"A rl rW~ .rw-4 II *

ATTACHMENT 71111.21

INSPECTABLE AREA: Component Design Bases Inspection

INSPECTION BASES: Inspection of component design bases verifies the initial design iand subsequent modifications and provides monitoring of thecapability of the selected components and operator actions toperform their design bases functions. As plants a6e,"their designbases may be lost and an important esign8feature may bealtered or 'disabled during/a nodi lti6rK The plant. riskassessment model assumes the capabilityof safety systems ayidcomponents to :perform 'their Ainte66d`` safety functionsuccessfully. This insp ar6verifie,6asp'eftsf itheInitiating Events,' Mitigting.4ystems and Barri , gritycornerstones for which rthetare no indicatorsto:Tmeasureperformance.

LEVEL OF EFFORT: Biennially reView:15 -207-ris ksigni ica'nt 'iid lowdesignmargin icomponents, 3-,5 ~4- risko operatornq6ris and 4 -6 operating |experience iss-4 ''

71111.21-01 INSPECTION 0CECTIV A .'>'

To verify that design bases have'tbee orrectlyimplemented for the selected risksignificant components and ttoperati ;proceduf and operator actions are consistentwith designand licensingbastes. This' i, £sei-ithat selected components are capableof perfoy ingitheir interfded'aUfety fur

71111 .21T02: ,' \NSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

02.01 ! n ns pe tioe n iPreparationN,' '

a. Insve~ion Sched P will be performed with a multi-disciplinary team consisting #oftfontractors and NRCJO iCspectors with expertise in power plant design and operation.The 7-week inspectfonl6chedule will consist of a pre-inspection site visit (preparation and |

/sample selection) o weeks of in-,office preparation, three weeks of on-site inspection, I(:.,a'd one week of rioffice dcumbentation of inspection results. l

b:Sarnple Selection. During the o'n-.site pre-inspection visit and the first week of in-office I\p'rep-arationi'Neek, the team will select 15-20 risk significant low margin components and I

3¢5risk'signif ica~nt/lowmargin operator actions. In additi6n, the team will also select 4-6 operating experience issues'relat6d to the selected components as well as generic |or common'cause issues that are not related to the selected samples for review. To theextent practical, the components selected'should be grouped into discrete systems toallow for easier inspection; however,' specific limits or boundaries should not be used |during the sample selection process to limit the number of systems involved. The #sample selection will be based on a risk-informed and low margin approach to identify |

_

Issue Date: 11/XX/05 -1 - 71111.21 1

-

the highly risk-significant components and operator actions at the facility. A seniorreactor analyst and one of the site resident inspectors should participate during thecomponent selection phase of the inspection to assist the team with the selection ofinspection samples.

02.02 Detailed Component and Operator Action Engineering Review Requirements. Forthose components and operator actions identified as risk significant with low availablemargins, the team should review the following attributes for each inspection sample:

a. Detailed Design Review

The purpose of the design inspection is to verifyfunction as required and support proper operatior1process of reviewing the design, inspectors shoulassumptions, boundary conditions, and modeinspectors may be required to verify appropriateThe interfaces between safety related and non- fbe reviewed.

the ,te as

Drify the4.I nde e Ai

components willstems. In teMaenss of desitan

)ntiods.alsoted compone

In reviewing the functional adequacy of thedetermine whether the design basis is met tinspectors should understand not only t Iand conditions under which the cornpetransients and accidents. For examine, ifdesign or procedures, these inpu shouldbases. j

selected corMDStalledall

ose iI wjatcji bE

,the inspectors shouldIconfiguration. The

esign but the manner4uired to function during

on was used as inputs forconsistent with the designvei

I

Select a sample of insrselected components. Sthsat aredhv Ily d em&,1or a~ crit 'G1I Cal~ fotlAttribts"ia~tn~its reqie uci heselected co .oes a,,

6171n attrn s forew and verify the design bases ofnof rin, c ibutes should focus on those attributes

d by tes not received recent in-depth NRC review,k, ent function. The table below, "Components Reviewimeattributes that are needed for a component to performsMinf ij t all inclusive and should be modified based on theap~xro~ate. During inspection preparation, identify which) th selected components. Component design basesAd components will have to be ascertained during their Ton for t

,tion prepai :Ss.

