UNCLASSIFIED AD NUMBER AD523510 CLASSIFICATION CHANGES TO: unclassified FROM: confidential LIMITATION CHANGES TO: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 25 JUN 1972. Other requests shall be referred to HQ, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Div [Army], APO San Francisco 96490. AUTHORITY 31 Dec 1978, per doc markings; OAG D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1979 THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
Transcript
UNCLASSIFIED
AD NUMBERAD523510
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES
TO: unclassified
FROM: confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES
TO:Approved for public release, distributionunlimited
FROM:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 25 JUN1972. Other requests shall be referred toHQ, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Div [Army],APO San Francisco 96490.
AUTHORITY31 Dec 1978, per doc markings; OAG D/Altr, 11 Jun 1979
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
GENERAL'DECLASSIFICA TION
SCHEDULEIN ACCORDANCE WITH
POD 52e0.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE,
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APrROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASEj
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITEP,
SECURITYMARKING
The classified or limited status of this repod, applies
to each page, unless oterwise marked,Separate page printoutsMUST be markdd accordingly.
I' THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.
NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or otherdata are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-nitely related government procurement operation, tne U. S. Governmentthereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; andthe fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in anyuay supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data iS notto be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensingthe holder or ak.y other person or corporation, or conveying any rightsor permission to ,manufacture, use or sell1 any patented invention thatmay in any way be related thereto. - -
J4.___ ___
"'CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THR ADJUTANT OUNCRAL
DAAG-PAP-A (M) (21 Nov 72) DFOTT4Dembr97
Suai J . Senior Officer Debriefing Report:1iW James F. llamlet4 Commander,3dBiae(SeparateY3 lit Cavalyivsi; 13 ̂ Dec 1 - 2 Jun72()
SEE DISTRIBUTION
1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) 2 July 1971.
S2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG James F. Hrmlet,Ssubject as above.
S3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized fromthe experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordancewith paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted asthe official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of theDepartment of the Army.
4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as aresult of subject report shuuld be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff
01-.. for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of coveringC) letter.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE RY
npL as KAJar General, USA " .4
,r. The'Adj~it nt General b ikrL IuDISTRIBUTION:~Commanders . 02o
US Continental Army Command e'G j) 4US Army Combat Developments CommandUS Army Materi31 Command 0
CommandantsUS Army War College'US Army Coimmand and General Staff Co 1101)US Army Air Defense SchoolUS Army Aviation School -nnesoUS Army Chemical School Rerdducas ldwUS Army Civil Affairs School tf w, Rqraed le u ncd s uIwen urUS Army Combat SurveillsAice'806611lssfiiInlsue
(Continued on passe2) to o'IL
(DISTRIBUTION (Contid CONFIDENTIAL CommandersUS Army Land Warfare Laboratory
US Army Electronic Warfare School US Army Loi c D ore,US Amy Eginer ScoolUS Amy Logistics Doctrine,US Army ineld Artillery School Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army I atery School US Army Mobility EquipmentUS Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Institute for Military Assistance Research & Development CenterUS Army Intelligence SchoolUS Army Medical Field Service SchoolUS Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Quartermaster SchoolUS Army Security Agency SchoolUS Army Signal SchoolUS Army Southeastern Signal SchoolUS Army Transportation School
Copies furnished:Office, Chief of Staff, US Army (DWSA)Office, Chief of StaffDeputy Chiefs of StaffChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of EngineersThe Surgeon GeneralChief of Military HistoryThe Provost Marshal GeneralOSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia ForcesOffice, of the Director of Defense Research & EngineeringOffice of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCommanders in Chief
CommandersUS Army, AlaskaUS Army STRATCOMUS Army Electronics Command"US Ariy Weapons CommandUS Army Flight Training CenterUS III CorpsUS Army Security Agency
Commander, US Army Forces SouthernCommandChief of Staff, USAFDeputy Chief of Staff, Air Foc Pans & OperationsChief of Naval OperationsCommandant of the Marine CorpsCommandantsArmed Forces Staff CollegeDefense Intelligence SchoolIndustrial College of the Armed ?orcesThe National War College
Senior Army Representative, Marine C rps Development & Education CommandProject Manager, Naval Inshore Warfare Project OfficeUSAF Air Ground Operations SchoolThe Air Un~versity LibraryDefense Documentation CenterCommanders (Continued on right side of page)
2 CONFIDENTIAL
x-
CONFIDENTIALDEPART4ENT OF THE ARiY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE (SEPARATE)1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR4OBILE)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96490
AVDACG 25 June 1972
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. HamletRCS CSFCF-74
THRU: Commanding GeneralUnited States Army, VietnamATTN: AV1IDO-DOAPO Sari Francisco 96375
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force DevelopmentDepartment of the ArmyATTN: For OT UTWashington, D.C. 20310
Country: Republic of ViataamDebriefing Report by: Briga4ier General James F, Hamlet
Duty Assignment: CommandiI Geieral of 3d Brigade (Separate),ist Cavalry Division (Airfobile)
Inclusive Dates: 13 Dec m~bt 1971 to 20 J ne 197?
Date of Report: 25 J 1972,*
1. (U) Introduction:. 3 repoct coverr observation,; andreports "irssiolis. learned .v',ring' tho emplyfent of a septzrateairmobile brigade in a c.,';bat enviTmnmen'i During the L.riodof this report, operatiP.s ranged from sw.,ll unit actions toconventional, mid-intensity cmba.A
2. (C) Mission: The BrigzJe missi ts ivre:
a. To conduct dyrnamic defent, oA% the Saigon - Long Dinhcomplex in coordinatio with RVNA ,
b. To assist in the training of Territorial Forces.
c. To be prej'ired to move battations to other MR's forsecurity missions.
* At the present tima the Brigade is undergoing a major re-organization in accocdance with Increment XII drawdowns.
This
will be fiiil zdmoumented And forwarded wider seDarte cover.
CLASSIFIED BY- BG James F. HamletDAFD-OTT SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
72B012 lol sure I CHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER [1652
InclsureAUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEARINTERVALSDECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1
9 7 8
A CONFIDENTIAL
AVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
CSFCF-74
d. To be prepared to execute assigned contingency missionsEmphasis was placed on combined operations. Although these ais-sions were essentially unchanged, the area of operations wasaltered significantly during the period December 1971 throughMarch 1972.
