AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION...AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE 1. Proposals for amendment of ADFPs are...

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

PUBLICATION

OPERATIONS SERIES

ADFP 25

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The information given in this document is not to be communicated either directly orindirectly, to the media or to any person not authorised to receive it.



ADFP 25, First Edition,1995

Sponsored by:

Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Operations)Headquarters Australian Defence Force

Developed and Produced by:

Commandant Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre

Published by:

Director PublishingDefence Centre - Canberra

ª Commonwealth of Australia 1995

This work is copyright. No material is to be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, for any purpose outside the courseof Commonwealth employment, without the written permission of the publication sponsor.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYADFP 25


AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

PUBLICATION

OPERATIONS SERIES

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Australian Defence Force Publication 25 (ADFP 25) - Psychological Operations , is issued for useby the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith.

A.L. BEAUMONTAdmiralChief of the Defence Force

24 April 1995

HeadquartersAustralian Defence ForceCanberra ACT 2600


iii


AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE

1. Proposals for amendment of ADFPs are to be forwarded to:

CommandantAustralian Defence Force Warfare CentreRAAF BaseWILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314AUSTRALIA

2. An information copy of the proposed amendment is also to be forwarded to:

Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Operations)Headquarters Australian Defence ForceRussell Offices (M-B-42)CANBERRA ACT 2600AUSTRALIA

Amendment Effected

No. Date Signature Date


v


AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATIONS

OPERATIONS SERIES

STOCK NUMBER(NSN)

ADFP 1 Doctrine 7610-66-139-0587

ADFP 2 Division of Responsibilities Within the AustralianDefence Force

7610-66-139-3520

Supplement 1 International Interoperability Arrangements Handbook

ADFP 3 Rules of Engagement 7610-66-135-2263

ADFP 4 Mobilisation Planning 7610-66-139-4137

ADFP 6 Operations 7610-66-139-4138

Supplement 1 Maritime Operations

Supplement 2 Land Operations

Supplement 3 Air Operations

ADFP 9 Joint Planning 7610-66-139-3518

Supplement 1 ANZUS Planning Manual (APM)

Supplement 2 Australia’s Territorial Base Line

ADFP 10 Communications 7610-66-139-4139

ADFP 11 Offensive Support 7610-66-139-4140

ADFP 12 Amphibious Operations 7610-66-139-4141

Supplement 1 Amphiluous Operations 7610-66-139-4141

ADFP 13 Air Defence and Airspace Control 7610-66-139-4142

ADFP 14 Air Transport 7610-66-139-4143

ADFP 15 Operations in an NBC Environment 7610-66-139-4144

ADFP 17 Joint Exercises and Training 7610-66-139-4145

Supplement 1 Umpiring Handbook

ADFP 19 Intelligence 7610-66-139-4147

ADFP 20 Logistics 7610-66-139-4148

ADFP 21 Movements 7610-66-139-4149

ADFP 22 Sea Transport 7610-66-139-4150

ADFP 23 Strategic Strike Operations 7610-66-139-4151

ADFP 24 Electronic Warfare 7610-66-139-4152

ADFP 25 Psychological Operations 7610-66-139-4153

ADFP 29 Surveillance and Reconnaissance 7610-66-139-4154

ADFP 31 Beach Intelligence 7610-66-139-3519

ADFP 37 Law of Armed Conflict 7610-66-139-4155

Supplement 1 Commander’s Guide


vi


ADFP 39 Airborne Operations 7610-66-139-4156

ADFP 41 Defence Public Information Policy During 7610-66-133-6630Periods of Tension and Conflict

ADFP 43 Evacuation Operations 7610-66-139-4157

ADFP 45 Special Operations 7610-66-139-4158

ADFP 53 Health Support in Joint Operations 7610-66-139-3258

ADFP 56 Explosive Ordnance Disposal 7610-66-139-4159

JOPNO Joint Operations Notebook 7610-66-139-4162

TACAID Tactical Airborne Information Document

STAFF DUTIES SERIES

ADFP 101 Glossary

ADFP 102 Service Writing

ADFP 103 Abbreviations and Military Symbols


vii


FOREWORD

1. The doctrinal and procedural aspects of psychological operations have been derived fromestablished principles, experience and lessons learnt by allied nations during major exercises andactual operations.

2. A key consideration in the planning and execution of psychological operations, whether it bea component of a single Service, joint or combined operation, is that the principles remainunchanged. ADFP 25 - Psychological Operations is suitable for use at all levels of war and within allstrata of command.

3. Responsibilities of national agencies and allusions to specific psychologicaloperations- related bodies serve as indicative bases for doctrinal development.

4. Every opportunity should be taken by users of this publication to examine constructively itscontents, applicability and currency. If deficiencies or errors are found, amendment action should betaken. Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre welcomes assistance to improve this publication.

5. ADFP 25 is not to be released to foreign countries without the written approval ofACOPS.


ix


CONTENTSPage

Cover -Authorisation Page -Amendment Certificate iiiAustralian Defence Force Publications Operations and Staff Duties Series vForeword viiContents ix-xiiAcronyms and Abbreviations xiiiGlossary xvInternational Symbols xviiDistribution List (back of publication) DL-1

Paragraph

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AN THE PRINCIPLES OFWAR

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim 108Cooperation 109Concentration of Force 110Economy of Effort 111-12Security 113Offensive Action 114Surprise 115Flexibility 116Morale 117

THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSCoordination 118Timeliness 119Credibility 120Intelligence 121Evaluation 122

CATEGORIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSPsychological Action 124-5Strategic Psychological Operations 126Operational Level Psychological Operations 127Tactical Psychological Operations 128Psychological Consolidation 129

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND OTHER SUPPORTPLANS

Deception 130Public Relations and Public Information 131-2Operations Security 133Military Civic Action 134-6

DEFENCE AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY AND DEFENCEFORCE AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

Psychological Operations in Modern Conflict 138

Annex:

A. Psychological Operations in the Gulf War


x


CHAPTER 2 THE ELEMENTS AND TECHNIQUES OFPSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychology 203-4Behavioural Research Principles 205

BEHAVIOUR IN ACTIONThe Individual 206Individual Needs 207Physical and Psychological Conditions 208Behaviour and Attitude Modification 209Degrees of Attitude Change 210Needs and Behaviour 211-12

THE IMPACT OF THE GROUP 213-7In-groups and Out-groups 215Group Leadership 216Mass Action 217

COMMUNICATION 218-23Techniques 220-1Evaluation 222-3

Annexes:

A. Hierarchy of Needs

B. Techniques

CHAPTER 3 RESPONSIBILITIES

Australian Defence Force Command Centre 301Operations Staff 302Psychological Operations Staff 303Relationship with Other Staff 304Communications Staff 305Psychologists 306-7Intelligence Staff 308

NATIONAL LEVELPolicy Determination 309-10

STRATEGIC LEVELDefence Intelligence Organisation 315-18

OPERATIONAL LEVELGeneral 319Intelligence Support 320-2Principles 323Tasks 324Joint Psychological Operations Staff Responsibilities 325Staff Relationships 326Maritime Headquarters 327Land Headquarters 328Air Headquarters 329Headquarters 1 Division 330Headquarters Northern Command 331


xi


Chapter 3 COMBINED OPERATIONS(Contd) General 332-4

Special Considerations 335-6Command and Control 337-8

SINGLE SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIESArmy 339RAN 340RAAF 341

Annex:

A. Determination and Implementation of PsychologicalOperations Policy

CHAPTER 4 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PROCESS

INITIAL RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCEDirection 405

COLLECTION

TARGET ANALYSIS

FORMULATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSPLAN

IMPLEMENTATIONProduction and Dissemination 411-12Evaluation 413

Annexes:

A. The Psychological Operations Process

B. Psychological Operations Media

CHAPTER 5 STAFFING PROCESS

Introduction 501The Commander’s Concept 502-3Intial Research and Intelligence 504Basic Psychological Operations Study 505-6Psychological Operations Estimate 507-8Associated Intelligence Collection Planning 509Monitoring Effectiveness 510Target Analysis 511Analysis of the Audience 512The Psychological Operations Plan and Orders or Instructions 513

Annexes:

A. Suggested Format of a Basic Psychological OperationsStudy

B. Suggested Format and Contents of a PsychologicalOperations Estimate

C. Example of a Psychological Operations Annex to anOperation Order


xii


CHAPTER 6 COUNTERACTION

National Level Requirements 601-3Counter-psychological Operations Estimate 604Threat Analysis 605-6The Products of Analysis 607Analysis of the Source 608Analysis of the Content 609-10Audience Analysis 611-12Media Assessment 613Analysis of the Effect 614Targets of Enemy Psychological Operations 615Military Forces 616Individual Training 617Civilians 618Counteraction Selection 619-21

EXECUTION OF COUNTERACTIONTechniques 623Restrictive Measures 624


xiii


ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACAUST Air Commander AustraliaACOPS Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Operations)ADF Australian Defence ForceADFCC Australian Defence Force Command CentreAHQ Air HeadquartersAO area of operations

CDF Chief of the Defence ForceC2W command and control warfareCJFA Commander Joint Forces AustraliaCNS Chief of Naval StaffCOMNORCOM Commander Northern Command

DCAS Deputy Chief of the Air StaffDGPI Director General of Public InformationDIO Defence Intelligence OrganisationDJOPS Director Joint Operations Staff

HQADF Headquarters Australian Defence ForceHQNORCOM Headquarters Northern Command

JFC joint force commander

LCAUST Land Commander AustraliaLHQ Land Headquarters Australia

MCAUST Maritime Commander AustraliaMHQ Maritime Headquarters Australia

NORCOM Northern Command

PM&C Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

RAAF Royal Australian Air ForceRISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition

SPCG Strategic Policy Coordination Group


xv


GLOSSARY

concept of operationsA clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order toaccomplish the mission.

counter-actionEfforts to negate, neutralise, diminish the effect of, or gain information from foreignpsychological operations.

directivea. A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered.b. A plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when so directed, or in the event that a

stated contingency arises.c. Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct or

procedure.

informationIn intelligence usage, unprocessed data of every description which may be used in theproduction of intelligence.

intelligenceThe product resulting from processing information concerning foreign nations, hostile orpotentially hostile forces or elements or areas of actual or potential operations. The term isalso applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged insuch activity.

jointConnotes activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than oneService of the same nation participate. (When all Services are not involved, the participatingServices shall be identified, eg Joint Navy-Army.)

joint forceA general term applied to a force which is composed of significant elements of the Army,Navy and Air Force or two or more of these Services operating under a single commanderwho is in turn directly responsible to CDF.

military civic actionThe use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the localpopulation at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture,transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic andsocial development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forceswith the population.

observer missionA group of military and/or civilian personnel with supporting elements established by aUnited Nations Mandate to supervise and/or to observe and report on the observance of atruce or other agreement.


xvi


peacekeepingAn operation involving military personnel, without powers of enforcement, to help restore andmaintain peace in an area of conflict with the consent of all parties.

propagandaAny information, ideas, doctrine or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion,emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor eitherdirectly or indirectly.

psychological actionThe use of psychological media and supporting activities in peace and war designed toreduce the potential or actual enemy’s prestige and influence in potentially hostile or neutralcountries and to increase friendly influence and attitudes in these countries.

psychological consolidationPlanned psychological activities in peace and war directed at the civilian population locatedin areas under friendly control in order to achieve a desired behaviour which supports themilitary objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders.

psychological operationsPlanned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutralaudiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of politicaland military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, consolidationpsychological operations and battlefield psychological activities.

public informationInformation which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fullyinformed, thereby gaining their understanding and support.

sourceIn intelligence usage, a person from whom or thing from which information can be obtained.

target audienceAn individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations.

ADFP 25FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

101. Psychological operations are joint operations which are planned activities in peace and wardirected to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviouraffecting the achievement of political and military objectives. The objective of ADF psychologicaloperations is to cause enemy, friendly and neutral personnel to act favourably toward Australia andits allies.

102. The psychological profile of a country’s population is an important element of nationalpower. When political or economic competition between nations develops into military conflict, allelements of national power may need to be applied to achieve a successful resolution. Thepsychological dimensions of a conflict could be as important to conflict resolution as the physicaldimensions.

103. The effects of psychological pressure can assist in securing national objectives. Coordinatedsocial, political, economic and military action should be applied in a controlled and coordinatedmanner to maximise the effectiveness of national policy.

104. Effective psychological operations can increase the destructive power of forces and reducethe need to apply combat force; they are therefore a force multiplier that can reduce casualties.The effectiveness of psychological operations is derived from being a component of a well-designedoperation; they are not a replacement for combat power but may be employed when the use ofcombat force is inappropriate. Psychological operations can be either cohesive (directed at friendlyor neutral target audiences) or divisive (directed at enemy audiences).

105. Psychological operations are a component of command and control warfare (C2W) and havethe potential to damage an enemy’s command and control system by lowering morale, instilling fearand breeding distrust. They may be directed toward enemy command and control systems, whendivisive themes are employed, or may be directed to protect friendly force command and controlsystems, when cohesive themes are pursued.

106. Psychological operations are applicable throughout the continuum of conflict and permitwell-prepared nations to reinforce themes, which may be conceived and even covertly pursued intimes of peace, with follow-on programs implemented during times of heightened tension orhostilities. The application of psychological operations should be assessed against target audiencevulnerability in terms of susceptibility, accessibility and viability. Failure to evaluate the targetaudience may render any plan unworkable.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

107. The principles of war guide the planning and conduct of all operations by the ADF. Whilethe weight given to a particular principle depends on the circumstances, psychological factors affecteach of the principles of war.

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

108. Psychological operations may support national and military objectives. In peace they mayfocus on economic or political objectives; in time of war they will generally focus on hostile militaryactivities, the enemy and allied force vulnerabilities. Psychological operations should always supportthemes designed to achieve the aim of operations.

