, who haveplayed pivotal roles in generating funds forthe organization and planning attacks.11

The Indian Mujahideen has four wings, eachwing having a distinct responsibility forspreading terror in India with the active as-sistance of LeT:12 Shahabuddin Ghouri Bri-gade which is headed by Amir Raza andlargely responsible for planning and exe-cuting attacks in southern India.

The Muhammad Ghaznavi Brigade is re-sponsible for planning and executing terrorstrikes in northern India and Shaheed-al-Zarqawi Brigade is responsible for targetingpolitical and other important personalities ofthe country as well as organizing suicideattacks. IM has a media wing which isheadquartered in Pune, Maharashtra. Thewing is responsible for email and print me-dia communications and press releases ofmanifestos before or after the blasts.

The arrest of IM cadres from different loca-tions demonstrates the geographical spreadof a terror network that now spans thelength and breadth of India – possibly evenextending into neighbouring states.

1.5 Students Islamic Movement of India(SIMI)

SIMI was founded in 1977 at the Universityof Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, as a radical stu-dent organization. The interlinked triad ofthe ummah, caliphate and jihad determinedSIMI's postures and activities in the countrythereafter – the group's logo includes aQuran, an AK-47 assault rifle and a globe.SIMI started as a united platform for Muslimstudents and youth in the country, with theobjective of restoring the caliphate to bringabout the unity of the ummah by rejectingthe concept of nationalism, secularism and

democracy. The group's aim was to establishDar-ul-Islam (land of Islam) by using vio-lence, if necessary, to convert non-Muslims.

In the early 1990s, SIMI activists were in-doctrinated by Pakistan's ISI and travelledfar and wide to garner support. The groupingconvened an Ikhwanul (Muslim Brother-hood) conference in Kanpur city in October1999 which was attended by around 20,000people including Sheikh Yaseen (Hamas),Qazi Hussain Ahmed (JI, Pakistan) and theimam of the Al-Aqsa mosque. In 2001, SIMIagain convened a mass conclave in Mumbai,especially for Muslim youths. It was herethat SIMI urged fellow Indian Muslims tolaunch an armed jihad in India with the es-tablishment of an Islamic caliphate as thegoal. The SIMI network is actively involvedin conversion in the southwestern states ofIndia.

Kashmir-centric Pakistani terrorist groupslike Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taibaand Jaish-e-Muhammad have had stronglogistical and operational ties with SIMI.In late 2002, Maharashtra police seized asmany as 30 compact discs containingspeeches of Maulana Masood Azhar, chiefof Jaish-e-Muhammad, along with clippingsof communal riots in Gujarat from SIMIoffices in Aurangabad. Also, SIMI's pro-Taliban stance in the wake of the 9/11 ter-rorist attacks, the group's anti-US demon-strations in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh,Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan, andSIMI's glorification of Osama bin Laden asthe ultimate "jihadi" prompted the Indiangovernment to impose a ban on the group in2001.13

After the government proscription, SIMIoperated closely with the Hyderabad-basedTehreek Tahaffuz-e-Shair-e-Islam and theradical Islamic vigilante unit, the DarsgahJihad-o-Shahadat ("Institute for Holy War andMartyrdom") which has countrywide centresteaching self-defense to Muslim youths, andaims to make the Quran the constitution of

38 Animesh Roul

India.14 SIMI also operated through the Is-lamic Youth Front in Kerala and the TamilNadu Muslim Munnetra Kazhagam.

Intelligence agencies have established SIMI'sinvolvement in major terrorist strikes in In-dia and believe that the organization hascreated the country's first home-grown ter-ror network called the Indian Mujahideen(IM). SIMI attempts to indoctrinate youthsby convincing them to fight for Islam. Toaccomplish this goal, SIMI uses provocativeaudio and video clippings which selectivelydepict the atrocities committed againstMuslims from Gujarat to Kashmir and fromBosnia to Afghanistan.

Having originally started as a studentmovement, SIMI has in due course become amajor radical Islamist movement with astrong presence in most of the northern andsouthern states of India. SIMI, along withother militant groups, has jointly carried outmany terrorist acts including the 13 Septem-ber 2008 serial blasts in Delhi and multipleexplosions in Ahmadabad and Jaipur as wellas blasts in the Uttar Pradesh courts in therecent past.

SIMI has operational ties with many foreignmilitant student groups, including the SaudiArabian Jamayyatul Ansar (JA), whosemembership comprises former SIMI activistsand expatriate Indian Muslims.

2. Ties and tentacles

The previous section has described terrornetworks, the occasionally symbiotic rela-tions among terror groups operating in theregion, and their geographical distribution.Relying on recent investigations into vari-ous terrorists events, this section looks moreclosely into the intricate ties between LeTand other terror groupings and how theirterror tentacles have been spreading in theregion and beyond.

For the past few years terrorist units havebeen trying to increase their geographicalspan by operating in southern and westernparts of the Indian states Goa, Karnataka,Kerala, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu. Infact, there are reports of terrorist groupspoised to infiltrate into the country throughthe coastlines and island provinces of Indiansouthern territories. For instance, the LeThas already established a Marine Jihad Unitto operate against India.15 Besides the usualroutes of intrusion in Jammu and Kashmir,LeT has managed to build alternate routesthrough the porous borders of Nepal andBangladesh as well while establishing basesin the Gulf countries. Investigating agencieshave now confirmed that LeT is working ona new strategy which involves using Dubaias the centre of planning for future strikesagainst India. Past and ongoing terror inves-tigations suggest the Gulf countries havebeen major hubs for LeT terrorists, andmany terrorist plots against India are nowhatched outside Pakistan's territory. The re-cent arrest and interrogation of a top LeT op-erative and close confidant of Hafiz Saeedrevealed the future terror plans in the coun-try. Md Umer Madni who was arrested in thecapital Delhi had been in touch with LeT'sHafiz Saeed since 2000 and was involved in"talent scouting" for the Lashkar-e-Taiba inIndia.16 Madni is also the LeT commander inNepal. He confessed to having travelled farand wide inside the country and also inneighbouring Nepal and Bangladesh with thepurpose of jihadi recruitment, fund-raisingactivities, and sending youths to terror train-ing camps in Pakistan-Administered Kash-mir. He had claimed to know terror master-minds Sabahuddin and Fahim Ansari whowere arrested and accused of the November2008 Mumbai attacks.

The recent spurt of terror activities by theLeT in India is directly linked to contribu-tions from the Gulf-based cells that haveplanned and financed most of the group's op-erations. The LeT's Gulf-based networks arebecoming the lifeline for LeT/JuD operations


in Pakistan and India. Investigations by In-dia's intelligence agencies into the 2008urban attack uncovered ties to many Gulfcountries, especially the financial networksin Muscat, Oman. At least four LeT opera-tives handled India operations from Gulfcities such as Muscat and Sharjah. They areidentified as Wali, Muslim Basheer, SarfarazNawaz and Abu Haroon. These four are be-lieved to be of Pakistani origin and to havebeen deputed in the Gulf to raise funds andmonitor operations planned for India. WhileWali was involved in fundraising activitiesand was responsible for coordinating withSIMI and IM militants in India, MuslimBasheer, based in Muscat, was the chief co-ordinator for the LeT in the Gulf. Funds forterrorist operations were raised by Wali, whoprovided the money for the blasts and whosent youths from the southwestern state ofKerala to Pakistan-Administered Kashmir(PAK) for terrorist training.17

Investigating agencies identified Abu Ha-roon, a travel agent in Muscat, as the opera-tive who facilitated the movement of moneyto India from the Gulf region through hawalachannels. Abu Haroon also coordinated be-tween the Lashkar leadership in Pakistan andIndia. The fourth terrorist, Sarfaraz Nawaz,another LeT man from Muscat and a formerSIMI leader was brought from Muscat to In-dia recently in an extraordinary rendition byIndia's external intelligence agency in early2009. Also, three other terrorists involved inthe July 2008 Bangalore serial blasts andother incidents have been identified asSaleem and Jaheed from Bangladesh (ha-wala operators) and Ali Abdul Azeez Hootiof Oman, the chief terrorist financier.

The Gulf's increasing ties to terrorism resur-faced when investigations into the November2008 Mumbai carnage tracked a similarpattern involving Gulf-based financiers andLashkar coordinators. The role of AzizHooti as one of the financiers in this con-nection is currently under investigation.Hooti, the Oman-based businessman and

key Lashkar operative there, was in touchwith LeT's Fahim Ansari just before the No-vember 2008 carnage in Mumbai. Accordingto the information shared between Oman andIndian police, Aziz Hooti could have had di-rect ties to the Mumbai attackers. It is nowbelieved in investigating circles that bothAziz Hooti and Nawaz played vital roles infinancing terrorist activities in India, espe-cially in providing funds for Indians under-going jihadi training in the PAK region.

Nawaz's interrogation has revealed manyfacts about Lashkar's plans in southern India.According to his statement, he and UmmerHaji, an IM cadre and key figure in the terrornetwork in south India, had hatched a plan tocarry out serial bomb blasts in Chennai andBangalore. However, Lashkar's Chennai plotwas dropped by Wali due to funding issues.Haji is the man who sent Kerala youths toMuzaffarabad in Kashmir for training. AzizHooti was also involved in the Bangaloreplan while the terrorist triumvirate (Wali,Nawaz and Hooti) met in Sharjah in early2008. Nawaz's statement also sheds somelight on Lashkar's operational strategy insouthern India.

The beginning of 2009 was marked by acrackdown by Islamabad on the LeT andother Pakistan-based terror groups in whichLeT came under severe pressure from thePakistan administration to de-escalate itsjihadi agenda against India. Despite thecrackdown and the detention and subse-quent release of LeT leaders in Pakistan, theLeT is reportedly once again looking tostrike India by plotting against its vital in-stallations and infrastructure.

3. Conclusion

It can be argued that in India the Kashmir-centric cross-border terrorism fuelled byIslamabad's territorial ambition and proxywar strategy has recently become fodder forIslamic extremists to spread their tentacles

40 Animesh Roul

beyond Jammu and Kashmir. Although theFederal government has proscribed numer-ous organizations for their anti-India activi-ties, many are still flourishing with politicaland religious patronage from across theborders. Groupings like HuJI, LeT, Jaishand Hizb are still targeting India and gettingall their support from Pakistan's ISI and itsBangladeshi counterpart, Directorate Generalof Forces Intelligence (DGFI), who haveformed a deadly alliance against India. Itmust be noted that most of these above-mentioned terrorist groups are members ofOsama bin Laden's International IslamicFront and have vowed to fight for the Mus-lim ummah (the community of believers).India has been experiencing cross-border ter-rorism from its eastern frontier too. The ter-ritory of Bangladesh has been used as a safehaven for various militant groups operatingin India's northeastern states and elsewhere.There is clear evidence that the growing Is-lamization of northeast India has been fa-cilitated by Pakistan's ISI and spurred bypolitical instability in bordering Bangladesh.The extremely violent United LiberationFront of Asom (ULFA) is now in the gripsof ISI and DGFI along with Muslim UnitedLiberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA).Also, the recent arrest of a Lashkar-e-Taibaoperative, Mufti Obaidullah, revealed thespreading networks of LeT in neighbouringBangladesh. Obaidullah who is originallyfrom India's West Bengal state told his inter-rogators that his task was to organize jihadin Bangladesh in cooperation with HuJI18

and Bangladesh-based Jam'atul Mujahedinof Bangladesh (JMB) operatives.

