Attitudes to Arab‐Jewish confrontation as reflected in the Hebrew press: 1900–1918

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Attitudes to Arab‐Jewishconfrontation as reflectedin the Hebrew press:1900–1918Yosef Gorni aa Associate Professor of History , Tel AvivUniversity, Director of the Chaim RosenbergSchool of Jewish StudiesPublished online: 18 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: Yosef Gorni (1980) Attitudes to Arab‐Jewish confrontation asreflected in the Hebrew press: 1900–1918, Studies in Zionism: Politics, Society,Culture, 1:1, 47-81

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Attitudes to Arab-Jewish Confrontationas Reflected in the Hebrew Press: 1900-1918

Yosef Gorni

W HAT YITZHAK EPSTEIN defined seventy years ago as "the con-cealed question"—i.e., the attitude of Zionism towards the Arab popu-

lation of Palestine—has since developed into one of the most acute problemsof the twentieth century, arousing violent nationalist emotions and frequentlyerupting into bloodshed. The Arab-Jewish confrontation has been so proc-racted, and has had so powerful an impact on both regional and internationalaffairs, that a study of its roots and origins is of obvious interest.

Such an examination may help us to probe several prevailing theories onthe origins of the confrontation. The first theory holds that the Zionistmovement became embroiled in the dispute, inadvertently, so to say, becauseit dismissed the problem either out of naivety or from sheer ignorance. •

The second and diametrically opposed hypothesis suggests that the courseof events was influenced by political miscalculation rather than naivety.According to this view, the confrontation was brought about by a faultyselection of political means and a series of missed opportunities for a negoti-ated settlement.

The third theory derives from the assumption that the existence of theproblem was recognized and its acuteness fully understood from the verybeginning. When dealing with this theory one must pose the questionwhether the Zionist movement did in fact foresee the possibility of a nationaldispute, and whether it was ideologically and emotionally prepared to face theconsequences of its inevitability.

One cannot attempt to answer these questions without clarifying some ofthe Zionist tenets which determined the nature of the Arab-Jewish problem.Zionism has always adhered to four social and political tenets, without whichits existence would have been pointless and its efforts doomed to failure. Allthese principles had a powerful influence, direct or indirect, on its policytowards the Arabs.

The first principle was the desire for the territorial concentration of theJewish people in Palestine, their historic homeland, Eretz Yisrael—The Landof Israel. This claim for a homeland, in die name of an historical right by apeople not residing within it, implied, a priori, a denial, whether moderate orextreme, of the exclusive rights of die Arab residents. The desire for territorialconcentration entailed a radical transformation of existing proprietary condi-tions, thus creating a much graver situation than the more common one inwhich two native populations are engaged in a struggle which does not affect

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48 YOSEF GORNI

the basic balance of forces.The logical consequence of the principle of territorial concentration was the

aspiration for a Jewish majority in Palestine. This was an essential componentof Zionism, the history of the Diaspora having demonstrated the great perilsinherent in perpetual minority status. It was indeed a key issue. The transitionfrom minority to majority status meant a drastic modification of the interna-tional status of the Jewish people and the opening of an entirely new chapter inits history. The persistent efforts to realize this goal in various ways meantnullifying the status of the Arabs of Palestine as the dominant ethnic group.Árab-Jéwish confrontation was born of the incessant endeavor to transformthe national status quo and the formal balance of forces in Palestine.

The third Zionist principle concerned the productivization of the Jewishmasses, and the consequent belief that the exclusive employment of Jewishlabor was a precondition for the independent existence of a Jewish society inPalestine. The movement aspired to create an autarkic society, set apart fromthe non-Jewish environment. The struggle for the "conquest of labor," whichwas undertaken during the first years of the century with the aim of creatingan all-embracing national autarky—above and beyond the wish to find em-ployment for individual Jewish workers—determined patterns of politicalattitudes towards the Arabs of Palestine. It should be kept in mind that thoseSecond Aliya workers in the van of the struggle for "Jewish labor" were tobecome the leaders of the Jews of Palestine—the Yishuv—and the Zionistmovement two or three decades later.

The fourth Zionist principle held that national regeneration required therenaissance of Hebrew culture. This ideal of Jewish cultural renewal in Pales-tine was imperiled by two conflicting processes in the Diaspora: the blossom-ing of Yiddish culture and cultural assimilation. These and the weakness ofHebrew culture aroused apprehensions which, transferred to Palestine,induced a feeling that Arab cultural influences must be avoided as far as poss-ible.

The common denomination of these four principles was the desire toestablish a distinct Jewish national society in Palestine, surrounded by protec-tive barriers—political, social, economic and cultural. Such protection wasseen as essential for the consolidation of a still frail national society taking itsfirst independent steps. In short, the ideology which advocated separationwas the outcome of weakness rather than the corollary of national strength.

This, again, raises a number of questions. Did that generation believe thatenhanced strength would in future enable them to reach a settlement with theArabs in a spirit of moderation and mutual consent, or did they hope toaccumulate enough power to settle the dispute by force? Furthermore, wemust ask, in the light of the prior assumption that there was a consensus ofopinion on basic questions of Zionist ideology, whether there was a mono-lithic Zionist attitude towards the Arabs or whether there were differences of

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ARAB-JEWISH CONFRONTATION IN HEBREW PRESS 49

opinion rooted in divergent outlooks, clashes of economic interests and dis-similar social backgrounds?

This leads us to another and somewhat paradoxical question. Didn't theZionist aspiration to create a separate Jewish national society in Palestineimply recognition of the existence of another national society—namely theArab one? Otherwise, what need would there have been for separation?

These and other questions to be raised further on will serve as guidelines forthis study. Historical research on the Arab-Jewish confrontation is still in itsinfancy, but has already produced several important studies. The present arti-cle is based on relatively untapped sources. It attempts to view the subjectfrom a new angle by examining references to the Arab question in Hebrewperiodicals and newspapers, from the beginning of the century to the out-break of the First World War. A few words on the importance of this sourcemay be appropriate here. The very fact that the subject was discussed in thesemedia attests to the public interest in the issue. This public discussion, whichwas ideological and theoretical rather than tactical, can help clarify differencesof opinion on this question, assuming of course, as we must, that the press is,on the one hand, influenced by current attitudes while helping to mold them,on the other. Although the Hebrew press at the beginning of the century hadonly a limited circulation, it was aimed at a select circle of educated readerswhose importance cannot be measured by mere numbers.1

The article will attempt to show that four different viewpoints, all based onthe Zionist consensus, emerged from the journalistic discussion of the Arabquestion. The first trend advocated altruistic integration; the second favorednational separation; the third was liberal and practical by nature and the fourthwas based on a constructivist-socialist approach to the problem. Following adescription of the various attitudes, the article will seek to establish whetherthere was any correlation between them and the social origins of the groupswhich upheld the various views.

i. Altruistic Integration

This approach originated in the response evoked by the challenge posed bythe first anti-Zionist utterances in the Palestinian and Syrian Arab press at thebeginning of the century. As early as 1900 Èliyahu Saphir, the Jerusalem-bornPalestine expert, writing in Hashiloah (leading literary journal in Russia untilWWI; Cracow, Warsaw, Odessa, Jerusalem, 1896-1926) called the attention

1 It should be kept in mind that some of the Hebrew journals of the time were published inEurope and were of a general Jewish rather than specifically Zionist nature. Every Hebrewpublication mentioned will be identified briefly as to main characteristic, place of publicationand duration of publication.

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50 YOSEF GORNI

of the Jewish public to the disquieting phenomenon of anti-Zionist prop-aganda in the Arab press. In an article, "Hatred of Israel in Arab Literature,"he distinguished between the anti-Zionist writers, most of whom belonged tothe Christian community, and the Moslem majority, which had as yet shownno indications of hostility towards Zionism. Cognizant of the perils inherentin this situation, Saphir concluded that the future of Zionism depended onclose cooperation with the Moslem majority in Palestine, since the MoslemArabs "are one of those nations—or the sole nation—close to us and to ourhearts; in their time we prospered and their love and affinity are still a possibil-ity for the future." Saphir's optimism was based not only on memories offlourishing Jewish life and culture under the medieval Arab caliphates. Hebelieved that the Arab was basically just, virtuous and kind. If these traits werenot always evident it was not the Arabs' fault but the result of the difficultconditions under which they lived. Furthermore, Saphir made a clear distinc-tion between Moslem anti-Jewish sentiments and Christian anti-Semitism:Arab hatred of Jews had derived from exclusively political motives; the Jewswere detested as long as they were a stumbling block to Islamic expansion,but the triumph of Islam spelled the end of anti-Jewish feeling. The Christianpeoples, on the other hand, hated and oppressed the Jews, though in no waythreatened by them; their hostility was therefore perpetual and fundamental.This, according to Saphir, was why the European Enlightenment had gener-ated an anti-Semitic movement while under enlightened Moslem rule anti-Jewish feelings were kept in check.

Saphir's comparative analysis of the relations of Jews with Christians andArabs, past and present, led him to the following conclusion:

In Europe we strive in vain to uproot and extirpate hatred of us, for it is aheritage deeply implanted in the hearts of the nations; therefore the sole meansof salvaging our pride and conserving our strength for ourselves alone is toremove ourselves from the influence of the "consensus." But here in the coun-tries I have mentioned, it is incumbent upon us to prevent others from absorb-ing the influence of this consensus. In the land of our fathers and the adjacentcountries we must proclaim our worth, and our very existence and activitiesmust constitute an open protest against all the slander and calumny beingdirected against us. And the most important thing is to feel entirely at homeand not as guests in these countries, in their language and in their culture.(Emphasis added.)

This point of view is indeed of considerable interest. It is not only notable asthe earliest recognition in the Hebrew press of the significance of the Arabnational awakening and of the accompanying anti-Zionist propaganda; it alsorepresents some of the basic tenets of the altruistic-integrative approach.

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Saphir attributed great importance to the Arab attitude towards Zionism, andall but concluded that its implementation was largely dependent on Arabgood will, which must be won by exemplary Jewish conduct in Palestine. Hisbelief in the possibility of reintegrating the Jews in the region and culture fromwhich they had been exiled was coupled with a denunciation of Christianityand the West, and the idealization of the Moslem East. His belief in the nobil-ity of the Arabs and his proposal that the Jews study Moslem culture markhim as the architect of the integrative approach. But the article went almostunnoted, possibly because Saphir's exposition did not imply any censure ofthe Jewish settlers or the Zionist movement.

