1
Assessment of Respiratory
Personal Protective
Equipment in U.S. Acute
Care Hospitals–2012
Final: November 19, 2014
2
Acknowledgments
This report was made possible through funding provided to the Association of State and Territorial
Health Officials (ASTHO) from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through Cooperative
Agreement 5U38HM000454 and with the technical support provided by National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the official views of CDC or NIOSH.
ASTHO thanks the American Hospital Association (AHA) and the Association for Healthcare Resource and
Materials Management (AHRMM) for the advice and assistance provided throughout the course of the
project. Specific recognition is extended to those members who served on the project work group (see
Appendix B for a list of work group members) and to Roslyne Schulman, Director, Policy at the AHA and
Peter Kralovec, Executive Director, Health Care Data Center, AHA for assisting in the development of the
assessment instrument and coordinating outreach efforts to the hospitals using the AHA hospital
database and to AHRMM member, Mickey Sparrow, CMRP, FAHRMM, Materiel Manager, Tuomey
Healthcare System for his assistance in the successful pilot testing of the assessment instrument. ASTHO
would also like to recognize Lisa M. Koonin, DrPH, MN, MPH, Senior Advisor and lead of CDC’s Pandemic
Medical Care and Countermeasures Task Force for her technical assistance and project stewardship;
Charles Oke, VMD, MPH, FACE for his technical assistance; James T. Wassell, PhD, NIOSH, for
conducting the quantitative statistical analyses for this project; and Sherline Lee, MPH, Epidemiologist,
Healthcare Preparedness Activity/DSNS/CDC, for sharing her subject matter expertise to help guide the
design and execution of this project.
ASTHO staff members Katie Sellers DrPH, CPH, Senior Director, Survey Research; Rivka Liss‐Levinson,
PhD, Director, Survey Research; Jennifer Lumpkins, MPH, Director, Public Health Preparedness; Geetika
Nadkarni, MPH, CPH, Senior Analyst, Public Health Preparedness; and James S. Blumenstock, MS, Chief,
Public Health Practice, directed this effort and analysis for this document. The report was written by
ASTHO with technical assistance by CDC.
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Assessment of Respiratory Personal Protective Equipment in Acute Care Hospitals‐2012
Abstract
Objective: To characterize and identify quantities of respiratory personal protective equipment (PPE: N95
respirators, surgical masks, and powered air purifying respirators [PAPRs]) in U.S. acute care hospitals as
part of a larger overall effort to inform the state of pandemic influenza readiness.
Methods: A total of 4,582 U.S. acute care community hospitals listed in the 2012 American Hospital
Association (AHA) database were asked by AHA to complete a simple inventory assessment of N95
respirators, surgical masks, and PAPRs that they had on hand at the time of the assessment and the
amount purchased over the preceding year (for the period June 1, 2011 through May 31, 2012). Based on
this response, estimations of the amount of this equipment were calculated for all US acute care
hospitals to account for hospitals that were not queried (because they did not have an e‐mail address in
the 2012 AHA database) or did not respond to this assessment.
Results: The 1,066 hospitals who completed the assessment (23% response rate) showed wide variability
in the numbers of PPE on hand, even when hospital size was taken into account. Hospitals in the eastern
half of the United States tended to have more PPE on hand than those in western states, and hospitals in
just a half dozen states collectively held much more respiratory PPE than hospitals in other states. Most
of the hospitals that were queried had experienced a shortage of respiratory PPE at some point, and the
most common tactic for dealing with the problem was to request assistance or resource sharing.
Conclusions: This assessment is the first attempt to capture a comprehensive snapshot of N95
respirators, surgical masks, and PAPRs on hand in U.S. acute care hospitals during a specific timeframe.
The study suggests that PPE supplies vary widely, and sufficient quantities to meet the need of a
pandemic may not currently be available in most hospitals. Further work is needed to explore the
feasibility and acceptability of using reusable respiratory protective devices in hospitals to protect
healthcare personnel during an influenza pandemic as alternatives to disposable devices. PPE is an
important part of hospital readiness and improved supplies may be needed.
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Introduction and Background
To improve visibility and understanding of our overall state of influenza pandemic readiness, the
American Hospital Association’s (AHA) Health Research & Educational Trust and the Association for
Healthcare Resource and Materials Management (AHRMM) partnered with ASTHO in a collaborative
project assessing inventories of respiratory personal protective equipment (PPE) in U.S. acute care
hospitals. Technical assistance was provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
and CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and CDC funded the project.
An important component of planning and response to an influenza pandemic is ensuring an adequate
supply and distribution of PPE, including respirators, for protection of healthcare personnel. The HHS
Pandemic Influenza Plan states that “healthcare facilities must be prepared to protect healthy personnel
from exposures in the healthcare setting through the use of recommended infection control
measures.” In 2009, CDC recommended that healthcare personnel in close contact with patients with
suspected or confirmed 2009 H1N1 influenza use an approach comprising a hierarchy of controls,
including the use of respiratory protection devices, to prevent exposure of healthcare personnel and
patients and prevent influenza transmission within healthcare settings (CDC, Interim Guidance on
Infection Control Measures for 2009 H1N1 Influenza in Healthcare Settings, Including Protection of
Healthcare Personnel, 2009). CDC’s recommendation will be effective only if hospitals have adequate
supplies and established procedures for acquiring, allocating, distributing, and using these assets during
times of emergency.
Planning at the national level for a surge in demand for respiratory PPE has been hampered by a lack of
information in three areas: current PPE supplies in U.S. hospitals, potential geographic or demographic
variability in supplies across the country under normal (non‐pandemic) operating conditions, and the
numbers and types of respiratory PPE that hospitals must have to meet anticipated needs during
surge. According to a cross‐sectional survey of members of the American College of Emergency
Physicians’ Disaster Medicine Section, only 63 percent of the 92 respondents indicated that their
hospitals had adequate1 supplies of PPE. The authors concluded that for many of the hospitals
represented in the survey, significant gaps exist in planning for pandemic influenza and other infectious
diseases (Morton, Hsu, Shah, Hsieh, & Kirsch, 2011). Ascertaining the quantity of devices by type will aid
assessment of the U.S. PPE surge capacity for a future influenza pandemic.
On a broader level this assessment is intended to serve as a critical first step toward addressing gaps in
key assets and helping to inform national policy by answering the question, “Do U.S. acute care hospitals
have enough respiratory PPE for their personnel in the event of an influenza pandemic?” This study
provides baseline of the quantities of specific types of respirators currently held in our nation’s acute
care hospital system. This information coupled with inventory data for the Strategic National Stockpile
and the commercial supply chain will render a more complete picture of respiratory PPE availability and
sufficiency in the event of a pandemic.
1 Respondents in this study self‐defined “adequate”.
5
Methodology
Development of the Respiratory PPE Assessment Instrument
To guide this project, ASTHO convened a seven‐person subject matter expert work group to provide
technical input to AHA. This work group included representatives from AHA, AHRMM, and CDC/NIOSH
(see Appendix B). The group routinely met via conference call between October 2011 and May 2012 and
was instrumental in designing the assessment strategy and protocol, and the data to be captured in the
Respiratory PPE Assessment. The assessment was intended to quantify respiratory PPE inventories at
acute care hospitals, as well as any inventories held in central supply warehouses and other special
emergency caches, not including materiel held in local, state, or federal government stockpiles. The
assessment instrument was finalized in May 2012 and contained five questions summarized as follows:
1. Record the amounts and types of PPE, by size where applicable, on hand at the time the
assessment was conducted, and the quantities purchased annually. The specific PPE included in
this query included N95 filtering face piece respirators (N95) or higher, surgical/isolation masks,
and powered air‐purifying respirators (PAPRs)2.
2. Determine whether the facility also owns an emergency cache of respiratory PPE.
3. If the facility does own an emergency cache, provide an inventory summary as specified in
Question 1.
4. Write a general description of the greatest challenges the responding facility encounters during
periods of respiratory PPE shortage, if any, and steps taken to mitigate the challenges/problems.
5. Elaborate on answers to the previous questions or share any other information deemed relevant
to this project.
The work group determined that this assessment would be minimally burdensome for hospitals to
complete, as it would likely be compatible with most hospitals’ inventory management systems. A
standardized reporting period of June 1, 2011 to May 31, 2012 was selected as one that was most
reflective of a current non pandemic annual period at the time of the assessment and also would be
best synchronized with the hospitals’ procurement and inventory records to allow for the most current
reporting of inventories. Respondents were afforded the opportunity to choose an alternate annual
reporting period if necessary. Accompanying the five‐question assessment were instructions that
provided a glossary of the terms used and standard definitions for the three types of respiratory PPE
reported.
As part of the Respiratory PPE Assessment development, the work group sought input from the state
directors of public health preparedness and state hospital associations and kept them informed as the
2 PAPRs have a battery‐powered blower that pulls contaminated air through filters and moves the filtered air to the wearer's face piece. PAPRs are significantly more expensive than other air purifying respirators but provide higher levels of protection and may be more comfortable for some users. Hooded PAPRs are available and do not require fit‐testing before use (OSHA, Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for an Influnza Pandemic, 2009).
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project advanced to ensure the assessment did not create conflicts with existing state‐specific
mechanisms and programs for collecting and reporting of emergency medical materiel inventories. This
was accomplished through written correspondence and conference calls between ASTHO and AHA and
their respective state members/counterparts. Ongoing dialogue with an opportunity to discuss
questions and concerns was an important step in explaining the purpose of this project and in enlisting
project advocates as a means to improve outcomes. In an effort to further refine the assessment, the
work group pilot tested the assessment tool with medical materiel managers, with the assistance of
AHRMM.
Pilot Testing of the Respiratory PPE Assessment Instrument
The Respiratory PPE Assessment was pilot tested with nine medical materiel manager volunteers from
hospitals of various sizes across the country. The purpose of the pilot test was to gauge, from the
receiver’s perspective, the degree of clarity regarding the project’s purpose, the understandability of the
assessment tool’s instructions for completion, and the ease for hospital staff to assemble the desired
information and enter it into the assessment form. This information was then summarized and used to
inform final development of the assessment tool. The pilot testing process was accomplished through
the conduct of brief interviews. To allow for sufficient preparation prior to the telephonic interviews, on
May 17, 2012, the volunteers were provided the draft letter of introduction, assessment instructions,
and questions. Over the course of a two‐week period, ASTHO staff conducted interviews with the
volunteers and walked them through the assessment tool and posed a few questions to capture
opinions and recommendations. Feedback from these interviews was compiled and shared with the
work group members, and a conference call was held with AHA to share and discuss the results of the
pilot test. Throughout June and July 2012, the Respiratory PPE Assessment tool was refined in response
to comments from the work group members and findings and recommendations found valid and helpful
through the field pilot test. During the last two weeks of July 2012, AHA’s Health Research & Educational
Trust incorporated the final questions into a web‐based platform for distribution to the hospitals.
Launch of Respiratory PPE Assessment Instrument
On August 2, 2012, the Respiratory PPE Assessment (Appendix D) was launched to the 4,582 U.S. acute
care community hospitals with e‐mail addresses in the 2012 AHA database. Acute care hospitals were
selected for this assessment because it was assumed that these hospitals would be more likely
(compared with long‐term facilities) to care for persons who become ill with pandemic influenza or
other infectious diseases during a public health emergency, and also would likely have stocks of
respiratory PPE on hand to use for everyday patient care. Mr. Rich Umbdenstock, AHA President and
CEO, sent a letter (Appendix C) to the CEOs of all of these hospitals inviting them to participate in the
assessment and providing a link, login information, and password to the online assessment form. The
letter also emphasized the following:
This assessment was in no way intended to interfere with or replace other data collection
systems already in place and functioning between hospitals and their respective state/local
health departments (e.g., SMARTT or HAvBED).
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The assessment data will remain confidential—no individual facility will be identified or
referenced in any report summarizing the findings. Only state‐level aggregate data will be
shared.
The targeted respondents were materiel managers at all U.S. hospitals cataloged by the AHA in the
following categories (including pediatric subcategories when available): acute long‐term care; cancer;
children’s acute long‐term; children’s general; children’s orthopedic; children’s other specialty;
children’s rehabilitation; eye, ear, nose, and throat; general medical and surgical; heart; orthopedics;
obstetrics and gynecology; rehabilitation; surgical; and other specialty.
