Journal of Semantics 5: 385-398 AT EASE WITH "AT' BIRGIT WESCHE ABSTRACT The preposition at has a range of rather diverse meanings - locative, temporal, causal, etc. - which would not seem to be captured by any common denominator that would still be strong enough to distinguish at from other prepositions. In order to clarify the relationship of the various meanings of at to each other, this paper assumes the notion of a semantic prototype and shows how other senses of at develop from a basic locative sense of at, and how these derived senses are motivated by the fact that their domain of application is conceptualized in analogy to the domain of the basic spatial sense, or in analogy to another sense of a; that is directly or indirectly related to the original locative sense along the same lines. 1. INTRODUCTION The English preposition at belongs to the set of fundamental locative prepo- sitions at, on, and in. While an NP to which at is attached should ideally refer to a (zero-dimensional) topological point, an NP that goes with on refers to a (one-dimensional) line or (two-dimensional) surface, and an NP with in refers to a (two-dimensional) area or a (three-dimensional) space. But these, in a sense ideal, uses of at, on, or in are not their only uses. At, for instance, is also found in applications such as at school, at someone's discre- tion, at random, arrive at, look at, etc. How are these senses related to the basic topological point sense and how are they related to each other? In the following we will use the notion of a prototype in order to characte- rize the structure of the overall concept of the preposition at. Concepts with prototype structure "are composed of a 'core meaning' which consists of the 'clearest cases' (best examples) of the category, 'surrounded' by other catego- ry members of decreasing similarity to that core meaning" (Rosch 1973:12). The core meaning, or prototype, is the one displaying the most characteristic set of features associated with the general concept. In this sense the locative meaning will be assumed as the prototype of the general concept denoted by the preposition at. Depending on the context, variations of this core meaning successively extend the protytype to further concepts, which, in their turn, can serve as the basis for new concepts. One can thus distinguish between "centrally-motivated senses", which emerge directly from of the core mea- at Duke University on October 14, 2012 http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from
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Journal of Semantics 5: 385-398
AT EASE WITH "AT'
BIRGIT WESCHE
ABSTRACT
The preposition at has a range of rather diverse meanings - locative, temporal, causal, etc. -which would not seem to be captured by any common denominator that would still be strongenough to distinguish at from other prepositions. In order to clarify the relationship of thevarious meanings of at to each other, this paper assumes the notion of a semantic prototype andshows how other senses of at develop from a basic locative sense of at, and how these derivedsenses are motivated by the fact that their domain of application is conceptualized in analogy tothe domain of the basic spatial sense, or in analogy to another sense of a; that is directly orindirectly related to the original locative sense along the same lines.
1. INTRODUCTION
The English preposition at belongs to the set of fundamental locative prepo-sitions at, on, and in. While an NP to which at is attached should ideally referto a (zero-dimensional) topological point, an NP that goes with on refers to a(one-dimensional) line or (two-dimensional) surface, and an NP with in refersto a (two-dimensional) area or a (three-dimensional) space.
But these, in a sense ideal, uses of at, on, or in are not their only uses. At, forinstance, is also found in applications such as at school, at someone's discre-tion, at random, arrive at, look at, etc. How are these senses related to the basictopological point sense and how are they related to each other?
In the following we will use the notion of a prototype in order to characte-rize the structure of the overall concept of the preposition at. Concepts withprototype structure "are composed of a 'core meaning' which consists of the'clearest cases' (best examples) of the category, 'surrounded' by other catego-ry members of decreasing similarity to that core meaning" (Rosch 1973:12).The core meaning, or prototype, is the one displaying the most characteristicset of features associated with the general concept. In this sense the locativemeaning will be assumed as the prototype of the general concept denoted bythe preposition at. Depending on the context, variations of this core meaningsuccessively extend the protytype to further concepts, which, in their turn,can serve as the basis for new concepts. One can thus distinguish between"centrally-motivated senses", which emerge directly from of the core mea-
ning and "distantly-motivated senses" (cf. Lakoff 1982:83), which developfrom a derived concept and are less representative of the overall concept.Even these distantly-motivated senses, however, will still bear enough of thecharacteristic features found in the prototype to be clearly distinguished fromconcepts of other prepositions such as on or in.