It can be argued that Indian Muslims aresusceptible to the global jihadi agenda andthe worldwide Islamist call for a Muslimcaliphate. However, there is a difference ofopinion about the current growth of thehomegrown jihadi threat in India. One sec-tion of scholars which includes the politicalelites (secular parties like the SamajwadiParty, Congress and other pro-Muslim re-gional parties) hold that Indian Muslims are

quite immune to the global jihadist move-ment, and that the call for the same fromBin Laden, Al-Qaida or LeT does not im-pact Indian Muslims.

Another school of thought argues that thismindset of the Indian Muslim is fast erod-ing and that the last couple of decades havewitnessed many Indian youths falling preyto jihadist thought and its agenda, perhapsas a result of concerted efforts from Paki-stan and Gulf-based agencies.

This discourse notwithstanding, there doexist minuscule but strong jihadi elementswhich often raise the issue of J&K, the Gu-jarat pogrom and the Babri Mosque demoli-tion in the context of global as well as IndianMuslim suffering. They are now also backedby pro-Muslim human rights activists andanti-violence NGOs and political or religiousgroupings. Since the November 2008 Mum-bai attacks, the Ministry of Home Affairs hasaccepted that terrorist groups including LeTand JeM have found support among dis-gruntled elements within India.

India cannot remain in permanent denialthat there is no involvement of Indian-bornMuslims in international terror events: theyhave been implicated in incidents like theUK terror plots, and include terrorist sus-pects such as Dhiren Barot, Haroon Aswat,and Kafeel Ahmed. India figures intermit-tently in the jihad propaganda of Al-Qaidaand LeT. Al Qaeda's Adam Yahiye Gadahnand the group's deputy commander Aymanal-Zawahiri have made calls in many videosfor attacks against India. Masood Azhar andHafeez Saeed constantly target India in theirregular preaching and often directly brain-wash youths to unleash jihad against India.

The radicalized – read Talibanized – neigh-bours of India have also had an indirect im-pact on the mindset of Indian Muslims andmade them less tolerant towards other re-ligions and society at large.


This is the current reality in India: there is anew phase of Islamic extremism emergingin the country, with home-grown jihadists

raising their heads and major terror group-ings choosing to combine forces and opt fora collective execution of terror plans.

Notes

1 Rana, Muhammed Amir: Gateway to Terrorism,New Millennium Publication, London 2003,p.347.

2 The Ahle Hadith (also Ahle Hadees) has beeninfluential in the subcontinent with active tieswith Saudi Wahhabis and strong diasporalinks. Literally meaning the "People of theTradition of the Prophet", Ahle Hadith iscalled non-conformist by rival Islamic move-ments, mostly because the movement does notconform to any of the four schools of Islamicjurisprudence or the commentaries and legalopinions based on them.

3 UP: Terror attack on CRPF camp, 8 killed, in:Rediff.com, 1.1.2008.

4 Terror strikes Uttar Pradesh; 15 killed in sixblasts, in: Zee News, 23.11.2007.

5 Rana, Muhammed Amir: Gateway to Terrorism,New Millennium Publication, London 2003,p.202.

6 For a detailed timeline of this high-profile hi-jacking and hostage crisis, seeURL<http://www.indianembassy.org/archive/IC_814.htm#The Chronology of Events

7 With a pan-Islamic world view and strong inter-national linkages, HuJI aims to fight for all Mus-lims. For one of the earliest publications on HuJIand its motto, see Ahmed Khaled: The biggestmilitia we know nothing about, in: Friday Times,20.5.2002.

8 Singh, Khurshchev: HuJI after the death of itsIndia chief, IDSA Strategic Comments, NewDelhi, 13.2.2008.

9 US designates HuJI as global terrorist organiza-tion, in: Hindustan Times, 7.3.2008.

10 The Rise of Jihad, Revenge of Gujarat: in:Outlook India, 29.7.2008.

11 Roul, Animesh: India's Home-Grown JihadiThreat: A Profile of the Indian Mujahideen, in:Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation),Volume 7, Issue 4, 3.3.2009.

12 Ibid.13 Roul, Animesh: Students Islamic Movement

of India: A Profile, in: Terrorism Monitor(Jamestown Foundation) Volume 4, Issue 7,6.4.2006.

14 Despite ban, SIMI worked through front outfits,in: Times of India, 29.3.2008.

15 Lashkar militants began killing spree in highseas, in: Daily Excelsior, 30.11.2008.

16 LeT militant Omar Madni remanded, in: TheHindu, 2.6.2009.

17 For a detailed report, see: Roul, Animesh, Lash-kar-e-Taiba's Financial Network Targets Indiafrom the Gulf States, in: Terrorism Monitor,Volume 7, Issue 19, 2.7.2009.

18 Huji's Hannan, Lashkar's Obaidullah old friends,in: Daily Star (Dhaka), 23.7.2009.

Der pakistanisch-afghanische Problemverbund

Hein G. Kiessling

Im April 2008 betreute ich im Auftragdes ISB-Büros der KAS eine Woche langneun afghanische Universitätsprofessoren inIslamabad und in Peschawar. Fünf der Pro-fessoren waren Paschtunen, vier von ihnenzugleich die Rektoren großer Universitätenihres Landes. Bei ihren Begegnungen mitpakistanischen Kollegen und Studenten derUniversitäten von Karachi, Islamabad undPeshawar wurden sie primär mit drei Fragenkonfrontiert:

1. Wann sorgt ihr dafür, dass die neuenausländischen Okkupanten Afghanistanverlassen?

2. Wann werden die indischen General-konsulate in Afghanistan geschlossen?

3. Wann erkennt Kabul die Durand-Lineendlich offiziell an?

Die Antwort der afghanischen Besucherwar eindeutig. Sie verneinten die Anwesen-heit ausländischer Okkupanten in ihremLande und verwiesen darauf, dass Pakistanwie Indien vier Generalkonsulate in Afgha-nistan habe. In Sachen Durand-Linie wardie Antwort der Afghanen besonders deut-lich. Diese sei Afghanistan 1893 in einerPeriode seiner Schwäche aufgezwungenworden, sie sei für einen Zeitraum von100 Jahren konzipiert gewesen und dieseseien vorüber. Eine Anerkennung dieserGrenze würde eine soziale Spaltung undSchwächung des paschtunischen Volkesbedeuten, die nicht akzeptabel seien.

Die Lehrer und Studenten der Universitätenvon Karachi, Islamabad und Peshawar zeig-ten sich von den klaren Aussagen sichtlichirritiert. Für das 1947 geborene Pakistan,das seinerseits die Kashmir-Frage seit über

60 Jahren auf dem Feuer hält, stellt die Du-rand-Linie eine endgültige Grenze dar. InKabul aber hält man sich in der Grenzfrageweiterhin bedeckt. Man weiß, dass man amStatus quo derzeit nichts ändern kann, ver-sucht aber, die Türen für künftige Möglich-keiten offen zu halten. Bei einem Auseinan-derbrechen Pakistans würde Kabul hier mitSicherheit Ansprüche geltend machen.

1. Die 70er-Jahre

Die Nichtanerkennung der Durand-Grenzedurch Afghanistan führte bereits in den frü-hen 70er-Jahren zu Spannungen zwischenbeiden Ländern. Im Oktober 1972 führte dieUnzufriedenheit der Marri-, Mengal- undBizenjo-Stämme in Balochistan über diePolitik der federalen Regierung zu Unruhen,die sich bis 1974 hinzogen. Die Balochenfühlten sich damals wie um die Reichtümerihres Landes betrogen. SezessionistischeForderungen waren an der Tagesordnung.Der damalige Premierminister Zulfikar AliBhutto sah sich genötigt, die Regierung inQuetta abzusetzen und, wie vor drei Jahrenbeispielsweise Musharraf, die Armee zurBeruhigung der Lage einzusetzen. DerSchah von Persien half damals mit der Ent-sendung von Hubschraubern und Piloten,er fürchtete ein Übergreifen der Rebellionauf die von Balochen bewohnten Landes-teile im Osten seines Reiches. Folgerichtigkam es hier denn auch zu einer ersten Zu-sammenarbeit zwischen dem pakistani-schen Geheimdienst ISI und dem iranischenSAVAK. Von Seiten Afghanistans aber kamHilfe für die rebellierenden Stämme, hierwar Kabuls Geheimdienst KHAD großzügigtätig. Nach der Niederschlagung des Auf-standes ging der gesamte Tribe der Marris,deren Führung sich zu sozialistischen Pa-

44 Hein G. Kiessling

rolen und Zielen bekannte, für fast 20 Jahreins Exil nach Afghanistan. Ein Teil von ih-nen wurde dort von KHAD zu Untergrund-kämpfern ausgebildet und verübte in den70er und 80er-Jahren Sabotageakte in Pa-kistan, vornehmlich in ihrer alten HeimatBalochistan, wobei Gas- und Elektrizitäts-leitungen und -stationen bevorzugte Zielewaren. Der Marri-Tribe kehrte aufgrundeiner Amnestie erst 1991 nach Balochistanzurück. Ihrer alten Siedlungsräume verlus-tig, hausen sie bis heute in Lagern in derUmgebung von Quetta.

Auch Murtaza Bhutto, der nach dem Hän-gen seines Vaters die Terrororganisation AlMurtaza gründet hatte, ging für einige Zeitnach Afghanistan, wo ihm und seinen Leu-ten Unterschlupf und Hilfe gewährt wurde.Al Murtaza machte danach mit Attentatenund blutigen Flugzeugenführungen von sichreden, in den 80er-Jahren verfehlte einKommando zweimal nur knapp das Zieleines erfolgreichen Attentats auf den da-maligen Präsidenten Zia-ul-Haq. Da sich inAfghanistan KGB und KHAD der Exil-Belutschen angenommen hatten, sah mansich in Pakistan unter Zugzwang. Mit demZiel, afghanischen Unruhestiftern unter denPaschtunen im Grenzland zuvorzukommen,stellte der ISI auf Anweisung von Bhuttoeine 5.000 Mann starke afghanische Gue-rillatruppe auf, die in Nordwestprovinz(NWFP) ausgebildet wurde. Unter ihrenersten Absolventen waren Leute wie Hek-matyar, Rabbani und Masood, deren Namenin den 90er-Jahren weltweit bekannt wurden.