Simultaneous with this launch to the hospitals, ASTHO and AHA notified the state directors of public
health preparedness and state hospital associations that the assessment was released to the field and,
for reference, provided them with a copy of the AHA letter and assessment questions with instructions.
The assessment was in the field for approximately two months to give hospitals ample time to collect
and provide accurate and complete information. AHA’s Health Research & Educational Trust conducted
follow‐up calls with non‐respondents to increase response rates during that period, and the information
collection phase of the project was officially ended on October 5, 2012.
The final data sets were transferred to ASTHO by AHA/HRET in mid‐ to late October 2012. ASTHO staff
stripped the data set of all hospital and sub‐state‐level geographic identifiers, and the data set was
transferred to NIOSH on November 14, 2012, to obtain technical assistance with statistical analyses.
Methodology for Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses
Quantitative Analyses
The assessment frame consisted of a list of 5,001 hospitals catalogued by the AHA. Frame variables
included (1) state code, (2) bed size code, (3) teaching affiliation, (4) primary service, (5)
control/ownership type, and (6) urban/rural location. Only hospitals having e‐mail addresses (4,582
hospitals) were contacted. Of these 1,066 (23%) responded to this query; However, data from three
“atypical” hospitals were removed from the subsequent analysis (after receipt of their information)
because (based on information gathered outside of the assessment) and based on the amount of
respiratory PPE held at these facilities, indicated that these three facilities were part of a broader
community stockpiling effort and their caches did not reflect individual hospital stockpiling
activities. Therefore, data from 1,063 hospitals were used for the analysis.
To estimate the amount of PPE held by all U.S. acute care hospitals and to account for hospitals that
were not queried (because they did not have an e‐mail address in the 2012 AHA database) or did not
respond to this assessment, we used computed estimates using adjusted weights to estimate the
number of respiratory PPE devices held by all U.S. acute care hospitals. Initially, weights were
calculated using standard sample weighting methods so that the estimated total agreed with the frame
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total.3 Then these initial weights were adjusted using a process called “raking.” Raking is an iterative
computer‐intensive method to improve estimation by adjusting the sample weights so that the
weighted estimates agree with observed totals for two or more frame variables (Lumley, 2010).
Battaglia, et al (2008) have shown that the raking method substantially reduces nonresponse bias,
and Kott and Liao (2012) report that raking produces an estimator with unbiasedness properties
equivalent to those of a generalized regression estimator under a conventional post stratification or
reweighting‐cell environment. Combinations of the six frame variables were tested as candidate
variables for raking, and we found that state code and bed size code produced the lowest variance
estimates. Confidence intervals were computed using a “Wald”‐type confidence interval by adding and
subtracting a multiple of the estimated standard error. This was calculated using the statistical package
in R software (Lumley, 2012; Lumley, 2010). In addition, to enable comparisons by state of the amount
of N95s and surgical masks held on hand, we computed the number and average number of N95s and
surgical masks by the number of staffed beds by state using information provided by AHA (AHA Annual
Survey Database Fiscal Year 2011).
Each hospital was queried for the amount of the three types of respiratory PPE (N95s,surgical/isolation
masks, and PAPRs) that they had on hand at the time of the assessment and the amount purchased
during the preceding year, for the period June 1, 2011 through May 31, 2012 (see Appendix D). The
assessment was intended to capture a “snapshot” of data on PPE inventories held in hospitals and also
included inventory stored in their central supply warehouses. Although hospitals were queried regarding
the amount of N95s and surgical masks by size of the device (e.g. “standard”, small, medium, large, X‐
large and other sizes), these data were summed to derive total counts for each type of device for each
hospital.
Qualitative Analyses
In addition to the numbers of respiratory PPE, hospitals were also asked two open‐ended questions as
part of the assessment:
1. What is the greatest challenge your facility encounters when there is a shortage of any of the
three types of respiratory PPE (N95, surgical masks, and PAPRs)?
2. What actions, if any, does your hospital take to alleviate them?
Responses to these questions were then coded using the constant comparison method. After coding
each response, the common patterns, categories, and themes were identified. After coding was
completed, the codes that were mentioned consistently across participants were clustered and
identified as themes. Frequency of mention and the importance of the issue as stated by the
participants were two factors in the identification of themes.
Multiple coders were utilized to assure accuracy in coding these data. Differences in categorization were
then reviewed by ASTHO staff and consensus was reached on all discrepancies. Frequencies and cross
3 The frame total used for this analysis included 5,000 acute care hospitals; one facility on the AHA list was removed from the analysis because of missing data.
9
tabulations were run for the qualitative data by the following characteristics: AHA facility classification,
bed size, hospital location (rural vs. urban), teaching affiliation, and hospital ownership type
(government, for‐profit, not‐for‐profit).
Results
Response Rate
Of the U.S. acute care hospitals listed in the 2012 AHA database and used in this analysis, 1,0664
responded to this assessment. This represents a 23 percent overall response rate5, ranging from 10
percent of hospitals in Washington, D.C. to 57‐percent of hospitals in Delaware (Table 1). The likelihood
of response did not correlate with the size of the hospital (number of beds); approximately one quarter
of hospitals responded in every hospital size category (Table 2). Similarly, urban versus rural location did
not seem to have much effect on response rate. About half of the responding hospitals were in urban
locations, and about half were in rural locations. In contrast, government and not‐for‐profit hospitals
were much more likely to respond than for‐profit hospitals. About one‐fourth of government or not‐for‐
profit hospitals responded compared with only one‐seventh of for‐profit hospitals.
Table 1: Sample Size and Response Rate, by State and Number of US Acute Care Hospitals
State No. of hospitals
in frame No. of hospitals
in frame with e‐mail
No. of hospitals responding
Percentage of hospitals responding
AK 22 21 4 19 AL 102 85 24 28 AR 82 74 20 27 American Samoaa 1 0 0 0 AZ 70 65 14 22 CA 342 299 56 19 CO 80 75 20 27 CT 34 34 7 21 District of Columbia 11 10 1 10 DE 7 7 4 57 FL 209 187 31 17 GA 153 134 26 19 Guama 1 1 0 0 HI 24 23 5 22 IA 118 113 41 36 ID 41 40 9 22 IL 188 181 44 24 IN 125 122 27 22 KS 130 124 39 31 KY 106 94 22 23 LA 126 118 23 19 MA 78 67 13 19 MD 47 46 14 30 ME 37 36 9 25
4 Data from three hospitals were removed from the analysis (after receipt of their information) because the amount of respiratory PPE held at these facilities were part of a broader community stockpiling effort and their caches did not reflect individual hospital stockpiling activities. 5 This is the response rate only for those 4,582 acute care hospitals with e‐mail addresses that were queried.
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Table 1: Sample Size and Response Rate, by State and Number of US Acute Care Hospitals
State No. of hospitals
in frame No. of hospitals
in frame with e‐mail
No. of hospitals responding
Percentage of hospitals responding
MI 152 145 29 20 MN 133 130 41 32 MO 121 113 33 29 MS 96 80 11 14 MT 48 44 7 16 NC 116 107 38 36 ND 41 38 9 24 NE 88 85 22 26 NH 28 27 9 33 NJ 73 69 12 17 NM 35 32 6 19 NV 36 30 4 13 NY 184 174 49 28 OH 182 166 35 21 OK 113 95 20 21 OR 58 53 9 17 PA 193 177 55 31 Puerto Ricoa 50 39 0 0 RI 11 10 3 30 SC 67 59 14 24 SD 53 47 8 17 TN 133 115 18 16 TX 417 379 74 20 UT 44 43 8 19 VA 89 83 16 19 Virgin Islandsa 2 1 0 0 VT 14 14 5 36 WA 86 81 26 32 WI 124 114 31 27 WV 55 52 13 25 WY 24 23 8 35
Total 5,001** 4,582 1,066 23
a Hospitals in American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands were not queried as part of this assessment, but are
included in the AHA frame.
** The total number of hospitals in the assessment frame consisted of a list of 5,001 hospitals catalogued by AHA. The frame total used for this analysis included 5,000 acute care hospitals; one facility on the AHA list was removed from the analysis because of missing data. Only hospitals having e‐mail addresses (4,582) were contacted. Of these 1,066 (23%)
responded; however, three reporting hospitals were removed from the analysis because the amount of respiratory PPE held at these facilities were part of a broader community stockpiling effort and their caches did not reflect individual hospital stockpiling efforts. Therefore, the sample size is 1,063 after removal of these three hospitals. In addition, one hospital was contacted but didn’t complete the assessment and no frame information about bed size, affiliation, etc. was available for this hospital; therefore it was not included in the analyses and is not included in Tables 2‐4.
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Table 2: Sample Size and Response Rate, by Facility Characteristics of US Acute Care Hospitals Characteristic No. of
hospitals in frame
No. of hospitals in frame
No. of hospitals that responded
Percentage of hospitals responding
AHA Facility Classification
Acute long‐term care 215 181 15 8
Cancer 9 8 0 0
Children's acute long‐term 1 0 0 0
Children's general 58 56 7 13
Children's orthopedic 14 14 2 14
Children's other specialty 7 6 3 50
Children's rehabilitation 3 3 0 0
Eye, ear, nose, and throat 4 3 1 34
General medical and surgical 4,459 4,100 1,012 25
Heart 5 3 0 0
Obstetrics and gynecology 8 8 4 50
Orthopedic 10 7 1 14
Other specialty 23 17 3 18
Rehabilitation 181 172 18 10
Surgical 3 3 0 0
Total 5,000 4,581 1,066 23
Bed size (# of beds)
6–24 445 397 106 27
25–49 1,173 1,074 243 23
50–99 949 872 195 22
100–199 1,033 934 234 25
200–299 588 542 123 23
300–399 354 333 64 19
400–499 186 178 42 24
500 or more 272 251 59 24
Total 5,000 4,581 1,066 23
Hospital Location
Rural 1,985 1,831 497 27
Urban 3,015 2,750 569 21
Total 5,000 4,581 1,066 23
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Table 2: Sample Size and Response Rate, by Facility Characteristics of US Acute Care Hospitals Characteristic No. of
hospitals in frame
No. of hospitals in frame
No. of hospitals that responded
Percentage of hospitals responding
Teaching affiliation
Major 304 286 66 23
Minor 928 862 199 23
Nonteaching 3,768 3,433 801 23
Total 5,000 4,581 1,066 23
Hospital ownership type (combined groups)
Government 1,057 977 262 27
For profit 1,039 874 118 14
Non‐government /not‐for‐profit 2,904 2730 686 25
Total 5,000 4,581 1,066 23
Hospital ownership type (original separate groups)
Govt. (federal) ‐ Public Health Indian Service 1 1 0 0
Govt. (nonfederal) ‐ City 97 92 25 27
Govt. (nonfederal) ‐ City‐county 23 23 6 26
Govt. (nonfederal) – County 349 317 93 29
Govt. (nonfederal) ‐ Hospital district 509 473 122 26
Govt. (nonfederal) – State 78 71 16 23
Investor‐owned; for‐profit ‐ Corporation 878 747 100 13
Investor‐owned; for‐profit ‐ Individual 13 10 1 10
Investor‐owned; for‐profit ‐ Partnership 148 117 17 15
Non‐govt. (not‐for‐profit) ‐ Church Operated 520 494 112 23
Non‐govt. (not‐for‐profit) ‐ Other 2,384 2,236 574 26
Total 5,000 4,581 1,066* 23 Note. One of the 5,001 hospitals in the AHA assessment frame had no information on facility characteristics and therefore these data were
omitted from this table and subsequent analyses. *Of these 1,066 (23%) responded; however, three reporting hospitals were removed from the analysis because the amount of respiratory PPE held at these facilities were part of a broader community stockpiling effort and their caches did not reflect individual hospital stockpiling efforts. Therefore, the sample size is 1,063 after removal of these three hospitals.
Estimating the Number of Respiratory PPE in Acute Care Hospitals
Overall, acute care hospitals in the US reported they collectively held more than 59.9 million N95 respirators (Table 3).
