7/27/2019 Assiter - Althusser and Structuralism http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/assiter-althusser-and-structuralism 1/26 Althusser and Structuralism Author(s): Alison Assiter Reviewed work(s): Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 272-296 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/590235 . Accessed: 08/01/2012 23:44 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Blackwell Publishing and The London School of Economics and Political Science are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The British Journal of Sociology. http://www.jstor.org
Althusser and StructuralismAuthor(s): Alison AssiterReviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 272-296Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/590235 .
Accessed: 08/01/2012 23:44
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Blackwell Publishing and The London School of Economics and Political Science are collaborating with
JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The British Journal of Sociology.
'Structure, social structure' and, recently, 'structuralismareterms that are frequentlyused in sociology. Louis Althusserswork is often mentionedas beingboth structuralist nd Marxist.In this articleI first raise,and attemptto answer, he question:'Whats structuralism?',nd then I go on to arguethat Althusseris not both structuralist nd Marxist imultaneously. conclude,therefore,that, at least as far as Althusser'swork is concerned-and his writingsareoften takento be paradigmaticf structuralistMarxism- it is misleading o lump togetherstructuralism nd
Marxism.
The terms 'structure'and 'socialstructure'arewidely used in soci-ology and have been since Spencerintroduced he term 'structure'into the field in the nineteenthcentury.Relativelyrecently,underthe influenceof Frenchwork n linguistics, new term'structuralism'hasappeared n the writingsof practitioners f the discipline. ndeed,ErnestGellnerwrote, in 1970: 'a spectre s haunting he intellectual
scene - structuralism,orbetter "le structuralisme".l It may be
fashionable o use the term, but its meaning s rarelyexplained.Ishould iketo raise, n thispaper,arsd ttempt o answer,he question:'Whats thisspectre,orwhatis structuralism?'
One individualwhose workis often cited, in texts on sociologicaltheory, and elsewhere,as both structuralist nd Marxist, s LouisAlthusser.2 ndeed, the writingsof Althusser resometimes aken tobe exemplary, ndeedparadigmaticf 'structuralist'Marxism.This sdespite Althusser'sown refusalto apply the label 'structuralist'ohis work: 'Webelievethat despitethe terminological mbiguity, heprofound endencyof our textswasnot attached o the "structuralist"ideology.'3 I shall argue,here, that thereare sometimesreasonsfordescribingAlthusser'swork as structuralist.Undeniably, oo, he isoften dealingwith Marxianhemes. But, I shallclaim,he is not both
structuralistand Marxistsimultaneously.I shall also suggest thatAlthusser's structuralismsometimes prevents him from solvingproblemshe posesin the interpretation f historicalmaterialism.
It is misleading,therefore,as least as far as the work of LouisAlthusser s concerned, o lumptogetherstructuralismndMarxism.Sometimes, where Althusser is most clearly a structuralist,hisstructuralismproduces theses which make some of Marxs ideasnonsensical. Structuralismmay perhaps have somethingto offersociologists,and so mightMarxism,but, in so far as we take Marx'sworkas exemplary, he juxtapositionof the two cangive nothingtoanybody.
THE BACKGROUND
In the literature,one finds a numberof different definitionsofstructuralism.Manyof thesewouldprobablybe denouncedby thosewho might, for otherreasons,wishto call themselves structuralist'.Thereare structuralistheories n mathematicalogic, philosophyofscience,4 n biology, in anthropology,n linguistics, n sociology.
each of these variousareas.He describest generally s a theorythatdeals n self sufficientand self regulatingwholes.But, in mathematics,it is opposedto 'compartmentalism'-it deals n wholesrather hanin isolated elements;in linguistics,it representsa departure romdiachronicstudies of isolatedlinguisticphenomena o a synchronicstudy of unified linguisticsystems(in otherwords,it movesfromastudy of the variation n linguisticunits overtime to a comparativeanalysisof different anguages t any one pointin time). Inpsychol-ogy, structuralisms contrastedwithatomism;and in philosophy t is
opposedto historicism.The varietyin typesof structuralismnd in areasof its application
hascausedA. L. Kroebez o say this:
'Structure' ppearso bejustyielding o a wordthathas a perfectlygood meaningbut suddenlybecomes fashionablyattractive . .everything hat is not wholly amorphoushasa structure . . what'structure' ddsto the meaningof ourphrase eemsto be nothing,except to providea degreeof pleasantpuzzlement.S
MiriamGlucksmannderivesthe word 'structure' rom the Latin'structurasrom'struere':o construct.6Accordingo her:
Its meaningwas exclusivelyarchitecturaluntil the 17th centurywhen its use was extendedto the studyof anatomyandgrammar.The arrangement f the organsof the body came to be viewedas a
kind of construction,and languagewas understoodas the arrange-ment of words n speechhavinga 'structured' haracter.7
In the nineteenthcentury,she tells us, the termwas introduced rombiology to the new 'sciencesof man'by HerbertSpencer.
Originally, hen, the term referred o a propertyof somethingorthe way something s constructed.A structurewas an abstractprop-erty of somethingelse: somethingpossessedby somethingelse. Andfor what it is worth, this sense accords with some contemporaryEnglishusage-buildings have structure, rguments avea structure.One could not have an argumentor a buildingwithout a structure:
their structuresare part of what makesthem buildingsor arguments.On the other hand, the buildingor the argument s not to be identi-fied with its structure-without a structure here s no building,butthe buildingand its structureare not one and the same. They areboth instantiated n the same object; one is a propertyof the other.Structure,however, is not attached to particular hings in the waythat, say, being made up of a collection of bricks s a propertyof aparticularhouse. Get rid of all the bricksand you have destroyed hehouse, but replacing he bricks and rebuilding he house leaves the
structureof the building ntact.Whateverelse an analysis of a random selection of cases mightreveal about structure, t tells us this: structureseems not to be athing in its own right. A. Schaff shares his view. According o him,originallya structurewas a structureof something: The way thoseelements are interconnectedwithin a given system, i.e. the totalityof the relationsamong them, is termeda structureof that system.'8A system was 'a whole consistingof elementsbearing uch a relationto one another hat a change n the position of one results n a change
in the position of the rest.'9 There could be no structurewithout asystem and vice versa.Schaff nformsus that de Saussure-accordingto many, one of the main structuralists-did not use the term 'struc-ture' at all, but only system. A system, then, is a kind of entity-anabstract entity - and a structure is one of its properties. Somescientistsaim, in their work, to uncover he structureof a system.
