YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 1

- Flora Pidoux

One of the Arab world’s poorest nations,

Yemen has been torn apart by a civil war

since 2015. Opposing forces loyal to the

internationally-recognised government

of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi

and that of the Houthi rebel movement,

the conflict also counts international

components which make the situation

harder to resolve. Often regarded as a

proxy war between Saudi Arabia and

Iran, it is hard to see a potential

resolution of the conflict in the near

future. Its continuation war contributes

to the spread of terrorist networks in the

region, and the ever growing number of

Yemeni refugees will have a negative

spill over effect on the neighboring

countries.

Yet another ceasefire was announced

on 19. November 2016.

The first article will focus on the

power struggle entangled in the conflict;

the second will focus on NATO’s ties

with the Gulf region and the parties

involved in the war in Yemen.

Yemen: A Regional Problem with International Consequences

Volume 6 - Issue 11 November 2016

Contents:

A Regional Issue with International Consequences

Mr. Neil Thompson analyzes the power struggles at play in the war in Yem-

en, focusing on the regional implications of the conflict as well as the role

NATO could play in order to contain the consequences of the situation on the

Bab el-Mandeb strait, a crucial point of passage for oil exports.

NATO, Relying on Regional Actors in Yemen

Ms. Flora Pidoux studies the elements at stake in the conflict of Yemen for

the Alliance, highlighting NATO’s backing and reliance on regional powers

such as Saudi Arabia. The potential role the Gulf Cooperation Council could

play in bringing an end to the conflict is also examined.

Pro-government forces have driven the rebels out of most of southern Yemen (Image:AFP)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 2

By Neil Thompson

S ince March 2015 US allies, led by Saudi

Arabia, have been increasingly involved in

a military campaign in Yemen against the

Zaydi Shia fundamentalist rebel movement known as

the Houthis, and their ally, former Yemeni President

Ali Abdullah Saleh. The war has been a controversial

one, with an estimated minimum of 10,000 civilians

being killed or wounded during the struggle, and at

least 2.8 million Yemenis forced to flee their homes

because of it.

Yemen’s collapsing state holds negative

implications for international maritime trade, as the

conflict is occurring near a major trading artery for the

global economy, the Suez Canal-Red Sea shipping

lane, and for regional security for countries on both

sides of the Red Sea, including Saudi Arabia and the

Gulf of Aden. The lack of a deep Yemeni national

identity means that the incomplete fall of Saleh has

seen multiple competing power centre re-emerge.

Owing to the lack of national cohesion, events could

yet see the country break up entirely, pushing nation

building into to the far future. Militarily, NATO

should therefore stay out of this bitter factional civil

war between multiple sides. However, the Alliance

should seek to mitigate the effects of the conflict at sea

where international shipping could be affected by the

belligerents or a fresh wave of piracy.

A Multisided Struggle

The real roots of the present civil war stem from

Yemen’s complex regional and tribal politics, long

predating the Arab Spring which led to the toppling of

Saleh, Yemen’s long-time dictator. Following months of

protests against his rule, a Saudi backed deal saw Saleh

step down in 2012 in favour of his Vice President, Field

Marshal Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Hadi took office after

running in an election as the only candidate for a

transitional presidency, but in 2015 he was overthrown

in turn by the Houthis who allied themselves with the

deposed Saleh. Their long running insurgency had first

developed in the early 2000s under the former dictator’s

rule, but the Houthis saw the chaos of the Arab Spring as

a chance to expand at the expense of the central

weakened government of Saleh’s successor.

Hadi bitterly denounced the Houthi move against him

as a coup, eventually fleeing to Saudi Arabia. A massive

Saudi-led intervention against the Houthis and Saleh

followed in March 2015, by nine Arab states and assorted

mercenary forces. Djibouti and Somalia opened their

airspace, waters and military bases to the coalition whilst

the US accelerated its sale of weapons to coalition states

and provided intelligence and logistical support. The US

and UK have also deployed their military personnel in

the command and control centre responsible for Saudi

airstrikes. Saudi influence has galvanised regional states

to defend the internationally recognised Yemeni

government. However, the kingdom’s military campaign

has also provided an opening for AQAP and IS to seize

territory in Yemen from which they operate in relative

safety, and threatens to internationalise the Yemeni civil

war.