Als Folge der Ereignisse in Belutschistanwurde 1973 im ISI zudem ein "SpecialOperation Bureau" geschaffen, das zurWiege des legendären Afghanistan Bu-reau’s der 80er-Jahre werden sollte. Chefdieses Büros war Colonel Syed Raza Ali,der über seinen Auftrag schrieb: "Ich sollteeine Organisation aufbauen und leiten, diegebraucht wurde, um die Regierung überdie vielfältigen Facetten der Bekämpfungvon Aufständen in Pakistan, die ausgemerzt

werden mussten, zu beraten und die Akti-vitäten von unterschiedlichen Stellen derStaatsmacht zu koordinieren. So fing allesan. Die erste Phase des Krieges in Afgha-nistan hatte begonnen."

Genauer gesagt, die Zeit der ISI-Aktionen imNachbarland Afghanistan hatte begonnen.Eine erste große Operation war 1975 die Ini-tiierung eines Aufstandes im Pansheer-Tal,der zwar fehlschlug, Kabul aber zu der Er-kenntnis verhalf, die pakistanische Kartenicht zu überreizen. Raza Ali berichtet, wieder ISI auf Leute wie Hekmatyar, Rabbani,Khalis und Masood aufmerksam gewordenwar und diese für seine Zwecke nutzte:

"Diese Individuen hatten einen gewissenEinfluss auf verschiedene Kollegs und Uni-versitäten in Afghanistan, besonders in Ka-bul. Ihre konservativ-religiöse Orientierungund ihre Opposition zur kommunistischenHerrschaft hatte sie in einen Konflikt mit derRegierung gebracht … Sie überquerten re-gelmäßig die Grenze von und nach Afgha-nistan, wo sie einen Aufstand organisierten,der im Pasheer-Tal stattfand. Dieses Ereignisweckte Daud aus seinem Schlummer, ließihn umgänglicher werden und den Ernst derLage erkennen. Er begann, sein Verhältniszu Pakistan zu verbessern. Von da an rück-ten die Realpolitik und die Diplomatie inden Vordergrund. Daud ließ sich dazu her-ab, sich mit dem Thema der Durand-Liniezu beschäftigen und damit aufzuhören, Ter-roristen über die pakistanisch-afghanischeGrenze nach Pakistan zu infiltrieren."

In der Folge kam es zu Kontakten zwischenden Regierungen beider Länder, PM Bhuttolegte einmal auf einer Auslandsreise einenkurzen Zwischenstopp in Kabul ein und trafsich mit dem afghanischen PM Daud. Eswurde ein Treffen beider in Pakistan ver-einbart, wo alle bilateralen Probleme be-sprochen und gelöst werden sollten. DasTreffen kam nie zustande, Daud wurde1978 von kommunistisch-linksgerichtetenOffizieren ermordet und Bhutto bekanntlich

Der pakistanisch-afghanische Problemverbund 45

als Regierungschef 1977 von Zia gestürzt,der ihn inhaftieren, verurteilen und hängenließ. Das Problem der seit 1893 existentenDurand-Line blieb somit ungelöst.

2. Die 80er-Jahre

Der Einmarsch sowjetischer Truppen imDezember 1979 eröffnete ein neues Kapitelin den afghanisch-pakistanischen Bezie-hungen. Die ersten Reaktionen hierauf inRawalpindi waren Beklemmung bis Furcht.Lassen wir hier noch einmal den ISI-Brigadier Raza Ali zu Worte kommen:

"Irgendwann in der ersten Januarhälfte 1980wurde eine Konferenz auf höchster Ebeneabgehalten, um die Lage, die durch diesowjetische Invasion entstanden war, ge-nauer zu betrachten … Der Präsident (auchder COAS) und der Außenminister undjeder, der zählte, nahmen daran teil … Dererste Redner sagte, dass die Sowjets ge-kommen waren, um zu bleiben. Sie sindeine Supermacht, sie haben noch nie einLand verlassen, das sie besetzt haben. Es istnur eine Frage der Zeit, bis sie an unsererGrenze sein werden, sagte ein anderer Red-ner … und so ging die Debatte immer wei-ter … Die Sowjets werden sich mit ihrenPanzern einfach einen Weg bahnen. Diezerlumpten Gruppen von schlecht ausge-rüsteten, unorganisierten Banden der afgha-nischen Mudschaheddin mit schlechter Dis-ziplin werden der sowjetischen Besatzungkeinen Widerstand leisten können. DasSpiel ist aus. Wir müssen unsere Politik inHinsicht auf Afghanistan neu konzipieren,sagte einer der Redner, auf den andere mitähnlichen Botschaften folgten."

Präsident Zia-ul-Haq und sein damaligerISI-Chef Generalleutnant Akhtar Rahmenaber hatten den neuen Stellenwert, den Pa-kistan in den Augen der strategischen Pla-ner in Washington nun hatte, schnell er-kannt. Es begann die heute in großen Zügen

bekannte Kooperation zwischen CIA undISI im Spiel um Afghanistan der 80er-Jahre.Hier nur einige Eckdaten:

Die USA und Saudi-Arabien zahlten jeweilsca. 2,5 Milliarden US$, hinzu kamen nocheinmal etliche Hundert Millionen Dollar alsSpenden privater Geber aus der islamischenWelt. Insgesamt wurden so für den Kampfin Afghanistan in den 80er-Jahren rd.6 Mrd. US$ aufgebracht. Der ISI nahm da-bei die Rolle eines "sole agents" im Ver-hältnis zu den Mudschaheddin ein und esversteht sich von selbst, dass dabei ein Teildes Geldes bereits in Pakistan hängen blieb.Immerhin, am Ende der 80er-Jahre warendie sowjetischen Truppen geschlagen undaus Afghanistan abgezogen, eine illustreListe pakistanischer Militärs hatte schmu-cke Häuser und gepolsterte Bankkontendaheim wie im Ausland, und der ISI warvon einem relativ kleinen und schlecht aus-gerüsteten Geheimdienst zu einem der ef-fektivsten und besten Nachrichtendienstezumindest in Asien geworden. Und dasSelbstbewusstsein pakistanischer Militärsund Politiker wie auch der afghanischenMudschaheddin-Führer war gewaltig ge-stiegen, geboren war die Überzeugung der"we are second to no one" und der bis heuteexistierende Glaube, dass man primär der-jenige war, der die Supermacht Sowjetuni-on zum Zusammenbruch gebracht hatte.

Geerbt hatte Pakistan im Zusammenhangmit dem Afghanistan-Unternehmen der80er-Jahre aber auch ein Problem, das bisheute weiter existiert. Das Land hat heuteca. 4,6 Millionen Drogenabhängige. DieFührer der zerlumpten, schlecht ausgerüs-teten und unorganisierten Gruppen der Mu-dschaheddin waren zu einem Großteil zugut organisierten Drogendealern geworden,die sie, so weit sie noch leben, bis heutenoch sind. Neben ihnen gibt es heute weite-re mächtige afghanische wie pakistanischeDrogenhändler und andere, die am Drogen-fluss finanziell mit verdienen. Afghanistanproduziert heute über 4.000 Tonnen Opium


im Jahr, das in Afghanistan selbst, in Pa-kistan und in der Türkei vorwiegend zu He-roin verarbeitet wird und danach den Wegweiter nach Westen findet. Die Hauptwegedieses Drogenflusses führen bis heute vonAfghanistan entweder direkt über den Iranin die Türkei oder aber über pakistanischesTerritorium, über seine Flugplätze, Häfenund die Makran-Küste nach dorthin.

Geblieben ist Pakistan aber auch ein, wennman so will, "positiver" Aspekt, es existierteine auf Schwarzgeld basierende Schatten-Ökonomie, die nach Meinung internationa-ler Experten zumindest genauso bedeutendwie die offizielle Wirtschaft und ein we-sentlicher Grund dafür ist, dass das Land inder Vergangenheit trotz zeitweiliger Zah-lungsunfähigkeit wirtschaftlich nicht zu-sammenbrach. Verschiedene pakistanischeRegierungen brachten denn auch Verord-nungen und Gesetze "as good economicmeasures to boost economic progress" aufden Weg, die den Zufluss von Schwarzgeldund damit auch das Reinwaschen von Dro-gengeldern erleichterten. Und ein FinancialBill von 2008, angenommen vom Parlament(NA) am 22. Juni 2008, ermöglicht das He-reinbringen von Geld ohne jedwede Nach-prüfung seiner Herkunft, sofern 2% Abgabean das Government bezahlt werden.

Großteilen der Welt, vornehmlich desWestens, ist zudem ein Erbe aus demAfghanistan-Unternehmen der 80er-Jahregeblieben, das bis heute weiterlebt undWirkungen entfaltet. Rund 60.000 Jehadis,vornehmlich aus arabischen Ländern, aberauch aus anderen Teilen der islamischenWelt kommend, waren in Camps in Af-ghanistan und Pakistan ausgebildet wor-den. Afghanistan wurde so, und das gilt bisheute, zum "… largest consumer and in-deed laboratory for Pakistan’s jihad factory.Afghanistan also provided inspiration tothe radical Islamists and enabled them torefine the tactics of their deadly trade andthen replicate the experience in battle-grounds around the world." 1

3. Die 90er-Jahre und dieSituation bis heute

Wenn man die internationale Berichterstat-tung über Afghanistan ab Mitte der 90er-Jahre liest, wird man immer wieder auf dieAussage stoßen, die dort ab April 1994 inErscheinung getretenen Taliban seien einGeschöpf des pakistanischen Geheimdien-stes "Inter Services Intelligence" gewesen.Diese Behauptung ist falsch, in Wirklichkeitwar man im ISI-Hauptquartier am AabparaMarkt in Islamabad bis zum Herbst 1994bzgl. des Kampfwertes der Taliban unddamit deren Nützlichkeit für Pakistan eherskeptisch. Eine Mehrheit der im ISI mitAfghanistan beschäftigten Offiziere favori-sierte 1994 eine weitere Zusammenarbeitmit Gulbadin Hekmatyar und seiner "Hezb-e-Islami", mit denen man in den 80er-Jah-ren in Afghanistan so erfolgreich gegen dieArmee Moskaus gekämpft hatte.

