Switzerland

UWE SERDÜLT

Direct democracy and federalism are the two most distinctive features of theSwiss political system. Even though the forces of modernity are pullingtowards an increased integration and coordination between the state levels,and are finally leading to a centralisation of competences, the administrativestructure is still very much decentralised and the principle of subsidiarity heldhigh. In the first half of the 19th Century Switzerland was characterized by ahigh cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. The formation of the modernSwiss state was a rather turbulent one, including the occupation by Frenchtroops under Napoleon (1798) and a civil war between the predominantlyliberal, Protestant cantons and the Catholic Sonderbund cantons1 campaigningfor cantonal autonomy (1847). Switzerland is also a country that underwent arather late but rapid industrialization process which eventually culminated inthe political crisis of the violent general strike of 1918. Due to the tensionsbetween Switzerland’s rigid and highly fragmented territorial structure2 andthe rapid evolution of governmental tasks, reform of the Swiss politicalsystem has been high on the political agenda ever since the late 1960s.

As it is widely known, Switzerland's political system includes importantelements of direct citizen participation for the creation, change andabolishment of binding legal norms. The mechanisms and functions of directdemocracy are at the core of all political developments (Trechsel/Sciarini1998). However, most legislation is passed by Parliament without interferenceof the voters. Roughly 93% of all bills formally subjected to the optionalreferendum are actually not challenged (Kriesi/Trechsel 2008: 57). In fact,most of the bills going through Parliament are even prepared by theexecutive, namely by the public administration. But all issues that are put to aballot vote are debated in Parliament beforehand. Hence, the literature oftenrefers to the Swiss political system as being a semi-direct democracy.

Historically, direct democratic institutions developed bottom-up, from thecantonal level to the national level. Between 1848 and 1873 only mandatoryreferendums and citizens' initiatives aiming at a complete revision of theFederal Constitution were allowed. The optional legislative referendum wasintroduced in 1874, and the citizen's initiative for a partial amendment of theConstitution in 1891. These institutions of direct democracy were advocated

1 Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Freiburg and Valais (since 1845).2 Switzerland consists of 20 full cantons and 6 so called half-cantons (Obwalden and Nidwalden,

Basel Stadt and Basel Landschaft, Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden) so that

the total count of cantonal votes amounts to 23. There are approximately 2,400 municipalities, of

which a bit more than half have less than 1,000 inhabitants.

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by the so called 'democratic movement' which stood in opposition to thedominating political party of the Radicals at that time.

During the 20th century, some modifications to direct democratic institutionswere made.3 The referendum for international treaties, introduced in 1921 andextended in 1977, provided for citizen participation in matters of foreignpolicy. Furthermore, the right of the Federal Assembly to withdraw itsdecisions from the referendum procedure through the use of the so-called'urgency clause' was limited in 1949 by the introduction of a referendum forsuch cases. Six years after the introduction of women’s suffrage in 1971, thenumber of required signatures for an optional referendum was raised from30’000 to 50’000, and for a citizens' initiative from 50’000 to 100’000 (Aueret al. 2006; Linder 2007). At the cantonal level, the direct democratic rightshave developed considerably since the 19th century, and nowadays includelegislative initiatives, referendums on administrative acts, as well asreferendums on one-time or recurring financial decisions (Linder 2007;Trechsel/Serdült 1999). The most important direct democratic institutions thatare actually in operation on all state levels are the mandatory referendum tosanction constitutional change, the optional referendum to challenge alreadypassed legislation, and the citizen's initiative to revise the Constitution (orlaws in the cantons) from outside of Parliament.

On a worldwide scale Switzerland still accounts for around 50 percent of allreferendum votes. On average, the Swiss have had the opportunity to vote onslightly more than nine referendum topics per year from 1984-2009, and thatonly accounts for the national level (Altman 2011: 74-75). Taking thecantonal level into consideration one would have to add another fivereferendum topics per year in each canton.4 However, something interestinghas happened during the last few decades. For the first time in history,Switzerland, if treated as a 'continent' in terms of direct democracy gave upthe lead to Latin America and Europe, mainly because of the so called 'thirdwave' of democratisation and new constitutions providing for directdemocratic mechanisms in countries of the former Soviet Block, respectively.In addition, referendum votes initiated by the bottom-up process of collectingsignatures tend to be spreading slowly but steadily across the globe(Serdült/Welp 2012).

3 Referendum votes in Switzerland are in general binding. On the local level, especially in the case

of communal mergers, a few consultative referendums have been organised as well

(Hangartner/Kley 2000: 901). On the cantonal level, minorities or qualified majorities of

Parliaments also have the right to call for a vote or to submit a subject matter to a vote,

respectively (Trechsel/Serdült 1999).4 Usually, but not necessarily so, referendum votes take place on pre-defined dates and are pooled

across all three state levels. The current national referendum schedule defines all potential dates

till 2032. National elections would not take place on a referendum polling day, however, lower

level elections might coincide.

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The Origins of Swiss Direct Democracy

How we can explain the fact that all cantons – without the presence of astrong centralizing force – ended up with more or less the same set of directdemocratic instruments is not so clear cut. Although the starting conditionsand constitution-making processes in the Swiss cantons were very differentthey, nonetheless, all ended up with similar sets of referendum and initiativedevices. And why primarily, and so prominently, in Switzerland if thecommunal assembly tradition and ideas of the French Revolution were alsovery much present elsewhere in Europe (Auer 2011: VI, Hangartner/Kley2000: 525)? In the literature we find two conflicting theories: Kölz'sdiscontinuity thesis, stating that direct democracy could not have emerged asa natural consequence of pre-modern communal practices such as the'Landsgemeinde', and that the French Revolution was a necessary pre-condition. Blickle, as the originator of the continuity thesis, departs from thefact that communal self-government was evolving during the late medievalage in large parts of Germany, Italy and Switzerland, and argues that directdemocracy should be interpreted as a continuation of this tradition (Adler2006: 11).

The development of direct democracy on the Swiss national level cannot begrasped without looking into the constitutional histories of the cantons. Thecantons provide for the foundations and the repertoire of political institutionsof modern Switzerland (Auer 2011: VI). The historical predecessors ofmodern direct democratic instruments in Switzerland are: the veto, the recall,and the Landsgemeinde. After the foundation of the Swiss Federation in 1848all cantons except the ones with a 'Landsgemeinde' tradition introduced directdemocratic instruments into their constitutions. The canton of Zurich evenwent as far as to allow (male) citizens to elect teachers and the school board(Gruner 1969: 16).

