Atlantiv Voices - Vol. 1 no.3

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 3 1

Volume 1-Number 3, December 2011

Contents: Can NATO Leave Behind a Literate Afghan Police Force?

Geoff Burt and Michael Lawrence examine the recent development of the Afghan National Police Force, assessing the impact that widespread illiteracy has had and highlighting the importance of literacy programs to continuing NATO efforts in Afghanistan and its COIN operations.

Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Rahmatullah Quraishi explores the importance of economic develop-ment to the future of Afghanistan, arguing that in order to ensure a sta-ble and conflict free society, country-wide economic development is they key. Looking at how past development policies have failed Rahmat-ullah Quraishi goes on to make recommendations for more balanced programs for development.

Exit Afghanistan: Prospects for

civilian stability and development

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publica-

tion of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It

aims to inform the debate on key issues

that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Or-

ganization, its goals and its future. The

work published in Atlantic Voices is written

by young professionals and researchers.

With NATO withdrawal from Afghan

combat deployment rapidly approaching in

2014 this issue, investigates the security situa-

tion in Afghanistan and how and if civilian led

efforts can help promote and guarantee the

security of Afghanistan in the long term. Civil-

ian efforts and economic development are

increasingly important to determining the

future stability of Afghanistan, and was one

subject of discussion at the International Af-

ghanistan Conference in Bonn.

We hope you find the following pages

both informative and thought provoking,

As part of our goal in promoting and in-

forming the public debate upon these top-

ics, Atlantic Voices is happy to accept re-

sponses to the issue and articles we have

selected.

Atlantic Voices Volume ? Issue ? 2


Editorial: Bonn, Gone but not forgotten?

Rahmatullah Quraishi

Rahmatullah Quraishi has worked with the United Na-

tions and World Bank amongst other international organi-

sations in Afghanistan. In addition to this, he has been

closely involved in the development and implementation

of a number of youth and civil society development pro-

jects. Holding a Masters in General Management, Rahmat-

ullah Quraishi has also worked for the Human Rights

Chair’s Office at the University of Connecticut, USA.

Geoff Burt and Michael Lawrence

Geoff Burt and Michael Lawrence are Research

Officers of the Global Security Program at the Centre For

International Governance Innovation, an independent non-

partisan think tank based in Waterloo, Canada. Their

research focuses on security sector reform, state-building,

and conflict. Michael Lawrence’s contribution is supported

by a Security and Defence Forum Internship Grant from

the Department of National Defence, Canada.

About the Authors

The 2011 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan passed by

with almost no mention by international Media outlets,

many of whom only weeks previously had been promoting

the idea of Bonn as a key chance to move towards a negoti-

ated peace in Afghanistan, and to resolve some of the big-

gest issues facing the country.

Bonn became a victim of ‘realities on the ground’. In a

relatively short period of time, speculation that the Tali-

ban, or at least elements of Taliban leadership, would send

some kind of representative to Bonn was crushed. Only

weeks later Pakistan, who had once hinted at an ability to

bring the Haqqani Network, a major insurgent group, to

the negotiating table, withdrew.

The killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in unclear circum-

stances by NATO certainly angered the Pakistan Govern-

ment, already riled by the US operation to kill Osama Bin

Laden. The Withdrawal of Pakistan from the conference

was the key turning point, as the country is so crucial to

the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.

Although in the end Bonn “committed” governments

to aid Afghanistan for the next 10 years, few specific de-

tails were offered, the results of Bonn were largely rhetori-

cal, and offered little to goals of negotiated peace.

Despite this apparent set-back 2 years of combat de-

ployment for NATO remain, and Governments have at

least pledged, in principle, to commitment beyond 2014 .

ATA Chapters Organise Afghanistan Youth Conferences The German Atlantic Association and the Estonian At-

lantic Treaty Association both organized youth conferences

on Afghanistan, inviting young participants from through-

out the Atlantic Community and from Afghanistan and

Pakistan.

