Assessment of Li 利 in the Mencius and the Mozi

Wai Wai CHIU

Published online: 4 April 2014# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract The attitude toward li 利 is often identified as a key differencebetween the Mencius 孟子 and the Mozi 墨子. A common view is that for theMencius, rightness (yi 義) and li are incompatible; but for the Mozi they are notnecessarily so. In this paper I argue that the Mencius and the Mozi are in broadagreement on the issue of li, and their attitudes toward li are not as different asmay seem at first glance. If we take a finer-grained understanding of li in twoways, namely the self-regarding li and the other-regarding li, then both theMencius and the Mozi would criticize the former but encourage the latter. Theterm li in the Mencius has a range of meanings, and it is not clear whether theMencius actually opposes all li-pursuing activities. Mencius would agree withMozi that, at least in some cases, one is obligated to seek li for others.Furthermore, despite their criticism of self-regarding li, both Mencius andMozi allow that in some cases it is morally permissible to act from the motiveof self-regarding li, as long as this motive coexists with the motive of rightness.That is, self-regarding li and rightness are not always mutually exclusive, evenfor Mencius, who seems to be more critical of li.

Keywords Mozi .Mencius . Ethics . Benefit

1 Introduction

It is often thought that the relationship between li 利, commonly translated as “benefit”or “profit,” and yi 義, commonly translated as “rightness,” in theMencius and theMozi

Dao (2014) 13:199–214DOI 10.1007/s11712-014-9372-3

Wai Wai CHIU (*)Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, New Territories, Hong Konge-mail: ertaichiu@gmail.com

墨子 differs in the following way: Mencius dichotomizes yi and li, 1 whereas Moziunifies yi and li. According to some scholars, this is one key difference betweenMencius and Mozi. Benjamin Schwartz states that “Mencius’ most fundamentalobjection does not revolve about the question of jian’ai [兼愛, the Mohist ethicaldoctrine] but rather about the question of the utilitarian basis of Mohist morality”(Schwartz 1985: 260). In similar vein, Bryan Van Norden, in his translation of theMencius, says that “the opening passage of theMengzi is probably an implicit criticismof Mohism” (Van Norden 2008: xxvi).2 In this passage, Mencius asks, “What is thepoint of mentioning li? All that matters is that there should be benevolence (ren仁) andrightness” (Mencius 1A1; my translation).3 At first glance, this passage would appear tosuggest that li has no place in an ideal ruler’s agenda. Indeed, some scholars regardMencius, and early Confucianism in general, as proposing ethical theories that opposethe Mohist “utilitarianism,”4 which mention li in conjunction with the ethical doctrine“inclusive concern” or “inclusive care” (jian’ai 兼愛).5 Some scholars even emphasizethe anti-utilitarian spirit to such an extent as to suggest that Mencius criticizes all kindsof li, including both self-regarding li and other-regarding li, or that Mencius suggeststhat li, no matter whether it is self- or other-regarding, is irrelevant to moral reasoning.For example, LI Minghui 李明輝 argues that, based on the similarity between Mencius’ethical view and Kantian deontology, “the li that is in Mencius’ distinction between yiand li includes not only self-regarding li but also public li. This can be seen in thecriticism of YANG Zhu楊朱 and MO Di 墨翟… [whose] ethical view is teleological anddefines moral good in term of non–moral good. For YANG Zhu this non–moral good is

1 FENG Youlan馮友蘭 (1895–1990) once said that Mencius opposed the idea of benefit because of his theory ofhuman nature, which, according to Feng, involves the idea that a moral agent follows her inherent goodness,which is intuitive and does not consider any external influence, such as benefit. Fung also criticized Menciusfor failing to explain the difference between rightness and benefit, and the difference between public andprivate benefit (Feng 1952: 119–128). Although Feng’s criticism of Mencius is not widely accepted, somescholars agree that Mencius proposed a clear distinction between rightness and benefit. For example: “[ForMencius] yi is universal, li is only particular … to follow li in practice will certainly result in conflict … thedistinction between yi and li (yi li zhi bian 義利之辨) is the distinction between impartiality and partiality (gongsi zhi bie 公私之別)” (Lao 2002: 163); “The distinction between yi and li is fundamental and categorical, whilethe distinction between gongli 公利 (public benefit) and sili 私利 (private benefit) is at most derived from thisfundamental distinction. They are not at the same level.” (Li 1990: 155); “[Recognizing li as private orpersonal gain] … Mencius developed the conflict between yi and li to its extreme form … [for him] yi and liare absolutely incompatible (jüe bu xiangrong絕不相容).” (Wang and Zhao: 1992: 32–33); “…Mencius drawsa fairly sharp contrast between rightness and profit or personal gain. The envisaged conflict between rightnessand concern with personal gain provides a partial ground for construing rightness as reflecting the Confucianmoral point of view as contrasted with the point of view of self-interest.” (Cua 2002: 132)2 Van Norden also gives a more detailed discussion in Van Norden 2007: 301–304.3 Unless specified, all citations from the Mencius are from Lau 2003.4 For example, “Mencius’ ethical view is gesinnungsethik [rather than erfolgsethik] … because it advocatesduty for duty’s sake, but not for any consequence” (Li 1990: 52–53); “During the Pre-Qin秦 period, utilitariantheories, which opposed Confucian rightness theories, were mainly proposed by Mozi… [who proposed] theunification of rightness and benefit” (Chen 2002: 283). Whether Mozi and his disciples are utilitarians is notthe concern of this paper, but it is not uncommon to find contemporary interpretations of Mohism asutilitarianism, for example, Graham 1989: 39–41; Hansen 1992: 108–117; Duda 2001: 23–31. For a viewrejecting the utilitarian interpretation, see Lu 2006: 123–134.5 See, for example, the Mozi 15.3, 15.4, 15.7, 26.4, 26.5. I have used the term “inclusive concern”or “inclusive care” to translate jian’ai 兼愛, rather than the popular term “universal love.” Thereason is that jian 兼 means “together” rather than “universal,” and “love” is too passionate for theancient Chinese word ai 愛.