7. (C) Operational Environment:
a. Area of Operations: The area of operations (AO) under-went three basic changes in configuration and location, Theseadjustments were primarily a result of the phasedown and with-drawal of allied forces. In mid-December 1971, the AO coveredapproximately 3500 square miles in parts of Binh Tuy, Long Khanh,and Phuoc Tuy provinces (Inclosure 1). The area south of QL-lin Binh Tuy Province is primarily a coastal plain covered withundergrowth or single canopy jungle, and is generally flat exceptfor three key mountains: Nui Be, Nui May Tau, and Nui Nhou.North of QL-l and astride the Long Khanh-Binh Tuy Provinceboundary lies an area of heavy vegetation, the Don# Nai RiverBasin, centrally located with respect to the other key terrainfeatures of the AO. The northwestern portion of Binh TuyProvince is heavily populated and contains the largest rice-producing area in 14RIII. The northeastern portion of the pro-vince is very rugged and mountainous and is relatively uninhab-ited. The portion of Long Khanh north and west of.QL-29 " kaownas War Zone D, consists of double and triple canopy jungle.Steep ridges and valleys dominate tho central and easternportion of War Zone D. The severity of the terrain not onlyimpeded ground movement but also significantly limited radiocoinunications. As the AO's were shifted to the west towardsBien Eoa, the terrain became predominantly flat to rolling withrelatively sparse vegetation and few mountainous areas. Q,1-l5which connects Bien Hoa with the Vung Tau Peniassula 4s "the onlyother major highway in this area. The dominar rivers of thearea are the Dong Nai which encircles Bien Hoa from the westand north, and the Song Be which joins the Don& Nai approximately2O kilometers northeast of Bien Hoa. In mid-Deconber 1971 theclosure of the Thai and Australian AO's south of Bien Hoa createda void. To provide continuity of defense, the Brigade area ofresponsibility was adjusted and troops were deployed so as todominate the Bien Hoa/Long Binh/Saigon rocket belt, By mid-January 1972 the second AO configuration included large por-tions of Bien Hca Province and adjacent portions of Long Khanh.
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AVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B,G. James P. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
One battalion sized AO was retained in the area north and southof Nui Chua Chan to the east of Xuan Loc against the 33d NVARegiment. By z4arch 1972 the Brigade was installed in an AOwhere relatively close-in protection could be afforded to theBien Hoa/Long Binh complex (Inclosure 3). In its final con-figuration the Brigade AO had been reduced to approximately1092 square kilometers.
b. Nature of the Enemy: The enemy threat in the Brigadearea of operations & OnSisted of main force and local forceelements under the control of Thu Bien sub-region operating insouthwestern War Zcne D and Base Area 359, southern Bien Hoa (P),eastern Bien Duong (7), and southern Phuoc Long (P).and Ba Riasu.-region operating in Base Area 300, Base Area 303 LongKhanh (P), Binh Tuy (P), and Ouuthern Bien Hoa (P) (ee Incl-osure 4). Logistical support was provided by the 814 RearService Group compised of the Ba Ria Rear Service Group (form-erly 84 Rear Service Group) and the Thu Bien Rear Service Group(formerly 81 Real Service Group). The Brigade's principalantagonists were the 33d NVA Regiment, the 274th VC Main ForceRegiment, and the 74th Artillery Regiment.
(1) In Djcember and January enemy activity remained light,the enemy c~ucentrating on resupply, training, and rice col-lection fro,,t the Binh Tuy "rice bowl" in preparing for his 1972TET offensive. Local force units used mines, booby traps,attacks bl, fire and terrorism to harass friendly forces withinthe BrigEde's area of operations. Significant contact duringthis period occurred west of V3 Dat when Brigade units engageda battelion of .3 33d NVA Division, resulting in the destruc-tion of a large buiu.:er complex and the disruption of the enemy'srice hiarvest.
.(2,) In February, enemy activity increased but the TEToff,.nsive did not materialize to the degree expected. Frommid-February to early parch contacts with the 33d NVA Regiment,the 274th VC Regiment and with district headquarters for theVC Vinh Cu distict of Bien Hoa Province and Xuan Loc districtoi Long Khanh Province hampered the enemy capability for asignificant TET or post-TBT offensive in the Thu Bien andDa Ria sub-regions.
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AVDACG 2S June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
(3) On 1 April the character of the war in lilitary RegionIII changed drastically when the enemy bega, his Nguyex !1ueCampaign as part of his new offensive throughout Vietnamz. Threeenemy divisions supported by conventional tube and rocket artil-lary, an anti-4ircraft regiment, and a ta:'. regiment werecommitted against An L3c in Binh Long (P) north of the Brigadcarea of operations. Both the 33d NVA and the 274th VC ?4ainForce Regiments and a battalion of the 74th Artillery Regimentwere conumitted in Phuoc Tuy (P) to the s~utheast in an enemyattempt to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the RoyalAustralian Task Force. Within the Brigade area of operations,enemy activity continued at a relatively low level. B-S2 airstrikes exploited by 1/12 Cavalry and 1/7 Cavalry are believedto have severely disrupted enemy plans for concurrent operationsin northern Bien {oa (P).
4. (C) Experiences in Command.
a. Concept of Operations: The size of the AO in mid-December I971 Land thtelyent of Brigade forces) was incon-sistent with the imi-sion of dynamic defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa/Saigon complex. This situation dictated the shiftof combat power closer to Bien Hoa to protect the northernapproaches and tu occupy the area vacated by the Royal ThaiArmy Volunteer Force. Two factors inhibitel the speed withwhich the reorientation of forces could be accomplished.First, the Brigade was dependent upon a hear Forward OperatingBase (FOB) Mace, at the base of Nui Chua Chin Aountain. Thissub-installation had to be dismantled and demilitarized,Concurrently, the Forward Supply Element and Army AviationSupport facilities had to be relocated. Secondly, a large engin-eer effort was required to close out the oi.' fire bases oc-cupied by the maneuver battalions and to construct three newmain bases and three mini-bases in the new AO. These require-ments exceeded the Brigade Engineer Company's capabilitieswithin the time constant, The shortfall between requirementsand capabilities was offset by the use of non-brigade engineerassets, under the direction of MG James P. Hollingsworth, CG,Third Regional Assistance Command. A KEY LESSON LBARNED ISTHAT AIRMOBILE BRIGADE ENGINEERS KUST BE AUG-!ENTED AS THEBRIGADE MISSION DICTATES A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE OVB( .AN'.EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME.
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CONFIDENTIALAVDACG25 June 1972
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. HamletRCS CSFCF-74
b. Organization: During this perio the Brigade was organ-ized with four :ianeuver battalions (2/5, 1/7, 2/8, and 1/12Cay) In addition the Brigade was given OPCON of the 2d SquLd-ron, 11th ACR on 21 December 1972. On 12 January 1972 the 1/12Cay moved north to T-iy Hoa Air Base and was placed under theoperatio)nal control of CG, Second Regional Assistance Group(SRAG). This battalion secured Tuy Hoa Air Base -luring thecloseout of that installation. A detached company providedlocal security to the US installation in Pleiku. The 1/7Cav conducted combat operations against the 33d NVA Regimentnorth and south of Nui Chua Chan. During February the 1/12Cay (minus Company D in Pleiku) returned to the Brigade AO.During larch 1972 the 2d Squadron, llth ACR, and the /5 Caywere alerted to standdown in Increment XI of the withdrawalprogram. These units were relieved in-place by the 1/7 and1/12 respectively. In an offensive operational environmentthe Brigade would have pursued enemy units relentlessly andwould have deployed to any part of RVN to do so. In an economyof for-e role, the defense of headquarters and logistical basesdirected a change in tactics. It is significant that no aug-mentation (except engineer support) was required to implementthe change. As other units stood down the Brigade was leviedfor increased aviation support to US and RVN units in MRIII.The absence of other forces generated an increased requirementfor physical security of key installations. This in turn,reduced the strength of infantry elements in the held. Asa lesson learned, it is significant that a high percentage ofTOE fill is still inadequate when security requirements exceedthe normal tasks of an airmobile brigade. To a degree thisshortcoming was offset by the responsiveness of intelligenceunits and supporting artillery.
c. Techniques of !1mployment:
(1) Force Employment Within the Brigade AO: Theenemy attempted to avoid contacw wlth brigade unts- in the AO.This required aggressive patrolling by the infantry units.The rifle companies ranged throughout the battalion AO's underthe protection of artillery and aviation. Two mutually sup-porting fire support bases were located in each AO. Thesebases were austere in design and of hard construction. Mainbases contained three 105mm howitzers and two 1SSmm howitzers.
