A TELEDYNEENGINE="RING SFRVICFS
7mCi-j>j)C~A~ RE~ OP7TR-3454-1
AS ME SECT) ON X) FRA CTURE hlECHANlCSEVALUAT)ON OF lNLET NOZZ~M INSERV)CP.
NSPEC ~. ) ON. INDICAT)QN
R.E. GINNA UNIT NO. 1 REACTOR VESSEL
MARCH 15 1979
't
ROCHESTER GAS l|( ELECTRIC CORPORATIOi'l89 EAST AVENUE
ROCHESTER, NY 14649
R.E. GIf'lilA UNIT NO. 1 REACTOR VESSEL
TECHNICAL REPORT TR-3454-1
ASHE SECTIOf'l XI FRACTURE HECHANICSEVALUATION OF INLET NOZZLE INSERVICE
. Ii'lSPECTIOi'l IffDICATIOff
i~1ARCH 1", 1979
)ii TELEDYNE ENGli4E=~lNG SERViCES
303 BEAR HILL ROAD'P/ALTHAiYi,MASSACHUSETTS 02154
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
1. 0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 CONCLUSION
3.0 DESCRIPTION OF VESSEL AND REPORTED FLAW
4.0 COMPARISON OF GINNA-1 REPORTED FLAW WITHPREYIOUSLY EVALUATED FLAWS
5.0 MATERIAL PROPERTIES
6.0
7.0
8.0
PRESSURE - TEMPERATURE LIMITS
STRESS ANALYSiS
FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH
9.0 FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSIS AND CRITERIA
10.0 ELASTIC - PLASTi'C ANALYSIS
APPENDICES
A. STRESS ANALYSIS
B. EF"=CT OF FLAW SiZE AND TOUGHNESS VARIATiONS
C. E"FFECT OF APPLIED STRESS VARIATiONS
D. ELASTiC - PLASTIC EVALUATION
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ABSTRACT
I
The Inservice Inspection indication of a near mid-wall flaw in the
reactor pressure vessel inlet nozzle N2 has been evaluated in accordance
wi th the requirements of Section XI of the ASHE Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code. The reported flaw satisfies the Code criteria for acceptance by eval-uation. Therefore, at least with respect to this indication, the vessel
.is acceptable for service as is without removal or repair of the indication.
\
1.0 INTRODUCTIOH
R.E. G>nna Unit Ho. 1 is a Westinghouse PWR which went into commercial
service in June, 1970. The reactor pressure vessel, constructed by the Babcock
6 Wilcox .Company was. subjected to an Inservice Inspection in accordance withTechnical Specification and Section XI of the ASHE Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code requirements. When certain alleviating factors are not considered, an
ultrasonic indication in excess of the size permitted for acceptance by
examination was identified in the weld which attached an inlet nozzle to the
vessel.
In support of other approaches being followed by Rochester Gas and
Electric personnel,. Teledyne Engineering Services (TES) was requested to,eval-uate the reported indication in accordance with the Section XI requirementsfor acceptance by evaluation. This report contains the results of that in-
.
vestigations~
A4-5
Z.O CONCLUSIONS
2.1 The reported flaw satisfies the Code criteria for acceptance by
evaluation, so is acceptable for service as is without removal~ ~
or repair of the indication.
2.2 For the reported flaw, of dimensions:
Through-wall depth = 2a = 0.93 inches
Len th = I = 5.3 inches
Eccentricity = e = 1.0 inches,
the calculated stress intensity factor is 9.2 ksi ~in. The Code
acceptable value is 63.2 ksi /in. Therefore, the total factor ofi 21.7 as corn ared to the code required factor of safety
of ~10: 3.16.
2.3 The effect of variations in flaw size or toughness of the materialcan be determined rom Figure 1. Based upon the results plotte
'hereon,a flaw of through-wall dimension 2a = 4.0 inches, would
satis y Code acceptance requirements even if the toughness we. o
reduced zo 67 ksi v in.