We shall now consider the principles that motivate the extensions of theprototypical meaning and that yield the various derived meanings of at. Thetwo basic operations that are at work here are
- successive change in the set of features and- projection onto a new domain.
The first applies to concepts within the same domain. Thus a locative conceptis extended to another locative one, a temporal concept is extended toanother temporal one, etc. The transition from one concept to the next thustakes place gradually. Features are successively changed so that at can beapplied to successively further removed kinds of relationships within thesame domain.
Let us, in order to describe the relationship expressed by at in a phrase like"x is at y", call x the located object and y the reference object*. A featurecharacterization for a particular sense of at may then be formulated as a tripleof
(a) a set of features that characterize the kind of relationship between thelocated object and the reference object (such as [±locative], [idirectional],[itemporal], [±causal], [iintentional], etc.),
(b) a set of features that characterize the reference object (e.g. [±static],[±dimensional], [±shape], [±concrete], [ianimate], [±goal], [±target],[±cause]), and
(c) a set of features very much like those under (b) that characterize thelocated object, as required by the specific relation expressed.
The most general ones of the features in the first of these sets define what wecall a domain of application: [locative], [directional], [temporal], [causal], and[intentional].
The second of the above operations, projection, accounts for the transitionfrom one domain to another. The process of projection would seem to rest onthe principle that the new is conceptualized in terms of the familiar, and thus,in general, that more abstract domains tend to be conceptualized in analogyto more concrete ones. This is illustrated by the transition from referenceobjects conceptualized as points of location to reference objects that areconceptualized as points in time.
In the following the motivation for, and the relationship between, thevarious senses of the preposition at will be discussed and illustrated. Theanalysis will not, however, contain the full feature specifications. It will onlydescribe the factors that motivate the non-prototypical applications of at.
In our description of the overall concept of at, we will take a synchronicperspective. This implies that some applications will not be accounted forwithin our paradigm. At the hands of, for example, is one of the few remnantsdisplaying the once productive conceptualization of the reference objectcontaining the feature [+source]. While some such phrases have currentlylost their motivation entirely and have become idiomatic, others receive aninterpretation different from the one that motivated those uses historically.In the adverbial at stake, at has lost its original locative sense and may be seenas synchronically motivated by the concept of "state of affairs or mind",which we can also find e.g. in at ease, at one's leasure, or at work.
Meaning differences between the concept oi at and those of other preposi-tions will be discussed at points where the domains of application overlap andwhere the choice of one rather than the other preposition determines thespecific interpretation of the sentence.
2. THE CONCEPT OF AT
2.1 The prototype: simple point of location
The prototypical locative sense of the preposition at is illustrated by thefollowing sentence:
(1) You are just at the point where three welfare districts join.2
Here the preposition at expresses a two-place relation between the locatedobject (you) and the reference object (the point where three welfare districtsjoin). The two central characteristics of this core sense of at are that
- the reference object is a point, and that- the located object is in the immediate vicinity of this point.
The application in sentence (1) clearly displays these two properties: thereference object is a (zero-dimensional) topological point with the locatedobject in its immediate vicinity. If reference object and located object were tocoincide the preposition on would have to be used instead, as in (la):
(1) a. You are just on the point where three welfare districts join.
This characterization of the core sense or prototype of at contrasts with aproposal rhade by Herskovits (1986), who assumes for the ideal meaning of at"for a point to coincide with another" (1986:50). But this notion would seemto be incorrect. When reference object and located object coincide ratherthan being in each other's immediate vicinity, we lose the distinction betweenat and on. A similar problem occurs for derived senses of at, especially in thedomain of directionality, which, as will be argued below, are equally impossi-ble to distinguish from the meaning of other prepositions without referenceto the notion of immediate vicinity.
It should be noted that the determination of a prototype is not guided bythe quantity of actual occurences of the relevant expression in that specificsense. It is rather its specific feature structure which constitutes the prototypi-cality of a particular word-sense. And this also holds for the preposition at -we may in fact not find very many instances in which the reference objectactually is a topological point. Nevertheless we experience this realization asthe best example of the overall concept of at.