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CONFIDENTIALAVDACG 25 June 1972
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of 3.G, Jes F. HamletRCS CSFCF-74
.linibases had three 105mm howitzers. This decentralization
of artillery increased the area of influence of each battalion.As intelligence was developed, or contact *ith the enemy oc-curred, the infantry would fix thb enemy while superior fire-power was brought to bear. Rarely was contact made with enemyelements larger than ten men, The combined capabilities ofAir Cavalry, Infantry, ground based Artillry, and AerialField Artillery proved the validitLy of the combined arms con-cept. The fact that there were no major contacts and onlyoccasional sporadic attacks by fire demonstrated that theenemy was kept off balance. It was commonplace to receiveintelligence of the enemy dispositions just beyond artiliiryrange. During the height of the enemy's Spring offensivethere were four enemy attacks by fire on the military baseat Bien Hoa. A total of seven rockets and fourteen 82mm mor-tar rounds were fired during theso attacks. The perimeter ofthe US Army installation yeas not penetrated by sappers.
(2) Force E mlo ment in Support of Higher Head-quarters and Ad~acent GVN-Forces: During the enemy Springofensive this Brigao had M only air cavalry troops (two)and AFA battery (one) available in MRIII. At the height ofthe action from 5 to 19 April 1972 both air cavalry troops andto heavy sections (6 Cobras) of the AFA battery were taskedto support the ARVN forces engaged at Loc Ninh - An Loc.More detailed discussion of engagements is furnished in para-graph 6, Aviation Support. These necessary commitments severezly cut into reconnaissance and aviation combat suport withinthe Brigade AO. As the intensity of the enemy o9fensive sub-sided, the above commitments were reduced. Aviation assetsem.ployed outside the Brigade A3 continued to be employed forbomb damage assessment (BDA), area reconnaissance, medicalevacuation, cover escort, and small scale snatch missions.The frequency with which Car pilots completed air missionsin a high density anti-aircraft environment attests to thesurvivability of helicopters in mid-intensity warfare,
(3) The.Acquisition of 1SSmm Howitzers: The Incre-ment XI drawd~dwn e-tected our artillery support significantly.With the standdown of the 2/5 Cay, one artillery battery alsostood down, leaving us with only 3 l OSm Howitzer batteries,
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' CONFIDENTIAL
AVDACG 25 Juno 1972SUWJECT: Stnior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
This in itself was not significant, but at the same time allremaining medium and heavy U.S. artillery units in PIRIII alsocompleted standdown activities. This left the 3d Brigade with-out any bunker-defeating capability. This was unsatisfactory,so the Brigade's three remaining artillery batteries wero aug,.menteJ with a 155m, 1ll4A-l howitzer platoon for a total ofsix medium artillery pieces.
5. Intelligence Operations: The Brigade was fortunate to havetwo air-cavaTlrytiops a anger Company, a chemical detachnontwith "Sniffer" (airborne personnel detector), a Left Bank radioresearch dotachaent, a radio research field station, infra-redand S'AR airbase surveillance systems, and agents of the 525thMilitary Intelligenco Group available. Varying assets Woreused to complement one another to oither confirm or rulo outan earlier report or sensing. Very accurate patterns of enemynovoment were obtained. The ultimate pay off came when maneu-ver units were put on the ground and either found the enemy orconvincing evidence that he had been there.
a. A typical sequence of events might begin with a SpecialIntelligence Roporthor an agent report indicating enemy activityin a general area',. '"Lten this information correlated withh Te-iults obtained from SLAA or infra-red. Sniffer and pink teamswould be assigned to the area. All indioations would be cor-related to produce a picture of what was happening in the area.Frequently, a long range.ipatrol from the Ranger Company wouldbe inserted to furtho.dfvetepathe area. When a target areahad beon established offmesiveaction, consisting of infantryA assault, artillery fire, air strikes, or a combination of allthr~o followed.
b. 'This correlation of intelligence information wasnecessary due to the large area of operations and the fluidenemy situation. The enemy situation changed so rapidly andconstantly that normal patrolling would have been far tootime consuming to stay abreast of the enemy's movements.
c. "The Brigade relied not only upon its own intelligencecapability but also upon the intelligence produced by otheragencies within MRIII. Information provided by the ProvisionalSecurity Coordinating Group (PSCO) was particularly valuable.
7" CONFIDENTIAL'
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CONFIDENTIALAVDACGAVDAJ CG : 25 June 1972
SUJJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. HamletRCS CSFCF-74
In February information furnished on the location of an enemybase area on the Long Khanh/Bien Hoa province border led tooperations which destroyed the base area, killed the VC VungCu district chief, and wounded his executive officer. In Mayinformation was provided on the location of elements of Head.quarters, Thu Bien Sub-Region which correlated with intel-ligence being produced by the Brigade. Five B-52 strikes weremade. Subsequent aerial reconnaissance and ground operationsfound several bunker complexes destroyed or damaged. Severalother bunker complexes were destroyed by the infantry. Anagent reported to the PSCG that 82 enemy had been killed and200 wounded by one of the air strikes, this was never cor-roborated by factual evidence.
d. Following TET the Brigade assumed operational controlof a third air cavalry troop (F-4 Cay). Support was alsogiven to TRAC for aerial reconnaissance missions throughoutMRIII and on limited missions across the border into Cambodia.This support became even more important after the enemy'sSpring offensive began on'l April. One or more air cavalrytroops were committed daily on visual reconnaissance and bombdamage assessment. The air cavalry troops proved vsluableduring reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of Dog'sjiead, during the enemy thrust south along QL-13 and during thesubsiquent battle of An Loc. Their ability to move from onestaging area to anbther and to locate the enemy for attack bygunship or tactical air strikes spelled the difference betweenholding the enemy at An Loc and defeat of the ARVN forces.
e. One short-coming in the information gathering areawas the lack of SLAR and infra-red airborne surveillance systemsatter the 73d Surveillance Aircraft Company stood down or,1 April 1972. SLAR would have been invaluable in locatingthe enemy's armor moving under the cover of darkness. For thefirst time in several years, enemy armor and vehicular columnswere on the move in Cambodia and in Binh Duong Province. SLAR,however, was enroute back to the United States.
f. There is no substitute for the Left Bank radio researchsystem. It was invaluable in proviting timely, accurate loca-tions of enemy elements, Its olle short-coming was also presentin fixed wing radio research aircraft, Neither was capable of
CONFIDENTIAL
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AVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
performing its mission when the ground was not visible and apositive terrain location could not be established. Theseaircraft should be equipped with some of the airborne positionindicator systems which have been available for several years.At present the Army does not have an all weather, 24 hour a dayairborne radio research capability.