Public controversy on the Arab question was sparked off by Yitzhak Ep-stein's article, "The Concealed Question," published in the monthlyHashiloah in 1907. Epstein (1862-1943) was a Russian-born educator andHebrew writer who settled in Palestine in 1886. In this comprehensive andprovocative essay, which elaborated the integrative approach, Epsteinexpressed harsh criticism of the methods by which Jews acquired land inPalestine. He argued that this system, entailing dispossession of poor farmers,was morally reprehensible and liable to cause future political damage. TheArabs would not keep silent forever and would one day rebel against thisharsh attitude and against Jewish settlement in general. As an alternative towhat he condemned as an unjust and perilous system, Epstein proposed thatdispossession be avoided completely through purchase of uninhabited areasand cultivation of land hitherto regarded as unsuitable for agriculture.

But the article's main interest in the context of this study lies in the politicaland ideological outlook on which Epstein based his arguments. He com-menced by formulating a political theory which is of considerable significancein the annals of Arab-Jewish" relations:

Among the difficult questions raised by the idea of the renaissance of ourpeople on its own soil, there is one whose importance outweighs all others: thequestion of our attitude towards the Arabs. This question, on the correct solutionof which depends the realization of our national aspirations, has not been forgottenbut rather has remained completely concealed from the Zionists, and in its trueform it has found almost no mention in the literature of our movement.(Emphasis added.)

Epstein was, in fact, the first who stated explicitly that the implementation ofZionism depended on Arab consent. He went even further in holding that thecountry belonged in practice to both Jews and Arabs. He criticized the leadersof the Zionist movement who engaged in higher politics "while the questionof the resident people, the [country's] workers and actual owners, has not yetbeen raised, either in practice or theory." (Emphasis added.) These leadersdisregarded the fact "that there resides in our treasured land an entire people

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which has clung to it for hundreds of years and has never considered leavingit." Epstein believed that this people was linked to the country not only bylengthy residence, but also by profound emotional attachments. Therefore"we are making a flagrant psychological mistake with regard to a strong,resolute and zealous people. While we harbor fierce sentiments towards theland of our fathers, we forget that the nation now living there is also endowedwith a sensitive heart and loving soul. The Arab, like all other men, is stronglyattached to his homeland." (Emphasis added.)

Epstein's differentiation between Palestine as the Jews' ancestral land andthe Arabs' native country did not affect his evaluation of their respectivenationalist sentiments: both loved the country and saw it as their homeland.

Like Saphir, Epstein admired the character of the Arab people. He wasundoubtedly influenced by romantic attitudes, by the open and covert long-ings of many Zionist thinkers who dreamed of the spiritual and physicalregeneration of the Jewish people in Palestine, and possibly also by fashion-able theories predicting the decline of the West and renaissance of the Orient.His article contains numerous expressions of esteem and affection for theArabs, a "great and resolute people" whose "physical development surpassesthat of all the peoples of Europe. As semi-vegetarians who drink water, theyare stronger than those who consume meat and drink alcohol." Above all heextols the Druze, "the most gallant of the Arab tribes, renowned for courage,heroism, physique, beauty and spiritual attributes."

On the basis of these assumptions Epstein formulated his ideological out-look on the Arab question, a combination of utilitarianism, altruism and morethan a touch of belief in "the mission of Israel." He began by warning that theZionist movement must not acquire the image of a colonialist movement,cautioning particularly against the danger that it might appear to resembleGerman settlement in Palestine. His arguments are based on morality as wellas political expediency. "We must on no account cause harm to any peopleand in particular to a great people whose hostility would be highly danger-ous." Furthermore, Epstein held that peaceful coexistence between Jews andArabs rested not only on the self-imposed restrictions advocated by him, butcould be expected to flow naturally from prevailing conditions. The Arabpeople, controlling enormous stretches of land, could accept Jewish settle-ment in its midst, and what is more "must, for its own good, let the Jews intothe country, for it is powerless to improve its situation and to extricate itselffrom its poverty and ignorance by its own efforts; only our people can pro-vide for its needs." The benefit would therefore be mutual; one people wouldregain its homeland and the other would achieve progress. Thus would comeabout "the renaissance of two ancient and gifted Semitic peoples with greatpotentialities, who complement one another." But Epstein was not contentwith a mutually beneficial alliance. He also proclaimed truly altruistic ideas,maintaining that the Zionist movement, besides extending agricultural assis-

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tance to the fellahin, should help in various other spheres:

We must throw wide open to the residents of this country our public institu-tions, hospitals, pharmacies, libraries and reading rooms, cheap eating houses,

, saving and loan funds; we shall organize popular lectures, plays and musicalperformances in accordance with the spirit of the people and in their language;we shall allocate an important place to the Arabic language in our schools andshall willingly admit Arab boys; we shall open our kindergartens to theirinfants thus helping poor families, bringing them economic and hygienic, andabove all—moral and spiritual benefits.

There is undoubtedly a utilitarian aspect to Epstein's altruistic vision. As ateacher he believed in the power of education to shape society, stating that"we must at long last understand that education is a great political mover towhich we should direct the main thrust of our public endeavors."

He was not unaware that his proposals had the semblance of missionaryactivities, but he distinguished between the religious objectives of mis-sionaries and the truly altruistic deeds which Zionism was to undertake. Ep-stein did not limit himself to cultural activities among the Arabs, but preacheda higher degree of involvement in the lives of the Arabs. Zionism should takeon the role of the "angel of peace" among the Arabs, reconciling rival factionsand helping to further the Arabs' "national awareness."

Thus, while he believed in the possibility of Arab-Jewish co-existence inPalestine, Epstein feared the emergence of an Arab nationalist movement hos-tile to Zionism. And although he recognized the existence of an Arab nation inPalestine whom he held in high regard, he tended to accord them, at leasttemporarily, an inferior social status in a partnership in which thejews were toplay the part of mentors and guides.

Similar views were expressed in the same year by Rabbi Benjamin (1880-1957, a Galicean born writer and public figure who settled in Palestine in1907),2 writing in Hatneorer (literary journal; London, 1906-1907). Butwhereas Epstein, who was personally acquainted with conditions in Palestine,favored integration through co-existence between the two peoples, RabbiBenjamin, from afar, advocated integration through assimilation of the Arabsby thejews. He had in mind not only cultural assimilation through educationand assistance, as proposed by Epstein, but an actual amalgamation. He usedbiblical phrases to express his belief in the advisability of marriage betweenJews and Arabs, as a means of improving the Jewish people: "And you shallgive him your sons and take his sons unto you, and the blood of his heroes will

2 Rabbi Benjamin was the pseudonym of Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann. He was not a rabbi.Rabbi Benjamin was one of the founders of the Brit-Shalom movement in the twenties whichadvocated Jewish-Arab cooperation.

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54 YOSEFGORNI

be mingled with your blood and you will increase and like will find like andthey will become one kind."

The upsurge of Arab nationalist fervor and of anti-Zionist feelings follow-ing the revolution of the Young Turks aroused the apprehension of variousHebrew writers and confirmed the upholders of the integrative view in theiropinions. They interpreted Arab opposition to Jewish settlement as the out-come of Jewish separatism and aloofness towards the Arabs. The "Araborientation" which the integrationists advocated, deriving as it did fromesteem for Arab power and disbelief in political Zionism, was bolstered afterthe revolution by the force of Zionist disillusionment with the new regime.The Turkish authorities' ill will towards Jewish immigration and the impo-tence of Turkish Jewry which failed to support the Zionists in Parliament, ledYosef Luria to the conclusion that "the Arabs constitute the main force inPalestine." (Luria, 1871-1937, was a Rumanian-born journalist and teacherwho settled in Palestine in 1907 and was later active in Brit-Shalom.) If thiswere so, he asked, writing in Haolam in 1911 (organ of World Zionist Organ-ization; Cologne, 1907-1914) perhaps they might waive their objections toJewish immigration? But at this point he admitted what was in his view theoriginal sin of the Zionist movement:

We must admit the truth. During all the years of our labor in Palestine wecompletely forgot that there were Arabs in the country. The Arabs were "dis-covered" only during the past few years. We regarded all European nations asopponents of our settlement, but failed to pay heed to one people—the peopleresiding in this country and attached to it. The Arabs' attitude towards ourcoming passed almost unnoticed. It was as if the Arabs did not exist.

In Luria's opinion, the attitude of the Arabs towards Zionism was moreimportant than that of the Turks. The latter could not act against the wishes ofthe Arabs who constituted a strong faction in Parliament and played a consid-erable part in the administration. Zionism had been ignoring the Arabs, andthe Jews of Palestine had made no effort to achieve greater cultural and socialaffinity. And even more dangerous, the Jewish community had done nothingto explain itself and its intentions to the Moslem majority in Palestine, leavingit completely exposed to the hostile propaganda of Christian Arab circles. Ithad not attempted to dispel the natural fear of the Moslem masses lest "theJews push them out of the country." Luria closed his article with a stemwarning: "We have been silent all these years and still are. The fate anddevelopment of our endeavors are in their hands and yet we remain silent andwait."

Proponents of this viewpoint believed that Zionist activities and even max-imalism were conditional upon agreement with the Arabs, which could onlybe attained if the Jews integrated into the East, aided the Arabs and won their

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trust. In 1912 Rabbi Benjamin, taking issue with Ahad Ha'am's opinions onthe future of Jewish settlement in Palestine,3 accused him of having in effectrenounced the idea of mass settlement by casting doubt on the possibility ofcreating a class of Jewish farmers and agricultural workers. Surveying thepractical prospects of mass settlement, Rabbi Benjamin argued that there wasroom in Palestine for a population of five millions, and therefore the presenceof several hundred thousand Arabs was no obstacle. But this was conditionalupon Jewish ability to develop close ties with the Arabs and to cooperate withthem in the development of the country. He saw no basic and perpetualconflict between the Jewish and Arab nations. The present tensions weretemporary and of marginal importance, and it was in the true interest of bothpeoples to unite "for a single objective and for mutual assistance." But thereciprocal relationship which he advocated implied, in practice, integration ofthe Arabs into Jewish society. He proposed that the Arabs be taught to adopt"a civilized and clean way of life" through "the construction of attractivesuburbs for local town-dwellers." This, he thought, would not entail Jewishinvestments, since Jewish experience, abilities and energies would suffice.Rabbi Benjamin maintained that his approach was not only politically expe-dient but also reflected a fundamental attitude towards the Arabs, because"the question of relations between Jews and Arabs does not belong to thesphere of politics, of considerations and interests, calculations and cunning; itis a moral and social issue, a matter of relations between fellow men."