But Schaff goes on to say that 'structure' s also used to mean'system : something which has a specified structure. This usage,indeed, is common amongstrecent structuralists-particularly hosein the French chool (see Levi Strauss,Barthesand Althusserhimself)and also amongst commentatorson this school and others.l° Thisusage, then, has become commonplace n the literature.So there s aquite specificambiguity n the meaningof the term.
Theremaynot be any set of featureswhich all 'structuralists' oulduphold, but is there a collection of views which would entitle us toput them all together in a school? A. Schaff lists the followingfourcharacteristicswhich form, he suggests,an intellectual trend: first,
structuralistsapproachthe subject matter of their researchas aspecificwhole which dominatesall its elements.They arecriticalofatomism,where thingsarestudiedas discretepartsof an aggregate,and where wholes are no more than the sum of their parts. Thewhole, according o the structuralist,ormsa systemwhoseelementsare interconnectedandwherethe structureof the whole determinesthe positionof each element.Second,structuralistselievethateverysystem has a structure: he taskof scienceis to find out what thatstructures. And third,structuralistsreinterestedn 'morphological'or'structurallaws.The awsdeal not in changesbut withco-existence.They thereforetend towardshavinga staticapproach o facts.And,finally, most structuralistswouldnot deny that the dynamicor the
diachronic s important n science,but they would say that this iswhollycomplementaryo synchronicanalysis.
Thoseare four features isted by Schaff.There s a fifth we mightmention, one which figures n C. Sumneras the definingfeatureofstructuralism,nd that is to see 'structures' s the real thingswhichunderliethe appearances, nd which are usuallyopaqueto the eye.Sumner:'Structuralisms a methodwhichexaminesphenomenaasthe outwardexpressionsof their inner, invisiblestructures.'llAndfor this featuresee alsoKeat andUrry.l2
Let us see how thesepropertiesof structuralismreexemplifiednthose who apply the label to theirwork. The first featureof struc-turalismappears n Saussure's escriptionof thefunctionof language.Language e characterizessa systemof signs. 3 Collectionsof noisescount as languageonly when they serveto expressor communicateideas; and to communicatedeas, they must be partof a systemofconventions:a system of signs. A sign is a union of a 'formwhichsignifies' - a signifier;and the idea signified.(Philosophersmightlabel these, respectively, he wordand the concept-although they
mightsay that, as it stands,Saussure'slaimdoesnot distinguishhe'referent'of the sign-what it picks out, fromits sense;whatFregedescribedas the 'modeof presentation'of the sign.)l4Thelinguisticsign, for Saussure,s arbitrary:here is no natural ink betweenthesignifierand the signified.There s no link, forinstance,betweenthesoundof the signand its signification, nd signschange heirmeanings-for instance,a 'silly'personwasoncehappy,blessedandpious.
Signifiersarenot autonomous,but they are definedby their rela-tions with other members f the system.What ives heword brown'
itsidentity s notanything ntrinsic o it, but its difference rom othercolour words. The identity of the sign consists in its place in the ̂ . . ..
systemot slgnl lers.And the first of the outlinedfeaturesof structuralisms apparent
in Levi-Strauss,who perceivesceremonies,rites,methodsof cookingnot as discreteentitiesbut in termsof the contrastive elations heybear to each other. 'Likephonemes,kinshiptermsare elementsof
De Saussure,for instance,emphasizes hat elementsin a languageshouldbe combined,but it could be saidto be a failing hathe doesnot offer detailedremarkson the way in whichthis combination sto be effected: on how individualwordscombineto formsentencesandhow sentences orm anguages.More ecent inguistsand logicians,e.g. ChomskyandD. Davidsonhavestressed he importance f rulesgoverning he combinationof units in a languageand haveoffereddetailedaccountsof the way the ruleswork.
A more detailedcriticismmightbe presented f thosestructuralists-the semiologists-who extend the idea of a signsystemoutsidethe realmof language.Saussurehimselfenvisaged his extensionofhis thinking.He said: 'A science that studies the life of signswithinsociety is conceivable;t would be a partof socialpsychology. . . Ishallcall it semiology (fromGreeksemeion'sign').2 In the workofLevi-Strauss, s we have seen, anthropologycame to be seen as abranchof semiology;andwith Barthesall sorts of aspectsof reality- traffic light systems, furnituresystems, menus etc. are seen ashavingmeaning n the way that languagesdo. They are saidto havestructureand aresupposedto be able to be usedto conveyinforma-
tion of some kind. But it is a little difficult to see how the analogycanwork.Whatevertructurea menuhasis withoutsemantic mport.A menu does not havea grammar;t does not havea way of deter-miningthe contributionof the meanings f the partsto the meaningof the whole. And hencetherecanbe no way of determiningwhetheror not unactualizedmenusare legitimateaccording o the structure.Theproblemof how it is that a personcan produce nfinitelymanysentenceson the basisof a knowledgeof a finite numberof parts sone that occupiedChomskyand also Davidson.23 n other words,
they wereconcernedto show how a knowledgeof the 'structure' flanguage-for Chomsky herulesof syntax,innate n the mind,andfor Davidsona knowledgeof the meanings f the partsof a languagetogether with an understandingof the 'logical rules buildingupwholesfromparts-yields thepossibilityof distinguishingmeaningfulfrom meaningless nutteredsentences.But therecanbe no such pro-cedure n the case of a menu. Any proposed tructures arbitraryna stronger han Saussureanense-it is not limitedas is languagebythe constraintof the possibilityof communication.Someunuttered
sentencesmustbe ruledout on the grounds hat they haveno seman-tic import;ultimately they cannot be used to say anything.But,though some meals may be ruled out as inedible, this will not bebecauseof the structureof any menu. A menumayhave a perfectlyacceptablestructureand the meal still be inedible;alternativelyhemenumay appear o have no acceptable tructureat all yet the mealcouldbe very tasty.