Component Review Attributes

i�, Inspection Activity

a-MTae-w* air* electrical signal

Verify that process medium will be available andunimpeded during accident/event conditions.* Example: For an auxiliary feedwater pump, verify that

the alternate water source will be available underaccident conditions.

* Example: For emergency core cooling system, verifythat the piping is kept free of voids as required bydesign bases or Technical Specifications.

71111.21 -2- Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05

- - -

Component Review Attributes I

Attributes . .Inspection Activity

Energy Source Verify energy sources, including those used for control* electricity functions, will be available and adequate during* steam accident/event conditions* fuel + air * Example: .For a diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump,* air verify that diesel fuel is sufficient for the duration of the

accident.Example: For an air-operated pretsurizer.-PORV, verifythat either sufficient reservoir airbill'-ist or instrumentair will be available to?•Ipport fead fbleed operationt

* Example: For a standb WDC bat erify adequacy of"battery capacity. f iŽ'l X 're A

Controls Verify component contro1s'wiffwbe functionaN7d fivide* initiation actions desired control duringle66iident/event conditions.* control actions * Example: For refueling-.wate'rstorage tank level* shutdown actions instrumentation prQ~ding*ig'nal for suction swap-over

-to containment sum'p, verif) tha'dtsetpointestablished tos'Liresufficient-water'inventory and

. prevent lo frequiredknet positlye suction head isaccepta We'

Operator Actions VAJoIper b odu s (normal, abnormal, or* initiation ' eergencyare consistent with operator actions for* monitoring accident/en!pconditions.• control4 \ .. Exampl ident analyses assume containment fan* sihitiown: t ,-, ' -. coolers re-running in slow speed, verify that

-procedures include checking this requirement.- - S'4.,Exar pIe:-- If accident analyses assume that -

' :containment spray will be manually initiated within a' ce tin time, verify that procedures ensure manual3 >eInitiation within assumed time and that testing

performed to validate the procedures was consistent: ' ',with design basis assumptions.

-Verify instrumentation and alarms are available tooperators for making necessary decisions.

;-' * Example: jFor swap-over from injection to recirculation,'-verify that alarms and level instrumentation provide

___ . operatois With sufficient information to perform the task.'

Heat Removal Verify that heat will be adequately removed from major* cooling water - components -* ventilation * Example: For an emergency diesel generator, verify

heat removal through service water will be sufficient forextended operation.

(

Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05 -3- 71111.21 1

Verify that the component condition and tested capability is consistent with the designbases and is appropriate. The table below, "Component Condition and Capability," isa listing of applicable attributes that could be inspected. Perform the inspection activitiesassociated with the selected attributes.

Component Condition and Capability

I Attributes Inspection Activity

InstalledConfigur* elevati* flowpatcompon(

Operatio

Design* calcula* proced

modifica

ationonshents

Verify, by walkdown or other means, thatconfiguration will support its design basisaccident/event conditions A* Example: Verify level or pres! instri

is consistent with instrumen setpoint ci

Verify that component confi ion Hvconsistent with design assuri

tL_Verify that component operaInM Iwith design and licensing basis assu* Example: For conti spray sy

emergency oper g changdesign assumptes aong

• Example: Fori rvcea6tsbalancing ensur&qde ua traaccidergati

installedJer

_ + ,, - _t- ---Installation

~n

L been aint o be

rnts are consistent

mi mponents, verifyShave not impacted

nponents, verify flowisfer to support

nLI

Verifyns apprfoiS All

W ha

esigi es aresign assumptions have beendesign calculations and procedures.

ce capability of selected componentsthrough modifications.

v that

Verify th'UfTtance criteria for tested parameters aresit~orted by calculations or other engineering documents toL saat design and licensing bases are met.

~ Eriipe: Verify that flowrate acceptance criterion isUcerelated to the flowrate required under accident conditions

* with associated head losses, taking setpoint tolerances andinstrument inaccuracies into account.

Verify that individual tests and/or analyses validate componentoperation under accident/event conditions.* Example: Verify that EDG sequencer testing properly

simulates accident conditions and the equipment response isin accordance with design requirements.