Rabbi Benjamin's moral-altruistic vision extended beyond the sphere ofArab-Jewish relations. One year later, in 1913, in Hatoren (literary journal;New York, 1913-1926), he proposed the construction in Jerusalem of a Palaceof Peace since "Jerusalem is unique in its sanctity to the three monotheisticfaiths. Let the representatives of the three faiths join in common worship inthe Palace of Peace." He envisaged this Palace, to be financed by the Jewishpeople, as a cultural center for all peoples, where all nationalities would beeducated in peace and international cooperation. It would dispatch emissariesand educators to preach international peace throughout the world.

These views led Rabbi Benjamin to adopt a critical stand towards the insist-ence of the nascent Jewish labor movement that in Palestine Jews must em-ploy Jewish labor. Despite his sympathy for the young people who werestruggling for the "conquest of labor," and although he realized that withoutthe ideal of living by one own's labor, so dear to the Second Aliya pioneers,there could be no national renaissance, he disapproved of the latter's violentobjection to the employment of Arab laborers in Jewish colonies. In 1913 heargued in Haherut (Jerusalem daily; 1909-1917) that it was wrong to foundnational life on that one sole principle, since "life itself is not dependent on onefactor, but on coundess conditions. The Yishuv is a living organism, and its

3 "In the Beginning," in Meanwhile, a Literary Anthology (Hebrew), Jaffa, 1912.

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vitality depends on fulfillment of a number of conditions. An essential condi-tion is the creation of a benevolent attitude towards the nation residing in thiscountry."

The man who arrived at the most far-reaching implications in his advocacyof integration in the East was Dr. Nissim Malul, a Palestinian-bom SephardiJew, educated at Cairo University and later a member of its faculty. In "OurPosition in the Country," in Haherut, June 18, 1913, he proposed absoluteintegration in Arab culture, which he held to be essential for the revival of theoriginal Hebrew culture. If the Jews, as heirs of Judah Halevi andMaimonides, wanted to follow in their footsteps, they must study Arabic andmerge with the Arabs; " . . . we must consolidate our Semitic nationality andnot obscure it with European culture. Through Arabic we can create a trueHebrew culture. But if we introduce European elements into our culture thenwe shall simply be committing suicide." Mahal's desire for an absoluteJewish-Arab cultural synthesis as an antithesis of Western culture led him topropose the establishment of a joint Arab-Jewish teachers' association. One ofits objectives was to be the evolvement of a new method of teaching theArabic language.

Malul's unconventional and provocative views would appear to representthe culmination of the altruistic-integrative approach. Despite the differencesin outlook between its proponents, there were certain principles to which theyall adhered. This school of thought recognized the existence of an Arab nationwithin the Turkish Empire in general and in Palestine in particular; it profes-sed profound admiration for the Arab national character and Arab-Moslemculture; it advocated Zionist aid to the Arabs as a moral injunction and as anact of political expedience. And though the supporters of this approach didnot shrink from belief in maximalistic Zionist aims, they held that the lattercould not be realized without Arab concurrence.

2. The Separatist Approach

The separatist approach was diametrically opposed to that of the integrative-altruistic school of thought. It originated in the controversy which followedthe publication of Yitzhak Epstein's views and was subsequently elaboratedinto an independent ideological outlook. As against the integrationists'respect for the Arabs, their opponents showed contempt; instead of equalnational rights they advocated Jewish dominion over Palestine; they coun-tered the belief in integration and reciprocity by preaching cultural separation.And where the first group nurtured hopes of peace, they accepted the inevita-bility of confrontation.

The separatist viewpoint was first formulated in an article by the historianand writer, Yosef Klausner, published in Hashiloah almost simultaneously

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with Epstein's article in 1907. Klausner (1874-1958, long-time editor ofHashiloah in Warsaw, Odessa, and, after immigration in 1919, in Jerusalem)called attention to the danger of assimilation of the Jewish settlers in Arabculture. He found indications of the existence of such a threat in the youngcolonists' imitation of Arab customs, and the approval of their conduct bycertain Hebrew writers:

We Jews have been living for more than two thousand years among culturedpeoples and we cannot and must not descend once more to the cultural level ofsemi-savages. Indeed our hope that one day we shall be masters of the country isnot based on the sword or on the fist but on our cultural advantage over theArabs and Turks, which will gradually increase our influence. (Emphasisadded.)

All the components of the separatist approach—separation, superiority anddominion—are evident in this excerpt.

Klausner also believed in the inevitability of confrontation. Reacting to theclashes in Jaffa, in 1908, between Jewish workers and an Arab crowd, hewrote in Hashiloah: "I know that in the long run a nation cannot be builtwithout clashes and bloodshed, but these are not inevitable at the presentmoment and should be postponed as long as possible."

Several Palestinian writers reacted angrily to Epstein's article. MosheSmilansky, a prominent leader of the Jewish settlers, was the first to respondin an article published in Hapoel Hatzair (labor journal, Jaffa, Tel Aviv, 1907-1970). He branded Epstein's theories as a national threat. He agreed withEpstein that the Jews should not alienate the fellahin by brusque behavior, butargued that "we must not help them grow more powerful. Our main objec-tive should be to become the majority in our country. Any act which goescounter to this aim is á national transgression." Moshe Smilansky held thatseparation was a prerequisite for the attainment of a Jewish majority in Pales-tine; it would strengthen the YishuV by ensuring that the national resourceswould benefit the Jewish people alone, and it would prevent the corruption ofits good qualities and debasement of its cultural standards: "Let us riöt get toofamiliar with the Arab fèllahin lest our children adopt their ways and learnfrom their ugly deeds. Let all those who are loyal to the Torah—avoid ugli-ness and that which resembles it—keep their distance from the fellahin andtheir base attributes."

Moshe Smilansky rejected the charge of immorality:

It is not "moral" ? It is quite moral. Is it moral to deliver the weak into the handsof the strong, relying on the latter's rectitude? No, that deed is moral whichenables the weak to resemble the strong. We do not want to remain weak, tobeg mercy and rectitude of our opponents. Let us be as strong as they and even

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more so; then we can speak out, then we shall become equals and can makepeace openly like equal men.

Thus, according to Moshe Smilansky, national egoism and separatismresulted from the weakness of the Palestinian Jewish community. But theyalso constituted the sole political path to future co-existence, attainable onlyon the basis of equal demographic and economic power.

No less vehement in his objections to Epstein's views was Ze'evSmilansky, one of the founders of the Hapoel Hatzair (workers' party) andcousin of Moshe Smilansky. In an article published in Haolam, official organof the Zionist movement, shortly after the outbreak of the revolution of theYoung Turks, he rejected Epstein's arguments one by one. He began byclaiming that Epstein suffered from a split personality, torn between his loveand compassion for the Arabs and his nationalist aspirations. This was why hevacillated between conciliatory ideals and nationalist extremism. Smilanskywent on to deny that the Arabs, as a nation, had a claim on Palestine. In fact,they were not à nation at all, but a society split into warring sects and tribes.He rejected the idea of Zionist aid to Arabs first because the required financialresources were not available, and secondly because of the danger that bettereducation might strengthen Arab opposition to Zionism, instead of inducingthem to accept it out of gratitude and understanding, as Epstein hoped.

This self-centered national approach was elucidated by Ze'ev Smilanskyhimself:

Epstein fears our excessive egoism. We must distinguish between two preval-ent types of egoism. There is the type of "nothing is of importance exceptmyself which engenders violence, and there is the type_which concerns itselfabove all with protection and care of the self. The first type should be com-bated and can be weakened gradually. The second type cannot be destroyed;neither rules nor prohibitions will sway the man who wishes to go on livingnor will they induce him to forget his own self, for to preserve life is thesupreme injunction.

Ze'ev Smilansky applied this individual psychology to the communal andpolitical sphere. The imperialist powers, he believed, were motivated byselfish impulses of the first type, aimed solely at subjugating others. Thenational egoism of the Zionist movement, on the other hand, was of thesecond type and reflected the existential question of life or death. Therefore,any deviation from this policy through the use of resources to satisfy bothJewish and Arab needs, or abstention from the purchase of cultivable land,would constitute a national danger. At the same time, Smilansky stressed thathe was not advocating expulsion of the Arabs from the country, if only for the

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selfish reason that in future they would provide the market for Jewish indus-trial products.

Smilansky continued his onslaught on Epstein's views in a series of articleswhich he published in Hashiloah. But whereas in Haolam he had attackedEpstein's altruism, he now endeavored to refute the integrationist theories.He claimed that the presence of large numbers of Arabs in the Jewish colonieswas a cultural and security threat to the Yishuv. Like Moshe Smilansky, heenumerated what he saw as the negative traits of the Arabs and their unsavorycustoms which were having a particularly detrimental effect on Jewish youthin the colonies. But the most dangerous aspect of the Arabs' integration in thelife and economy of the colonies was that of security. "Our farmers mustemerge from the narrow confines of their outlook and become more acutelyaware of the situation. They must understand that a new era is approaching,fraught with nationalist ferment, in the course of which a national clash willcommence in our country." They should therefore refrain from aggravatingthe unavoidable national ferment by adding the social pathos implied in thephrase "The soil belongs to those who till it."

Ze'ev Smilansky's warning, uttered shortly after the Young Turks tookpower, soon proved to have been prophetical. The confrontation which heenvisaged became a certainty after the revolution. The first indications werepolitical. The new constitution legitimized parliamentary association on anational basis and led to the establishment of a strong Arab national faction inthe Ottoman parliament, which from the outset was blatantly anti-Zionist.This development aroused a great deal of anxiety and concern in the Pales-tinian Jewish community and the Zionist movement. From now on it wasdifficult to maintain that the opponents of Zionism were mostly Christians,i.e., a relatively small section of the Arab population. In view of the hostilityof the elected Arab representation, Hebrew writers began to advocate cooper-ation with the Turks against Arab nationalism. Unlike the integrationists whoheld that Arab consent was essential for the realization of Zionism, theseparatists wished to exploit the tension between Turks and Arabs bycooperating with the former.