A Regional Battle for Influence

An example of this internationalisation came on

A Regional Issue with International Consequences

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 3

October 12 when the US alleged that Houthi forces had

fired missiles on American naval assets and struck back

by targeting the rebel’s radar systems. Previously

American attacks in Yemen had been limited to targeting

members of Sunni militant groups in the fragmented

state such as al-Qaeda’s local franchise, al-Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which found refuge in

Yemen after largely being driven out of neighbouring

Saudi Arabia in 2009 AQAP.

Houthi hostility to America predates the US backing

of Saudi Arabia during

its intervention on

behalf of President

Hadi’s feeble regime

in March 2015. As a

minority Shi’a

community in a Sunni

majority nation, they

are fierce enemies of

Sunni fundamentalist

movements such as IS

or AQAP, which view

them as apostates to be

exterminated. But

they also oppose US

military involvement

in the fight against the

Sunni radicals as an

unacceptable infringement of Yemeni sovereignty. Now

that the US has supported direct military intervention

against the group, this position has hardened and

allegedly led to the recent missile attacks against US navy

ships. Though the Houthis deny their forces carried out

the attacks analysts speculate the rebels may have

acquired Iranian anti-ship missiles or seized these from

captured Yemeni army stocks. The result is direct

hostilities have occurred between the Houthis and the

US for the first time.

Meanwhile the Saudis see the Shi’a Houthis as

coming under the influence of Iran, though proof of

Iranian backing to the rebels remains limited. As such

Riyadh perceived the overthrow of the Hadi

government through the lens of its struggle for influence

in the Middle East with Tehran, rather than an internal

development in Yemen’s turbulent politics. Thanks to

forceful Saudi and US support, President Hadi’s forces

have been able to retake Aden and hold onto large parts

of central Yemen. But the Houthis still hold the capital

Sana’a and the Saudi

led coalition has been

unable to dislodge

the rebels from the

parts of Yemen

unsympathetic to the

internationally

recognised

government.

The exact

extent of any Iranian

backing for the

Houthis is unknown

but likely to remain

small. The Houthis

do not follow the

same branch of Shi’a

Islam as the Iranian regime and the Yemeni militia is not

influenced by Tehran to anywhere near the same extent

that Lebanon’s Hezbollah is, for example. Nonetheless

there are credible reports that weapons transfers sent

through neighbouring Oman, said to include missiles,

ammunition and small arms, have been stepped up by

Iran to the Houthis in recent months. Yemeni and

senior regional officials accuse the Omanis of turning a

blind eye to the flow of arms through their territory and

Who controls Yemen as of 10 October 2016 (Image: Risk Intelligence /BBC)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 4

of failing to aggressively crack down on the transfers.

Western officials have been more sceptical about the

scale of Iranian backing, pointing out that the Houthis

secured an arsenal of weaponry when entire divisions of

Yemen’s army, allied to former Yemeni President Saleh,

defected to them at the start of the civil war last year.

These included the crews of three Chinese-made Type

021 missile boats armed with C.801 anti-ship missiles.

Some analysts claim that an unknown number of these

C.801 missiles and their launchers were installed on

trucks by Houthi forces and coupled with various surface-

search radars to create an improvised missile system. The

Houthis had been using these weapons without success to

strike at the Saudi coalition’s naval blockade against

Yemen for about a year until they managed a direct hit

against the catamaran Swift, a former US Navy catamaran

now in Emirati service. This system was destroyed in

retaliatory strikes by American forces after the Houthis

targeted US ships but Tehran can easily supply its proxies

with Iranian made replacements and the training to use

them. Since Iran offers a quasi-recognition of the Houthis

as Yemen’s legitimate government and certainly sees the

civil war in Yemen through the matrix of its regional

conflict with Saudi Arabia, this would not be impossible

to envisage. Tehran believes backing the Houthis in

Yemen against Saudi Arabia is a counter move offsetting

Saudi Arabia’s support for Syrian rebels fighting Iran’s ally

Bashar al-Assad. It carries the risk of potentially

antagonising the United States at a time the two countries

have warily cooperated over Iran’s nuclear programme,

but Tehran may think of Washington’s approval of Saudi

action in Yemen as a sop from the Obama administration

to Riyadh. When the nuclear deal was signed in 2015

sceptical Gulf countries warned Washington it would

only embolden Iran in conflicts in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen

and elsewhere. The Iranians may be gambling that at least

in Yemen the US will not care enough to do anything

except continue reassure the Saudis that they remain

committed to defending Saudi Arabia’s interests.