The e f -" of
variant.
ons in app1 ied stress across the 7 (aw can "e
det .mined =rom Figure 2. Based upon the results plot-.ed therein,tne repor- d flaw, Za = 0.93 inches, would satisfy Code acceptance
require:-;.-=. ts even i= the applied stress across the flaw were equa;
to the yield strength of the material, or 51 <si, whichever islower. Stat d differently, the calculat d pressure sLress actiingacross the flaw could be increased by a factor in excess of 6 wi-;noui
violation of the Code criteria.
2.5 An elastic-plastic fracture mechanics analysis, following the
methods applied by Dr. P. C. Paris as a consultant to NRC to a
similar investigation indicated that:
a. The factor of safety against plastic instability failure is
in excess of 3 for a flaw through-wall dimension in excess of
2a = 4 inches.
b. For a flaw through-wall dimension in excess of 2a = 4 inches,
yielding can occur and residual stresses, such as those which
result from weldin ,'nd discontinuity stresses, such aq those
which result from tern erature differentials or from pipe reaction
stresses, would be eliminated from consideration. Although
this evaluation results in the conclusion that such stresses
may be ignored, such stresses were considered in the evaluations
which lead to the previously listed conclusions.
2.6 The previous MCAP-8503 ASHE III, Appendix G analysis was reviewed
to determine if the pressure of the reported flaw requires a re-
e!aluat:on of the Appendix G requirements. It is a conclusion of
this review that the Mestingnouse evaluation of a postulated flaw
in the vicinity of an outlet nozzle represents a mucn more signi-
f;:cant situation than does the reported flaw. Tnerefore, accepz-
abiiit of the postulated outlet nozzle flaw ls fu1tner confirmac'.on
,of the acceptability of the reported flaw.
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3.0 DESCRIPTION OF VESSEL AND REPORTED FLAW
The Ginna Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Yesse 1 (RPV) was fabricated by the Babcock
5 Wilcox Company (85W) to the requirements of Section III of the ASt<E Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code in accordance with Westinghouse Electric Company (W) Equip-
ment Specification Ho. 676206 Revision 0 with Addendum 676554, Revision 0. The
RPV Stress Re orts're B8W 1966, Reports Numbers. 1 through 12.r
The inside diameter, to the inner surface of the cladding, is 132 inches.
The minimum clad thickness is 5/32 inches. The wall thickness is 6 1/2 inches
at the beltline and 9 inches at the nozzle course. The nozzle course contains
two 52 1/2 inch outside diameter inlet nozzles, two 49 inch diameter outlet noz-
'les and two nominal 4 inch diameter safety injection nozzles. The inlet and
outlet nozzles are at a- common el'evation.
A sketch of the inlet nozzle is shown in Figure 3, with the dimensions of
the weld preparation on the OD of the nozzle sketches above. This configure-ion
is mportant because it locates the reported flaw. Figure 4 shows the inne. por-
tion of this weld prepa. ation with the reported flaw lying along the line AC.
The reweld pr paration dimensions are defined on a radial plane through the vessel
cen-erline (= = 0' 360'). Since the weld oreparation is machined cylindr cally
with the nozzle centerline, the radial dis-ance be-'.veen the inside of the .esse.
and -he weld preparation land varies with radial position ~ . The flaw is loca-;ed
be-ween 305' 9 < 316.5", approximately the 10:30 o'lock position wnen look':ng
along the nozzle centerline from outside of the vessel. Figure 4 indicates :~e
radial distance from the RPV ID to Point D as varying between 4.2 and ..1 inches.