6. Aviation Support:
a. Avii-tion support for the Brigade AO came from the229th Assault Helicopter Battalion and the Medical EvacuationPlatoon of the 215th Combat Support Battalion. These assetswere utilized for combat assaults, visual reconnaissance,logistical support, medical evacuation, armed escort and closefire support. Aviation support for ARVN and VNAP operationswas intensified during the 1972 NVA spring offensive. Duringthe first four days of the enemy offensive, Brigade helicopterssupplied b6ti attack and lift support. USAF and Navy attackaircraft were in short supply due to priority targets in MRIand North Vietnam. Those that were available were restrictedby low ceiling and poor visibility in the target areas. Theinitial delay at Loc Ninh provided three days to prepare thedefenses at An Loc and inflicted heavy casualties on the NVAforces attacking Lc; Ninh. The MVA established a classic Soviettype air defense in the rubber plantation surrounding the air-field at Loc Ninh. The utilization of 51 Cal, 23mm, and 37mmwas extensive and posed a mid-intensity ground-to-air threatto the attack helicopters. The date of 8 April was documentedas the day that the 3d Brigade: rescued three US Advisorsthat were surronded by an NVA force 8 miles south of Loc Ninh;performed a massive relocation of ARVN artillery and 3500 ARVNtroops and civilians under hostile fire from Bu Dop to SongBe; and provided gunship, lift and medevac support for US andARVN troops on Nui Ba Den mountain outpost near Tay Ninh toprevent the NVA from establishing a vital command and controlsite. Two regiments led by a force of 30 tanks attempted tooverrun the Provincial Capital of An Loc on 13 April. Enemytanks occupied key terrain in the city of An Loc. A sectionof AH-iG's from F Battery (AFA) 79 Artillery was cleared toattack the targets in the city that had been placed off limitsto TAC Air. The Cobras destroyed one T-54 Soviet-built tankand damaged two additional T-54 tanks, blunting the initial
9CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIALAVDACG 25 June 197ZSUBJECT: Senior Officer Dobriefing aeport of B.G. James F. Hamlet
offensive and forcing the remaining tanks to withdraw fromthe city. The ARVN soldiers, observing the destruction ofthe tank with rockets, were convinced that the tank was notinvincible and proceeded to attack the withdrawing tanks withLAW's. A significant lesson learned was the ability of theCobra to attack a pinpoint target that was off-limits to TACAir, and the proof in combat that the AH-IG could attack anddestroy a Soviet-made tank. The main NVA attack at An LocLook place on 15 April and was repulsed by the effective employ-ment of army helicopters, TAC Air, VNAF, and ARVN Infantry.F Battery (AFA), 79th Artillery was credited with destroyingfive T-54 tanks in the city of An Loc on this day. The mainNVA thrust in May occurred on 11 May. Critical to repulsingthe attack was the destruction of four PT-76 tanks in thewestern portion of the city by the AFA. The anti-aircraft firethroughout the April-Aay time frame was the most intensiveever experienced in South Vietnam and inrluded 51 Cal, 23mm,37mm, 57anh, and SA-7's. The AFA was utilized to attack pointtargets in the city and perform critical medevac escort. TheCay Troops were alternated to recon the areas surrounding AnLoc. BDA was difficult Sut the 3d Brigade has been creditedwith the destruction of tanks, trucks, crew served weapons,structures, and numerous NVA personnel, The Army gun shipscomplimented TAC Air by being employed on tar'gets that requiredthe utmost in accuracy and a selection of o'dinance possibleonly with the A.-lG. The Cobr. was frequently employed whencloud coverage restricted the ure of fast moving aircraft. Therequirement for both attack helicoptex supDort and close airtactical fighter support were clearly documented during thesiege of An Loc.
b. Air Traffic Control: The 365th Aviation Detachment(Divisional) was assigned to the 3d Brigade on 4 March 1972.The detachment operated thp airfield at Long Thanh North andprovided the Brigade with the flexibility of mobile air traf-fic control, radar equipment and navigational aids. This capa-bility waL a major factor in several .contingency plans. Thedetachment has provided the daily air traffic control supportrequired and a similar organization should be a considerationfor any future separate airmobile brigade.
c. Aircraft Availability: The Brigade has maintained avery acceptable aircrat availability rate during the past sixmonths. This has been primarily due to:
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIALAVDACG 25 June 1972
SU3JECT: Senior Officer D~ebriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
(1) Keeping the flying hour program at or near theUSARV standards.
(2) An extremely low not operationrily ready forsupply (NORS) rate.
(a) The operations personnel were tasked to insurethat maximum utilization was made of all aircraft. Unusableblade time was kept at a minimum. Listed below for each air-craft are the USARV standard flying hours program, and the aver-age OPREP availability rates for each month during the periodDecember 1971 through 'fay 1972:
OH-6A AH-lG UH-lH CH-47
USARV Flying Hour Program 60 55 70 47Average Flying Hours: DEC 58.1 58.8 72.2 47.4
(b) This Drigade has enjoyed the lowest NORS ratein Vietnam. The average:'NORS rate during the past six monthshas been 1.791 overall. This low NORS rate was partially theresult of having a Direct Suppor SupPly Agency (DSSA) organic to thebrigade. The DSSA dealt directly vith Aircraft aintenanceManagement Center (AMMC) and affordsd aviation units a moredirect link to the source of aircrait repair parts. Daily
CONFIDENTIAL
CONIDENTIALAVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
reconciliations of all requisitions could easily be accomplished.The end. result was a faster flow of parts and a low NORS rate.
(c) Until the drawdown imposed by Increment XI, theBrigade contained an organic back up direct support aircraftmaintenance company. This maintenance unit was extremely use-ful, especially during periods of heavy flying. They wereable to augment a particular company or type of aircraft withthe necessary extra maintenance personnel and equipment to in-sure that the airc-aft were returned to a f..yable condition asquickly as possible. This unit also contained moro sophisticatedmaintenance equipment thma was authorized the aviation units.In effect, the Trans Company, Aircraft TAaintenance, made the3/1 self-sufficient in aircraft maintenance.
(d) The beneficial presence of NHA personnel car notbe over emphasized. These personnel provided continuity to allthe aviation units. The NHA personnel were highly qualifiedin their aviation maintenance specialties and required no addi.tional training. They sijnificantly contiibuted to the exceptionalmission-ready availability rate established by the Brigade,
(e) During March the Brigade began to experienceserious sho-tages of 67 and 68 series MOS personnel. By Maythe Brigade was at 77% fill in these critical areas. The 67Y?AH-lG crew chief, was at 50% fill and the 68G, air frame repair-man, was at 32% fill. The personnel shortage required the freezeof all 67, 68 and 35 series IMOS's in April. The shortage isattributed to two factors: one, the failure of the personnelaccounting system to be properly updated; and two, the dynamictactical situation which requirel that programed standdown unitsremain in RVN---and compete for limited resources.
d. Movement of Brigade Aviation Units to Long ThanhNorth AAF: In late February 197Z all Brigade aviation unitsmade plans and preparations for movement to Long Thanh NorthkAF. Priority for movement was given to thl 362d AviationCompany, then located at Phu Loi and F Bat My 79th AerialField Artillery, located at Plantation, Lone Binh. Movementof these units was caused by the scheduled 'cosure of Phu Loiand Plantation. Brigade aviation units were time phased intoLong Thanh North as the tenant units cleared the installation.