No Kosovo

The US and other Western nations are right to hesitate

before committing themselves, either individually or

collectively though NATO, to a military campaign aimed

at resolving Yemen’s intractable differences. Yemen was

only formally united as a country in 1990 and has

remained deeply divided even during the height of Saleh’s

dictatorship. In many ways, its constant tribal skirmishes

and kidnappings mirror the state of perpetual clan conflict

seen in its near neighbour Somalia across the Gulf of

Aden. The new Houthi Revolutionary Committee has

been unable to defeat tribesmen opposed to it in central

Yemen despite holding its ground against the Saudis and

their allies on its home ground in Yemen’s north-western

areas.

Meanwhile, although Saudi money did much to keep

Yemen afloat before the war, this has now gone. As a

result, the Yemeni economy is in freefall while civilians

are on the brink of starvation. Yemen’s feuding factions

include hostile southern secessionists and IS and AQAP

militants who would react violently to any Western

intervention on behalf of the Hadi regime. Heavy

casualties would be inevitable and any post-conflict clean

up would take years and cost billions, particularly one

aiming at a Kosovo or Bosnian style nation building

programme to bring a permanent end to civil war. No

Western government would be willing to meet this

commitment at present and any failure would damage the

prestige and perceived value of NATO.

The presence of major regional powers backing

different sides in the present civil war also means that

Yemen makes an especially poor choice for a major

NATO intervention. Admittedly Yemen is lower on the

Iranian priority list than it is for Saudi Arabia; Iran is

ultimately much more willing to relinquish Yemen than

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 5

cede influence in Iraq or Lebanon. But it is a useful card

to have, and Tehran will keep playing it for as long as it

can, because the Iranian regime knows how weak its

proxies are, making Iran’s major rival look through

their defiance. Riyadh has always considered Yemen to

be in its backyard, and insisted that foreign countries,

including the United States, follow the Saudi lead when

making deals with its troublesome neighbour.

Inserting NATO forces into this conflict would be

unlikely to end the fighting in Yemen entirely as long as

Riyadh remains determined to end the war on its

terms. Iran could step up its support to compensate for

any NATO troop

surge, setting the

stage for a wider

escalation beyond

Yemen if Western

armies are being

constantly

attacked by

Iranian weapons.

At a time when

Europe is already

strained by

refugees from the

war in Syria, any

escalation of war

in the Middle East would be a disaster which would

expose divergent US and European interests.

A Job for NATO: Maritime security

The Houthi attacks on shipping passing through the

Gulf of Aden have highlighted one valuable role for

NATO forces — maritime security. Indeed, the

Houthis gained access to missile systems which present

a real danger to international shipping in the Gulf of

Aden and the nearby strait, Bab al-Mandeb. The strait is

a major shipping lane between the Red Sea and the

Gulf of Aden leading into the Indian Ocean, and any

Houthi attempt to disrupt the passage of international

shipping would have massive financial implications for

logistics and insurance companies involved in the

maritime sector. It would also be an economic disaster

for Egypt, which controls the Suez Canal connecting

the Gulf region and Asia to Europe and North

America. Egypt has committed warships to support

coalition operations against the Houthis and the rebels

may calculate that targeting the economies of Saudi

Arabia’s allies would be a good way to weaken the

coalition supporting

its domestic enemies.

Missile launchers and

their radar systems

have proven

vulnerable to US

countermeasures but

there are also reports

that the Houthis have

used small speed

boats to support their

missile attacks on

coalition and US

vessels. These only

present a danger to

unarmed support ships like the Swift or to civilian

vessels but these are precisely the vessels which would

be vulnerable if the Houthis decided to switch tactics

and start performing suicide attacks or hijackings in the

Gulf of Aden or the straits. There are precedents for

this — in 2000 the USS Cole was hit by a speed boat

packed with explosives while it was being refuelled in

Yemen's Aden harbour. Meanwhile hijackings by

Somali pirates using small boats to approach and board

undefended civilian vessels mean ships passing through

A delegation from Yemen’s Coast Guard and Navy, headed by Colonel Abdul-Hafed Al-Wali, paid a visit to the Commander of NATO’s Counter-Piracy Task Force 508 (CTF-508),

