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l lA M A G E O O N T R O L

: B A C K G R O U N D1 . ATLANTICO N V E Y O R (ACO)was taken up :fromtrade on 1 6 April 1 9 8 2 at Liverpool.She was oonverted at Devonportfor her ferry oarrier role, and sailed south on25 April to transfer these airoraft to the oarriers. She embarkeda . large amountof other stores (see Annex - ATLANTICO N V E Y O R - S H I P ' S C A R G O L O A D I N G ) , muohofit of a hazardous and/or inflammablenature. The risks assooiated with the oargo,distributed throughout the ship, were well appreoiated,as were ine problems offi:t'cElfightingand damage oontrol gi'V~ the large, open plan oargo deck spaces with1i -_litleor no watertight integrity betweendeoks and the use of wooden(WORXHA.US)deoks in oertain areas. Risks assooiated with flying operations from each of theship's two flight deoks were also appreoiatedand required speoial measures.2. The ship underwent a large numberof modifioations to equip her for her roleand those for damagecontrol inoluded:

a. Upperdeck firemain system for RNfirefighting equipment, for aircraftemergenoies (details inoluded at AnnexB). ,I .b. Additions to the internal communicationssystems to link proposed damageoontrol bases (Appendix1 to this Annex). j ..

c. The automatic spray system in the magazine areas was converted to amanual system.

Tb.eship also embarkeda large amountof extra RNfirefighting equipment, both forflight deok emergencies and for normal ship damageoontrol purposes, based on afrigate's normal outfit.3" IniaJ.ly, on sailing fromDevonport, the firefighting and damageoontrol (DC)organisation was based onMerohantNavy(MN)prooedures. This wasmainly beceusethe ;1MerchantNavyoffioers and ratings formed the only possible organisation inthe time available. They also bad the ship knowledS'e,not yet shared by the some\ 1 2 0 servioe personnel whohad joined during the previous week. However,soon after

J sailing, the organisation was ohangedto follow recognised 1m prooedures and practioe.Additionally, hourly fire and seourity rounds throughout the ship were instigated.D A M A G E C O N T R O L .A :R R A N G 1 ! . lM . E N T S

SH IP SY STEM S .,.

4. The ship's fixed firefighting systems are d~scribed in AnnexE.Inter.na1 Communioations5 . The ship's normal internal oommunioationsoonsisted of:

a. A comprehensiveinternal ship1s telephone system, serving much of theship. It's main design shortoomingwas that the .individual reoeivers wereinsecurely mountedand liable to falloff even inheavyweather; oncemorethan about three receivers were off their oradles,in these oircumstances,the whole system failed on overload.b. Limited SP telephones as showninAppendix1 to this .A:nn:lx.

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I6. . A n add!tionaJ. SP telephone systemwas added in Devonport, also as shoWninAppendix1. Sto:t."nPphonesere oarried, but proved to be materiallyunreliable, particularly the RNmodel. The.possibility of employing 'leakyfeeders' in the large internal deok areas was not appreoiated and hence nottried. Arudimentary main broadoast was also installed in Devonportwhiohis shownin detail at Appendix2.7 . Eleptrical System. An outline of the electrical supply system is atAppendix:3. The intercomleoted breakers oould only be olosed remotely fromthe ECR,a design shortoomingwhiohoould have had serious oonsequences;they could also be closed manually. Themain generation was.at 440volt60 H z :; phase, the sameas in RNships, whichwas particularly fortunategiven the large variety of oonverted supplies required for the extrafacilitiesinstaJ.led whenthe ship was oonverted at Devonport. Main servioesonly had.one supply to them, i.e. normal supply only, and there vas.noprOVision for emergencysupplies. Onlyone trained 11Mlectrician was borne,the Chief Eieotrioian, and he required assistanoe fromnaval ratings in orderto oopewith the extra work. The drafting of an xxxxxxx to STUliTmaybeneoessary infuture.O RG AN ISA TIO N A ND TR AIN IN G8. MerohantNaN Organisation. It is impprtant to understand the MNorganisa.tion, as it has a bearing on subsequent events. This was the basioorganisa.tion on sailing fromDevonport. In any fire, other than in theEngine Room,the XXXXXXXXXXXXX} wouldpersonally lead firef1ghting efforts.Inthis he was supported by:

a. No.1Fire Party, conSisting of about four ratings, for.minganAttack Party.