The first canton with a veto right was St. Gallen in 1831, and it was shortlyfollowed by Basel Landschaft, Lucerne and several others, before thefoundation of modern Switzerland with the Constitution of 1848 (Gruner1969: 15; Möckli 1996: 214). Gradually, veto rights transformed into what wenow call the optional referendum which is used to stop a law already passedin Parliament by the collection of signatures. In a first step of itsdevelopment, the veto was based on simple majorities of all the citizens (andnot only the voters). Since non-voters were counted as consenting to thestatus quo, de facto, a participation quorum was applied.What is called the Landsgemeinde is actually a people's assembly, in whichthe citizens vote by show of hands. Physical violence during or after a'Landsgemeinde' as well as practices such as vote buying were sometimeseven officially tolerated and certainly not deemed as unusual at the time(Adler 2006). Only Appenzell Innerrhoden and Glarus have kept the'Landsgemeinde' till today. Several other cantons have abolished it in thecourse of history (Zug and Schwyz 1848; Nidwalden 1996; Appenzell

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Ausserrhoden 1997; Obwalden 1998). For very practical reasons the'Landsgemeinde' was difficult to maintain since assembly squares were soonnot big enough for a growing population. In addition, the lack of vote secrecyand transparency of counting procedures became ever more difficult tojustify. However, on a communal level this form of direct democracy is stillwidely practised. This is especially the case in the German speaking part ofthe country where communal assemblies usually take place in spring and fall.In their survey among Swiss communes Ladner and Fiechter (2012: 439) canshow that on average 82% of them still take major decisions in the communalassembly and not in a Parliament.5

The canton of Bern introduced the possibility to recall Parliament in 1846,Argovia followed in 1852 (though it abolished it again in 1980). To date onlysix cantons with recall procedures either to recall Parliament, Government orboth still exist (Bern, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, Ticino, Thurgau, Uri). Indeed,in the case of Uri every elected body can be recalled. Lately, and maybesurprisingly so, Uri and Ticino (both in 2011) have extended recall to thelocal level. However, practice is virtually non existent. There were two casesof unsuccessful recall votes, one in Schaffhausen (12 March 2000), and one inBern (1852). To my knowledge of the literature, there is only one successfulcase: the recall of the Argovian Parliament in 1863, after Parliament grantedreligious and administrative autonomy to the two Jewish villages of Endingenand Lengnau (Schaffner 1996: 156) which caused a major uproar among theCatholic population. In general, there were only very few attempts and mostlythey did not make it to the vote because not enough signatures could becollected (such as the recent case in the city of Bellinzona). The lack ofinterest in the recall in Switzerland can be explained by the fact that on theone hand Swiss recall only applies to an elected body as a whole (not aperson) and that on the other hand important state matters can be solved bymeans of referendum votes.6

Just to point to one of the many fascinating historical trajectories of cantonaldirect democracy, I would like to highlight the case of the emergence of theveto in the canton of St. Gallen in its Constitution of 1831 (Wickli 2011).Without an already existing repertoire of social and political action thisbreakthrough would not have been possible: the launch of petitions, theorganization of people assemblies disregarding census restrictions (mainlybased on wealth) and the distribution of leaflets and pamphlets spreadingideas stemming from the French Revolution (without necessarily mentioning

5 In the German speaking part 95% of the surveyed communes use the assembly system, 62% in

the French-speaking part and only 24% in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland

(Ladner/Fiechter 2012: 439).6 There is no recall on the national level. However, there is the indirect option of launching an

initiative for a total revision of the Constitution which would, in case of success, trigger new

elections (this was actually tried by the Frontists and other right-wing, nationalistic movements

in 1935). However, the attempt was clearly rejected with 72.3% no votes (see annex).

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it) became common practice. The 'Landsgemeinde' cantons were very near,serving as a real existing example of popular sovereignty (Wickli 2011: 210).Especially, the physical presence of 600 men from the Rheintal area in frontof the hall where the constitutional assembly was going to reside played acrucial role (Thursday, 13 January 1831). Some of the men were armed withsticks and threatened which is why this day became known as 'SticksThursday' (Stecklidonstig). Thus the veto made it into the Constitution,reinforced by physical presence, threats, and occasional violence.Despite the very few veto votes that actually took place, this embryonic directdemocratic instrument nevertheless had indirect effects. For the 194 laws thatwere passed in the Canton of St. Gallen between 1831 and 1861, in 40 cases aveto movement formed, however, only four of them finally made it to a vote(Gruner 1969: 26). The low success rate of the veto in St. Gallen is notsurprising once you look at the conditions that had to be fulfilled for a veto togo through. The initiation of the veto had to take place on the communal levelwhere 50 citizens had to call for an assembly of all citizens which then had todecide whether a law should be opposed or not. However, the number ofvotes cast had to pass a double threshold, the simple majority in the assemblyand the majority of all citizens (absentees were counted as votes agreeingwith the status quo, in this case in favour of the law). Thus within 45 days inall communes of the canton a double majority of voters had to oppose a lawotherwise the veto failed (Möckli 1996: 210).Historically speaking, referendum movements that formed, dissolved andwere reinvigorated by political elites ad-hoc can be interpreted as thepredecessors of political parties. As Gruner (1969: 25), the doyen of Swissparty research, puts it: Swiss political parties are the 'children' of directdemocratic rights. The use of the veto actually led to the first political party inSt. Gallen when members of the Catholic church, a minority in Parliament atthat time, managed to oppose and to vote down an anti-clerical bill in 1834(Gruner 1969: 26). The veto right and later on the referendum right thussupported the formation of party-like movements on a broad scale (since onehad to mobilise in order to collect the necessary signatures and to getorganised to run a campaign). In the following years such loosely organisedmass parties formed in all other cantons as well. Most of them representedand originated from opposition groups that lost a battle in Parliament (in thecantons of Valais and Lucerne, similarly to St. Gallen the Catholics, in Vaud,Bern and Geneva the Radicals). The first climax of party movements occurredduring the Sonderbund war 1847 and the struggle for a federal state, thesecond one during the 1860s, during the time of so called 'democraticmovement' aiming at an extension of direct democratic rights (Gruner 1969:27).

As Auer (2011) states in his overview of the latest historical research on theemergence of direct democracy, despite of the seminal and far reaching workof Kölz (2004) and later works (Auer 1996, Roca/Auer 2011,Hangartner/Kley 2000, Suter 2006), some puzzles still remain. Furthermore,not all trajectories of cantonal democratisation have been well documented.