Organised to coincide with the Bonn Conference the

German Atlantic Treaty Association’s “International Af-

ghanistan Student Conference” saw youth participants

meet with German political leaders such as Chancellor Dr.

Angela Merkel and Guido Westerwelle, German Federal

Foreign Minister; and with Afghan national representa-

tives.

* * *



by Geoff Burt and Michael Lawrence

T he NATO mission in Afghanistan has long

touted the training of the Afghan National

Security Forces (ANSF) as the only durable,

long-term solution to the country’s myriad security chal-

lenges, including insurgency, terrorism, warlords, and

rampant human insecurity. A capable and effective ANSF

represents the international community’s exit strategy

from Afghanistan. As the Commander of the NATO Train-

ing Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), Lieutenant General

William B. Caldwell IV, and Captain Nathan K. Finney put

it, NATO is ‘building the security force that won’t leave’.

As the 2014 deadline to begin US troop withdrawal from

Afghanistan approaches, the ability of the ANSF to provide

security and enforce the rule of law is becoming an urgent

priority.

The training process is attempting to overcome some

monumental barriers as it constructs a security sector that

can simultaneously combat terrorism and insurgency and

satisfy the security needs of the population. Three decades

of war have devastated both the physical and human re-

sources upon which capable security institutions are

based. Chief among the many gaps in human re-

sources is illiteracy, which former U.S. Special

Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Richard Holbrooke called one of the most

“extraordinary” hurdles facing ANSF training1. Iraq

presented international actors with daunting reconstruc-

tion challenges but programs benefitted from an educated

populace with an adult literacy rate of 74.1%. Afghani-

stan’s 28% adult literacy rate represents a challenge of a

starkly different order2. While illiteracy poses grave chal-

lenges to all facets of security sector reform (SSR) – not to

mention reconstruction, state-building and development

more broadly – this paper examines the role of literacy

training in international efforts to build a capable Afghan

National Police (ANP) force.

While the Afghan national Army (ANA) has a critical

role to play in bolstering the Kabul regime through coun-

terinsurgency (COIN) operations, it is the police who

serve the daily security needs of their communities. Police

officers are the most visible face of the state to ordinary

Afghans and their high community contact places them at

the forefront of efforts to exclude terrorist and insurgent

influence. By effectively investigating crimes, upholding

rights, resolving disputes and safeguarding communities,

the ANP can bolster support for the government and curb

the appeal of other armed groups3.

Ineffectiveness, rampant corruption and abuse have the

opposite effect and ANP performance, by any measure, has

fallen dismally short. Within the three main bodies of the

ANP (the Afghan Uniform Police, the Afghan Border

Police, and the National Civil Order Police), ISAF has not

rated a single unit as capable of functioning without inter-

national assistance4. A United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime survey found that in 2010, one quarter of the

respondents had paid at least one bribe to a police official

in the previous year. Reflecting their lack of faith in Afghan

institutions, only nine percent of urban respondents had

ever reported an act of

corruption to authori-

ties. The same survey

found that when

approached by civil-

ians, police, court, and

customs officials request a bribe nearly half of the time5.

Afghans are fed up. Public opinion polls point to rampant

official corruption as the leading grievance against the

Afghan government. Even more disturbing, the Afghan

police are often themselves a source of insecurity. Accord-

ing to Lt. Gen Mohammad Rahim Harifi, head of statistics

and analsis for the Afghan government’s top prosecutor,

“nearly 200 policemen were accused of murder and just

over 4,600 were involved of crimes in 3,026 separate cases

sent to the attorney general in Kabul in [the] year that

Public opinion polls point to rampant official corruption as the leading

grievance against the Afghan government.

Can NATO Leave Behind a Literate Afghan

Police Force?



itized combat support functions over community policing.