This viewpoint was unequivocally and bluntly expounded by Ze'evJabotinsky (1880-1940; founder and leader of the Revisionist Zionist Party) inan article published in 1909 in Haolam. He argued that the nationalist-unitariannature of the new regime would soon cause it to clash with any national entityof similar characteristics within the Ottoman Empire, i.e., with "the Arabnation. " There were more Arabs than Turks in the Ottoman Empire and theyhad a long cultural tradition and a spiritual center in Egypt. Jabotinskydoubted whether an Arab national movement already existed, but he wasconvinced that all conditions were ripe for the development of "a strongnational movement in the not too distant future." His reasoning led him to arather paradoxical conclusion.

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According to Jabotinsky, the threat to Turkish hegemony posed by theArab national movement would not lead to Turkish-Arab conciliation at theexpense of the Zionist movement. On the contrary, the Turkish regimewould soon realize that it could employ the Zionist movement as an instru-ment for diluting the overwhelmingly Arab character of Palestine. Accordingto Jabotinsky's optimistic outlook, Turkish fears of national territorial con-centrations need not apply to Palestine:

Even now it will not be difficult to make the Young Turks understand thattheir fear of the concentration of one nation in one spot does not apply to anincrease in the number of Jews in Palestine, that land which is at present but asegment of Arab territory, with one nation and one language. The migrationofjews to Palestine does not at present constitute a concentration of one nationin a mixed area. On the contrary, we are creating a new national element in aplace which has been almost entirely homogeneous.

Jabotinsky was in fact suggesting that the presence of a homogeneous Arabnation in Palestine could be made to serve Zionist interests. If Palestine were anational vacuum, Jewish settlement there could be seen as an attempt to createa national uniformity which was bound to harm Turkish interests. As mattersstood, Jewish settlement was undermining the existing homogeneity. Hetherefore held that at that stage the Turkish imperial policy of divide and rulewas congruent with Zionist interests, and that the fiercer the political compet-ition between Turks and Arabs, the more likely the former would be "toregard with growing favor the increase in our numbers in Palestine. Thegrowth of Arab power will gradually increase Turkish sympathies towardsus." At the same time "it is incumbent upon us to act with great tact andcaution so that, while making use of these sympathies to foster the develop-ment of the Jewish population and to expand our influence, we will pay heed tothe just feelings of the Arabs." (Emphasis added.)

Despite this appeal for moderation towards the Arabs, Jabotinsky may beclassified among those who rejected the possibility ofJewish-Arab integrationand cooperation. The alternative they offered was political integration in theOttoman Empire with its heterogeneous national structure. This idea wasadvocated by people of varied and conflicting outlooks, but few based it, asdid Jabotinsky, on the assumed inevitability of Turkish-Arab confrontation.Another prominent proponent of this view was the famous Hebraist andjournalist, Eliezer ben Yehuda.

As tension between Arabs and Jews increased, the separatist approach inone form or another found increasing support among a variety of people. Onthe cultural and political plane, Avraham Ludivpol (1886-1921, Russian-bornjournalist, settled in Palestine in 1897) objected to a proposal, supported byHaherut, to establish an Arab-Jewish paper for the purpose of conducting

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propaganda among the Arabs, declaring that it reflected a trend among youngSephardicjews towards assimilation into Moslem culture. He denied the use-fulness of propaganda and maintained that only organized national powerwould be effective in relations with Turks and Arabs, since "as regards both,it is not through the foundation of an Arab paper that we will defend ourselvesbut rather by arraying our forces and by becoming the organized force of theJewish people, just as the Armenians are the organized force of the Armeniannation."

Ludivpol also rebuked Malul for proposing Jewish-Arab cultural integra-tion. He accused him of preaching assimilation and propagating an absurditywhich was refuted by the most elementary historical logic: "TheJewish peo-ple were never assimilated by nations of highly developed cultures; it goeswithout saying that they have turned from those calling on them to assimilateto a people whose creative powers can be gauged by the barren wastes of ourcountry, in which they have been living for centuries." Not only did heregard the Arabs as culturally inferior to the Jews; he held that historical pro-cesses were operating in favor of Zionism and that nothing could stop them.Completely reversing MaluTs theories, Ludivpol predicted Arab integrationinto Jewish culture, believing that the day would come when "the indigenouspeople will have to learn Hebrew and this necessity will have its effect."

While Ludivpol feared Jewish assimilation in the Arab environment, YosefHaim Brenner (1881-1921, settled in Palestine in 1909, murdered in the Arabriots in Jaffa, 1921), the prominent publicist of the new pioneering immigra-tion, used vehement language to describe his apprehensions in the face of theArabs' acute hostility towards the Jews. In a merciless attack on the views ofRabbi Benjamin, published in 1913 in Revivim (a literary journal, Lvov,Jerusalem, 1908-1919) he wrote: "I see in this idealistic approach to the world,in these high-minded and childish dreams, which have no foundation in basichuman instincts, a kind of immorality, yes immorality, since they are nothingbut a mirage, the result of a misreading of the bitter truth."4 What, then, didBrenner regard as the true facts? He held that

In this small land there reside, apart from the other inhabitants, no lessthan six hundred thousand Arabs, who despite their backwardnessand lack of culture are masters of the land, in fact and in full knowledgeof the fact; and we have perforce come here to enter among them andlive with them. There is already hatred between us—so it must be andwill continue to be. They are stronger than we in every possible wayand could crush us underfoot. But we Jews are accustomed to beingthe weak among the strong, and we must therefore be ready for theconsequences of the hatred and must employ all the scanty means at

4 Yosef Haim Brenner, Collected Writings (Hebrew), vol. 2, Tel Aviv, 1964, p. 321.

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our disposal in order to survive here. After all, since we became anation we have been accustomed to and are surrounded by hatred,imbued with hatred. This is how it should be: cursed are the soft-hearted and the loving! But above all—let us comprehend the truesituation, without sentimentality and without idealism.5

With characteristic fury Brenner addressed his adversary directly: "RabbiBenjamin, what is the point of speaking of love for our neighbors, theinhabitants of this land, when we are sworn enemies, yes, enemies? Whatpoint is there in introducing ideals into the relations between nations when it isutterly useless to do so? The idealistic approach has always been false."6

Brenner's total despair of the possibility of peaceful co-existence should beattributed not only to sober appreciation of actual conditions but also to hisown temperament in which despair and hope were intermingled. Yet, despitehis pessimism, he never fled the country, and his very stand spelled hope.Towards the Arabs he advocated unyielding firmness. His was perhaps themost extreme example of the separatist approach, but he was not its solerepresentative. In 1914, Yehoshua Barzilay (1855-1918, Hebrew writer, set-tled in Palestine in 1887) came to similar conclusions, hi an article inHashiloahwhich expressed optimism as to the future of Jewish settlement in Palestine,he claimed that though the Arabs should be treated justly and aided in variousways, the Jews must not concede anything nor truckle to them. It was point-less to advocate the study of Arabic and of Arab culture because their culturalstandards were low and their language could serve no purpose except that ofdaily commerce. It would be preferable to study Turkish. The Jews shouldlearn from other settlers how to win the respect of the Arabs: "If we wish theArabs to treat us properly, we must learn from the Germans [i.e., the Germansettlers in Palestine], who do not maintain close ties with the Arabs; theirattitude is cool and impersonal, they study Arabic only in order to discussessential needs and no more." At the same time, Barzilay believed in thepossibility of Jewish-Arab co-existence on the basis of national autonomy.But all this was for the future, after the Jewish community had attained equal-ity with the Arabs through a policy of national preference, such as the emp-loyment of Jewish'labor by Jewish employers and separation for the sake ofconsolidation.

Yehoshua Barzilay's separatism was also paternalistic. He proposed aid tothe Arabs in order to render them worthy neighbors or even brethren of theJews, "but all this must be done with a sense of our own national worth, andwithout concessions. Then the Arabs will respect us and will learn to love us."But for the time being the Jews should seek no agreement with the Arabs.

5 Ibid., p. 323.6 Ibid.

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Agreement implied concession, and concessions were harmful, since theArabs would interpret them as a sign of weakness, thus cancelling all theadvantages which the Jews could hope to derive from an agreement.

The description of the separatist approach would not be complete without abrief survey of the views of two prominent members of the second generationof the Jewish colonies—Avshalom Feinberg and Aaron Aaronsohn, thoughwe have to draw on sources of a different kind in order to acquaint ourselveswith their opinions. Feinberg, writing to Henrietta Szold,7 described Jewishsettlement in Palestine as a struggle between culture and savagery. The recla-mation of the desolate land of Palestine had been made possible by Jewishfortitude and firmness towards the Arabs. Jewish achievements in the countrywould be secure only if protected by barbed-wire fences. Feinberg argued thatthis policy of digging in behind barbed-wire would have a beneficial educa-tional effect on the Arabs, since it would prevent them from engaging inrobbery and looting. Feinberg's contempt for the Arabs could hardly be sur-passed: "I have lived among them all my life and it would be difficult to swayme from my opinion that there is no more cowardly, hypocritical and falserace than this one."

Aaron Aaronsohn, Feinberg's mentor and comrade, held similar views. Hebelieved that the Arabs lacked a sense of justice and of human rights. Bothoppressors and oppressed accepted authority and power as natural anddivinely ordained. They were ingrates and fatalists.8 This evaluation ledAaronsohn tojustify a policy of total separation between Arabs and Jews. In areport submitted to the British intelligence in 1917, he explained that for vari-ous reasons it was essential for thejewish national movement to insist on strictseparation, as had been shown by the harm done whenever the Jews hadexercised lassitude in this respect. It is difficult to envisage how Aaronsohn,that sober realist, hoped to maintain such total separation while cheap Arablabor was being employed in Jewish agriculture, unless one assumes that thewhole concept was based on an ideology nurtured on a sense of superiorityand mastery. Indeed, according to Aaronsohn's view, Arabs of whateverstratum—the ruling elite as well as the uneducated masses—could not beregarded as potential partners for negotiation and agreement on the future ofPalestine. This future should be determined on the basis of the common inter-ests of the Zionist movement and of the dominant imperialist power in theregion—namely Great Britain. In effect, this was a continuation of the policywhich had wished to construct ajewish national entity in Palestine in coopera-

7 Avshalom, Writings and Letters (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1971. Henrietta Szold (1860-1945) was anAmerican Zionist who, after her first visit to Palestine in 1912, founded the American Hadas-sah Organization. She settled in Palestine in 1920 where she was active in social welfare andlater in child refugee rehabilitation.

8 E. Livneh, Aaron Aaronsohn, His Life and Times (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1969, p. 253.

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tion with the Turkish imperial interest. The principle remained the same, onlythe partner for cooperation had changed.