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However, as so often in the contingent meanders of history, the causes of thesuccessful diffusion of direct democracy in all Swiss cantons probably liesomewhere in the middle. Direct democracy in Swiss cantons came aboutbecause of an amalgamation of two political cultures, the late medievalassembly tradition and the liberal-representative ideas spreading in theaftermaths of the French revolution.

Mechanisms of Direct Democracy at theNational Level

Switzerland was the first European country to permanently adopt egalitarianand democratic institutions based on French revolutionary ideas into codifiedlaw. Besides the direct democratic experiences on the cantonal level, thedirect election of judges, the egalitarian and secular education system as wellas the application of the collegial principle for executives and courts could bementioned (Kölz 1996: 116). With the implantation of direct democraticmechanisms into cantonal Constitutions the pressure to introduce them on thenational level increased and can be seen as the next evolutionary step. In thecourse of history, institutional changes usually worked towards a cumulativeexpansion of direct democratic rights and only very rarely were theyabolished (Kriesi/Trechsel 2008: 50-51). The following list of directdemocratic institutions is currently codified in the Swiss Constitution of 18April 1999 and the Federal Act on Political Rights of 17 December 1976.

1848 - The Mandatory Constitutional Referendum and the Citizens'Initiative for a Total Revision of the ConstitutionBetween 1848 and 1873 only mandatory constitutional referendums forpartial or total revisions of the Constitution7 as well as initiatives aiming at acomplete revision of the Federal Constitution8 were allowed. After theexperience of 1802 with the first national referendum vote ever in the contextof the establishment of the Helvetic Republic (Kobach 1994: 100), and theFrench revolution of 1830 spurring a series of constitutional referendums onthe cantonal level (Auer 1996a: 94), there was a broad consensus amongmembers of constitutional assemblies throughout the country thatreferendums ought to be held in order to ratify newly drafted Constitutions(Kölz 1996: 109). As a compromise between Protestant and Catholic cantons,the Constitution of 1848 provided minority protection for the smaller, ratherrural Catholic cantons of central Switzerland in the form of a double majorityapplying to all constitutional changes. Which means that a majority of allvoters and a majority of the cantons is needed. In the case of a split cantonalvote (11.5 versus 11.5 of 23), the bill would not go through. The double

7 Article 140 Constitution: The following must be put to the vote of the People and the Cantons: a.

amendments to the Federal Constitution [...]. See www.admin.ch for unofficial versions of the

Swiss Constitution and major legislation in English.8 Article 138 Constitution: Any 100,000 persons eligible to vote may within 18 months of the

official publication of their initiative propose a complete revision of the Federal Constitution.

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majority requirement seems to serve its function as a safeguard for cantonalinterests up to our days. The pattern described by Kobach (1994: 103)according to which conflicting majorities tend to occur when competenceswere to be passed on to the the federal government still holds.9 As thedisparity of population size in the cantons grew over time, so too did criticismof the double majority requirement increase. A vote in the Canton ofAppenzell Innerrhoden weights more than forty times as much as a vote in theCanton of Zurich. In fact, it leads to the situation where a very small fractionof the overall electorate (de facto roughly 20%) in small cantons is able toblock the whole country (Linder 2007: 110).A total revision of the Constitution can also originate from Parliament. Inwhich case the question of principle whether to start a total revision of theConstitution or not need only put to a vote in case the two chambers – theNational Council and the Council of States – would disagree.10 To adopt thequestion of principle about a total revision of the Constitution a simplemajority of the voters would suffice.

1874 The Optional Legislative ReferendumUntil the introduction of proportional representation in national elections in1919 there were only two political parties on the national level, the largelydominant Liberal Party (Radicals) and the Catholic Conservative Party as aminority. Since the formerly progressive reform movement of the Radicalsincreasingly turned into a self-serving regime (Dardanelli 2011), oppositionand modernizing forces became more fervent, attempting at a total revision ofthe Constitution in 1872, and after failure again in 1874. On the cantonallevel, the 'democratic movement' of the 1860s succeeded to introducemandatory referendums for all laws in several cantons (Schaffner 1996: 156).This broad, mainly Protestant, movement for more direct participation andcontrol of those in office comprised all linguistic regions and also put thefederal level under pressure, eventually resulting in the introduction of theoptional legislative referendum in the Constitution of 1874.The requirements for an optional legislative referendum were to collect30'000 signatures11 within 90 days after publication of the law or decree in theofficial gazette. The threshold was increased to 50'000 signatures in 1977following the introduction of women's suffrage on the national level in 1971(the time frame to collect signatures was extended to 100 days in 1997). Asimple majority of the people is enough for a referendum to be successful.

9 Vote results with the citizens saying Yes and the cantons No occurred in the following years

1866, 1955, 1970, 1973, 1983, 1994 (2), 2013. The opposite configuration occurred in the years

1910, 1957, 2002.10 Article 140 Constitution: The following shall be submitted to a vote of the People: [...] c. the

question of whether a complete revision of the Federal Constitution should be carried out, in the

event that there is disagreement between the two Councils.11 Eight cantons can also trigger the referendum. This happened only once so far in 2003 when the

cantons opposed to a package of tax laws. The cantons defeated the contested laws in the vote of

16 May 2005 (participation 50.8%, Yes votes 34.1%, cantons saying Yes 0).

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Note that the vote refers to the parliamentary bill, thus voters are askedwhether they want to adopt the respective bill. Therefore voting Yes in thereferendum means to confirm the already adopted bill. Voting No means tosupport the referendum committee.

1891 The Citizen's Initiative for partial revision of the Constitution andthe Counter Proposal by ParliamentThe first attempt to introduce the citizens' initiative to the Constitution failedin 1874. Only after a heated political debate did the Catholic ConservativeParty (nowadays the Christian Democrats) and the Social Democratic Partymanage to push it through (Hangartner/Kley 2000: 333). The citizens'initiative aims at amending the Constitution from outside of Parliament,which also explains why it was only reluctantly accepted. Parliament in suchcase has no control over the proposed text which can take the form of ageneral proposal or of a specific draft. In cases where Parliament agrees witha general proposition it is supposed to draft the respective constitutionalprovisions and submit it to a vote. In case where it does not agree, theproposition is put to a vote to the people (since the vote rather corresponds toa question of principle, only requiring a simple majority). Should the peopleaccept, a corresponding bill has to be drafted by the national assembly whichis then again put forward to the people for a binding vote (requiring a doublemajority). After the introduction of the citizens' initiative in 1891 it took50,000 signatures to trigger a vote. Originally, there was no time limit forsignature collection. The 18 months time limit was only introduced in 1977together with a rise of the necessary number of signatures to 100'000.12 In theyear 2013 it took 1.9% of the electorate to trigger an initiative, at thebeginning of the last century around 6% of the electorate needed to sign up(Lutz 2012: 23). For the adoption of the citizens' initiative at the ballot again adouble majority of the people and cantons is required.In Switzerland the scope of direct democracy is wide. It is possible, forinstance, to write a citizens' initiative demanding the abolishment of the SwissArmy. Such a vote took actually place in 1989 but did not go through as is thefate of most of citizens' initiatives (though surprisingly 36% voted in favourof the initiative). Since there is no judicial review on the national level it is upto Parliament to make sure that citizens' initiatives are formally correct,comply with mandatory provisions of international law (jus cogens), and onlycomprise one, well defined subject matter. Parliament can declare citizens'initiatives partly or completely void in case they do not comply to thoseminimal standards. So far this has happened only four times (1955, 1977,1995, 1996).13