The reported flaw "through-wall"dimension measured along the weld prepa.ation
is 0.93 inches. For purposes of analysis, Section XI permits this flaw to b re-
olved into a "throuah-wall" dimension measured perpendicular to the vess'el sur-
face which would decrease the 2a dimension, Because of the complex geometry,
advantage is not taken of this factor. The flaw length, measured around the cir-
cumVerence of the weld preparation as the distance between 305'nd 316.5's 5.27
-5- ENG)NEER)NG SERVtCES
inches. Section XI defines the flaw eccentricity as the distance between .the
flaw center and the vessel midplane. The distance from the vessel ID to the
flaw center varies between approximately 3.55 and 4.47 inches. Conservatively
neglecting the increased thickness resulting from the outer nozzle corner radius,
therefore taking the total thickness as 9 inches; the eccentrici ty varies between
approximately 0 and 1".
8ased upon the above discussion, and noting that an increase in eccentricityincreases the calculated stress intensity factor, the flaw is defined for pur-
poses of analysis by the dimensions:
pa = 0.93 inches
1 = 5.3 inches
e = 1.0 inch
I
lay
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4.0 COMPARISON OF GINNA-1 REPORTED FLAW WITH PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED FLAWS
For purposes of examining pressure-temperature limitations, WCAP-8503*
considered the effects of a flaw adjacent to the outlet nozzle. Although there~ $ N
are differences in geometry between the inlet and outlet nozzles, the stresses
are very similar. This evaluation considered a surface flaw in a plane passing
through the RPV centerline of depth equal to 1.8 inches {a/t = 0.20) and surface
length of 1,8 inches {aspect ratio of 1:6). Since a surface flaw of' given
length and depth results in approximately the same stress intensity factor as does
a subsurface. flaw of the same length and twice the through-wall dimension, the
WCAP-8503 evaluation is equivalent to thai which would be obtained for a mid-wall
flaw of 2a = 3.6 and 1 = 10.8 in the same orientation...In fact, the WCAP evalu-'I
ation would be very conservative because the surface is subject, to discontinuitystresses which have but little effect near midplane. Of even more importance,
however, is the diffe. ence in orientation between the two flaws. The indicatedGinna flaw is circumferential to the nozzle and the WCAP flaw is radial to the
nozzle; therefore, the pressure stress normal to the WCAP flaw is about thretimes as large as t. at normal to the Ginna indication. The. efore, the indic't d
Ginna flaw is of considerable less significance than the nozzle flaw used forthe Appendix G evaluation of ihe Ginna vessel
The mid-wall, nozzle attachment weld flaw most similar to that indices d inGinna-1 which has been subjected to extens ve investigation by TES and by the *
HRC is the indication in the Pilgrim-1 recirculation inlet nozzle NZB which was
first detec.ed in 1974 and wnich was reevaluated in 1976 by both TES and HRC.
The significant parameters may be compared as follows, using the Pilgrim values
evaluated by TES:
ttWCAP-8'03, "ASME III, Appendix G Analysis of Rochester Gas h Electric Corporation
R.E. Ginna Unit Ho. 1 Reactor Vessel, July 1975.
A FEi~jNEER)NG SERVICES
Plant:
Depth, 2a, in.Length, 1, in.Eccentricity, e, in..Hoop stress in vessel,ksi(at operating pressure)Yessej thickness
6 irma-I
0.93
5.3
1.0
16.5
9.05.2
~PI'I rim-1
1,5
5.2
0.55
16.2
7.0
10. 7
The NRC evaluation assumed somewhat more conservative parameters. Soth
the TES and HRC evajuations concluded thaw the Pilgrim-1 RPY was satisfactory iorcontinued service. Tne calculated stress ntensi y =actors for GInna-1 woutd
be expected to be much smaller than those computed =or Pilgrim-l.
Sased upon these iwo comparisons with previously evaluated flaws, one wouid
judge thai the Ginna-1 vessel would easily satisfy the Section Xl cri ria =or
acceptance by evaluation.