Cooperation

109. All elements of military power should cooperate to ensure delivery of a consistentpsychological message.

ADFP 25

1-2



Concentration of Force

110. Psychological operations are part of the effort to concentrate all available force against theenemy. While the products of psychological operations are widely dispersed, their effortsconcentrate on the aim of inducing a behavioural change in a target audience. Themes and effortshould be consistent if maximum effect and credibility of psychological operations are to bemaintained.

Economy of Effort

111. Psychological operations can act as a force multiplier by:

a. contributing to C2W, in concert with operations security, deception, electronic warfareand destruction;

b. overcoming censorship, illiteracy and interrupted communications with targetaudiences;

c. providing reassurance and guidance to isolated or disorganised friendly targetaudiences; and

d. sustaining target audience morale in friendly military forces.

112. Psychological operations can increase the cumulative effect of successful combat operationsif they are correctly integrated into the campaign plan. The end result of these operations is lowerenemy morale than would have been achieved by the application of combat force alone.Psychological operations can simultaneously reinforce desirable behaviour in neutral or friendlyaudiences using complementary themes.

Security

113. Psychological operations support provided to a deception plan enhances the overall securityof the campaign plan. Psychological operations units and staff must abide by security proceduresset in place by the supported formation, otherwise longer term operational plans may bejeopardised. Psychological operations staff routinely develop awareness programs for supportedunits to reduce individual susceptibility to hostile propaganda and contribute to operations security.

Offensive Action

114. When applying psychological operations friendly forces take the battle to the enemy andattempt to influence enemy behaviour on the battlefield to the advantage of the ADF.

Surprise

115. The element of surprise can dislocate a force’s expectation of events and impose a state ofmental confusion within that force. Surprise and the consequent psychological effect favours theforce seizing the initiative. Psychological operations support to a deception plan can enhancesurprise by giving credence to feints and ruses.

Flexibility

116. The preparation of uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders enhances the flexibility ofan operation. Psychological operations staff must be prepared to modify their themes in the light ofunfavourable evaluation and changing strategic or operational circumstances.

Morale

117. Psychological operations can bolster friendly force morale while decreasing that of theenemy. Themes directed at enemy forces should be complemented by psychological themes aimedat friendly military audiences which emphasise the ascendancy of those forces and their cause overthe enemy.

ADFP 25

1-3



THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Coordination

118. Coordination of events ensures that psychological operations are coordinated with the focus,timing and intensity of operations. Compromise may be required in some circumstances, egoperational security concerns might outweigh the perceived benefit of psychological operations thatrely on the release of information detailing aspects of a commander’s future intentions.

Timeliness

119. Psychological operations activities must respond to rapidly changing strategic or operationalcircumstances. Responsive and effective psychological operations activity maximises thepsychological impact of enemy defeats or setbacks and can help to minimise the impact ofsetbacks to our own forces.

Credibility

120. The temptation to distort situations to maximise their effect must be avoided. Deceitful ployscan usually be identified by an enemy, and almost invariably by our own forces, and will destroycredibility and detract from friendly force activities.

Intelligence

121. Modification of a target audience’s behaviour requires a detailed understanding of theirreligious, cultural, economic, political, historical and current operational influences. Relevant andtimely intelligence is of fundamental importance to the initial design and subsequent modification ofpsychological operations. Psychological operations staff should receive constant and accuratefeedback on the results of psychological operations activities, including those themes and measuresbeing absorbed, ignored or countered by the enemy. This information can be obtained throughinterrogation of prisoners of war and other intelligence sources.

Evaluation

122. The effectiveness of psychological operations messages and themes must be verified byevaluation. This is achieved through pre-testing material using an audience, which preferablyincludes members of the target audience, and where possible, timely and periodic evaluation toassess the effectiveness of the delivered product.

CATEGORIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

123. Psychological operations may be categorised as:

a. psychological action,

b. strategic psychological operations,

c. operational psychological operations,

d. tactical psychological operations, or

e. psychological consolidation.

It should be noted that the categories of psychological operations can be complementary and occursimultaneously.

ADFP 25

1-4



Psychological Action

124. When international relations deteriorate and hostilities may occur between groups, activitiesmay be initiated by these groups as a means of demonstrating strength to potential enemies orstrong support for actual or potential allies. Such activities, planned to reduce an enemy’s prestigeand influence while at the same time increasing friendly influence and attitudes in potentially hostileor neutral countries, are referred to as psychological action.

125. Most peacetime activities conducted by the ADF with regional powers are designed to buildtrust and promote regional ties by encompassing aspects of diplomacy, marketing and defencecooperation. These activities are designed to reduce the potential for conflict and while they are nota deliberate attempt to conduct psychological action, they may have an inadvertent psychologicalimpact. Examples of such activities are:

a. combined exercises,

b. port calls and goodwill visits,

c. exchange and liaison postings,

d. consultations,

e. public information activities,

f. maintenance and demonstration of a technologically superior force structure, and

g. maintenance of highly trained and well organised armed forces.

Strategic Psychological Operations

126. These are actions which pursue long term, mainly political objectives and are designed toundermine a potential or actual enemy’s will to fight. Strategic psychological operations can bedirected against an enemy’s leadership (the dominant political group, government and its executiveagencies), towards the population as a whole or particular elements of the population. Objectiveswill be determined by Government in consultation with Defence and other national agencies andmay be applied as a means of conflict prevention or deterrence. Objectives may be designed to:

a. exploit audience setbacks,

b. weaken an audience’s faith in their ultimate chance of victory,

c. cast doubt on the legitimacy of aims,

d. foment distrust in leadership,

e. develop resistance to governmental ideologies within the population,

f. create resistance and disaffection within specific audiences, and

g. encourage resistance movements within enemy occupied areas.

Operational Level Psychological Operations

127. This level of operation is designed to bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forcesand civilians in areas where operations are planned or conducted. Objectives will be developed bythe operational level commander and should conform to strategic guidelines. Psychologicaloperations at the operational level aim to lower enemy morale and facilitate the successfulprosecution of operations within a theatre or area of operations.

ADFP 25

1-5



Tactical Psychological Operations

128. These actions bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians in supportof tactical military ground, air or sea operations. Tactical psychological operations may beconstrained by lack of staff and planning time. There may not be time to develop carefullyorchestrated and coordinated psychological operations for endorsement at the highest level as itmay reduce the effectiveness of activities planned and conducted at the tactical level.

Psychological Consolidation

129. Actions designed to foster the establishment or maintenance of order and security and gainthe support of a population in an area of operations, to advance political and military objectives, arereferred to as psychological consolidation. Military civic action is part of the consolidationundertaken to improve the standing of military forces by contributing to the economic and socialdevelopment of a population. The judgment and conduct of troops dealing with the civil populacewill be fundamental to achieving the desired level of cooperation from the population.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND OTHER SUPPORT PLANS

Deception

130. Psychological operations should be used to support deception plans by contributing toconditioning the enemy to the deception scenario. Coordination of psychological operations anddeception plans must be effected at all levels by operations staff.

Public Relations and Public Information

131. Maintenance of national strategic effort will be assisted by securing domestic support forADF operations and activities. The media is a major factor in influencing public perceptions.Maintenance of favourable relations and coordination with media will help to maintain consistencyamong public relations, public information and psychological operations. All published informationwill be accessible to the enemy, therefore, coordination and careful scrutiny of information must beundertaken before it is released for publication.

132. A requirement will exist to ensure continuity between public information plans aimed at local,national and international audiences. The use of centrally controlled mechanisms that mirrorarrangements used for dissemination of public information is essential to ensure full exploitation ofresources available within media organisations in a way that is secure and consistent. Informationexposed to or provided to the media must not contradict psychological operations products andthemes.

Operations Security

133. Formulation and implementation of a psychological operations plan should reflect operationssecurity requirements. If the real aim of the psychological operation is obvious to the enemy thenother operations planning may be compromised.

Military Civic Action

134. Military civic action encompasses use of elements of military forces on projects such aseducation, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health and sanitationdesigned to assist a civilian community. Noting that military civic action may often take place in theabsence of a psychological operations dimension, the principles of conducting military civic actionare that:

a. it may be an element of the psychological operations plan,

b. policy must be decided at the highest level,

ADFP 25

1-6



c. consultation and agreement with the local authorities must occur in the formulation ofplans,

d. maximum participation by the local population must be encouraged, and

e. maintenance of projects should be within the capacity of the local population.

135. While military civic action is of particular importance for operations outside mainlandAustralia and its territories, it can also assist in countering enemy propaganda within Australiaparticularly when used to support and maintain local infrastructure.

136. Military civic action may also be undertaken in cooperation with philanthropic organisationsand, in overseas deployments, the ADF might operate in support of accredited non-Governmentorganisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Any ADF operations insupport of such philanthropic or non-Government organisations should not compromise theprotected or neutral status of those organisations. Responsibility for the coordination of military civicaction with psychological consolidation rests with the operations staff.

DEFENCE AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY ANDDEFENCE FORCE AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

137. The skills required in psychological operations may be applicable in peacetime in support ofdefence aid to the civil community and defence force aid to the civil power. Appropriately trainedand equipped personnel can perform various tasks such as the broadcast of messages detailingthe location of health support services or feeding points in areas of natural disaster or messagesdesigned to maintain or restore public confidence in the civil authorities.

Psychological Operations in Modern Conflict

138. Psychological operations have occurred in all major conflicts in which Australian militaryforces have been involved. An analysis of psychological operations during the Gulf War is atAnnex A.

Annex: A. Psychological Operations in the Gulf War

ANNEX A TOADFP 25

CHAPTER 1



PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF WAR

COALITION PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. The objectives of Coalition forces psychological operations during the Gulf War were to:

a. gain acceptance and support for Coalition operations;

b. encourage Iraqi disaffection, alienation, defection and loss of confidence;

c. create doubt in Iraqi leadership;

d. encourage non-cooperation and resistance;

e. strengthen confidence and determination of friendly states to resist aggression; and

f. improve the deterrent value of Coalition forces.

Products Used

2. In supporting their objectives, Coalition psychological operations forces made extensive useof:

a. leaflets,

b. radio broadcasts, and

c. loudspeaker operations.

The Use of Leaflets

3. Leaflets were the most commonly used product, with some 29 million disseminated in theKuwait area of operations. Leaflets were delivered from a variety of platforms including C-130, A-6,F-16 and B-52 aircraft and artillery projectiles.

4. The initial themes of leaflets were peace and brotherhood. Increasing the intensity of thepsychological operations message as events evolved, leaflet themes changed to an emphasis onthe United Nations deadline. After the deadline passed and Operation DESERT STORM began,themes emphasising the abandonment of equipment and desertion were used. Leaflets were alsoused which informed specific Iraqi units that they were going to be bombed. A number of B-52strikes were thus advertised. Feedback from Iraqi prisoners of war validated the success of theseoperations.

Radio Broadcasts

5. `Voice of the Gulf’ was the Coalition’s radio network. From 19 January it broadcast from avariety of ground-based and airborne transmitters, 18 hours a day for 40 days. Radio scripts wereprepared daily and provided news, countered Iraqi propaganda and disinformation and encouragedIraqi defection and surrender.

1A-2



Loudspeaker Operations

6. Loudspeaker teams were used effectively throughout the theatre, with each manoeuvrebrigade making extensive use of attached loudspeaker teams. Surrender messages were preparedby cross cultural teams in Arabic and were broadcast in both Kuwait and Iraq.

7. The messages complemented those delivered by leaflets. Iraqi soldiers were encouraged tosurrender, were warned of impending air attacks and were told they would be treated humanelyand fairly. Many captured Iraqi soldiers mentioned hearing the broadcasts and had surrendered tothe Coalition forces because they feared further bombing.

Psychological Operations and Deception

8. As a result of the coordinated use of leaflets indicating likely Marine amphibious operationsand the use of airborne troops by Coalition forces, significant Iraqi combat power was spreadpiecemeal in an attempt to cover threats which were never planned to materialise. Numerous Iraqidivisions were deployed on the coastal approach to Iraq to await a Marine landing which did noteventuate and engineer battalions were tasked to emplace anti-airborne stakes in likely drop zonesthroughout the desert.

Validation of Psychological Operations

9. Operational analysis indicates that 99 per cent of Iraqi prisoners of war interviewed hadseen leaflets and 70 per cent stated that the leaflets influenced their decision to defect orsurrender. Surrendering and defecting soldiers invariably had leaflets in their possession, despiteIraqi Army standing orders that anyone in possession of a leaflet would be executed forthwith.

10. Interrogation of prisoners of war indicated that 80 per cent had heard `Voice of the Gulf´.The broadcasts were considered nearly as credible as those of the British Broadcasting Corporationand more credible than their own government`s radio broadcasts. The threat to Iraqi troop moralefrom `Voice of the Gulf´ was considered so serious that Iraqi commanders outlawed possession oftransistor radios by their soldiers. The fact that quantities of the radios were recovered from Iraqiprisoners of war indicates that the premium placed on accurate advice of the progress of the warby Iraqi soldiers was high. Disobedience of higher authority by possession of the radios providespositive evaluation of this particular psychological operations product.

11. Loudspeaker operations were successful in persuading and instructing thousands of Iraqitroops how to surrender. In one case an Iraqi battalion surrendered to a helicopter when theloudspeaker team broadcast that `death from above was imminent´. Coalition psychologicaloperations were effective to the extent that the Iraqis organised squads whose function was to huntand execute deserting, defecting and surrendering Iraqi soldiers.

IRAQI PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Cultural Misappreciation

12. The Iraqis did not appreciate their audience. The Iraqis destroyed their credibility when theybroadcast stories to Coalition troops which were offensive by nature of their moral imputations andwhich illustrated a minimal understanding of Western society.