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self-regarding li, for MO Di it is public li. Mencius rejects both of them, showing thatthe distinction between self-regarding and public li is morally irrelevant” (Li 1990:190).6 YUAN Baoxin 袁保新 states that, “yi and li are heterogeneous and irreducible toeach other … choosing yi in practice might bring happiness to the majority of people,but yi is not public li” (Yuan 1992: 150). Yuan’s point is that, when a Mencian ismaking a moral choice, she should only consider whether an action or practice is yi,regardless of whether she can foresee that action or practice can realize any form of li.Although practicing yi might sometimes cause one to attain li, this is never a reasonwhy one should advocate yi. The dichotomy between yi and li is reinforced if oneaccepts Mencius’ ethical view and regards Mencius as a faithful follower of Confucius;on this account, Confucius’ paradigmatic person (junzi 君子) is identified with yi and apetty person with li, as noted in the Analects 4.16.

However, it is not altogether clear whether the Mencius actually opposes all li-pursuing activities. Furthermore, the suggestion that the Mencius only criticizes aparticular, limited sense of li—such as li as material wealth or personal profit—mightstill prove to be oversimplistic. In this paper, I argue that both Mencius and Mozicondemn self-regarding li (because it can threaten social well-being), but not other-regarding li. I also argue that the critique in the Mencius is not directed at li-pursuingactivities as such (let alone the Mohist conception of li), but at any individual who ismotivated only by self-regarding li. This, however, does not prevent Mencius to allowthat an individual who is motivated by both yi and li (including self- and other-regarding li) is a permissible option. This is also permissible for the Mohists, althoughthe question of motivation rarely surfaces in their discussions of ideal personhood.

2 “Benefit” and “Harm” in the Mozi

We start by considering the idea of li in the Mozi. While li in the Analects is notpresented as an ideal, the Mozi clearly upholds the pursuit of li. Before the Mohists, nothinker had paid such attention to “benefit” as to place it at the core of their theory ofsociety and government.7 Precisely speaking, the Mohists’ concern is tianxia zhi li天下

之利—reasonably translated as “the world’s benefit,” meaning the benefit of all people.“Promote the world’s benefit and eliminate the world’s harm” is the most importanttask of any benevolent agent (Mozi 12.7, 15.1, 16.1, 16.3, 19.10, 27.4, 31.2, 32.1). Thecontrast between benefit and harm is central to Mohist ethical and political theory. Forthe Mohists, the most important distinction one should learn to make is that betweenright and wrong, and benefit and harm (shifei lihai zhi bian是非利害之辨) (Mozi 11.2).8

The criterion used to distinguish right from wrong is the world’s benefit: to promote theworld’s benefit is right (yi 義). Since benefit necessarily involves the absence of harm,let us first examine what the “world’s harm” (tianxia zhi hai 天下之害) means:

… [O]f the world’s harms what, at the present time, are the greatest?

6 I interpret “public li” as the general li of all people from a social point of view. It necessarily includes other-regarding li for each person involved.7 Carine Defoort points out that “theMozi is the earliest extant Chinese source that consistently and forcefullyputs li [i.e., benefit] on the agenda” (Defoort 2008: 158).8 All citations from the Mozi are from Johnston 2010.

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… They are great states attacking small states, great houses bringingdisorder to small houses, the strong plundering the weak, the many ill-treating the few, the cunning scheming against the foolish, and the noblebeing arrogant towards the lowly. Also, it is rulers not being kind, ministersnot being loyal, fathers not being compassionate and sons not being filial… base men make use of weapons, poisons, water and fire to injure andharm each other. (Mozi 16.1)

This passage conceives of the world’s harm as the situation wherein people, either asindividuals or as groups (families, states), attack and injure each other. Here, we mayalso include situations where people do not behave in accordance with their respectivesocial roles (father, son, etc.). “Harm” here is not only physical or material, such asdamage inflicted on one’s body or property, but also moral. For example, the failure toact morally (e.g., failing to be filial) may cause physical or emotional damage and istherefore a harm: in Mozi 16.13, Mozi responds to an objection to the Mohist ethicaldoctrine, jian’ai 兼愛. The objection claims that jian’ai “harms” filial piety in that ithinders one from being filial (Mozi 16.13). This attests to the suggestion here that thesense of “harm” in the Mozi is quite broad.