Rear Admiral (ESP N) Eugenio Diaz del Rio in March 2014. The meeting took place on board ESPS ALVARO DE BAZAN which is currently conducting counter piracy patrols in the

Gulf of Aden. (Photo: NATO Maritime Command—MARCOM)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 6

the Gulf of Aden have required a permanent

international naval taskforce to protect them. Even

before Yemen’s civil war reached its present heights

there were fears that a devastated Yemen could serve

as a new hub for piracy.

NATO should consider the possibility that the

Houthis could adopt this tactic or encourage and

tolerate the

emergence of

pirate groups on

their territory as

a form of

economic

warfare against

the Saudi

coalition and its

Western

supporters. This

would function

similarly to the

way Iran

presently

sponsors the

Houthi

‘government’ as

a means of

pressuring Saudi Arabia without fighting an open war

against them. This could be modelled on the effort to

suppress Somalian piracy, which NATO has been

helping to deter and disrupt since 2008, protecting

vessels and helping to increase the general level of

security in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa

and in the Indian Ocean. As part of this, NATO is

currently leading Operation Ocean Shield in the

region and working in close collaboration with the

European Union’s Operation Atalanta, the US-led

Combined Task Force 151 and individual country

contributors. Ocean Shield is scheduled to terminate in

December 2016 but with the rise of the Houthi threat

the alliance should shift its attention to the other side of

the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

Conclusion

Yemen would be a highly unsuitable place for NATO

intervention by air or on land. The interests of the

Alliance at stake in

Yemen are simply

not high enough yet

to justify

intervening in what

is essentially a civil

war between

Yemeni factions,

aggravated by the

sectarian struggle

between Iran and

Saudi Arabia. The

cost of maintaining

peace and security

in Yemen would be

staggering at a time

when the Alliance

needs to focus on

more urgent

matters, such as deterring Russian adventurism in

Eastern Europe. This could change if there is an

emergence of a jihadist emirate along the style of the IS

caliphate declared in Iraq and Syria or the takeover of

northern Mali in 2012. But for now, AQAP and IS in

Yemen have not reached such threatening heights, while

the arrival of NATO units to Yemen would merely

provide targets of opportunity and ideological

justification to the Sunni terrorist networks currently

operating there. What would be of great value in light of

the demonstrated Houthi interest and ability to hit

Yemen, strategically located near key shipping routes and bordering oil-rich Saudi Arabia

(Image: L. Saubadu / K. Tian / C. Mutto, cam/gil/jj (AFP/File))

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 7

vessels passing through the Bab al-Mandeb strait is the

creation of a new NATO naval task force modelled on its

Somali predecessor to help deter future attacks and

enforce freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, the Bab al-

Mandeb and elsewhere around the world.

Neil Thompson is a Contributing Analyst at

geostrategic analysis and business consultancy Wikistrat

and a blogger at the Foreign Policy Association. His work

has appeared in the Diplomat, the Economist Intelligence

Unit, the International Security Network, the

Independent, the Financial Times, and various other

publications. He holds an MA in the international

relations of East Asia and is presently based in London.

Al Arabiya, “First Iran flight lands in Shiite-held Yemen

capital”, March 2015 Al Araby, "Could Yemen become the next base for

pirates?", February 2015 Al Araby, “Houthis sign huge finance deal with Iran”,

March 2015 Critical Threats, "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula",

October 2016 European Council on Foreign Relations, “Mapping the

Yemen Conflict”, October 2016 NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM, "MARCOM

factsheet, Operation Ocean Shield", October 2016 NATO, "Counter-Piracy Operations", July 2016 Navy.mil: The Official Website of the United States Navy,

“US Military Strikes Radar Sites in Yemen Involved in Recent Missile Launches Threatening USS Mason”, October 2016

Politico, "The Giant Al Qaeda Defeat That No One’s Talking About", May 2016

Reuters, "Arab coalition says targets Houthi forces after ship attack", October 2016

Reuters, "Exclusive: Iran steps up weapons supply to Yemen's Houthis via Oman - officials", October 2016