71111.21 -4- Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05

Attributes [ Inspection Activity

Component Degradationi' 'Verify that potential degradation is monitored orprevented.-

Example: For ice condensers, verify that inspectionactivities ensure air channels have been maintainedconsistent with design assumptions.

Verify that component replacement is consistent withinservice/equipment qualification life.'

Verify that the numbers ofcyclesare appropriatelytracked for operating Xyclesensibtie components.

Equipment/ Verify that equipment qualificatiois so itable'Jorthe/Environmental environment expectedu conditions *Qualification * Example: Verify equipment is qualified fo'roor if* Temperature temperatures unde'r'a-'cidet conditions.:Humidity ''i''''iA

Radiation* Pressure* Voltage ,*VibrationUS'-'IX ,tr;

Equipment Protection Verify/, ipment is adedquately protected.* fire * E miple: Verify freeze protection adequate for CST*flood selinstrmnain;

* fissileo - entat nditions and modifications* high energy line break ;`tidentifiy the rlcensee's high energy line break

*VAC analysebeen implemented to protect selected*frbezfh>i hihy I irificant components.'

Compo n he9n, \ . Vedfy;,l iat component inputs and outputs are suitable forInputs/Outpbtst' \ applidcafion and will be acceptable under accident/event

, conditions -

, - / ~. .Example: Verify that valve fails in the safeconfiguration.

v X*Example: Verify that required inputs to components,, such as coolant flow,' electrical voltage, and control air

necessary for proper component operation are/ provided.

',Op&ating Verify that applicable insights from operating experience*have been applied to the selected components.

* Example: 'Verify that component functioned,_ _,__ ,_ _ appropriatelypwhen challenged during transients.

Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05 -5 - 71111.21 1

b. Equipment Reliability Review and Walkdown of Selected Components

1. Review any outstanding repetitive maintenance work requests on theselected components and any deficiencies that could affect the ability of thecomponents to perform its function(s).

2. Review any outstanding design issues, including open/deferred or canceledengineering action items, temporary modifications, operator workarounds,and items that are tracked by the operations or engineering departments thatmay affect selected highly risk-significant componerlts. v

3. Perform a walkdown inspection of thediscrepancies between the existing ecalignment. Inspect for visible signs of a"'missing fasteners, cracks, degraded ithe selected components, inspec oquestions:

(a). Is the installed component cogdiagram?

(b). Will equipment and ifunction?

(c). Has adequate sloping of png r

(d). Are requiredequipmerotectionA(such as frce pro on) iBla

its. Identify anyjand the correctDnt

it co. Dunrconsii

Ah of,wing

piping and instrument

n ele\ support the design

nent tubing been provided?

arriers (such as walls) and systemsand intact?

Wrnquilment make it susceptible to flooding, fire,s, or other environmental concerns?

al separation/electrical isolation been provided?

z_'4."

any'Ton-seismic structures or components surrounding the.ts which require evaluation for impact upon the selected

5s the location of equipment facilitate manual operator action, ifuuired?

Are baseplates, hangers, supports and struts installed properly?

Are their indications of degradations of equipment ?

(k). Are the motor-operated valve operators and check valves (particularlylift check valves) are installed in the orientation required by themanufacturer?.

711 11.21 -6- Issue Date: 1 1 /XX/05

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4. Technical Evaluations/Corrective Action Program Review

For each low margin, risk-significant component within the sample selection,the inspectors should review all associated significant'corrective actiondocuments generated within the last four years including any degraded ordeficient conditions that have not been entered into the corrective actionprogram. Review the adequacy of any licensee technical:evaluation(corrective action program evaluations, engineering evaluations, operabilitydeterminations, etc.) associated with the component, andrdetermine ifoperability is justified and problems are properly iddnrtified4id corrected.Verify that the licensee considered other degra deco4dtions and theirimpact on compensatory measures for thcondi o'being evaluated. SeeInspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Reso ution'6f.Problems," oradditional guidance on corrective actions. --9' ' ;'-'>, :7If operability is justified, no further reviewi required. I9(e bilityevaluation involves compensatory measureszdetermine if the measures arein place, will work as intended, and are 6ppropriactely controlled. If operabilityis not justified determine impact on anySTe'cb'icil 'Specification LCOs. Referto Part 9900 Technical Guidance, _5SODP\,Cperbability Determinations &Functionality Assessments foroResolution of Degraded or NonconformingConditions Adverse to Qua ity.rSoafet 74or additional information.