The application of at in sentence (1) actually should be considered aprototypical instantiation of the prototypical concept of "simple point oflocation". Just as the general concept of at is structured around the prototy-pical core meaning (as characterized by the two properties given above), alsoeach single concept consists of a prototypical sense and less representativemembers. Further, non-prototypical instances of the prototype of "simplepoint of location" are relations where the located object is still found in theimmediate vicinity of the reference object, but where the latter is not azero-dimensional point but a physical object that has a particular shape, cf.e.g. (2):
(2) Maria was standing at the window.
In such applications, however, the actual size and shape of the referenceobject are irrelevant, as is shown by the following paraphrase, where therelation to be expressed is still the same:
(2) a. Maria was standing at a point very close to the window.
Thus the reference object can take any shape here, as long as one can stillconceptualize the located object as being at a point in the direct vicinity of thereference object.
In the following we will discuss only the prototypes of each concept,without going into further extensions within once concept, which eventuallylead to the development of new concepts. It should be born in mind, however,that - concerning extensions within the same domain - transitions from oneconcept to the next take place gradually. Boundaries between the singleconcepts will thus always be fuzzy and not as clear cut as it might appear frommerely considering the respective prototypes.
2.1.1. Locative extensionsVarious extensions now emerge out of the prototypical concept "simple pointof location". Along one chain the notion of a point is sucessively extended toapplications in which the reference object denotes more complex entities.This comprises relations in which the shape of the reference object does notany more permit a paraphrase by "...at a point very close to...", but wouldrather require the application of the preposition on (because the referenceobject is conceptualized as a surface, cf. (3), or in (because the reference objectis conceptualized as a three-dimensional space, cf. (4)):
(3) My friends had a party at the beach yesterday.
(4) The meeting at Manchester was illegal.
The extension to the concept of "extended location" is motivated by aconceptualization of the relevant reference object "simply as a place on themap" (Leech and Svartvik 1975:85).
There are, however, limitations to this type of extension. With certainverbs that specify the relation between located object and reference object areduction to a simple point of location in the conceptualization of a largerarea is not possible:
(5) *Peter has lived at London for some time.
That live, for example, blocks the application of at when the reference objectis a city would seem to be due to the fact that here the more dominantconceptualization of the city as a three-dimensional space is triggered, whichrequires the use of the preposition in.
2.2. Intentional concepts
A further variation in the features of the relation results, at least for appro-priate reference objects, in the concept of at that expresses an "intentionallocation". This extension can be seen as a projection of the above twoconcepts of "simple point of location" and "extended location", in the sensethat the speaker refers to exactly the same point of location, either simple orextended, but emphasises the respective regular intention that goes with therelation of being located at the relevant reference object. Cf.
In (6) the idea of waiting for the bus prevales over the mere indication of theplace where Peter was waiting. In fact, the sentence
(6) a. Peter was waiting by the bus stop.
places Peter at exactly the same point of location as (6), but does not triggerthe desired intentional interpretation. Sentence (7) expresses the idea that thechildren are learning. If one wanted to specify merely the point of locationwithout this intentional reading a phrase such as, "... inside the schoolbuilding" would be appropriate. In sentence (8) the use of at indicates thatTom and Jerry are visiting the zoo. Using the preposition in here would makeit more likely that they are zoo animals. This difference nicely illustrates thedistinction between, as it were, a bare locative relation on the one hand, and alocative relation that is viewed from a particular intentional aspect on theother.
The abstract "intentional location" concept of at is an instance of a doublymotivated concept. Both the topological point prototype and its locativeextension motivate a mapping onto this abstract domain, where the intentio-nal aspect dominates over the actual dimensions of the reference object.
Tne extension from one concept to another does not always occur linearly,but often the development of a new concept is guided by extending thecharacteristic features of a specific concept plus incorporating features ofanother. It is this fact in particular that supports the idea of taking aprototype approach to the problem of representing wordmeaning. With aset-theoretical classification a definite description, which must hold for eachsingle instance, will decide over the membership in a certain category. But nosuch classification could account for the fact that in some applications wefind more and in others we find less of the characteristic features whichdetermine the meaning of a specific word, as in our case of the preposition at.
In an extension of the concept "intentional location" the idea of denoting alandmark is completely abandoned:
(9) Maine and Spender are hard at work right now.