The discussion on the world’s harm is followed by a description of the world’sbenefit, which involves the elimination of harm:

People would view others’ states as they view their own states … view others’houses as they view their own houses … view other people as they viewthemselves … they would not go to wild battlefields … there would not bemutual usurpation… [Individuals] would not injure each other.... There would bekindness and loyalty… compassion and filial conduct… harmony and accord....The strong would not dominate the weak, the many would not plunder the few,the rich would not despise the poor, the noble would not scorn the lowly.... (Mozi15.3; translation modified)

The first step toward promoting the world’s benefit is, of course, stopping strife.This is achieved through people including fellow humans in their moral consider-ations. The resultant effect consists of two parts: the first is described negatively,that people stop attacking, injuring, or despising others. The second is describedpositively, that people behave according to their respective social roles, such as ason being filial to his father. Furthermore, the world’s benefit is described in avision of a well-ordered, efficient, and prosperous world, which is realized by theefforts of the Mohists:

…[I]f the world is poor, he works to make it rich. If the people [of the world] arefew, he works to make them numerous. If they are numerous but in disorder, heworks to bring them to order… while ever he has untapped strength, hiddenresources or remaining materials, he cannot do otherwise than use them for theworld.... (Mozi 25.1)

The world’s benefit, conceived as an ideal, involves individual conscientiousness,where every person devotes herself to the two measures (eliminating harmful and

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enacting beneficial acts). Implicit in these two measures is social cooperation, wherepeople use their resources for all instead of hoarding them.

The above passage also highlights at least two important characteristics of theMohist account of benefit. First, such benefit is not merely economical—the Mohistsdo not merely consider the world’s benefit in monetary or material terms. In an idealsociety people fulfil their social roles appropriately, respect and help others even if theyare not family members or if they are of lower status. This explains why it isinappropriate to translate li as “profit” in the Mozi. Just as “harm” has a broader sensethan material loss, “benefit” has a broader sense than material gain.9 This is consistentwith the point made previously that the concept li extends beyond the countable and thetangible. Second, the Mohists usually mention benefit together with concern or care (ai愛). In certain passages these concepts are two faces of the same coin.

In short, the Mohists’ ethical teaching is: “Inclusively care for each other, interactwith and mutually benefit each other” (jianxiang’ai jiaoxiangli 兼相愛交相利) (e.g.,Mozi 9.8, 15.3, 16.13, 16.14, 26.4, 35.6). Generally speaking, it requires that one has acertain disposition to benefit others (such as the son caring for his father and wanting tobenefit him), and puts it into practice. Notice that, in doing so, the Mohists take oursocial roles and corresponding duties for granted. This is why they do not think thatthere is any contradiction between their doctrine and filial piety (Mozi 16.13).10 Theterms jian 兼 and jiao 交 concern the scope of benefit, which we will discuss in thefollowing Section.

3 The Mohist Critique of Self-regarding Li and the Scope of Li

The Mohists do not just advocate li in any form, but li of the world. This means that notonly the sense of li but also its scope is broad. Actually, most of the time the Mozimentions li in conjunction with its scope or the recipient of li11: besides benefiting theworld,12 it considers whether one benefits himself (zili 自利) (e.g., Mozi 14.2, 17.1,31.1); benefits the upper, middle, and lower realm (that is, Heaven, the ghosts, and thepeople) (e.g.,Mozi 10.3, 19.1, 26.7, 27.8, 28.8, 47.4); benefits the ordinary people (e.g.,Mozi 9.8, 10.6, 12.9, 15.8, 16.15, 32.2, 46.9); or benefits the entire state (e.g., Mozi13.6).13 When the benefit only accrues to a few, or the scope is too narrow, say, whenone pursues li only for himself or a few people associated with him, it becomes a

9 When the term li is used positively (as something favorable or good) in ancient classics, it does notnecessarily refer to material gain. For example, in the ode entitled Sang Rou 桑柔 in the Book of Odes, wefind the sentence “[The hypocrites] work out the injury (bu li 不利) of the people” (Legge 1960: 527).According to the context, “injury” here includes social disorder, so the opposite of li is not simply materialloss.10 When dealing with the objection that the doctrine “inclusive concern” contradicts filial piety, Mozi says afilial son wants others to care about and benefit his parents, so he should care about and benefit the parents ofothers in order to motivate others to treat his parents in a reciprocal manner.11 This point was suggested by Karyn Lai in a personal conversation.12 Besides the term “the world’s benefit” (tianxia zhi li 天下之利), sometimes the text considers whether theworld can “gain (de 得) benefit” or whether one “benefits the world,” for example, 9.6, 13.7, 19.9.13 “State” here refers not to any state, but a state in which the yi of all people is unified (yitong tianxia zhi yi 一同天下之義, the Mozi 12.2).

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problem. The Mohists criticize self-regarding benefit, that is, benefit for oneself or forone’s group. Their criticism is expressed in their analysis of social disorder:

If a son cares for himself but does not care for his father, then he disadvantagesthe father and benefits himself (zili 自利). If a younger brother cares for himselfbut does not care for his older brother, then he disadvantages the older brotherand benefits himself. If a minister cares for himself but does not care for hisprince, then he disadvantages the prince and benefits himself. This is what isspoken of as disorder.… In all cases it arises through lack of mutual care.… Evenif we come to the disorder that great officers bring to each other’s houses and theattacks made by the feudal lords on each other’s states, it is also the case. (Mozi14.2; translation modified)

If one is only concerned about himself or his own group (which can be his kin, house,or even state), then he cannot see any reason not to disadvantage others when it ispossible for him to do so. Such behavior contradicts the vision of an ideal society, inwhich people are supposed to inclusively care for each other, interact with, andmutually benefit each other. Jian 兼 basically means putting two or more thingstogether, or having two or more things at the same time. 14 To practice “inclusiveconcern” is to “put all people together,” to include others in one’s moral considerationsso that one will not benefit oneself at the expense of others. This does not demand thatone gives up li, but rather that one extends the scope of li and acts in such a way that liis exchanged or shared. Mozi quotes a poem from the Book of Odes to illustrate thispoint:

… [I]n the words of the Da Ya it is said: “No words are without response, novirtue is without reward. If you present me with a peach, I repay you with aplum.” This, then, is to say that those who care for others must themselves becared for, and those who hate others must themselves be hated.... (Mozi 16.13)

This passage illustrates two points: first, that people generally want others to haveconcern for them or want to be cared for; second, that generally people tend toreciprocate other people’s behaviors. Strictly speaking, these two are not normativeclaims; they are general psychological descriptions. Nonetheless, they facilitate thepractice of inclusive concern and mutual benefit, which requires that everyone iswilling to li everyone (not necessarily li everyone in the same way, since there aresocial roles), that is, to extend the scope of li to all people.