The estimated number of N95 respirators on hand in these hospitals varied among states by three orders of
magnitude, ranging from approximately 14,000 to over 32 million of these devices. Three states (Texas, California,
and New York) collectively held about two‐thirds of the estimated total number of N95 respirators in U.S. acute care
hospitals. Only five states (North Carolina, California, Maryland, Vermont, and New York) had more N95 respirators
on hand per hospital (on average) than the U.S. mean per hospital (n=12,118). The mean number of N95 respirators
on hand per hospital was calculated based on estimates from all 50 states and the District of Columbia. However, the
mean number of N95 respirators held in hospitals in one state (New York) far exceeded that held by other states and
was more than four times greater than the estimated number of N95 respirators held in hospitals in the state with
13
the next largest amount (Vermont). Therefore, a national adjusted mean number of N95 respirators on hand per
hospital was calculated excluding estimates from that state to more accurately portray the average amount of N95
respirators held in US acute care hospitals; the national adjusted mean number of N95 respirators on hand per
hospital was 5,572. In aggregate, acute care hospitals in the U.S. reported they collectively held over 78.2 million
surgical/isolation masks. By comparison, the estimated number of surgical/isolation masks on hand in each state
ranged from about nine thousand to over 24 million. Four states (North Carolina, California, Virginia, and South
Carolina) collectively held more than half of the estimated total number of surgical/isolation masks in U.S. acute care
hospitals. Fourteen states had more surgical/isolation masks on hand per hospital (on average) than the U.S. mean
per hospital (n= 15,825).
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Table 3: Estimated Total Number On Hand and Mean Number per US Acute Care Hospitals of N95 Respirators and Surgical/Isolation Masks,
by State, 2012
State Estimated no. of N95 respirators on hand [95% CI]
Mean no. of N95 respirators on hand per hospital [95% CI]
Estimated no. of surgical/isolation masks on hand [95% CI]
Mean no. of surgical/isolation masks on hand per hospital
[95% CI]
AK 27,167 (21,939 – 32,394) 1,236 (998 – 1,474) 223,168 (68,642 – 377,694) 10,152 (3,126 – 17,179)
AL 127,421 (53,788 ‐ 201,055) 1,249 (527 – 1,971) 409,902 (112.814 – 706,990) 4,019 (1,106 – 6,932)
AR 122,836 (59,637 – 186,022) 1,498 (727 – 2,268) 167,114 (101,226 – 233,002) 2,038 (1,234 – 2,841)
AZ 203,386 (81,527 ‐ 325,244) 2,907 (1,165 – 4,649) 467,779 (0 – 974,799) 6,686 (0 – 13,934)
CA 5,026,709 (1,775,746 ‐ 8,277,673) 14,704 (5,194 – 24,213) 5,803,736 (781,453 – 10,826,019) 16,976 (2,286 – 31,667)
CO 306,493 (80,775 – 532,210) 3,829 (1,008 – 6,650) 1,798,728 (0 – 4,179,099) 22,474 (0 – 52,218)
CT 206,830 (49,497 – 364,164) 6,085 (1,457 – 10,714) 2,661,571 (0 – 6,623,017) 78,308 (0 – 194,845)
DC 122,159 (NA) 11,120 (NA) 626,174 (NA) 57,000 (NA)
DE 36,387 (0 – 83,193) 5,203 (0 – 11,894) 193,059 (2,060 – 384058) 27,606 (307 – 54,905)
FL 1,460,906 ( 286,850 – 2,634,962) 6,995 (1,373 – 12,616) 3,782,188 (1,172,054 – 6,392,321) 18,108 (5,610 – 30,607)
GA 783,545 (55,563 – 1,511,527) 5,122 (363 ‐9,882) 778,316 (156,306 – 1,400,326) 5,088 (1,022 – 9,155)
HI 136,777 (44,255 – 229,299) 5,701 (1,844 – 9,557) 175,310 (69,021 – 281.599) 7,306 (2,873 – 11,739)
IA 164,492 (63,746 – 265,238) 1,393 (540 – 2,246) 343,606 (173,632 – 513,581) 2,910 (1,470 – 4,349)
ID 35,363 (19,826 – 50.899) 862 (483 – 1,241) 59,349 (28,104 – 90,594) 1,446 (685 – 2,208)
IL 2,085,707 (442,205 – 3.729,208) 11,094 (2,351 – 19,836) 1,172,477 (784,218 – 1,560,737) 6,236 (4,171 – 8,302)
IN 794,114 (331,100 – 1,257,128) 6,351 (2,647 – 10,054) 3,291,738 (0 – 7,453,501) 26,324 (0 – 59,610)
KS 252,714 (124,821 – 380,606) 1,943 (959 – 2,926) 315,816 (138,969 – 492,662) 2,428 (1,068 – 3,787)
KY 218,418 (95,367 – 341,470) 2,061 (899 – 3,222) 418,178 (165,184 – 671,172) 3,945 (1,558 – 6,332)
LA 294,565 (102,340 – 486,790) 2,337 (811 – 3,862) 400,337 (0 – 866,709) 3,176 (0 – 6,875)
MA 333,028 (138,189 – 527,866) 4,271 (1,773 – 6,769) 653,855 (182,135 – 1,125,576) 8,386 (2,335 – 14,438)
MD 1,127,758 (112‐551 – 2,142,965) 24,532 (2,445 – 46,619) 1,386,659 (0 ‐2,867,232) 30,164 (0 – 62,373)
ME 269,966 (65,239 – 474,693) 7,296 (1,761 – 12,831) 158,695 (85,015 – 232,375) 4,289 (2,296 – 6,282)
MI 467,552 (34,690 – 900,414) 3,075 (228 – 5,923) 730,098 (292,178 – 1,168,018) 4,802 (1,921 – 7,683)
MN 710,925 (288,594 – 1,133,256) 5,383 (2,185 – 8,582) 726,989 (295,258 – 1,158,720) 5,505 (2,235 – 8,775)
MO 465,167 (0 – 989,910) 3,843 (0 – 8,178) 583,306 (151,018 – 1,015,593) 4,819 (1,247 – 8,390)
MS 367,659 (113,414 – 621,904) 3,831 (1,181 – 6,480) 224,824 (89,809 – 359,839) 2,342 (936 – 3,749)
MT 42,531 (10,719 – 74,342) 886 (223 – 1,548) 166,409 (39,049 – 293,768) 3,465 (812 – 6,118)
15
Table 3: Estimated Total Number On Hand and Mean Number per US Acute Care Hospitals of N95 Respirators and Surgical/Isolation Masks,
by State, 2012
State Estimated no. of N95 respirators on hand [95% CI]
Mean no. of N95 respirators on hand per hospital [95% CI]
Estimated no. of surgical/isolation masks on hand [95% CI]
Mean no. of surgical/isolation masks on hand per hospital
[95% CI]
NC 1,436,770 (789,388 – 2,084,152) 12,391 (6,807 – 17,974) 24,524,752 (11,415,613 – 37,633,891) 211,503 (98,451 – 324,555)
ND 121,360 (0 – 287,466) 2,957 (0 – 7,006) 90,386 (112 – 180,661) 2,202 (2 – 4,403)
NE 135,671 (35,092 – 236,249) 1,541 (398 – 2,683) 141,668 (98,161 – 185,175) 1,609 (1,114 – 2,103)
NH 24,132 (10,573 – 37,690) 862 (378 – 1,346) 77,029 (22,247 – 131,811) 2,751 (794 – 4,708)
NJ 624,272 (205,762 – 1,042,782) 8,561 (2,821 – 14,300) 1,159,650 (168,990 – 2,150,310) 15,903 (2,318 – 29,487)
NM 33,904 (8,170 – 59,637) 969 (233 – 1,704) 103,384 (37,605 – 169,162) 2,954 (1,075 – 4,832)
NV 25,732 (0 – 62,692) 715 (0 – 1,741) 9,249 (0 – 22,562) 257 (0 – 626)
NY 32,364,708 (0 – 86,965,901) 176,012 (0 – 472,958) 1,301,769 (557,067 – 2,046,472) 7,080 (3,029 – 11,130)
OH 961,865 (400,611 – 1,523,119) 5,287 (2,202 – 8,372) 1,865,543 (76,108 – 3,654,977) 10,254 (418 – 20,090)
OK 121,399 (35,599 – 207,200) 1,074 (315 – 1,832) 346,243 (0 – 709,996) 3,062 (0 – 6,279)
OR 88,116 (42,447 – 133,786) 1,519 (731 – 2,306) 1,112,886 (0 – 2,445,224) 19,180 (0 – 42,146)
PA 986,323 (636,185 – 1,336,462) 5,113 (3,298 – 6,928) 2,048,720 (554,509 – 3,542,930) 10,620 (2,874 – 18,366)
RI 14,280 (7,664 – 20,896) 1,299 (697 – 1,901) 78,169 (22,208 – 134,131) 7,109 (2,015 – 12,203)
SC 592,552 (226,481 – 958,623) 8,845 (3,379 – 14,311) 4,873,896 (0 – 11,771,674) 72,753 (0 – 175,726)
SD 59,527 (31,938 – 87,116) 1,122 (602 – 1,643) 122,808 (62,454 – 183,163) 2,316 (1,177 – 3,454)
TN 943,675 (241,843 – 1,645,507) 7,097 (1,818 – 12,376) 730,662 (257,743 – 1,203,582) 5,495 (1,937 – 9,052)
TX 2,524,287 (539,425 – 4,509,150) 6,052 (1,293 – 10,811) 2,599,691 (1,629,287 – 3,570,095) 6,233 (3,906 – 8,560)
UT 47,590 (10,055 – 85,126) 1,082 (229 – 1,936) 99,138 (16,530 – 181,746) 2,254 (375 – 4,133)
VA 690,383 (24,263 – 1,356,502) 7,760 (272 – 15,248) 5,522,425 (0 ‐14,148,547) 62,075 (0 ‐159,040)
VT 605,227 (0 – 1,311,584) 43,227 (0 – 93,696) 277,085 (26,210 – 527,959) 19,790 (1,877 – 37,704)
WA 661,445 (69,538 – 1,253,352) 7,779 (817 – 14,742) 882,068 (134,404 – 1,629,733) 10,374 (1,579 – 19,169)
WI 389,364 (173,162 – 605,566) 3,139 (1,396 – 4,882) 1,825,721 (685,378 – 2,966,064) 14,719 (5,524 – 23,915)
WV 226,526 (48,500 – 404,552) 4,118 (882 – 7,355) 610,804 (184,452 – 1,037,156) 11,105 (3,353 – 18,857)
WY 31,113 (13,694 – 48,532) 1,296 (571 – 2,022) 98,403 (49,715 – 147,091) 4,099 (2,070 – 6,129)
ALL U.S. 59,900,788 (5,107,417 – 114,694,159) 12,118 (1,033 – 23,203) 78,221,532 (58,740,413 – 97,702,651) 15,825 (11,884 – 19,766)
16
Note. NA=not available; CI=confidence interval. Confidence intervals represent non‐sampling variability.6
6 This variability is the result of selecting only hospitals with e‐mail addresses instead of selecting a random sample (or a probable sample) from the sampling frame. Additional variability results from nonresponse.
17
U.S. acute care hospitals that specialized in orthopedics reported holding the largest mean number of
N95 respirators compared with hospitals of other specialty types. Hospitals with more beds had, on
average, more N95 respirators on hand than smaller hospitals (Table 4). Hospitals located in urban areas
had, on average, about eight times more N95 respirators on hand than rural hospitals. Teaching
hospitals also had many more N95 respirators, on average, than nonteaching hospitals. In addition, not‐
for‐profit hospitals held, on average, about four times as many N95 respirators as government‐owned or
for‐profit hospitals.