(10) As it is, there are very few places left now where one can be at ease.
The af-phrases in these sentences do not any more answer a wAere-question,but refer to a certain "state of affairs or mind".
2.3. Scale concepts
The concept of a scale forms the basis fora number of extensions. The notionof a point is applied here in the specific sense of a point on a scale.
Also Herskovits notes that "the range of uses of at indicates that at is agraded concept" (1986:51). Evidence for this view is provided by the supple-
mentary use of modifiers such as exactly, precisely, etc. Her understanding ofthe graded concept, however, comprises even those realizations which weclassified under the prototypical concept of "simple point of location" (see(11)) or its locative extension to "extended location" (see (12)):
(11) The car is at the corner of 6th and Broadway.
(12) There is a Film of oil at the surface of the water. (Herskovits 1986:51)
The reason for this is, as mentioned above, that she considers any applicationof at to express a relation in which the located and the reference objectcoincide more or less. The actual distance then is determined by the nature ofthe objects in question. Since she only considers the spatial senses of a/thisgeneralization may be justifiable to some extent, although it leads intoproblems already in the locative domain, with the distinction between at andon, as we saw above. Things get worse, however, when we also want toaccount for the abstract senses of at. It will be very hard for example to justifya graded concept as a basis for the abstract concept of "intentional location".
In the present analysis the idea of a graded concept will therefore only beassumed for those cases which - because of the kind of object involved -suggest an explicit scale, divided into particular units. The scale conceptemployed in sentence (13) is an instance of the locative "distance" concept, acentrally-motivated sense:
(13) He could pass us by at a thousand yards, and we still would not misshim.
While in this sentence the underlying unit, yards, is of a concrete nature, anabstract scale concept on the basis of speed-units is realized in the followingapplication:
(14) Why are those ambulances driving around at breakneck speed?
This "abstract scale" concept, a projection from the corresponding concreteconcept, furthermore comprises gradings on the basis of price-units (buysomething at a certain price), moods (keep the morale at fever pitch), etc.
For the concrete as well as for the abstract scale concept it holds that thescale itself can be horizontally or vertically oriented. The conceptualizationsof the end-point of an arbitrary scale reflect these types of orientationaccordingly - e.g. at the beginning, at the bottom. Furthermore phrases suchas at best, at most, at least, or at all also belong to the abstract scale concept.
2.3.1. Temporal ConceptsAlso the temporal concepts of at could be viewed as conceptualizing areference point on a scale, consisting of varying time units. The reason for
discussing them separately lies in the observation that they additionallydisplay a structure analogous to all of the three locative concepts. Thecorrespondence can be summarized as follows:
- point of location versus point of time,- local distance versus temporal distance,- expanded location versus period of time.
Examples of these temporal concepts of at are found in (13)—(15) in corres-ponding order:
(15) It was Sunday, August 25th at 3:32 standard British summer time.
(16) Well, this is the best I could do at short notice.
(17) He couldn't study at night because he was afraid of the dark.
With these temporal concepts we find again the phenomenon of multiplemotivation. On the one hand they can be seen as further instances of theconcept of an abstract scale, just as the domain of price, velocity, etc. On theother hand, they may also be viewed as projections from the correspondinglocative relations, which clearly sets them apart from other abstract scalerealizations. A further reason for treating them separately is that they moti-vate further applications.
2.3.2. Causal conceptsAs an extension of the abstract concept "point of time" one can view thedevelopment of the causal concept of at. Consider the following opposition:
(18) Peter left the house at 6 o'clock.
(19) Peter left the house at his father's signal.
In (19) the aspect of denoting a point in time recedes in favour of the moreprominent causal component. The latter can trigger any kind of action as in(19), or an emotion as in (20):
(20) My husband and I confess ourselves extremely surprised at suchunrefined behaviour.
2.4. Directionality
Another concept of at, which requires a reference object that is conceptuali-zed as a goal, again emerges directly out of the prototype "simple point oflocation". When the reference object is a point of location, its interpretation,
however, is restricted to a position reached after a certain movement, jour-ney, etc.:
(21) The train arrived at Victoria Station.
While the movement itself is not included in the a/-relation tied to this "goal"concept, it does form part of the relation in its extension to reference objectsconceptualized as a "target":
(22) Bella snatched at the lipstick.