In the Mozi, another way to argue against the idea that li only has self-servingconnotations is that such an idea is not universalizable—so it cannot be taught ortransmitted, and cannot compete with the doctrine of inclusive concern in the publicdomain. Consider the following dialogue:

14 Shuowen說文 states that the character兼 symbolizes “holding two grains” (chi er he 持二禾). Contemporarystudies do not seem to agree with this view. Some say it symbolizes “holding two arrows” (chi er shi 持二矢)(see Guwenzi Gulin Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 2003: 667–668). Others say it symbolizes three people standingtogether (see Karlgren 1972: 168). Nonetheless they all preserve the sense of togetherness.

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Wu Ma Zi 巫馬子 spoke to Master Mozi, saying: “…I am not able to practiseinclusive care. I care for the people of Zou 鄒 more than the people of Yue 越. Icare for the people of Lu 魯 more than the people of Zou. I care for the people ofmy district more than the people of Lu. I care for the people of my familymore than the people of my district. I care for my parents more than theothers in my family. I care for myself more than my parents.... Thereforeit is possible to have them killed to benefit me, but not possible to haveme killed to benefit them.”

Master Mozi said: “Is your way of thinking to be kept secret or is it to be told toothers?”

Wu Ma Zi replied: “Why should I keep my way of thinking a secret? I shall tellothers.”

Master Mozi said: “In that case, then, if one person agrees with you, one personwill want to kill you to benefit himself… If one person disagrees with you, oneperson will want to kill you, taking you to be a person who disseminates evilwords.... What benefit is there in your words?” (Mozi 46.18–19; translationmodified)

Wu Ma Zi’s point is that the interest of those who are “nearer” always overrides thosewho are “further” from oneself. This sounds like Confucianism but it is not: Wu Ma Zisays it is always permissible to sacrifice others for one’s own benefit, whileConfucianism forbids this. Besides, Confucianism requires that moral practice startswith caring for family members, which means that one cannot be a moral person whenone restricts the scope of consideration to oneself. On the contrary, the practicalimplication of Wu Ma Zi’s view is that since I am nearest to myself, mypersonal benefit always overrides those of others. In his rebuttal of Wu Ma Zi,Mozi says that if one encourages the pursuit of self-regarding benefit andadvocates it, then those who agree with him will, in following his recommen-dations, kill him in the competition for self-gain. Those who disagree with himwill also kill him in order to prevent him from bringing disorder to society (orat least distance themselves from him). Both cases show that the promotion ofself-regarding benefit is a practice that contradicts itself and should becondemned. This is strikingly similar to the Mencius 1A1, to which we nowturn.

4 Li in the Mencius

In Mencius 1A1, Mencius was worried about people from different social classes eachcaring primarily for li. Their questions are:

If your Majesty says, “How can I profit [li利] my state?” and the Counsellors say,“How can I profit my family?” and the Gentlemen and the common people say,“How can I profit my person?” then those above and those below will be vying

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with each other for profit and the state will be imperilled. (Mencius 1A1;translation modified)

Since their primary concern is their own benefit, in competing for self-gain they ignorethe larger picture—the state as a whole. Following Mencius, it is easy to see why this isdangerous: since it is always possible to gain more li at the expense of others, if thiskind of li is the primary concern, disorder is inevitable. Note that this does not deviatemuch from the Mohists’ description of “the world’s harm,” whereby each persondisadvantages others due to his or her pursuit of self-regarding benefit. Indeed wecan see Mencius 1A1 as talking about self-regarding li, whose scope is narrow. Recallthat both Lau and Van Norden translate li as “profit” in 1A1 (Lau 2003; Van Norden2008). This translation suggests that li in 1A1 concerns only material benefit but notintangible benefit, such as the fulfillment of social roles; and it concerns only self-gainbut not collective benefit. Although King Hui 惠 of Liang 梁 does not seek the li of hisperson but turns to the li of his state, as noted by Van Norden (2007: 302), this is stillself-regarding li because, after all, it is the li of his own state.15 There is no reason tothink that King Hui advocates Mohist doctrines either in thought or in action.16 If this isthe case, then the criticism of li here does not support Schwartz’s and Van Norden’sclaim that this passage criticizes Mohism, but rather shows the agreement betweenMencius and Mozi in the criticism of self-regarding li, although they might havedifferent conceptions of yi. Furthermore, if we adopt the Mohist conception of li, whichincludes not only material benefit but social order, then the affinity between Mencius1A1 and the Mozi is even stronger, for “[Mencius] opposed promotion of benefit notbecause he opposed benefit fundamentally, but because, being a ruler, if all he does is toseek benefit for himself, then he cannot seize great benefit, and will put the state intodanger” (Wang 2000: 210–211).17 This “great benefit” cannot be seized even if the kingfocuses on the benefit of his state instead of himself. What is this “great benefit”? It is tobecome a benevolent ruler and to unify the empire.18 It is not merely that benevolenceis useful in helping a ruler get what he wants, that is, to unify the empire, but rather, thatwhat a ruler ought to want is to unite and pacify the land, and his benevolenceconstitutes this mission (Im 2011: 56).