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5.0 HATERIAL PROPERTIES
4~ ~
Based upon the values publ ished in WCAP-8421*, - the unirradi a ted ma teria 1
properties of the nozzle, using outlet nozzle data, and of the weld, using beltlineweld data, are as follows:
Location RTNDT Cy Shel f, ft-1 b
Nozzle
Weld
0. 09
0.23
60
0
125
80
18The computed end-of-life fluence at the nozzle elevation is 1.08(IO)
at one-quarter thickness. Using Regulatory Guide 'l.99, Revision 1, the end-
of-life properties are computed as:
LocationNDT',fShelf, ft-lb
Nozzl e
Wel d
60
70
112
62
!I, in WCAP-8503 has used an upper shelf Kl = 200 ksi ~n.IR
The Sect-ion XI toughness versus temoerature curves are plotted in Figure =
for an end-of-life RTi„'= 70F.s Ul
" 'iCAP-8421, Analysis of Capsule R From the Rochester Gas and lectric CorporationR.:. Ginna Unit No. 1 Reactor ilessel Radiation Surveillance Program, November, 1974.
I
6.0 PRESSURE - TEMPERATURE LIMITS
The upper limit of the Technical Specification heatup and. cooldown curves
are also plotted on Figure 5. Because these limits are controlled by the .higher
fluence beltline region, full'operating pressure, ZZSO psig, is not permittedbelow 315F. This temperature is on the toughness upper shelf by a margin inexcess of 100F.,
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)> TELEDYNEENGINEERING SERVICES
7.0 STRESS ANALYSIS
The significant stresses acting across the flaw indication are those due to
vessel pressure and due to welding residual stresses. At the near mid-wall
location, thermal stresses and stresses resulting from pipe reaction effects are
negligible.
The pressure stresses of interest are those acting in a radial di rection with
respect to the nozzle. In the main shell course away from the nozzle, the operatingpressure of 2250 psig causes a hoop stress equal to 16.5 ksi and an axial stress
equal to 8.3 ksi. The presence of the nozzle reduces the radial stress, sine ata radius equal to the nozzle bore radius the stresses must be equal to -2,3 ksi,
I
where'the negative sign indicates compression.
In the course of evaluating similar flaws in other vessels, a very simple
stress calculation technique was found to give excellent answers for the pressur
memorane stress across the flaw. Specifically, the values obtained with th sim-
ole approximation may be compared to other solutions as follows:
!!ethod
S imp 1 e approx ima t-:. on
30 finite element
0 8
C 8.710.3
membrane
inner surfacemid-wallouter surface
20 axisymmetric model, doubled 7.7 inner wall10.0 mid-wail
Thi 5 s lmpl e approximat ion is used in thi s eval uation . in order to obta in thepressure stress acting normal to the F') aw, as contained in Aooendix.A.
>< TELEDYNEEiNGIREERNG SERVICES
The residual stresses used in this evaluation are a conservative approximation
to those measured in a heavy weldment after post-weld heat treatment*. These
data indicate that the residual strssses vary through the thickness with a cosine
relationship from 8.0 ksi tensile on the surfaces to 8.0 ksi compression at mid-
wall. Despite coniirmation of the presence of compressive residual stresses atmidwall by removal of a similar flaw to the one under consideration in a RP'J. Ho
credit is taken for these compressive stresses in this analysis. Instead, the
residual stresses are considered to vary as a cosine function through the thickness
with 8.0 ksi tensile on the surfaces to 0 ksi at the center.
Previous evaluation of a recirculation inlet nozzle in a BtlR, which is sub-
jected to larger temperature changes than is the subject PHR inlet nozzle, indi-cates that thermal stresses are not significant as long as the flaw does not
approach wi thin about 1 1/2" from the inner surface, This is true during normal
and abnormal operations because the inlet nozzle and the adjacent vessel are
suojected to the same temperature transient and are similar in thickness. Tnere-
fore, thermal stress effects are not considered to be of importance in the range
oi ilaw sizes considered, 2a <4 inches.
Pipe reaction stresses in ihe weld region are primarily bending stresses
varying irom tensile ai one surface to compressive at the other. Since the re-
sorted ilaw oi inte. est is near mid-wall, pipe reaction stresses across the taw
are '.'nsignificant.