Erst Ende 1994 kam es zu ersten offiziellenKontakten zwischen den Taliban und demISI, nachdem die neuen Gotteskrieger am3. November 1994 in die strategisch wichti-ge südafghanische Stadt Kandahar einmar-schiert waren. Im ISI begann ein Umdenkenin Richtung einer Abkehr von Hekmatyar undeiner künftigen Kooperation mit den Tali-ban. Im November 1994 kam eine TalibanDelegation erstmals zum ISI nach Islam-abad, geführt von Mulla Rabani, der damali-gen Nummer 2 der Taliban und deren späte-ren Außenminister. In der Erinnerung desdamaligen ISI Chefs Generalleutnant JavedAshraf Qazi, der später unter MusharrafPakistans Minister für Bildung war, lauteteder Tenor der ersten Taliban-Bitten an denISI wie folgt: "Don’t help the MujahedeenCommanders anymore, stay out, be neutral.We don’t want weapon or money from you,but don’t stop food and oil supply to uswhich we will pay with our own money."Nun wurden die Grundlagen einer künftigenZusammenarbeit besprochen und ab Beginn1995 wurde der ISI zum mächtigen Mentorder afghanischen Taliban, eine Partnerschaft,


die erst in der Folge der Ereignisse vom11. September ein dramatisches Ende fand.

Wenn somit der ISI nicht der Vater derTaliban war, stellt sich die Frage, wer derwirkliche Geburtshelfer war. Tatsächlichwar es die von 1993 bis 1996 im Amt be-findliche zweite Regierung von BenazirBhutto, die aus wirtschafts-strategischenGründen sichere Transportwege nach Zen-tralasien und Westchina suchte und dabei dieTaliban schuf. In Zentralasien sah und siehtIslamabad bis heute für sich ein großesHandelspotenzial, dort sah man Öl, Gas,Erze, Baumwolle etc. Hier erhofft man fürsich einen Markt und für seine Kaufleuteund Ingenieure neue Tätigkeitsfelder. Pa-kistan offeriert den zentralasiatischen Staa-ten und China die kürzesten Routen zu denblauen Wassern des Roten Meeres und desIndischen Ozeans. Das Problem ist nur, dassdiese Wege immer über Afghanistan füh-ren. Eine nördliche Route führt von Pesha-war über Kabul, den Hindukush (SalangTunnel), Mazar-e-Sharif nach Tirmez undTaschkent in Usbekistan. Eine südlicheRoute von Quetta über Kandahar und Heratnach Ashkabat in Turkmenistan. Zwar gibtes, von China in den 60er-Jahren gebaut,mit dem Karakorum Highway auch einedirekte Verbindung zwischen China undPakistan über den 4960 m hoch gelegenenKunjerab-Pass, der zur alten Seidenstraßen-Stadt Kashgar führt, diese Hochgebirgs-straße allein aber ist unzureichend. Ihrewirtschaftliche Tragfähigkeit ist begrenzt,zudem ist sie im Kriegsfall leicht zu blo-ckieren. Daher also das Interesse Pakistansund auch Chinas, siehe den Neubau desTiefseehafens Gwadar in Balochistan, anden über Afghanistan führenden Routen.

Ein zweiter Grund für Pakistans Engage-ment im Nachbarland Afghanistan ist dasWunschdenken seiner Militärs nach strate-gischer Tiefe. Als im Jahre 1991 der dama-lige Armeechef General Aslam Beg vordem National Defence College, der Militär-universität des Landes, sein Projekt "strate-

gic depth" vorstellte, erhielt er von den an-wesenden Offizieren lang andauernden Bei-fall. Pakistan fürchtet, in einem Krieg mitIndien nicht genügend tiefen Ausweich-und Rückzugsraum zu haben und sucht die-sen in einer Allianz mit Afghanistan undmöglichst auch dem Iran. Hier wird auchdeutlich, warum man in Pakistan seit demAbzug der Armee Moskaus darauf drängt,an der Spitze Afghanistans wieder Paschtu-nen zu sehen, mit denen man solche Pläneleichter zu verwirklichen glaubt. Expertenhalten dies allerdings für einen Irrglauben,da viele Paschtunen eher an ein Groß-Pastunistan glauben als an eine künftigestaatliche Einheit Pakistans.

Im Übrigen steht Pakistan mit seinen stra-tegischen Interessen beim Nachbarn nichtallein. Hamid Karzai verschweigt das Tunanderer Mitspieler, wenn er sich über dieEinmischung Islamabads in die innerenAngelegenheiten seines Landes beklagt. Alssolche weiteren Mitspieler wären nebenden USA auch der Iran, Russland, Saudi-Arabien, China und Indien zu nennen. DieAbsichten der USA sind deutlich, sie wol-len von Afghanistan aus den Iran isolieren,Pakistan an seiner Westgrenze beobachtenund kontrollieren, über Afghanistan fürsich selbst Zugang nach Zentralasien habenund Russland und China den Zugang nachAfghanistan und Pakistan erschweren.

Der Iran

Der Iran will die amerikanische Umklam-merung aufbrechen, will den Abzug derUSA aus Afghanistan, dem Irak und ausdem ganzen Mittleren Osten. Alle Möglich-keiten, die Pläne der USA zu torpedieren,werden in Verfolgung dieser Ziele vonTeheran genutzt. Ergo mischt der Iran ver-deckt auch in Afghanistan weiter mit. InAbkehr seiner Politik der 90er-Jahre, als erAhmed Shah Masood gegen die Talibanvon Mullah Omar unterstützte, lieferte Te-heran verdeckt ab 2003 Waffen an die neu-


en Taliban. Der Iran bietet sich zudem mitseinen bereits voll ausgebauten Straßen-und Eisenbahnverbindungen, seinen Pipe-lines und Tiefwasser-Häfen auch als wirt-schaftliches Transitland mit Wegen an, diekaum länger sind als die pakistanischenRouten. Der Iran steht damit auch in wirt-schaftlicher Konkurrenz zu Pakistan. Zu-dem ist der Iran bemüht, in Kabul keine vonPaschtunen dominierte Regierung zum Zu-ge kommen zu lassen. Über eine dortigeRegierung, die proportional gerecht alleVolksteile umfasst, will er den eigenenkulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Einfluss inAfghanistan, zumindest aber in Herat undden Provinzen im Westen des Landes,schützen und erhalten.

Russland

Russland ist derzeit erfolgreich dabei, inseinem Hinterhof Zentralasien verlorenenBoden zurückzugewinnen und die Ameri-kaner von dort wieder hinaus zu drängen.Diese Pläne schließen den amerikanischenAbzug aus Afghanistan ein, ergo spieltMoskau verdeckt weiterhin dort in nichtunbeträchtlichem Maße weiter mit. Es wa-ren russische Schmuggler, die als Erste ab2003 neue Waffen nach Afghanistan brach-ten. Moskau hat im Land am Hindukushnicht unbeträchtliche wirtschaftliche Interes-sen. Es war immer bemüht, geplante Gas-und Ölpipelines von Zentralasien über Af-ghanistan und Pakistan zur Arabischen Seezu verhindern. Sollten diese Pipelines künf-tig dennoch zustande kommen, ist von demBemühen Moskaus auszugehen, an entspre-chenden Kuratorien zumindest beteiligt zusein, um so Einfluss zu haben und mitzu-verdienen.

China

China hat in Afghanistan neben seinem schonerwähnten Suchen nach sicheren Routenvon Westchina zum Indischen Ozean auchdas Interesse, das Land nicht wieder zum

Ausbildungs- und Ruheraum uighurischerRebellen werden zu lassen. Peking hat aberauch enorme wirtschaftliche Interessen inAfghanistan selbst. Dort gibt es Uranerze,an denen es interessiert ist. Im "Jalrez-Tal inSana", nur 100 km südlich von Kabul gele-gen und heute als ein von Taliban kontrol-liertes Gebiet geltend, befinden sich bei"Aynak" mit 240 Millionen Tonnen zudemdie nach heutigen Erkenntnissen zweit-größten Kupfererzlager der Welt. Der Be-darf an Kupfer wird steigen, für Expertenist der Zeitpunkt absehbar, an dem Kupferweltweit zur Mangelware wird. Für dieLagerstätten bei Aynak hat vor einigenMonaten die Staatsfirma "China Metallur-gical Construction Corp." gegen sechsfacheKonkurrenz, darunter die amerikanische"Phelps Doge Corp.", die Ausbeutungs-rechte bekommen, ein weiterer Fakt für dasInteresse und Engagement Pekings an Af-ghanistan. Wir haben somit heute hier dieetwas absonderliche Situation, dass NATO-Truppen in Afghanistan unter hohen Kostenauch zur Absicherung chinesischer Wirt-schaftsinteressen beitragen und Peking hier-für dem Westen später kaum einen Bonuseinräumen wird.

Indien

Was Indiens Rolle in Afghanistan betrifft,gibt es in Pakistan unter Militärs und Poli-tikern, unter Professoren, Studenten undJournalisten eine regelrechte Phobie. DieMilitärs glauben, Indien habe mit 5.000vornehmlich als Bauarbeiter getarntenMännern bereits das Skelett einer ganzenDivision im Norden Afghanistans statio-niert. Es sei in der Lage, diese Anzahlschnell auf 50.000 Mann, d.h. auf Stärkeeines Korps, zu erhöhen. Die Politiker spre-chen von 4.000 Spionen, die als Ärzte Inge-nieure, Wissenschaftler und Unternehmergetarnt seien. Die Anzahl der vier indischenKonsulate im Lande wird als ungerechtfer-tigt gesehen, sie seien mit Angehörigen vonR&AW überbesetzt und in Wirklichkeit


Ausgangspunkte für den von Indien unter-stützten Untergrundkampf einer sog. "Balo-chistan Liberation Army" in Balochistan.

Tatsächlich ist es Neu-Delhi nach dem11. September gelungen, seine aus der Zeitdes Kalten Krieges stammenden guten Be-ziehungen zu Kabul wieder aufzunehmen.Es hat beträchtliche Hilfs- und Wiederauf-bauleistungen erbracht, über 100 Omnibussegeliefert sowie Straßen und Hospitäler ge-baut. Dies geschieht mit Sicherheit nicht nurin edler Art und Weise, denn Indien verfährtnach dem Motto, der Feind meines Feindesist mein Freund. In Neu-Delhi konnte mandurchaus hören, Islamabad sorgt für Unru-hen an unserer Nordgrenze, sprich Kaschmir,also kümmern wir uns um Pakistans West-grenze.

Saudi-Arabien

Auch Saudi-Arabien gehört zu den Spielernim heutigen "great game" um Afghanistan.Ein nicht unbeträchtlicher Teil der heute inAfghanistan kämpfenden Taliban kommtaus Saudi-Arabien. Dabei kann es Riadnicht nur um die Unterstützung der dortigenwahabitischen Glaubensbrüder gehen. Es istauch darum bemüht, an seinen Grenzenkeine unfreundlichen Nachbarn zu haben.Hier sei zudem der pikante Hinweis gestat-tet, dass es in Saudi-Arabien 100 km nörd-lich und 500 km südlich von Riad moderneRaketensilos und Abschussanlagen gibt, indenen heute Raketen neuester pakistanischerBauart lagern. Die Bestückung solcherRaketen mit konventionellen Sprengköpfenmacht wenig Sinn. Ergo kann von einerengen Kooperation zwischen Pakistan undSaudi-Arabien auch in Afghanistan ausge-gangen werden. Man kann zudem von sau-dischen Wirtschaftsinteressen in Afghanis-tan ausgehen. Sollten einst Pipelines vonTurkmenistan zur Arabischen See gebautwerden, dürfte Riad, wie im Übrigen auchMoskau, darum bemüht sein, den entspre-chenden Konsortien anzugehören.