While eliminating terrorism and insurgency is an essential

step towards a better future in the country, so is the con-

struction of capable and legitimate security infrastructure

that can provide for citizens needs while garnering support

for the state. While the counterinsurgency effort looms

largest in international assistance to Afghanistan, everyday

security and justice may be much more important for the

Afghan population. Indeed, a 2009 poll conducted by the

Royal United Services Institute and the BBC in Afghanistan

asked Afghans what they thought was the biggest problem

confronting Afghanistan. 26% pointed towards the econo-

my, poverty and jobs; 24% pointed towards security war-

lords, attacks and violence; but only 8% pointed towards

the Taliban insurgency specifically9. While international

actors often conflate insecurity with the insurgency, these

findings suggest that it has a much broader meaning for

Afghans.

The international emphasis on force levels persists as

the NTM-A strives for a target force size of 157 000 ANP

members by October 201210. International assistance,

however, has begun to counterbalance the concern for

quantity of officers with greater attention to the quality of

their training and performance. As the NTM-A reported in

its year in Review report for 2009-10, the focus on quantity

“was understandable given the immediate operational need

for large numbers [police, but] it had a corrosive impact on

began March 2010”6.

With time running out for ANP training, the NTM-A is

focusing many of its resources on literacy training to im-

prove police performance and improve its alarmingly poor

record. The change in strategy is long overdue. As

Holbrooke testified, “For seven years, for reasons I cannot

understand, the United States participated in training Af-

ghan police at vast expense without giving them literacy

training… We were turning out police with 88 percent

illiteracy, and it went right by everyone.”7 For the most

part, their focus was elsewhere— on getting as many

‘boots on the ground’ as possible, as quickly as possible, to

contribute to the counterinsurgency campaign which was

the paramount concern of international security assistance

to Afghanistan.

For the police, this too often meant deploying before

they have acquired the skills they need to perform their

duties. As late as November 2009, the majority of police

were deployed without any basic training, and those that

were trained largely received instruction on infantry tactics

provided by military personnel8. The police have been

largely treated as a paramilitary force deployed to support

the ANA in its fight against insurgents. In these circum-

stances, there was little concern for pervasive illiteracy in

the police force.

International assistance to the Afghan police thus prior-

Source: NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan



the quality of the AUP and fostered a negative public opin-

ion of the Afghan police in general.”11 Despite over $12

billion allocated to police training by the United States

alone12, the ANP has proven largely corrupt, abusive and

ineffective. The Strategic International Afghan National

Police Development Symposium in Brunssum, Nether-

lands in January 2011 thus cited “a recognized need

to balance the immediate security imperatives with

the enduring requirements for a responsive, ac-

countable and capable policing institution that can

support and sustain the rule of law in Afghani-

stan.”13

Literacy training is central to this shift towards quality.

According to former NTM-A Deputy Commander for

Programs, Col. John Ferrari, “Literacy is the single most

important thing we are doing at NTM-A.”14 Between Oc-

tober 2010 and May 2011, NTM-A had spent $8.6 million

on ANP literacy training15. In June 2011, UNESCO and

the Japanese government agreed to begin a $3 million lit-

eracy training program for 3000 ANP personnel in Kabul

and seven other provinces over the next 20 months16. In-

deed, the NATO training mission is today the largest adult

literacy program in the entire country.

Literacy is vital to effective policing in several respects.

It is foundational to the rule of law as a basic means of

identifying people, making detailed reports about inci-

dents, and understanding what the law actually says17. This

point seems obvious, but as late as November 2009 ANP

officers were being deployed without any training (let

alone literacy training) so that, as NTM-A explains, “the

majority of police did not know the law they were respon-

sible to enforce… Not unexpectedly, most Afghans had

come to view the ANP as lawless armed men, rather than

trusted law enforcement officials”18. Indeed, a 2009 survey

by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commis-

sion (AIHRC) found that fewer than 20 percent of law

enforcement officials were “aware that it’s illegal to tor-

ture someone accused of a crime”19.