Reuters, "Iran leaders blast Saudi over Yemen, stress support for Assad", May 2015

Reuters, "UAE says Houthi attack on ship in shipping lane was 'act of terrorism", October 2016

Sic Semper Tyrannis, "Who done what?", October 2016 The Financial Times, "Houthis take control of Yemeni

government", February 2016 The Financial Times, "NATO panel aims to beef up anti-

piracy patrols off Somalia", December 2008

The Long War Journal, “Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2016”, October 2016

The Washington Institute, "Yemen's Forever War: The Houthi Rebellion", July 2010

The Washington Post, "No, Yemen’s Houthis actually aren’t Iranian puppets", May 2016

War Is Boring, "To Threaten Ships, the Houthis Improvised a Missile Strike Force", October 2016

About the author

Bibliography

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 8

of territory.

Backed by the United States, the Saudi-led coalition

has so far been unsuccessful in reinstating President

Hadi, who was forced to flee in 2015, and in restoring

peace in the country. Although Western countries have

preferred playing a more indirect role in the conflict in

Yemen, NATO is not standing far behind the regional

efforts, as the Allies also have interests at stake in Yemen

and in the Arabian Peninsula in general. While the Gulf

countries’ involvement is motivated by religious

considerations (the Houthis are Shi’a Muslims, while

countries such as Saudi Arabia are Sunni), more

elements are to be considered. For the Gulf, it is the

opposition to Iran which allegedly backs the Houthis

militia that also pushed them to intervene in Yemen –

this factor can most probably explain why the West is

not intervening directly. Most prominently, NATO’s

concerns in Yemen are related to terrorism, as Yemen is

said to harbour branches of Al Qaeda and continuous

instability could increase ISIL’s foothold in the country,

further jeopardizing the long-term stability of the

region.

This article focuses on NATO’s indirect involvement

in the conflict in Yemen. First, the implications for the

fight against terrorism will be explored. Second, the

relationship with the Gulf countries will be analysed.

Third, the role of the GCC in potentially resolving the

Yemen war will be in focus. Finally, the broader risks

associated with the Yemeni conflict will be discussed.

Fighting Terrorism

Yemen has been proved to be Al Qaeda’s host nation

in the Arabian Peninsula, a branch of the terrorist

NATO, Relying on Regional Actors in Yemen

By Flora Pidoux

F ar from making the headlines in the

Western world, the conflict which has

been tearing Yemen apart for the past five

years has widely stayed under the radar, with more

emphasis being put on Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The

situation in the southern-most country of the Arabian

Peninsula is, however, worth looking into, considering

the potential destabilizing effects this war could have

on the security of the Middle East and the world in

general, in light of the interests at stake.

The war in Yemen regroups numerous aggravating

factors that make a resolution in the near future

unlikely: intrinsic elements (political distrust,

corruption, oil distribution, water, religious and clan

divisions), as well as external influences seem to

reinforce one another, making the country spiral

deeper and deeper into chaos. The international

community has paid some, although faint, interest to

the matter, as illustrated by the numerous United

Nations Security Council Resolution and the

deployment of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees (UNHCR) in Yemen. It is Saudi Arabia

which has taken the lead in countering the Houthis’

insurgency in the hope of reinstated stability in the

country. More specifically, Riyadh, supported by 10

countries from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

and the larger Middle East and North African (MENA)

region. In effect, this has meant the deployment of air,

naval and land capabilities (Operation Decisive Storm

and Restoring Hope) following Yemeni President Abd

-Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s plea for help to the Security

Council of March 2015 following the Houthis’ seizing

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 9

organization said to be one of the most active in the

world. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is an

important threat due to its alleged technical expertise

and global reach, as well as ever-growing links with ISIL.

It is therefore no surprise that the Alliance has some

interest in stabilizing the country which in effect would

enable the return of President Hadi. Such appeasement

would prevent the expansion of terrorist networks

which tend to exploit chaos to expand their reach, as

illustrated in Syria.