Control of the Media

13. Saddam Hussein held absolute control over his own media. In seeking to repeat,deliberately or incidentally, the success of the North Vietnamese psychological operations campaignby driving a wedge between Coalition forces and the media, Hussein orchestrated what PeterArnett of Cable News Network observed in his reports from Iraq.

1A-3



Psychological Operations Success

14. Hussein used extensive psychological operations, including the application of combat powerin support of psychological operations. An example is the use of SCUD missiles, an inaccuratevehicle of little threat to manoeuvre units when carrying a conventional payload. His use of thesemissiles against Israel occasioned the redeployment of a significant number of theatre groundbased air defence assets to Israel and Saudi Arabia. The US public’s fear of high casualties andsubsequent redeployment of air defence assets proved that this campaign was a limited strategicsuccess for Iraq.

15. Strategically, however, Saddam failed because he did not draw Israel into the conflict. Thisaspect of his psychological operations campaign was directed against the Muslim member nationsof the Coalition. Participation with Israel in a war against a nation of fellow Muslims would createenormous pressures within the Coalition. This situation would have greatly improved Saddam’schances of victory, given that the withdrawal from the Coalition of even one wavering member waslikely to occasion similar action from fellow Muslim member nations.

Psychological Operations Failure

16. Saddam failed to appreciate the horror with which Western nations viewed the threatenedemployment of weapons of mass destruction. His threats to use such weapons served to hardenthe resolve of both Coalition troops and world opinion. The use of captured Coalition pilots to readobviously prepared ’atrocity statements’, regardless of their apparent physical appearance, alsoserved to alienate Saddam and the Iraqis from world opinion.

17. Saddam’s credibility was eroded, in the longer term, by the ’Baby Milk Factory’ episode.Some European peacemakers accepted the story at face value and retransmitted the Iraqi reportsas factual. In the shorter term, this represented success for Saddam; ultimately the implausibility ofthe factory sign, hurriedly manufactured in English for the benefit of Western audiences, wasappreciated. Iraqi credibility was damaged and was not restored by the time of the ceasefire.

CONCLUSION

18. The extensive use of psychological operations by opposing sides in the Gulf War isevidence of the continuing and growing relevance of psychological operations to conflict. Thesuccess each side achieved in psychological operations reflects the extent to which the principlesof psychological operations were adhered to, particularly coordination, credibility and evaluation.

19. The Coalition’s psychological operations campaign was well-orchestrated. The credibility ofthe campaign was maintained to the end, partly due to the Coalition’s ability to demonstrate theconsequences of not abiding by surrender requirements contained in leaflets and broadcasts. Thetarget analysis conducted by the Coalition was essentially accurate.

20. The Iraqi psychological operations campaign, while not without success, was dogged byrelatively poor target analysis and lacked credibility in the eyes of the less susceptible, non-Muslimmember nations of the Coalition. This flaw left the Iraqi psychological operations susceptible toCoalition counter-action. In addition, the continuing high morale of Coalition forces militated againstthe effectiveness of Iraqi psychological operations.

Source: 1. Conduct of the Gulf War: Final Report to Congress , April 1992



CHAPTER 2

THE ELEMENTS AND TECHNIQUES OFPSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

201. Psychological operations are designed to maintain or change human behaviour to contributeto national or allied objectives. To achieve this objective, psychological operations should be basedon a sound knowledge of individuals and groups to which they may belong.

202. The study, prediction and control of human behaviour is based on a number of scientificdisciplines including psychology, sociology and anthropology. Research findings, concepts andprocedures from these disciplines will facilitate planning, product development and the evaluation ofpsychological operations.

Psychology

203. Psychology has been defined as ’the scientific study of behaviour and mental processes’.This reflects psychology’s concern with an objective study of observable behaviour. It alsorecognises the importance of understanding mental processes that cannot be directly observed butwhich must be inferred from behavioural research.

204. A person’s actions can be explained from several different points of view as many differingapproaches to psychology are possible. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; rather, theytend to focus on different aspects of complex behaviours. Most psychologists take an eclecticviewpoint, using a combination of several approaches in explaining psychological phenomena. Thethree major approaches relevant to psychological operations are as follows:

a. All forms of behaviour by a person can be observed and measured using scientificprinciples. The behavioural approach studies what factors elicit behavioural change,and the rewards and punishments that maintain or modify these changes.

b. The cognitive approach argues that people are not passive receivers of messages;rather, the mind actively processes information and transforms it into new forms andcategories. Cognition refers to the mental processes of perception, memory andinformation processing whereby a person acquires knowledge, solves problems andplans for the future.

c. The phenomological approach focuses on a person’s subjective experience andtends to reject the notion that behaviour is primarily controlled by unconsciousimpulses or by external stimuli. Rather, people are the builders of their own livesbecause they can make choices and set goals to enhance their personal growth.

Behavioural Research Principles

205. Correct use of research methodologies will maximise the effectiveness of psychologicaloperations. Thorough research and understanding of psychological operations and their impact willpromote more predictable effects and allow more impact from these operations to be incorporatedinto the commander’s design for battle. The application of social science principles is ofteninstrumental in the development of effective products and actions for psychological operations.Similarly, the use of research methodologies are an essential element of the evaluation process forthese operations.

ADFP 25

2-2



BEHAVIOUR IN ACTION

The Individual

206. Organisations consist of a number of individuals. To achieve the aim, psychologicaloperations must be designed to effect either modification to or reinforcement of the attitude ofindividuals. Attitude has been defined as ’an enduring system of judgments, emotions and actiontendencies which predispose an individual to behave in certain ways to achieve particularobjectives or goals’. Attitudes are derived from one or more of the following elements:

a. An individual’s knowledge, perceptions and beliefs about him self are organised intoan internally consistent system, a cognitive consistency which the individual willsubconsciously strive to maintain. As a result many cognitive attitudes are stable andnew information which is contradictory tends to be rejected. Evidence which onlymarginally alters accepted beliefs is more likely to be accepted. Accordingly,psychological operations which seek to modify peripheral viewpoints have a fargreater chance of success than those directed at core attitudes.

b. Emotions are states of psychological arousal, socially acquired and reinforcedresponses which generate attitudes. Emotional responses act as safety valves topermit the expression of feelings. This process may be exploited by offeringalternative outlets for expression which promise similar or greater relief to anaudience.

c. Action tendencies are the behaviour patterns acquired in the course of a person’s lifewhich take the form of standard responses to key situations, objects andpropositions. Psychological operations can successfully redirect action tendencies,providing that the redirection is consistent with the emotional and cognitive attitudesof the audience.

Individual Needs

207. In addition to the attitudes adopted by an individual, he/she is also driven by the need tomeet purely individual needs. These range from simple physical requirements such as food, waterand shelter to complex psychological demands such as recognition and self-esteem. These needsare important to psychological operations as they are identifiable and the target audience can bereminded of them. At the same time, the target audience can be presented with solutions forsatisfying those needs in a manner consistent with the interests of the initiator’s objectives.

Physical and Psychological Conditions

208. External stimuli which bear directly on an individual’s value system or physical wellbeing areof particular significance to psychological operations where target audiences are exposed tounfamiliar or extreme situations. The impact of these situations can often produce temporaryemotional and behavioural responses which override pre-existing attitudes. These mood fluctuationscan be exploited by psychological operations and the preparation of friendly forces to withstandpsychological operations attack must seek to minimise these impacts.

Behaviour and Attitude Modification

209. Social acclimatisation, spontaneous information gathering and instinctive needs areessentially unplanned attitude forming processes. Psychological operations products aimed atbehaviour and, ultimately, attitude modification should:

a. introduce, at the cognitive level, new information designed to modify the individual’sview of his world;

b. where it is evident that the audience has been obliged to repress strongly heldfeelings, provide an apparently legitimate means of expression;

ADFP 25

2-3



c. use key communicators (persons of established or perceived influence and prestige)to influence an audience to embrace attitudes or behaviour patterns previouslyconsidered inappropriate; and

d. identify and highlight an unsatisfied audience need coupled with the offer of asolution which will support the psychological operation’s aim. In this instance theaudience will tend to justify its acceptance of the course of behaviour as a product ofnecessity.

Degrees of Attitude Change

210. The extent of attitudinal change through psychological operations or other actions will fallinto one of the following categories:

a. Compliance is the simplest and least enduring form of change. It results from aconscious decision by the target audience to accede to the demands of thepropagandist in response to threats or inducements. It is unlikely to survive theremoval of the threat or inducement and represents only a temporary and pragmaticchange of behaviour, with little if any change in attitude.

b. Identification is a more reliable form of attitude change and comes from theidentification of an audience with the opinions of a particular individual or group.Behaviour emulation is intrinsic to identification and the change is more enduringthan compliance. The duration of identification is dependent on continuing adherenceto the propagandist’s theme.

c. Internalisation occurs when the target audience accepts as its own the attitudes ofthe propagandist. The new attitudes may become as firmly entrenched as previouslyheld views. Internalisation can occur only when the proposed attitudes are compatiblewith existing target audience values.

Needs and Behaviour

211. Maslow’s theory of hierarchical needs (1970) illustrates how one major psychological theoryhas been utilised in developing potential psychological operations products. It must be noted thatMaslow’s theory is not definitive; rather, it serves as a medium within which to discuss humanbehaviour theory. The theory states that in addition to attitudes adopted in the course of thelearning process or by social acclimatisation, the individual is driven by the desire to satisfy purelyindividual needs. These range from the simple requirements of the body to complex psychologicaldemands and can be represented as a hierarchy, with the most fundamental and primitive needs atone end of the scale and the most complex and abstract at the other. This is represented atAnnex A.

212. The theory of motivation suggests that the individual is constantly striving to progressthrough the scale of satisfaction. As soon as one need has been satisfied, attention and effortswitches to the attainment of the next goal. Society or the individual can alter the relative positionsof elements within the hierarchy but the bottom level is almost universal in application. Theimportance of this theory to psychological operations is the link established between need,behaviour and satisfaction. If a need can be recognised and the target audience constantlyreminded of it, then the audience is highly likely to accept a proferred solution.

THE IMPACT OF THE GROUP

213. The behaviour and attitudes of a target audience are the product of those influences whichaffect individuals. Characteristics of the organisation and behaviour of groups apply to groups ofany size. The characteristics of groups must be understood in order to appreciate their influence onthe conduct of psychological operations. A highly motivated and well led group, bound by anaccepted set of norms and values, is bound by exceptionally strong forces. Within the group anindividual’s performance or behaviour is influenced by a number of dynamic and interactive systemsand processes such as groups, leaders, organisations and environment. This interplay of influenceson individual performance is depicted at figure 1.

ADFP 25

2-4



Figur e 1 - Influences on Individual Performance

214. Group dynamics, particularly in smaller groups, are influenced by such factors as spatialproximity, the capacity for intimate communication, the provision of paternal protectiveness byauthority figures and the gratification of certain personality needs. An example of gratification is thepresumed aura of self-sufficiency stemming from membership of a military organisation.Psychological operations must encompass potential target audiences within the categories of`leader’, `group’, òrganisation’ and ìndividuals’. This will ensure that intended target audiences areconsidered within a dynamic relational system.

In-groups and Out-groups

215. Membership of any particular group often implies rejection of one or more alternative groups.Psychologically, this rejection must be continually reinforced in the minds of the membership. Thisis achieved by identifying the chosen association as an ìn-group´ deserving of support andallegiance. Implicitly, members of òut-groups´ are treated with caution or even hostility. Theresultant polarisation can be exploited by psychological operations by either exacerbating thecurrent distinctions or by providing support to only one group at the expense of others.

Group Leadership

216. Internal leadership must be analysed by the psychological operations staff, with special effortdedicated to the identification of those individuals who most influence group attitudes and policies,some of whom may not appear in the context of a hierarchical (military) organisation. Theseindividuals will be prime targets as their removal from a position of influence leaves a void whichcan be exploited by psychological operations. Communications within groups should also beanalysed in order to target those points into which psychological operations messages can be mostreadily inserted for wide and influential distribution.

ADFP 25

2-5



Mass Action

217. Societal groups are targeted by psychological operations staff as part of long-term action tochange the balance of opinion within a society. Where a quick reaction is required, it is possible toprovoke a group into taking mass action in the form of demonstrations or riots. The possibleshort-term benefits of such a course may be offset by a number of disadvantages: unpredictabilityof group behaviour, bringing discredit upon the group arguments in the eyes of the uncommittedand the provocation of a counteraction by the authorities upon a group which may not survive sucha reaction.

COMMUNICATION

218. Psychological operations are effected through some means of communication, with the aimof conveying the required message to the target audience. The message, designed to accomplish aspecific objective through an identified target audience vulnerability, is transmitted via the selectedmedia to the target audience.

219. Messages should be simple, unambiguous and designed to reflect the language andsymbols of the target audience. An inappropriately presented message is likely to lose its meaningor reflect an unintended nuance. Once the message has been received the target audience mustbe kept under scrutiny to determine its effect.

Techniques

220. Successful communications in psychological operations stem from the use of proventechniques. Information on such techniques is at Annex B.

221. In order to be successful, propaganda should be:

a. based on information which is, to the audience, credible truth;

b. presented in a form which will attract and excite the audience;

c. designed to exploit psychological or physiological needs; and

d. suggestive of a course of action which seems to provide an effective method ofsatisfying those needs.

Evaluation

222. Testing products, both before and after dissemination, is an essential part of thepsychological operations process. A number of sampling techniques and statistical methods fromthe social sciences could be incorporated into the process as ongoing procedures to facilitate theevaluation process and allow modification as required.

223. Many other areas of the social sciences such as cross-cultural studies, consumerpsychology, political behaviour and religious behaviour provide information relevant to thedevelopment of psychological operations products and themes.