Pakistan

Was Pakistans Interessen in Afghanistan an-geht, wird es weiterhin danach trachten, inKabul eine gegenüber Pakistan kooperative,mehrheitlich von Paschtunen geführte Regie-rung im Sattel zu wissen. Im Hintergrundstehen dabei die bereits dargelegten Interes-sen des Landes nach sicheren Durchgangs-routen von und nach Zentralasien, von denenes sich große wirtschaftliche Impulse ver-spricht. Zudem ist das Streben der Militärsnach "strategic depth" weiterhin existent.Pakistan will, und wer kann es ihm verden-ken, im Westen eine sichere, anerkannteGrenze haben. Auch wenn die PräsidentenHamid Karzai und Asif Zardari kürzlichin Washington einträchtig neben dem US-Präsidenten Obama standen, das Verhältniszwischen ihren beiden Ländern wird nochlange von Misstrauen geprägt sein. Nichtszeigt das deutlicher als der Umstand, dassvon einem zwischen Karzai und Zardari inWashington unterzeichneten Memorandum,das Indien einen Wirtschaftskorridor von derWagha-Grenzstation bei Lahore über denKhyber-Pass nach Afghanistan einräumt,inzwischen nichts weiter zu hören ist. Hierdürften die Militärs ihre Bedenken angemel-det und auf die Bremse getreten haben. InPakistan ging man seit April 2009 davonaus, dass Hamid Karzai mangels personellenAlternativen eine weitere Amtszeit als Präsi-dent Afghanistans vor sich haben wird. Manweiß, dass Karzai gegenüber Indien freund-lichere Gefühle hegt als gegenüber Pakistan.Die Militärs in den Hauptquartieren vonArmee und ISI werden daher die Afghanis-tan-Politik ihrer Regierung weiterhin genaubeobachten und notfalls ihr Veto anmelden.

In den Musharraf-Jahren hatten afghanischeTaliban (Mullah Omar und Shura) und diezu al-Qaeda gehörenden, aus verschiedenenLändern stammenden islamistischen Kämp-fer Schlupfwinkel vornehmlich in Balo-chistan und FATA gefunden. Ihre pakista-nischen Gesinnungsgenossen und ISI-Leutehalfen ihnen, sich neu zu formieren und


auszurüsten. Zusammen mit pakistanischenTaliban und Jehadis sickerten sie dann wie-der nach Afghanistan ein und trugen zu-sammen mit dortigen militanten Gruppenzur zunehmend fragiler werdenden Sicher-heitslage bei. Die an der Grenze postierten100.000 pakistanischen Soldaten schautendabei weisungsgemäß weg. Das Musharraf-Regime betrieb so ein Doppelspiel. Es nahmzum einen am internationalen Kampf gegenden Terror teil, wo es sowohl Erfolge errangwie selbst Opfer trug. Zugleich aber trug eszur Instabilität im Nachbarland bei und ver-suchte so seine strategischen Interessen zuschützen. Auch heute sind ein Teil der Mili-tanten in Afghanistan Ausländer. NachMullah Mehmoud, einem Taliban-Comman-der im Golestan-Distrikt in der Helmand-Provinz, sollen es 60% sein, wobei diemeisten aus Saudi-Arabien und der pakista-nischen Provinz Punjab kommen sollen.2

An dieser Stelle sei der Hinweis gestattet,dass die im Westen verbreitete Vorstellung,nach der die Madressen (Islamic Seminaries)des Landes die Hauptgeburtsstätten der pa-kistanischen Jihadi-Kultur seien, nicht rich-tig ist. Einige bekannte Madressen spielenohne Zweifel hierbei eine Rolle, die über-wiegende Zahl der Jehadis aber kommt, wieeine Studie des Sustainable DevelopmentPolicy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad zeigt,aus dem Punjab. Und das in Karachi er-scheinende politische Monatsmagazin He-rald schrieb: "It is a fact of life that for everymilitant thrown out by a madrassa, there aredozens who never went anywhere near areligious seminary. Instead, they were justplain criminals before they chose to elevatethemselves to the status of jihadis. Talkingof a crackdown on madrassas may makeeminent sense to the West but it offers verylittle in terms of actually getting a handle onthe problem".3

In Pakistan unterschätzten die Generäle überdie letzten Jahre zwei Dinge. Zum einenden zunehmenden Herrschaftsanspruch derislamischen Militanten in Pakistan selbst.Bei einer Lagebeurteilung im Frühjahr 2009mussten sie feststellen, dass die Regierungnur noch 38% und die Taliban bereits 24%von NWFP kontrollierten. In weiteren 24%von NWFP waren die Taliban zumindestpermanent anwesend. Noch schlimmer aberwar, dass sich für 47% von Punjab die Ge-fahr höherer Aktivitäten der Taliban ab-zeichnete. Bei den Generälen setzte sichdaher die Einsicht durch, dass die Talibandie Grenze des aus taktischen und strategi-schen Gründen bisher Tolerierten über-schritten hatten und man zeigen musste, werHerr im Hause ist. Zum anderen wurde imGHQ wie beim ISI der Wille der USA un-terschätzt, in Afghanistan nicht ein ähnli-ches Debakel hinnehmen zu müssen, wie esMoskau beschieden gewesen war.

Das Ergebnis ist das gegenwärtige Vorge-hen pakistanischer Militärs in Swat, in an-deren Teilen von NWFP und in FATA. DerAusgang dieser Unternehmen ist noch un-gewiss. Fraglich ist weiterhin, ob die Strate-gen in Rawalpindi und Islamabad ihre bis-herige Afghanistanpolitik in wesentlichenZügen ändern werden und ob in Kabul einin seinem Amt bestätigter Hamid Karzaiund seine neue Regierung ein entspanntesund kooperatives Verhältnis zum NachbarnPakistan finden werden. Im April 2009 kameine afghanisch-pakistanische, aus Parla-mentariern und politischen Spitzenbeamtenbestehende Besuchergruppe auf Einladungdes Auswärtigen Amtes nach Berlin. In ih-ren Ausführungen sprachen Afghanen wiePakistaner mehrfach von einer stattfinden-den neuen Annäherung zwischen beidenStaaten. Bleibt abzuwarten, ob diesenWorten Taten folgen werden.

Anmerkungen

1 Sushant, Sareen: The Jihad Factory, New Delhi2005.

2 Siehe Daily Times, 15.6.2009.3 Siehe Herald, Oktober 2003.

Stability in South Asia: a view from China

Liping Xia

1. Introduction

There are three distinct factors which have asignificant influence on stability and securityin South Asia. The first concerns relationsbetween external major powers and SouthAsian regional powers. During the Cold War,the Soviet Union supported India, and theUnited States and China supported Pakistan.Both sides were engaged in a struggleagainst each other. Since the end of the ColdWar, major powers including China and theUS have shared some common interests inthe security field of South Asia. They wouldlike to see peace and stability in the region.It is not in their national interests to useone country against another in South Asia.Neither is it in their national interests tostruggle against each other for their strate-gic position in South Asia. However, somepoliticians in the US still want to use Indiato balance China.

The second factor concerns relations be-tween India and Pakistan. India and Pakistanfought three wars against each other duringthe Cold War period. In May 1998, bothconducted nuclear tests. Since 2005 relationsbetween India and Pakistan have improvedto some extent, and this has helped to reducethe possibility of armed conflict, includingnuclear exchanges, between the two coun-tries.

The third factor relates to non-governmentalorganizations. In South Asia, especially inIndia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the terroristorganization Al-Qaida and extremist groupssuch as the Taliban have become a seriousthreat to national governments. Other non-governmental entities such as warlords inAfghanistan have also had a serious negativeimpact on national governments.

2. The China-India securityrelationship

The China-India security relationship hasgone through three major phases: friendship(from 1949 to the end of the 1950s); oppo-sition (from the early 1960s to the late1990s) whereby the progress made betweenIndia and China since 1988 was marred bytension again between the two sides causedby India's nuclear tests in May 1998. Andfinally, strategic partnership from 2005 on-wards.

Since the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongjivisited India in January 2002 and subse-quently Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bi-hari Vajpayee visited China in June 2003,both countries have made considerable pro-gress in their political, economic and secu-rity relations. After experiences akin to along and winding road, China-India rela-tions have entered a new stage characterizedby maturity. Both China and India are thelargest developing countries, and their totalpopulation is one-third of the world's popu-lation. In order for the two countries to ac-complish their economic and social sustain-able development it is therefore criticallyimportant to maintain peace, stability andprosperity in Asia as well as in the world.At the same time, both countries are risingpowers in international affairs and eachother's neighbours of considerable size, sothey are obliged to view China-India rela-tions from a strategic perspective and tomake every effort to establish a mutuallyconstructive and cooperative long-term re-lationship. Both China and India have civi-lizations of long standing and a unique his-tory of their own. The two countries arepeace-loving and their friendly exchangesgo back to ancient times. Furthermore, both

52 Liping Xia

countries are initiators of the Five Principlesof Peaceful Coexistence and share the samemajor objectives of realizing their economicand social modernization. So they are ableto overcome the difficulties and obstacles intheir relationship. During the visits of Chi-nese Premier Zhu Rongji to India in 2002and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee toChina in 2003, both countries agreed tostrengthen their "long-term constructivepartnership", an objective which was putforward by the leaders of the two countriesduring the visit of Chinese President JiangZemin to India in 1996.

During the visit to India by Chinese PremierWen Jibao in April 2005, both countriesagreed to develop their cooperative partner-ship into a strategic cooperative partnership.Development of trade and diplomatic linksbetween the two nations is in the interests ofboth, and contributes to regional and worldpeace and stability. During the visit, the twogovernments inked an agreement on thepolitical guiding principles to solve the bor-der issue. This was the first political docu-ment to be signed by the two countries since1981 when both countries had started nego-tiations to settle border disputes. Accordingto the agreement, "the differences on theboundary question should not be allowed toaffect the overall development of bilateralrelations" and "the two sides will resolvethe boundary question through peaceful andfriendly consultations. Neither side shall useor threaten to use force against the other byany means". India and China will "makemeaningful and mutually acceptable adjust-ments to their respective positions on theboundary question, so as to arrive at a pack-age settlement to the boundary question".Furthermore, "the boundary settlement mustbe final, covering all sectors of the China-India boundary". Bilateral "strategic and rea-sonable interests, and the principle of mutualand equal security" will be kept in mindwhile arriving at a final settlement. TheSino-Indian border has remained tranquilwith no confrontation since 1993.