c. Review of Operating Proced res and 1perator Actions

For the selected componep nd o ~rator actions, walk-through a sample ofassociated system operating;proedurd at the funtiional level with an appropriate plantoperator. This includes no a abn al, ard nemergency operating procedures. Forthe' sample of proceduf4is ected f eVverify that the procedures are consistentwith enogiinie4ering inpits`an6&assum the operators are able'to implement theproc6 dures from thehnain controlppanel and the alternate shutdown or local controlpanels`ancdth\'`key c`mp'onein'ts and equipment are accessible for normal andemergency-operation. If any'spe 'cial-equipment is required to perform these procedures,determinelif.th e'equipment Is -av'ailable and in good working order. Verify that theknowl d4ige vel of.the;operalors is adequate concerning equipment location andoperation.

The inspectors sh sider the following attributes to verify the adequacy of theoperating procedui's to support the design and verify that key operator actions can beperformed withinihfe constraints of 'the design analyses.

the ;'' 'cific operator actiorns required;

* the potentially harsh or inhospitable environmental conditions expected;

* a general discussion of the ingress/egress paths taken by the operators toaccomplish functions;

* the procedural guidance for required actions;

Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05 -7 - 71111.21

* the specific operator training necessary to carry out actions, including any operatorqualifications required to carry out actions;

* any additional support personnel and/or equipment required by the operator tocarry out actions;

a description of information required by the control room staff to determine whethersuch operator action is required, including qualified instrumentation used todiagnose the situation and to verify that the required action has succ.ssfully beentaken; A Ai

*~~~ ~ ~ ~ th ablt t eovrfomceibeerosi* the ability to recover from credible errors in p

the expected time required to make such a

* consideration of the risk significance of the

* the time available to complete an actionmethods used by the license to verify and vatcompleted within the available time. Twalkdown to validate the licensee's timingshould be given to time dependent actihacontrol by auxiliary equipment opatasA

* observe demonstrations or tring in the simfor a given event or accidentconditio

d. Permanent Plant MOdIon Re

For he selcted co the te riepln Lm ic tions, at eth ases,

ofrman' iftwual actions, andery;

erato

safety analyes and thehe required actions can beA, should include a fieldo,, @ iParticular attentionib * clDlished outside the

assurit must

validate operator actions

*w a sample of applicable permanent, licensing bases, and performancedegraded through modifications.pts have not been c

design adequacy of the modification by performing theEntified in Section 02.02.a. Refer to IP 71111.17,Plant Modifications," for more information.

(b). V fy that the licensee has considered the conditions under which theykmay make changes to the facility or procedures or conduct tests or

experiments without prior NRC approval. Verify that the licensee hasappropriately concluded that the change, test or experiment can beaccomplished without obtaining a license amendment. For thechanges, tests, or experiments that the licensee determined thatevaluations were not required, verify that the licensee's conclusionswere correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. Refer to I P 71111.02,"Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments," for more information.

2. Post-modification Testing Review.

71111.21 -8 - Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05

- - .

Verify that post7modification testing will establish operability by:

* Verifying that unintended system interactions will not occur.

* Verifying SSC performance characteristics, which could have beenaffected by the modification, meet the design bases.

* Validating the appropriateness of modification design assumptions.

* Demonstrating that the modification test acceptance criteria have beenmet.