Table 4: Mean Number per US Acute Care Hospital of N95 Respirators, by Facility Characteristics, 2012
Characteristic Mean no. of N95 respirators on hand per hospital [95% CI a, b]
AHA Facility Classification
Acute long‐term care 1,707 [329 ‐ 3,085]
Cancer –
Children's acute long‐term –
Children's general 13,833 [7,867‐ 19,800]
Children's orthopedic 79 [0‐ 182]
Children's other specialty 3,310 [816‐ 5,804]
Children's rehabilitation –
Eye, ear, nose, and throat 0
General medical and surgical 12,558 [797‐ 24,319]
Heart –
Obstetrics and gynecology 9,037 [0‐ 18,807]
Orthopedic 43,800 NA
Other specialty 594 [79‐ 1,109]
Rehabilitation 3,902 [1,782‐ 6,022]
Surgical –
Bed size (# of beds)
6–24 1,514 [899‐ 2,129]
25–49 1,890 [1,316‐ 2,464]
50–99 2,874 [1,527‐ 3,022]
100–199 4,321 [3,443‐ 5,198]
200–299 11,548 [7,286‐ 15,810]
300–399 12,991 [2,810‐ 23,171]
400–499 20,447 [12,196‐ 28,698]
500 or more 129,082 [0‐ 330,387]
18
Characteristic Mean no. of N95 respirators on hand per hospital [95% CI a, b]
Hospital Location
Rural 2,364 [1,952‐ 2,776]
Urban 20,090 [0‐ 40,239]
Teaching affiliation
Major 17,221 [10,754‐ 13,688]
Minor 43,176 [0‐ 100,789]
Nonteaching 3,803 [3,120‐ 4,485]
Hospital ownership type (combined groups)
Government 3,222 [2,193‐ 4,250]
For profit 4,268 [1,296‐7,240]
Nongovernment /not‐for‐profit 17,127 [0‐ 34,714]
Note. A dash indicates that no hospitals in this category responded to this assessment. a Confidence intervals represent non‐sampling variability.7 b NA means the confidence intervals were not calculated.
7 This variability is the result of selecting only hospitals with e‐mail addresses instead of selecting a random sample (or a probable sample) from the sampling frame. Additional variability results from nonresponse.
19
When normalized by the number of staffed hospital beds per state, the estimated number of N95
respirators on hand varied by state, with the largest number of N95s on hand per staffed bed for
hospitals reported by facilities in New York and Vermont. (Figure 1). The national average of N95
respirators on hand was 58 per staffed hospital bed. About 80‐percent of the states held fewer N95s per
staffed bed compared with this national average.
Figure 1: Estimated Number of N95 Respirators on Hand, by Staffed US Acute Care Hospital Beds by State, 2012
20
Overall, the mean number of N95 respirators on hand by U.S. acute care hospitals was 12,118 and the
adjusted national mean number of N95 respirators on hand per hospital was 5,572. Hospitals in eighteen states
had a higher mean number of N95 respirators compared with the adjusted national average (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Adjusted Mean Number of N95 Respirators on Hand in US Acute Care Hospitals per State,
2012
Overall, the estimated amount of surgical/isolation masks per hospital staffed bed was 103 masks.
Hospitals in 12 states held more surgical masks per staffed bed than the national average.
21
Figure 3: Estimated Number of Surgical Isolation Masks on Hand, by Staffed US Acute Care Hospital
Beds, by State, 2012
The estimated number of PAPRs on hand varied among states, ranging from 63 to 7,905 of these devices
held in hospitals (Table 5). The number of PAPRs on hand per hospital was 21 on average and ranged
from 6 to 75. Nineteen states had the same or more PAPRs on hand per hospital (on average) than the
U.S. mean per hospital. The number of estimated PAPR filters on hand in each state showed slightly less
variability than the estimated number of PAPRs, ranging 161 to 12,091. More than half of the PAPR
filters held by acute care hospitals across the United States were found in just nine states. Seventeen
states had more PAPR filters on hand per hospital (on average) than the U.S. mean per hospital (50).
Respondents were also asked to indicate the amount of PPE (N95s, surgical masks and PAPRS)
purchased between June 1, 2011 and May 31, 2012. The estimated number of N95s purchased over the
preceding year varied among states, ranging from 956 to 4,185,183 of these devices (Table 6). The
estimated number of PAPRs purchased over the preceding year varied among states, ranging from 0 to
131,387 (Table 7).
22
Table 5: Estimated Total Number On Hand and Mean Number per US Acute Care Hospital of Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPRs) and PAPR Filters, by
State, 2012
State Estimated no. of PAPR respirators on
Hand [95% CI]
Mean no. of PAPR respirators on Hand per
Hospital [95% CI] Estimated no. of PAPR Filters on Hand [95% CI] Mean no. of PAPR Filters on Hand per
Hospital [95% CI]
AK 509 (355 – 663) 23 (16 – 30) 674 (277 ‐ 1,071) 39 (25 ‐ 54)
AL 668 (350 – 986) 9 (5 – 13) 2,147 (798 – 3,495) 33 (14 – 52)
AR 188 (34 – 341) 6 (2 – 10) 879 (0 – 1,795) 23 (1 – 44)
AZ 850 (532 – 1,168) 17 (13 – 21) 2,427 (1,436 – 3,417) 48 (34 – 62)
CA 7,905 (5,621 – 10,189) 30 (22 – 38) 12,091 (8,186 – 15,996) 53 (39 – 68)
CO 902 (460 – 1,344) 16 (9 – 23) 3,624 (793 – 6,455) 76 (22 – 131)
CT 854 (449 – 1,258) 30 (19 – 41) 1,476 (855 – 2,096) 52 (38 – 66)
DC 308 (NA) 28 (NA) 1,516 (NA) 138 (NA)
DE 135 (51 – 218) 19 (7 – 31) 213 (0 – 462) 43 (1 – 86)
FL 1,780 (938 – 2,622) 18 (12 – 24) 5,659 (1,050 – 10,268) 65 (18 – 111)
GA 1,031 (552 – 1,510) 13 (8 – 17) 2,085 (1,045 – 3,126) 33 (23 – 43)
HI 186 (44 – 327) 13 (7 – 18) 1,165 (164 – 2,166) 79 (30 – 127)
IA 1,307 (925 – 1,689) 14 (10 – 17) 1,509 (1,070 – 1,948) 17 (13 – 21)
ID 302 (99 – 505) 14 (8 – 19) 654 (0 – 1,330) 37 (7 – 67)
IL 3,768 (2,489 – 5,047) 24 (16 – 31) 6,419 (3,839 – 8,999) 45 (28 – 62)
IN 2,150 (1,169 – 3,131) 19 (10 – 27) 2,597 (1,084 – 4,111) 27 (12 – 42)
KS 1,129 (660 – 1,598) 12 (8 – 17) 2,422 (1,417 – (3,426) 30 (20 – 41)
KY 831 (496 – 1,167) 10 (6 – 14) 1,892 (750 – 3,035) 26 (12 – 40)
LA 412 (223 – 601) 6 (4 – 8) 988 (481 – 1,496) 14 (8 – 19)
MA 713 (365 – 1,062) 12 (7 – 17) 1,452 (410 – 2,494) 26 (9 – 43)
MD 1,845 (266 – 3,425) 75 (22 – 127) 4,026 (1,793 – 6,260) 163 (108 – 218)
ME 1,010 (39 – 1,981) 27 (1 – 54) 4,158 (0 – 9,022) 144 (0 – 307)
MI 1,721 (1,100 – 2,342) 14 (10 – 19) 4,913 (1,642 – 8,184) 47 (17 – 76)
MN 1,364 (984 – 1,743) 12 (9 – 15) 3,344 (1,875 – 4,813) 33 (19 – 46)
MO 626 (440 – 812) 8 (6 – 9) 3,389 (1,712 – 5,067) 46 (26 – 66)
MS 465 (127 – 804) 9 (4 – 14) 199 (0 – 415) 7 (2 – 12)
MT 1,065 (0 – 2,453) 39 (0 – 84) 516 (41 – 992) 26 (15 – 37)
NC 3,180 (2,084 – 4,275) 37 (26 – 48) 1,398 (576 – 2,220) 29 (15 – 43)
ND 377 (86 – 669) 12 (3 – 20) 1,122 (0 – 2,495) 35 (0 – 76)
23
State Estimated no. of PAPR respirators on
Hand [95% CI]
Mean no. of PAPR respirators on Hand per Hospital [95% CI] Estimated no. of PAPR Filters on Hand [95% CI]
Mean no. of PAPR Filters on Hand per Hospital [95% CI]
NE 522 (254 – 791) 7 (4 – 11) 1,602 (446 – 2,757) 25 (8 – 42)
NH 341 (193 – 490) 14 (8 – 19) 858 (381 – 1,335) 39 (20 – 57)
NJ 1,293 (421 – 2,165) 21 (8 – 34) 2,254 (0 – 4,704) 65 (3 – 127)
NM 216 (67 – 364) 12 (12 – 12) 777 (0 – 1,722) 64 (14 – 114)
NV 1,282 (406 – 2,158) 47 (25 – 70) 1,040 (0 – 2,089) 38 (4 – 73)
NY 2,951 (1,540 – 4,362) 21 (12 – 31) 5,901 (3,323 – 8,479) 50 (30 – 69)
OH 4,755 (2,308 – 7,202) 29 (15 – 44) 21,656 (163 – 43,150) 165 (4 – 326)
OK 489 (230 – 748) 7 (4 – 10) 1,650 (420 – 2,881) 24 (8 – 41)
OR 405 (217 – 593) 10 (7 – 13) 411 (62 – 760) 12 (4 – 20)
PA 4,511 (3,164 ‐5,858) 30 (22 – 38) 7,818 (5,183 – 10,453) 65 (47 – 84)
RI 63 (6 – 120) 9 (5 – 13) 251 (0 – 572) 36 (1 – 72)
SC 1,734 (930 ‐2,538) 28 (16 – 40) 2,405 (1,015 – 3,795) 56 (30 – 83)
SD 663 (393 – 933) 14 (9 – 19) 1,672 (768 – 2,576) 36 (18 – 54)
TN 5,200 (543 – 9,857) 50 (6 – 93) 7,704 (172 – 15,235) 94 (7 – 182)
TX 5,834 (681 – 10,988) 25 (3 – 47) 8,041 (5,201 – 10,881) 36 (25 – 46)
UT 607 (122 – 1,091) 19 (6 – 32) 1,828 (0 – 3,774) 69 (4 – 134)
VA 1,624 (819 – 2,428) 23 (12 – 33) 3,545 (1,200 – 5,889) 53 (21 – 85)
VT 209 (122 – 297) 18 (14 – 22) 237 (1 – 472) 42 (33 – 33)
WA 1,286 (852 – 1,719) 19 (13 – 24) 3,930 (1,785 – 6,075) 68 (34 – 101)
WI 1,951 (1,416 – 2,486) 18 (14 – 22) 4,115 (3,011 – 5,219) 41 (32 – 50)
WV 816 (328 – 1,305) 24 (12 – 35) 1,444 (184 – 2,703) 48 (11 – 85)
WY 149 (62 – 236) 6 (3 – 10) 161 (22 – 301) 9 (2 – 16)
ALL U.S. 74,483 (65,770 – 83,196) 21 (18 – 23) 154,252 (128,332 – 180,173) 50 (42 – 58) Note. Confidence intervals do not represent sampling variability.