Annexes: A. Hierarchy of Needs

B. Techniques

ANNEX A TOADFP 25

CHAPTER 2



HIERARCHY OF NEEDS

Level Components Examples

Physiological Homeostatic Body maintenance - eating,drinking

Instinctive drives Reproduction

Primitive sensations Taste

Safety Security Self-defence

Stability Government

Freedom from fear and anxiety Law and order

Financial security

Belongingness Group membership Friendship

Love

Children

Home or community

Esteem Self-respect Success

Self-actualisation Fulfilment of potential Full use of faculties and talents

Cognition Thirst for knowledge EducationAccess to news

Aesthetics Art and beauty Artistic expression

ANNEX B TOADFP 25

CHAPTER 2



TECHNIQUES

1. Communication difficulties can be avoided when dealing with differing cultural traditions if thefollowing aspects are considered:

a. psychological operations staff must be fully briefed on the target audience, includingthe society to which the target audience belongs;

b. propaganda should be pre-tested on a representative audience prior to its release;and

c. the campaign must be monitored and apparent errors rectified.

The Target Audience

2. Each audience must be examined by a section of the psychological operations staff whoconcentrate on one ethno linguistic group. Specific target audience groups are analysed to identifytheir vulnerability and susceptibility and a prototype of each group is developed against which draftmaterials are evaluated.

The Themes

3. This represents the final link in propaganda development as it relates the audience’s needsto psychological operations objectives. Theme selection is based upon the psychological operationsestimate and a compromise between the aims of psychological operations and audiencesusceptibilities. The following three themes are considered to have wide applicability:

a. Members of the target audience are encouraged to identify with a group holding the’right’ attitudes and values (in-group); all other groups (out-groups) are characterisedas deserving of rejection.

b. The outcome of events is suggested to be inevitable. The audience is encouraged tomodify its behaviour to best accommodate future circumstances.

c. The policies of current or potential leaders are represented as being legitimate andacceptable to group interests.

The Means

4. In presenting the message to the target audience it is imperative that the broadest possiblerange of delivery means is considered. Means of delivery belong to one or more of the followingcategories:

a. psychological action (see chapter 1),

b. civil military action (see chapter 1), and

c. propaganda (see chapter 6).

2B-2



The Nature of Propaganda

5. Propaganda is the deliberate distribution of a message by any means of communication thatadvances the friendly cause or harms an enemy’s intentions. It consists of information, ideas orspecial appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of anyspecified group to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. Propaganda is classified in thefollowing manner:

a. black propaganda purports to originate from a source other than the true source,

b. grey propaganda does not specifically identify any source, and

c. white propaganda is disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or anaccredited agency.

6. Propaganda is most likely to be effective when based on information which appears to thetarget audience as credible and does not attack their core beliefs, when developed with anaccurate knowledge of the receptivity of the target audience or presented in a cultural form that willattract the interest of the target audience.

Truth and Credibility

7. A truthful and credible reputation must be established and maintained with the targetaudience. Credibility is the product of the audience’s reaction to the sponsor’s message in the lightof personal knowledge and experience. If factual information is used that contradicts the audience’sentire body of understanding and beliefs, it is unlikely that the information will be received ascredible.

Gaining Audience Attention

8. If influence is to be exerted over an audience their attention must be gained and held.Useful techniques to gain audience attention include the use of novel, dramatic or repetitive (butvaried) messages.

Techniques

9. Consideration of the attitude of the target audience and psychological operations objectivewill assist in deciding the style of argument used to present the message. Techniques available formessage presentation include the following:

a. Glittering generalities, traditional and nostalgic appeals capitalise on the audience’score attitudes. They seek to identify the message with cherished values such asfreedom or popular cultural or historical images.

b. Character assassination and guilt by association (the smear campaign) are directattacks on the character, credibility and motives of public figures, institutions orphilosophies. Attacks on core beliefs should be avoided.

c. Simplification and card-stacking relies on the presentation of material which supportsthe theme and the calculated exclusion of material which does not support thetheme.

d. The employment of humour is dependent upon an intimate and current knowledge ofthe cultural values of the target audience.

e. Testimonial endorsement of the message is provided by prestigious and influentialcommunicators.

f. Credibility is gained if information emanates from sources at target audience leveland is phrased in the vernacular of that audience. This is particularly relevant insocieties with marked class differentiation.

2B-3



Rumour

10. A rumour is an item of information, truthful or otherwise, which is communicated to anaudience and spreads spontaneously. To be acceptable it must be unconnected to its sponsor.Audience receptivity will be heightened by a shortage of timely and credible information and theexistence of a real and immediate interest or concern about the chosen subject matter. While auseful psychological operations weapon, the use of rumour is subject to the following dangers:

a. Progressive mutation may occur after release. A message is subject to the vagariesof human memory when retold; it may become distorted to the extent that it providesno benefit to the sponsor.

b. Attribution should be avoided. If a rumour is traced back to its originator, thecredibility of the information source will be seriously damaged.

c. Unintended effects may ensue; a rumour may generate an unintended effect on thetarget audience or spread to an unintended audience, including neutral or friendlyforces.

d. Rumours may linger indefinitely; at some future time they may embarrass thesponsor.

Key Symbols

11. These are a simple and effective means of transmitting an idea or emotion, particularly to anilliterate audience. They may be visual (Christian cross or red cross), audible (slogans,catchphrases or music) or behavioural (Hitler salute or handshaking).



CHAPTER 3

RESPONSIBILITIES

Australian Defence Force Command Centre

301. The ADFCC is the facility through which CDF commands, directs and controls ADFoperations. Accordingly, CDF is responsible for overall direction of psychological operations inaccordance with national objectives. Psychological operations support to the ADFCC is provided byDJOPS.

Operations Staff

302. Psychological operations are an operations staff function which relies upon effectiveinvolvement of all staff branches for successful planning, conduct and supporting activities.Operations staff are responsible for executing the psychological operations plan in concert with theoperation. They are also responsible for adjusting psychological operations plans due to changingcircumstances and for their coordination with phases of the operation. The senior operations officerat all levels of command is responsible for the execution and modification of the psychologicaloperations plan.

Psychological Operations Staff

303. Responsibilities of psychological operations staff are:

a. preparation of psychological operations estimates and development of resultantcollection plans;

b. advice to commanders on the psychological operations implications of militaryoperations and activities;

c. preparation and implementation of psychological operations plans;

d. evaluation of the effect of hostile propaganda on friendly forces; and

e. advice on counter-propaganda methods.

f. The above responsibilities are assumed by operations staff when psychologicaloperations staff are not raised.

Relationship with Other Staff

304. Psychological operations staff should develop a close working relationship with otherbranches within the headquarters. In particular, they should keep abreast of current operations andresponses to psychological operations collection requirements. Close relations should also bemaintained with public relations staff to ensure that public information activities support thepsychological operations plan.

Communications Staff

305. Access to secure communications at superior and subordinate echelons of command, lateralheadquarters and psychological operations agencies is vital to the timely dissemination ofpsychological operations products at all levels. Communications branch staff at all levels providethe necessary communications support.

ADFP 25

3-2



Psychologists

306. Specialists in the field of clinical psychology, whether Service officers or civilian experts,provide a valuable contribution to psychological operations. At the tactical level, in particular, thepsychologist is a flexible vehicle of scientific knowledge and skills and can provide much neededinput to the design and conduct of psychological operations. Psychologists are well placed toconduct job analyses for specialist psychological operations staff and to construct and administerappropriate selection measures for such staff.

307. An understanding of the way people behave and communicate and the factors whichinfluence behaviour is essential to the conduct of effective psychological operations. Trainedpsychologists can contribute to the preparation and conduct of training in these areas.Psychological validation procedures may be incorporated into psychological operations as a meansof monitoring and evaluating the impact of psychological operations products.

Intelligence Staff

308. Intelligence staff responsibilities relating to psychological operations are:

a. advice to commanders on related intelligence collection priorities;

b. tasking, or staffing requests for sources and agencies for the collection of informationand intelligence relating to current and future psychological operations;

c. processing and dissemination of related intelligence; and

d. provision of related intelligence support to superior and subordinate elements andother agencies as required.

NATIONAL LEVEL

Policy Determination

309. National psychological operations policy is conceived as an extension of peacetimediplomatic and security policies that Government pursues to fulfil national strategy. As the worldbecomes more interconnected by common economic activity and growth of global informationtransfer, influence by persuasion will be continuous. At the strategic level, psychological operationsfocus on achieving national exposure of agreed themes via appropriate media. CDF is responsiblefor the overall direction of psychological operations in accordance with national objectivesestablished by Cabinet. To this end, activities which support psychological operations objectiveswould normally be coordinated at all levels of Government, up to that of the Department of thePrime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). The process of determining and implementing nationalpsychological operations policy is illustrated at Annex A.

310. The effort of civilian agencies with psychological operations responsibilities should becoordinated during operations with military staffs. Such coordination is effected through theStrategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG). This responsibility may be delegated to a similargroup at assistant secretary level. SPCG composition and planning responsibilities are covered inADFP 9 - Joint Planning.

STRATEGIC LEVEL

311. At the strategic level psychological operations are the responsibility of ACOPS and areimplemented through Director Joint Operations (DJOPS) by the Staff Officer Grade Two CounterIntelligence (SO2 CI). During operational planning there should be close liaison and coordinationbetween ADF Command Centre (ADFCC), DIO (through the ADF Intelligence Centre), jointcommands and the single Services. Early and close liaison is vital to facilitate effective and timelypsychological operations support to the headquarters controlling the operation.

ADFP 25

3-3



312. DJOPS has responsibility for the central direction and coordination of all ADF psychologicaloperations processes, including:

a. providing psychological operations staff advice to HQADF policy formulationprocesses and contingency planning,

b. advising on development of ADF capabilities for the passage and processing ofpsychological operations data, and

c. advising on single Service psychological operations issues.

313. DJOPS is also responsible for policy guidance and the effective management of:

a. identification of strategic psychological operations requirements,

b. strategic psychological operations estimate preparation,

c. psychological operations staff tasking,

d. psychological operations evaluation, and

e. implementation of counter-action within ADF establishments in the Australian supportarea.

314. While established to fulfil the psychological operations requirements of their particularcommander, psychological operations elements remain under the technical control of DJOPS, whois empowered to ensure that ADF psychological operations are coordinated and conform to nationalpolicy.

Defence Intelligence Organisation

315. DIO has responsibility to monitor Australia’s strategic environment and provide the Minister,the Department and the ADF with timely warning of changes, particularly in respect of adversepsychological operations, security and defence-related situations or developments in theAsia/Pacific region. DIO’s psychological operations functions are to:

a. provide high quality information, such as the psychological operations capabilities ofother nations, and analytical support;

b. ensure that joint commanders have ready access to psychological operations dataand assessments relevant to their functions;

c. maintain close relationships with other Australian and allied psychological operationsagencies and to establish links with other foreign agencies; and

d. provide the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and other Governmentdepartments and instrumentalities with related information and assessments.

316. DIO and ONA provide strategic level support, including assessments of potential targetaudiences in the operational area. These assessments provide judgments on the broadinternational environment relevant to the formulation of psychological operations policy.Psychological operations capabilities and intentions of foreign powers whether they be hostile,neutral or friendly towards Australia are reflected in these estimates, as are broad political,economic and technological considerations.

317. Although DIO provides specific strategic assessments to satisfy the requirements of theDepartment of Defence and the ADF, some elements may be devolved to the joint commands.Within Australia, the production of estimates, basic intelligence collection and the planning andexecution of psychological actions directed at friendly forces and the local population may beallocated to joint commanders, Commander Joint Forces Australia (if appointed) or a joint forcecommander.

ADFP 25

3-4



318. In overseas deployments the commander of the deployed headquarters may be givenresponsibility for the operational level psychological operations estimate, using details provided byDIO and any other available sources. DIO consults ONA and ADF psychological operationselements, as appropriate, in the preparation of its estimates.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

General

319. The application of national psychological operations objectives at the operational level andcomplementary psychological operations objectives designed to support the aim of the commander,is effected as follows:

a. Specialist staff are responsible for the implementation of policy, planning and theorganisation of training. In times of large scale commitment of forces, it is likely thatspecialist staff will be augmented by the use of attached personnel with expertise inmatters relevant to the prosecution of psychological operations. This includes the useof single Service psychologists and external consultants from such fields as thebehavioural sciences, the media and the commercial advertising industry.

b. Specialist introductory training of nominated appointments at formation headquartersenables these staff to:

(1) advise the commander on psychological operations policy,

(2) advise the commander on the psychological implications of military operationsand activities,

(3) evaluate the impression made by hostile propaganda on friendly forces andadvise on propaganda methods,

(4) identify the intelligence required to support the planning and conduct ofpsychological operations, and

(5) assist the intelligence staff in identifying suitable sources of the informationfrom which this intelligence can be derived.

Intelligence Support

320. Effective psychological operations are dependent on timely, continuous, accurate anddetailed intelligence. A thorough knowledge and understanding of potential target audiences isessential if psychological operations are to be effective. Continuing research into the social andphysical geography of potential areas of operations, infrastructure and enemy armed forces isrequired to support psychological operations.

321. At the strategic level, DIO is responsible for this research. At the operational level, both atHQJFA (if raised) and at joint force headquarters (JFHQ), the joint intelligence centre wouldundertake specific support to psychological operations planning.

322. Psychological operations support to joint operations comprises all personnel, equipment andresources involved in the production and dissemination of psychological operations in support of theoperational commander. Support includes the staffs, agencies and resources in the joint commandsand any other JFHQ established. Inadvertent psychological impact may attend ADF participation insuch activities as short warning conflict, peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance andoffshore contingencies.

ADFP 25

3-5



Principles

323. The principles which guide psychological operations at the tactical level (seeparagraphs 118-22) are evident at the operational level. However, the increased complexity ofoperational level warfare necessitates consideration of the additional principles of:

a. development of a unified campaign supportive of national policy and the operationalcommander’s concept of operations,

b. interoperability and mutual support between all elements of the psychologicaloperations system, and

c. employment of automated data processing capabilities to support joint psychologicaloperations.