Concerning the scope of li, there are other passages in which we can see Mencius’agreement with Mozi in promoting other-regarding li, although he does not use the term“li.” For example:

15 Besides, the reason why King Hui seeks the li of his state is not that he cares for his people, but because ofthe indulgence in power. This can be seen inMencius 1A2 and 1A5, when Mencius criticizes King Hui for notsharing his wealth with the people and being obsessed with warfare. Thus the so-called “li of my state” doesnot reflect a genuine concern for his people.16 Thomas Radice points out that, on the issue of li, King Hui appears more like a Yangist than a Mohist(assuming counterfactually that the description of Yangism and Mohism is accurate in the Mencius) (Radice2011: 144). Radice ultimately does not think that Mencius 1A1 is a critique of Mohism.17 Chad Hansen even thinks that, in 1A1, Mencius implicitly used benefit as a reason for condemning benefit(Hansen 1992: 159, 170).18 Although Van Norden claims that 1A1 is directed against Mohism, he nevertheless adds that “Mengzi is notcondemning li or even the desire to achieve li. However… [this desire should] be subordinated to a focus onbenevolence and rightness” (Van Norden 2007: 303). This raises the issue of mixed motives, but Van Nordendoes not discuss it. We shall return to this issue in Section 6.

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A benevolent man never harbours anger or nurses a grudge against a brother. Allhe does is to love him. Because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy rank [gui貴]; because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy wealth [fu富]…. If as Emperorhe were to allow his brother to be a nobody, could that be described as lovinghim? (Mencius 5A3)

Put in order the fields of the people, lighten their taxes, and the people can bemade affluent [fu 富]…. In governing the Empire, the sage tries to make food asplentiful as water and fire [i.e., abundant]. When that happens, how can there beany amongst his people who are not benevolent? (Mencius 7A23)

“When a paradigmatic person stays in a state,” said Mencius, “if he is employedhe can make the prince secure, rich [fu 富] and honoured, and, if the young mencome under his influence, he can make them dutiful to their parents and elders,conscientious in their work and faithful to their word.…” (Mencius 7A32)

What do “rank,” “wealth,” “affluent,” and “rich” refer to, if not some kind of benefit?Although the word li does not appear, it seems reasonable to suggest that these passagesapprove of benefit when its scope is not limited to self-gain. If this is the case, we may evenreplace the relevant terms in these passages by li and still preserve their meaning. Forexample, inMencius 5A3, we can change愛之欲其富也 (ai zhi yu qi fu ye, because he loveshim, hewishes him to enjoywealth) to愛之欲其利也 (ai zhi yu qi li ye, because he loves him,he wishes him to be benefited). The sentence is then very close to the Mohist teaching thatloving people implies benefiting them.19 5A3 is stating that sometimes it is acceptable oreven obligatory for one to seek benefit, but one’s actions must not solely benefit oneself.This, again, makes Mencius closer to Mozi: both claim that one should promote other-regarding benefit20 instead of self-regarding benefit.21 If we also change愛之欲其貴也 (ai zhiyu qi gui ye, because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy rank) to 愛之欲其利也, this will

19 Actually, when the Mohists spell out what kinds of good are included in their conception of li, a typicalanswer is “wealth (fu 富)” (along with population and social order). See, for example, Mozi 25.1 and thediscussion in Fraser 2010.20 In a presentation of an earlier version of this paper at the Tenth East West Philosophers’ Conference (May16–24, University of Hawaii, 2012), a question was raised regarding whether Mencius favors other-regardingbenefit at all, because the scope of the “self” may expand to cover other people (family members, friends,seniors, etc.), and self-regarding benefit under this interpretation may be compatible with benevolence. This isan interesting comment, and we may even say that this view of the self is not confined to Confucianism, sincethe Mohists encouraged people to regard others as oneself (see, for example, Mozi 15.3) and, as mentioned inSection 3, one’s self-regarding li might refer to the benefit of his clan or state. A reply to the question is that,even the scope of the self is flexible, there is still a distinction between “self” and “other” as long as the scopeis not all-encompassing. For Mencius, benevolence sometimes requires us to act morally without consideringwhether someone belongs to my group or not, such as saving the child near the well in 2A6. If the scope of theself is not all-encompassing, pursuing only self-regarding benefit might still clash with benevolence, as in thecase of 1A1.21 The moral distinction between these two kinds of benefit constitutes the distinction between gong 公 and si私, a topic that received increasing attention during the development of ancient Chinese philosophy. Whilegong in the early Spring and Autumn period (770 BCE–403 BCE) sometimes refers to a concrete objectwithout moral implication (such as the “house of the lord”), in the late Warring States period (403 BCE–221BCE) the idea becomes more abstract (such as “impartial”) and upholding gong is praised as a virtue. SeeHuang 2010.

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make it clear that Mencius does have a broader sense of benefit, which includes goods otherthan material wealth.