24
Table 6: Estimated Total Number Purchased* and Mean Number Purchased per US Acute Care Hospital of N95 Respirators and Surgical/Isolation Masks, by State, 2011‐ 2012
State Estimated no. of N95 respirators
Purchased [95% CI]
Mean no. of N95 respirators Purchased per
hospital [95% CI] Estimated no. of surgical/isolation masks
Purchased [95% CI] Mean no. of surgical/isolation masks
Purchased per hospital [95% CI]
AK 438,526 (0 ‐ 994,104) 19,950 (0 ‐ 45,226) 3,040,266 (1,116,367 ‐ 4,964,164) 138,309 (50,828 ‐ 225,790)
AL 286,615 (97,246 ‐ 475,985) 2,810 (953 ‐ 4,667) 6,256,923 (2,015,311 ‐ 10,498,536) 61,341 (19,748 ‐ 102,935)
AR 299,357 (0 ‐ 656,494) 3,650 (0 ‐ 8,005) 1,439,305 (807,688 ‐ 2,070,923) 17,550 (9,844 ‐ 25,256)
AZ 356,050 (94,128 ‐ 617,972) 5,089 (1,345 ‐ 8,834) 3,212,492 (0 ‐ 6,530,915) 45,918 (0 ‐ 93,355)
CA 3,474,672 (1,947,123 ‐ 5,002,221) 10,164 (5,695 ‐ 14,632) 30,350,978 (15,318,670 ‐ 45,383,287) 88,779 (44,805 ‐ 132,754)
CO 80,261 (16,995 ‐ 143,528) 1,003 (212 ‐ 1,793) 4,937,207 (0 ‐ 11,650,112) 61,687 (0 ‐ 145,566)
CT 141,107 (18,987 ‐ 263,227) 4,152 (559 ‐ 7,745) 1,645,598 (571,796 ‐ 2,719,399) 48,416 (16,819 ‐ 80,013)
DC NA (NA) NA (NA) 2,768,347 (NA) 252,000 (NA)
DE 76,348 (13,379 ‐ 139,317) 10,917 (1,918 ‐ 19,916) 1,447,671 (0 ‐ 3,104,122) 207,004 (0 ‐ 443,864)
FL 3,017,386 (1,512,244 ‐ 4,522,528) 14,447 (7,239 ‐ 21,654) 47,325,090 (6,947,056 ‐ 87,703,124) 226,584 (33,250 ‐ 419,918)
GA 658,946 (139,614 ‐ 1,178,277) 4,308 (912 ‐ 7,703) 2,445,685 (673,040 ‐ 4,218,330) 15,989 (4,398 ‐ 27,579)
HI 388,033 (32,288 ‐ 743,777) 16,172 (1,342 ‐ 31,003) 4,621,741 (189,066 ‐ 9,054,417) 192,623 (7,826 ‐ 377,419)
IA 82,384 (0 ‐ 200,987) 698 (0 ‐ 1,702) 2,502,996 (0 ‐ 6,218,177) 21,195 (0 ‐ 52,657)
ID 23,349 (2,041 ‐ 44,656) 569 (50 ‐ 1,088) 405,091 (0 ‐ 903,652) 9,872 (0 ‐ 22,025)
IL 1,048,490 (262,833 ‐ 1,834,147) 5,577 (1,398 ‐ 9,756) 9,351,057 (4,825,573 ‐ 13,876,541) 49,738 (25,662 ‐ 73,814)
IN 207,734 (78,505 ‐ 336,963) 1,661 (627 ‐ 2,695) 4,244,433 (0 ‐ 8,707,976) 33,943 (0 ‐ 69,643)
KS 114,443 (37,106 ‐ 191,781) 880 (285 ‐ 1,474) 4,374,261 (0 ‐ 9,276,929) 33,625 (0 ‐ 71,316)
KY 270,938 (112,987 ‐ 428,889) 2,556 (1,066 ‐ 4,046) 4,128,942 (1,159,764 ‐ 7,098,121) 38,951 (10,937 ‐ 66,966)
LA 407,204 (69,744 ‐ 744,665) 3,230 (553 ‐ 5,907) 1,995,817 (0 ‐ 4,213,718) 15,831 (0 ‐ 33,426)
MA 260,857 (89,304 ‐ 432,409) 3,346 (1,145 ‐ 5,546) 5,894,887 (0 ‐ 13,143,486) 75,607 (0 ‐ 168,584)
MD 255,551 (134,752 ‐ 376,350) 5,559 (2,931 ‐ 8,187) 2,397,893 (1,131,819 ‐ 3,663,966) 52,161 (24,614 ‐ 79,708)
ME 39,866 (0 ‐ 88,129) 1,077 (0 ‐ 2,382) 933,657 (68,573 ‐ 1,798,740) 25,233 (1,845 ‐ 48,621)
MI 308,898 (102,966 ‐ 514,830) 2,032 (677 ‐ 3,387) 19,178,101 (658,094 ‐ 37,698,108) 126,145 (4,322 ‐ 247,968)
MN 43,843 (14,047 ‐ 73,640) 332 (106 ‐ 558) 2,551,721 (15,255 ‐ 5,088,188) 19,323 (115 ‐ 38,531)
MO 112,384 (38,756 ‐ 186,012) 928 (320 ‐ 1,537) 3,973,938 (804,128 ‐ 7,143,748) 32,829 (6,640 ‐ 59,017)
MS 200,285 (9,539 ‐ 391,031) 2,087 (100 ‐ 4,074) 1,432,446 (130,769 ‐ 2,734,122) 14,925 (1,360 ‐ 28,490)
MT 33,220 (0 ‐ 72,696) 692 (0 ‐ 1,514) 629,098 (0 ‐ 1,357,080) 13,099 (0 ‐ 28,262)
NC 1,379,527 (811,440 ‐ 1,947,614) 11,897 (6,998 ‐ 16,797) 6,882,460 (2,921,467 ‐ 10,843,453) 59,355 (25,192 ‐ 93,517)
25
*Respondents were asked to indicate the annual amount purchased for the time period of June 1, 2011 to May 31, 2012.
State Estimated no. of N95 respirators
Purchased [95% CI]
Mean no. of N95 respirators Purchased per
hospital [95% CI] Estimated no. of surgical/isolation masks
Purchased [95% CI] Mean no. of surgical/isolation masks
Purchased per hospital [95% CI]
ND 29,350 (0 ‐ 70,618) 715 (0 ‐ 1,721) 1,301,803 (0 ‐ 3,283,341) 31,721 (0 ‐ 80,017)
NE 19,330 (6,132 ‐ 32,529) 220 (70 ‐ 369) 458,027 (82,161 ‐ 833,892) 5,201 (932 ‐ 9,470)
NH 5,674 (871 ‐ 10,476) 203 (31 ‐ 374) 483,856 (13,636 ‐ 954,076) 17,280 (483 ‐ 34,077)
NJ 641,473 (186,998 ‐ 1,095,948) 8,797 (2,564 ‐ 15,029) 3,275,000 (1,232,237 ‐ 5,317,764) 44,911 (16,901 ‐ 72,921)
NM 162,196 (69,001 ‐ 255,391) 4,634 (1,970 ‐ 7,298) 1,679,894 (0 ‐ 3,455,350) 47,996 (0 ‐ 98,743)
NV 13,191 (0 ‐ 28,630) 366 (0 ‐ 795) 105,531 (0 ‐ 236,723) 2,931 (0 ‐ 6,576)
NY 1,559,792 (907,339 ‐ 2,212,244) 8,483 (4,934 ‐ 12,031) 10,527,404 (6,425,393 ‐ 14,629,416) 57,252 (34,943 ‐ 79,562)
OH 774,420 (62,726 ‐ 1,486,115) 4,257 (345 ‐ 8,169) 13,486,346 (1,242,550 ‐ 25,730,142) 74,128 (6,826 ‐ 141,429)
OK 233,528 (0 ‐ 594,556) 2,065 (0 ‐ 5,258) 742,033 (152,117 ‐ 1,331,949) 6,562 (1,344 ‐ 11,780)
OR 58,696 (18,126 ‐ 99,267) 1,012 (312 ‐ 1,711) 1,254,038 (160,870 ‐ 2,347,207) 21,613 (2,766 ‐ 40,459)
PA 663,331 (363,509 ‐ 963,154) 3,439 (1,884 ‐ 4,993) 11,753,411 (6,652,460 ‐ 16,854,363) 60,927 (34,481 ‐ 87,373)
RI 25,550 (0 ‐ 56,446) 2,324 (0 ‐ 5,135) 1,361,678 (643,621 ‐ 2,079,735) 123,833 (58,478 ‐ 189,188)
SC 1,950,047 (0 ‐ 4,591,135) 29,109 (0 ‐ 68,536) 3,499,620 (639,970 ‐ 6,359,270) 52,239 (9,543 ‐ 94,936)
SD 956 (0 ‐ 2,514) 18 (0 ‐ 47) 31,149 (6,111 ‐ 56,188) 587 (115 ‐ 1,059)
TN 354,955 (121,019 ‐ 588,892) 2,669 (910 ‐ 4,429) 4,131,864 (1,379,893 ‐ 6,883,835) 31,073 (10,371 ‐ 51,775)
TX 4,185,183 (802,615 ‐ 7,567,751) 10,034 (1,924 ‐ 18,144) 38,632,466 (17,885,961 ‐ 59,378,972) 92,621 (42,878 ‐ 142,364)
UT 30,016 (0 ‐ 64,734) 683 (0 ‐ 1,472) 417,596 (0 ‐ 901,566) 9,495 (0 ‐ 20,501)
VA 396,407 (19,039 ‐ 773,775) 4,456 (213 ‐ 8,698) 2,755,203 (872,395 ‐ 4,638,011) 30,970 (9,801 ‐ 52,139)
VT 6,818 (0 ‐ 15,570) 487 (0 ‐ 1,112) 538,618 (0 ‐ 1,209,483) 38,470 (0 ‐ 86,380)
WA 644,828 (0 ‐ 1,375,386) 7,584 (0 ‐ 16,177) 29,022,006 (0 ‐ 72,552,770) 341,324 (0 ‐ 853,328)
WI 148,889 (0 ‐ 302,182) 1,200 (0 ‐ 2,436) 27,003,170 (0 ‐ 58,944,298) 217,707 (0 ‐ 475,251)
WV 151,062 (0 ‐ 329,669) 2,746 (0 ‐ 5,994) 1,354,511 (416,608 ‐ 2,292,414) 24,627 (7,568 ‐ 41,685)
WY 3,837 (1,251 ‐ 6,424) 160 (52 ‐ 268) 278,640 (26,064 ‐ 531,217) 11,608 (1,083 ‐ 22,133)
U.S. 26,065,805 (21,212,720 ‐ 30,918,890 5,273 (4,291 ‐ 6,255) 334,461,965 (259,742,453 ‐ 409,181,478) 67,664 (52,548 ‐ 82,780)
26
Table 7: Estimated Total Number and Mean Number of PAPR Respirators and PAPR Filters Purchased* per US Acute Care Hospital, by State, 2011‐2012
State Estimated no. of PAPR respirators Purchased [95% CI]
Mean no. of PAPR respirators Purchased per hospital [95% CI]
Estimated no. of PAPR Filters Purchased [95% CI]
Mean no. of PAPR Filters Purchased per hospital [95% CI]
AK 146 (0 ‐ 377) 14 (0 ‐ 33) 0 (NA) 0
(NA)
AL 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 186 (0 ‐ 472) 7 (0 ‐ 17)
AR 8 (0 ‐ 21) 0 (NA) 1,933 (0 ‐ 4,794) 75 (0 ‐ 175)
AZ 69 (0 ‐ 184) 3 (0 ‐ 8) 667 (12 ‐ 1,323) 26 (5 ‐ 46)
CA 170 (0 ‐ 339) 2 (0 ‐ 4) 2,407 (412 ‐ 4,403) 30 (9 ‐ 51)
CO 4 (0 ‐ 11) 0 (NA) 4 (0 ‐ 11) 0 (NA)
CT 53 (0 ‐ 139) 3 (0 ‐ 8) 102 (0 ‐ 214) 6 (1 ‐ 11)
DC 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
DE 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 82 (0 ‐ 212) 25 (0 ‐ 56)
FL 732 (154 ‐ 1,310) 11 (4 ‐ 18) 1,909 (0 ‐ 3,954) 29 (1 ‐ 56)
GA 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 651 (28 ‐ 1,274) 22 (7 ‐ 37)
HI 9 (0 ‐ 24) 1 (0 ‐ 2) 225 (0 ‐ 572) 24 (0 ‐ 53)
IA 319 (0 ‐ 838) 6 (0 ‐ 15) 494 (0 ‐ 1,037) 9 (0 ‐ 19)
ID 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
IL 10,263 (0 ‐ 27,572) 128 (0 ‐ 340) 210 (26 ‐ 395) 3 (1 ‐ 5)
IN 585 (0 ‐ 1,290) 13 (0 ‐ 27) 327 (48 ‐ 605) 6 (1 ‐ 11)
KS 163 (0 ‐ 373) 3 (0 ‐ 7) 280 (37 ‐ 523) 6 (1 ‐ 11)
KY 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 160 (5 ‐ 316) 5 (1 ‐ 9)
LA 57 (0 ‐ 126) 1 (0 ‐ 3) 169 (0 ‐ 375) 4 (0 ‐ 9)
MA 367 (0 ‐ 816) 9 (0 ‐ 18) 1,305 (0 ‐ 3,110) 30 (0 ‐ 69)
MD 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 250 (0 ‐ 669) 37 (0 ‐ 81)
ME 0 (0 ‐ 0) 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
MI 338 (0 ‐ 678) 5 (0 ‐ 9) 1,084 (0 ‐ 2,388) 16 (0 ‐ 35)
MN 117 (0 ‐ 280) 2 (0 ‐ 5) 25 (0 ‐ 67) 0 (NA)
MO 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 576 (0 ‐ 1,298) 16 (0 – 34)
MS 189 (0 ‐ 499) 5 (0 ‐ 12) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
MT 904 (0 ‐ 2,333) 66 (0 ‐ 139) 301 (0 ‐ 778) 22 (0 ‐ 46)
NC 131,387 (59,017 ‐ 203,756) 2,742 (1,542 ‐ 3,942) 244 (0 ‐ 492) 16 (4 ‐ 28)
27
State Estimated no. of PAPR respirators Purchased [95% CI]
Mean no. of PAPR respirators Purchased per hospital [95% CI]
Estimated no. of PAPR Filters Purchased [95% CI]
Mean no. of PAPR Filters Purchased per hospital [95% CI]
ND 0 (NA) 0
(NA) 0
(NA) 0
(NA)
NE 15 (0 ‐ 34) 1 (0 ‐ 1) 62 (0 ‐ 149) 2 (0 ‐ 5)
NH 3 (0 ‐ 9) 1 (0 ‐ 1) 34 (0 ‐ 88) 10 (10 ‐ 10)
NJ 43 (0 ‐ 115) 4 (0 ‐ 8) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
NM 51 (0 ‐ 131) 9 (9 ‐ 9) 641 (0 ‐ 1,599) 53 (0 ‐ 116)
NV 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
NY 295 (1 ‐ 589) 4 (0 ‐ 9) 1,269 (117 ‐ 2,422) 19 (3 ‐ 35)
OH 126 (0 ‐ 264) 2 (0 ‐ 4) 353 (54 ‐ 652) 7 (2 ‐ 12)
OK 61 (0 ‐ 135) 1 (0 ‐ 3) 39 (0 ‐ 107) 1 (0 ‐ 3)
OR 67 (0 ‐ 176) 3 (0 ‐ 8) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
PA 469 (28 ‐ 911) 6 (1 ‐ 12) 2,094 (705 ‐ 3,484) 29 (12 ‐ 46)
RI 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
SC 22,920 (0 ‐ 60,999) 806 (0 ‐ 2,094) 209 (12 ‐ 407) 11 (5 ‐ 17)
SD 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
TN 96 (0 ‐ 258) 2 (0 ‐ 5) 498 (0 ‐ 1,331) 11 (0 ‐ 29)
TX 143 (0 ‐ 286) 1 (0 ‐ 3) 2,034 (636 ‐ 3,433) 18 (7 ‐ 29)
UT 11 (0 ‐ 28) 1 (0 ‐ 2) 21 (0 ‐ 56) 2 (0 ‐ 5)
VA 43,798 (0 ‐ 96,395) 1,542 (0 ‐ 3,130) 9,427 (0 ‐ 25,063) 405 (0 ‐ 994)
VT 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 106 (0 ‐ 274) 40 (NA)
WA 124 (0 ‐ 279) 3 (0 ‐ 7) 732 (75 ‐ 1,389) 22 (4 ‐ 39)
WI 65 (0 ‐ 155) 1 (0 ‐ 3) 22 (0 ‐ 58) 0 (NA)