12 Article 139 Constitution: 1) Any 100,000 persons eligible to vote may within 18 months of the

official publication of their initiative request a partial revision of the Federal Constitution. 2) A

popular initiative for the partial revision of the Federal Constitution may take the form of a

general proposal or of a specific draft of the provisions proposed.13 Since the Minaret as well as the Expulsion (of criminal foreigners) initiatives got accepted (see

annex) and are now difficult to implement because of conflicting international law, there is a

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In case of a specific draft, Parliament is allowed to couple a citizens' initiativewith a counter proposal.14 Since 1988 the double-Yes with a tie-breakquestion is applied. Before, one could only give a vote to either the citizens'initiative or the counter proposal which were therefore cannibalising eachothers votes. Counter proposals are usually less extreme than citizens'initiatives, however, they tend to incorporate some of the demands by theinitiators and thus have, in general, a higher chance of passing. Citizens'initiatives with a major impact on the Swiss political system include theintroduction of proportional rule elections for the National Council (1918),the treaty referendum (1921) and the limitations and safeguards for urgentdecrees (1949) (see annex).

1921/1977 The Optional and Mandatory Treaty ReferendumsAfter ambiguities on how to deal with the decision of the authorities to jointhe League of Nations in 192015 (Kobach 1994: 105), the optional referendumwas extended in 1921 to some international treaties by a citizens' initiative16.This nicely demonstrates the reflexive nature of direct democracy since it canexpand itself with the help of the very instruments it was created. Treatyreferendums were per se nothing unusual at that time, they were verycommon in the cantons already (Trechsel/Serdült 1999). However, the ratherrestricted scope of the optional treaty referendum in its form of 1921 leftmuch to desire. Since the introduction of the new norm at the end of the1960s only 3.5% of all treaties were potentially affected by it (Linder et al.2010: 357). In reaction to internationalisation and the immigration of foreignworkers, the right-wing nationalistic party 'Nationale Aktion' launched acitizens' initiative in 1975 asking for an extension of the optional treatyreferendum to all past (sic!) and future international treaties. The counterproposal worked out by the Federal Council actually suggested to go evenfurther in certain respects and to introduce mandatory treaty referendumsrequiring a double majority in the case of an accession to organisations forcollective security or to supranational communities (Art. 140 Constitution)and to transform the optional treaty referendum from 1921 such thatpermanent treaties, the accession to international organisations andmultilateral unifications of law can be challenged by 50'000 signatures. Inaddition, Parliament was allowed to submit further international treaties to theoptional referendum. In the votes of 13 March 1977 the initiative failed as

debate on how to evaluate citizen's initiatives prior to starting the collection of signatures.14 Note that although Counter Proposals are formally a competence of Parliament, in practice, the

Federal Council as the executive can submit, however, not decide upon a proposal for a Counter

Proposal. The Counter Proposal is an option for Parliament, not an obligation.15 Parliament treated the accession to the League of Nations as a constitutional matter and hence

the vote required the double majority. The vote went through with 56.3% Yes votes and 11.5

cantons adopting (participation 77.5%).16 The citizens' initiative asked to submit permanent treaties or treaties lasting for longer than 15

years to the optional referendum. The proposition passed 30 January 1921 with 71.4% yes votes

and 20 cantons in favour.

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clearly as the counter proposal won (see annex). A minor reform in 2003further extended the optional treaty referendum.17

1949 Mandatory and Optional Referendums in case of Urgent DecreesIn an attempt to regain power over Parliamentary acts that tried to avoidreferendum votes by applying an urgency clause, further mandatory andoptional referendums were introduced. Legislation via urgent decrees used tobe particularly prevalent during the economic crisis in the 1930s and theSecond World War. About one hundred important decrees were thus exemptfrom the referendum clauses during that period (Trechsel/Kriesi 1996: 190).For unconstitutional urgent decrees excluded from the referendum clause byParliament a mandatory referendum has to be organised after one year(double majority applies), for the ones which are compatible with theConstitution only an optional referendum option exists. In the latter case50'000 signatures need to be collected and a simple majority would apply.18

2003 The 'General Initiative'The latest addition in this historical line up only represented a blip on thescreen. The idea was to avoid an over-crowding of the Constitution withamendments that did not actually belong there and could be regulated on thelevel of a law or ordinance. Thus an initiative can be submitted as a generalproposition and it is then left up to Parliament to decide on which level thedemand is supposed to be implemented. At first this seemed like a good ideaand it was adopted in an uncontested vote 9 February 2003 (see annex).However, the practical handling of this instrument was less evident and theincentive to make use of it very low. Why collect 100'000 signatures withouthaving any control of what might happen when with the same amount ofsignatures it is possible to write directly into the Constitution? The instrumentwas therefore taken off the shelve in a referendum vote in the year 2009without much further ado (see annex).