Literacy facilitates many aspects of day-to-day police

operations. Orienteering imperatives like reading a map or

recognizing street signs become possible. Literacy is also

especially important for administrative tasks that involve

documents and identification, and especially to border

control. Further, the inability to keep diligent records hin-

ders accountability and transparency, creating a space for

corruption to flourish

within the ANP.

Finally, and more im-

portant than all else,

literacy is a foundation-

al skill that enables officers to acquire further skill sets,

including investigative techniques, human rights and

gender training, community policing, training, and special

tactics. Without this foundation, NTM-A and Afghan

trainers are limited to oral and visual training techniques ill

-suited to subjects that involve lists, memorization, docu-

mentation and either technical or nuanced content.

As an encouraging sign of its commitment to quality,

NTM-A has implemented a “recruit-train-assign” model to

replace what might be called the “recruit-assign-intend to

train” model which saw 60-70% of the force hired and

deployed with no training whatsoever20. Today there are

37 training centres around Afghanistan, which hold lan-

guage classes of no more than 33 students at a time. Each

day, 9000 trainees benefit from these facilities, which will

expand their capacity to train 20 000 recruits each day by

April 201321. Each month, approximately 21 000 ANP

officers receive 64 hours of instruction to achieve grade 1

literacy, with an 87% pass rate22. Presently, over 30 000

(22%) of the 135 000 members of the ANP have passed

the level one literacy exam, 18 000 the second level exam,

and 9000 the third level23.

While the focus on literacy is a positive step, it remains

a recent and belated one. It is too early to tell whether

literacy is having an impact on police performance or help-

ing to repair (or even build for the first time) the tenuous

relationship between citizens and police. It is unlikely that

literacy alone will stem the tide of police corruption and

As an encouraging sign of its commitment to quality, NTM-A has implemented a “recruit-train-assign”

model



abuses that plague Afghanistan today. Indeed, ANP training

ultimately aspires to achieve grade 3 level literacy, which

will likely remain insufficient for the more complex tasks

described above (administering technical documents for

example). Yet any progress on literacy will help develop

administrative capacity, improve understanding of the law,

and advance record-keeping that will help crack-down on

these offenses. In this sense, literacy is the keystone of the

core SSR concern for promoting good governance and

effective management systems in security institutions as a

necessary complement to improvements in their on-the-

ground capacities.

Ultimately, the long-overlooked issue of literacy train-

ing directs our attention to more profound issues in Af-

ghanistan and beyond. Among the most enduring lessons of

the international engagement in Afghanistan is that a

narrow conception of security—that is, freedom from

insurgent attack—fails to capture the range of security

needs facing the population of conflict-affected societies.

The belated strategic shift towards more education and

training for the ANP in 2009 seems to suggests a realiza-

tion that poorly-trained police forces were not only unable

to provide a robust paramilitary function in the COIN

effort, but that a lack of community policing capacity,

along with police abuses and impunity, were undermining

the already fragile state-society relationship to the detri-

ment of both COIN and SSR. The security of Afghans

represents just one of many international objectives in

Afghanistan, but it has important consequences for other

goals. It cannot be neglected.

The massive investment in literacy training by the

NTM-A is a credible first step towards a legitimate and

community service oriented police force. However, too

much damage may have already been done to salvage a

relationship of trust and respect between the Afghan police

and the communities they serve in time for the Interna-

tional community’s withdrawal. The best case scenario for

the NTM-A’s new training model is therefore to give the

ANP the skills required to start the gradual process of re-

gaining that lost trust in Afghanistan’s post-NATO future.

Notes 1 Edwin Mora, “NATO’s Education Training Chief Unsure When Afghan

National Security Force Will be Fully Literate,” CNS News (22 July 2010), availa-ble at: http://www.cnsnews.com/node/69843.

2 Based on Statistics from United Nations Development Program, Interna-tional human Development Indicators (accessed 21 Sept. 2011), available at: http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/default.html.