02.03 Operating Experience Review. The teamAipeselectceissues related to the selected components as well genericor common cause ises thatare not related to the selected samples for reviek_.iSom' iof the operatiqfrgeexperienceselected should cover initiating events and barrier integrity &ornerstones. For theoperatingexperience items selected for review, the team should asseshow the licensee evaluatedand dispositioned each item. The focus shoulcd'/e;on ens'iuring that the conditionsdiscussed in the operating experience either are not applicable, br have been adequatelyaddressed by the licensee to ensure operabil.p hecomponent.4To'the extent practical,the inspectors should acquire objective e erice.tfhafithe operating experience item hasbeen resolved, beyond a written lice e evaIuation.,;F if the operatingexperience item required a procedur .ange1 inispector should verify the procedurewas-changed. If the operating e6 erience,,ffequired'rnodification of a component, theinspector should verify the modification wa lcompIet d

7111 i1.21-03 -INSEC:lON GUIOANQ/

03.01 'ehneral"Guidance on System and Component Selection

a. Inspection Schedule. Atpica team i nispection time line is expected to consist ofthe foll6winjg: -- \Cheek 1 On-site 'preparation/sample selection.

/ Week 2 In;ffice preparation/finalizing samples for inspection.

Week 3 dZn'n-site inspection of selected samples.

e In-office preparation/inspection activities.

Week 5 On-site inspection of selected samples.

Week 6 Last week of on-site inspection of selected samples.

Week 7 Documentation of inspection results.

Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05 g9 71111.21 1

Note: Regions may rearrange the order of on-site inspection and preparation weeks aslong as the direct inspection and contractor support efforts are not exceeded. The eamleader would require additional time to prepare for the inspection and after the insF/ectionto integrate the report input.

b. Team Staffing and Administration. The design review portion of the inspectionshould be performed by inspectors with extensive nuclear plant design experience,preferably comparable to the experience gained through previous employment withan architect engineering firm. The team composition will be an NRGC team leader,two design specialists in the mechanical and lectricalJ I" instrumentation andcontrol disciplines (typically contractors), two regional ins, eM (operations andengineering). In addition, as a minimum, a r react d one of tt0resident inspectors should participate duri the corn h 'Ofthe inspection to assist the team with thIe t f nsp Ifpossible, the regional branch chiefs shou Iuclear SaferosionalDevelopment Program participants or ins fr ainees for deve lopmental orqualification training purposes. I

C. Sample Selection. Thephase to facilitate sampavailable margin. Margin(or predicted) and requireLow margin can be amodifications, or can be d(safety or non-safety rislccomponent (e.g. pumj1assist in inspection npassive componetscfai could impt

of beration and

team will visit thb seleced ite 4dring the preparationle selection aM on risk ance and the leastis typicall he differ ene between the actuald perfi6 nc6fsy~m, cQhponent, operator action.funeqtion of the X rigE Ar'esign, caused by designyelb degrad'ed matgniadbnditions. Inspection samples

,ificant'8 omponep, s) should be identified at the majorMotor operated vave, etc.) or procedural step level tof tning. Itude ihin the sample selected should bei as s 6gs, strainers, piping, cables, etc., whosem funcality, component design function that involvesn actions, availability/reliability issues, and componentsAot fully demonstrated through testing. To the extent?Include a diverse range of equipment and humanprai p 4plrl

"The team le',approach for

W selected facilI components:k licensee's Hrs

WI the Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) should develop anentrying the most critical components and operator actions at the

Y. Although the methods used to identify the highly risk-significantAd operator actions will be dependent on the type and quality of theassessment tools, the following criteria should be considered:

'Risk Reduction Worth (RRW): The RRW is the factor by which the plant's-core damage frequency decreases if the component or operator action isassumed to be successful. Components or operator actions with a RRWvalue of 1.005 or greater should be considered for inclusion in the inspectionsample. A lower threshold may be used if desired.

Risk Achievement Worth (RAW): The RAW is the factor by which the plant'score damage frequency increases if the component or operator action of

71111.21 -10- Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05

interest is assumed to fail. Components and actions with a RAW value of 2or greater should be considered for inclusion within the inspection sample.A lower threshiold may be used if desired.