Voting channels

For more than a century voting used to take place at the ballot box or in theopen in the case of the 'Landsgemeinde' in one or several dedicated publicspaces in the commune. However, postal voting has gradually been simplifiedand is now the most common form of voting in Switzerland (introduced 1994on the national level, earlier in some cantons). In cities more than 90% of thevoters cast their vote by post (starting 3-4 weeks ahead of the official polling

17 The optional treaty dispositions of Article 141 Constitution read as follows: [are submitted to the

vote of the People] [...] d) international treaties that: 1. are of unlimited duration and may not be

terminated; 2. provide for accession to an international organisation; 3. contain important

legislative provisions or whose implementation requires the enactment of federal legislation.18 Article 141 Constitution states in Paragraph 1, Lit. c that „emergency federal acts that are not

based on a provision of the Constitution and whose term of validity exceeds one year; such

federal acts must be put to the vote within one year of being passed by the Federal Assembly.“

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day). It is left to the communes whether they want to cover the postage feesfor the return of the ballot or not.Quasi-experimental studies were able to quantify an increase of turnout due tothe sequential introduction of postal voting amounting to a considerable 4.1%on average (Lüchinger et al. 2007). The hope for a further increase in turnoutand efficiency gains due to the adoption of new technologies have lead toexperiments with voting via the internet. Currently, the trials are operationalin three pioneer cantons Geneva, Neuchâtel and Zurich. So far we can onlyobserve a substitution effect from postal to internet voting. No furtherincrease in turnout can be detected. After an initial 'novelty effect' with e-voter turnout rates above 30% in the trial communes, the use of the internet asa voting channel then typically hovers around 10-20 percent of the votersdepending somewhat on the specific setup. As a part of the official e-Government strategy of Switzerland, e-voting for the Swiss living abroad issupposed to be available in all Swiss cantons by the year 2015. The canton ofBasel-City started with the November 2009 vote (with a high e-voter turnoutof 48%) and others have already followed (Serdült 2010). The e-votingsolutions for the Swiss abroad are hosted by the systems of either Geneva orZurich. Among the Swiss abroad internet voting seems to become wellaccepted and highly appreciated. Although it is official policy to keep allchannels open, voting at the ballot box seems to become less common, whilevoting by correspondence is becoming the norm.

Who is allowed to vote?

In the course of history voting rights on the national level have gradually beenexpanded. In the 19th century, in the first few decades of modern Switzerlandthe struggle was to implement full political rights for Swiss residents notnecessarily living and working in their canton of origin. Swiss Jews, women,criminals, people in debt or of 'bad' reputation were all at some pointexcluded from political rights. It took several attempts to fully harmonisepolitical rights across all cantons.Regarding women's suffrage we can note that Social Democrats and tradeunions advocated the women’s right to vote already in the late 19th century.In 1909 the 'Schweizerischer Verband für das Frauenstimmrecht' (SFV), alargely middle-class association to lobby women's voting rights, was founded.However, women's suffrage on the national level was only introduced in 1971by a national referendum vote (7 Feb 1971, 66% Yes, 15.5 cantons in favour,turnout: 58%). All earlier attempts by Parliament (back to 1913) were blockedand delayed by the Federal Council (the executive) for decades (Linder 2010:268). Nowadays regarded as maybe the darkest stain in the history of Swissdemocratisation, it took the men two attempts to grant women their votingrights. A first attempt on 1 Feb 1959 clearly failed (67% No, 19 cantonsagainst, turnout: 67%) after it passed both parliamentary chambers, notwithout opposition but with solid majorities. Only in 1971 did the vote gothrough (see annex). On the cantonal level, Appenzell Innerrhoden resisted

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implementation until 1990, when finally the Federal Court made it clear thatthe new norm had to be accepted and enacted.19

In order to enfranchise young people and to familiarise them with politics asearly as possible by active practice voting age was lowered from 20 to 18years20. A first attempt in 1979 resulted in 50.8% of the voters and 14 cantonsagainst it. A second attempt in 1991 succeeded with 73% Yes votes and allcantons accepting. That vote was valid for the federal level. By 1992 allcantons have, however, followed and lowered the voting age from 20 to 18years as well.Since 1992 Swiss citizens living abroad are allowed to participate in nationalreferendums and elections via postal voting without having to travel toSwitzerland. To be eligible they have to register in their local Swiss embassyand renew their registration form every four years. By 2015 all cantons planto offer internet voting to their citizens living abroad.The last and currently most fervently debated frontier of general suffrageseem to be political rights for foreigners. As usual, diffusion andexperimentation happens in the 'laboratory' of the cantons. Cantons areactually free to decide whether they want to introduce active (to vote and toelect) or passive (to be elected) voting rights for cantonal or communalmatters. Some cantons have already introduced voting rights for foreigners onthe communal level under certain conditions (Fribourg 2006, Geneva 2005,Jura 1979, Neuchâtel 1849, Vaud 2003). The cantons of Jura (1979, ten yearsresidence in Switzerland, one year in Jura) and Neuchâtel (2001, five yearsresidence in the canton) have even extended active voting rights for foreignresidents on to the cantonal level. Others have taken a more cautiousapproach and granted their communes the option to introduce voting rightsfor foreigners, such as Appenzell Ausserrhoden (1995, till now in thecommunes of Wald, Speicher and Trogen), Graubünden (2003, 18 communeshave introduced it so far, all of them smaller ones), and Basel-Stadt (2005,none so far, but would only apply to Bettingen and Riehen).

Mechanisms of Direct Democracy at theCantonal Level

Some more direct democratic instruments, more so than on the local levelactually, exist on the cantonal level. Most notable among the directdemocratic instruments not available on the national level are the initiative tointroduce, change or abolish laws as well as the so called financialreferendum allowing to block expenses and to have a say on the budget or taxrate (Monnier 1996, Trechsel/Serdült 1999, Christmann 2010: 65).

19 See also the documentary film by Erich Langjahr on the last men-only 'Landsgemeinde' in

Hundwil Appenzell Ausserrhoden called 'Männer im Ring' (engl. subtitles).20 The debate whether to lower the voting age to 16 years pops up from time to time. Pioneer

among the cantons is Glarus, having accepted the voting age 16 in a 'Landsgemeinde' in 2007.

However, this does not include the right to be elected into an executive office or Parliament.

12

Frequency of Use

Over time the number of votes on the national level has increasedconsiderably. Between 1848 and early 2013 a total of 584 votes have been putto the ballot (see Table 1).21 Since direct democratic mechanisms are also,though not exclusively, a weapon for the political opposition, an increase inits use can also be interpreted as a manifestation of intensified politicalstruggles often related to uncertain or unstable socio-economic conditions.Such was the case, for example in the 1970s during the oil crisis and to alesser degree in the 1980s with a youth movement fighting against theestablishment and then again during the economic recession in the 1990s.During those periods the Swiss society and economy underwent majortransformations. These phases were also marked by an increase in partycompetition. However, if we count the rejection of citizens' initiatives, theacceptance of counter proposals, of mandatory as well as of optionalreferendums as expressions of governmental support it becomes clear that thevoters have endorsed the authorities to a high degree across all decades since1890s. However, this interpretation on a highly aggregate level should notdisguise the fact that the political elite can lose out on substantially importantmatters and then has to cope with it (Trechsel/Sciarini 1998).