3. The Liberal-Practical Approach

The practical approach represented an intermediate position between the twoextreme viewpoints—the integrationist and the separatist. In essence it was anattempt to take the edge off the Jewish-Arab confrontation without renounc-ing the possibility of strengthening the Jewish grip on Palestine. It advocated acautious and fair attitude towards the Arabs, but was highly suspicious oftheir intentions. Its adherents favored political cooperation with the Arab rul-ing class, within the framework of the Turkish Empire rather than in viola-tion of its interests. They, too, thought that assistance should be extended tothe Arab masses, but through their traditional leaders rather than directly.They believed that the material benefits which Zionism could offer wouldblunt the resistance of the Arabs and soothe their anger, though they doubtedwhether they would suffice to eliminate all opposition. Their outlook wastherefore both moderate and sceptical, and its proponents included such var-ied personalities as Ahad Ha'am and Moshe Smilansky (after he had modifiedhis attitude to the problem), Palestinian representatives of the Zionist Organ-ization such as Arthur Ruppin and Yaakov Thon, the Zionist representativesin Constantinople—Victor Jacobson and Richard Lichtheim, and a group ofintellectuals, mostly members of the Sephardic community in Palestine whowere connected with Haherut.

The first to warn the Jewish settlers in Palestine of the possibility of anall-out confrontation with the Arabs was Ahad Ha'am. In a review inHamelitz (first Russian Hebrew newspaper, Odessa, St. Petersburg, 1860-1903) of his first visit to Palestine in 1891, he castigated the Hibbat Zionmovement—the precursor of political Zionism—for its attitude of contempttowards the Arabs. The Arab was not an ignorant and naive savage, he wrote ;on the contrary—"like all Semites he is sharpwitted and cunning." The rela-tive moderation which the Arabs were displaying towards Jewish settlers, heexplained, was the result of the advantages they derived from them. But "ifthe time should come when the lives of our people in Palestine develop to theextent that they to a smaller or greater degree usurp the place of the localpopulation, the latter will not yield easily." Ahad Ha'am clearly foresaw thatthe disturbance of the balance of national forces in Palestine would inevitablylead to a clash. Although he concurred with the opinion prevalent among thesettlers that the Arabs, by nature, respected force and courage, he cautionedthe settlers against improper or unjust behavior in their relations with theArabs, which might arouse vengeful and hostile feelings and ultimately sparkoff a dangerous explosion. Ahad Ha'am suggested by implication that a dif-

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ferent attitude might placate the Arabs and mitigate their hostility.Fourteen years after the appearance of Ahad Ha'am's article, similar views

were expressed by A. Hermoni (1882-1960, Lithuanian-born teacher andjournalist, settled in Palestine in 1898) inHashiloah. In a discussion of the socialand ideological aspeas of burgeoning Arab nationalism, in Palestine andelsewhere, the author called the attention of his readers to the dangers inherentin this process. He warned that though the Arab movement was still in itsinfancy and confined to limited circles, the Zionists must take measures tomeet the challenge. They must "be alert to all that is going on among theArabs and to anticipate events by eliminating the danger before it grows. Thiscan only be done through reclamation of the land, expansion of settlement,and concentration ofjews in Palestine gradually and by all possible means."They should also endeavor to maintain neighborly relations with the Arabs"so that there will be no trace of that despotic and domineering attitudetowards them which has been manifesting itself in the Baron's colonies."

The policy on cautious but consistent and uninterrupted settlementrecommended by Hermoni was also reflected in Ruppin's plan for the crea-tion ofjewish majorities in interlinked areas of Palestine. Ruppin outlined thisscheme in a memorandum which he submitted to the Zionist Actions Com-mittee in 1907, after returning from a tour of Palestine on behalf of the ZionistOrganization.

The revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 seemed to confirm the validityof this policy. Ahad Ha'am, for one, certainly thought so. In a letter toUssishkin, the Russian Zionist leader, written in August 1908, he maintainedthat political development called for a change in Zionist methods in Palestine.The movement should now act not merely for the good of the Jewish com-,munity but on behalf of the entire country, since "Palestine will no longer bean obscure comer in which we can do as we will, having paid the necessarybaksheesh." From now on it was essential to avoid extremist slogans andinsistence on the employment ofjewish labor, which endangered the veryexistence of the Yishuv. Instead, there should be quiet, persistent and con-structive work, pursued in the clear knowledge that Jewish aspirations inPalestine would not go unchallanged, and that "those who are more compe-tent, more diligent and industrious will prevail."9

Ahad Ha'am envisaged constructive work as the building of an economicand cultural infrastructure for a large Jewish community in Palestine, andregarded it as the primary task of Zionism. He was scornful of the move-ment's political activities and of the socialist ideologies upheld by a section ofthe newly-arrived Jewish workers in Palestine, and he attached little impor-tance to Zionist propaganda among the Arabs. When in 1908 Ussishkin sug-gested that the Zionist Organization produce an Arabic newspaper, Ahad

9 Ahad Ha'am, Letters (Hebrew), vol. 4, Tel Aviv, Berlin, 1924, p. 27.

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Ha'am commented, in a letter to Mordecai Ben Hillel Hacohen:10

What shall we say to the Arabs? That we want to settle in Palestine? And whatwill they answer? "Good! Let us work and live together?" . . . How long shallwe delude ourselves with phrases? It must be obvious that we have only onetask now: to tell the Jews to come and work. If they respond, then our strengthin this country will develop and the time will come when we shall really be ableto approach the Arabs and talk to them on behalf of our people in Palestine.And if we cannot induce our people to dedicate their physical and mentalpowers to work in Palestine, what can we expect of the Arabs?

Despite the mutually critical attitude of Ahad Ha'am and the Jewish workers'movement in Palestine, he concurred with the Poalei-Zion on this issue.

Many proponents of the practical-liberal approach, including YaakovRabinowitz, who publicized Ahad Ha'am's opinions inHashiloah, and ArthurRuppin, whose settlement plan was based on them, were not content withAhad Ha'am's solution, i.e., the gradual expansion of the Jewish hold onPalestine. They also wanted political action, mainly through establishment ofa national association of the Jews within the Turkish Empire to representJewish national interests and to strive for Jewish national autonomy in Pales-tine. These plans, complemented by the idea of a newspaper in Arabic, weresupported by the editors oiHaherut. But the endeavors to organize the Jews ofthe Empire on a national basis came to grief, as did the attempts to arrive at anunderstanding with Arab candidates for the Turkish parliament. It couldhardly have been otherwise, in view of the slight electoral weight of the Pales-tinian Jews who were Turkish nationals and the growing opposition of Arableaders to Zionism.

The violent anti-Zionist propaganda in the Arab press, and the increasinglynumerous Arab attacks on Jews were reflected in the Hebrew press, particu-larly in Haherut, which gave extensive coverage to Arab opinions and warnedagainst the inherent dangers. These articles also had a strong impact on readersin the Diaspora, to wit several of Ahad Ha'ajn's letters written in 1910 and1911.

The disillusionment with the new regime's attitude to Zionism and theforebodings aroused by Arab opposition did not discourage the moderates.Their belief in the need to seek ways for peaceful cooperation between the twopeoples was not shaken, though their scepticism may have increased, asRuppin put it in his speech at the Eleventh Zionist Congress in 1913: "At thesame time we have before us the task, which can in no wise be evaded, ofcreating peaceful and friendly relations between the Jews and the Arabs."11

10 Ibid., p. 37.11 Arthur Ruppin, "Our Way in Settlement," in Thirty Years of Building Palestine (Hebrew), Tel

Aviv, 1937, p. 60.

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The practical-liberal outlook found its fullest expression in the later writ-ings of Moshe Smilansky. In his polemic with Yitzhak Epstein he had advo-cated a separatist stand, but over the years, apparently as the result ofintensified Arab hostility, on the one hand, and of his rift with the workers'movement on the question of Jewish labor, on the other, he adopted a moremoderate outlook. He now defended the mixed labor system in the colonies,saying that it was politically expedient. Thus, in 1913, when on one occasionArab workers were suspected of involvement in the murder of a Jewishwatchman at Rehovot, he openly denounced the collective accusation levelledat Arab laborers in an article in Haherut: "I shall never agree to accuse andboycott a community because of individuals; that is how our enemies havealways treated us." Shortly after, Smilansky complained in a letter to AhadHa'am of the hostile and contemptuous attitude of the workers and of theZionist Organizataion's Palestine Office towards the Arabs. Ahad Ha'amreplied that he found it hard to believe that the workers and Ruppin (head ofthe Palestine Office) had gone out of their minds and failed to grasp the situa-tion. "But if this is really so," he continued, "I do not know what to say.When I realize that our brethren may be morally capable of treating anotherpeople in this fashion and of crudely abusing their sanctities, then I cannot butreflect: If such is the situation now, how shall we treat others if we one dayactually become the rulers of Palestine? If this is the Messiah—may he comebut let me not behold it."12 Smilansky's insistence that Arab dignity must berespected fitted in well with his assessment of the actual situation in Palestine.He disagreed with those who argued that Arab attacks could be prevented ifArabs were not employed in Jewish colonies; in his opinion these attacks werethe inevitable result of the state of imbalance between the two peoples. "Therehave always been clashes and always will be because we are a minority amonga majority of natural opponents, and must therefore endeavor to increase ournumber in the colonies," Smilansky wrote in the same year. The convictionthat conflict was inevitable as long as the Jews remained a minority led him topropose that the number of Jewish watchmen in the colonies be increased, andthat more Jewish laborers be attracted to them through creation of congenialliving conditions.

At the same time, anxious to shatter the wall of hostility, Smilansky pub-lished in Haherut an article entitled "Zionism," in which he appealed to theArabs. Writing under the impact of the Balkan wars, he declared that therewas a racial and religious conflict between the Arabs and Turks, on the onehand, and the Christians and Western powers, on the other. The East couldnot withstand Western pressures without the aid of the Jews, who were inpossession of the necessary capital and knowledge. Jewish assistance to theWest would not entail subjugation of the Eastern peoples; the Jews would

12 See note 9 above, vol. 5, p. 113.

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demand only one thing in return, namely Palestine. A Jewish homeland inPalestine would benefit both Jews and Arabs. Jewish capital would be firstand foremost attracted to and invested in Palestine, spreading prosperitythroughout the region. The Jewish concentration in Palestine would not harmthe Arabs as individuals nor would it threaten their national existence. Theaddition of some two and a half million Jews to the half million Arabs living inPalestine would prove a blessing to the Arabs. It would not threaten the Arabnation, which was settled mainly outside the borders of Palestine, and theJews would always constitute a minority within it. "In short," Smilanskyconcluded, "the destinies of the national revival of Turks, Arabs and Jews areinterwoven. If they all help each other they will realize their renaissance, but ifthey devour each other they will be lost, to the joy of their mutual enemies."Similar views were expressed in the same year by Yehoshua Barzilay in hisarticle "On the Future of the East," published in Hashiloah.