WV 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA) 0 (NA)
WY 3 (0 ‐ 8) 0 (NA) 22 (0 ‐ 53) 1 (0 ‐ 3)
ALL U.S. 214,171 (115,456 ‐ 312,886) 129 (70 ‐ 188) 31,157 (14,584 ‐ 47,729) 20 (9 ‐ 30)
* Respondents were asked to indicate the annual amount purchased for the time period of June 1, 2011 to May 31, 2012.
28
Respiratory PPE Emergency Caches
In response to the question asking if hospitals owned an emergency cache8 of respiratory PPE, just
under half (44%) of the hospitals indicated they did, which would imply that slightly more than half
(56%) of the hospitals did not own an emergency cache. About a third of the states (16) had no hospitals
reporting ownership of an emergency cache.
In aggregate, hospitals reported that surgical masks comprised about 65 percent and N95s comprised
approximately 34 percent of emergency caches they owned, whereas a very small proportion of PAPRs
were stockpiled in emergency caches (< 1%). However, we were not able to compute a reliable estimate
of the amount of each type of PPE held in emergency caches because we could not determine how to
disaggregate overlapping information from hospitals reporting the same co‐owned emergency cache in
a state.
Respiratory PPE Shortages
The greatest challenges identified for hospitals that responded they have experienced shortages of
respiratory PPE were: access, allocation/priority from vendor, cost/funding,
guidance/education/communication, inventory management, patient/staff safety, proper usage of
PPE/fit testing, resupply/locating product, storage space, other, and no shortage experiences. (Appendix
E). The most frequently reported challenge that hospitals encountered in the event of a respiratory PPE
shortage was locating additional supplies to meet their needs (Figure 4 and Appendix F). One third of
respondents—and 37 percent of urban hospitals—ranked this as their greatest challenge. The reasons
for these challenges included the difficulties of finding alternate vendors who had available stock,
disruptions of the supply chain, and hoarding during a widespread shortage (as during H1N1). The
second most common challenge during a PPE shortage was related to the difficulties/burden of
conducting fit‐testing of an alternate brand of PPE (including the time and cost to conduct fit‐testing).
8 “Emergency cache” for this assessment was defined as a cache of respiratory PPE beyond a facility’s in‐house, central supply or warehouse stock (not including materiel held in local, state, or federal government stockpiles).
29
Figure 4. Percentage of US Acute Care Hospitals Reporting Item as Their Greatest Challenge in the
Event of a PPE Shortage, 2012 (N=617)
Notably, one quarter of hospitals who responded to the assessment indicated they had not previously
experienced a shortage of PPE. The greatest differences in responses about PPE shortages were related
to hospital size. Smaller facilities (six–49 beds) reported fewer issues with PPE shortage. At least 20
percent of mid‐size facilities (50–399 beds) also reported having no shortages of PPE. All of the largest
facilities (over 400 beds) reported a shortage at one period of time. Almost a third of rural hospitals
indicated that they had not experienced PPE shortage. Slightly more government‐owned hospitals
reported experiencing respiratory PPE shortage than did for‐profit hospitals (67 percent government‐
owned versus 58 percent for‐profit).
Respondents were also asked what actions, if any, their hospital had taken to alleviate the challenges of
these shortages. Twenty‐eight percent of the 630 hospitals that reported taking action to alleviate PPE
shortages reduced the shortfall by sharing resources or requesting assistance from other facilities
(Figure 5 and Appendix F). These facilities included affiliated hospitals within their hospital system,
members of their hospital coalition, or nearby facilities from which they could request mutual aid.
Smaller facilities were more likely to request assistance from other hospitals during shortages, while
larger hospitals (>300 beds) tended to work with their vendors or seek alternate suppliers for PPE. The
other most common responses to a PPE shortage that were mentioned included: working with vendors
to obtain more products, and keeping an emergency cache of PPE. These top three actions (Figure 5)
accounted for nearly two‐thirds of all actions reported.
5.7%
1.6%
2.1%
2.8%
3.2%
4.2%
6.0%
6.8%
9.2%
24.8%
33.5%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0%
Other
Storage space
Guidance/education/communication
Cost/funding
Allocation/priority from vendor
Access
Inventory management
Patient/staff safety
Proper usage of PPE/fit testing
No shortage
Resupply/locating product
30
Figure 5. Percentage of US Acute Care Hospitals Reporting Action Taken to Alleviate Shortage, 2012
(N=630)
Discussion
Given the lessons learned from the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003, the
H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009‐2010, and the 2014 Ebola cases in the US, availability and proper use
of PPE is considered critically important and essential as an infection control measure (IOM , 2011).
During the SARS and the 2009 H1N1 outbreaks, there were spot shortages of respiratory PPE because of
the increased use of these devices by healthcare personnel related to patient surge and enhanced
infection control measures being taken (CDC, 2009). Hospitals and healthcare coalitions (HCCs) have
begun to address the impact of spot shortages through requesting assistance from each other and
resource sharing. What is not clear is how efficient this tactic would be if the increased demand was
wide scale and long term (e.g. during a severe influenza pandemic) and significantly exceeded the
amount of material available through the commercial supply chain.
The Department of Health and Human Services’ Hospital Preparedness Program released the Interim
Healthcare Coalition Checklist for Pandemic Planning National Healthcare Preparedness Programs
(NHPP) to assist HCCs in assessing, developing, and improving their preparedness and response plans for
a pandemic event (ASPR, 2013). This checklist recommends the following: “development of a coalition‐
wide occupational health assessment tool that assesses the readiness status of current staff and their
families in each member organization in terms of personal protective equipment (PPE) and
pharmaceutical protection (fit‐testing, mask types, vaccine and prophylaxis vs. non‐pharmaceutical
intervention); and to establish education and training around PPE, fit testing, vaccine prophylaxis, and
other health services” (ASPR p.9, 2013). Recently, CDC released its Detailed Hospital Checklist for Ebola
Preparedness (CDC, 2014) which advises that “Hospitals should review infection control policies and
procedures and incorporate plans for administrative, environmental, and communication measures, as
8.7%
1.6%
1.7%
1.9%
2.1%
2.2%
2.5%
3.0%
3.2%
3.5%
4.8%
17.9%
19.2%
27.6%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0%
Other
Fit testing
Increased par
Reuse of PPE/extended use
Training and communication
Rotate stock
Emergency plan
Rely on PAPRs
Alternate PPE
Ration use of PPE
Regional cache
Extra supply
Work with suppliers‐main or alternate vendors
Request assistance/resource sharing
31
well as personal protective equipment (PPE) and training and education (p.1) and also advises hospitals
to ensure an “adequate supply” of PPE, for all healthcare personnel who will be caring for Ebola patients
(p.3)
Previous studies have shown that while hospitals are stockpiling some N95 respirators, few are
stockpiling surgical masks, and those that are stockpiling these items usually have less than seven days’
worth of supplies (Rebbman, 2009). Surgical masks may be less likely to be stockpiled as they are widely
used in hospitals every day (Rebbman, 2009).The literature is scant as far as quantifying estimates of
stockpile needs for respiratory PPE in preparations for a severe pandemic. One study conducted in Japan
(Hashikura & Kizu, 2009) concluded that “four sets of PPE” (e.g., N95 respirators, gloves, gowns, and
goggles) per day should be provided for healthcare personnel in a “high‐risk group9”. The Japanese
authors also advised that a supply of two surgical masks should be maintained for every worker and
hospitalized patient and one for each outpatient per day. Hashikura and colleagues recommend that
PPE stockpiles should be prepared to cover at least an eight‐week pandemic. Additionally, in 2008, the
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) proposed (but has not posted it as official guidance) that “four
respiratory protection devices per shift is the estimate used for most healthcare and emergency
response settings where employees are in contact throughout the shift with pandemic influenza
patients.” (OSHA p.10, 2013) The DOL advised that two facemasks be stockpiled per shift for healthcare
personnel at “medium risk10” and one to two facemasks be stockpiled for use by ill patients per day.
In contrast to this recommendation, our assessment showed that U.S. hospitals are holding an average
of 58 N95 respirators per staffed hospital bed and about 80 percent of the states fell below this average.
Based on the DOL‐proposed recommendations mentioned above, a supply of 58 N95s per staffed bed
would last approximately 14.5 shifts or 4.8 days for just one healthcare worker, far short of an eight
week supply, and acute care hospitals in most states would have far less than this amount.