):

b. Vent Party, led by. XXXXXXXXXxxxxxx: to olose downall vents andopenings preparator,r to the possible use of 002 g,ystems;thereafteravailable as additional manpowerto the Fire Party. However,in normalci:rcumsta.nces,ventilation laps were shut once the ship sailed, as itwas not normal practioe for there to be movementinoargo spaces duringa passage. Whilst employedinhe STUFl ' role, ventilation to oargo spaceswas rag'Ularly used beoause of the necessary movementof military stores;this was the situation at the time of the missile attack and all naps were open.c, First Aid Party, under the Purser, but also used for marshallingfirefighting equipmentas required.d. :Boa.tParty, under KXXXXXXXXXXXJ( preparing boats for abandoningship_ ,J / I but only the former could be w /Aconsidered to be n:i,n-datett Nosmokebombswere available to give somerealityto the exercises and. it is doubtful, given the large open betweell""decksareas,whether they wouldhave been useful.1-3. The parties were formedmainly of RNpersonnel, with a numberof trainedMNpersonnel inaddition to .provide detailed ship' knowledge. Inthe case ofthe After DCFarly the 2nd Officer was put incharge, a decision apparentlydetermined moreby his. rack than any practical firefigbting experience. Themajority of BNpersonnel were FAAratings frpmMARTSU,hoseknowledgeof shipfirefighting, as distinct from airoraft firef~ghting, was distinotly lim!tedHole ver , the majority of these were Senior Ratings and their experienoe wasa.ble to makeup in part for this lack of detailed knowledgeand ship experience.

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14. Initially, the After DOParty was stationed at CDeoklevel by the"Qathedral" area (aft of the Engine Roomoasing). However, for the reasonsstated by0000( in Appendix1 to Annex0, para 1.12. the Party wasmovedup toits final position.~s movedid not meet with the agreement of the POPrI,but it is oonsidered to have been the right deoision and, in the event, onethat saved a numberof l,'ives.15. Therefore, at the time of the attack, the damagecontrol parties wereinas good a state of preparedness a.s could have been expeoted, given thelimitations of material, training and experienoe.

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FIXE tD FIREFIGI .L ' ING SYSTEI1ffiF IREIY f A Il iI S Y STEr1

1. Afixed system serving hydrants on Port and Starboard sides of theShip from truL~top level (F Deck) through to the Navigational Bridge levelof the superstructure. Additional fire hydrants together with fixed in-linefoaminductors were fitted to the upper deck in the vicinity of the ForwardandAfter flight deck spots as part of the oonversion.2. The firemain system, unlike BNpraotice, provides pnessure to hydrantsonly. The l1N praotice is to maintain a dry systeminnormal oircumstanceswith manual,pumpoperation whencircumstances demand. The system issupplied by 2 inNO120 tons/hou.r pumps, one situated in the EngineRoom,the other in the Stabiliser Compartment(Starboard).3. In ACO'srole as an aircraft carrier, the MNSOPwas adpated to onewherebya fire pumpwas started wheneverthe ship went to flying stations.It was soon realised that with no hydrant take-off, that fire pump damagewouldocour through churning in the pumpcasing and so the procedure was.further adapted to have a bleed off fromone'hydrant to avoid pumpdamage.In the event, this provedunsatisfactor.y as ~craft parked forward andaft were being sprayed by the whippedup outlet fromthe hydrant and damagedid occur to the EngineRoompumpwhenthe hydrant was inadvertently shutoff, resulting in total write off of the pump, Thereafter, with only onei'ire pun i :p available, the MNpractioe was reverted to maintaining a primedsystem and starting the pumpwheneverrequired.4. Theupper deok conversion providing add!tiona! hydrants forward andaft was of the RNinstantaneous connection type, whereas the remainderof the fit above and below this level were of the bayonet oonnection typeresulting in non-compatability so that foambranohpipes oould only be ledand fed from the upper deck.