Answering questions during a joint press conference

with former Supreme Allied Commander

Transformation General Jean-Paul Paloméros on 25

March 2015, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, when

asked about the situation in Yemen, declared the

following:

So we are deeply concerned about the situation

in many parts of the Middle East, North Africa and

also in Yemen. Because we see this as a part of a

pattern where we see violence, terrorism spreading

across the Middle East and parts of Africa and

North Africa. And, and that’s the reason why we

have to do many different things and also the reason

why we have to be prepared for the long haul, that

this will take time… But I think what we see in

Yemen just underlines the seriousness of the impact

of terrorist violence and violence spreading around

and we have to stand united and we have to work

together with other organizations to counter that

challenge.

In speeches, the current international efforts

deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen seem to

be taken together. This would indeed make sense as the

Alliance strives in all these countries to fight off the rise

of terrorism which has taken ground in these countries.

The geostrategic importance of the Bab al-Mandab is also

to protect to secure the European members of NATO’s

oil supplies. Although NATO has been taking a less

direct and active role in Yemen, it seems like everyone

has the same objective.

A Foot in the Gulf

During the press conference, Stoltenberg further

emphasized the role of backing Jordan in an effort to

reinforce regional partners’ defence capabilities. Just as

with the case of Saudi Arabia, NATO is helping

indirectly, giving the means to their partners to fight off

threats that destabilize the Middle East, hoping that

conflicts will stop through a regional effort before it

impacts the Alliance’s territory. In Yemen, NATO is

thus leading from behind through the individual

involvement of its members. Sec. Gen. Stoltenberg

declared that all the Allies were contributing in the

efforts in stabilizing Yemen, one way or another, but

not directly. For example, the United States and the

United Kingdom have been helping the Saudi-led

coalition with logistical support and intelligence.

This strategy of leading from behind seems to have

been made more and more common by the Alliance,

preferring to build stronger ties in the Middle East in

order to help train and share military expertise with

regional actors. In turn, the Allies expect that this

expertise will help its partners in fighting local threats

before they potentially reach Europe and North

America.

These efforts are illustrated by the setting up of the

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Founded in 2004,

this partnership “aims to contribute to long-term global

and regional security by offering countries of the

broader Middle East region practical bilateral security

cooperation with NATO.” So far, only Bahrain, Qatar,

Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have joined, while

Saudi Arabia and Oman have shown interest in the

initiative but not yet accepted the invitation. Efforts

have been put into persuading Riyadh to join, which

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 10

would also enable NATO to have some degree of

control over a country that seems to have been

distancing itself from the United States, resulting in

Saudi Arabia being labelled a ‘free rider’.

Despite Saudi Arabia not being an ICI member,

NATO can still be said to have been close to the

actions in Yemen through the other members of the

initiative. It is no surprise that three of the four ICI

members have been involved in the coalition in

Yemen over the past few years, and the same can be

said of a couple of members of the Mediterranean

Dialogue, another of NATO’s partnership programs.

GCC seems to be at the heart of operations in Yemen,

as well as holding the potential resolution to the war.

The GCC, Taking the Lead

Founded in 1981 “amidst fears of instability

stemming from the Iraq-

Iran War”, the Gulf

Cooperation Council for

the Arab States of the Gulf

(GCC) comprises six

members: The Kingdom of

Bahrain, the State of

Kuwait, the Sultanate of

Oman, the State of Qatar,

the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia and the United Arab

Emirates. The objectives of

this regional organization

are “to enhance coordination, integration and inter-

connection among its members.” It seems to have

taken the lead of the coalition fighting the Houthis’

insurgency in Yemen, under the leadership of Saudi

Arabia.

The GCC appears today as the only cooperation

platform that could actually make a difference in the

conflict in Yemen. With Iran back on the political

scene thanks to the lifting on its oil embargo, it is true to

point out that the country has made tension rise up again

with the Gulf States. Many Gulf countries seem to even

picture Iran as a bigger evil than ISIL. Despite these

apparent difficulties, it seems like the GCC could play a

beneficial role, based on precedents, in halting the

confrontation between the countries of the Gulf and

Iran. In 2007, Former Iranian President Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad was invited to attend the GCC’s 28th

summit, which led to prospective cooperation

programs. In addition, Oman has reportedly played a

role in Iran-US diplomatic negotiations leading to the

signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

(JCPOA). This would explain why Oman is the only

GCC member not taking part in the coalition. But the

Sultanate may nonetheless play a role in bridging the gap

between the two blocks.