As a result oi this discussion, the only stresses used in the fracturemechanics analysis of Aopendix 8 are those which result from internal pressureand the weld r'esidual stresses. Since the resulting stress intensity factor isvery low, a question often arises as to the consequences of an error in the cal-culated stress. For this reason, an additional evaluation, Appendix C, is made
for the indicated flaw dimensions giving the stress intensity factor which would be
'computod for arbitrary values oi membrane stress acting across the flaw.
D..'. Ferr'.'(1 P."". ~uhl and D.R. l1iller, ".'4easurement o7 Residua 1 Stresses in a
"e '6 e'lT.q sr';te'd.,'na ~puma I Resea, cn UDDlemenr., tlovemoer i "co
A4-15
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)< TELEDYNEZG;XEERIXG SERVICES
With respect to Faulted Conditions, the inlet nozzle provides the path forinjection flow for about 40 minutes following a LOCA. For the first 20 seconds
the flow is from the safety injection accumulators at a temperature of 90'F.
At that time the safety injection pumps are started and deliver 155F fluid from
the boric acid tanks. At 140 seconds following LOCA initiation the flow trans-fers to the refueling water storage tank and the water temperature drops to'60F.
At the end of 40 minutes flow switches to the containment dump and flow is at a
minimum of 140F, The reactor pressure drops to near zero immediately followinga LOCA.
The other Faulted Condition of concern is a Large Steamline Break Accidenl
(LSBA). Following a LSBA the reactor coolant temperature end pressure rapidlydecreases. When the pressure descreases below 1450 psig, flow from the boricacid storage tanks enters the vessel at 155F. Safety injection terminates ten
minutes after the LSBA.
Flow during these events is through the inlet nozzle and down the vessel.Because the nozzle and vessel are of about the same thickness, but small the.mal
discontinuity stresses result. Analysis of similar transient in other nozzles
indicates thermal stresses across the weld of less than 5 ksi. Since the pressure
nas decreased, the total stress intensity factor, for the Faulted Condition is,smaller than that calculated during normal operation. Therefore, postulatee sur-fac flaws in the vessel beltline region are more limiting than is the reportednozzle weld flaw.
A4-16
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8.0 FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH
Because of the operating characteristics of a PWR, the inlet nozzle
temperature variations within the power range are negligible. Even when
coolant temperature 'changes do occur, the nozzle and vessel respond similarlyin that thermal discontinuity stresses are negligibl'e in the vicinity of the
reported flaw. Skin-type thermal stresses may be significant at and near
the inner surfaces, but not in the vicinity of the reported flaw.
Therefore the only cycle of importance to growth of the reported flaw ispressurization and depressurization. For the reported Flaw, the aK for pres-
.surization to 2500 'psig, the design pressure, is only 8.7 ksi. An. For a
subsurface flaw, Figure A-4300-1 predicts a fatigue crack growth rate of8(10) in/cycle for pressurization to 2500 psig. Therefore no fatigue crack
growth is predicted. l
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9.0 FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSIS AND CRITERIA
The linear elastic fracture mechanics methods of Appendix A, Section XI
of the ASME Code are used. These methods are conservative, but are not overlyconservative in the absence of steep stress gradients as is the case in thissolution.
The acceptance criteria used are those based on applied stress intensityfactor as contained in the Summer 1978 Addenda to Section XI of the ASME Code,
IWB-3612. These criteria are identical to those used in the Pilgrim-1 evalu-
ation, although at that time the criteria were referenced to a June ll, 1974
letter from ASME to Boston Edison.
10.0 ELASTIC - PLASTIC A!HALYSIS
Attachment 4 to the!'(RC Staff Evaluation of the 1976 Pilgrim-1 ISIresults, dated April 21, 1976, summarizes an elastic-plastic Fracture Mechanics
Analysis performed by Or. P. C. Paris as a consultant to NRC. Appendix O to thisreport contains an elastic-plastic analysis applicable to the Ginna-1 situationwhich follows Paris'lternative secondary stress computation method. Also
considered is the maximum ilaw size which would result in retention of a factorof safety of burst of at least, three.