These two articles are noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, both Smilanskyand Barzilay wrote openly of Palestine as the homeland of the Jewish peoplealone, and" emphasized the need for a Jewish majority. Both implied that thehomeland of the Arab people lay outside Palestine. Secondly, in contrast tothe integrationists who believed that Zionism could only prosper if it suc-ceeded in forming an alliance with the Arabs, and the separatists who advo-cated ties of mutual interests with a great power, these two writers proposed athreeefold alliance—of Turks, Arabs and Jews.

A few months later, at the beginning of 1914, Smilansky published inHaolam another article on the Arab question, which unlike the first article, wasaddressed mainly to the Jews. The tone was one of self-accusation at the factthat during thirty years of Jewish settlement in Palestine little attention hadbeen paid to the Arab question. Smilansky admitted that the insolent attitudeof the settlers towards the Arabs had been at the root of many a violent clashand had fanned Arab hostility. Other evil results of this attitude were: ignor-ance of the Arabic language and culture which precluded direct contact bet-ween the two peoples; insufficient acquaintance with the laws of the land,giving rise to numerous misunderstandings; lack of consideration for the feel-ings of Arab peasants and failure to offer adequate compensation to tenantsevicted from land sold to Jewish settlers; exploitation of Arab workers em-ployed in Jewish colonies. All these had aroused Arab antagonism whichfound expression in virulent propaganda in the press and in increasingly fre-quent assaults on Jewish life and property.

On the face of it, Smilansky's remarks could be said to have borne outEpstein's warning of seven years before on "The Concealed Question." Theyappeared to confirm the validity of his prognosis that disregard for the feelingsof the Arabs and the espousal of a coercive policy would inevitably lead tonational conflict. Nevertheless, Smilansky's approach differed in several waysfrom that of Epstein. To begin with, Epstein fully believed in the soundness

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of his proposals and policy, while Smilansky was as sceptical as Ruppin—perhaps because both advocated a pragmatic approach. Smilansky did notmake definitive statements but rather asked questions: "First of all, let ourown questions be clear and intelligible to us; this clarification and understand-ing may perhaps also bring about the desired solution." Indeed, Smilanskyexplicitly took issue with Epstein's views:

These gloomy thoughts are not new. They have frequently occurred to peoplewho work in Palestine or who write and think about the country. Some ofthem have drawn extreme conclusions. Some—for example, Y. Epstein in hiswell-known article in Hashiloah—have proposed that we do not acquire anylands owned by the local population and confine ourselves to areas which arestill unoccupied. Furthermore, we should also help the Arabs both materiallyand spiritually and enable them to develop and thrive on their own land, thuswinning their affection. But if we do without all those lands which alreadyhave owners—where can we go? Shall we go to the desert or climb the rocks?And if we give it all up—what is the point in aiding the Arabs and what needhave we of their love? We are not missionaries toiling for the sake of heaven.

Nor was Smilansky an admirer of the noble attributes of the Arabs, as wereEpstein and his school of thought:

We should not forget that we are dealing with a semi-savage people, withextremely primitive concepts. This is their nature: if they sense that you arestrong—they will yield to you and repress their hatred. If they sense that youare weak—they will dominate you. They equate gentleness with impotence.What is more, under the influence of the numerous tourists and urban Christ-ians, the Arabs have developed base characteristics which are not prevalentamong other primitive peoples, and which are most evident among the urbanquasi-intelligentsia: lying, cheating, suspiciousness and slander—all these arefaults in which the Arab masses are wallowing. What is more, as a result ofthese influences, the Arab masses have developed a simmering hatred for theJews. These Semites—are anti-Semites.

Smilansky nevertheless advocated a policy halfway between that of Epsteinand the line postulated by the extremists. He aspired to some sort of com-promise between Jews and Arabs. "I believe that there is no inherent andinevitable conflict between the national hopes of Jews and Arabs. There isnone—because the land of our hopes is but one corner within the greatexpanse of large countries in which the Arabs constitute the overwhelmingbulk of the population; there is none—because our perspective is not politicalbut rather economic and cultural. Our maximal ideal is economic and culturalautonomy."

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Smilansky's recognition of the existence of a great Arab nation whichtogether with the Turkish nation would be the political rulers of Palestine, andhis declaration that Zionism aspired only to cultural and economic autonomyin Palestine, did not imply the renouncement of an ultimate Jewish majority.Indeed, he stated explicitly that although the Zionists found the country set-tled by an Arab population, "there is still much space for a great number ofnew settlers, and the former will in due course become a minority among thenumerous newcomers."

Starting from these basic assumptions, Smilansky drew up a plan of actionwhich epitomized the liberal-pragmatic approach towards the Arabs. It wasdivided into two parts: first—long-term objectives of political significance,and second—practical steps having an immediate impact on relations be-tween the two peoples.

Under the first heading he proposed:a. Study of the Arabic language and culture. He dismissed the separatists'

fear of cultural assimilation in view of the superior cultural level of the Jewishcommunity.

b. Acquaintance with the Arab nationalist movement and establishment offriendly relations with its leaders.

c. An effort to gain some influence in the elected Ottoman institutions(involving the acceptance of Ottoman nationality by the Jews of Palestine,most of whom were not Turkish citizens).

Under the second heading Smilansky expounded the following plan ofaction:

a. The Jews should refrain from purchasing land from which tenants hadbeen forcefully evicted by the eflfendis.

b. Lands purchased by Jews must not include villages and sacred sites.c. One third of the purchased lands should be left to their previous cul-

tivators, who would be helped to improve the soil and make it adequate fortheir needs. This land should be given to the fellahin on long-term lease.

d. As for Jewish labor, everything should be done to ensure that work inthe colonies is carried out by Jewish workers, who should be enabled to com-pete with Arab workers. But the desire to encourage Jewish labor should nottake the form of a campaign against Arab labor.

e. The Arabs should receive decent and fair treatment in all Jewish settle-ments, and should be proffered medical and even educational assistance.

Smilansky's article was highly praised by Ahad Ha'am. In a letter to itsauthor, dated December 12, 1914, he wrote that most Zionist leaders werestill unable to free themselves from the illusion of their Utopian vision of aJewish State:

They find it unpleasant to recall and are incensed at those who remind themthat there is in Palestine a nation which is already settled there and has no

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intention of leaving. In future, when this illusion is entirely obliterated and thestark reality is seen with open eyes, they will certainly understand the mag-nitude and importance of this question and how much we shall have to work inorder to come as close as possible to a solution.13

Smilansky's views were also supported by the editor of Haherut, Haim Ben-Atar, who was encouraged by the prospects of a more tolerant attitude of theGovernment to Jewish immigration. He proposed that the Jews of Palestineaccept Ottoman citizenship with a view to the creation of "a great Jewishcenter in Palestine" and in order to demonstrate to the Arabs that the Jewsintended peaceful réintégration and cooperation for the benefit of the countryand of all its inhabitants.

Thus, on the eve of the First World War, the "practical liberals" believed inthe possibility of establishingjewish national autonomy in Palestine through atriple alliance of Turks, Arabs and Jews. Implicitly they recognized the rightsof the Arabs as a nation in Palestine with a say in the country's future. But theywould probably not have conceded that Jews and Arabs had an equal claim toPalestine. For them Palestine was the homeland of the Jewish people and theabode of the Arabs.

4. The Sodalist-Constructivist Outlook

The socialist-constructivist approach to the Arab question became involvedfrom the very beginning in a series of contradictions of which its proponentsthemselves were partly unaware. There were contradictions between thea priori view of the problem and the later realization of its nature; betweenhistorical right and historical actuality; between international class solidarityand national interests; between ultimate ideals and present-day pragmatism.Furthermore, the socialist-constructivist outlook was characterized not onlyby internal contradictions, but also by its attitude towards the other view-points. While criticizing them all, it accepted some of the basic ideas of each.

Before analyzing this school of thought, its contradictions and the attemptsto reconcile them, something should be said about its social background. Asimplied above, the social identity of the three other groups was nothomogeneous. The proponents of altruistic integration were writers andteachers, but came from different cultural and communal backgrounds. Theseparatists included both writers and practical people born in the Jewish col-onies of Palestine and abroad. The liberal-pragmatists included people aaivein Zionist affairs, writers and intellectuals from colonies, and young Pales-tinian Sephardim. On the other hand, most adherents of the socialist-constructivist outlook came from the same region and had a common

13 Ibid., p. 161.

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ideological background. The great majority came to Palestine from EasternEurope and were members of the Socialist Poalei-Zion.

Poalei-Zion's views on the Arab problem originated in the prior assump-tion that a Jewish-Arab national confrontation in Palestine was not inevitable.This view was first expounded in Ber Borokhov's article "Our Platform,"published in 1906. Borokhov stated unequivocally that

The indigenous inhabitants of Palestine do not constitute an independenteconomic and cultural type. They are divided and split up not only because ofthe structure of the terrain, and not only because of religious diversity, butbecause of the nature of the country as an international hostelry. The indigen-ous inhabitants of Palestine are not one nation, nor will they be one for a longtime to come. . .

Unlike Epstein and likejabotinsky, Borokhov claimed that there was no Arabnational entity in Palestine. What is more, he argued that as a result of thecosmopolitan nature of Palestine, which weakened the national consciousnessof the indigenous population, and in the light of the rapid development of theJewish society which was destined to control the country's economy, theArabs would undergo a process of economic and cultural assimilation amongthe Jews. On this point his views somewhat resemble those of Rabbi Benja-min, although their reasoning is different. Both believed in the integration ofthe Arabs into Jewish society, the one foreseeing ethnic integration of theArab minority into the Jewish majority and the other predicting cultural andeconomic integration.