Protecting healthcare personnel is also an important part of business continuity for healthcare
organizations. (Rebbmann, Wang, Swick, Reddick, & delRoasario, 2013). A study conducted by Garrett,
et. al., looked at proposed interventions to mitigate absenteeism in hospital personnel during a
pandemic. Their study suggested that a mitigation strategy that includes options for preferential access
to either antiviral therapy, protective equipment, or both for the employee as well as for their
immediate family would increase the likelihood of the employee showing up at work (Garrett, 2009).
CDC emphasizes the importance of having a robust business continuity plan to minimize the impact of a
biologic event (e.g., bioterrorism attack, outbreak of an emerging infectious disease or pandemic) on
individuals, the community, and the economy. Business continuity plans should address occupational
health policies, such as providing staff paid sick leave, allowing employees to telework during biologic
9 Hashikura et al characterized the “high risk” group as doctors and nurses performing high‐risk procedures (Such as intubation, suctioning before intubation, manipulating the oxygen mask) and radiologists performing high risk procedures (such as chest x‐ray examinations of infected patients).
10 The Department of Labor characterized those at “medium risk” as doctors and nurses who perform medium‐risk procedures
(caring for infected patients in a stable condition), medical clerks (who have close contact with suspected or infected patients) and cleaners who work in emergency departments or the intensive care units with high risk patients.
32
events, offering seasonal influenza vaccine to employees, and also includes having PPE available to
healthcare personnel (CDC, Guidance for Businesses, 2009).
Conflicting reports regarding the various modes of influenza spread have resulted in uncertainty in the
optimal respiratory‐protective strategies for healthcare personnel caring for patients with influenza. For
instance, during the 2009‐2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic, CDC issued guidance recommending the use
of respirators that are N95 or above when caring for patients with influenza (CDC, Interim Guidance on
Infection Control Measures, 2009). However, at the time, other groups questioned the need for N95 or
respirators for all influenza‐associated patient care scenarios (SHEA, 2009). Several studies have
provided recommendations for further research on addressing the use of respiratory PPE to prevent the
transmission of pandemic influenza and other viral respiratory diseases. In particular, the Institute of
Medicine’s 2010 Update report: Preventing the Transmission of Pandemic Influenza and Other Viral
Respiratory Diseases recommends a comprehensive array of actions needed to improve the use and
availability of respiratory PPE including: developing standardized terms and definitions for respiratory
PPE and appropriate classifications to describe transmission routes, developing and implementing a
comprehensive research strategy to understand viral respiratory disease transmission, expanding
research on PPE for healthcare personnel, and identifying and disseminating effective leadership and
training strategies and other interventions to improve PPE use (IOM , 2011).
Despite the uncertainty about influenza transmission, it is anticipated that respiratory PPE will be
needed to protect healthcare personnel in a future influenza pandemic or other respiratory virus‐related
outbreak. Given current “just in time” industry ordering and procurement practices, storage limitations
and associated expenses, and lack of clear authoritative guidance, hospitals are left to their best
judgment and business practices as to how much respiratory PPE to purchase and to store on hand
above and beyond routine usage needs, which is believed to contribute to the observed variation in
inventory levels in this assessment.
Limitations
This assessment is the first of its kind, aiming to quantify the amount of PPE held in U.S. acute care
hospitals. A number of limitations warrant highlighting. Although this effort included reporting from
hospitals in every state, it did not include reporting from all U.S. acute care hospitals, thus necessitating
data extrapolation. Therefore these estimates may under or over estimate the amount of respiratory
PPE held in hospitals, particularly supplies held by for‐profit acute care hospitals, as these hospitals were
more likely to be non‐responders compared with governmental and not‐for‐profit hospitals. Because the
whole AHA database of U.S. acute care hospitals were queried through this effort, there was no random
sampling involved in this assessment; thus it is a non‐probability sample (or a “convenience” sample)
and generalization to the population frame may be biased. One source of bias is “exclusion bias”
because hospitals without e‐mail addresses were excluded from the assessment. The second type of
bias is “nonresponse” bias because out of the possible 4,582 hospitals that were sent the assessment,
only 23 percent (1,066) responded. Nonresponse and exclusion bias suggests that the reported results
33
may have over or underestimated the “true” number of respirators available in the typical or in a
randomly selected hospital. In addition, this assessment did not examine the supplies of PPE held in
supply chains, distributors, or manufacturers, nor supplies held in other healthcare facilities such as
outpatient offices and clinics, nursing homes, and other long‐term care settings, so this assessment only
represents the estimated amount of respiratory PPE held in the nation’s acute care hospitals.
Additionally, this assessment was conducted in 2012, therefore the supplies of respiratory PPE held in
U.S. acute care hospitals currently may or may not be consistent with these estimates. Furthermore,
although 44 percent of hospitals reported owning an emergency cache of respiratory PPE, we were
unable to quantify the amount of these caches. Finally, estimates of respiratory PPE reserves owned by
intrastate regions and federal agencies, caches held by state governments, and by the Federal Strategic
National Stockpile were not captured through this assessment. Therefore the estimates presented in
this report represent only one component of respiratory PPE held in the U.S., but serve as key part of
preparedness to protect frontline hospital personnel in the event of an influenza pandemic or other
infectious disease emergency.
Recommendations
This report makes the following recommendations toward advancing policies on stockpiling respiratory
PPE to protect healthcare personnel during a future pandemic or other viral respiratory diseases:
Guidelines should be developed to assist U.S. hospitals in determining appropriate stockpile
amounts of respiratory PPE, and best practices should be identified and shared regarding sound
approaches to purchasing and maintaining inventories to mitigate the effects of supply
shortages. As indicated by the hospitals that participated in this assessment, the greatest
challenge experienced in the event of a shortage of respiratory PPE was locating product in the
supply chain and obtaining sufficient resupply. The anticipated impact a severe pandemic may
have on global commerce, and the predicted increased demand for respiratory PPE worldwide,
would undoubtedly render the practice of just‐in‐time procurement ineffective, thus
emphasizing the importance of maintaining reasonably sufficient quantities of PPE in hospital
inventories along with other private and public caches or stockpiles.
This paper and others could be used to emphasize the importance of PPE for hospital continuity
functioning and serve as a baseline for future preparedness efforts.
State and local public health preparedness planners should use this report’s findings to advance
discussions with their respective healthcare coalitions around various strategies, tactics, and
operational frameworks to increase PPE inventories, improve resource sharing, and
conservation of scarce resources, if and when necessary.
Further work is needed to explore the feasibility and acceptability of using reusable respiratory
protective devices in hospitals to protect healthcare personnel during an influenza pandemic.
Although there was wide variability in the number of PAPRs held by U.S. acute care hospitals,
greater use of these devices and other reusable equipment (e.g. elastomeric respirators) could
possibly shore up preparedness efforts. The Department of Labor determined that the use of
reusable elastomeric respirators (plus filters) cost (in 2008 dollars) approximately $40 per
34
employee protected compared with $240 needed to provide protection to a healthcare worker
using disposable N95 respirators (OSHA, 2013).
Consideration should be given to repeating this assessment in a few years to see if any changes
in practices can be ascertained of respiratory PPE currently on hand in U.S. acute care hospitals
in light of new proposed rules by the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS)
“Emergency Preparedness Requirements for Medicare and Medicaid Participating Providers and
Suppliers” (42 CFR Part 403, 416, 418 et al., December 27, 2013) as well as observations and
lessons learned from the 2013 outbreaks of H7N9 influenza in China, MERS‐CoV in the Middle
East, and Ebola cases in the US.
Consideration should be given to ensuring funds for the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP)
are sustained to help hospitals establish such PPE caches and other priorities for emergency
preparedness. It is vital that this funding continue to provide our nation’s hospitals with the
resources for training and necessary tools to respond quickly and collaboratively to all public
health emergencies.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this assessment is believed to be the first attempt to present a comprehensive snapshot
of N95 respirators, surgical masks, and PAPRs on hand in U.S. acute care hospitals. This study suggests
that most acute care hospitals in the United States do not have robust supplies of respiratory PPE to use
in the event of an influenza pandemic, and slightly more than half (56%) of the hospitals did not own an
emergency cache of these supplies. Further work is needed to develop methods that enhance pandemic
preparedness for respiratory PPE in U.S. acute care hospitals and additional research is needed to more
rigorously determine targets for sufficient respiratory inventories for each hospital, hospital system,
and/or healthcare coalition and the associated costs/benefits.
35
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37
Appendix B: Respiratory PPE Work Group Members
A special thanks to the Respiratory PPE Work Group members who provided their input to the
Respiratory PPE Assessment Tool and process.
Peter Kralovec (American Hospital Association)
Charles Oke (Centers for Disease Control/National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health)
Gina Pugliese (Premier, Incorporated)
Roslyne Schulman (American Hospital Association)
Mickey Sparrow (Tuomey Healthcare System)
Deborah Sprindzunas (Association for Healthcare Resource and Materials Management)
Caroline Steinberg (American Hospital Association)
38
Appendix C: Letter from Rich Umbdenstock, President and CEO of the American Hospital Association
July 31, 2012
Subject: Respiratory Personal Protective Equipment Assessment in U.S. Acute Care Hospitals ‐‐ Input
Needed
Dear «F_Name»:
Do acute care hospitals have enough respiratory personal protective equipment (PPE) for their workers
in the event of a pandemic? Please help us find out.
In 2009, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended that health care personnel
who were in close contact with patients with suspected or confirmed 2009 H1N1 influenza use a
hierarchy of controls approach, including the use of respiratory protection devices, to prevent exposure
of health care personnel and patients and prevent influenza transmission within health care settings.
Going forward, this recommendation will only be effective if hospitals have adequate supplies and
established procedures for acquiring, allocating, distributing and using these assets during times of
emergency.
To help us determine our pandemic readiness in this important area, the American Hospital
Association’s (AHA) Health Research & Educational Trust and the Association for Healthcare Resource
and Materials Management are collaborating with the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials (www.astho.org), with funding and technical support from the CDC and technical assistance
from the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), to conduct an assessment.
You can help by asking the most appropriate person in your facility knowledgeable of your PPE inventory
and usage practices to complete this assessment. The primary objective of this assessment is to
describe and quantify the amount of respiratory PPE (respirators, surgical face masks, and powered air
purifying respirators) in the nation’s acute care hospitals. This information will provide a more accurate
picture of current hospital capacity and identify gaps and needs regarding our state of readiness to
protect health care workers in the event of a severe influenza pandemic. The data will also complement
the information streams on federal and state PPE stockpiles, and commercial supply chain inventories to
improve state‐level pandemic preparedness.
39
Your state public health department and hospital association have been informed about this effort. This
assessment is in no way intended to interfere with or replace those data collection systems already in
place and functioning (e.g., SMARTT or HAvBED).
This assessment is intended to capture relative real time data on PPE inventories and usage from both
your facility and your central supply warehouse. These data will remain confidential. Only aggregate
data at the state level will be provided to CDC and NIOSH. No individual facility will be identified or
referenced in any report summarizing the findings.
You may complete the survey online using the ID and password below. To access the survey, click on
this link:
http://response.survey‐one.com/taker/jsp/scstart.do?id1=6089&id2=15&sname=59
or go to the AHA Health Forum website: www.healthforum.com, and under the AHA Data tab, click on
‘Surveys’ and select the PPE Assessment in U.S. Acute Care Hospitals survey.
ID: «logonid» Password: «Password»
To make sure your answers contribute to this assessment, please respond by August 10, 2012. If you
have any questions, please contact Survey Support at (800) 530‐9092 or
Thank you for helping us to help you.
Sincerely,
Rich Umbdenstock
President and CEO
40
Appendix D: Respiratory PPE Assessment Tool
Respiratory PPE Assessment in U.S. Acute Care Hospitals – 2012
Thank you for agreeing to complete this short assessment. To assist you in this process, please note the following:
The unit of measure for the numbers to be inserted is piece count or “each”
The “Amount on Hand” column is intended to capture how much of the three types of respiratory PPE you have at the time you complete the assessment (or the closest date that your material management information system will show). This should include the combined amount of PPE on hand in the hospital as well as inventories in your facility’s central supply/warehouse. Please insert the date of the “snap shot” (e.g., “as of”) for our reference.