This analysis i.ndicates that a flaw through-wall (2a) dimension in exc ss
of 4 inches is required to 'reduce the factor of safety below 3.0, using an
analysis which assumes a very long flaw. In addi tion, this analysis shows
that any residual or secondary stresses wnich are present in the structure willbe eliminated by yielding as long as the flaw depth (2a), is less than a nu;.-
be. in excess of 4". That is, weld residual stresses, thermal stresses and
pipe reaction stresses need not be conside. ed in evaluating the vesse! saic-yif 2a < 4 inches.
41
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ATTACHMENT 3
SCOPE OF ULTRASONIC EXAMINATIONSOF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL WELDS
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1
The followingis a listing of mechanized ultrasonic ezaminations of the reactor pressure vessel weldsand adjacent piping welds. These examinations willinclude 1/2T base material for vessel welds and 1/4inch base material for piping welds. Also shown are the anticipated ezamination angles and thedirection of the beam component.
The lower head is forged and has no meridional welds and the shell courses are ring sections with nolongitudinal welds. In all cases the goal is to examine 100% of the weld plus 1/2T each side of theweld. Examination of 100% of the weld length is the goal also for the circumferential vessel welds eventhough 74/S75 Section XIonly requires 5%. Interference from other vessel components may limitthedesired ezamination coverage. Ifthis was the case in previous ezaminations, ithas been noted. Acomplete discussion of the individual ezamination area coverage wiQ be provided in the final report ofthe ezaminations as required by Regulatory Guide 1.150 Rev. l.
Mech UT examinations willbe performed on the reactor vessel welds and selected reactor coolant pipingwelds from the inside surface utilizingthe PaR ISI-2 Device and SwHI Fast PaR equipment. Ezaminationareas include vessel circumferential, nozzle-to-shell, and nozzle piping welds.
The Mech UT ezaminations of the RPV willbe performed in accordance with the requirements of the74/S75 Section XIand Reydatory Guide 1.150, Rev. 1.
N
a) "RPV Shell and Head AVelds
1) 0-degree longitudinal wave (UTOL) examinations willbe performed for detection oflaminar reQectors which might affect interpretation ofangle-beam results.
2) 0-degree longitudinal wave (UTOKV) ezaminations willalso be performed for detection ofreflectors in the weld and base material.
3) 45-degree and 60-de~ ee shear wave (UT45 and UT60) ezaminations willbe performedfor detection of reflectors in the weld and base material oriented parallel to the weld.
4) 45-degree and 60-degree transverse shear wave (UT45T and UT60T) ezaminations willbeperformed for detection of reflectors in the weld and base material oriented transverseto the weld.
5) In the case of the RPV welds, SwRI 50/70 tandem search units v% be used to ezamineto a depth of approximately 2.25 inches for detection of reQectors in the clad-to-basemetal interface area and also in the volume between the examination surface and thedepth of the first Code calibration reQector.
These dual-element tandem search units develop an interactive beam with longitudinal'wave propagation and produce an ezamination with significantly improved signal-to-noiseratio over conventional near-surface techniques.
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b) RPV Nozzle Areas
The inlet, outlet, and safety injection nozzle-to-vessel welds willbe examined from the boreutilizing 15-degree (for inlet nozzles), 10 degree (for outlet nozzles) 10-degree (for safetyinjection nozzle) and 45-degree beams for detection of reQectors in the weld and basematerial. In addition, UT45T and UT60T ezaminations willbe performed from the shell insidesurface for detection of reQectors oriented transverse to the weld and base material. Thesetransverse examinations vrillutilize a computer to control the X-Y-Zmovements of the PaR
. device to assure accurate positioning around the nozzle during ezaminations. 50/70 tandemsearch units wiH be utilized from the bore and shell inside surfaces for detection of reflectorslocated in the clad-to-base metal interface region and also the volume between theexamination surface end the Qrst Code calibration reQector for the purpose ofsatisfying therequirements in Section XI.
c) Piping Welds
Nozzle Pi in Welds
For the inlet safe end-to-nozzle welds, a UTOL scan willbe used for detection of reQectorswhich might affect interpretation of the angle-beam results. UT45 and UT 60 scans willbeused for detection of reQectors parallel to the weld from both sides of the weld. A UT45Tscan willbe used for detection of reflectors oriented transverse to the weld. The acousticproperties of the inlet elbows preclude ezamination from the elbow side; therefore, a UTOWscan willbe performed in addition to the scans identifled above.