Within this directionality chain of extension the criterion of immediatevicinity plays again an important role: the reference object remains unaffec-ted by the relevant af-relations. The conceptualization stops, as it were,immediately before the reference object. Thus sentence (22) is to be interpre-ted in the sense that Bella reached out for the lipstick, but most likely did notget it. And although (for technical reasons) a train arriving at Victoria Stationwill usually enter (and in this sense affect) the station, this is not a matter ofthe af-relation. A bus arriving at the station makes this point clear.
Modification of the kind of movement in the "target" notion of at yields afurther extension of the concept. While in (22) we are concerned with actual,physical movement, sentence (23) - the prototypical realization of an "abs-tract target" notion - is concerned with an abstract kind of movement:
(23) Have you looked at the newspaper headlines today?
Again the reference object, within this chain of extension the "focussedobject" (cf. Radden 1981:154), is not affected. This is well demonstrated bythe opposition between (24) and (24a); cf.:
(24) John has been talking to his neighbour for hours.
(24) a. John has been talking at his neighbour for hours.
While with the use of the preposition to the neighbour is seen as an interlocu-tor, the use of at indicates that only John has been talking. The application in(24a), in fact, lies on the borderline to the concept of "abstract intentionaltarget" (see below), since the speaker could also - instead of merely beingcarried away in talking - have had the intention of hurting or humiliating theother person.
Within the abstract target concept the reference object is conceptualized asa point of focus for the relevant action or event. In an extension of thisconcept of abstract target we find again the principle which we already saw inan extension of the locative concept of at, i.e. the extension from a referenceobject that is a point of location to a reference object that is a two- or
three-dimensional area. Just as for the locative uses, the actual dimensions ofthe reference object are irrelevant for this concept of "focussed domain",since the reference object only serves as a point of reference. Examples of thefocussed domain concept often refer to a capability of some sort, as in (25):
(25) Bill is quite clever at organizing things, but not much good at any-thing else.
The same distinction as in (24) and (24a) can be found in the concept of"intentional target", the second extension of the concrete target concept; cf.(26) vs. (26a):
(26) Peter threw the ball to Mary.
(26) a. Peter threw the ball at Mary.
Again, the difference between these two applications lies in the fact that inone case the reference object is seen as a partner, while in the other it isexcluded from the action and is seen only as the target the respective action isaimed at. Thus in sentence (26) the ball was thrown for Mary to catch,whereas (26a) suggests a negative intention accompanying the throwing of theball - it was meant to hit Mary.
By removing the component of actual physical movement towards thereference object while maintaining the intentionality feature, the intentionaltarget concept is extended to the concept of "abstract intentional target"; aconcept that could equally well be construed as resulting from the abstracttarget concept by adding the intentionality feature. The concept of at with anabstract intentional target as a reference object is illustrated in sentence (27)(which also shows that the intention need not always be negative).
(27) She kept smiling at him all evening long.
To what extent the abstract intentional meaning of at is productive cannotbetter be demonstrated than by the following sentence:
(28) On no account allow a Vogon to read poetry at you. (Adams 1982:45)
How could one have told the reader any better than by the use at, whichstands in direct opposition to the preposition to here, that Vogon poetry wasunbearable and that it was one of the most terrible tortures when a Vogonread it at someone?
In fact, it is by these kinds of extensions that the whole concept of at issubject to constant change. Certain applications may gradually acquiredifferent interpretations, or, as mentioned in the beginning, whole sensechains may even become obsolete, as was the case with its meaning compo-nent "source".
The last concept to be discussed here establishes the link between the targetconcepts and the scale concepts. This extension, doubly motivated by theabstract intentional target concept as well as by the concept of cause, ismainly found in the context of emotion predicates:
(29) I'm not sick at you, just sick with fear.
The conceptualization here shows a complex structure: The reference object,here the addressee, is at the same time the cause and the target of the speak-er's emotion. Within this concept the reference object carries the feature[+ animate], which it inherits from the motivating abstract intentional tar-get concept.