Tasks

324. Joint psychological operations tasks include:

a. collecting, producing and disseminating data necessary for the planning andexecution of operational missions;

b. advising JC on psychological operations priorities;

c. providing psychological operations support to subordinate elements of the joint force;and

d. undertaking psychological operations missions and tasks assigned by highercommand.

Joint Psychological Operations Staff Responsibilities

325. Responsibilities common to the joint psychological operations staffs include:

a. identification of related intelligence requirements;

b. maintenance of relevant databases;

c. coordination with other commands for the ready flow of relevant information;

d. system development and psychological operations training;

e. representation at relevant international exchanges and within Service-to-Service links;and

f. representation in ADF psychological operations planning, production anddissemination processes.

Staff Relationships

326. To be effective, the joint psychological operations staff must be an integral part of theoperations branch. In addition, the majority of agencies on which the psychological operations staffrely for information, product dissemination and monitoring is often tasked by other elements within ajoint headquarters.

ADFP 25

3-6



Maritime Headquarters

327. Psychological operations is the responsibility of the Chief Staff Officer Command, Control,Communications and Intelligence, who is responsible to Maritime Commander Australia (MCAUST)for:

a. developing, coordinating and implementing maritime psychological operations policy;and

b. managing all maritime psychological operations assets.

Chief Staff Officer Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence also provides psychologicaloperations policy advice to Chief of Naval Staff (CNS).

Land Headquarters

328. Psychological operations support to nominated JFHQ is the responsibility of Colonel(Operations). This is implemented through Intelligence Branch, which provides psychologicaloperations support to Land Commander Australia (LCAUST) for the conduct of land operations.Branch tasks are dependent upon the nature of Army support to, or involvement in, ADFoperations. The responsibility to maintain accurate psychological operations databases is anongoing one, as is the need to disseminate relevant products to higher and lateral headquartersand to formations commanded by LCAUST. Specific tasks include:

a. formulating psychological operations requirements for the planning and direction ofjoint and combined operations;

b. developing operational level psychological operations products, eg psychologicaloperations supporting plans to Australian Joint Service Plans;

c. providing direct, relevant and timely psychological operations support to LandCommand elements and the command structure of the ADF, including operationallevel psychological operations estimates;

d. liaison with HQADF (via the ADF Intelligence Centre), Maritime Headquarters (MHQ),Air Headquarters (AHQ), deployable joint force headquarters, Headquarters Northern(HQNORCOM), subordinate psychological operations staffs and units and otheragencies on psychological operations matters;

e. providing advice and assessments to LCAUST on the psychological operations threatto ADF personnel deployed on peacekeeping and defence cooperation tasks;

f. coordinating the collection of psychological operations related intelligence in LandHeadquarters (LHQ)-led joint and combined operations; and

g. exploitation of captured personnel in the monitoring of psychological operationsprograms with the staff of other LHQ branches.

Air Headquarters

329. Responsibility for support to psychological operations rests with Chief of Operations and isimplemented through the Senior Operations Officer. AHQ Air Intelligence Centre is responsible, incoordination with DIO, for the collection, analysis and direct dissemination of intelligence tooperational elements of the RAAF. This includes advice on psychological operations counter-action.

ADFP 25

3-7



Headquarters 1 Division

330. Within HQ 1 Div, psychological operations are the responsibility of Staff Officer Grade One(SO1) (Operations). In formulating psychological operations support requirements and planningpsychological operations, CJFA/LJC may draw upon basic psychological operations studiesproduced by 1 Reconnaissance Intelligence Surveillance and Target Acquisition Unit (1 RISTA), aunit of 1 Division which includes psychological operations specialist staff.

Headquarters Northern Command

331. Control and coordination of psychological operations resources are the responsibility of theCommander Northern Command (COMNORCOM), through Staff Officer Grade One (SO1) JointOperations. SO1 Joint Operations is assisted in the design and monitoring of psychologicaloperations by the Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC), whose tasks include:

a. preparation of psychological operations estimates for operations within the NorthernCommand area of operations;

b. participation in planning joint psychological operations intelligence collection;

c. reviewing and updating the HQNORCOM basic psychological operations intelligencerequirements;

d. liaison with DIO, JIC, subordinate psychological operations staffs and units, and otherpsychological operations agencies; and

e. provision of specialist psychological operations advice to special-to-task groups.

COMBINED OPERATIONS

General

332. The nature of combined operations necessitates flexibility and foresight in the provision ofpsychological operations support. ADF psychological operations doctrine must be compatible withthat of our major allies. However, each allied nation involved in the operation will normally operateseparate psychological operations systems, which comply with their own national laws, in support oftheir own national policies and deployed military forces. The integration of separate psychologicaloperations into a combined system may present difficulties. Additionally, combined operations mayinvolve nations outside normal alliance agreements and any operational and procedural differencesmay be compounded by language and cultural differences.

333. During combined operations, psychological operations objectives must be multilaterallyagreed and liaison initiated at the highest levels to ensure that operations are coordinated. Theformation of a combined psychological operations centre at the operational level, the deployment ofliaison officers to allied headquarters and the establishment of a psychological operations networkcomplete with secure communications will assist this coordination. The combined psychologicaloperations staff should plan the deployment of assets to support the commander’s mission.

334. National considerations affecting the conduct of psychological operations should be reflectedin any written directives. There may be instances where the interests of an ally must besubordinated to Australian national objectives as reflected in psychological operations objectives.

Special Considerations

335. The principles of combined psychological operations are similar to those for jointpsychological operations. However, the involvement of allied nations requires the consideration ofadditional factors necessary to achieve an effective and coordinated effort. The diverse nature ofallied forces and their operational doctrine and national interests create challenges to a combinedeffort.

ADFP 25

3-8



336. Responsibilities for the prosecution of psychological operations must be agreed by allnations contributing to the headquarters staff, or with psychological operations responsibilities,largely in accord with procedures employed by the lead combined operations staff. Considerationswhich might ease integration of psychological operations efforts are:

a. development of a combined psychological operations system acceptable to all alliednations;

b. establishment of clearly defined channels for the flow of information;

c. establishment of agreed standard operating procedures for combined psychologicaloperations;

d. development of a secure, reliable and dedicated communications system;

e. establishment of liaison between allied psychological operations units;

f. establishment of a common data base with agreed formats and reports; and

g. interoperability of systems.

Command and Control

337. A combined forces commander is appointed from either the nation with jurisdiction over theterritory under threat or the nation providing the preponderance of forces. In either case, theorganisation of the combined psychological operations centre will be dictated by the nature of thesupported force and the theatre of operations. Combined psychological operations staff shoulddevelop a system which provides for the input of multinational all-source information, its subsequentconversion to psychological operations products and dissemination.

338. There may be difficulties with releasing highly classified, compartmented intelligenceessential for the evaluation of psychological operations. For this reason, essential elements offriendly information must be determined well in advance for the timely development of sanitisingand release guidelines. A combined psychological operations centre should have tasking authorityover all psychological operations agencies deployed to support the operation.

SINGLE SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES

Army

339. Army is responsible for:

a. development and provision of Army doctrine, training publications and minorspecialist equipment including broadcast equipment;

b. provision of Army aircraft placed in support of operational or tactical levelcommanders;

c. sponsorship of specialist psychological operations units and staffs; and

d. provision of training support to the other Services.

Director-General Army Operational Support is responsible to the Deputy Chief of the General Stafffor implementing counter-action within Army establishments in the Australian support area.

RAN

340. Navy is responsible for the provision of naval support to psychological operations.Director-General Naval Policy and Warfare is responsible to the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff forimplementing counter-action within RAN shore establishments in the Australian support area.

ADFP 25

3-9



RAAF

341. RAAF is responsible for the provision of air support to psychological operations.Director-General Support Services - Air Force is responsible to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff forimplementing counter-action within RAAF establishments in the Australian support area.

Annex: A. Determination and Implementation of Psychological Operations Policy

ANNEX A TOADFP 25

CHAPTER 3



DETERMINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS POLICY



CHAPTER 4

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PROCESS

401. The execution of psychological operations, a component of command and control warfare,consists of six stages:

a. initial research and intelligence,

b. direction,

c. collection,

d. target analysis,

e. formulation of the psychological operations plan, and

f. implementation.

402. The stages are not discrete, neither are they finite; throughout the psychological operationsprocess, intelligence is reviewed and compared to initial estimates. Collection of informationcontinues throughout the process. The campaign evaluation, part of the implementation stage, mayinitiate a re-assessment of the initial target analysis.

403. Psychological operations are a cyclic activity, with evaluation and feedback from intelligenceleading to adjustments to activities and new approaches. Even when military operations arecompleted there is a need to sustain psychological operations against the possibility of theresumption of operations by the enemy. The psychological operations process is depicted atAnnex A.

INITIAL RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

404. Intelligence provides the basis for planning psychological operations campaigns directed at aspecific target audience. The required approach and associated themes are deduced from the basicpsychological operations study. Current intelligence on the target audience is required to determinethe effect of the commander’s concept of operations and psychological operations upon the targetaudience. Modifications may be required to material to attain psychological operations objectives.

Direction

405. The commander’s concept sets the framework within which supporting psychologicaloperations plan must fit. The psychological operations estimate supports the commander’s aim andreinforces adherence to national objectives in the form of guidance, directives and operationinstructions. In identifying the target audience, the psychological operations estimate provides afocus.

COLLECTION

406. The collection stage follows initial research. Collection aims to validate the premises uponwhich the commander’s concept was based, in particular the current attitudes and behaviour of thetarget audience. Revalidation of assumptions is a continuing requirement as the environmentaffecting the target audience, and their resultant attitude, is not static. Psychological operations staffmust be aware of those attitudinal variations. Moreover they must incorporate the effects of thesechanges into current and future psychological operations so that they remain relevant, credible tothe audience and, therefore, effective.

ADFP 25

4-2



TARGET ANALYSIS

407. Target analysis is explained in some detail at paragraph 511. The aim of target analysis isto ensure that appropriate messages reach the target audience to induce attitudinal changesrequired to achieve the psychological operations objectives.

FORMULATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN

408. Tasks required to achieve the necessary attitudinal changes in a target audience and theresources required to accomplish those tasks are identified in the psychological operations plan.The plan must be flexible and readily modified if the results appear ineffective. Commandersconducting psychological operations should establish an advisory group incorporating membersfrom:

a. operations staff;

b. intelligence staff;

c. public relations specialists;

d. psychological operations specialists (including psychology staff);

e. political and civic representatives, where appropriate; and

f. legal staff.

409. The psychological operations advisory group, under the lead of the operations staff, isresponsible for ensuring that:

a. psychological factors are considered during planning,

b. the commander is advised of options, and

c. policy and guidance is produced.

IMPLEMENTATION

410. The final stage of the psychological operations process is the production of material, itsdissemination and evaluation of the product and the campaign.

Production and Dissemination

411. Propaganda material is prepared based upon the themes, symbols and media selected forthe target audience (from target analysis). The first draft of material should always be tested togauge its effectiveness. This eliminates errors in analysis and interpretation, weaknesses in theconcept behind the propaganda or any misappreciation of recent changes in the situation of thetarget audience; all these factors may render psychological operations ineffective. Testing may takeone of three principal forms:

a. Survey sampling gauges the reaction of a sample of the target audience byquestionnaire or personal interview. This is the most reliable method.

b. If the target audience cannot be accessed, it may be possible to test using a panel ofrefugees, defectors or other representatives.

c. As a last resort, a panel of experts, individuals with knowledge of the targetaudience, may be used for testing. This method is not as reliable as other methods,but may reveal inconsistencies or nuances overlooked by originators.

ADFP 25

4-3



412. Psychological operations staff carefully monitor propaganda production to ensure that thefinished product retains all original meaning of the draft. The finalised product may then bedistributed in accordance with the psychological operations plan, using any of the media describedat Annex B.

Evaluation

413. All plans implemented must be subject to continuous evaluation after product dissemination(referred to as post-testing) to appraise the credibility, reliability, relevance, accuracy andeffectiveness of the plan. Where weaknesses in the plan are revealed, the relevant sections shouldbe reviewed and adjusted.

Annexes: A. The Psychological Operations Process

B. Psychological Operations Media

ANNEX A TOADFP 25

CHAPTER 4



THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PROCESS

ANNEX B TOADFP 25

CHAPTER 4



PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS MEDIA

Serial Media Production Considerations Delivery Considerations

1. Leaflets Relatively simple and quick toproduce at all levels.

Can be delivered by:

1. hand,

2. airdrop,

3. balloon drop, or

4. artillery shell.

Choice of means determined by:

1. tactical situation,

2. air defence threat, and

3. counter-battery threat.

2. Posters As above. Primarily delivered by hand.

3. Audio Messages Successful production requires: Delivered by:

1. recording facilities, and 1. ground-mountedspeakers, and

2. a speaker fluent in targetaudience dialect/language. 2. aircraft speakers.

Use can be made of existing Effectiveness of meansfacilities or new facilities can be determined by:provided.

1. tactical situation,

2. weather, and

3. air defence threat.

4. Radio Broadcast As for Serial 3. Radio transmissions can bevectored or the power varied inorder to minimise the risk ofinterception by hostile elementsor an unintentional audience.Transmitters can be locatedinside or outside the area ofoperations.

5. Audiovisual An expensive and time- Delivery affected by:messages: consuming process. Usually

only conducted at strategic and 1. broadcast facilities, and1. film possibly operational levels.