Borokhov's views were shared by two party leaders, Alexander Ashin andDavid Blumenfeld, before they emigrated to Palestine. In 1907 Hashin pub-lished an article denying that Arab nationalist opposition threatened Jewishsettlement in Palestine. If the opposition were as strong as depicted, he wrote,then Zionism would be a mere utopia, but since this was not the case, thecompetition of Arab workers was not disastrous and had no historicalsignificance. Hashin's remarks may have been written in response to the con-troversy aroused by Epstein's "The Concealed Question": he denied bothEpstein's apprehensions as to future relations between Jews and Arabs andJabotinsky's forbodings as to the present. Blumenfeld went on to propose thatArab workers be accepted into Jewish trade unions, and he frowned onattempts to drive them out of the Jewish economy. He went as far as declaringthat "we must strive to improve the ability of the Arab worker to resist Jewishexploitation. Firstly, our own interest demands this, and secondly, we believethat as Palestine develops, there will certainly be room there for both Jewishand Arab workers." Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (second president of Israel), thenalready living in Palestine, showed even greater optimism. There were in theJewish economy, he wrote, "hundreds and perhaps thousands of places of

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employment for Jewish workers" and therefore the struggle for the employ-ment of Jewish labor, directed against Arab workers, was destructive andpurposeless.14

The opinions of these Poalei-Zion leaders were formulated both as a resultof the optimistic belief that there would soon be a great spontaneous Jewishimmigration to Palestine leading to the creation of a Jewish majority in thecountry, and against the background of political conditions in Turkey beforethe 1908 Revolution, when no nationalist ferment was as yet evident amongthe Arabs.

In the wake of the revolution and the resultant upsurge of Arab nationalistfeeling, the Poalei-Zion attitude began to change. In October 1908, YitzhakBen-Zvi wrote that at a stage when the Jews constitute'd a small minority inthe country, it would be dangerous to demand Jewish autonomy in Palestine:the Turkish parliament might hand the country over to "our outrightrivals—the Arabs—and strengthen the latter at our expense." Thus theArabs, who had but recently been regarded as a passive social element, likelyto assimilate with the Jews, were now seen as rival claimants to Palestine.What is more, in one of the first issues of the Poalei-Zion journal Ha'ahdut(organ of Poalei-Zion in Palestine, 1910-1915), David Ben-Gurion warnedagainst the combination of class tension and national antagonism. Referringto the wave of anti-Zionist propaganda which was sweeping the Arab pressand the increasing number of assaults on Jews, Ben-Gurion explained that

The source of this hatred is the Arab laborers working in the colonies. Like allworkers, the Arab laborer hates his oppressor and exploiter, but since in addi-tion to the class clash, there is in this case a national difference between workersand farmers—this hatred takes the form of national hostility and, what ismore, the national element predominates over the class factor—and a fiercehatred of Jews is aroused in the breasts of the masses of Arab workers.

Ben-Gurion's explanation of the motives for anti-Zionist emotions amongthe Arabs may be questioned, but for the purposes of our discussion it isimportant to note his recognition of the existence of a conscious nationalalienation between the two peoples and the preponderance of national overclass factors. The majority of Poalei-Zion regarded the issue in that light,which goes a long way to explain their approach to the Arab problem.

To begin with, Poalei-Zion came to the conclusion that the traditional con-cepts of class solidarity did not apply to conditions in Palestine. The accep-tance of Arab labor in the colonies in the name of class solidarity might aggra-vate rather than alleviate the conflict between the two peoples. Furthermore,as proponents of a socialist-constructivist outlook, according to which the

14 Hashin, Blumenfeld and Ben-Zvi (the latter from Palestine) wrote in Der Yiddisher Arbeiter,published in Lemberg.

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Jewish labor movement was to bear responsibility for the construction of aJewish society in Palestine, they had no choice but to stand in the forefront ofthe struggle against Arab opposition to Zionism.

Yaakov Zerubavel (1886-1967, Russian-bom leader of left Poalei-Zion,came to Palestine in 1910), summing up his tour of Galilee in 1911 inHa'ahdut,related that the Arabs were attacking those colonies which had introducedJewish labor and guard-duty, while those still employing Arabs were left inpeace. This led him to conclude that there were two systems of Jewish settle-ment. The one relied on alien labor, thus ensuring tranquility but offering nohope of a solution to the Jewish national problem. The other advocated em-ployment of Jewish workers and guards as the way to national redemption. Itmight, admittedly, lead to a confrontation with the Arabs, but there was noalternative since "the first method will not secure our objective unless there isa switch to the second method. Whatever the outcome of our work in Pales-tine, we shall not achieve our aim unless we follow the second path, which isthe direct, consistent and redemptive one."

This attitude was further expounded in an article in Ha'ahdut in 1913 byAharon Reuveni (brother of Yitzhak Ben-Zvi) called "The Arab Question."He derided those worried Zionists and young Sephardim who wrote inHaherut on the Arab problem; according to him, it was non-existent from theJewish national point of view. The Jews could change nothing and, therefore,no opportunity had been missed, as these people erroneously believed. Heregarded the Jewish-Arab confrontation as the inevitable outcome of socialprocesses sparked off by mass migration, a universal phenomenon in moderntimes. Therefore

Even when Arab nationalism gains strength in Palestine—socially [i.e., intheir own surroundings] and politically [vis-à-vis the government], and veh-emently opposes our entry into the country and our settlement here—it willnot succeed in checking what must be. Arab nationalism, however strong itbecomes, can never close the gates of the country to us. We must state thisplainly, so as to prevent fluctuations of mood between rapturous confidenceand utter despair. Our migration to Palestine is of vital importance to us, moreso than migration to any other place; the local population can injure us andharass us, but will be powerless to stop immigration completely.

Zerubavel's voluntarist outlook, advocating the choice of one of two possiblemethods, and Reuveni's deterministic views, based on a concept of spontane-ous processes, complemented one another. Their conclusion was identical:persistent implementation of Zionism in Palestine in the teeth of Arabnationalist opposition.

The crystalization of this attitude within the party and the constant strugglefor the employment of Jewish labor aroused misgivings among party mem-

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bers. There were those who began to doubt whether a synthesis betweenSocialism and Zionism was possible at all. How could class solidarity bemaintained if it clashed with the fundamental principle of "the conquest oflabor?" The dilemma caused a rift and impelled some members to leave theparty; in order to close this breach and to dispel the confusion Yitzhak Ben-Zvi wrote his comprehensive programmatic article in Ha'ahdut, "NationalDefence and the Proletarian Outlook."

In this article, which combined theoretical and practical discussion, and wasinfluenced both by Borokhov's views and by actual conditions in Palestine,Ben-Zvi formulated several assumptions which were to become basic tenetsof the Jewish Palestinian labor movement in decades to come. He first discus-sed the question of whether there was a moral contradiction between theconcept of national defence and the idea of international solidarity. Ben-Zviargued that the criterion for evaluating the morality or immorality of any deedwas its social purpose or public usefulness. Thus murder was immoralbecause it harmed the community; on the other hand, the class struggle,which in extreme cases could also lead to loss of life, was moral because it wasa means of advancing society. This led Ben-Zvi to the next conclusion,namely, that to the extent that the proletariat's struggle benefited society as awhole, its interests were identical with those of the entire nation. This impliedthat the proletariat was the sole and true interpreter of the national interest.Society was divided into nations and therefore "the supreme upholder of theideal of human liberation is not some abstract working class, but the actualworking class. The interests of the working class of any particular nation arenot subservient to the interests of the world-wide proletariat. The workingclass of each people is the supreme judge, the final arbiter, whose judgment isirrevocable." According to Ben-Zvi, the interests of the proletariat wereinfluenced to a decisive degree by its particular national environment, and theinter-class national interest was of no less significance than the specificeconomic class interests. The right to national defence was therefore ethical byMarxist-Socialist criteria and could not be denied to the proletariat.

Class interests as well as national interests might cause conflict betweenworkers of different nationalities. Here Ben-Zvi cited Borokhov's views onthe clash of interests between workers in various stages of social development,illustrated for example by the opposition of trade unions in developed capital-ist countries to the immigration of workers from undeveloped countries, whomight bring about a decrease in wages. But these clashes were of a temporarynature and existed only as long as the workers were seeking employment.When they became part of the organized working class and endowed withclass consciousness, internal conflict within the class would vanish.

In the second part of his article, Ben-Zvi applied these theoretical postulatesto the Palestinian situation, in an attempt to explain and solve its contradic-tions. This brings us to the third contradiction which troubled Poalei-Zion,

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namely, the conflict between the right to work and the degree of its impor-tance. The Arabs had a right to work, but it was not as vitally essential forthem as for the Jewish workers. An Arab proletariat would emerge throughthe development of an existing Arab economy, but the Jewish working classcould not evolve, nor could the individual Jewish worker exist, without anational territory and without being granted precedence in the Jewisheconomy, then in its early stages of development. Thus, the struggle for anational territory and for the "conquest of labor" both served to further thesocial aspirations of the Jewish working class. Because of his need for em-ployment, which could not be secured without a national territory, the Jewishworker found himself in the forefront of the national confrontation with theArabs. Indeed, Ben-Zvi went even further and declared that in addition to thedirect conflict of interests between Jewish and Arab workers

We find the Jewish worker being drawn of his own free will into the nationaldisputes which break out daily between the Jewish and Arab communities.And what is more, the Jewish worker is the most lively and fermentativeelement in the Yishuv and is in the van wherever there is strife or danger.Without the Jewish guards and workers, the farmers or officials could not holdonto the lands which they bought or otherwise acquired. The Jewish worker istherefore a partner in the national conflict between the Jewish settlers and theArab inhabitants.

To sum up, the essentiality of work aggravated the problem; it intensifiedtensions between the two peoples because of the presence of a dynamicfactor—the workers—within the Jewish community. But Ben-Zvi did notsee this as a permanent state of affairs. Ultimately, as the Yishuv developedand grew, the Jewish working class would expand, the need would becomeless urgent and the equal rights ofjewish and Arab workers to work would berecognized.

Ben-Zvi's admission of the existence of "national conflicts" between theJewish community and the Arab population brings us to the fourthcontradiction—that between historical rights and historical reality, betweenthe demand for Palestine as a Jewish national territory and the demographicfact that the country was not empty of inhabitants and contained anothernational society. This problem, which also preoccupied both idealists andrationalists among the Hebrew publicists, was particularly vexing for social-ists. For them the issue was not merely moral—dispossession of the Arabs, orpolitical—the degree of Arab opposition to Jewish settlement, but also a mat-ter of principle. They queried to what degree Jewish settlement in Palestinewas justified on objective rather than on mystical and historical grounds. Theanswer may be found in Ben-Zvi's statement that "this country, our country,is at present sparsely populated, even in comparison with earlier times." This

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statement reconciled the historical rights, ("our country"), with historicalreality (the possibility of mass Jewish immigration into Palestine), despite thepresence of an Arab community there. Furthermore, the facts of the situationinspired in him the hope that "in due course, we shall acquire a dominantshare in the economy of Palestine, and in its cultural and social life." Ben-Zvievidently believed in the practical possibility that a Jewish minority might becreated in Palestine, thus automatically resolving the ostensible contradictionbetween historical rights and actual conditions. But how was this ideal to beattained ?