3 A UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report observes that “the police force, through its regular contact with the general population, has greater potential to change popular conceptions about the legitimacy of the Afghan government than the ANA.” United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee - Eighth Report Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan (21 July 2009), 1. Available at: w w w . p u b l i c a t i o n s . p a r l i a m e n t . u k / p a / c m 2 0 0 8 0 9 / c m s e l e c t /cmfaff/302/30202.htm.

4 United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (30 July 2011), 55. Availa-ble at: http://www.sigar.mil/July2011Report.asp. An ‘independent’ rating denotes: “The unit is able to plan and execute its missions, maintain command and control of subordinates, call on and coordinate quick reaction forces and medical evacuations, exploit intelligence, and operate within a wider intelligence system.”

5 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims (January 2010), 9. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf.

6 Mirwais Harooni, “Billions Spent on Afghan Police but brutality, Corrup-tion prevail,” Reuters.com (24 August 2011), available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/24/us-afghanistan-police-crime-idUSTRE77N10U20110824.

7 Quoted in: Mora.

8 In 2009 there were over 1000 military mentors but only around 500 civilian police advisors focused on police development. See: Scott Chilton, Eckart Schiewek, and Tim Bremmers, Evaluation of the Appropriate Size of the Afghan National Police Force (Kabul: 15 July 2011), available at: http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/files/ANP_Tashkil_Final_Study.pdf.

9 See: Michael Clarke, “More Effort Needed to Win Afghan Hearts and Minds – Afghanistan Opinion Poll 2009,” Royal United Services Institute Commen-tary (no date), available at: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4990051938E13/. Survey results are available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_02_09afghan_poll_2009.pdf.

10 William Caldwell, preface to Shohna ba Shohna [Shoulder to Shoulder – NTM-A Public Affairs publication] vol. 1 no. 1 (September 2011), 2.

11 NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), Year in Review: November 2009 to November 2010 (November 2010), 18. Available at: http://www.ntm-a.com/documents/enduringledger/el-oneyear.pdf.

12 SIGAR, 65.

13 Opening statement, quoted in: Konrad L. Shourie, “Beyond Brunssum: ANP Development,” (12 February 2011), 2. Available at: http://ntm-a.com/wordpress2/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Brunssum-and-Beyond.pdf.

14 Col. John Ferrari, “One on One: NTM-A’s Deputy Commander for Programs,” Shohna ba Shohna vol. 1 no. 4 (July 2011), 5. Echoing this sentiment, Afghan Minister of the Interior Bismellah Mohammadi stated at the Brunssum conference: “The first priority is training and education”. Quoted in Shourie, 5.

15 SIGAR, 67.

16 Ibid., 68.

17 Maj. Jeremy Burnan, head of the literacy branch of the NTM-A, explains: “Without literacy there are no civil rights, no accountability, no understanding of [the] Rule of Law. I can identify a person; I can write a report myself. I can describe an incident and write it down. I can read the law - I am the complete policeman and twice the citizen.” G. A. Volb, “To Learn to Read: Literacy Train-ing Enhances the Afghan national Security Force,” Shohna ba Shohna vol. 1 no. 4 (July 2011), 7.

18 NTM-A, Year in Review, 18.

19 Steven Chase, “Afghan Officials Unaware Torture Illegal,” The Globe and Mail (1 May 2009).

20 United States Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan national Security Forces (2009-2010), 118. Reports can be found at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/.

21 Walter M. Golden Jr. “Policing the Training: Engaging the Afghan Na-tional Police Training Organization,” Shohna ba Shohna [Shoulder to Shoulder – NTM-A Public Affairs publication] vol. 1 no. 1 (September 2011), 5.