21 On the cantonal level: 1970-1979 there were 1'356 votes, 1980-1989 1'360 votes, 1990-1999

1'325 votes, 2000-2009 1'112 votes, 2010-2012 360 votes (see: www.c2d.ch). There is a trend to

pooling issues (Setälä 1999: 142) otherwise the quantity would not be manageable.

13

Table 1: National referendum frequencies by decade and type of legalinstrument

DecadeCitizens'

InitiativeCounter

proposalMandatory

ReferendumOptional

Referendum TotalYes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

1848-1859 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11860-1869 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 91870-1879 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 5 111880-1889 0 1 0 0 2 1 2 6 121890-1899 1 2 0 0 7 3 3 6 221900-1909 1 3 1 0 3 1 3 2 141910-1919 1 2 0 0 7 0 1 0 111920-1929 3 11 1 1 7 2 2 5 321930-1939 0 6 3 0 6 0 2 6 231940-1949 1 5 1 1 1 1 4 3 171950-1959 0 10 2 2 13 7 3 8 451960-1969 0 5 0 0 12 1 4 4 261970-1979 0 23 4 3 29 9 11 7 861980-1989 2 22 5 2 16 5 6 4 621990-1999 3 26 2 1 26 5 24 13 1002000-2009 5 39 1 5 9 3 24 4 902010-2013 3 9 2 1 1 1 3 3 23

Subtotal 20 164 22 16 143 48 95 76Total 184 38 191 171 584

Source: www.c2d.ch

Comparing the three main types of direct democratic instruments we can statethat none of them predominate. The frequency of use during the last fewdecades suggests that they all seem to perform a useful function in the Swisspolitical system. For decades launching a successful citizens' initiative was analmost singular event, not to speak of winning one. Only since the 1970s,coinciding with the so called 'participatory age', initiatives seem to have amore direct impact. Since 1988 when the option of the double-Yes was madeavailable the chances for citizens' initiatives to go through clearly improved.The frequent complaint that it recently became more difficult to collectsignatures is not supported by the data. The degree of organisational capacityof political parties and civil society have also increased, in addition theelectorate grew considerably22 while the threshold for collecting signaturesstayed untouched since 1977. Overall counter proposals by Parliament have agood chance of getting accepted. They allow the political elite to react todemands formulated in initiatives and to stay in an institutionalised dialogue

22

From 3.8 mio in 1977 to 5.1 mio in 2013.

14

with the citizens during a legislature. Starting in the 1990s we can observe ashift from the use of the mandatory to the optional referendum. Mandatoryreferendums are in a sharp decline while the use of the optional referendum isshooting up. This shift is indicative of the more confrontational politicsSwitzerland is currently experiencing. During the 1990s the grand coalition ofthe four major political parties represented in the Swiss Executive23 –colloquially also called the 'magic formula' – started to come under stress andeventually broke up after the elections in 2003 when the Swiss People's Partybecame the strongest political party in the National Council. Further politicalstruggles have led to a situation in which the optional referendum is now usedby the political left and right to fight against the effects of economicliberalisation, Europeanisation and globalisation.

A matter of concern is the high number of votes. De facto, the politicalagenda is 'jammed' with referendum votes. After a vote is before the next votewith yet another campaign. All political actors as well as the media systemare very much absorbed by referendum politics and I am wondering whetherwe have maybe not reached a point where too much heat is constantlypumped into the pressure cooker. Without putting Swiss direct democracyinto question in principle – far from it – it might be wise to turn the heat downa bit. Therefore signature requirements should be increased considerably.However, so far such a proposition was not able to find a political majority.

Participation

It is nowadays almost customary to blame the frequent use of directdemocracy for the relatively low average turnout rates for referendum andelection votes on all three state levels. Low turnout seems to be the price topay in a polity with such strong elements of direct democracy (Trechsel 2006;Lutz 2007; Linder 2012). The long-term average turnout rate dropped afterthe Second World War from roughly 60% to around 40% during the 1970sand currently amounts to around 45 percent in a slight trend upwards (seeGraph 1). With the exception of a few notable peaks, turnout rarely crossesthe 50% or even 60% mark. With a turnout of 78.3% the mobilization for thereferendum on the accession to the European Economic Area that took placein 1992 was the highest since 1947. A similarly high mobilization rate in thelast decades was only attained by the citizens' initiative intending thesuppression of the Swiss Army, which resulted in a participation rate of69.2% in 1989 (see annex).

Causal factors generally put forward to explain the partially high absenteeismin Switzerland such as 'the frequency of ballots', the '(low) competence of

23 In place since 1959, informally, more or less according to party strength in Parliament, reserving

the Liberal Democratic Party, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats two seats in

government, and one seat for the Swiss People's Party (which got their second seat in 2003 at the

expense of the Christian Democrats).

15

citizens' or 'the salience of the issue at stake' only partially make sense whenobserving longer diachronic trends. There were always more or less complexissues on the ballot. The education level of the Swiss population has increasedsince the Second World War without a positive impact on participation, anddespite the increasing number of ballots in recent years average turnout hasnot dropped.

Graph 1: Average turnout for Swiss national referendum votes peryear (grey bars) and ten year moving-average (punctuated line), 1879-

2012

Source: www.c2d.ch

Note: referendum votes took place in most but not in all years; the averageturnout per year was calculated as the simple arithmetic mean of the turnoutfor each separate ballot vote.

Comparative turnout studies came up with interesting results for the Swisscontext (Freitag 2011). First, most cantons actually stopped compulsoryvoting after the Second World War or in the early 1970s. The older generationof the current electorate thus grew up under a regime in which voting wasvery much perceived as a civic duty. In addition, social control was still verymuch at play. Voting took place at the ballot box where everyone could see it(at least in rural places) and postal voting was not generalised yet. Eventhough the actual the fine for not turning up must have varied considerably,was sometimes not enforced or very low, comparative studies across allcantons confirm the importance of (the lack of) compulsory voting as anexplanatory factor. Second, the late adoption of women's suffrage hasnegatively affected older cohorts of women who only received voting rightsin 1971 after their primary political socialisation. As a group they thereforeshow lower turnout rates as well (Kriesi 2005: 113).