Limitations are expected around the vessel support lugs, safety injection and inlet nozzles due to theproximity of these components. Other limitations are listed.
I. Circumferential welds Estimated time - (2.5 shifts)
Ring fory'ng-to-lower head weld (RPV-E)
Ezamination area0- 3600- 360
Angle0,45,60,50/700,45T,60T,50/70T
Beam Componentup/dnmv/cd
Lower sheD-to-ring forging weld (RPV-D)
Ezamination area0- 3600- 360
Angle0,45,60,50/700,45T,60T,50/70T
Beam Componentup/dncw/ccw
Limitations due to prozimity of core support lugs @0 from (344.20 - 15.90) CG-190 from (74.20 - 105.80) CG-2180 from (164.20 - 195.80) CG-3270 from (255.25 - 284.75) CGA
Intermediate sheD-to-lower shell weld (RPV-C)
Ezamination area0- 3600- 360
Angle0,45,60,50/700,45T,60T,50/70T
Beam Componentup/dnmv/cd
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D. Upper sheH-to-intermediate shell weld (RPV-B)
Examination area0- 3600- 360
Angle0,45,60,50/700,45T,60T,50/70T
Beam Componentup/dncw/ccw
II. Upper shell region area (A)
A. Flange-to-upper shell weld (RPV-A) from shell
Estimated time - (3.0 Shifts)
Examination area0- 3600- 360
Angle0,45,60,50/700,45T,60T,50/70T
Beam Componentupcw/cd
B. Outlet nozzle-to-shell welds (N1A), (NlB) from shell
Examination areanozzle (0 - 360)
Angle0,45T,GOT,50/70T
Beam Componentnv/cd
C. Inlet nozzle-to-shell welds (N2A), (N2H) from shell
Examination areanozzle (0 - 360)
Angle0,45T,GOT,50/70T
Beam Componentcw/cd
D. Safety injection nozzle-to-shell weld (AC-1002), (AC-1003) from shell
Examination areanozzle (0 - 360)
Angle0,45T,60T,50/70T
Beam Componentav/cd
III. Upper shell rey'on area (B)
A. Flange-to-upper shell weld (RPV-A) from seal surface
Estimated Time - (1.5 shifts)
Examination area0- 360
B. Vessel supportlugs'mmination
areaVessel support (RPV-VSL-1)Vessel support (RPV-VSL-1)Vessel support (RPV-VSL-2)Vessel support (RPV-VSL-2)
Angle18, 11, 4
Angle0,45,60,50/700,45T,60T,50/70T0,45,60,50/700,45T,60T,50/70T
Beam Componentdn
Beam Componentup/dnnv/cdup/dncw/ca,v
A 1-3
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IV. Nozzle inner radius, integral mention and nozzle bore Estimated time - (3.5 shifts)~7
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rA. Outlet nozzle inner radius section integral extension region and nozzle bore.
B.