The reason for this is that it is senseless to direct ones emotions at aninanimate object, which can neither be held responsible for its annoyingbehaviour, nor show any kind of reaction to the aroused emotions (cf.Radden 1985:183), unless, of course, there is a possibility for personification.Accordingly, (30) - with no way of personifying an earthquake - is unaccep-table, whereas (30a) is fine. Cf.
(30) *Susan is mad at the earthquake.
(30) a. Susan is mad at her car.
The overall concept of the preposition at is presented in the diagram, illustrat-ing how the various extensions are chained to one another. It shows the basicconcept of "simple point of location" as the best and most central case whichdisplays the most characteristic features of at: the notion of a (dimensionless)point as reference object, and the location of the located object in its imme-diate vicinity.
All of the extensions display a gradual decrease in prototypicality. Never-theless, each single concept of at still bears enough of the basic characteristicsto be clearly distinguished from other concepts such as on, in, or to, as hasbeen shown with selected examples.
CONCLUSION
By assuming the notion of a prototype in order to represent the overallconcept of the preposition at, we have been able to give a plausible model forhow its various senses are related to each other. An important observationthat emerges from this analysis is that the extensions from one concept toanother may take place gradually, via intermediate concepts.
Another important fact to note is that each extension is motivated, but notpredictable. Not just any relation that is conceptualized analogously to aparticular ar-relation would automatically trigger the application of at. Fromcases like at 3 o'clock, at night, or at Christmas, one may want to derive atemporal scale with days as units and hence have expressions like "at Mon-day". Still, for days as reference objects only the preposition on is used.
In classifying the sentences in our corpus, different subdivisions intoindependent concepts would have been possible. The temporal extensions,for example, could have been classified under the abstract scale concept, orwe could have taken all abstract scale concepts, including the causal one, toconstitute one single concept. The same holds for the concepts along thedirectionality sense chain. As we mentioned above, Herskovits (1986:128),investigating only the spatial senses of at, on her part arrives at a classifica-tion of the various spatial applications that is rather different from the oneproposed here. Her suggested structure might have turned out differently,however, if she had considered the criterion of immediate vicinity, which webelieve cannot be neglected in an account for the structure of the full conceptof the preposition at.
Furthermore, not every a/-phrase can be clearly classified. Very often acertain application of at is motivated by a number of concepts. The phrase"stop at a pub", for example, displays the characteristics of both the conceptof goal and the concept of intentional location. Since we assume with Lindner(1983) that a preposition is meaningful in each application, we did not dealwith the different syntactic constellations - prepositional phrases, verb-phrase, or adjectival phrase - that we find for the various concepts. Neitherdid we dwell in detail here on the restrictions with certain collocations imposeon the use of at (except for *live at, cf. above). In a full and fully adequateexplanation for the uses of at, however, the latter deserves just as muchattention as do the characteristics of the involved objects.
Static locative concepts, for example, seem to require reference objectswith the feature [-animate]. Cf.:
(31) *The children are at Maria.
(32) *Susan is sitting at the roses in the backyard, reading a book.
And also salience seems to be required of the reference object. Thus one cansay
unless the particular chair referred to has a very specific or prominentmeaning for the speaker and hearer of this phrase.
For reasons of space these and further relevant considerations have herenot been given the full attention they deserve3. The intention of this analysiswas more modest in the sense that it only wanted to give a description, first,of the motivating components for the development of the various senses ofthe preposition at, and, second, of the relationship between them.
IBM Deutschland GmbHScience and Technology - LJLOGP.O. Box 80 08 SOD-7000 Stuttgart 80
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
A large part of this paper is based on research on prototype semantics andmetaphorization which I carried out in 1983 and 1984 in close cooperationwith Giinter Radden at the University of Hamburg.
NOTES
1. I use these two notions with Herskovits (1986). In the literature one can also find thedistinction "figure" versus "ground" (cf. Talmy 1983).2. Our investigation is based on data drawn from a corpus maintained at the University ofLouvain, containing contemporary British theatre plays (which yielded about 5000 sentenceswith at), and the London-Lund-Corpus of Spoken English (another 2000 sentences). Further-more, the reactions of 30 British students and teachers to a questionnaire containing some 100sentences about the usage of the preposition at served for verification of the concepts aspresented here.3. A more detailed account is provided in Wesche (1984).
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