It appears,then, that there are difficultieswith some sorts ofstructuralism,ndparticularlywith thoseof the semiological ariety.
I proposenow to go on to discussAlthusser ndstructuralism.
ALTHUSSER AND STRUCTURALISM
Althusserupholdsenoughof thethesesI haveidentified o be labelleda 'structuralist'.He dislikesempiricismandemphasizestotalities',24the 'structurea d ominante25 and 'complexwholes 26 Theseentitiesare not separable rom the elementsthey compose27nor arethey
nothingbutthe sum of theirparts-they areelements:relationsof
production, forces of productionetc. connectedin specificways.Indeedthe natureof eachpartof the wholeis determined y its rolein the totality. Economicpractice, or example,doesnot exist on itsown but only aspartof the 'complexstructure'.
Althusser and the first prtnciple of structuralism I should ike now todescribe n more detailthe way in whichAlthusser'stotality'fits orfails to fit the first outlinedfeatureof structuralism.shalldescribethe type of totality of whichhe is critical;and I shalldrawon theideas of a thinkerwhom he acknowledgesas having nfluencedhisviewsin thisarea:Spinoza.ThenI'llaskwhetherornot it tallieswiththe other outlined propertiesof structuralism. discussingeachfeature,I shallraisethe questionwhetherAlthusser'spicturecanbeapplied o thatof Marx.
Societyor atleastsomeabstractionrom t is describedby Althusseras a 'complexwhole'whichhas '. . . the unity of a structure rticu-lated in dominance.'28He contraststhis whole with the CHegelian'totality and the type of totality assumedby Cmechanisticaterial-
ists.'29 He believes that these two mistakenpositions derivefromcommon presuppositions.Whatis common to the two viewpoints,and the respectin whichthey areboth wrong, s theirbeliefthatonecan 'readoff' an understandingf the essenceof somephenomenonby lookingat its appearances.Thisdoctrineappearsn 'empiricism',the view from which AlthusserderivesCmechanical' aterialism s'abstractionism',nd it appearsn Hegelas the theorythat the eventsin historyareto be treatedasmanifestations f the Idea.)
Althusserclaimsthat he andHegelhave n commonthe useof the
word'totality'30but thatthe conceptions o whichthe wordrefers neachcasearevastlydifferent.TheHegelianotalityis 'simple';3l veryCconcreteifference'eaturedn(it) forexample ivilsociety, hestate,religion,philosophyetc, is 'negatedassoonas (it is) affirmed.'32
InHegel,accordingo Althusser;
(all the concretedifferencesare)no morethan 'moments'of the
simple internalprincipleof the totality, which fulfils itself bynegatingthe alienateddifferencethat it posed;furtheras aliena-
tions - phenomena - of the simple internalprinciple,thesedifferencesare all equally 'indifferent',hat is practicallyequalbesideit ... andthereforeequalto one another....33 (Althusser'sitalics)
In Hegel'sPhilosophy f Right, o givean example, he Stateis dealtwith only in so farasit pertains o the courseof developmentof theIdea.34
In contrastwith the Hegelian totality',it looksasthoughAlthus-ser's 'whole'fits tenet one of structuralism.Histotality,hisabstractmodel of society, is a 'complex'one 'structured-in-dominance'.tcontains four levels or elements,each of which is itself structuredand is describedby Althusseras a 'practice'.Practice n generalhecharacterizess
any processof transformationf a determinate ivenrawmaterialinto a determinateproduct, a transformationeffected by adeterminatehuman abour,usingdeterminatemeans(of 'produc-tion').35(Althusser'stalics)
There are four types of practice going to make up the totality:economic practice, political, ideological and theoreticalpractice.Economicpractice is the practice of producinguse-valuesby theactivity of men and women workingwith meansof production nproductionrelations.36Politicalpractice is that one organizedonthe basis of historicalmaterialism,and which transforms ts rawmaterial-social relations-into new ones.37 Ideologicalpracticetransformsits object - people's consciousness.And theoretical
practicetakes two forms:on the one hand t is 'ideological'heoret-ical practice-the forms that go to make up the pre-historyof ascience and their philosophies;and on the other it is 'scientifictheoreticalpractice'.The term 'Socialpractice',then, coversall ofthese types. Althusser ellsus thatevery'simplecategory'e.g. labouror productionpresupposeshe structuredwhole of society.38
Now I believethat Althussersconflating wotypesof explanationhere. He confusesa logical connectionbetween two thingswith afactual -in this case historical-relation between them. He says
that every 'simplecategory'presupposes he existenceof the struc-turedwhole of society. Onemightinterpret presuppose' ereeitherin a logical or in a factualhistoricalmanner.Viewedin the formerway, Althusser's iew is structuralist nd conformswiththe thinkingof his mentor, Spinoza.It is also compatiblewith his sympatheticreferenceto Marx'scritiqueof the concept 'production-in-general'.However,Althusser'sview, on this reading,does not allow us to
281puts it: '(Spinoza) ail(s) to distinguish he identifylng romthe des-cribingfunctions of expressions,he cannot distinguishbetween asubstance incorrectly identified and a substanceincorrectlydes-
cribed'.46All truths,for Spinoza, hen,arenecessary ruths.So, reverting o the exampleof the wormand the bloodstream,
if the dropof bloodis anattributeof the bloodstreamn accordancewith definition4 (thoughthis is open to question,in fact, sincethebloodstreamwouldnot be a Spinozist substance' ndevensupposingit were, the dropof blood maynot be one of its essentialattributes)then the drop of blood 'presupposes' he bloodstream n a veryspecial sense: propositionsassertingof the dropof blood that it is'in' the bloodstreamwill be necessarily rue, and the proposition
'that'sa dropof blood'willbe deductively elated o the proposition:'that s the bloodstream'.