22 Shourie, 4, 7.

23 Golden, 5.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They

do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association,

it’s members, affiliates or staff.



by Rahmatullah Quraishi

Background

A fghanistan, following Russian war, con-

tinued to go through severe civil conflict

from 1989 to 1995, then enjoying a

comparatively peaceful era until 2001. During this

period of relative peace and security, the government

had very limited capacity to deliver basic social ser-

vices and most of the institutions couldn’t continue

the historical ability to address hardship caused by the

long civil war. This resulted in acute unemployment

not only among professional Afghans, but also large

number of the youth. Compounded by this, Afghani-

stan’s socio-economic structure, which was already

fundamentally devastated due long war, continued to

flare up and vanish.

Alongside this, the international community sus-

tained pressure against the Taliban regime with an

increasing regime of sanctions, pushing the country to

even worse humanitarian crises. The international

community failed to understand that sanctions and

pressure against Taliban regime did not affect their

power to rule the

country, but they

harshly added to the

burden of catastro-

phe and problems on

civilians. The Afghan

people felt alone, particularly during the rule of the

Taliban regime, when there was comparative peace

and security yet they badly needed assistance and sup-

port to recover from the long Russian and civil war.

This is when, the international community missed an

opportunity to create an Afghanistan that would have

been very different today, if the Afghan people had

been supported and assisted at that point in time. The

socio-economic structures of the Taliban regime have

direct influence and linkages with today’s situation

and the living conditions of the Afghan people. In oth-

er words, if, currently, it takes decades to rebuild and

reconstruct the country, support at that time would

have sharply reduced the time period and resources to

rebuild today’s Afghanistan.

Post 2001

Following collapse of the Taliban government,

large number of developed countries made

their way to Afghanistan and rapidly initiated

many humanitarian and development projects.

Since there was a dire need of rehabilitation in

almost every sector, a huge number of devel-

opment efforts were required to allow the

country and its people to stand alone. Alongside this,

efforts continued to build the capacity of the demo-

cratically elected Afghan government to ensure peace

and security and effectively deliver basic services.

During the reconstruction process, immense pro-

gress has been made in almost every field, either

through quick impact or long term development pro-

grams. A constitution was adopted and over 75% vot-

ers participated to in government elections. Afghani-

stan’s economy has seen very significant progress with

Since there was a dire need of rehabili-tation in almost every sector, a huge number of development efforts were

required ...

Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts in

Afghanistan

Source: NATO ISAF



robust GDP growth and huge amount of investment

by both national and international companies. More

than 6 million children are at school and basic health

services extended to most remote areas. Thousands

kilometres of roads have been constructed to inte-

grate rural and urban areas, largely improving the

agricultural economy.

The capacity of the

national police and

army has been greatly

enhanced to fight

against insurgents and

ensure peace and se-

curity in some urban areas. Government institutions

have been equipped with more resources to extend

and provide required services where possible.

There are significant numbers of development pro-

grams and achievements almost in all areas, resulting

in improved quality of life for Afghans and strength-

ening government capacity to provide social services.

However, together with all this development, there

have been many new challenges. Afghanistan is faced

with these because of irrelevant, improper, and poor

policies and strategies. Below are discussed some of

the key sectors where, in the context of Afghanistan’s

current transition period, dynamic and positive pro-

gress can be made.

First, Afghanistan is a country, which is strongly

united and combined by in-depth community struc-

tures derived from various roots and historical tradi-

tions. This especially applies to rural Afghanistan,

where the majority of the decisions and are made

through traditional mechanisms. Afghanistan’s 34

provinces can be clustered into 6 regions, each with

specific characteristics, values, norms and attitudes.

Within each region, province and district, there are

local community structures with a leader, who nor-

mally is a religious scholar or someone with power to

influence local citizens. The community leader is al-

ways at the forefront of contributions, donations, hos-

pitality or sacrifices. He normally defines and estab-

lishes decision making process and structures for dif-

ferent matters and problems, and addresses them

through a form of collective decision making. There

are many examples of development issues that gov-

ernment institutions couldn’t secure community con-

sent for through formal channels and methods, but

later issues were very easily resolved by these tradi-

tional community structures and mechanisms.