On this point Ben-Zvi took issue with Rabbi Benjamin, who had advo-cated an active search for ways of co-existence with the Arabs, denouncingthe dispossession of Arab farmers and proposing that various types of assis-tance be extended to the Arab population. Ben-Zvi found the program assuch quite acceptable, "but," he wrote, "on one point I disagree with RabbiBenjamin—I doubt whether the time has come to commence outside work."Ben-Zvi considered that the time was not yet ripe because in view of thesocio-economic and hence political weakness of the Jewish community inPalestine, the Arabs would scorn all such attempts to befriend them. Theoutcome of that temporary weakness was separation, inevitably leading toviolent clashes between the two peoples. There was no escaping this fate: "Wehave no choice but to tread a path strewn with victims and casualties—ourdead brethren, fighters For the happiness and future of the Jewish proletariat,and the dead of our enemies. We cannot divert our attention from our ulti-mate objective until we attain it." Despite the vehement and tragic tone ofBen-Zvi's conclusion, he cautioned his comrades against a chauvinisticattitude towards the Arabs, "which is not merely reactionary but also absurdwhen we are but a weak minority and cannot move hand or foot withoutencountering the power of our stronger and more numerous enemies."

This article, which summed up the quandary of Poalei-Ziori, leads us to ourfinal question: did Poalei-Zion recognize the existence of an Arab nation inPalestine and the emergence of an Arab national movement in the country? Inorder to appreciate the importance of this question, it must be borne in mindthat the Poalei-Zion leaders, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi and, even more so, DavidBen-Gurion, were later to have a crucial say in determining the policies of theZionist movement. The dilemma which confronted Poalei-Zion must also beseen against the fact that in 1914 the non-Marxist labor party, Hapoel Hatzair,and its leader, Yosef Sprinzak (later first speaker of the Knesset), concludedthat there were two peoples in Palestine. Demanding that the Zionist move-ment pay greater heed to the problem of relations with the Arabs, Sprinzakwrote in Hapoel Hatzair that "the time has come to understand that ourphilosophy of life in Palestine increasingly calls for determination of theboundary line between the two peoples," in order to delineate a mature andresponsible policy, and create the opportunity for future co-existence.

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Did Poalei-Zion arrive at a similar conclusion at the end of the Second Aliyaperiod? The answer, in their case, is much more complex and less une-quivocal.

In 1911 inHa'ahdut, arguing the case for a Zionist paper in Arabic, Ben-Zviwrote that "our neighbors in this country are not homogeneous. They aredivided by economic conditions, sources of livelihood, race, religion and cus-toms, and only their language unites them." On the basis of the assumptionthat the Arabs were not a united nation but rather a heterogeneous society, heconcluded that it was possible to locate among them strata whose interestswere identical with those of the Zionists and that an understanding with themcould be promoted by an Arab-language paper. The Poalei-Zion obviouslyregarded the Arab working class which would emerge from the ranks of theexploited fellahin as the potential partner of the Jewish working class in theconstruction of a new society in Palestine. But this morphological theory,which distinguished between the interests of various social groups in relationto Zionism, did not hold water. In fact, later statements of Poalei-Zion lead-ers, including Ben-Zvi's programmatic article on the national conflict bet-ween Jews and Arabs, were couched in general terms and did not distinguishbetween different groups. Furthermore, in 1914, Hashin published an articlein Ha'ahdut, in which he accused the Arab intelligentsia of conducting anti-Semitic agitation as a lever for creating an Arab national movement. If thisleading stratum had decided that it was possible "through a cry of'Help! TheJews are upon us!' to arouse the Arab people from its eternal slumber andthereby to expand self-rule in Palestine, they will not let us be, even if weestablish a special Tel Aviv for them. They will always see only the dark sideof the Yishuv, and will always find sufficient reasons to fight it." Hashin drewattention to the emergence of an Arab national movement and, though mak-ing no attempt to come to grips with the basic issues involved, he was awarethat this movement, which aspired to attain self-rule in Palestine, had an intel-lectual leadership and had found an external foe in Zionism which was servingas a catalyst in the formative stage. Not surprisingly, he concluded that "it isextremely hard to live in the midst of national hostility and strife. We cansurvive as long as we trust in our own strength, but to live and make a livingfrom enemies and persecutors, to be dependent on them—this is a mostunhappy situation."

Recognition of the existence of an Arab people and of its nationalresurgence was not always couched in negative terms. A few months afterthe outbreak of the First World War, Yaakov Zerubavel reported in Ha'ahduton an unprecedented meeting of Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem which had beenconvened in order to discuss relations between the two peoples. Zerubavelhad decided that since the Arabs had made certain frank and unpalatableremarks, it was only fitting to present the Zionist viewpoint with equalfrankness. He reiterated the common arguments that the Jews had no inten-

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tion of dispossessing the Arabs; that Zionist settlement would benefit theentire country and all its inhabitants; that there was no intention of oppressingthe Arabs, etc. But he went beyond these conventional arguments when headmitted to the existence in Palestine of two peoples possessing equal nationalrights. This led him to the conclusion that "since two nations, Jews andArabs, have found themselves together in Palestine, and have been destined toweave the fabric of their national lives in the same geographical area, theymust find a common denominator and a way to evolve a local policy com-mon to Jews and Arabs." Indeed, Zerubavel recognized the historical links ofthe Arab nation to Palestine. He claimed that the Zionists accepted the factthat "they are in the midst of the Arab people which has been living forgenerations in this country and is linked to it by historical ties."

The recognition of the equal historical rights of Arabs and Jews to Palestineenabled Poalei-Zion, ideologically speaking, to reaffirm their claim that Jews,no less than Arabs, had a right to settle in Palestine. In 1916 Ben-Gurion andBen-Zvi, who were then in exile in the United States, made full use of thisargument in their polemics with left-wing Poalei-Zion circles on the moraljustification for Jewish settlement in Palestine. They claimed that the right tosettle derived from the need of the Jewish people for a national territory andfrom the desolate condition of the country which made possible large-scaleJewish settlement without harming the Arabs residing in Palestine who, forthe time being, constituted the majority there.

5. Conclusion

Three stages can be discerned in the development of attitudes to the Arabquestion before the First World War. The first period—up to the revolutionof the Young Turks of 1908—was characterized by recognition of the exis-tence of the problem, coupled with a discussion of the moral aspect involved.The second period—from the outbreak of the revolution of the Young Turksup to the end of 1909—was colored by the political hopes aroused by therevolution. The legitimization which the new constitution provided fororganization on a national basis within the framework of the Ottoman stateled many people to believe that Jewish autonomy in Palestine was around thecorner. A settlement with the Arabs was seen as an inseparable part of thepost-revolutionary Turkish political structure. The third and last periodbrought disappointment with these expeaations and apprehension in the faceof increasing Arab opposition to Zionism. The "Arab problem" became amajor subject of discussion in the Hebrew press, and its dangers nowappeared acute. It was at this stage that the various attitudes towards the ques-tion of national confrontation were defined and crystalized.

As mentioned above, the various attitudes to the Arab question had no

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80 YOSEF GORNI

clear-cut social basis. Apart from Poalei-Zion it is difficult to point to anydistinct common denomination for any of the other groups, which couldexplain the social motives and background of the political and ideologicalviewpoints. Nevertheless, the role played by certain personalities or organiza-tions in the life of the Yishuv undoubtedly affected their views on this ques-tion. Ruppin's pragmatic-liberal stand was influenced by the fact that heheaded the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization, and the struggle forthe employment ofjewish labor stf ongly colored the outlook of Poalei-Zion,on the one hand, and of Moshe Smilansky, on the other.

The differences between the various outlooks were therefore political andideological At the political level, the dividing line between the variousapproaches was related to the degree of importance attributed to the Arabs as afactor furthering or hindering the realization of Zionism. The integrationistsheld that Arab assent was a prerequisite for the implementation of Zionism.The separatists did not attribute importance to the Arabs as a political force orrecognize their right to negotiate on the future of Palestine. They believed thatthe fate of Palestine would be determined by forging links, based on commoninterests, between Zionism and the Turks, whose consent would be essentialto any settlement with the Arabs. After the War, Great Britain was to replaceTurkey in this role. For the constructivist socialists, the political factor was ofsecondary importance. The settlement with the Arabs was to be postponed tothe future, when Jewish power and a new national balance in Palestine made itpossible. The adherents of this point of view advocated implementation ofZionist objectives even in the teeth of Arab opposition and hoped for a futuresettlement based on equality.

At the ideological level, particularly on the question of recognition of thenational rights of the Arabs in Palestine, there were the two extremeviews—one recognizing the equal rights of the two peoples to Palestine, theother insisting, out of a strong sense of national egotism on the exclusivenessofjewish rights. The two intermediate viewpoints recognized the nationalrights of the Arab people residing in Palestine, while demanding precedence,particularly in the sphere of immigration, for the Jewish people returning toits homeland.

The last differentiation relates to attitudes towards the Arab as an individualand towards Arabs in general. Here, too, there is a striking difference betweenthe extremely negative and positive views, on the one hand, and the moremoderate evaluations, on the other. While the former idealized the attributesof the Arab people and the quality of Arab culture, the latter utterly con-demned them. Both differed from what may perhaps be termed "the realisticattitude," which neither idealized nor condemned. The socialists, whilerespecting the Arab as an individual, favored a belligerent policy on questionsof national interest and national honor, an attitude which at that time wasmost conspicuously evident in the struggle for the employment ofjewish

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labor and Jewish guards.Finally, all these attitudes towards the "Arab problem" were closely related

to the sense of national weakness prevalent among Jews in Palestine at thetime. Under the political and social circumstances of Palestine before the FirstWorld War, it was the principles of Zionist ideology and the feeling ofnational weakness which determined attitudes towards the Arab question.

The development of this attitude under the new political conditions createdby the Balfour Declaration and the British occupation of Palestine is a subjectfor another study.

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Attitudes to Arab‐Jewish confrontation as reflected in the Hebrew press: 1900–1918

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