2. videotapes, 2. ownership of receivingand equipment (eg television

sets).3. television



CHAPTER 5

STAFFING PROCESS

Introduction

501. Psychological operations must be planned and coordinated at the highest level. Failure todirect psychological operations efforts toward achievement of a defined national aim will result atbest in failure to achieve the psychological operations aim and, at worst, in the sending ofmisleading signals to the adversary, particularly at a time when diplomatic initiatives might haveavoided a military commitment. Such considerations must guide the design and application ofpsychological operations at both the strategic and operational levels.

The Commander’s Concept

502. Following the conduct of an appreciation, the commander’s concept is produced. Theconcept may reflect a significant reliance on the success of activities designed to achieve adebilitating reduction in the enemy’s morale. In the first instance this may be sought byoverwhelming relative strength and surprise, but these measures should be reinforced bypsychological operations activities designed to ensure effects are sustained and the perception ofinevitable loss is maintained in the enemy’s mind.

503. Psychological operations activities and their intended results will appear in the concept,along with the relative emphasis and priority accorded them by the commander. Psychologicaloperations objectives are not usually stated in the concept, but may be stated in the form of awritten psychological operations directive. In this case, the psychological operations plan will bebased on both documents.

Initial Research and Intelligence

504. A thorough knowledge and understanding of the target audience is essential if psychologicaloperations are to be effective. This requires continuing research of the sociology, demography,culture, economic circumstances, human and physical geography, infrastructure and political andmilitary hierarchy of the target audience. At the strategic level this task is conducted by the DefenceIntelligence Organisation (DIO). At the operational level, the psychological operations staff at thejoint/joint force headquarters use information from their own sources to supplement intelligenceprovided by DIO.

Basic Psychological Operations Study

505. A basic psychological operations study provides information for staff to familiarisethemselves with the characteristics of the enemy society and to identify possible target audiences.The basic psychological operations study incorporates biographical, political, demographic, cultural,infrastructure and sociological intelligence and should be comprehensive. A suggested format for abasic psychological operations study is at Annex A.

506. Production of the basic psychological operations study is a DIO responsibility. Integrationagreements between DIO and the joint commands for intelligence production may, however,devolve this responsibility. Joint/joint force headquarters, for example, may be tasked with theproduction of regional basic psychological operations studies. If a study is not readily available,psychological operations staff will commence assembling a study from other material. Countrystudies provide a good starting point for the collection of psychological operations intelligence, but awide variety of sources, beyond those used for the production of operational intelligence, arerequired to identify the cultural subtleties and tensions that provide themes for successfulpsychological operations.

ADFP 25

5-2



Psychological Operations Estimate

507. The psychological aim required to support the commander’s concept of operations must beidentified. The aim focuses the psychological operations estimate, which identifies the psychologicaloperations mission. The estimate identifies tasks to support the commander’s concept of operationsand the order in which they should be accomplished. It contains all known political, military, socialand economic factors relevant to a specific situation. The psychological operations estimate shouldalso address:

a. enemy counter psychological operations capabilities,

b. their likely effectiveness, and

c. how they might be overcome.

A suggested format for the estimate and guidance on the contents is at Annex B.

508. The estimate defines the target audiences, the psychological operations objectives to beachieved with each target audience and initial components of the psychological operations effort.Any assumptions used in the absence of intelligence should be checked against firm intelligence assoon as possible. The estimate must be constantly reviewed in the light of ongoing changes in theconditions and attitudes of the target audience and the general military situation. Such changesmay require a new psychological aim, mission or tasks.

Associated Intelligence Collection Planning

509. Notwithstanding the availability of a basic psychological operations study, there remains theneed for current intelligence concerning: changes in the social and material conditions of the targetaudience, shifts in popular attitudes resulting from political and military events, indications of thereceptivity of the target audience and the effectiveness of various psychological operationsmeasures. The intelligence community collects such information from:

a. prisoners of war and defectors,

b. refugees and civil administrators,

c. civil and paramilitary police,

d. newspapers and magazines,

e. research reports, studies and academic journals,

f. foreign media broadcasts,

g. intelligence studies by allied intelligence staffs and agencies,

h. captured documents, and

i. agents.

Monitoring Effectiveness

510. Following promulgation of the commander’s concept of operations the effect on the targetaudience must be determined, especially with reference to current attitudes and behaviour. Theconstant input of intelligence supporting psychological operations throughout the planning andimplementation stages is necessary to ensure timely and appropriate effort. Interrogators may bespecifically tasked with exploiting sources in search of information to support the conduct ofpsychological operations.

ADFP 25

5-3



Target Analysis

511. Each target audience must be examined in relation to the appropriate task to discern:

a. target audience attitudes as they relate to the mission;

b. the desired target audience response in support of the psychological objective, whichflows from the psychological operations estimate;

c. lines of persuasion for each psychological objective;

d. themes and symbols to express the lines of persuasion;

e. media suitable to approach the target audience; and

f. the intensity and timing of the campaign.

The staff tools used in target analysis are described in ADFP 19 - Intelligence.

Analysis of the Audience

512. Audience analysis establishes the target audience and route of the message, as well asindicating other groups which may have been exposed to it in the process of transmission.Audiences may be categorised as follows:

a. The apparent audience is the obvious and immediate target of the message. It maybe the only recipient.

b. The intermediate audience becomes involved when the recipient is employed only asa link in the communication process.

c. The unintended audience consists of social groups which may overhear the messageenroute to its target. As the message has not been tailored to their attitudes andvalues it may generate an adverse reaction.

d. The ultimate audience is the intended target of appeal; if the material has hadsignificant impact then this group will need to be the subject of counteraction by theenemy.

The Psychological Operations Plan and Orders or Instructions

513. Following close consultation between the operations and psychological operations staff,direction on the purpose and form of the psychological operations effort is given in the form of awritten psychological operations directive or as a section of the commander’s concept of operations.In either case, a psychological operations plan and associated orders or instructions willsubsequently be produced, either as a discrete document or as an annex to the operation order(see Annex C).

Annexes: A. Suggested Format of a Basic Psychological Operations Study

B. Suggested Format and Contents of a Psychological Operations Estimate

C. Example of a Psychological Operations Annex to an Operation Order

ANNEX A TOADFP 25

CHAPTER 5



SUGGESTED FORMAT OF A BASIC PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS STUDY (1)

PART 1 - THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Introductory Description

1. This provides a brief survey of the target area to enable an overall understanding of itsprimary physical characteristics. It contains the following:

a. physical geography, which includes major features of the target area, with emphasison any identifiable geographic regions within which elements of the population maybe susceptible to separatism, demography, ethnicity, religion, tribalism, culture orhuman geography;

b. climate variations which may contribute to lifestyle or cultural differences; and

c. natural resources, their socio-economic importance and any other relevant factors.

History

2. This is a selective description of the target society’s historical growth, especially thoseaspects with a continuing influence, including:

a. a general outline dealing in detail only with events, personalities or periods remainingwithin the public consciousness;

b. social history, including social groups and migration patterns; and

c. political development, including the influence on the current political structure oftraditional forms of rule.

Society and Culture

3. This provides discussion of the component social groups of the target society, includingcommentary on the values and expression forms which separate groups, or which identify one withanother. The following aspects are considered:

a. population distribution, including pattern of settlement and major population centres;

b. ethnic and racial groupings which perceive themselves as discrete from theremainder of the population;

c. languages and literacy within each group;

d. class structure, including socio-economic classes and their correlation with racial orethnic groups;

e. moral and ethical values which have a significant effect on social behaviour;

f. legal norms which have a significant effect on social behaviour;

g. customs, folklore and traditional behaviour patterns;

h. artistic expression, including forms and symbols of particular emotional significance;

5A-2



i. religious beliefs and their influence on the population; and

j. family structure, including importance of the family group to the individual and itsrelationship with larger social organisations.

The Economy

4. This study summarises the economic organisation and activities of the target population andidentifies areas of stress and resentment resulting from inequities in the distribution of wealth or thecontrol of economic power. The contents are:

a. general outline of significant industrial, agricultural and commercial economic activity;

b. distribution of wealth and land, including ownership of industrial resources and theland tenure system, including popular attitudes towards current forms of economicorganisation;

c. intent and effect of taxation policy of government or other agencies or groups, suchas guerillas or occupying forces, who impose taxes on a subjected population;

d. distribution of work within a society with emphasis on the relationship betweenmembership of social groups and employment prospects; and

e. labour relations, as reflected in membership, philosophy and effectiveness ofemployee organisations, including the incidence of labour unrest.

Science and Technology

5. The assessment of the impact of science and technology upon the society includes:

a. indigenous scientific resources, including the educational and technical facilities tomeet local needs;

b. imported science and technology, including the extent of dependence upon importedassistance and exerted donor influence;

c. the scientific community, including membership and influence of the technical elite;and

d. social impact, including popular attitudes towards the changes promoted by scientificdevelopment.

Social Conditions

6. This section describes the living conditions of the populace, noting perceived deficiencies,and including:

a. nutrition, including the availability, cost and quality of food;

b. health, availability of medical treatment, endemic diseases and mortality rates;

c. housing supply and ownership;

d. adequacy of public services such as transport, water supply, sewerage, drainage androads;

e. education resources and accessibility;

5A-3



f. extent, administrative efficiency and adequacy of welfare programs; and

g. extent, nature and control of distribution of foreign aid and the attitudes of recipientstowards donors.

PART 2 - POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Government and Politics

7. An analysis of the distribution of power within society describes the formal apparatus of bothgovernment and power centres external to the constitutional structure. An assessment is also madeof popular attitudes towards the political system and leadership, including:

a. the constitution and institution as the overt framework of the government and law,including the constitutionally appointed organisations through which power isexercised;

b. political parties, including their philosophies, aims and support bases;

c. interest groups and other power centres, in particular membership, alignment andinfluence of organisations outside the spectrum of government and recognisedpolitical parties;

d. distribution of power and the decision making process, including relative importanceof groups discussed and their influence upon the formulation of government policy;

e. administrative machinery, in terms of efficiency, membership and influence of thepublic service; and

f. popular attitudes towards political life as reflected in the degree of involvement of thepopulace in political organisations.

Foreign Relations

8. This section covers the formal and informal relationships existing between the target societyand those of other nations, in particular the degree of influence achieved by each party in theprocess of communication. These relationships include:

a. the strategic situation, including a short resume describing the major factorsgoverning a nation’s foreign policy;

b. formal alliances and the effects upon domestic opinion of bilateral treaties andmembership of multinational bodies;

c. traditional relationships and established popular feelings of friendship or hostilitytowards other nations; and

d. non-governmental relations as reflected in communication patterns, support orinfluence among social and political groups within the target area and similar groupsor governments without.

5A-4



Security Forces

9. This section examines the police and armed forces, including the social and politicalaffinities of their members and the degree of political influence exercised by them overGovernment. This section also considers the psychological operations capabilities andachievements of the armed forces in reference to their own personnel and society as a whole.Additionally, the susceptibility of police and servicemen to psychological operations is assessed,along with the approaches and media to which they are most receptive. There may be more thanone set of forces: enemy and Government forces supported by the ADF; ADF allies and the enemyor, in peacekeeping, forces of each of the protagonists. The assessment includes:

a. establishment and order of battle, including outline organisation, strength, equipmentand deployment;

b. recruitment of regular, conscript and reserve personnel, together with the quality andtype of training they receive;

c. component elements within specific social groups;

d. leadership, including quality and social identity of officers and senior ranks;

e. internal cohesion, including stress between ranks and branches of the Service,disciplinary arrangements, welfare and morale;

f. foreign and military alliances, specifically sources of aid, and resultant influences andidentification with allied armed Services;

g. political orientation, including degree of involvement and influence in governmentalorder exerted by the armed Services;

h. internal propaganda and indoctrination, including extent and duration of programs andthe degree of success achieved;

i. access and receptivity of personnel to external media; and

j. psychological operations units, equipment, manpower and techniques, the mediaemployed and the means of delivery.

PART 3 - COMMUNICATIONS

Facilities and Flow

10. This section outlines the availability of media, its audience and the degree of acceptance.Governmental arrangements to control domestic and externally sourced information are explained,as well as the extent of interpersonal and informal communications within various social groups,including:

a. press and broadcasting facilities, ownership and political orientation;

b. mass media audience access, including ownership of television and radio sets,consumption of newspapers, perceptions of the truth and the credibility of availablepress and broadcasting output;

c. availability of foreign information penetration, including available sources and contentof the material and audience receptivity; and

d. informal communications by interpersonal communication and social interaction,within and between groups.

5A-5



Government Information Services

11. The organisation, authorship, themes and techniques employed, target audiences and effectof government information services are considered as follows:

a. organisation and control, size and structure, responsible department and key policymakers;

b. aims and themes of editorial policy, research facilities and prominent propagandists;

c. media available to Government and the philosophy governing their selection;

d. form, purpose and effectiveness of external output; and

e. overall effectiveness of the program, key themes to be countered and exploitableweaknesses.

PART 4 - POTENTIAL TARGET AUDIENCES

12. From the evidence deduced from Parts 1 to 3, tentative identification may be made of:

a. groups within the target society which may be potential target audiences due to theirsusceptibility or influence over society;

b. group attitudes which reveal conditions and attitudes of the selected groups;

c. key communicators who would be suitable channels for the transmission ofmessages due to community respect for their views;

d. media, including the means of communication which are available and esteemed bythe audience; and

e. themes and symbols likely to support psychological operations.

PART 5 - BIBLIOGRAPHY

13. This section provides a list of source material, including a commentary indicating particularsubject areas and the political or other bias of authors.

Note:

1. This annex provides a format, with brief explanatory notes, suitable as a basis for acomprehensive basic psychological operations study. Not all points covered will be relevantin every case and the annex is not exhaustive.

ANNEX B TOADFP 25

CHAPTER 5



SUGGESTED FORMAT AND CONTENTS OF A PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS ESTIMATE

Commander’s Concept of Operations

1. The estimate commences with a statement of the commander’s concept of operations. Themission must be borne in mind constantly by psychological operations staff. Operational milestonesmust be specified in space and time.