Mencius 7A23 mentions the administration of a sage king, the effect of which is toincrease and secure the people’s wealth. This passage even mentions how to achievesuch a result—it recommends that a ruler adopts certain policies which benefit thepeople. This echoes 7A13 in which the people, governed by a benevolent ruler, arebenefited. In 7A13, Mencius actually uses the term li. Promoting the benefit of thepeople is thus a duty of a ruler.22 Indeed, if fulfilling one’s duty is part of rightness, aruler who neglects the benefit of his people is deemed to be “crippling rightness”(Mencius 1B8).

Mencius 7A32 outlines the effects of a paradigmatic person engaged ingovernmental affairs. One effect is that the prince who employs such a personwill be prosperous (fu 富). Of course, we should not take this passage to implythat a ruler should employ a paradigmatic person simply because he wants tobe rich; this is not an appropriate motivation, as we will discuss later. However,7A32 certainly welcomes prosperity and regards it as an apt contribution fromthe paradigmatic person in office.

All three passages above allow the pursuit of other-regarding li in certain wayswithout using the term li. Furthermore, Mencius does not always criticize li even whenit is restricted to self-regarding benefit. For example:

He who never misses a chance for profit [li 利] cannot be killed by a bad year; hewho is equipped with every virtue cannot be led astray by a wicked world.(Mencius 7B10)

Here, the text mentions li but does not condemn it. To the extent that “killedby a bad year” is not a good thing, 7B10 actually allows the pursuit of lieven it benefits only the agent himself. 23 This stands in contrast to 1A1,which seems to state that no one in society should aim at pursuing self-regarding li. However, there is a difference between them. 1A1 opposes libecause it might provoke strife among people, which in turn leads to thedisintegration of the state; while 7B10 does not seem to suggest that “he whonever misses a chance for profit” is involved in such strife. Why is he notinvolved? A possible explanation is that when he pursues li he also shows aconcern for others, which makes him different from the person who justwants to seize all the profit available, as noted in 2B10. It is this co-existence of benefit and concern for others in one’s motivation that deservesmore discussion, as this reveals another point of agreement between Menciusand Mozi.

22 The Analects occasionally uses the term “li” positively when it discusses the performance of paradigmaticpersons in social or political context. See, for example, the Analects 20.2: “… [A] man benefits the commonpeople by taking advantage of the things around them that they find beneficial…” (yin qi suo li er li zhi 因其所

利而利之; translation from Lau 1979).23 That is, the pursuit of li here is considered to be at least sometimes morally acceptable. Of course, this initself does not imply that one has an obligation to benefit himself, and it certainly does not imply that it isalways morally acceptable to seize a chance for profit.

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5 Criticism of Self-regarding Li as a Motivation

So far we have seen that both Mozi and Mencius refer to the consequences of thepromotion of self-regarding li so as to show its wrongness. InMozi 46.19 the pursuit ofself-regarding li brings harm to the person and to the people; inMencius 1A1 it leads tothe disintegration of the state. However, Mencius has another reason to oppose self-regarding li, which concerns a person’s motivation. Consider the following:

If you place profit [li 利] before the kings of Qin 秦 and Chu 楚, and they call offtheir armies because they are drawn to profit, then it means that the soldiers intheir armies retire because they are drawn to profit. If a subject, in serving hisprince, cherished the profit motive, and a son, in serving his father, and a youngerbrother, in serving his elder brother, did likewise, then it would mean that in theirmutual relations … all cherished the profit motive to the total exclusion ofmorality. The prince of such a state is sure to perish. (Mencius 6B4)

Mencius disagrees with the idea that one should persuade a king to decrease hisaggression by appealing to li.24 In Mencius’ hypothetical scenario, if a king advocateshis own li (regardless of whether it is the li of his person or his state), it will make theofficers and common people focus on their personal li to the extent that they will setaside all moral consideration, and then the state will disintegrate due to strife.Nevertheless, the focus is not on one’s action per se. It is not about what a subject,son, or younger brother should do (they should serve their superiors; this is notproblematic or unclear). The focus is their motive. To pursue self-regarding benefit,and to pay no attention to benevolence and rightness—at any rank—is unacceptable.Hence, even doing the right thing (e.g., serving the prince) is insufficient in thissituation. The distinguishing characteristic of a paradigmatic person is his right motive(cherishing rightness in serving the prince). This is further supported by the followingpassage:

Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses thisdistinguishing feature, while the paradigmatic person retains it. Shun 舜 under-stood the way of things and had a keen insight into human relationships. He actedfrom morality, not just put morality into practice. (Mencius 4B19; translationmodified)

There is a distinction between “act from benevolence and rightness” (you renyi xing由仁義行) and “put benevolence and rightness into practice” (xing renyi 行仁義). Rightacts are insufficient for paradigmatic personhood—this does not differentiate a personfrom a beast. Actually, this does not even differentiate a good person from a bad one:one can, say, put rightness into practice for the sake of fame. In the famous story ofsaving a child-near-a-well, Mencius says:

24 Thomas Radice points out that in 6B4Mencius regards Song Keng宋牼 (the one who persuades the king) asone who appeals to the king’s self-regarding benefit, but it is unclear that this is precisely what Song Kengdoes (Radice 2011: 143–145). Here, we only consider the reason why Mencius thinks Song Keng’s view (inMencius’s eyes) is unacceptable. Whether his criticism is fair to Song Keng is left open.