Returningnow to Althusser, f we interprethisclaim to the effectthat every 'simplecategory'presupposes he existenceof the struc-turedwholeof societyin Spinozist ashion,we haveto say thateverypropositionexpressinga relationbetweenthe socialwhole and oneof its elementswill be a necessary ruth. But, it is difficultto thinkof examples which make sense in this light. Some of Althusser'sexamples, following Marx, of simple categoriesare 'labour'and
'exchange'.Of the first, he says, 'the individualproducer- theindividualas the subjectof productiononly appearedn developedcapitalist ociety.'Here, ndividual conomicactivitypresupposesheexistence of capitalistsociety. And, of exchange,he says, quotingMarx,that it 'didnot appearhistorically n all its intensityuntilthemostdeveloped tatesof society.'47Heconcludes, hen,that 'it is thestructuredwhole which givesits meaning o the simplecategory.'48Canone say that Althusserreallymeansthat all descriptionsof ex-changeentaildescriptions f society?Thiswouldbea highly mplaus-
ible claim,and wouldnot be whatMarx ntended.Perhaps,rather than using quite this strong Spinozistsense of'presuppose'Althusser means something weaker. According toP. F. Strawson:
( ) a statementS presupposesa statementS' in the sense thatthetruthof S' is a preconditionof the truthor falsity of S.... Thisis the relationbetweenthe statementthat all John's childrenareasleep (S) and the statementthat John has children,that there
exist childrenof John's (S').49
Similarlywe could say 'anact of exchangehas takenplace (S) and'a society exists' (S'). As in the firstcase,the truth of S' is a precon-dition of the truthor falsityof S. Butour secondcaseis not so clear-cut as is that of Strawson.Wecanonly get the appropriateelation fwe buildin the requiredassumption-namely thatexchangescannot
take place outside of society. If society is defined in such a way asto make it true by definition that exchangestake place in it, the
relation holds, but only in a trivial ense.So, if we interpretAlthusserin Spinozist fashion, as he apparentlywishes us to do, we cannotmake much sense of the particular xampleshe offers us of 'simplecategories'presupposing he existence of the structuredwhole. Wecould on a Spinozist readingof Althusser,however,make sense ofAlthusser's ympatheticreference o Marx'scritiqueof 'production-in-general'.Production,on the Spinozistreadingof Althusser,wouldbe more like a large particular hing-more like Spinoza'sGod orNature-than like a concept. It would not be somethingof which
particular productions were instances. Rather, particularacts ofproduction would be simply exemplificationsof 'production'.Inproducing a part of a car in the capitalist mode of production, Iwould be simply exemplifyingproduction or exchangevalue.
So there is a way of makingAlthussera structuralist y criterionone, but though this readingof him allows us to give a certainkindof meaningto one idea of Marx's, t does not make much sense ofsome of the examples rom MarxAlthusserhimselfcites.
These examples are made more intelligible f we interpret 'pre-
suppose' in 'simple categories presupposesociety' in an historicalfashion. As a matter of historical act, exchangeand productiondidnot appearoutside of society-they presuppose ociety only in thisweak sense. Althusserhimselfappears o readthe examples his way.But, seen in this light, they do not of course ustify any connectionwith KSpinoza. eading them this way, indeed, is compatiblewithreferring o production-in-general's Althusser ometimesseems towant to, as a general concept, which has instances. Production' n'productionpresupposes ociety' is a particular ase of the concept
production-in-general. It is conceivable thoughunlikely that thereare other types of productionoccurring utside society.So, the answer to the question: 'is Althussera structuralistby
criterionone?' is 'yes and no'. If he is reada la Spinoza,he is a struc-turalist,but his own examplesfrom Marx, hen, makeno sense. Andif he is not readthrough he eyes of his mentor,he is not a structural-ist. In such circumstances,however,Althusser ails to do justice toanothertheme of Marx.
THE SECOND CRITERION FOR STRUCTURALISM
What about the second criterion or being a structuralist?Althusseroccasionallymentions the word 'system'and describes t as havingastructure,S° o at least sometimeshe is a structuralist y this tenet.He does not discuss aws of co-existence (at least not by that name)instead he emphasizes he particular ype of causation metonymic
causality'which is characteristicof his structuralism.But in fact, 283
what he actuallymeansby 'cause'may be morelike whatothershave
characterized s 'co-existence'.So he may indeed be a structuralistby the third criterion.Let us have a look at Althusser's oncept ofcausation in order to see whetherhe is a structuralist n the thirdsense.
AlthusserandcausationAs vvithhis pictureof the natureof the total-ity, here too Althusser s influenced by Spinoza. In discussing herelationshipof the structure o its elements,Althusserrefers to thelatter. Hesays:
. . . the structure s immanent n its effects, a cause immanent nits effects in the Spinozistsense of the term, that the whole exas-tenceof thestructure onsastsn its effects . . .51 (Althusser'stalics)
Let us look once more at Spinoza, his timeto understandwhat hemeant by cause. The cause of any being, for Spinoza, s that whichmakes it what it is. Causesproduce heir effects necessarily.Fromagivendefined cause, an effect necessarilyollows.... If something sthe adequate cause of somethingelse, the latter can be adequatelyconceived hrough he former.'52
The conception of an effect dependsupon and involvesthe con-ception of cause. 'x is not the cause of y' entails 'y cannotbe under-stood by x'. There is thus a very close connection, for Spinoza,betweenthe cause of a being(whatmakes t what it is) andthe beings'essentialproperties.To explain somethingcausally is to show thenecessaryconnectionof the essentialpropertiesof a substancewiththe substanceof which they areproperties.That s to say, to explainsomething causally is to show, of an essentialproperty,that that is
. .
w zat lt lS.