Psychological Operations Capabilities

2. Consideration of own psychological operations capabilities should include:

a. psychological operations resource availability, including:

(1) manpower (having expertise such as linguistic capabilities or media training);

(2) equipment; and

(3) available external sources of manpower and equipment (government agenciesand commercial resources);

b. media access to potential target audiences;

c. any restrictions imposed by higher authority (themes to be avoided or targetaudiences to be excluded); and

d. time available to prepare and mount psychological operations.

3. The conclusions drawn from the above considerations indicate the possible size and scopeof the psychological operations effort.

Current Attitudes

4. This section determines the current attitudes of each target audience identified in the basicpsychological operations study and relates them to the commander’s concept of operations.Elements that influence the attitudes and behaviour of a group’s members, but over which theyhave little or no control, are referred to as conditions. Examples of such conditions are constantbombardment of a unit and inefficiency on the part of unit officers.

5. By listing the conditions that relate to the commander’s concept of operations, the analysthighlights those factors influencing, or even creating, target audience attitudes that also relate tothe commander’s mission. This process readily identifies relevant attitudes in the next step of theestimate (see paragraph 7). Conditions must be considered from the perspective of the targetaudience but not that of the analyst, for it is the target audience whose attitudes and behaviourrequire modification.

6. It may be helpful to organise the conditions under environmental headings. For example, inconsidering the civilian population, in the context of internal security, appropriate headings mightbe:

a. political,

b. economic,

c. social,

d. security forces’ activities, and

e. insurgents’ activities.

5B-2



7. The next step is assessment of the target audience’s attitudes to the conditions and theintensity with which they are held. Only attitudes relating to the operational concept are considered.The analyst starts with the concrete and obvious (conditions) and from these deduces the abstract(attitudes). Some target audience attitudes relating to the commander’s concept of operations mayresult from culture rather than from immediate conditions. These must be considered as they maymodify or override the attitudes to the conditions. An example is the role of Japanese troops’ beliefin `bushido´ in overcoming the harshness of local conditions as the troops continued to fight.

8. The final step in this section of the appreciation is to determine whether identified attitudesare favourable or unfavourable to the accomplishment of the commander’s operational concept.The following example is provided to assist in the understanding of the basic method:

a. Commander’s Concept of Operations. `To restore law and order in X by defeatingthe insurgents’.

b. Target Audience. The target audience is the uncommitted population of X.

c. Condition. The security forces are enforcing restrictive security measures (roadblocks and curfews) aimed at insurgents, but which affect the daily lives of the targetaudience.

d. Attitude. The target audience is resentful and angry over inconvenience caused bythe measures.

e. Effect on the Commander’s Concept of Operations. The attitude is unfavourablein that it adversely affects the relationship between security forces and the targetaudience, making the security force’s task even more difficult.

f. Psychological Operations Objective. The psychological operations objective is togain the support for the security forces of the uncommitted population of X.

Potential Psychological Missions

9. Potential psychological missions are identified by considering what might reinforcefavourable attitudes or weaken unfavourable attitudes. From the example in paragraph 8, if anumber of attitudes had been identified, all indicating an unsatisfactory relationship between thesecurity forces and the target audience, a potential psychological mission would be to reverse thissituation. A possible mission would be `to gain the support and cooperation of the uncommittedpopulation for security forces’.

ANNEX C TOADFP 25

CHAPTER 5



EXAMPLE OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ANNEX TOAN OPERATION ORDER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (1)

ANNEX X TOOPORD X/XXDATED DMY

Refs: A. (2)

1. Psychological Operations Situation:

a. Enemy. This section should cover any enemy tactical, operational or strategicpsychological operations in support of operations. Any details on general enemyactions should be referred to a relevant intelligence summary.

b. Friendly. Only covers friendly psychological operations action relevant to theoperation.

2. Mission. A clear and realistic statement of the psychological operations mission. It may bedrawn from the psychological operations estimate.

3. Execution:

a. Target Audiences. Only those relevant to the psychological operations mission.Drawn from the psychological operations estimate.

b. Psychological Objectives. Drawn from the target analysis worksheets. For detail atthe tactical and operational levels, see Manual of Land Warfare part one, volumetwo, pamphlet No. 10 - Psychological Operations.

c. Unit/Formation Identification.

(1) Grouping.

(2) Tasks. Individual unit/formation tasks drawn from the campaign controlsheets. For detail, see Manual of Land Warfare part one, volume two,pamphlet No. 10 - Psychological Operations.

d. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Timings.

(2) Locations.

(3) Any special requirements.

4. Administration and Logistics:

a. Production of relevant psychological operations material.

b. Allocation of psychological consolidation material.

5C-2



5. Command and Signal.

a. Command and control details.

b. Codewords or nicknames.

c. Communications plan.

Notes:

1. Usually same classification as remainder of order.

2. Maps, instructions or related documentation such as basic psychological operations study orpsychological operations estimate.



CHAPTER 6

COUNTERACTION

National Level Requirements

601. The possibility of hostile psychological operations is ever present and an awareness of thepotential for adversary propaganda against Australian target audiences at the national level must bemaintained. Information of adversary propaganda or psychological operations can originate from anumber of sources including the business community, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade(DFAT), the international media and expatriates, or overseas visitors. An Australian response tohostile psychological operations may be required at ministerial level and is likely to involve severalareas of Government. Such a response would necessitate a highly coordinated approach byAustralia.

602. The threat can have such effects as a change in foreign investment attitudes, altered tradepreferences or evidence of a negative attitude towards Australian nationals (either resident ortransiting). The form of the threat lies in how the effects are achieved. Whatever the form of threat,confirmation of its existence should be coordinated at national level to provide advice toGovernment. Such advice will enable Government to determine actions to be taken to counterenemy propaganda.

603. DFAT and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) can provide information orintelligence pertinent to propaganda generated external to Australia. The Office of NationalAssessments (ONA) is capable of producing from such advice an assessment of the likely effectson Australia and its interests of the adversary’s propaganda. In the event of enemy propagandabeing generated from within Australia, for example by a disenchanted ethnic group, responsibilityfor both collecting the necessary intelligence and producing an assessment of the likely effects onAustralia and its interests of the adversary’s propaganda rests with the Australian SecurityIntelligence Organisation (ASIO).

Counter-psychological Operations Estimate

604. Before commencing the propaganda campaign an adversary will complete a psychologicaloperations estimate. An appropriate response to adversary propaganda efforts is the completion ofa counter-psychological operations estimate which addresses our own vulnerabilities, potentialadversary intentions, psychological operations capabilities and target audiences (sections of theAustralian population) and measures required to counter enemy attacks. These should beincorporated in the counter-psychological operations plan.

Threat Analysis

605. Effective psychological operations are responsive to the situation and attitudes of the threatsource. The threat source may not necessarily be our target audience. The threat source may be ahostile government whereas the target audience may be the civilian populace of the country inquestion. Threat analysis commences with the preparation of a comprehensive basic psychologicaloperations study on the threat source which is updated by continuous monitoring of information byall sources and agencies. Such monitoring includes analysis of enemy propaganda, which providescurrent information on the appropriateness of friendly counter-psychological operations and is usefulin countering enemy propaganda.

606. In cooperation with the Attorney General’s Department, ASIO is responsible for monitoringthe effectiveness of enemy propaganda directed against the Australian population, within theparameters stated at paragraph 603. If the ADF is operating in defence of another country,counteraction activities would be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the defendedcountry’s national psychological operations policy, consistent with Australian national policy.

ADFP 25

6-2



The Products of Analysis

607. The following information may be gathered by propaganda analysis:

a. conditions affecting the target audience and resultant attitude modification;

b. effectiveness of psychological operations on the target audience;

c. issues sensitive to the enemy (issues which the enemy perceives to affect theenemy’s target audience, but which betray enemy sensitivities);

d. weaknesses in the enemy’s knowledge and understanding of the enemy’s targetaudience;

e. successful enemy propaganda themes requiring positive counteraction;

f. enemy material suitable as the basis of a counterpropaganda campaign due to itsclumsiness, insensitivity or inhumanity;

g. indications that the enemy is preparing public opinion for a particular activity oreventuality;

h. errors of fact indicating a weakness in enemy intelligence; and

i. changes in enemy propaganda authorship suggestive of personnel changes at thehigher political level.

Analysis of the Source

608. Such analysis identifies the enemy individual or agency which released the material. Thismay indicate the authority with which the propagandist is speaking and whether the view of thepropagandist is representative of the group for which the propagandist speaks. The credibility of theauthor in the eyes of the target audience may also be assessed.

Analysis of the Content

609. This furnishes the majority of information to be extracted from reviewed material, including:

a. propagandist techniques by which the approach may indicate areas of enemyconcern: vagueness may indicate a desire to turn the target audience’s attentionaway from a potentially damaging aspect;

b. factual information by which the enemy may reveal extant societal circumstances: thismay constitute feedback on friendly psychological operations;

c. correlation with previous material, which reveals changes to previous approaches orlines of argument, indicating a possible shift in enemy policy or tactics; and

d. fluctuations in quality of output, which may reveal a change in the organisation andresources of the enemy propaganda machine.

610. The single most important analysis is that of the message itself. Its purpose and appeal maybe apparent; or it may be indirect in nature, concealing its true aim behind bland or routinephraseology. The question of ultimate purpose is the critical element in this analysis.

ADFP 25

6-3



Audience Analysis

611. This process establishes the enemy’s target audience and route of the enemy propagandamessage, as well as indicating other groups which may have been exposed to it in the process oftransmission. Details of friendly target audience categories are found at paragraph 512.

612. Identification of the friendly target audience is inconclusive at this stage and it is set asidepending an analysis of media. Initial selection of media reflects the perceived media habits of thetarget group; media examination may confirm or deny initial target audience assessment.

Media Assessment

613. The enemy will generally use the media of choice from those available, in which case it maybe assumed that the choice reflects the enemy’s understanding of the degree of influence enjoyedby the various media over the enemy’s target audience. In order to reinforce or reject the originalestimate of the enemy’s target audience, the analyst must have a sound knowledge of the varietyand relative acceptability of media available to the enemy and of affinities between particular socialgroups within the friendly target society and specific media.

Analysis of the Effect

614. An analysis of the effect of enemy propaganda reveals the influence of the message uponthe target audience. It also reveals the secondary or accidental results occasioned from unintendedaudiences, results which may not have been anticipated by the sponsor and may therefore becounterproductive to enemy objectives.

Targets of Enemy Psychological Operations

615. The enemy will use every aspect of psychological operations to bring psychological pressureto bear upon target audiences. For the purpose of countering enemy psychological operations,these target audiences may be classified as either friendly or neutral military forces or civilians.

Military Forces

616. Well led and highly motivated troops well informed of the current battle situation are difficulttarget audiences for enemy psychological operations. In countering enemy psychological operationsdirected at military forces the following should be considered:

a. leadership,

b. morale and esprit de corps,

c. discipline,

d. physical fitness,

e. conviction of purpose,

f. spiritual belief,

g. timely and accurate information,

h. reliable postal services,

i. countering rumours,

j. the media, and

k. adequate rest and recuperation.

ADFP 25

6-4



Individual Training

617. Instruction in the enemy’s political, social, economic and cultural objectives should beconducted to inoculate troops against enemy propaganda. The display and considered criticism ofenemy propaganda is a useful means to this end. An explanation of friendly psychologicaloperations can provide a balance and reinforce friendly force superiority.

Civilians

618. Civilians may be subjected to enemy psychological operations which seeks to demonstrateunsound government policies or leadership, the inevitability of defeat, the possibility of loss ofcivilian life and property, and uncertainty of the future. To counter the effects of enemypsychological operations against civilians, the following measures should be implemented:

a. a reliable and timely public information program,

b. access to a friendly news service,

c. countering rumours,

d. psychological consolidation,

e. military civic action,

f. counterpropaganda, and

g. security against enemy action.

Counteraction Selection

619. The next step is an analysis of options to counter the possible effects of enemy propaganda(the enemy psychological operations campaign). Analysis of the presented options will lead to theselection of a preferred option for the neutralisation of enemy propaganda. This is usually referredto as counterpropaganda, which is propaganda designed specifically to counter or capitalise uponenemy propaganda. It is an essential component in a psychological operations to avoid loss of thepropaganda battle by default.

620. Counterpropaganda may be either:

a. defensive counterpropaganda, which either shields the audience from enemypsychological operations or lessens the impact of the messages to which they areexposed; or

b. offensive counterpropaganda, which exploits any errors by the enemy propagandistby highlighting them to his audience.

621. Provided with the counter-psychological operations estimate and assessment from ONA orASIO, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet will provide the Security Council of Cabinetwith information or broad options addressing a response that will be either diplomatic, military or acombination thereof. The Security Committee of Cabinet is privy to information from all members ofthe Australian intelligence community and can readily assume responsibility for deciding thenational response to adversary propaganda. As not all requisite information and intelligence may beavailable, the Security Committee of Cabinet should be provided with updates as necessary toreview its initial response.

ADFP 25

6-5



EXECUTION OF COUNTERACTION

622. The next stage is the application of the counter-action in accordance with psychologicaloperations objectives. The preferred option may require modification to comply with national policy.The success of counterpropaganda is dependent upon the quality of enemy propaganda analysis.

Techniques

623. The following techniques may be used to counter enemy propaganda:

a. forestalling, which involves pre-emptive presentation, in the best possible light, ofmaterial likely to be used by the enemy;

b. direct refutation, which employs a point by point rebuttal of enemy claims, coveringevery aspect of his statements;

c. indirect refutation, which refutes the enemy message without repeating it and isachieved by introducing a new argument which, if adopted by the target audience,tends to invalidate the enemy position;

d. diversion, by which attention is drawn from enemy propaganda by the introduction ofanother, high impact theme;

e. silence, which involves calculated avoidance of the issue;

f. immunisation, the continual use of information and education services to predisposethe audience to ignore messages from particular sources;

g. minimisation of the relative importance of an argument to lessen its impact;

h. imitative deception by altering the content or imitating the style of enemy propagandato change the effect of the propaganda or discredit further efforts; and

i. ridicule of an effective propaganda source to reverse belief to contempt oramusement.