During the course of the many programs design

and implementation, there was little or no con-

sultation with communities, their structures,

values and attitudes were not considered,

which resulted in failure for some very crucial

projects. This deprived some communities of

assistance and support, whilst simultaneously it se-

verely compounded a lack of trust between people

and government. This resulted in increased instabil-

ity, insecurity and more vulnerability. Also, due to

lack of prioritization and realistic strategies, rural are-

as and their relevant sectors, particularly agriculture,

were not given the required fundamental support and

assistance.

Second, in Afghanistan over 75% of the people live

in rural areas where agriculture is the primary source

of income, in addition to this it is the main compo-

nent of the Afghan economy. Despite the fact that

only 12 per cent of Afghanistan’s total land area is

arable and less than 6 per cent is currently cultivated,

more than 80 per cent of Afghanistan’s population is

involved in farming, herding or both. The agricultur-

al sector contributes about half of GDP (excluding the

opium economy). According to international organi-

zations, to enable faster economic growth and rural

poverty reduction, agriculture needs to grow at least

5% per year over the next decade. But its main driv-

ers of growth like technology, roads, irrigation, and

education are deteriorated due to conflict, lack of

maintenance, and frequent droughts.

The recent efforts and rebuilding processes focus-

ing on the agricultural sector are not aligned with the

priorities on the ground. Market linkages between

agribusiness and industry are clearly missing, and Af-

ghan framers have not been provided with modern

During the course of the many pro-grams design and implementation, there was little or no consultation

with communities...



agricultural skills and technologies. Almost, all facto-

ries which depended on agricultural raw materials and

could provide job opportunities to very large number

of unemployed Afghans remain derelict. Support to

these government and non-government firms would

not only increase productivity and employment, but it

would also immensely contribute to a reduction of

poppy cultivation, which is considered to be the main

source of income for insurgents. For example, the

cotton seed factory in Helmand, which has not been

rebuilt and made functional, could make huge differ-

ence in reduction of poppy, providing job opportuni-

ties, increases in the local income and improved sta-

bility. Likewise, there are examples in other provinc-

es as well, where factories and industrial parks remain

untouched and unsupported over the last 10 years.

Third, within the education sector, historically

Afghanistan has always had a need for technical voca-

tional education, alongside general and higher educa-

tion. Due to its context, geographical structure and

local industry, there has been always a very high de-

mand for skilled labor to meet market demands. This

particularly applies at the current juncture since there

have been large number of development programs,

which need relevant skilled laborers. But the focus

from international community and development pro-

grams is only on general education, disregard-

ing the importance of the technical vocational

education and training. There are over 6 mil-

lion students in general education (36% fe-

male), while in technical vocation education

the total number of students is not more than

100 thousand. Not only is the number of stu-

dents and graduates are not responding to market

needs, but also the curriculum and its tools and mate-

rials are irrelevant to market demands and employers

requirements. This resulted in the employment of

foreign workers, causing Afghan youth to remain job-

less, which immensely contributes towards insecurity,

hopelessness, and an indefensible local economy.

To overcome this trouble, sound and clear strate-

gies need to be developed based on ‘on the ground’

realities and actual needs assessments with consulta-

tion from local communities. The development strat-

egies should include the characteristics, elements, and

potential of each specific region and geographical area

to ensure local response to local needs. Huge focus

should be placed on two very important components;

a) revision of curriculum and materials based on the

current market needs b) establishment of value chain

and provision of clear market linkages for all technical

vocational education graduates. During the whole

process ownership at very grass roots (district) levels

needs to be maintained, which has not been practiced

in the past. So far, most of the international origina-

tions and development partners have been holding

relatively few meetings with ministries and other gov-

ernment institutions at central level, assuming this is

sufficient for coordination and a sense of national

ownership!