Spinoza'sconception of causality s in markedcontrast o that ofthe person whom many regard o be the primerepresentative f theempiricist radition:DavidHume.According o Hume,the connectionbetweencause and effect is nevernecessary; t is alwaysconceivablethat a given causemight be conjoinedwith the negation of its usualeffect.53 Causalrelations are analysed as regularsuccession of theeffect upon the cause.Not only is the notion of necessary onrlectionbetweencause and effect expelledfromHume'sanalysis,but so too
is any idea of causalpower oragency.In a sense, then, Spinoza'sconception of causality s more like a
law of co-existencethan like a law of succession: f, for instance,atable is defined as a body with four legs and a top, then possessingfour legs and a top is necessarilypart of what makes the table whatit is. The legs and the top 'co-exist' in the table. But it would beharder to understand uccessivephenomena n this Spinozist ight.
here, and it just seemsto us that they differ?Of course,if we takeappearanceo be equivalent o whatMarxdescribedas reality,then
the twowill coincide. But Marx-and Althussertoo -wants to
makethe point that the capitalist appearance's asmuch'reality'asis the one he hasanalysed.Andsurely t isjust not truethatwereweGod - were we to have perfect knowledgeof existingreality, ofcapitalistsocial relations-essence andappearancewould coincide.The distinctionMarxdrew attention to, between the essenceandappearance f the capitalistworld,wouldnot disappearust throughour comingto understand he reality-on the contrary,action hasto betaken o doawaywithit. In thisrespect,the distinctionbetweenessenceandappearancen Marx'sanalysisof capitalisms absolutely
unlike that, for instance,in a Lockeansubstance.And, one couldoffer a parallelargumentagainstthe Spinozistreadingof Althusseron causeand the relationbetweenappearance ndrealityfittingthis
examplefrom Marx.Marxwould havedisagreedust as muchwith
the Spinozistclaimthat appearance ndrealitycoincide,as he does
with the Lockeanview that really they coincide, but they arenotseento be the sameby we, limited,beings.
And the emphasison the appearancedisappearingnto therealityis very different romAlthusser'sSpinozistemphasis,whichis on the
'structure' r the 'essence'beingnothingoutsideits 'effects'; n otherwords,he seemsto want to collapsethe distinction n favourof theappearance.So it seems that it does not make much sense of the
examplesfromMarxto describe hem ascaseswhere really'essenceand 'appearance'oincide,but it just seemsotherwise o us, limited,humanbeings.It seemsthenthatthereis, indeed,a conflictbetweenthe 'realist' eadingof Althusserandthe Spinozistreading.
Wherewe takethe 'Spinozist' eading f Althusser,hen,it is plaus-ible to say that he is a 'structuralist'y criterion hree.Butas in our
discussionof the first propertyof 'structuralism'o, here, does itappearthat, to the extentthat Althussers a 'structuralist'e cannotclaimto be analysingMarx.
Perhaps,however,we can get a 'structuralist' eadingAlthusser,by this criterion,one whichis compatiblewithMarx, f we look else-where in Althusserfor an understanding f the way in which he
applies he conceptof cause.
Cause:anotherattempt Rememberthat, for kSpinoza,auses and
effects are necessarilyrelatedto one another.Thereis another m-portantfeatureof cause, for him,whichon the faceof it, appearsobe in conflict with the necessaryrelationshipbetweenthe two. Thisis that the concept of cause s 'conceivedasaction'.58Howare thesetwo ideas reconciled n Spinoza?The answer s that the concept ofactivity, here, is that of makingexplicit somethingwhichis alreadylatently there: it is activity in the sense in which the proof of a
theoremcould be said to involve he activityof applyingaxiomsandrules. The 'effect', the theorem, is produced from the 'cause':the
axioms and rules. So, the cause 'contains' he effect.It may be that this Spinozist concept of cause is relevant to
Althusser's onceptionof reading, or Althusser ays:
. . . a philosophical eadingof Capital s only possibleas the appli-cation of that which s the very object of our investigation,Marx'sphilosophy.... It is therefore a question of producing, n theprecise sense of the word, which seems to signifymakingmanifestwhat is latent . . .59
This passage s directlyreminiscentof Spinoza. n order o under-stand the way in which the concept of cause has application,wemust examine the theory of reading.Let us look at this theory, andsee whether we can produce an interpretation f Althusser's truc-turalism, n this sense, which s compatiblewith Marx.
RE ADIN G
The notion of reading, for Althusser, s connected, in some way,with the question of the scientificityof what is expressed n Capital:'We read Capital (in order to pose) the question of scientific dis-course. 0
Reading hould not be 'innocent' there s no such thing as an in-nocent reading.'6l Innocent readings'go along with 'the empiricistconception of knowledge'.62Althusser dislikes the conception ofknowledge which, in his view, underpinsa technique, and not a
particular echniqueor particular echniquesof reading. One couldof course criticizea techniquewithout criticizing he view of knowl-edge underlying t -one might suggest that a techniqueof for in-stance placing emphasisupon particularwords when readingEliot'sThe WasteLand, fails to do justice to the meaningof the poem.)
Althusser criticizes 'innocent readings'for viewing the relationbetween the text and its subjectmatter as an 'expressive' ne. This,as we alreadyknow, is an empiricistway of seeingthe relation.As anexample of an innocentreading, ake our readingof Marx'sCapital-'Whenwe read Marx,we immediately ind a readerwhoreads to us,and out loud. 63 (Althusser's talics) When Marx reads to us 'in-nocently', '(he) readshis predecessors iscourse Smith's or instance)throughhis own discourse.'64Whenhe reads n his way, Marx's extis just Smith'swith a few thingsadded.
Althusser is concerned, not with methods of reading,generally,nor with just any method of readingCapital. He is interestedquitespecifically n the way to readCapitalin orderto understandMarx's
287relation to the classicalpolitical economists.The questionof thescientificityof historicalmaterialisms seen hereas that of Marx'srelationto Smith and Ricardo.So Althussermakescertainassump-tions about the way of goingabout answeringhe questionof scien-tltlClty.
Onthe faceof things herearesomesimilarities etweenAlthusser'sconception of readingand that of Derrida(althoughDerridas, infact, criticalof earlier structuralisms'). ccording o the latter, thetext is a 'de-centredstructure'.65There is an infinite numberofpossible'readings'f a text. Eachact of consuminghe text producesa differentreadingof it. The text is not a givenentity with a fixedmeaning.Rathera particularmeaning s producedby a reading rom
the 'semioticfield'.The text is, as it were,produced'in theprocessof readingorconsumingt.