Delta CDF or Delta LERF2Data: Components or operator actions whichincrease the delta CDF.or delta LERF by an order of magnitude should beconsidered for inclusion within the inspection sample. Likewise, componentsor actions that increase the initiating event likelihood by an order ofmagnitude should also be considered (e.g. service water systemi). For DeltaLERF, as an example, in plants with ice condense1s contafiment designscertain accident sequences (e.g. station blackout)k.=It4/7a dominant riskincrease from Delta LERF versus Delta'CDF. T,,hese sequences can befound by looking in the "LERF Factor" colurn-i of the piarit' pie solved phase2 SDP notebook. - A -,

* Subjective risk rankings based on engineering or expe p jugementsuch as those performed to identify rinsksignificant structures, syems, andcomponents forthe licensee's Maintenance'Rule program. These subjectiverisk rankings typically are .perforr 4>ifoebstablishthe risk significance ofequipment that may not be fully modeled in e licernsee's probabilistic riskassessment. '

* The use of dominant acci ftseqIe'nice sinc select components maybe appropriate for SSs, thatpe more :significant to LERF than CDF;external events (e.g sire, seismic, flood),than'internal events (e.g., LOCAs);or risk during shut fWf than firing no2 Ial operation.

* Other risk criteriaestablis b the6-tam leader and SRA (e.g. operatingexperience, ieringment etc.).

ntifying specificiinspection areas for the margin review,'the team shouldbroadly .,asess 'm nt and, operator attributes'necessary to meet theprobabilistic risk assessmenfu6nctional success criteria. For example, if thesa rijpleIs'lectionh reviewide6ntifies'a specific pump failure to start or run as risk-sidnifican ti'argin,,review activities should consider all conditions that couldsrasonably c 'useJdss~of pump flow (e.g. clogged suction strainer, loss of motivepower, inadecnuate ,et positive suction head, valve misalignment or failure, etc.).The followintActivities should be performed to identify low margin areas:

* Design and engineering specialists should review detailed calculationsassociated with the identified risk-significant components to identify areas of___margin. In this case,-the inspector should identify calculations showing

little margin between predicted results and calculation'and/or regulatoryacceptance criteria.

* Inspectors should obtain corrective' action program insights and repetitivemaintenance summary associated with the identified risk-significantcomponents.

Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05 -11- 71111.21 1

* Inspectors should review operating procedures, and operator task analysisvalidation studies to identify critical operator actions with little marginbetween the time required and the time available to complete an action.

The margin review should include evaluation of the impact of plant modificationsor licensing basis changes on available margin. In particular, licensing changesthat can reduce safety analysis margins, such as extended power uprates, shouldbe considered.

d. Sources of Information. The following table shows the.suggested sources ofinformation necessary to perform this inspection.

Information J rgestedSoi.ircDesign Bases Updated Final Safety Anatysis RepmF

Design Basis [ ew, CtionSystem DescriptDesign Calculation,Design Analyse sPiping & InstrgumentationgsSignificantio'n rawning pSignifi&' mff fiace ProduePre-§ iedration es ocum entsVeFfd or a

Licensing Bases RC Rqgulations-OlantT od cal SpecificationsUFS >

-RA, "'eL v ation Reports

A 4p-16a leUFcI en Individual Plant Examination

Ai Canalyses. ~i 4,ergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)

ystehrib System Modification Packages (including postmodification test documents)10 CFR 50.59 Safety EvaluationsTemporary ModificationsWork RequestsSetpoint Changes

7, EOP Changes

Inutry Experience Licensee Event ReportsBulletinsGeneric LettersInformation Notices

711 11.21 -12- Issue Date: 1 1 /XX/05

t - ... -

Information ' Suggested Sources

PRA Information Individual Plant Examinations (IPE)or Updated PRA model resultsRisk-informed inspection notebooksRisk importance rankings for SSCsDominant accident sequencesImportant operator actionsIndividual Plant Examinations for Ext

03.02 General Design Inspection Guidance 7 -,

Design Review. The purpose of the design inspection is~tdverifytha he componentswill function as required and support the propero'pration of the associated systems.In the process of reviewing the design, inspectors 'shouldlverify the appropriateness ofdesign assumptions, boundary conditions, and models'.1'nIndependent calculations by theinspectors may be required to verify appropriate ss ofhe licensee's ahalysismethods.

In reviewing the functional adequacy of t lecd compo s-Ahe inspectors shoulddetermine whether the design basis is ale' hiistalled anrdtested configuration. Theinspectors should understand not o Il ginal 'seothe design but the mannerand conditions under which the tem will ac~iallybeirequired to function' duringtransients and accidents. For xP ple, i fJFSAR riforiation was used as inputs fordesign or procedures, these ip't ored be'verified to be consistent with the designbases. /.rt sh

Duins desigen ra e pectors sider the following questions:

Valv - :,s

1. prethepermissive interlocks appropriate?