S PB .IN KL ER S YS TE M5. Supplyby one 120 tons/hour electrically driven :pumpituated intheEngine Room. The system is a heat sensitive automatio operation systememploying.a quartzoid bulk at each sprinkler head. The system embraceda pneumatioally pressurised header tank, whosepressure provides the initialdischarge to a fractured bulb resulting inthe pumpbeing started by pressureswitch as the header tank pressure dec~s.6. Manual starting of the pumpcould be achieved at the Control Roomandlocal position. "7. Abatoh of section oontrol valves situated inthe Sprinkler Roomon theupper deck gave the facility to isolate seotions not required, in'the eventof a fire and thus concentrate the sprinkling effeot on the seotion involved.Thepractioe adopted inATLAN'.rICONVEYORas to isolate Seotions 1 and 2on CDeokwherethe cluster bombswere stowedand break the quartzoid bulbsinthose seotions, thus providing manual control. Inthe event, whenthesesections were reqaired there is no evidence that the sprinkler pumpoperatedafter the initial pressure was released.

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8. Inthe event of failure of this pump)ihe firemain could be bridged tothe sprinkler system through upper deck hydrant hose oonnected to a spr1nkl~rsystemhyd:cantnormally used whentaking a supply from shore. This connectdonwasnot madein ATLANTICONVEYOR.C02FIREEXTINGUISHINGYSTEM

9. ATLANTICONVEYORACO)was equippedwith a oombineddetection andextin8trlshing systemdesigned to monitor and give protection to 45 locationsin the general cargo spaces on A, 13 , C, D, E Deoksand ta.:tlktop level, Portand Starboard BowThruster compartmentswith additional cover for Engine/BoilerRoom,Diesel Generator compartmentand Steering compartment.10. The system compriseda gas bottle stowageright aft on ADecklevel withaccess from the mooringdeck. 515 x 47 kg bottles of C02were stored, gangedup in banks of 12 bottles with a single release lever for each bank. Thebottles discharged to a commoning mainm.a:n;ifoldwhichwas then led bypiping to the Safety Roomwhich contained a ,series of identified location3-w~ ~ves. Fromthis point, the systembecamea dection/extinguishingone wherebythe samepipil'lg led to each outllet wasused for continual andsimUltBneousmonitoring. Extraction fans mountedinthe superstructure drewsamples of air from each protected space and passed themthrough a viewingchamber. The chamberhad direct lightil'lg so arranged that although it wasnormally quite dark, the light illuminated strongly any smokeemanatingfromthe ends of the samplingpipes. Thepipe ends were labelled so that the sourceof smokecould be immediatelylocated. On leaving the viewing chamber, allsamples passed through an automatic detector which soundedan audible alarmw.henthe optical density exceededa pre-determined level.11. Theaction to be taken inthe event of the alarm soundingwas to goimmediately to the viewing chamberin the safety room, identify the locationof the source of the smoke, concurrently all ventilation fans wouldbe crashstopped and ventilation flaps closed by hydraulio action. Havingidentifieda genuine presence of smokeand located its source, the operator wouldthenoperate the appropriate number.iof3-waYvalves to the section(s) involved,effectively isolating the deteetion equipmentfrom the piping and allo~dng adirect llassage from the discllarge manifold to the source of the fire. Theoperator would,then consult a~comprehensivechart, giving details of therecommendedumberof cylinders of CO2to be released to the section involved.)12. It should be emphasisedthat the system ;wasso designed to have an "initial"discharge level to each protected area, which: should contain a normal cargo.fire, thereafter and at set intervals, lesser "del~ed" discharge levels areemployedto J>reventre-igni tioD and help cool the source of the fire.13. Havinf!4Iscertained the amountof gas to be released, the operator wouldthen go to::!.l;hetorage roomand release the appropriate numberof cylindersto effect t a n initial discharge. At later intervals, the operator wouldrevertthe ~y v~.ves back to the monitoring position to assess whether the dischargehad been effe.ctive by the presence of smokein the viewing chamber.

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