Assessment of Li 利 in the Mencius and the Mozi 209

[The person saves the child] not because he wanted to get in the good grace of theparents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends,nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child…. (Mencius 2A6)

Saving the child is a right act. However, if one is motivated only by recompense orpraise, then one fails to act from rightness even his acts are acceptable. To be a trulymoral person, that is, a person with ren and yi, one must be motivated by genuinecompassion or shame. By contrast, “improper” motives include not only those whichconcern only self-regarding benefit, but also those which do not take into account thefact that the person cares about the child and may have certain feelings toward the child(anxiety for the child’s safety, sadness if the child cannot be saved, joy if the child issafe, etc.).25 The marked emphasis on motivation is a distinctive feature of theMencius.When it comes to the question “why a sage is a sage,” theMozi does not focus much ona person’s motive (which is not to say that it is opposed to an examination of motives).That being said, we need not go as far as Whalen Lai, who says “motivation was neveran issue in the original thesis of Mo-tzu” (Lai 1993: 130). This is because Mozisometimes mentions how we can motivate people to care for others inclusively bythe implementation of policies, as we shall see in the next section. However, WhalenLai is right in saying that Mozi does not regard one’s motivation as the most importantreason for explaining why a sage is a sage, therefore it would be misleading to judgeMohism by appealing to an “ethics of motivation” (Lai 1993: 130).

On the other hand, Mencius’ stress on having the appropriate motivation is not aprohibition against pursuing li per se. It cautions against being fully or solely preoccu-pied with li. This distinction between self-gain and rightness, when combined with theneed to uphold the latter, implies that one should always act from the motive ofrightness. However, it does not imply that one should not act from the motive ofpromoting li, for two reasons. First, it is possible that one has mixed motives, that onedoes something because it is right and it is beneficial to oneself. Remember, inMencius7B10, it is possible that the one who is not killed by a bad year is intentionallyaccumulating wealth for oneself. This is allowable to the extent that the wealth is notgained at the expense of benevolence and rightness. We will come back to this issue inthe next section. Second, when we allow the content of li to include collective goodsother than material gain, such as social order, the motive of pursuing li does notnecessarily clash with the motive of rightness. Schwartz interprets Mencius as holdingthat one’s motivation should be free from even “the general interest” (as opposed tonarrow self-interest),26 because “to the extent that the mind is fixed on goods such assecurity, wealth, ambition, or honor, the pursuit of the general interest will constantly

25 There are two sets of distinctions that should be kept conceptually distinct. The first is the distinctionbetween acting from proper motives (e.g., genuine compassion) and acting from improper motives (e.g.,greed), the second is the distinction between acting spontaneously and acting reluctantly. A person who actsspontaneously might still act from improper motives and thus fail to be a moral person. For example, a greedyperson might help others simply because she wants to exploit them later, and this “cheating” can bespontaneous (in the sense that she is comfortable and natural to do so). A person who acts from propermotives might sometimes find it difficult to act from her compassion and need to make an effort. An exampleis King Xuan 宣 of Qi 齊 in Mencius 1A7, who has to deliberately “take this very heart here and apply it towhat is over there” (ju si xin jia zhu bi 舉斯心加諸彼).26 Here, it is assumed that “the general interest” and “self-interest” are translations for tianxia zhi li 天下之利

and zili 自利 respectively.

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disintegrate into the pursuit of particular interests” (Schwartz 1985: 260–261).Schwartz takes this as Mencius’ attack on the Mohists. However, even if we grant thatsuch disintegration is inevitable, this interpretation could hold only if the generalinterest is reducible to tangible goods and power. Mozi does not hold this simplisticconception of benefit: as we have seen, “the world’s benefit” refers to a well-orderedsociety where people have mutual concern and behave in accordance with theirrespective social roles.

6 The Issue of Mixed Motives

Although Mencius 6B4, like 1A1, claim that one should focus on rightness only, thereare other passages in the Mencius that seem to allow for the possibility of mixedmotives, that one can act from both rightness and benefit. First, let us consider thefollowing passage:

Only a Gentleman [shi 士] can have a constant heart [hengxin 恆心] inspite of a lack of constant means of support. The people, on the otherhand, will not have constant hearts if they are without constant means.Lacking constant hearts, they will go astray and fall into excesses, stoppedat nothing. To punish them after they have fallen foul of the law is to seta trap for the people…. (Mencius 1A7)

A gentleman’s heart is always set upon rightness regardless of whether there iseconomic benefit. The common people, however, will not follow what is right if theireconomic well-being is not secured. This seems to suggest that, when the commonpeople are poor, they can be motivated to perform a right act only if they see that actcan be economically beneficial. While this does not imply that they are motivated onlyby economic benefit, it certainly implies that they cannot be motivated only byrightness. Mencius even proposes that they are not fully responsible for their heartsbeing “inconstant.” This may be understood in light of the fact that, for Mencius, theduty of promoting other-regarding li is more stringent for the social elites or peoplewho have more power. Mencius is aware that although everyone has the potential forchoosing rightness even over life itself (Mencius 6A10), 27 the well-functioning ofsociety should not be based on such a high moral ideal. In other words, while a personcan always attempt to make oneself care about rightness only, it does not imply that oneis always justified in imposing the same requirement on others, especially when oneenjoys higher social status. This reflects a context-sensitive element in Mencius’thought.

Furthermore, Mencius not only allows the common people to have a mixed motive,sometimes he allows that those in power can have it as well:

“If you consider my words [of being a benevolent king] well spoken, they why doyou not put them into practice?”

27 That is, it is practically possible for a person to sacrifice all things to preserve himself as a moral person.

Assessment of Li 利 in the Mencius and the Mozi 211

“I have a weakness. I am fond of money.”