12.
CONFIDENTIAL
AVDACG CONFIDENTAL25 Jun 1972SUBJ"ECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of 3.G. James F. Hamlet
LCS CSFCF-74
The 362d Aviation became operational at Long Thanh North on4 March followed by F Battery 79th AFA on 4 April. The USArmy Installation, Long Thanh North and the 365th AviationDeta,:hment, which operated the airfield, were reassigned tothe Brigade on 4 "arch. This, in effect, made Long Thanh.orth a "First Team" airfield even though there were still auumber of non-Cay units. B and A Companies, 229th AviationBattalion were scheduled for movement to Long Thanh on 1 and10 Aay. respective.y, followed by F Troop 9th Cavalry on 20 lay.The remaining elements of the battalion were scheduled to movein June .s units of the 224th RRU displaced. The movementwould have consolidated all Brigade aviation elements in onelocation, improving the command, control, logistics and defensesituation. It also created problems in engineer and trans-portation support during a period when these assets were severelylimited. The movement of all other 3d Brigade aviation unitsto Long Thanh North was terminated when the relocation of the3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division to Long Dinh was cancelled.The move of the two company size units demonstrated the abilityoF the units to relocate without impact on daily missions,
7. Firebase Construction: The 3d Brigade had traditionallyoperated over an extremely large area, using the airmobilcapability to respond to changing tactical requirements atseparated points. The keystone of these operations was aseries of artillery bases providing fire support to the FirstTeam's maneuver elements. The Cavalry fire base was rapidlyconstructed, served for a short duration and was quicklydisassembled and relocated. As the brigade area cf operation:contracted, fire support could be provided over the entiretactical operations zone from a series of permanent firebases,each capable of mutual artillery support. The hasty firebase was inadequate as a static position. A more permanent,better protected firebase was required. Since these baseswould be occupied for long periods of time, extensive barrierand fortification construction would be possible. The newfirebase was triangular in shape and protected by a 7-8 footberm. Two 155mm howitzers and three 105mm howitzers wereplaced on raised gunpads to provide a direct fire capability,Maximum protection to personnel and equipment was provide2 oyplacing almost all facilities below ground. Backfilling andwaterproofing of these structures required extensive engineerand troop effort, but the result was an all weather facilitycapable of withstanding P direct hit by a 122mm rocket.
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CONFIDENTIAL
AVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
Because construction materials were in short supply, the basicmodular unit of living and fighting bunkers was the conexcontainer. Readily available in the salvage yard, the conexprovided a structurally strong, waterproof and fireproofshelter for firebase living. A cluster of eight conexes con:-.nected by a common passageway was the standard living accomo-dation. Conex containers with firing ports cut iL the frontand sides were ideal fighting bunkers, when hardened with sand-I-ags, earth, and PSP. Underground tactical operacions centerswere constructed from heavy timbers and steel beams. A twentyfoot by ninety-six foot structure provided adequate space foran operations area, briefing area and office space for keystaff personnel. Ammunition storage was provided with under..ground ASP's complete with overhead cover, waterproofing andcovered entranceways large enough to accommodate a mule. Thefood preparation areas were bunkered and at some bases placedun'erground. Here food was stored, prepared, and served.Dinin, facilities were decentralized about the fire base toavoid troop congestion during meal hours. Along the berm,pr'imary and supplementary-fighting positions allowed interlockingfires along each leg of the triangle. At each corner, guardcowe'rs provide observation during daylight hours. The berm wastopred with triple concentina wire and Husch flares were spacedto illuminate the perimeter if tactical air support wererequired at night. Jungle vegetation was cleared to 500 meterswhen possible and irregularities in the ground landscaped to allowgrazing fire. In the cleared areasconcentric bands of tripleconcentina wire and double gpron fence were constructed. Thearea between the bands was covered with tanglefoot wire overcrushed concentina wire to discourage sappers. Claymore minesand fougasse were used along suspected avenues of approach.The Ist Cavalry firebase was designed to provide maximum troopprotection while insuring that maximum firepower could bebrought upon an attacking force. From these secure operatingbases, the Brigade could continue to operate as a potent air-mobile strike force.
8. Chemical Operations: Extensive use has bee*n made of avail-able-chemical cEmNaFtSupport, Flame field expedients used insupport of base defense included fougasse, flame mines, bermmarkers and Husch flares. Aerial flame drops have been usedto destroy bunker complexes and booby traps and to burn offheavily vegetated areas affording the enemy good concealment.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIALAVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
Riot Control agent CS has been used to flush the enemy fromcovered positions and expose him to HE artiller'y. CS hasalso been used to contaminate bunkers and restrict theiruse. Extentive use has'been mdde 6f'tie Airborne personneldetector. (Sniffer) throughout the Brigade's AO as a xeansof cross checking intelligence information and detailingenemy forces. Maximum readouts were engaged with artilleryfire.
9. Communications: Providing communications to a highlymobile separate brigade over extended distances proved to bea challenge.
a. Efficient :ommunications for the brigade requiredthat signal support be designed for rapid deployment of F:Arelay teams. The most efficient equipment for this purposewas a stackable retransmission unit. This provided flexi-bility and ease of operation. The distances that these relaysites operated from the Brigade Headquarters was often greaterthan the planning range of the FM radio equipment used. Alsothe CP at which the radios were located was often in a locationwhere a normal FM shot was masked by rubber trees or jungle.The AB-577 proved to be an adaquate solution to overcome theseproblems. The additional height obtained over the RC-292 inmany cases made the difference between communicating and notcommunicating.
b, The extremely large number of FM radios used in theBrigade created a serious frequency problem. Units werecontinuously being interfered with by other units. Althoughthis problem could not be completely eliminated withoutreducing the number of FM radios used, a significant reducti3nof interference was achieved through an extensive educationprogram. This program of operator training included antennalocation, antenna construction, proper radio procedures, andthe reduction of power whenever possible, This training alsoresulted in the reduction of excessive "chatter" which hadbeen a problem. An additional measure which was taken to reducethe FM frequency interference problems was in the method usedto issue frequencies. Frequencies had previously beenissued in a random manner with no consideration given tomutual interference of frequencies. A systematic method offrequency assignment was devised and the problem was
C iCONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIALAVDACG 2S June 1972
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Dibriefing Report of 8.G. James F. amletRCS CSFCF-74
greatly reduced. To furtlier reduce traffic on the FM nets,teletype (TT) was used for recurring reports and routinetraffic which required no immediate answer.