Fourth, Small and Medium Enterprise develop-

ment has always proven to be the most important

driving factor for the development of any war affected

country. In Afghanistan to achieve long-term stability

and prosperity, it is important that the successes of

the past ten years on the political and institution-

building fronts are matched on the economic front

with poverty reduction and sustainable job creation.

This is especially true

for rural Afghanistan,

where most of Af-

ghanistan’s popula-

tion lives and where

the problems of pov-

erty and unemploy-

ment are particularly severe.

Whereas the Afghan economy as a whole has regis-

tered robust growth rates in recent years, these fig-

ures largely reflect booming construction and trade-

related activities in urban areas and the steep rise in

narcotics. There has been little growth of enterprise-

related activities in rural areas of Afghanistan, and

most people still live on subsistence farming. Even

where Afghanistan could be self-sufficient in agricul-

This resulted in the employment of foreign workers, causing Afghan youth

to remain jobless, which immensely contributes towards insecurity...



ture-related products, the country imports vast quan-

tities of food and other easily-manufactured daily use

items, while the exports sector remains small and un-

diversified. The lack of economic growth in rural are-

as directly contributed to unemployment among

youth, who are easily manipulated and misguided by

m a n y a n t i -

government ele-

ments, particularly

insurgents and drug

dealers because youth

in rural areas are the

most vulnerable and largest group of Afghan popula-

tion,

Hence, in order to provide most these communi-

ties in need with legitimate income and address un-

employment among youth, it is vital to enhance local

enterprises and strengthen their capacity to effectively

manage their business and value-chain, produce more

products and link with markets for more access to

finance and other services. This needs to start with

mapping the potential of productivity in each geo-

graphical region, followed by development and im-

plementation of realistic national-led strategies and

programs. Due diligence has to be exercised when

implementing the rural enterprise development pro-

grams by identifying and ensuring the important role

of rural communities during the whole process, which

hasn’t been considered in most of the rural develop-

ment programs over the past ten years.

Finally, large numbers of development projects

were implemented with aims to provide immediate

support without considering the establishment of a

system within government or community to maintain

and sustain such support for longer periods. This in-

cludes the implementation of projects through inter-

national companies and NGOs, who had no or very

little understanding of the Afghan context.

On one hand Afghanistan, over the past ten years,

made rapid strides toward development and the econ-

omy witnessed vigorous growth rate, on the other

hand, peace and security gradually deteriorated over

time. The worsening peace and security situation has

been severely undermining the wonderful achieve-

ments and development that Afghanistan made with

support from the international community. Afghans

are now in between either standing firm against the

current challenges or losing hope, which will mean a

return to the civil war of the 90s, which was

responsible for the deaths of more than one

hundred thousand innocent Afghans and forcing

more than 10 million people to migrate to oth-

er countries.

The current transition period is the most ap-

propriate time to implement nationally-owned

development programs with longer vision, based on

the past lessons learnt i.e. ensuring involvement of

communities, focusing on youth employment, eco-

nomic growth through enterprise development, real-

istic health, education and agricultural projects, and

respect for Afghan beliefs and customs. Unlike in the

past, the starting point for projects should be rural

areas, not urban areas.

In Afghanistan peace, security, democracy and

human rights can be achieved through the develop-

ment of economic growth programs and projects.

However it is not true that development and econom-

ic growth can be accomplished by implementing pro-

grams and projects through international NGOs on

democracy and human rights.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They

do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association,

it’s members, affiliates or staff.

The current transition period is the most appropriate time to implement

nationally-owned development programs with longer vision



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and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue

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In 2011 the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that

reflects the constantly evolving dynamics of international

cooperation. These goal include:

The establishment of new and competitive programs on

international security issues.

The development of research initiatives and security releted

events for its Members.

The expansion of ATA international network of experts to

countries in Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more

policy activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network

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Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a

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Atlantiv Voices - Vol. 1 no.3

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