Examination areaOutlet A (N1A-IRS)Outlet B (NlB-IRS)Outlet A (N1A-IE)Outlet B (N1B-IE)
Inlet nozzle inside radius region
Examination areaInlet A (N2A-IRS)Inlet B (N2B-IRS)
Angle10,45,50/7010,45,50/7050/7050/70
Angle50/70
- 50/70
Beam ComponentTo Vessel C/L cw/ccwTo Vessel C/L cw/cmvTo Vessel C/LTo Vessel C/L
Beam Componentcw/cmvcw/cd
C. Nozzle-to-sheD welds from nozzle bore
Examination areaInlet A (N2A)Inlet B (N2B)
Angle15,45,50/7015,45,50/70
Beam ComponentTo Vessel C/L nv/cdTo Vessel C/L zv/ccw
D. Safety injection inside radius region and nozzle bore
Emmination areaSafety injection A(ACr1003-IRS)Safety injection B(AC-1002-IRS)
Angle0,100,10
Beam ComponentTo Vessel C/LTo Vessel C/L
Safety injection nozzle integral nxension
Ezamination area AngleSafety injection A{AC-1003-IE) 70Safety injection B{AC-1002-IE) 70
Beam ComponentAvWv
V. Nozzle-to-piping welds
Elbow-to inlet nozzle welds
Estimated Time - (3.5 Shifts)
Ezamination areaInlet A (PL-FW-V)Inlet B (PL-PV-VII)Inlet A (PL-FKV-V)Inlet B (PL-FW-VII)Inlet A (PL-FW-V)Inlet B (PL-FW-VII)
Angle0,45,600,45,6045RLT45RLT45RL45RL
Beam ComponentAway from Vessel C/LAway from Vessel C/Lnv/cdcw/cnvTo Vessel C/LTo Vessel C/L
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B. Nozzle-to piping welds
Examination areaOutlet A (PI PW-II)Outlet A (PL-FW-Il)Outlet B (PL-FiV-IV)Outlet B (PI FW-IV)
C. Safe end-to-nozzle welds
Examination areaSafety injection A(AC-1003-1)Safety injection A(AC-1003-1)Safety injection B(AC-1002-1)Safety injection B(AC-1002-1)
D. Piping-to-safe end welds
Examination areaSafety injection'A(AC-1003-2)Safety injection A(AC-1003-2)Safety injection B(AC-1002-2)Safety injection B(AC-1002-2)
Angle0,45,60,45T,600,45,60,45T,600,45,60,45T,600,45>60,45T,60
Angle0,45,45T,600,45,45T,600,45,45T,600,45,45T,60
Angle0,45,45T,600745,45T,600,45,45T,600,45,45T,60
Beam ComponentAway from Vessel C/LTo Vessel C/LAway from Vessel C/LTo Vessel C/L
Beam ComponentAway from Vessel C/LTo Vessel C/LAway from Vessel C/LTo Vessel C/L
Beam ComponentAway from Vessel C/LTo Vessel C/LAway from Vessel C/LTo Vessel C/L
SCHEDULE OF MECHANIZED EXAMINATIONS
FOR R. E. GIHHA RPV
anination Areas
Circunferential 'Llelds
RPV-E, D, C,-B
Day 1 Day 2
2 [ 1 2
Day 3 Day 4
1 2
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Day 5 Day 6 Day 7
I 1 2
I——I-
Days On
~==Vessel
(c="-Crew Shift
Upper Shell Region
Area Melds (A)RPV-A, H1A, N18,
H2A, HZB, AC-1002,
& AC.1003
Upper Shell Region
Area Welds (8)RPV-VSL1) RPV-VSL2(
& RPV-A
AC 1002
Piping Melds
Elbow co Inlet NozzleA PL-FM.V
8 PL FM;VIIOutlet Nozzle to Pipe
A PL-FN-II8 PL-FM-IV
SI Safe End to NozzleA AC-1003-1
8 AC-1002 1
SI Pipe to Safe End
A AC.1003.2
8 AC-1002.2
Nozzle Inside Radius Sectionsand Integral Extension
Outlet A (H1A-IRS,- IE)Outlet 8 (N18-IRS,-IE)Inlet A (H2A-IRS)
Inlet 8 (H28-IRS)
Safety injectionAC.1003.IRS,-IE
IRS,- IE
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ATTACHMENT 4
NOZZLE FLAW SIZXNG PROGRAM(FOCUSED TRANSDUCER DEVELOPMENT)
4