c. While operating with tne Fire Support Base concept,where the battalion headquarters was relatively stationary, theB rigale came to rely greatly on VHF communications for theconduct of day to day activities, The AN/GRC 163 was issuedto provide four channels of VHF communications for this pur-pose; howevcr a number of problems were encountered with'tbe163. The radio was highly subject to interference. Since itoperated in the same frequency range as the tactical FM radios,frequency interference became a major problem. There wasalso a maintenance problem with the equipment. To overcomethese problems the Brigade switched to TRC-117 radios for UHFco:::nuncations. Maintenance still left much to be desired,but it was much better than the VHF system. The frequency pro-blem was eliminated when UHF was employed. The only otherproblem of note experienced with the UHF was that, like the VHF,it was limited to line oi sight communications. The solutionapplied to this problem was to erect AB-216 antenna towers atthe Fire Support Bases and at the Brigade Headquarters. The3attalions also made good use of the additional eight channelsoffered by the TRC-117. These channels were used for "hotlines" and special purpose communications. This system wasrun iwith a minimum of outage time due to the fact that countingthe 163s there was 300% back-up for the VHF system,
10. Training:
a. Combat Training Center (CTC): CTC continued to bean integral part of brigade, providing all newly assigned per-sonnel with initial indoctrination into the Car's methods ofoperations. The professionalism displayed at CTC had a lastingimpression on the new replacements. The replacement trainingcycles at CTC reached a peak in the months of January andFebruary when as many as 500 replacements a week were trainedand shipped to field units. This large influx of personnelwas caused by the standdown of 101st Airborne Division as manyof their personnel were transferred to the "3d Brigade &Separate)Even though mtny of these soldiers had considerab e "b rsh a)experience, it was felt that the best method to prepare themfor operations in the Brigade AO was to let the8m go through
16
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIALAVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of 3.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
the CTC cycle. The large classes of replacements have now ceased.With the drawdown of U.S. units and a lack of CONUS replacements,the average class at CTC now averages less than 50.
b. lines and BoPbytrap Training: Combat experience reaffirmedthe enem7's capabilities and intentions to usa mines and boobytraosfor harassment and casualty production. A two-hour course of re-fresher training was established at CTC to cope with this proble.-.Emphasis was placed on specific fundamentals and techniques neededto successfully negotiate mined and boobytrapped areas. The courseof instruction was composed of approximately one-half i.cturO/ -r.,-stration and one-half practical exercise where the unit personnelactually negotiated a mined and boobytrapped lane. All rifle com-panies, reconnaissance platoons, and blues platoons were requiredto complete this training once every two months.
c. Pathfinder 0 Rigger, Scout Do&, and Forward Observer Training:In order'to be able -tc use ail of theYfqga~de's assets in tie propermanner, several additional.courses of instruction were initiated.Pathfinder classes were given on the selection and improvement oflanding zones. Rigger training was conducted to qualify and famil-iarize unit personnel in the techniques of rigging equipment forairmobile moves. A practical exercise/demonstration was also givento the infantry units in the employment of scout dogs-these dogshave endeared themselves to the grunts and many units wouldn't tninkof going on an operation now without their dog. Just recently a six-hour refresher training course on the call for and adjustment ofartillery fire was initiated; it is designed so that all personnelwill have a working knowledge of artillery procedures and be able rocall for fire should the need ever arise. It is through courses suchas these and othero that undoubtedly will'bo *taught in the "uture,that the infantryman.comes to possess his basic knowledge of allfacets of .the Car, hence, allowing hm to accompish his mission inthe most proficient manner.11. Redeployment of 3d Brigade Forces: The word redeployment isused in the broadest iense, to" incude massive changes in p6rsonnflassignments as well as tactical and base area adjustments. Numerousadministrative factors introduced by the withI4awal program hud asignificant impact on the selection of Brigade bases and securitymissions. Key areas that stand out are personnel turbulence due toUSARV-wide curtailment criteria and redistribution of personnel andthe standdown of battalions within the b:igade while the residualforce, Task Force Garry Owen, was being formed.
17CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIALAVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
a, Personnel Turbulences: The Brigade was affected by Incre-ments X, Xl,and XII. increment X introduced an enormous turn- -
over in personnel due to the USARV-wide 40,000 man space reductionin December 1971 and January 1972. This reduction was complicatedby the requirements to return as many troops as possible to COWUSfor the holiaay period. The Brigade experienced a 50% turnoverin personnel and received most of its replacements from in-countrytransfers. Personnel management was critical and every effortwas made to provide personal touches to the in-processing ofreplacements. Unfortunately, there were undesirable aspectsof the replacement situati-n which demanded aggressive actionat all levels of command. As the major units drawing downreported their excess personnel for reassignment in-countrythey relieved themselves of borderline disciplinary problems.Immediate measures were taken by the Brigade to identify thesepersonnel and administrative eliminations, bars to reenlistment,etc. were pursued to root out the trouble makers who weredeveloping as repeated offenders.
b. Standd*wA of Forces:
(1) Planning for the redeployment of 3d Brigadeforces during Increment XI began in January'72. The Redoploy-ment Control Center was established in the office of the S-3to plan, coordinate, and monitor the exect,tion of troop reductionrequirements. Detailed planning resulted in the publicationof the "3d Brigaie Redeployment Planning Guide", It providedguidance regarding the execution of personnel, administrative,and logistical requirements engendered by redeployment. TheIncrement XI trocp reduction resulted in the standdown of the2/5 Ca'.alry, 2/327 Infantry and 2/11 ACR (OPCON), and thedrawdown to zero strength and equipment of B/l/21 Arty and theAviation Maintenance and Supply Company. Additional spacereductions were effected through the selective drawdown ofother units. The Brigade's authorized strength w&s reducedfrom 7270 to 5294, a reduction of 1977 spaces. The standdown/drawdown of all units was completed prior to the IncrementXI suspense of 30 April 1972.
(2) The Brigade originally was structured for anincrease in strength to 5927 during the inItial phases ofIncrement XII. Considerable planning had been effected towardsthat end by 5 June 1972, Thus when the requirtament on thatdace to reduce to 2859 spaces ty 27 June 1972 viaa; received, the
18CONFIDENTIL
CONFIDENTIALAVDACc 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
staff was immediately set into vigorous motion in anotherdirection. Actually the reduction in strength had been anti-cipated for the July or beyond time frame. While the structureef the residual force, Task Force Garry Owen, was being deter-mined, equipment turn-in was beginning. Personnel outprocess-Ing was a majgr problem; assignment instructions, DEROScriteria and a myriad of other personnel factors had to beresolved. To a significant degree reassignments within theBrigade were delayed by negotiations about the residual 5trucfuresince 40S requirements could not be determined until theorganizational package was approved. Finally, the mere trans-fer of people would not solve all problems. Personnel had tobe outprocessed so that units could begin turning in equipment.By 23 June the emphasis shifted to the reassignment and ship-m ent of personnel within units so that buildings could be clearedand unit records and property books could be turned in. Withmore than 3000 people to transfer the Brigade was presentedwith a sizeable challenge to meet its suspense date. Theexperience which had bull up over the months concerningstanddown/drawdown activities did much to enable the Brigadeto accomplish its mission.