The text, for Althussertoo, is not simply given. Its meaning sproducedby the readingof it. Andwheretherearesimilaritieshereare shareddifficulties.The text ceasesto haveany identity-howdoes one distinguishKing Lear from The Third Policeman?Thewords on the page mightproduceidentical 'readings'of each. Butthere are differencesbetweenAlthusserand Derrida.Theremay bean infinityof possiblereadings f a text forAlthusser, s for Derrida,
but for him only one of theseresults n a knowledge.Onlyoneread-ing of Capital s correctfrom the viewpointof uncoveringhe scien-tificityof historicalmaterialism.
We will see that Althusser'spicture is directly reminiscentofSpinoza'sview of the iproduction'of natureby God: natureis anecessaryeffect of God'sproductivity,as the proof of a theoremisthe necessaryeffect of the applicationof axiomsandrules.InAlthus-ser, the text and the theoryof scientificityare the necessary ffectsof a readingof the text. In orderto see how this is, we willneedto
takea little detour.
LECTURE SYMPTOMATIQUE
Spinoza,according o Althusser,givesus the beginningsof a correctview of reading.Spinozaproposed:'. . . a philosophyof the opacityof the immediate.6 Spinoza 'linked together (in this way) theessenceof readingand the essenceof historyin a theoryof the dif-
ferencebetweenthe imaginary nd the true'.67The correctview of readings whatAlthusser alls'symptomatic':'lecturesymptomatique'.Onthisconception,wemustnot understandMarxas havingoperatedwith the sameassumptionsas the classicalpoliticaleconomistsbut simplyto haveseen morethanthey did,onthose assumptions.Wemustnot readthe texts of SmithandRicardoascontaininggapswhichMarx illedin. Onthe contrary:
(i) 'The valueof labour( ) is equal to the valueof the subsistence 289
goods necessary for the maintenanceand reproductionof
labour. 73 (Althusser'stalics)and(ii) The value of labour is equal to the value of the subsistence
goods necessary or the maintenance nd reproductionof thelabourer.74 Althusser'stalics)
And he says: '(the first) sentencemeansnothing:what is the main-tenance of "labour?"what is the reproductionof "labour?"75 Andin the second sentence,
the term at the end of the sentence (now) clasheswith the termatthe beginning: hey do not have he samecontent and the equationcannot be made, for it is not the labourerwho is bought for wages,but his 'labour76
Althussergoes on to tell us that there is present n the answer heabsence of its question. Marxcan go on, he tell us, to 'pose the un-uttered question', simply by 'uttering he concept present n an un-utteredform in the emptiness n the answer.'77Althusser'stalics).
How does the theory look? The examinationof the text of Capitalis to play a crucialrole in determininghistoricalmaterialism'scien-tificity. How exactly does it do this? We will find the answer byexamining notherconcept which is importantas far as the scientific-ity of historicalmaterialisms concerned.Marx, n Capital,produceda new object: labour power. Implied n the productionof this newobject was
a transformation f the entire terrainand its entirehorizon,which
are the background gainstwhich the new problem s produced . .the production of a new problem endowed with this crzticalcharacter(critical n the sense of a critical situation) is the un-stable index of the productionof a new theoretical roblematic,ofwhich this problem s only one symptomaticmode.78 Althusser'sitalics).
PROBLEMATIC
Can he concept sproblematic'hrowlighton the techniqueof readingCapitaland its relevance or the theory of scientificity and can itreveal a sense of Althusser's tructuralismwhich is compatiblewithMarx?To facilitate answering hese questions, t would be useful tolist a few occurrencesof the concept, in Althusserhimself, and in acouple of his commentators.A. Callinicos ays:
291as the latter sense of 'problematic'goes, Marx'sconceptionof thecapitalistmode of productionand exchange mpliesa non-Hegeliantheory of the form of the social totality and its parts;whereas,asfaras the first sensegoes, 'Hegel's onceptionrepresents nessential,historicalcondition of the possibilityof Marx'scritiqueof politicaleconomy. 4
It is the second,Spinozistsenseof 'problematic'whichis relevantto the outlined picture of reading.Althusseris drawingboth onFreudand on Spinoza.
LetustakeFreud's nterpretation f Dreamsprocedureorillumin-ation. In interpreting dreamFreudpays as muchattentionto the'errors' nd 'omissions'of the dreamas he doesto what he terms ts
'manifest' ontent.85The latter, in his terminology,is a 'condensed'and 'displaced'
versionof the dreamthoughts.86 t is by enlarging n the manifestdreamcontentand replacing ome of it thatone arrives t the latentdreamthoughts.The latter are responsible or the dream;and thedreamhas the function of fulfillingwishes which are expressed nthose thoughts.
Freud 'reads' a dreamin a particularway, takinginto account'absences' n it, whichhe obtainsfrom elsewhere, n orderto arrive
at the latent dreamthoughts.Althusserreadsa text in a particularway, also takinginto account 'absences'which he, too, gets fromelsewhere,in order to obtain the problematic of that text. Andsometimes,that problematicwill containthe theory of scientificity(for the science expressed n that text). In Althusser's iew,just asMarx 'symptomaticallyreads'the classicalpolitical economists,sodo we 'symptomaticallyead'Marx'sCapital.Weread t in thisway,in order o uncoverMarx's hilosophy-or the theoryof scientificityfor Capital.In fact Marxemployedphilosophicalconcepts which
were 'essential o his thought,butabsentfromhisdiscourse.'87And,just as the classicalpolitical economistsproducedan answerto aquestionthey wereunableto pose, so did Marxproduce he answerto a questionhe did not 'havetime' to pose; the question,namely'what is the specific differencedistinguishinghe Marxistdialecticfrom the Hegeliandialectic?8 Althusser 'reads Capitalfrom aparticularpoint of view, takinginto account what is not there asmuch as what is there, and obtains,by this means, the theory ofscientificity, or Marx'sphilosophy.AlthusserreadsCapital n this
way and causally 'produces', n Spinozist fashion, the theory ofscientificity.Just as the proof of a theoremis 'contained n' theaxioms and rules, and its production s the productionof what isalready, latently, there; so too the production of the theory ofscientificity is an act of makingmanifestwhat is already,latentlythere. The theory of readingis cruciallyrequiredfor uncoveringMarx'sphilosophy.The Spinozistconceptionof the causalrelation
between 'appearance'nd realityhas clear application: he 'proble-matic',the appearance,s the set of techniquesemployed o uncover
the 'reality': he theory of scientificity n Capital.But there are difficulties with this SpinozistlFreudian icture.