3. China's new policy towardsneighbouring countries

There is a new aspect in China's current for-eign strategy and security policy. Amongothers, it includes the concept of a period ofimportant strategic opportunity, and safe-guarding the common interests of all man-kind. The foreign strategy and security pol-icy pursued by the new Chinese leadershipcan be analyzed according to the theories ofinternational relations, including interde-pendence theory, international regime the-ory, geo-economic theory, and cooperationfor win-win theory. In fact, China has de-veloped those theories into a new rationale.There are internal factors and externalfactors affecting China's international role.With the integration of China into interna-tional economic and political mechanisms,China will continue its responsible role as amajor power in international affairs in thenext twenty years.

At present, China has put its relationshipswith major powers as the first priority ofits foreign strategy; its relationships withneighbouring countries as critically impor-tant to its foreign strategy; and its relation-ships with developing countries as thefoundation of its foreign strategy. India is arising major power in Asia, a neighbouringcountry with China, and one of the biggestdeveloping countries. So China has placedgreat importance on its relationship withIndia.

The first two decades of the 21st century area period of important strategic opportunityfor China. During this period China willfocus its attention on an all-out effort tobuild an affluent society. The objectives ofChina's modernization programme are toquadruple the GDP of 2000 by 2020, and tobecome a mid-level developed country by2050. In order to achieve these objectives,China needs long-term peace and a stableinternational security environment whichwill further its economic development.

Stability in South Asia: a view from China 53

4. China's new concepts offoreign strategy

In the 21st century there are the three majorhistorical tasks for China: to propel the mod-ernization drive; to achieve national reunifi-cation; and to safeguard world peace andpromote common development.1 In order toaccomplish the three major historical tasks,China has some new concepts for its foreignstrategy.

4.1 Safeguarding common interests

Firstly, China recognizes the necessity to goalong with the tide of history and to safe-guard the common interests of all humanity.Due to the development of economic glob-alization, the common interests of all man-kind have become evident. China is ready towork with the international community toboost global multi-polarization, promote theharmonious coexistence of diverse forces,and maintain stability in the internationalcommunity. China will continue to improveand develop relations with the developedcountries. Proceeding from the fundamentalinterests of all countries concerned, Chinawill broaden the converging points of com-mon interests and properly settle differenceson the basis of the Five Principles of Peace-ful Coexistence, notwithstanding the differ-ences in social systems and ideologies.China has been cooperating with the UnitedStates and other countries in anti-terrorprojects and in dealing with regional secu-rity problems, such as the North Koreannuclear crisis.

4.2 Mutual trust, mutual benefit,equality and coordination

Secondly, China stresses a new concept ofsecurity which features mutual trust, mutualbenefit, equality and coordination. Since theend of the Cold War, China has greatlychanged its security concepts in accordance

with the new international situation and theinterests of the Chinese people as well asmankind's need to seek peace and develop-ment. It is China's view that to obtain lastingpeace, it is imperative to abandon the ColdWar mentality, cultivate a new concept ofsecurity and seek a new way to safeguardpeace. China holds that countries shouldtrust one another, work together to maintainsecurity and to resolve disputes through dia-logue and cooperation, and should not resortto the use or threat of force. It has beenproved that the new concepts of security arein keeping with current trends and have greatvitality.

China holds that the core of the new securityconcept should be mutual trust, mutualbenefit, equality and coordination.2 The newsecurity concept should also be the guidelineto resolve disputes in international security.3

On 7 October 2003, Chinese Premier WenJiabao stressed: "It is China's existing guide-line to advance the vigorous development,peace and stability in Asia. It is an importantpart of China's development strategy tomaintain good relationships with neighbours,make them secure and help them to becomerich".

"To maintain good relationships with neigh-bours" means that China will carry forwardthe Chinese philosophy of "making close andfriendly relations with neighbours", so thatthey can cooperatively establish a stable andharmonious structure of relationships be-tween China and its neighbours under theprinciple of living in harmony with sur-rounding countries. "To make neighbourssecure" means that China will vigorouslymaintain regional peace and stability, andpersist in improving mutual trust throughdialogue and cooperation and in resolvingdisputes though peaceful negotiations, so asto construct a peaceful and stable regionalenvironment for the development of Asia."To help neighbours to become rich" meansthat China will strengthen cooperation ofmutual benefit with its neighbours, and will

54 Liping Xia

deepen regional and sub-regional coopera-tion in order to realize common developmentwith other Asian countries.

4.3 The China-India strategiccooperative partnership

Thirdly, China will strengthen the China-In-dia strategic cooperative partnership throughmutual trust and a win-win concept. The twocountries should look on their mutual rela-tions from a strategic perspective, and withlong-term views. Both should recognize thelong-term and fundamental common inter-ests between them. They should continue touse the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexis-tence as the guidelines to guide China-Indiarelations. The two countries should resolvetheir border disputes in a spirit of mutual co-ordination as well as mutual understandingand accommodation through negotiations.The China-India agreement on politicalguiding principles on solving the border is-sue will help the special representatives ofthe two governments negotiate territorialclaims as experts delineate the boundary ona map and on the ground.

The two countries should further strengthenthe dialogue on strategic and security issuesbetween them. They should further enhancedefense exchanges and confidence-buildingmeasures between the two militaries so asto improve mutual trust. They should alsoincrease mutual economic and trade coop-eration so as to strengthen the foundation ofthe China-India relationship.

5. Terrorism as one of the major threats to South Asia

Since the end of the Cold War, and espe-cially since the 9/11 events, the system ofinternational relations has been undergoingtransformation from one of balance of powerin international anarchy to a new onemainly characterized by mutual interde-

pendence between countries. This transfor-mation will go through a long-term transi-tion period during which there will manycomplex struggles, on a path that will betortuous. Terrorism has become one of themajor threats to mankind and the interna-tional community during this transforma-tion of the international relations system.

5.1 Non-traditional security threats

The impact of non-traditional security threatson international relations has been rapidlyincreasing. Non-traditional security threatscan also be described as global problems,transnational problems or low politics prob-lems. They include terrorism, environmentalpollution, global warming, population explo-sion, drug trafficking, international crime,HIV/AIDS. Non-traditional security threatshave two major characteristics: they are pre-sent everywhere in the world and as suchconcern all mankind; and they threaten theexistence and development of all humanbeings.

Security problems can be transformed intonon-traditional security problems, and non-traditional security problems can lead to tra-ditional armed conflicts. Furthermore, tra-ditional security threats and non-traditionalsecurity threats can be interwoven with eachother and mutate from one to the other. Forexample, weapons of mass destruction aretraditional security problems. However, ifterrorists have such weapons, this becomesa non-traditional security threat and a trans-national problem. Another example is thatcross-boundary attacks by terrorists are non-traditional security threats, which may leadto traditional armed conflicts.

As a result of the large-scale Cold War armsrace between the two superpowers, theUnited States and the former Soviet Union;of long-term exploitation and ignorance to-wards developing nations by developed na-tions; and as a result of human greed, non-


traditional security threats have increased inrecent years and have more and more im-pact. That has greatly increased the com-mon interests of all countries in the world,and made countries more inclined to coop-erate in order to deal with and resolve thoseproblems. With the growing impact of non-traditional security threats on internationalrelations and the growth of common inter-ests between countries, it is necessary forcountries, especially the major powers, toresolve disputes between them through con-sultation and coordination, and to cooperateto deal with non-traditional security threats.

5.2 The role of non-state elements

Terrorism as one of the non-state elementsis being increasingly implicated in interna-tional relations. Non-state actors include ter-rorist organizations, transnational companies,non-governmental organizations, multilateralorganizations. In recent years, non-state ac-tors have become important actors in inter-national relations. Some non-state actorsnow have even the same amount of capitaland means as states do. There are largetransnational companies which have morecapital than medium-sized or small states. Ininternational society, there are many kinds ofnon-governmental organizations which playa spectacular role in international relationsand international politics. Since the end ofthe Cold War, terrorist organizations andtheir actions have developed and become thenew threat to human society. The 9/11 inci-dent is the most glaring example. Althoughterrorism has been around for ages, globalterrorism is a relatively new phenomenon.Transnational and multiethnic, it is interna-tional in scope, with terrorists representingall walks of life, poor to rich, third world tofirst world, illiterate to educated. Ironically,the same mechanisms that have fuelledeconomic globalization have also enabledterrorism on a global scale. Those non-stateactors have a very significant impact on in-ternational relations.

6. Anti-terror war launched by theUnited States

In line with the military concept of Revolu-tion in Military Affairs (RMA), the Ad-ministration of George W. Bush which as-sumed power in January 2001 intended tostrengthen the absolute superiority of theUS military, to realize absolute security forthe United States, and to further consolidateits leadership in the world through makinguse of US high-tech military superiority.

The 9/11 incident was the first time since ithad become a superpower that the UnitedStates suffered such a heavy loss from anexternal attack on the American mainland.Under those circumstances, the UnitedStates regarded anti-terrorism as the high-est priority of its national security strategyand began the anti-terror war. At the sametime, the Pentagon began to make signifi-cant readjustments to its defense strategy.

One important characteristic of the read-justment of US defense strategy is to stressthat the US military should shift from a"threats-based approach" to a "capabilities-based" approach. The Pentagon holds thatconcept since it reflects the fact that theUnited States cannot know with confidencewhat nation, combination of nations, ornon-state actor will pose threats to vital USinterests or those of US allies and friendsdecades from now. So the Bush Admini-stration has given up the guideline ofmilitary strategy to "prepare for winningtwo major theatre wars" and has asked USforces to have military capabilities to dealwith different situations in this century. An-other important characteristic of the read-justment of US defense strategy is the pro-posal of the strategic concept of "pre-emptive attacks". In the Nuclear PostureReview report presented by the Pentagon inJanuary 2001, the US Department of De-fense even holds that nuclear weapons canbe used to attack targets which are able tosustain attacks by conventional weapons.

56 Liping Xia

The third important characteristic of the re-adjustment of US defense strategy is to re-gard homeland security as the foundation ofUS defense strategy. In order to win the waron terror and to develop future capabilities,the Pentagon is speeding up the developmentof high-tech weapons, including Missile De-fense, weapons to be used in space, capabili-ties for persistent surveillance, tracking, andrapid engagement. However, the new US de-fense strategy still has a lot of the Cold Warmentality. For example, in the annual de-fense report to the US President and Con-gress put forward by US DoD in August2002, the Pentagon claims that a militarycompetitor with a significant source basemay appear in Asia in the future. In order todeal with this, the United States will takesome measures to strengthen its militarypresence in East Asia, including amongothers deployment of another aircraft car-rier, and submarines with cruise missiles.