12. rorale Building Programs: Two programs that improvedmorale were the fsB 1x imprest funds and the "King for a Day"programs. Initially a "Flying PX" was established to providePX services to the infantryman in the field. This system hadits limitations as to the volume and quality of services itcould provide. A program to establish a permanent mini-PX ateach fire support base was initiated. The mini-PX's were con-trolled by the individual units and financed through an i.:prestfund. This system gave responsive service to tha Skytroopersin the forward areas. Supplementing this, was the policy of3electing each weekjone company or battery commander or avia-tion platoon loader to visit the brigade headqu*irters forrecognition of his performance of duty. His selection notonly permitted him to gain insight into the brigade operations,but afforded staff members the opportunity to uncove, problemsin their areas. The selected commander was given VIP treat-ment. During his reign, the "King for a Day" attended thebriefings, met the Brigade Staff, toured the area of operationswith the Commanding General, and received an appropriate 1stCavalry Division memento.
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CONFIDENTIALAVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
a. Human Relations: The Brigade has had a low incidentrate of human relations problems. Human relation councils wereformed at all echelons within the Brigade. All Skytrooperswere given the opportunity to present their problems throughmany different channels. Problems were considered on a personalbasis and attempts were made to establish satisfactory answersto all queries. The Brigade Human Relations Council woasrevitalized through the adoption of a new charter requiring thenresence of Battalion Commanders or Executive Officers as theunit representative. The success the Brigade has experiencedwas the result of the total and vigorous reas..,ertion of !eader-ship and command responsibilities. Councils can easily becomefacades, paying lip service to goals, The requirement that com-manders or executive officers be members of the Brigade Councilwas a compromise between the old and the new. Viable com-munication channels are also a necessity, both horizontal andvertical. The sacond mission of any leader is the welfare ofhis men. This is an old,yet clear' statement of human relations.
b. Drug Abuse Prevention: The Drug Abuse Prevention andControl Program for the 3d B3rigade has been oriented toward theaccomplishm~ent of three gbals: (1) prevention of drug abusethrough education of both enlisted and officer personnel, (2)control of drug abuse through regular urinalysis testing, and(3) rehabilitation of t1e known drug users so as to reintegratethe soldier back into the Army community. The primary agenciesestablished within the Brigade to establish these goals werethe Brigade Drug Control Center and the Drug RehabilitationCenter. The Drug Control Center was responsible for theeducotional and control aspects of the drug program, The centerscheduled classes for all units of the 3d Brigade in coordinationwith USAftV and 14ACV education teams. Those units within theBrigade that had a higher incidence of drug. abuse were scheduledfor refresher classes given by an officer, enlisted man, andex-addict, Likewise, the Drug Control Center scheduled periodicunit testing for all units in the Brigade. This permitted thecommand to identify the drug user and to take appropriate actionwith this individual. Once identified the known drug user wasrequired to submit to urinalysis testing twice a month forthe remainder of his tour. This follow-up testing was tcov-plished at the Brigade's Medica, Company dispensary. The DrugControl Center also scheduled appointments for admission tothe Drug Treatment Center, Long Binh and the Drug Abuse HoldingCenter. It also provided policy guidance to all units within
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COFFIDENTIAL
AVDACG 25 June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
the Brigade, The Drug Rehabilitation Center was establishedto help stop drug abuse among those soldiers who voluntarilyadmitted to their misuse of drugs. The center operated afourteen day program during which time the patients were engagedin group therapy sessions, individual counselling sessions andphysical activity program. The Rehabilitation Center also assumedresponsibility for the training of all unit counselors in theBrigade. The experience of the Brigade was that the drug programmust be characterized by a strong policy or philosophy. Simply,there is* no place for a recidivist drug abuser in the Brigadeor anywhere in the Army. Elimination must be fair, but exped-itious and final. Undesirable discharge should be the goal inmost cases. Of course a compassionate alternative must existfor those few individuals deserving and capable of rehabilitation.The Drug Rehabilitation Center provided such an alternative.Again, the key as always was command awareness and subsequently,competent command action.
c, USARV Curtailment Program: After obtaining a veryhealthy sfren.;t posture through a large input of CONUS andin-country replacements during the month of December, the Bri-gade was tasked to support the USARV-wide curtailment program.This program was initiated in order to meet the strengthgoals established by the President. Under this program, USARVannounced a USARV-wide DEROS cutoff date for curtailment andadjustment of DEROS. Basically, all personnel with a normalDEROS prior to the cut-off date had their tour curtailed andtheir DEROS adjusted. This system was easy to implement,considered fair by the troops and effected a speedy drawdown.However, the USARV-wide curtailment had certain disadvantages.Mainly, there was no selectivity among units or militaryoccupational specialities. This situation caused a seriousMOS imbalance and severely threatened the accomplishment ofcombat, combat support, and combat service support missions.The program continued through March with enlisted personnelbeing curtailed up to 90 days and additional plans to curtailup to 120 days, Needless to say, this amount of curtai ient,without regard to MOS and grade structure would have 'ippedunits of much needed knowledge and expertise. Although omespecialities are easily substituted for, the hard-skill MOS'ssuch as the aircraft maintenance (MOS 67) and aircraft com-ponent repair CMOS 68) series are not. In most cases, thereplacement flow failed to restore those critical specialties.
21CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL -2
AVDACG 25 June 1972SU3JECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
On 18 :arch 1972 in recognition of this problem, USARV modifiedthe program and established a comaiiand quota system. In essence,this system established or assigned a levy of personnel lossesto each subordinate command for the following mcnth. This systemwas designed to give each commander greater flexibility andselectivity in the management of his assets and yet still pro-vide sufficient losses to meet withdrawal goals. Under theseconlitions, commanders declared selected individuals as "ai5-sion essential". They were retained until normal DEROS or otheradjusted DEROS as the commander determined. This program createdadditional work for the unit and additional time was needed toplan and implement the local "mission essential" designations.Of course, 'time in-countTy" equity for curtailment purposeswas lost under this system as selected personnel were retainedand others with equal or less time in-country curtailed. Asa result, the challenge to leadership was increased as commandersimplemented the new procedure and sought to explain the rationalein support of the quota system and selective retention. Ingeneral, the new quota system was flexible and was much moreeffective Lt response to both mission accomplishment and achieve-ment of the USARV withdrawal goals. Of course, a severe MOSimbalance had already developed due to USARV-wide curtailmentsand delay in establishment of a flexible quota/levy-type system.iwever, the Brigade retention continued to perform effectively
dtJspite the handicap of critical MOS imbalances. This couldnot nave been accomplished if the USARV-wide curtailment programhad continued as previously planned.
d. AG Section Organic to Brigade: Throughout the periodof opae;tions of the 3d Brigade isepaate), the option ofreplacing the Adjutant General Section with a Personnel ServicesCompany was considered. The option was rejected since the provenAG Section was consistently more flexible and more responsive.The personnel turbulence caused by redeployment and USARVcurtailment was significant. The impact was acceptable dueto the tailored, and single unit-oriented administrative sup-.Drt rendered by the Brigade's AG sectlon. The geographicalrientation of the personnel service company support concept
.qas cited as a key advantage. This proved to be a myth whenthis 3rigade became the parent unit of the 2d Battalion, 327thInfantry located at Cam Ranh Day. The value of personalizedservice was quite evident. Members of the Brigade's AG sectionvisited Cam Ranh Bay to assist 2/327 Infantry in standdown.