Despite inherent tensions

between the Gulf and

Iran, it is the GCC which

holds the best change of

devising a peaceful issue

to the crisis in Yemen, or

at least in reducing the

effects of foreign

intervention into the

faction fight dividing

Yemen. The latter could

potentially join the GCC,

which could potentially mark a step towards enhanced

internal stability for Yemen thanks to regional solidarity

and cohesion.

Keeping Distances

Considering the religious underlying implications of

the conflict, notably between Shi’a Iran and Sunni Saudi

Arabia, it would be wise for the Alliance to stay away

from Sana’a. It seems that regional power struggles have

Saudi-led coalition against Yemeni rebels (Image: Reuters)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 11 11

been adding oil on the already vivid fire that Yemen

represents, and adding a Western component to the

fight would probably not help towards a quick

resolution. Also, considering the dual interests of

Alliance’s members, namely between close relation

with Saudi Arabia, notably through arms trade, and

Iran, with whom the Nuclear Deal is still fragile, it

seems appropriate to stay out of further involvement

and to avoid overtly taking sides beyond supporting the

restoration of the rule of law, peace and curbing global

terrorism.

NATO must aim to support the restoration of peace

by offering help to the United Nations, as declared by

Sec. Gen. Stoltenberg on 11. May 2015, “to find a

political solution to stop the violence and to improve

and help the humanitarian situation and help the people

which are in Yemen, which are now suffering because

of the fighting and the violence that takes place.” The

conflict tearing Yemen apart has had, in itself, dramatic

consequences for the population, but the airstrikes

conducted by the Coalition has had an even greater

impact on one of the world’s poorest nations. Since the

beginning of the conflict, “More than 6,800 people

have been killed and 35,000 injured since March 2015

… The conflict and a blockade imposed by the

coalition have also triggered a humanitarian disaster,

leaving 80% of the population in need of aid.” With the

recent scandals linked to numerous deaths caused by

Saudi bombings and of British manufacture, as well as

human rights violation allegations, it would be wise for

NATO to abstain from direct intervention in the

Yemeni war. It would, however, be wise to support a

long-term, comprehensive, and regionally groomed

solution which would entail ending what has been

presented as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and

Iran. It is certain that removing that international

component to the war in Yemen would certainly

reduce the level of violence destroying the country and

forcing its inhabitants to flee, with the collateral

consequences that refugees have.

Flora Pidoux is currently pursuing a PhD in Political

Science at Université de Montréal. She is the editor of

Atlantic Voices and previously worked as Program

Assistant at ATA. Her fields of interest including

transatlantic security, territorial disputes and United

Nations institutional practices.

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Bussieres, Pierre-Olivier, Building Unity in the Middle East:

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NATO Association of Canada, 19.05.2016, Available at:

http://natoassociation.ca/building-unity-in-the-middle-east-

can-the-gulf-cooperation-council-be-a-force-for-change/

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https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/gulf-

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and-the-eu_en

About the author

Bibliography

This publication is co-sponsored by the

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Editor: Flora Pidoux

ATA Programs On November 21-23, ATA, in cooperation with Comitato Atlantico

Italiano and with the support of NATO SPS will hold a NATO Advanced

Research Workshop on “Human Factors in the Defense against

Terrorism : The Case of Jordan”. Follow the discussion on Twitter

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More details here: http://atahq.org/2016/11/nato-advanced-

research-workshop-november-21-23-2016-jordan/

On November 21, John Jacobs, President of YATA International,

addressed the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) during the plenary

session in Istanbul, Turkey. In his speech, he highlighted the long standing

cooperation between ATA, YATA and NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

He also emphasized the achievements of YATA in forming and training

the future leaders of the Transatlantic community. Finally, he announced

YATA’s five key priorities for the months to come: Counterterrorism;

Hybrid warfare; Women in security; Defense spending; Energy security .

It has been a tradition for the past few years that YATA Presidents are

invited to address the NATO PA, as well as that YATA helps in the

organizing of the event, contributing to bridging the generation gap.

What does adaption for NATO mean? And what changes must it drive

in the missions, capabilities, capacities and structures of the Transatlantic

Alliance? Globsec's steering committee on NATO's Adaption to a

Changing Strategic Environment released their report.

Read it here: goo.gl/5SRNuo

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By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with academics, media

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In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

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