The terrorist attack on the World TradeCenter and Pentagon on 11 September 2001marked the beginning of a new era in thefight against global terrorism. US PresidentGeorge W. Bush declared war against ter-rorism, dictating a strategic shift of the USfrom diplomatic and police action to war. On7 October 2001, the United States launchedmilitary attacks against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. U.S forces defeatedthem, but have still not captured Osamabin Laden. Al-Qaida remnants still exist.

In 2003, following its 2002 release of theNational Security Strategy, the US pub-lished the National Strategy for CombatingTerrorism, National Strategy to Secure Cy-berspace and National Strategy for PhysicalProtection of Critical Infrastructure and KeyAssets, in order to flesh out its new nationalsecurity strategy aimed at counter-terrorism,non-proliferation and homeland security. Asthe first step in carrying out the new strat-egy, the US waged a preemptive war againstIraq in March 2003 on grounds that Iraqhad weapons of mass destruction. With no

WMDs found in Iraq, the US and the UKhad to face increasing suspicions about theirrationale for the war. Although there was ageneral election in Iraq in January 2005,there have been frequent attacks from bothterrorists and anti-American resistanceagainst both US forces and Iraqi police, of-ficials and civilians. Many terrorists havecome to Iraq from all over the world and areusing Iraq as their training centre. Further-more, terrorists also struck Western targetsin Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, Russia, Mo-rocco, Egypt, Pakistan, London, and so on.

In May 2003, the US launched the Prolifera-tion Security Initiative (PSI), expressing itsreadiness to carry out sea or air interceptionswith willing allies against ships and aircraftsuspected of transporting nuclear, biologicaland chemical weapons and their compo-nents. PSI received support from Australia,Japan, the European countries, and someother countries.

7. China’s policy towards terrorismand the war on terror

7.1 International cooperationagainst terrorism.

China has been actively participating ininternational cooperation against terrorism.During the Anti-terrorism Meeting of For-eign Ministers of the UN Security Councilheld on 20 January 2003, Chinese ForeignMinister Tang Jiaxuan put forward a four-point proposal for extending the war on ter-ror. First, with peace and security for allmankind as the central theme of counter-terrorism, efforts should be made to culti-vate a new security concept featuring mu-tual trust, mutual benefit, equality and co-operation and to resolve or mitigate suchregional hotspots as the Middle East andIraq. Second, with universal developmentand common prosperity as the foundation ofcounter-terrorism, efforts should be made topromote the economic development of all


countries, to narrow the wealth gap and at-tain the development goals laid down by theUN Millennium Summit. Third, with closercommunication among and integration ofdifferent civilizations as the safeguard ofcounter-terrorism, efforts should be madeto promote understanding and toleranceamong diverse civilizations and cultures.Fourth, with stronger exchange and coop-eration as the key to counter-terrorism, ef-forts should be made to give scope to theleading role of the UN and help developingcountries build up their capacity in compli-ance with the purposes and principles of theUN Charter.4

7.2 The role of the UN

China has supported the leading role playedby the United Nations and its SecurityCouncil in counter-terrorism and opposingterrorism in all its forms and manifestation.China has actively taken part in counter-terrorism discussions at the UN and its Se-curity Council. China voted in favour of Se-curity Council Resolutions 1456, 1465 and1561 on counter-terrorism, and worked ear-nestly with the Counter-Terrorism Com-mittee of the Council.

7.3 Opposition to all forms of terrorism

China opposes all forms of terrorism. China'sposition also includes: a comprehensive ap-proach to address both the symptoms androot causes of terrorism, enhanced capacity-building of developing countries against ter-rorism, and rejection of double standardsand the simplistic practice of linking terror-ism with specific countries, ethnicities andreligions. China also holds that the fightagainst the East Turkistan terrorist forceswas part and parcel of the worldwide cam-paign against terror, and China stood readyto step up its cooperation with the relevantcountries on this front in the interest of re-gional peace and stability.

7.4 Regional cooperation againstterrorism

China has continued to take an active part inregional or sub-regional cooperation againstterrorism. The Shanghai Cooperation Or-ganization has developed into an importantmechanism to promote regional security,stability and development. In 2003, Chinaparticipated in joint military exercises underthe framework of the Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO), a move that signifi-cantly deterred the terrorist forces operatingat home and abroad. In September 2003, theForeign Ministers of six member countriesof the SCO signed the Shanghai Conventionon Combating Terrorism, Separatism andExtremism and the Agreement Between theSCO Member Countries Concerning theRegional Counter-Terrorism Agency. In2003, the Chinese side also participated inthe meeting of the attorney-general and thefirst meeting of the Council of the RegionalCounter-Terrorism Agency of the SCO,playing an important role in guiding andstrengthening the cooperation of the or-ganization. In January 2004, the SCO Sec-retariat and the SCO Regional Counter-Terrorism Agency were formally inaugu-rated in Beijing and Tashkent respectively.In June 2004, during the Summit Meetingof the SCO in Tashkent, leaders of membercountries of the SCO signed the Agreementon cooperation against the illegal transpor-tation of narcotic drugs, mind-altering drugsand their component materials. The SCOalso established a mechanism of regularmeetings of Secretaries of National SecurityCouncils of member countries, so they canstrengthen their security cooperation.

In September 2004, the Chinese Ambassadorto Portugal Ma Enhan as the representativeof the SCO attended the second meeting ofthe OSCE in Lisbon on preventing and com-bating terrorism. Ambassador Ma briefed themeeting on the principled positions of theSCO on preventing and combating terrorismand the concrete actions it had taken, and ex-

58 Liping Xia

changed views with the Organization of Se-curity and Cooperation in Europe and otherinternational organizations on anti-terrorismcooperation.

7.5 Bilateral cooperation against terrorism

China has continued to deepen bilateral co-operation against terrorism with the relevantcountries. In 2004, China held the fourthcounter-terrorism consultation with the USand the third consultation of the China-USworking group on financial anti-terrorism. InJuly 2003, the customs authorities of Chinaand the US signed the bilateral declarationon the principles of Container Security Ini-tiatives (CSI) cooperation and the annexes inBeijing, which opened a new area of China-US cooperation against terrorism. In addition,China held the third counter-terrorismdialogue with India and conducted counter-terrorism consultation with Germany in 2003.

Following the signing of the Shanghai Con-vention on Combating Terrorism, Separatismand Extremism (or the Shanghai Conventionfor short) by the Foreign Ministers of sixmember countries of the Shanghai Coopera-tion Organization (SCO) in September 2003,China began to negotiate and conclude bilat-eral agreements on combating terrorism,separatism and extremism (or "agreementagainst the three forces" for short) with othermember states of SCO in an effort to imple-ment the Shanghai Convention, build a net-work of legal cooperation against the threeforces and foster closer cooperation withinthe SCO. The China-Tajikistan agreementagainst the three forces and that betweenChina and Uzbekistan were signed on 2 and4 September 2003 respectively. The Stand-ing Committee of the National People'sCongress (NPC) of China ratified the China-Kazakhstan and China-Kyrgyzstan agree-ments against the three forces on 26 and27 August 2003 respectively. The agreementbetween China and Kazakhstan on the issueentered into force on 3 July 2003.

In order to help the Afghan people rebuildthe country after the war, China has taken anactive part in Afghanistan's post-war recon-struction. The Chinese Government seri-ously honoured its January 2002 pledge ofUS$ 150 million aid. During the visit of Af-ghanistan's Vice-President Nimatullah Shah-rani to China in May 2003, China announcedits provision of a US$ 15 million grant toAfghanistan and US$ 1 million cash to theAfghan Reconstruction Fund. In August2003, the Chinese side officially handed overits donation of 80,000 pieces of office appli-ances to the Afghan Transitional Govern-ment. By now, the construction of the Chi-nese-assisted Republic Hospital in Kabul andthe preliminary preparations for the ParwanIrrigation Project have been completed. Inaddition, China made vigorous efforts toexpand its mutually beneficial economiccooperation and trade with Afghanistan intelecommunications, building materials,electrical appliances, and other fields.

China is also helping the Iraqi people recon-struct the country after the Iraq War. In Oc-tober 2003, Chinese Assistant Foreign Min-ister Shen Guofang led a delegation to theConference of Donating Countries for IraqiReconstruction held by the United Nations inMadrid, Spain. During the conference, theChinese Government announced that Chinawould provide US$ 25 million worth of hu-manitarian aid to Iraq for its reconstruction.In 2004, the Chinese Government declaredthat it would provide training to attorneysfor Iraq.

8. Strengthening internationalcooperation against terrorism

8.1 The leading role of the UN

It is important to find a way to facilitate theleading role of the UN and its SecurityCouncil in the international cooperationagainst terrorism. The United Nations hasbeen playing an important role in the anti-


terror campaign. Almost all countrieshave commended the important role of theUnited Nations in coordinating internationalcounter-terrorism cooperation, and havespoken highly of the work of the SecurityCouncil Terrorism Committee. Most coun-tries emphasized that international counter-terrorism operations must comply with thepurposes and principles of the UN Charterand other norms of international law, andefforts should be made to address bothsymptoms and root causes of terrorism. Onthe definition of terrorism, the Islamic andnon-aligned countries continued to under-score the justice and legitimacy of nationalliberation movements against foreign occu-pation and to call for sanctions against actsof state terrorism according to the relevantconventions and international law.

Under the framework of the UN, the discus-sions of the Sixth Committee on the DraftComprehensive Convention on InternationalTerrorism, the Draft Convention on the Sup-pression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism andthe Convocation of a high-level conferenceon preventing and combating terrorism havebeen continuing, but have made little prog-ress. The delegations remained divided onthe major outstanding issues, such as thedefinition of terrorism, the scope of applica-tion of the conventions, the legitimacy of theuse of nuclear weapons by a state, the activi-ties of armed forces, and the relations be-tween the comprehensive and sectoral con-ventions. The Chinese delegation expressedits support for India's drafting of a Compre-hensive Convention on International Terror-ism and Russia's drafting of a Convention onthe Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terror-ism, and believed that the draft conventions,once adopted, add to the international legalframework on counter-terrorism.

8.2 Multilateral cooperation

Multilateral cooperation in the anti-terrorcampaign should be enhanced. The common

interests and cooperation between countriestowards non-traditional security threats, in-cluding terrorism, environmental pollution,drug trafficking, transnational crimes,HIV/AIDS, SARS, bird flu, and so on, havebeen increasing, so that they will seek to re-solve traditional security problems morethrough dialogue and negotiations. The mainobjectives of most countries will be the de-velopment of their economy, society, scienceand technology. The mutual interdependenceand cooperation between major powers willcontinue to increase, so they will make greatefforts to avoid armed conflicts betweenthem. The process of establishing and de-veloping international and regional mecha-nisms of security cooperation and dialoguewill continue, so that in many regions andsub-regions, co-existing multi-level, multi-channel and multi-type mechanisms of se-curity can be formed. Those international,regional and sub-regional mechanisms ofsecurity cooperation will become the im-portant parts of the future system of inter-national relations mainly characterized bymutual interdependence between countries.