2.-,iWl'e;'Kvave function at the pressures that will exist duringtransien/accidptri conditions?

3. Will the 'jcontrol and indication power supply be adequate for systemfunctio ''

4.__11,he control logic consistent with the system functional requirements?

6;>What manual action's are' required to back up and/or correct a degradedfunction?

Pumps

7. Is the pump capable of supplying required flow at required pressures undertransient/accident conditions?

Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05 -13- 71111.21 1

__ _ ''l2

8. Is adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) available under all operatingconditions?

9 Is the permissive interlock and control logic appropriate for the systemfunction?

10. Is the pump control adequately designed for automatic operation?

11. When manual control is required, do the operating procedureslappropriatelydescribe necessary operator actions?

12. What manual actions are required to badk up an ect a degradedfunction? ,-..

13. Has the motive power required fot¶e pumpduring ransient/acc dentconditions been correctly estimateInd -hcluded in te l andemergency power supplies?

14. Do vendor data and specifications si pp s i operations at low flowrates?

15. Is the design and quality of -beariong §d al cooln sytems acceptable?

Instrumentation pi3 eeracepebe

16. Are the required plaame used s inputs to the initiation and controlsystem?

17 If operator giterention is reireicertain scenarios, have appropriatealarms and R Ictions b oded?

1he d kcy, and setpoint of instrumentation adequate?

19. Are t. ecifie rveillance and calibrations of such instrumentationacceptable?

Circuit Breakers an u

20. Is the breaker control logic adequate to fulfill the functional requirements?

21. Is th eshort circuit rating in accordance with the short circuit duty?

22 Are .the breakers and fuses properly rated for the load current capability?

23. Are breakers and fuses properly rated for DC operation?

Cables

711 11.21 -14- Issue Date: 1 1 /XX/05

-

24. Are cables rated to handle full load at the environments temperatureexpected?

25. Are cables properly rated for short circuit capability?

26. Are cables properly rated for voltage requirements for the loads?. I .

Electrical Loads

27. Have electrical loads been analyzed to function proprl u nderthe expectedlowest and highest voltage conditions9 \/;

28. Have loads been analyzed for their in'shand f curret

29. Have loads been analyzed for their electrical pdtectionuirements?+

As-built System

30. Are service water flow capacities h-tt e minimum number ofpumps available under accident conditions?.,<'.',-

31. Have modified equipment n %nts,,alfing u pe of 10 CFR50.49 been thoroughly ev-tepd fa environmt equipment qualificationsconsiderations such as e'mperat6re>adiatiin and humidity?

32. Are the modificatio the (tem consistent with the original design andlicensing bases( t ?' *1

Specific Guidance DV

No specijic'uidance p ovded

71111.21-4 RESOUR MATEz s Age 7- - -

This insp cedure tis ested to take an average of 680 hours (408 NRCinspector' hours andh72, conitactor support hours) based on a team of five inspectors ata sitee/

74<111.21-05 C MPLETION STATUS

nsp ection of tbe minimum sample size will constitute completion of this procedure in thePS., TThaTmiirmfum sample size consists of fifteen component reviews, three operator

actinsani .fdour operating experience issues, regardless of the number of units at the site.

71111.21-06 REFERENCES

1. IP 71111.04, "Equipment Alignment."2. IP 71111.15, "Operability Evaluations."

Issue Date: 11/XX/05 -15- 71111.21

3. IP 71111.17, "Permanent Plant Modifications."4. IP71111.02, "Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments."5. IP 71111.22, "Surveillance Testing."6. IP 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems."7. IP 93801, "Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI)."8. Information Notice 97-078, "Crediting of Operator Actions in Place of Automatic Actions

and Modifications of Operator Actions, Including Response Times."9. SECY-04-0071, dated April 29, 2004 (ML040970328).10.SECY-05-0118, dated July 1,2005 (ML051390465).

END

71111.21 -16- Issue Date: 1 1/XX/05 I