16

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

18791884

1887

1889

1891

1893

1896

1897

1898

1902

1905

1907

1908

1912

1913

1914

1915

1917

1919

1920

1921

1922

1923

1924

1926

1928

1929

1930

1931

1933

1935

1939

1941

19441945

1947

1949

1950

1951

1953

19541956

1959

1960

19621964

1965

1967

1969

19701971

1973

1974

1975

1977

1981

19841987

1988

1989

1990

1991

19931994

1996

2001

20022005

2007

2011

2012

Based on the VOX polls, conducted after each vote since 1977, we candistinguish three types of voters (Mottier 1993). In the group of abstentionistswe, on average, find more women, younger age groups (20-39 years old) aswell as participants with lower levels of education. They can identify lesswell with a political party and tend to distrust government. The profile ofselective participants regarding gender, age, education, party identification,left-right placement and trust in government conforms to the average of theSwiss citizens represented in the VOX surveys. Among the model citizens wefind more men who tend to be more than 50 years old with an interest inpolitics as well as a higher education. Research is, however, uncertain aboutthe magnitude of the three identified groups. In general, we consider 30% tobelong to the group of model citizens who never miss a vote and 20% tonever go to the polls. This suggests that there are therefore 50% that areselective participants (Linder 2010: 111-112).

Table 2: Cumulative participation for seven consecutive referendumvotes in the City of St. Gallen, in percent

1/1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7

2010 Vote1 47.0

57.5

Vote2 46.7 66.1

62.3 68.6

Vote3 55.4 66.3 71.4

62.4 69.6 73.8

2011 Vote4 49.7 67.1 72.5 75.3

60.4 70.6 74.2

Vote5 49.6 66.6 72.6

62.6 69.6

Vote6 53.2 67.2

62

2012 Vote7 51.3

Source: Statistics office canton of St. Gallen

As Kobach (1994: 137) suspects the number of voters who participate at leastonce a year is considerably higher than average turnout figures. So far, theactual magnitude used to be investigated mainly with the help of survey data.However, voter registry data can, in some respect, give a more preciseaccount of turnout. With the help of a combined data set over seven

17

referendum votes for the years 2010 (3 dates), 2011 (3 dates) and 2012 (1date) it is possible to follow the turnout of individual voters over time(Serdült 2012). Average turnout rates for the seven individual referendumvotes do not look surprising. They are actually rather high and range from44.5% to 53.4% (see Table 2).Taking note of how many voters participated at least once across all sevenvotes we can see that the cumulative participation rate climbs up to 75.3%within a time span of only two years. It could very well go up to 80% for awhole legislature, not yet including elections. 75.3% of the electorate in theCity of St. Gallen have therefore participated in at leasts one polling day outof seven. These figures hardly mirror the picture of an apathetic electorate orof a largely silent majority. As we can see in Table 2 cumulative turnoutalready crosses the 50% mark for each consecutive pair of polling dates,which means that within only six months more than half of the electorate wasmobilized for a formal political event. The annual values for the years 2010and 2011 amount to 66.1% and 66.6%, respectively (see Table 2).Even though turnout rates can sometimes be alarmingly low we cannot speakof a general crisis of political participation in Switzerland. During the decadeswith low average turnout levels in the 1970s and 1980s Switzerland evenexperienced several waves of political activity and social protest movementsbringing up topics so far neglected by the official channels(Joye/Papadopoulos 1994).

Direct Democracy Campaigns

During a referendum campaign the government is allowed to present itsviewpoint and give out a recommendation. Alongside the voterecommendations provided by political parties and interest groups, it ispublished in most newspapers and thereby offers important heuristic cues tothe undecided voter (Trechsel/Kriesi 1996: 199). The government canfurthermore explain its viewpoint in the official information brochuredistributed to each citizen together with the voting material. To a large degree,however, Swiss citizens inform themselves with the help of newspapers andtelevision (Trechsel/Sciarini 1998). The Internet as a source of votinginformation is also becoming more important but does not rank very high yet.One would expect Switzerland to having developed an extensive regulationon referendum campaigns, including rules on campaign financing, campaignduration and on media access. Surprisingly, this is not the case (Serdült2010a). There is no obligation for campaigners to reveal their identity or theamount of money spent.24 On the federal level, there are no transparency rulesat all. However, Switzerland would not be Switzerland if there were nocantonal exceptions. In the Canton of Ticino, since October 1998 donations ofmore than 10,000 Swiss francs to political parties have to be published in the

24 In Switzerland political parties are not state funded. They are mostly not for profit associations

under private law and finance themselves from membership fees, donations and contributions

from office holders (Ladner 2007).

18

official gazette. The rules also apply to cantonal initiative and referendumcommittees. However, thus far there has only been one case.25 In the Cantonof Geneva, since September 1999 anonymous donations are forbidden andtransparency rules apply to political parties and to political groups engaged incampaigns as well. Non-compliance with this rule, however, does not seem tohave very serious consequences.On campaigning in general, it is important to notice that political advertisingon radio and television is forbidden (Serdült 2010a). Thus a lot of money istaken out of the game. Committees and political parties can only spend theirmoney for posters, direct mailings and advertisements in newspapers.The political left continues to make demands asking for more transparency inthe political process in general, whereas the political right is rather concernedwith limiting the government's involvement26 in referendum campaigns. TheCouncil of Europe's body specialised on the topic (GRECO), OSCE observersfor the national elections 2011, and Transparency International repeatedly askfor more regulation.

The Swiss debate on the question of whether referendum results can bebought with money started with a study by Gruner and Hertig (1983)concluding that there was enough evidence to make the claim that in principlereferendum results could be bought. In reaction, counter examples in whichmoney was not able to buy the end result were presented. Some authorsargued that a professional organization and infrastructure would play a crucialrole as well, not only the availability of funds. However, recent studies showthat there is room for influencing a referendum campaign, especially whenthe issue at the ballot is complex, the expected result is going to be tight andthe individual level of information of citizens is low (Kriesi 2012, Bernhard2012). However, it remains difficult if not impossible to empirically provethat referendum results can be bought.

Functions and Effects of Direct Democracy

As Dardanelli (2011: 152) puts it, direct democracy in the Swiss system canfunction as both a 'brake' and a 'spur' whereas the optional referendum standsfor the 'brake' and the citizens' initiative for the 'spur'. Whereas thereferendum accounts, for example, for a slow international integration (lateUN accession, not an EEA or EU member) and the late adoption of women'ssuffrage (also late introduction of paid maternity leave), the initiative hasbrought about some surprising policy changes in the field of environmentaland social policy (moratoriums on GMOs and additional nuclear powerplants). However, the boundaries are not so clear cut since, for example, the

25 Canton of Ticino. Foglio ufficiale no 32/2011.26 See for example the citizens' initiative that colloquially became known as the 'Muzzle Initiative'

(Serdült 2010a: 173) trying to stop governments to take part in a campaign. On judicial practice

and what is allowed for public authorities during a campaign, see the encompassing and detailed

analysis by Tornay (2008).