Restrictive Measures

624. Physical restrictions on the flow of enemy propaganda material and punitive action againstmembers of the enemy’s target audience possessing such material are of questionable value. Suchmeasures generate inordinate interest in those items which do penetrate the controls and punitiveaction may cause resentment.



DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR ADFP 25(as at 22 Feb 95)

HQADF

OPERATIONS DIVISIONACOPS (M-B-42) 1ADFCC (M-B-10) 2DGJCE (DDCO, M-SB-40) 3DGJOP (M-B-11) 1DDC2IN (M-SB-45) 1DJOPS (M-B-20) 1DJOPS (SO1 CCOPS, M-B-24) 1DJP (M- SB-24) 2JEPS (CCLK H-2-01) 4

DEVELOPMENT DIVISIONDCISD (DDES B-2-31) 1DGCIS (B-3-22) 1DGFD(Air) (ADMIN1, B-1-18) 1DGFD(Land) (B-3-01) 1DGFD(Sea) (B-4-05A) 1DGMSC (F-3-17) 1DGMSC (DMOB, F-3-33) 1

VCDF COORD AND SUPPORT STAFFCDF Spt Cell (F-3-01) 1

SURGEON GENERAL ADFDCHSR (CP4-6-40) 1AOPHS (CP4-6-14) 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

ADF LEGAL SERVICES BRANCHASLEG/DGDFLS (NCC-B3-13) 1

DIRECTOR PUBLISHINGDefence Centre - Canberra 25

DIODIO Library (L-4-13) 2PD ADFDIS (L-2-17) 1

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENTAUSTRALIADGEMA (NBH-6-19) 1CDO (NBH-6-15) 1

PUBLIC INFORMATION BRANCHDGPI (B-4-29) 1

INTERNATIONAL POLICY DIVISIONASSPP (F-1-16) 1CEOCS (F-2-22) 1

FORCE DEVELOPMENT ANDANALYSIS DIVISIONASFD (F-2-44) 1

DSTO (Science Policy Division)Head CSSG (Fernhill Park) 1

JOINT ESTABLISHMENTS

ADFA (Military Library) 1ADFWC 90JSSC 1NORCOM 5

DEFENCE CENTRESDefence Centre - Adelaide 2Defence Centre - Brisbane 2Defence Centre - Canberra 2Defence Centre - Hobart 2Defence Centre - Melbourne 2Defence Centre - Perth 2Defence Centre - Sydney 2

DEFENCE LIBRARIESDefence Central Library (E-G-4) 1Defence Central Library (CampbellPark CP2-5-6)

1

DEFENCE SECURITY BRANCHADF- INT (K-4-09) 1

ADF PERSONNEL OVERSEAS

Australian Exchange Instructor 1Canadian Forces Command andStaff College215 Yonge Blvd TORONTO ONTARIOCANADA M5M 3H9

STAFF OFFICER (COORDINATION) 1Australian High CommissionAustralia HouseThe Strand LONDON WC2B 4LAUNITED KINGDOM

ADS-W 1AS Naval Attache Washington 1RAAFWASH 1Australian Embassy1601 Massachusetts Avenue NWWASHINGTON DC USA 20036

Australian Liaision Officer 1HQ US TRADOC Fort Munroe VAUSA 23651-5000

Military Adviser 1Australian Mission to the United Nations885 Second AvenueNew York NY 10017USA

RAAFPNG 1Australian High CommissionPO BOX 9129 HOHOLA PNG

DL-2



RAAFSUBUT 1Australian High Commission6 Jalan Yap Kwan SengPO Box 10921Kuala Lumpur 50730 MALAYSIA

OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

Australian Federal Police 1PO Box 401CANBERRA CITY ACT 2601

Australian National University 1The Research School of Pacific StudiesStrategic and Defence Studies CentreCANBERRA ACT 0200

Department of Foreign Affairs andTrade

1

Administrative BuildingParkes PlacePARKES ACT 2600

Attorney General’s DepartmentPSCC 1GPO Box 158 CANBERRA ACT 2601

Department of Prime Minister andCabinet

1

3-5 National CircuitBARTON ACT 2600

OTHER COUNTRIES

CANADA

Director-General Force Development 1National Defence Headquarters(QCJWC)Colonel By DriveOTTAWA KIA OK2

Canadian NDHQ 1(Through CDA STANREP ABCA-ArmyOffice, Russell Offices G-1-30A)

NEW ZEALAND

HQNZDF Ops (Attn:DDJ Plans) 56th FloorDefence HouseWELLINGTON NZ

UNITED KINGDOM

Doctrine Editor (QCJWC Member) 1Joint Warfare StaffRoyal MarinesPOOLE DORSET BH15 4NQ

DCTS MOD (QCJWC Member) 1Ministry of DefenceWHITEHALLLONDON SW1A 2HB

COMMANDANT 1AIR WARFARE CENTRERAF CRANWELLNr Sleaford Lincs NG34 811B

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Director (QJCWC Member) 1Joint Doctrine and AlliedInteroperability DivisionJ7 DivisionJoint Chiefs of staffPENTAGONWASHINGTON DC USA 20301-5000

Commandant (QJCWC Member) 1Air Ground Operations SchoolHurlburt FieldFLORIDA USA 32544-5000

Director PSO ABCA (QJCWC Member) 1Primary Standardization OfficePark Centre II, Suite 2754401 Ford AvenueALEXANDRIA VA USA 22302-1401

COMMANDER 1Naval Doctrine Command8952 First Street Suite 200NORFOLK VA USA 23511-3790

HQ USCINCPAC (for J5, J54, J55) 3Camp H.M. SmithHonoluluHAWAII USA 96861-5025

NAVY

NAVY OFFICEDCNS 1DGNLP 1DGNPW 3DNP 1

NAVAL COMMANDSCOMAUSMINFOR WATERHEN 2COMAUSNAVSUP (FONSC) (MHQ) 1COMAUSPABFOR (CAIRNS) 1COMAUSSUBRON (PLATYPUS) 2COMFLOT (MHQ) 1MHQ 3SJOP (MHQ) 1

SHIPS AND BASESADELAIDE 1ALBATROSS 1BRISBANE 1CAIRNS 1CANBERRA 1CDT1 WATERHEN 1CDT4 STIRLING 1CERBERUS 1COONAWARRA 1CRESWELL 1

DL-3



CRESWELL Library (RAN-CL-ACT) 1DARWIN 1HARMAN 1HAROLD E HOLT 1HOBART 1KANIMBLA 1KUTTABUL 1MELBOURNE 1NAS NOWRA HC 723 1NAS NOWRA HS 816 1NAS NOWRA HS 817 1NEWCASTLE 1ONSLOW 1ORION 1OVENS 1PENGUIN 1PENGUIN Library (RANSC) 10PERTH 1PLATYPUS Library 1STIRLING 2SUCCESS 1SWAN 1SYDNEY 1TOBRUK 1TORRENS 1WATERHEN 1WATSON 1WATSON (RANSWARS) 20WESTRALIA 1Navy Supply Centre 24

ARMY

ARMY OFFICEOFFICE CGS 1DALS 1DCOORD-A 1DEME-A 1DGAOS 2DLOG- A (incl DLD/DLC) 2DMI-A 2DMOV&T 1DORD-A 1DSEC-A 10Gen Staff Div 1Mat Div Coord 1Army Svy Regt 1

ARMY OFFICE UNITSHQSF (G-1-18) 1HQ 1 Cdo Regt 11 Cdo Coy 12 Cdo Coy 1HQ 1 GL Gp 166 GL Sect 167 GL Sect 168 GL Sect 170 GL Sect 1MEA 1SASR 5

LAND COMMAND UNITSLHQ 12HQ 1 Div 5

HQ 1 Div Arty 1HQ 2 Div 5HQ 1 Bde 3HQ 1 BASB 1HQ 3 Bde 3HQ 3 BASB 2HQ 4 Bde 1HQ 5 Bde 1HQ 6 Bde 2HQ 6 BASB 1HQ 7 Bde 1HQ 7 BASB 1HQ 8 Bde 1HQ 9 Bde 1HQ 11 Bde 1HQ 11 BASB 2HQ 13 Bde 3HQLSF 1HQ 1 LSG 11 BASB (Fwd) 1Land Command Battle School 1LCAUST Liaison Sect Butterworth 11 Armd Regt 21/15 RNSWL 12 Cav Regt 22/14 LH (QMI) 13/9 LH (SAMR) 14/19 PWLH 112/16 HRL 1A Sqn, 10 LH 1B Sqn, 3/4 Cav Regt 11 Fd Regt 14 Fd Regt 18/12 Mdm Regt 116 AD Regt 1131 Div Loc Bty 1HQ LSF Engr 21 CER 12 CER 13 CER 34 FER 17 Engr Spt Regt, LSF Engr 121 Const Regt, LC Engr 122 Const Regt, LSF Engr 11 Topo Svy Sqn 11 Sig Regt 37 Sig Regt (EW) 38 Sig Regt 3103 Sig Sqn 3104 Sig Sqn 1108 Sig Sqn 1109 Sig Sqn 1139 Sig Sqn 1140 Sig Sqn 1141 Sig Sqn 1144 Sig Sqn 1152 Sig Sqn 1615 Sig Tp 1Land Force Sig Unit 11 RAR 31/19 RNSWR 22 RAR 32/17 RNSWR 2

DL-4



3 RAR 34 RAR 34/3 RNSWR 25/6 RVR 25/7 RAR 36 RAR 38/7 RVR 28/9 RAR 39 RQR 210/27 RSAR 211/28 RWAR 212/40 RTR 216 RWAR 225 RQR 231 RQR 241 RNSWR 242 RQR 249 RQR 351 FNQR 2NORFORCE 3Pilbara Regt 21 Avn Regt 25 Avn Regt 2161 Recce Sqn 2162 Recce Sqn 2171 Comd and Liaison Sqn 2173 Gen Spt Sqn 21 Div Int Coy 22 Div Int Coy 27 Int Coy 1HQ 9 Tpt Regt 1HQ 10 Tml Regt 13 Tpt Sqn 17 Tpt Sqn 18 Tpt Sqn 110 Tpt Sqn 111 MC Gp 115 Tpt Sqn 116 Tpt Sqn 126 Tpt Sqn 130 Tml Sqn 135 Water Tpt Sqn 144 Tpt Sqn 1176 Air Dispatch Sqn 1SAD HMAS TOBRUK 11 Fd Amb 11 Fd Hosp 12 Fd Hosp 13 Fd Amb 13 Fwd Gen Hosp 15 Fd Amb 16 Fd Amb 17 Fd Amb 110 Fd Amb 12 Fd Log Bn 239 ADE Maint Pl 11 MP Coy 11 Psych Unit 1

TRAINING COMMANDHQ Trg Comd 6C&SC 110

LWC 57PTS 1RMC 2Army College of TAFE 2Army Maritime School 11Army School of Transport 49RAAOC Centre 2RAEME Training Centre 2School of Armour 3School of Army Health 2School of Army Aviation 4School of Artillery 34School of Infantry 32School of Military Engineering 1School of Military Intelligence 40School of Military Police 1School of Military Survey 1School of Signals 341 Trg Gp 12 Trg Gp 13 Trg Gp 14 Trg Gp 15 Trg Gp 16 Trg Gp 17 Trg Gp 111 Trg Gp 1Monash University Regt 1

LOGISTIC COMMANDHQ Log Comd 5Bandiana Log Gp 1Brisbane Log Gp 1DNSDC 1Adelaide Log Bn 1Army Spt Unit Darwin 1Broadmeadows Log Bn 1Perth Log Bn 1Puckapunyal Log Bn 1ACT Wksp Pl 11 MU 12 MU 13 MU 14 MU 15 MU 16 MU 17 MU 18 MU 1BASC Albury/Wodonga 1BASC Darling Downs 1BASC Enoggera 1BASC Enoggera 1 Div RANLO 1BASC Hunter Valley 1BASC Lavarack 1BASC Liverpool 1BASC Puckapunyal 1BASC Randwick 1BASC Rockhampton 1BASC Watsonia 11 Mil Hosp 13 MP Coy 1Bandiana Log Gp 104

DL-5



AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE OFFICEDOCAS 2AFPOL3 1DAFLS 1DGPP 1DOMAT-AF 1RAAFSUCAN Library 4

BASES

AmberleyHQSRG 182WG 11SQN 12AFDS 223SQN 138SQN 2114MCRU 4

Darwin321TSF 6

East Sale32SQN 2SAN 3

EdinburghHQMPG 124SQN 1

Fairbairn34SQN 1AHQIAC 1RAAFSC 4

GlenbrookAHQ 4RAAFSUGLEN 2

Pearce306ABW ( 306TSF) 1

RichmondHQALG 186WG 236SQN 1ATTU 4MATU 1ALCC 1

Tindal322TSF 375SQN 1

Townsville323TSF 184WG 135SQN 1SUWAG Library 1

Williamtown302ABW 1302TSF 181WG 23CRU 276SQN 1

WilliamsSUWIL (Library) 121SQN 2RAAFCOL 1CENBAN 1CPE 1

INDEPENDENT UNITS1CAMD 11RSU Det A SALISBURY 1RAAFPU 19

Inquiries:SOPUBSADFWCRAAF BaseWILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314Ph: (049) 28 7357DNATS: 841 7357Fax: (049) 28 7574

Date post:	15-Sep-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	2 times
Download:	0 times

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION...AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE 1. Proposals for amendment of ADFPs are...

Documents