“…You may be fond of money, but what is it to you so long as you share thisfondness with the people?” (Mencius 1B5)

When King Xuan宣 of Qi齊 says that he is fond of money, he is certainly talking aboutself-regarding benefit. However, unlike 1A1, Mencius does not refute the king’sinterest in benefit, but instead encourages the king to look after his people. In thispassage, Mencius seems to suggest that the king may keep his interest in money as longas he allows the people the same. There are at least two reasons to explain thedifference in Mencius’ attitude in 1A1 and 1B5. First, it might be said that, in 1A1,King Hui himself assumes the incompatibility of rightness and benefit by asking aboutbenefit at the beginning of conversation. Mencius replies that if one focuses on benefitunder this assumption, one would lose both rightness and benefit. In other words, it isthe king rather than Mencius who dichotomizes rightness and benefit. This point isargued by WANG Yunping (Wang 2005: 28). Second, it might be said that King Xuanhas already shown that he can be motivated by benevolence in the saving-the-oxscenario (Mencius 1A7) because he shows compassion to an ox. If he can transferthe compassion to his people, then even though he is still fond of money, this will nottrigger strife among his people. However, King Hui does not show any sign ofcompassion in the text, so once he is fond of self-gain, he will be preoccupied by it,which has the potential to lead to conflict.

It must be noted that theMozi also allows one to act from a mixed motive, includingboth the agent’s self-regarding benefit and a proper sense of rightness. Mozi thinks allpersons have their own conceptions of what is right even without any politicalinfluence (Mozi 11.1, 12.1, 13.2),28 and some of them may even sacrifice their livesfor rightness (Mozi 47.1). So, as long as they discern what is right, they will bemotivated, at least in some cases, to pursue rightness. The Mohists then use severalarguments to support the claim that inclusive care is the right ethical doctrine. As wehave seen, one of their arguments is that practicing inclusive care helps to promote theworld’s benefit (Mozi 15.1–15.3). Nonetheless, the Mohists also realize that, in order tomake the practice sustainable, people must be convinced that it is not only right, butalso enhances, or at least does not clash with, self-regarding li. Therefore

[The practice of] inclusive care for each other and interacting with and mutuallybenefit each other is quite different from [sacrificing oneself for fame]. If a personcares for others then others must, as a result, care for that person. If a personbenefits others then others must, as a result, benefit that person … where is thedifficulty? It is only that those above do not make it part of their government, sotheir officers see no reason to do it. (Mozi 15.4, 15.7; translation modified)

28 Chris Fraser thinks that not all these conceptions of rightness can be reduced to self-interest, so there mustbe people whose reason for action is that the action is the proper thing to do. In other words, there must bepeople who can be motivated on moral grounds, even before the Mohist ethical doctrine is enforced publicly.Fraser also thinks this challenges certain interpretations of Mohism entertained by Confucian scholars such asDavid Nivison and SHUN Kwong-loi 信廣來. See Fraser 2008: 438–444.

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Precisely speaking, this passage does not show why inclusive care is morally right. Itonly shows that it “can be practiced even by people who initially lack the normativemotivation to do so” (Fraser 2008: 446). Dan Robins states, “What matters here is thatif inclusive care were regularly and seriously at odds with people’s existing practicalinterest, then they would be unlikely to care inclusively even if they recognized thatinclusiveness is right… the point is that inclusive care makes practical sense because ifyou care for others then you will be able to benefit from other people’s care” (Robins2012: 68).29 Robins’s point is that sometimes the inclination to do what is right is not astrong enough impetus for people to care for others, especially when we are consideringa large group of people rather than an individual. So the Mohists must allow that peoplecan have mixed motives, and consequently do not insist on bringing about a world inwhich most people’s other-regarding attitudes are “pure” (Robins 2012: 73). This issimilar to Mencius’ thought that the universal potential—being only potential ratherthan actual—for choosing rightness rather than life cannot be regarded as the basis of awell-functioning society.

We may summarize by saying that, although Mencius and Mozi have differentconceptions of rightness, namely, an emphasis on moral sentiments and an emphasis onconsequences, respectively; they realize that the requirement of pure motive cannot bemade universal in practice.

7 Conclusion

If we divide benefit into self-regarding and other-regarding types, we will find that boththeMencius and theMozi criticize the former but encourage the latter. The critique of liin the Mencius is more prevalent, but it only points to a narrow sense of li, rather thanall kinds of li. Though they do not differ in rejecting self-regarding li, a differencebetween Mozi and Mencius is that Mencius focuses more on an agent’s motive ratherthan benefit-pursuing acts as such. This is because how we feel toward moral actionsand how we motivate ourselves to act morally are critical questions for Mencius, and lias self-gain is dangerous both in behavior and motivation. However, this difference ofemphasis should not eclipse our understanding of the resemblances between theirethical and political theories. Both of them admit that a person is sometimes obligedto promote the benefit of others, especially when the person is in a position of power.This is especially important in the case of the government, which is responsible forpromoting the benefit of the people, in order to ensure their security and provide thenecessary conditions for sustaining moral development. While both of them assignmore stringent moral responsibilities to the social elites, they allow that, across thepopulation, the inclination to show genuine concern for morality and the inclination tosecure self-regarding li may coexist in one’s motivational reasons for action.

Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank the two anonymous peer reviewers and Professor HUANG

Yong 黃勇 for their comments, advice, and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper.

29 People’s “practical interest” includes, but is not limited to, their own self-interest.

Assessment of Li 利 in the Mencius and the Mozi 213

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