Cooperation between major powers has beenincreasing, but competition among themhas been more complicated. Since the 9/11events, the US has regarded the war againstterrorism as the highest priority on itsagenda. In order to realize the goal of anti-terrorism, it has to strengthen cooperationwith other powers, including China, andhopes to have stable Sino-US relations.

8.3 A new concept of security

At present there is competition between thenew security concepts and the Cold Warmentality. On the one hand, some new secu-rity concepts including cooperative security,coordinated security, and common securityhave been put forward. On the other hand,the Cold War mentality of "zero sumgames" theory, balance of power, geopoli-tics, still exists. In many countries there is a

60 Liping Xia

the struggle between new security conceptsand the Cold War mentality. If countries,especially major powers, can see the worldthrough new security concepts and cooper-ate to deal with non-traditional securitythreats such as terrorism they can have awin-win or a win-win-win situation be-tween them. Otherwise, they will all lose.

In order to effectively counter terrorism,countries should abandon the Cold Warmentality and adopt some new conceptsabout global security. This would include theconcept of "mutual security". During theCold War, the concept of "zero sum game"had played a crucial role in internationalpolitics. After the end of the Cold War,countries should accept the concept of "mu-tual security" because of the changed situa-tion. We should oppose any country whichbuilds its own absolute security upon the in-security of others. According to the concept,nuclear powers, especially two nuclear su-perpowers, should speed up their processof nuclear disarmament.

The new concept of security would also in-clude the concept of cooperation. At present,all countries are facing many commonproblems or transnational problems, such asterrorism, environmental problems, green-house effect, drug trafficking, proliferationof weapons of mass destruction and so on.They should make common efforts and co-operate to deal with the challenges. Espe-cially, they should pay more attention tonuclear non-proliferation, because nuclearproliferation is still hanging like the swordof Damocles above mankind and has neverceased to threaten the survival of humanity.

The emphasis should be changed from em-phasis on military security to emphasis oncomprehensive security. Although after theend of the Cold War, geopolitical, militarysecurity and ideological factors still play animportant role that cannot be ignored, eco-nomic factors are becoming far more rele-vant in international politics. So all coun-

tries should make the greatest effort to seeksettlement of differences and disputes amongnations through peaceful means.

9. A possible alliance of the UnitedStates, Japan, Australia and India

A number of security specialists have con-cluded that the United States, Japan, Austra-lia and India are well on their way to form-ing a military alliance, the heart of whichrepresents a NATO-styled organization inAsia. Evidence to this effect can be inducedfrom the naval wargames recently held in theBay of Bengal. The atmospherics originatingfrom the leadership of the said countries alsosuggest a new alliance of sorts. US Vice-President Richard B. Cheney on a recentvisit to Japan contended that the UnitedStates, Japan and Australia should establishtrilateral defense relations. Former JapanesePrime Minister Abe Shinzo put forward aproposal that the United States, Japan,Australia and India should form an alliancebased on "common values". In May 2007 theforeign ministers of the four countries held ameeting in Manila and decided to proceedwith the decision to stage the Malabar seriesof naval exercises., The United States, Japanand Australia held their first strategic dia-logue in Sydney on 8 September 2007, rightin the middle of the same exercises.

These more recent developments have coin-cided with a rise in regionalization trends inEast Asia over the last decade or so. This ex-pansion has lead to more economic and secu-rity-related interdependence between coun-tries in the region, underpinning the pillars ofregional security and stability. With this re-gionalism, the scope of security has beenenlarged to encompass not only military is-sues, but also those related to politics, eco-nomics, finance, science and technology,culture, and so on.

The common interests of countries in theregion have greatly increased, and interde-


pendence best defines the many relationshipsbetween them. Military means present less ofan option in East Asia and are no longer suf-ficient to deal with the variety of securitychallenges that are envisioned over the hori-zon. Such a state of affairs will necessitatethe development of new means and conceptsto maintain stability and peace. These newdevelopments require a move away from thetraditional concepts of national security toa more comprehensive and cooperative ap-proach.

During recent years, regional institutions ofeconomic and security cooperation and dia-logue have made significant progress in EastAsia. These include the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEANPlus Three (ASEAN+3), the East AsianSummit (EAS), ASEAN Plus One(ASEAN+1), the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-tion (APEC), the six-party talks on NorthKorean nuclear issues, and so on. These re-gional institutions are playing an increas-ingly important role in the economic andsecurity fields in Asia. However, the amountof traction a potential multilateral alliancebased on "common values" or a concert ofdemocracies in Asia is likely to have is lim-ited, and likely to have a very negative im-pact on regional security.

Firstly, such an alliance would inevitablydivide the region. Since the end of the ColdWar, the trend of regional economic inte-gration has grown rapidly and represents ahighly successful means by which to main-tain regional stability. Although the UnitedNations system that grew out of the SecondWorld War should be reformed, the currentinternational system based on sovereignstates remains a fundamental pillar thatshould not be overridden by military alli-ances that presuppose a superiority of sorts.If a concert of democracy is established, theworld as well as the East Asian region willbe split two ways, with conflict dominating

the landscape instead of cooperation. Inter-national terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida will likely relish such an eventuality.

Secondly, the development of a "gang ofdemocracies" will reek of discrimination,especially when juxtaposed against manydeveloping countries. This will inevitablyundermine the concept of sovereignty, atleast according to the principles of the UNCharter. It will produce more failed or failingstates, which will become hothouses for ter-rorists.

Thirdly, the development of any democraticaxis will slow down the process of moderni-zation and democracy within developingcountries. With many developing countriessuffering from the pains associated with de-mocratization, it is likely to take a considera-bly long time before such countries developtheir own systems of democracy that reso-nate according to their own situation.

Regardless of the implications of this alli-ance of democracies, the Malabar 2007 na-val exercises have sent a message to China.The area where the naval exercises wereheld is of strategic importance for China,representing the critical sea lanes throughwhich half of its imported oil transits. Inaddition, some Chinese security analysts areconcerned that the four countries, namelythe United States, India, Japan and Austra-lia, have indeed formed a multilateral alli-ance that ultimately works to restrict China.

In June 2007, China had issued a démarcheto India, the US, Japan and Australia inwhich it sought details about their four-nation meeting, termed a QuadrilateralInitiative. India and Australia moved toquickly assure Beijing that security and de-fense issues did not form part of that meet-ing's agenda. On 23 August 2007, slightlyover a week before the Malabar 2007 navalexercises, Admiral Timothy J. Keating,Commander of the US Pacific Command,

62 Liping Xia

declared that the exercises were conductednot to isolate China or to push it into a cor-ner. He reiterated that he was interested inengaging China and would seek to avoidany misunderstanding. Most Chinese wouldlike to believe what the Admiral said. How-ever, the US should understand that theproof of the pudding has not been made ap-parent to China. In recent years, China hasheld that traditional concepts of securitywere outmoded and that new concepts werenecessary. Thus China advocated the "NewSecurity Concepts" which regard mutualtrust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordi-nation as its raison d'état.

The "New Security Concepts" should be-come the theoretic foundation for establish-ing the regional security architecture in the21st century. China would like to acceleratemutual trust through dialogue and to spurcommon security initiatives through coop-eration with the US and other countries.China understands that the only way to en-sure the integrity of its sea lanes in the IndianOcean and the Straits of Malacca is to coop-erate with the US and other countries – thepurpose of which is to build a harmoniousand stable Asia-Pacific region which is basedon mutual trust and benefit for the commoninterests of all countries in the region.

Notes1 Documents of the 16th National Congress of

the Communist Party of China [ZhongguoGongchandang Dishiliuci Quanguodabiao Da-hui Wenjian Huibian], Beijing, China: ForeignLanguage press, 2002, p.2.

2 China's Document about the Position of theNew Security Concept [Zhongguo Guanyu XinAnquanguan Lichang De Wenjian], put forwardby the Chinese Delegation at the meeting ofASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), held in Seri

Begawan, the capital of Brunei, on 31.7.2002Beijing, China: People’s Daily, 2.8.2002, p.3.

3 Chinese Ambassador of Disarmament HuXiaodi's Speech at the Conference on Disarma-ment in Geneva, on 7.2.2002, Beijing, China:People's Daily, 3.2.2002.

4 Department of Policy Planning of Ministry ofForeign Affairs of People's Republic China,China's Foreign Affairs: 2004 Edition, WorldAffairs Press, Beijing, May 2004, pp.340-341.

List of authors

Anand, VinodBrig. Gen. (ret.), Centre for Strategic Studies &Simulation; Senior Fellow at United ServiceInstitution of India, New Delhi

Chandler, MichaelInternational Consultant on Terrorism andSecurity, Freiburg/Elbe

Kiessling, Hein G., Dr.Consultant on Pakistan, political scientist,Munich

Lange, Klaus, Prof. Dr.Desk of International Security, Academyfor Politics and Current Affairs, Hanns SeidelFoundation, Munich

Roul, AnimeshExecutive Director, Society for the Study ofPeace & Conflict, New Delhi

Wieck, Hans-Georg, Dr.Ambassador (ret.), Berlin

Xia, Liping, Prof.Dean and Professor of School of PoliticalScience & International Relations, TongjiUniversity, Shanghai; General-Secretary ofShanghai Institute for International StrategicStudies (SIISS)

Editor of Publications Series:Prof. Dr. Reinhard Meier-WalserHead of the Academy for Politics and Current Affairs, Hanns Seidel Foundation,Munich, Germany

Editor:Prof. Dr. Klaus LangeDesk of International Security, Academy for Politics and Current Affairs,Hanns Seidel Foundation, Munich

"Studies & Comments"

In print copies of the Studies & Comments series can be ordered free of charge from the websiteof the Hanns Seidel Foundation or by telephone: +49-89-1258-263. The series is also availablein PDF format on www.hss.de/mediathek/publikationen.html

No. 1 Migration Policy and the Economy: International Experiences

No. 2 Christian-Democratic and Center-Right Parties in Europe and North America:Selected Perspectives

No. 3 Integrating Regional and Global Security Cooperation

No. 4 India's New Dynamics in Foreign Policy

No. 5 International Labour Standards and the Social Dimension ofOpen Trading Regimes

No. 6 European-Chinese Security Cooperation: Possibilities and Limits

No. 7 European and Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation

No. 8 Interventions for the Best Interest of the Child in Family Law ProceduresInterventionen zum Kindeswohl

No. 9 Security in South Asia: Conventional and Unconventional Factors of Destabilization

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