19

heroin prescription for certain drug users and the acceptance of same sexmarriage both were accepted in a referendum vote (see annex).

Table 3: Bottom-up votes by initiators and historical periods, withsuccess rates (1874-2010)

Period

InitiatorPolitical party ingovernment

Political party in the opposition

Individuals or civil society

Σ % passed Σ % passed Σ % passed

1874-1890 0 - 12 83 4 25

1891-1900 2 50 9 44 4 75

1901-1910 0 - 5 20 2 50

1911-1920 0 - 2 50 4 50

1921-1930 0 - 8 25 10 33

1931-1940 0 - 6 50 9 44

1941-1950 1 - 5 40 8 25

1951-1960 2 50 8 38 10 33

1961-1970 3 0 3 0 9 44

1971-1980 4 25 13 15 23 17

1981-1990 7 14 3 0 31 19

1991-2000 10 20 13 31 47 17

2001-2010 17 29 4 0 41 20

Total 46 24 91 35 202 24

Source: Based on C2D archives and Serdült/Welp (2012).

The common feature of the optional referendum and the initiative is that theyare both launched by the collection of signatures. As we can see in Table 3,however, political parties – whether in government or not - are making use ofthe two 'bottom-up' direct democratic instruments as well. Even a politicalparty represented in government will have to demonstrate from time to timethat it is able to launch a citizens' initiative from time to time. We can also seethat in the course of history civil society based organisations make anincreasing use of the tools and are also quite successful. Direct democracyfrom bottom-up in Switzerland was therefore very much a weapon forpolitical parties in the opposition, however, it seems to become deeperingrained in civil society over time (Serdült/Welp 2012).

20

The main indirect effect of the optional referendum is that over time theinstitution has influenced the composition of the federal government, theFederal Council (Linder 2010: 129). Strong political minorities were able tothreaten and mobilise for an activation of the optional referendum, until theywere eventually co-opted into government (Papadopoulos 2001: 39). This iswhat happened when first the Catholics (1891), then the Farmers Party (nowthe Swiss Peoples Party) and finally the Social Democrats (1943) wereallowed to have seats in the Federal Council which is elected by Parliament.This process was intensified after 1919 when proportional rule elections wereintroduced. Political parties in power are thus doomed to find a compromiseand to adopt a more consensual style of policy-making. Negotiations amongthe political elite and all antagonistic forces during the pre-parliamentaryphase of the political process are thus very much common (informal andformal ones), trying to reach a compromise and thus to avoid the referendumor, in the worst case, deciding not to decide (Papadopoulos 2001: 41).

Besides their direct outcomes citizens' initiatives also have some well knownindirect effects (Linder 2010: 107). They first of all have an agenda-settingeffect. Many more citizens' initiatives are launched than actually voted on.Lutz (2012: 26) reports that between 1891 and 2010 in total 378 initiativeswere launched and that around a fifth failed to collect the necessary numberof signatures. For smaller political parties launching a citizens' initiative maybe a strategy that pays off. The party becomes known and can build up a baseof potential followers for the next election. It is also a political weapon for theones that could otherwise not get heard in the media or did not manage topush something through Parliament. The most notable indirect effect,however, is the fact that for a justified political request, the government willenter into negotiations with the citizens' initiative committee, eventuallymeeting some of the demands at least partially in a counter proposal or withan attempt to legislate before the initiative is put to a vote (Papadopoulos2001: 38). The hope is that the initiators will eventually withdraw thesubmitted text. As we can see in Table 4 29% of all initiatives werewithdrawn. Adding up indirect concessions via legislation in Parliament,Rohner (2010) in her dissertation was able to demonstrate that despite the lownumber of citizens' initiatives accepted in a vote, 50% of them had left theirmark in legislative acts.

21

Table 4: Submitted and withdrawn initiatives for a partial revision of theConstitution by decade (1891-2010)

Decade Submitted Withdrawn27

Σ Σ %1891-1900 5 0 01901-1910 4 1 251911-1920 9 0 01921-1930 8 1 01931-1940 21 12 571941-1950 11 3 281951-1960 23 12 521961-1970 16 7 441971-1980 40 11 281981-1990 47 16 341991-2000 56 9 162001-2010 43 11 26

Total 283 83 29

Sources: Rohner (2012: 304-327), Federal Chancellery (www.admin.ch).

Note: The number of withdrawn initiatives during a decade corresponds tothe submitted ones in that particular decade. For example: From the 21initiatives submitted during the period 1931-1940 twelve were withdrawn(possibly in a later decade).

Conclusion

Papadopoulos (2001: 52) reminds us not to be too quick to make judgementcalls about the efficiency and the overall performance of Swiss directdemocracy. I could not agree more. On one hand such an evaluation at leastpartly depends on political preferences and whether they have been servedwell by direct democracy or not. On the other hand an assessment isembedded in a historical discourse on short to mid term problems a country is

27 For political reasons, the initiative submitted 31 May 1935 regarding the guarantee ofthe freedom of the press has never been voted on, nor has it ever been withdrawn. Ithas finally been classified by article 90 paragraph 3 of the Act on political rights of 17December 1976 (Bundesgesetz über die politischen Rechte, AS 1978 688; See alsoBBl 1975 I 1317; BBl 1951 III 547; BBl 1935 II 413).The initiative submitted on 1 October 1 1969 regarding school coordination has beenclassified by article 3 of the Federal Act of September 25, 1972, without withdrawalby the initiative's committee or the holding of a vote (Bundesbeschluss über dasVolksbegehren für Schulkoordination, BBl 1972 II 1060; See also BBl 1971 II 1001;BBl 1970 II 755).

22

struggling with. From today's perspective Switzerland seems to fare ratherwell on a number of performance indicators. Whether this can be attributed todirect democracy is yet another question. The ones disappointed by slowprogress, most notably in the domain of social policies, should not forgetabout the conservative nature of Swiss voters. In Switzerland the political leftnever even came close to a majority in Parliament. Outcomes of referendumvotes cannot completely be de-coupled from parliamentary majorities. Theyare simply a reflection of the fact that the electorate for referendum votes andelections is the very same.Considering the importance of direct democracy for a large majority of Swisscitizens, for the political system as a whole and certainly also because of an'institutional' lock-in effect, it is very unlikely that Switzerland is going toabandon its historical path. Direct democracy will stay the most distinctivefeature of the Swiss political system. However, critically monitoring directdemocratic institutions certainly is a necessity and helps to make sure thatdirect democracy constantly reforms itself for the benefit of the institution.

23

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