Indeed the Freudianclashes with the Spinozistone to produceaproblem or Althusser.Whichabsencesneedto be taken nto accountin the readingof Capital?Clearly t is not just any old idea whichhappensnot to be in the text -the theme of Blake'sMarrsagefHeavenandHell for instance.In Freud'scase,we knowtheanswer:the relevantabsencesare culled from the wakingthoughtsof theindividualwhose dream is undergoinganalysis.(And it may be a
problemfor Freudwhetheror not the decisionas to which thoughtsareto be considered he appropriate nesmakes he wholeprocedureof analysiscircular.)But whatare the relevantabsencesn Althusser?If we areto takewhathe sayshe takes nto accountasgivingus someidea of what he considers o be relevant,he tellsus thatthe absencescontainMarx'sphilosophy.And herewe get the Spinozism.
A philosophicalreadingof Capitalconstitutesthe causal 'produc-tion' in the Spinozist enseS f whatis already here.Anuncharitableinterpretationof Althusserhere would be to say that he is simply
'readingn' to Marx'sext whathe wantsto find. Marxhimselfcouldnot have producedthe rulesand procedurenecessary o understandthe scientificityof his own theory,for
the ageMarx ived ndid not providehim,and he couldnot acquirein his lifetime,an adequateconceptwith whichto thinkwhat heproduced: he conceptof the effectivityof a structureon its ele-ments.89
We couldsay, then,thatAlthussers 'readingn' to his understandingof Marx'stext the very generalizationhe wants to discover.Mighttherenot be other techniqueswhichare 'latent' n ̂ 'Iarx'sext?Howdo we know hat Althusser'ss therightone?Whyshouldwe accepthis reading?Thereseemsto be a crucialdisanalogybetweenthe typeof case Spinozaoffered us and the one Althusser s presentinguswith. It makessense to say that the axiomsandrules are 'latent' nthe proof of a theoremand that if the proof works out, the axiomsand theoremswere the right ones. And similarly,because of the
propertiesGodis supposed o possess,accordingo Spinoza, t makes
sense to talk of God being latent in natureand Godas causewithNatureas effect beingthe 'right'cause.But it doesn't makesense nthe sameway to referto Althusser's roblematic eingthe 'right'onefor the productionof the theoryof scientificity n Capital,because tdoes not makesense to referto the relationbetweenthe problematicand the theoreticalobject as a necessaryone in the way that theothers are. So there could be other possible 'problematics' nd it
becomesviciouslycircularof Althusser o 'read n' to his understand-ing of particularciences, he verygeneralizatione wantsto discover.
It seems,then, that if Althusser'sSpinozistnotion of cause s likethe structuralistlawof co-existence' hen he is indeeda structuralistby criterionthree. This time his structuralism as led him into adifferent kind of difficulty. Whereas, n the previous two cases,Althusser'sviews either fitted the tenets of 'structuralism' ut didnot tally with the ideasof Marxor compliedwith the ideasof Marxbut not of structuralism;his timethe problem s different.Althusseris tryingto answera questionhe thinks s latentin Marx, he questionnamely;'Is historicalmaterialismcientific?'And this timehis struc-
turalismpreventshim from answeringhat question n a non-circularfashion.Althusser s at painsto emphasize hat the 'social ormation' s not
revealed or what it is to the untutoredeye: graspingt requires hatone penetratethe appearances.So he is a structuralist y the fifthcriterion.Here indeed,he is likeMarx; n severalplacesMarxholds a
* . .
slmli r vlew.If one takes 'structuralism'o indicatea trend,it is not necessary
that every structuralistexhibit all of the featurespicked out ascharacteristic f the trend, nor indeedthatany individual houldup-hold all of them. Such tidy fitting of the facts is not characteristicof e.g. the 'Enlightenment'r Protestantism ny more than it needbe of structuralism. lthusser s a structuralistn so far as histhoughtfits at least some of the propertiesof the phenomenon.So, althoughA. Schaffmay be rightwhen he criticizesAlthusser or usingtermsambiguouslyand forlacking n logicalprecision,90 e is goingtoo farwhen he refers to Althusser'sthought as 'pseudo-structuralism'.9lTimpanaro,oo, is too criticalwhenhe labels'French tructuralism'(includingAlthusser's)as 'sophisticatedharlatanry';nd talks about
'old literaryfoxes who, as their final and most sophisticated rick,have takento playingat science'.92 f fitting the principles f struc-turalismmakes one a structuralist,hen Althusser s one, and not a'pseudo'one.
CONCLUSION
It seems hat there s someevidence hat Althusser its the structuralist
bill, thoughit is difficultto give any overallconceptionof the natureof his versionof the view. Sometimeshis thinking s ambiguous ndonly one of the interpretations f it is a structuralistne. Clearlyhebelieves in 'wholes'and he thinksof them as somethingmore thanthe sum of their elements. Furthermore,he conceptionof causewith whichhe is sympatheticmakeshis view out to be closerto thestructuralistone of emphasizingaws of co-existence rather than
causal laws in the sense of relations between temporallydistinctitems. Despite his renunciationof the structuralist abel, then, his
thinking is close to structuralismn severalways. But, often whereAlthusser s a structuralist, e cannot be describedas a Marxist.Hisstructuralism onflicts with his Marxism.Althusser s reputed to bethe paradigmatic tructuralistMarxist. have arguedhere, however,that often, where he is one, he is not the other. Sociologists, here-fore, should not lump together 'structuralism' nd 'Marxism'.Thetwo terms refer to very differentbodies of thought;traditions hatare unlikely to be happilymarried.