The “Annual Amount Purchased” column is intended to capture how much of the three types of respiratory PPE you have purchased in one year. This should include the combined amount of PPE purchased for the hospital as well as inventories in your facility’s central supply/warehouse.
When providing us with the amount of PPE purchased over the past year, optimally it would be for period June 1, 2011–May 31, 2012. If that time period is problematic for you, please use the next closest 12 month period for which you can generate reasonably accurate data. Please specify the start date of that time period in the file provided in the on-line assessment form.
To assist you in this exercise, the following definitions are being provided: o N95 – a NIOSH-approved particulate filtering respirator having an N95 class
filter. The term “or higher” is intended to also capture those respirators rated to be equally or more efficient than N95 such as N99, N100, R95, R99, and R100; and P95, P99, and P100.
o Surgical mask/isolation mask – nose and mouth covering that is used to prevent sputum and droplets from a wearer’s mouth from dispersing into the atmosphere.
o PAPR – an acronym for powered air purifying respirator. It is a type of respirator that uses a battery-powered blower to assist the movement of air through a filter element into the respirator face piece, as opposed to relying entirely on the actions of wearer’s breathing to move the air.
41
Question 1:
Type of PPE Amount on Hand
As of date xx/xx/xxxx
Annual Amount Purchased
Period start date xx/xx/xxxx
N95 Respirator or Higher
Standard
Small
Medium
Large
X-Large
Other: __________
___ piece/each ___Not applicable ___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
Surgical/Isolation Masks
Standard
Small
Medium
Large
X-Large
Other: __________
___ piece/each ___Not applicable ___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable ___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPR)
Filters
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
42
Question 2
Do you own an emergency cache of the Respiratory PPE beyond your in-house, central supply or warehouse stock (not including material held in local, state or federal government stockpiles)?
a. No comments: ________________________________________________________________
b. Yes, Please describe: ______________________________________________________________
Question 3
If you answered yes to Question 2, please provide the following additional information:
Types and amount of PPE in storage at this time in your Off-site Emergency Cache
Type of PPE Amount on Hand
N95 Respirator or Higher
Standard
Small
Medium
Large
X-Large
Other: __________
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
Surgical/Isolation Masks
Standard
Small
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
43
Medium
Large
X-Large
Other: __________
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPRs)
Filters
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
___ piece/each ___Not applicable
a. Number of hospitals served by the emergency cache (beyond the central supply warehouse)______________
b. Entity(ies) responsible for managing the material in the emergency cache please describe____________________
c. Other information that would help us understand the nature of this operation: ______________________________________________
Question 4
What is the greatest challenge your facility encounters when there is a shortage of any of the three types of Respiratory PPE (N95, Surgical Masks, and PAPRS)? What actions, if any, does your hospital take to alleviate them? __________________________________
Question 5
Please feel free to elaborate on your answers or share any other information that you feel will be useful to us as we conduct this assessment: ______________________________________________________________________________
44
Contact Information
a. Hospital Name: b. City: c. Zip Code: d. Individual Completing the Assessment:
Name: Title: Phone number: Email:
Thank You!!!!
45
Appendix E: Respiratory PPE Assessment Data Codes for Qualitative Data
Greatest Challenge Your Facility Encounters?
1. Access (geographical) (remote locations, delivery times/delays, transportation) 2. Allocation/priority from vendor (receiving amounts based on order history, getting less
priority from vendor due to size of institution) 3. Cost/funding 4. Guidance/education/communication (panic and overuse from the community, unclear
guidance from feds) 5. Inventory management (using stock before it expires, challenges of rotation stock in
emergency cache, keeping batteries charged) 6. Patient/staff safety 7. Proper usage of PPE/fit testing (cost and burden of fit testing, waste of product during fit
testing, people wearing appropriate PPE/not those who don’t need them) 8. Resupply/locating product (hoarding by large institutions, backorders, supply chain
issues, finding alternate products or vendors, rationing) 9. Storage space 10. Other 11. No shortage experienced
Actions Taken
1. Alternate PPE (different brands, different mask, non-healthcare N95s) 2. Emergency plan 3. Extra supply (on-site cache, off-site cache, other emergency supplies available) 4. Fit testing (conducted in advance, just in time) 5. Increased par 6. Ration use of PPE 7. Regional cache 8. Rely on PAPRs 9. Request assistance/resource sharing (share resources within hospital system; access
corporate supply; mutual aid with other facilities; assistance from hospital coalition or association; request county, state, or federal resources)
10. Reuse of PPE 11. Rotate stock (to avoid expirations) 12. Training (and communication) 13. Work with suppliers – main or alternate suppliers
Other 99: Code for those that didn’t answer the question/treat the responses that don’t make sense as missing data for both the challenges and action taken.
46
Appendix F: Key Challenges and Actions Taken
Key Challenges Hospitals Encounter When There Is a PPE Shortage (n=617)
Characteristic Challenge #1
% of
Hospitals
Reportin
g Challenge #2
% of
Hospitals
Reporting
Challenge #3 % of
Hospitals
Reporting
AHA facility classification
Acute long‐term care
(n=8)
No shortage 75.0 Access 12.5 Resupply/locating
product
12.5
Children's general (n=6) Resupply/locating product 50.0 Proper usage of PPE/fit
testing
16.7 Guidance/educatio
n/
communication
16.7
Children's orthopedic
(n=1)
Allocation/priority from
vendor
100 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
Children's other specialty
(n=1)
Patient/staff safety 100 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
Eye, ear, nose, and throat
(n=1)
No shortage 100 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
General medical and
surgical (n=588)
Resupply/locating product 33.8 No shortage 24.5 Proper usage of
PPE/fit testing
9.4
Obstetrics and
gynecology (n=2)
Proper usage of PPE/fit
testing
50.0 Resupply/locating
product
50.0
47
Key Challenges Hospitals Encounter When There Is a PPE Shortage (n=617)
Characteristic Challenge #1
% of
Hospitals
Reportin
g Challenge #2
% of
Hospitals
Reporting
Challenge #3 % of
Hospitals
Reporting
Orthopedic (n=1) Inventory management 100 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
Other specialty (n=1) Resupply/locating product 100 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
Rehabilitation (n=7) Resupply/locating product 28.6 No shortage 28.6 Storage space 14.3
Bed size
6–24 beds (n=51) No shortage 41.2 Resupply/locating
product
21.6 Inventory
management
7.8
25–49 beds (n=137) No shortage 31.4 Resupply/locating
product
29.2 Patient/staff safety 8.8
50–99 beds (n=115) Resupply/locating product 30.4 No shortage 27.8 Access 9.6
100–199 beds (n=127) Resupply/locating product 42.5 No shortage 21.3 Inventory
management
9.4
200–299 beds (n=79) Resupply/locating product 30.4 No shortage 22.8 Proper usage of
PPE/fit testing
15.2
300–399 beds (n=40) Resupply/locating product 35.0 No shortage 20.0 Proper usage of
PPE/fit testing
17.5
48
Key Challenges Hospitals Encounter When There Is a PPE Shortage (n=617)
Characteristic Challenge #1
% of
Hospitals
Reportin
g Challenge #2
% of
Hospitals
Reporting
Challenge #3 % of
Hospitals
Reporting
400–499 beds (n=31) Resupply/locating product 41.9 Proper usage of PPE/fit
testing
22.6 Patient/staff safety 6.5
500 or more beds (n=37) Resupply/locating product 43.2 Proper usage of PPE/fit
testing
21.6 Other 10.8
Hospital location
Rural (n=283) No shortage 31.4 Resupply/locating
product
29.0 Proper usage of
PPE/fit testing
7.1
Urban (n=334) Resupply/locating product 37.4 No shortage 19.2 Proper usage of
PPE/fit testing
11.1
Teaching affiliation
Yes (n=169) Resupply/locating product 36.7 No shortage 17.8 Proper usage of
PPE/fit testing
14.2
No (n=448) Resupply/locating product 32.4 No shortage 27.5 Proper usage of
PPE/fit testing
7.4
Hospital ownership type
49
Key Challenges Hospitals Encounter When There Is a PPE Shortage (n=617)
Characteristic Challenge #1
% of
Hospitals
Reportin
g Challenge #2
% of
Hospitals
Reporting
Challenge #3 % of
Hospitals
Reporting
Govt (n=147) No shortage 33.3 Resupply/locating
product
29.9 Access 7.5
For profit (n=59) No shortage 42.4 Resupply/locating
product
27.1 Access 8.5
Nongovt; not‐for‐profit
(n=411)
Resupply/locating product 35.8 No shortage 19.2 Proper usage of
PPE/fit testing
11.4
Key Actions Taken to Respond to PPE Shortage (n=630)
Characteristic Action #1
% of
Hospitals
Reporting Action #2
% of
Hospitals
Reporting
Action #3 % of
Hospitals
Reporting
AHA facility classification
Acute long‐term care (n=8) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
25.0 Alternate PPE 12.5 Extra supply
Work with suppliers
12.5
50
Key Actions Taken to Respond to PPE Shortage (n=630)
Characteristic Action #1
% of
Hospitals
Reporting Action #2
% of
Hospitals
Reporting
Action #3 % of
Hospitals
Reporting
Children's general (n=4) Regional cache 25.0 Request assistance/
Resource sharing
25.0 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
25.0
Children's orthopedic (n=2) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
50.0 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
50.0
Children's other specialty
(n=1)
Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
100 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
Eye, ear, nose, and throat
(n=1)
Extra supply 100 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
General medical and surgical
(n=601)
Request assistance/
Resource sharing
28.0 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
19.0 Extra supply 18.0
Obstetrics and gynecology
(n=3)
Alternate PPE 33.3 Extra supply 33.3 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
33.3
Orthopedic (n=1) Rotate stock 100
Other specialty (n=1) Request assistance/ 100
51
Key Actions Taken to Respond to PPE Shortage (n=630)
Characteristic Action #1
% of
Hospitals
Reporting Action #2
% of
Hospitals
Reporting
Action #3 % of
Hospitals
Reporting
Resource sharing
Rehabilitation (n=7) Extra supply 28.6 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
28.6 Emergency plan 14.3
Bed size
6–24 beds (n=55) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
38.2 Extra supply 20.0 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
12.7
25–49 beds (n= 123) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
28.5 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
19.5 Extra supply 17.1
50–99 beds (n=117) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
32.5 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
21.4 Extra supply 18.8
100–199 beds (n=152) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
27.6 Extra supply 24.3 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
19.7
52
Key Actions Taken to Respond to PPE Shortage (n=630)
Characteristic Action #1
% of
Hospitals
Reporting Action #2
% of
Hospitals
Reporting
Action #3 % of
Hospitals
Reporting
200–299 beds (n=73) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
24.7 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
17.8 Alternate PPE 9.6
300–399 beds (n= 48) Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
18.8 Request assistance/
Resource sharing
16.7 Extra supply 14.6
400–499 beds (n=24) Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
25.0 Request assistance/
Resource sharing
16.7 Emergency plan 12.5
500 or more beds (n=38) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
21.1 Extra supply 21.1 Work with suppliers‐
main or alternate
vendors
18.4
Hospital location
Rural (n=282) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
26.6 Extra supply 20.2 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
19.9
Urban (n= 348) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
28.4 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
18.7 Extra supply 16.1
53
Key Actions Taken to Respond to PPE Shortage (n=630)
Characteristic Action #1
% of
Hospitals
Reporting Action #2
% of
Hospitals
Reporting
Action #3 % of
Hospitals
Reporting
Teaching affiliation
Yes (n=170) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
22.9 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
21.8 Extra supply 15.9
No (n=460) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
29.3 Extra supply 18.7 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
18.3
Hospital ownership type
Govt (n=140) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
29.3 Extra supply 21.4 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
19.3
For profit (n=73) Request assistance/
Resource sharing
31.5 Extra supply 19.2 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
19.2
Nongovt; not‐for‐profit
(n=417)
Request assistance/
Resource sharing
26.4 Work with suppliers–
main or alternate
vendors
19.2 Extra supply 16.5
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