Alison AssiterSchool of Humanities
Thames Polytechnic
NOTES
1. E. Gellner, On Structuralismn
Cause and Meaning in the SocialSciences, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
London, 1 9 7 3.2. See e.g. J. Piaget, Structuralism,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,1971, p. 101; S. Hall Class and ClassStructure, (ed.) A. Hunt, Lawrence &Wishart, London, 1 9 7 8.
3 . Althusser & Balibar, 19 7 0, p . 7 .4. See J. Piaget, Structuralism,
New York, 1948, quoted in C. Levi-Strauss: Structural An thropology,Basic Books, New York, London,1963,p. 278.
6. M. Glucksman, StructuralistAnalysis in Contemporary SocialThought,A Comparison f the theoriesof Claude Levi-Strauss and LouisAlthusser, Routledge & Kegan Paul,London, Boston and Henley, 1974,p. 15.
7. Ibid.,p. 15.8. A Schaff, Structuralism and
Marxism, Pergamon Press, Oxford,New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris,Frankfurt, 1 9 7 8, p . 4.
9. Ibid., same page.10. See , for example R . Keat and
J. Urry, Social Theory as Science,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,Henley and Boston, 1975, p. 124; R.
Bhasker, 1975, p . 24, and throughout
the book and see C. Sumner: ReadingIdeologies: an investigation into theMarxist Theory of Ideology and Law,Academic Press, London, New York,San Fransisco, 1979.
11. Sumner,1979, p. 102.12. Keat and Urry,1975, p .124.13. F. de Saussure: Course in General
Linguistics, in R. and F. de George(eds), The Structuralists from Marx to
Levi-Strauss, Anchor Books, Garden
City, New York,1972, p. 67.14. P. Geach and M. Black (eds),
Translations from the PhilosophicalWritings of Gotlob Frege, Blackwell,Oxford, 1960, pp.56-78.
15. Levi-Strauss,1963; p .34.16. Ibid., same page.17. F. de Saussure,1966, p.9, quoted
in S. Timpanaro, On Materialism, NLB,London,1975, p. 143.
18. See R. Barthes, Elements of
Semiology, Cape, London, 1967,Chapter 1, Sect. 2,3, pp. 27-8.
19. Ibid.,pp.27-8.20. See H. G. Gadamer, Truth and
Method, Sheed&Ward, London,1979.21. See Barthes,1967, pp. 26-9.22. F de Saussure, Course in General
(eds), in collaborationwith A. Ried-linger. McGraw-HillBook Company,New York, Toronto, London, 1966,
p.16.23. See N. Chomsky,Knowledgeof
Langllage n MinnesotaStudies in thePhilosophy of Science, University ofMinnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1975,and D. Davidson,Meaningand Truth,Synthese, 1967.
24. See e.g. Althusser, 1969, pp.102-3,202-4, andelsewhere.
25. See, ibid., pp. 204-7, 209-11,213-17.
26. See, ibid.,pp. l 94-202.27. See Glossary, bid., underStruc-
ture.28. Ibid.,p. 202.29. See, ibid., p.202.30. See, ibid., pp. 202-3.31. See, ibid.,p. 203.32. Ibid.,p. 203.33. Ibid.,p. 203.34. See T. M. Knox (trans.),Hegel's
Philosophyof Right,OxfordUniversity
Press, London, Oxford, New York,1980.
35. Ibid.,p. l 66.36. See, ibid., p.167.37. See, ibid.-, amepage.38. See, ibid.,p.196.39. Althusser and Balibar,1970, p.
187.40. See Spinoza to Oldenburg, in
J. Wild (ed.), Spinoza Selections,Charles Scribner's Sons, New York,
Boston,1930,p. 291.41. See Spinoza, Ethics, in Wild,
1930.42. Wild,1930, p.94.43. Wild,1930, p. 94.44. H. F. Hallet: Substanceand its
Modes, in M. Grene(ed.), Spinoza:ACollection of CriticalEssays, Double-day, Anchor Press, New York, 1973.
45. All of which, are of subjectpredicate form, see A. Macyntre:
Spinoza, in the Encyclopaedia ofPhilosophy, Macmillan,London, andthe Free Press, New York 1967, p.532.
46. Macyntre,1967,p. 532.47. Althusser,1969, p. 196.48. Ibid.,p.196.49. P. F. Strawson:Introductionto
Loggsal Theory, Methuen London,1960,p.175.
50. See e.g. ibid.,pp. 231-3.
51. Althusser and Balibar,1970, p.189.
52. SpinozaC1 Ethics, quoted in A.Naess: Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence, Universitats Verloget,Oslo,1975.
53. See Hume, 1968, PartIII, Sects.II, III, IV andXIV.
54. Althusser and Balibar,1970, p.188.
55. See Paul Patton: Althusser's
Epistemology:the limitsof the theoryof theoretical practice, in RadicalPhilosophy, No. 19, Spring 1978, foran account of the conflicting sensesof the term 'production'in Althusser-one deriving rom a Spinozistread-ing of him, and the other from a'realist'reading.
56. See Chapter 1 of my D. Philthesis: 'TheLimitsof Althusserianism',Sussex University, 1983, for a des-
cription of the epistemologicalrealistAlthusser.According o this Althusser,there is a contingentcausalconnectionbetween 'essence'and 'appearance'.
57. See Althusserand Balibar,1970,pp.191-2.
58. See H. F. Hallett: Benedict deSpinoza: The Elements of his Philos-ophy, The Athlone Press London1957,p. 9.
59. Althusser and Balibar,1970, p.
34.60. Althusser and Balibar,1970, p.
14.61.Ibid.,p.14.62. Ibid.,p. 35.63. Ibid.,p. 18.64.Ibid.,p.18.65. See J. Derrida:Writing nd Dif-
ference, Routledge & Kegan Paul,London, Henley and Boston,1978,pp.278-81.
66. Althusser and Balibar,1970, p.16.
67. Ibid., pp. 16-17.68. Ibid. p. 21.69. Ibid.,p. 21.70. Seeibid.,p.20.71. Ibid., Althusser quoting Marx,