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AViAlCG 25 June 172SU3JECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
Efficiency reports, awards and decorations were transportedto Bien 11oa for processing and subsequently returned to CamRanh Bay. Space saving is cited as a second advantage; howeverthe personnel service company is not capable of providingfull administrative support. An enlarged S-I section wouldhave been required since such activities as awards and decora-tions, postal requirements and congressional replies must b'eaccomplished by the supported unit. !he organic AG sectionalso supported dispersed uiits in Pleiku Kontum -andA]uv !o .In short, the activities and services provided b an Nect1nhave direct impact on the efficiency and morale of the parentunit. In the period of seven months the Brigade shipped andreceived in excess of 20,000 personnel while continuing to meettactical requirements. Personnel services should not be isolatedfrom the unit that is supported. Moreover, personnel managersare more efficient when they are rated by the commander thatthey supportl
e. Staff Judge Advocate: During the period 15 Decemberuntil present there was au increase in number of cases and Article15's processed. A majority of the cases processed during thisperiod were drug related, resulting primarily from a largeinflux of in-country transfers during December and January.The rising trend of drug offenses within the Brigade peakedduring early November. There were some field refusals duringlate December and early January. Most of those offenders werepersonnel new to the Brigade. The net increase in militaryjustice actions is a direct reflection of command emphasis onthe need for discipline. The subsequent decrease is a reflectionof troop response and individual pride in this unit.
i. Malaria Prevention: The Brigade Surgeon's Officesupervised the Malaria Prevention Program. All men wererequired to take one C-P tablet weekly and one Dap3one tabletdaily. An officer or NCO administered the pill and watchedeach trooper swallow. Since I January 1972 a program wasinstituted whereby all men processing on R&R or DBROS receiveda malAria debriefing. This fact was recorded on a malariadebriefing form which is included in the individual's DA 201File. In extension of the malaria prevention program, a concertedeffort was made to screen all living bunkers and night-workingbunkers (e.g, RTO shack and aid stations), Weekly aerial insecti-cide spray missions we'e conducted on all fire support bases,the Vung Tau R&R .enter and Bien Hoa Army Base. The net effectwas a reduced malaria incidence rate despite the onset of therainy season.
23CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAl.AVDACG 25 June 1972SU3JECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
g. Preventive Dentistry: The Preventive Dentistry Programwas successful. The Dental Officer visited two fire bases perweek on a rotating basis. Personnel were screened, Treatmentwas accomplished at the fire base or at the rear dental clinic.The program resulted in an increase in the level of dentalhygiene of 1st Cavalry Division personnel and a decrease ofmanpower loss to units.
13. Logistics: The logistical system continued service supportoperallons but expanded convoy operations to reduce aircraftutilization. In contrast to a purely airmobile environment,all maneuver battalions relocated their major fire supportbases near reads. As a result of these moves, the frequencyof road convoys increased. This technique has reduced aircraftutilization in the Brigade AO and also insured that bases wouldbe effectively resuppiied during periods of adverse flyingweather.
a. The increased us6 of vehicular transportation enabledthe brigade to simultaneousl;, move three major fire supportbases during December and early January. The operation wentsmoothly because of the planning and programifig that went intoeach separate unit move. By using road convoys, aircraft werereleased for higher priority missions. The closure of forwardoperating base MACB was accomplished in twenty-three days. Thebase had grown so large that demilitarization required 284 stakeand platform trailers. While not as rapid as an airmobile move,the use of road convoys facilitated combat operations. Tacti.alunits were compelled to relearn the techniques of road movement.As a lesson re-learned, unit SOP's should be regularly updatedto cover this eventuality.
b. Helicopter rearm/refuel points operated by the 229thAviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) and the 215th CompositeServico Battalion (Support) were reduced in number as theBrigade's AO reduced. During this period airmobile rearm/refuel euipment contributed significantly to the accomplishmentof the combat mission. The need to maintain this capabilltywithin the Brigade was further emphasized during the NVA iffensivewhich commenced in April. The availability of this equipmentallowed the Brigade to immediately react to the combat sitiation.
24I ONF:'flFMTiAl
~CONFIDENTIAL.
AVDACG 25 June 1972
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James F. HamletRCS C5SPIF-7 4
By establishing a rearm/refuel facility at a forward stagingarea (Song Be), the reconnaissance and armed helicopters wereable to stay on station for longer periods of time. Also, theproximity or the rearm/refuel assets organic -o the Brigadewere the only ones available in MRIII. This fact underscoresthe importance of retaining this capability within the TO&Estructure of the Brigade. This equipment gives the Brigadethe tools to establish a rearm/refuel point or to operateexisting rearm/refuel facilities that may not be operatingto their maximum capacity.
14. The Ri ers: Thu parachute riggers are an essentialfeature ot airmoility, The riggers, organic to the deliveryplatoon of the Composite Service Battalion (Support), S&TCompany, perform a unique mission. They inspect all loads forthe CH-47, UH-lH, and CH-54 helicopters, insure that all aerialdelivery equipment within the Brigade is serviceable, and rigsupplies and equipment for air drop. These highly skilled tech-nicians proved invaluable during the NVA offensive in Apriland May. During the initial phase of the offensive, the rig-gers organic to the Brigade constituted all of the US Amnyrigging capability in MRIII. They were used continually,rigging and inspectinS loads to be delivered to the combatareas, They also were instrumental in insuring that the mobilerearm/refuel point was rapidly and efficiently moved to itsforward location. The parachute rigger is the key to anefficient and safe airmobile resupply operation.
15, Maintaining a Garrison Headquarters: A prob)em faced bythis Brigad was the &ccompllshment of base defense missionsand the administrative operations of a perrianent installationwhile actively engaged in combat operations. Tactical unitsdo not have this capability and experience has shown thatgarrison functions can and must be carried out by a tailoredTDA unit. In the case of Bien Hoa, approximately 130 personnelwere required to maintain mimimum operation of facilities andconduct the required long range planning and supervi.ion of basedefense activities. Bien HoA Garrison also was reslponsiblefor the operation of a club system an education center, anda special services activity in addition to base defense and basedevelopment functions. Bven with this or anization, certaininadequacies were noted: primarily, the fact that only a smallS3 man TDA was approvdd to hanl.e te garrison function. Thuspersonnel, of necessity, were taken from Brigade assets to augmentthe TDA. This created an increased hardship while trying tomaintain our field strength.
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CONFIDENTIAL
I CONFIDENTIALAVDACG 2S June 1972SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of B.G. James P. Hamlet
RCS CSFCF-74
16. (U) Conclusion: Du~ing the past six months and duringseven years ot sustiined combat duty in Vietnam the Garry OvenBrigade has added to a long list of battlefield achievements.Throughout those years, the morale and espirit of the CavTrooper has been unequalled. Now, as more and more unitsdepart for home, much of the 3d Brigade (Separate), let CavalryDivision (Airmobile) remains. It is an honor to be ent'rustedwith this important mission, and our men have acceptec it assuch. Every trooper knows that he is a member of a teahemust do his Job so that no other team member suffers. It isthis spirit that has sustained THE FIRST TIAM throughout theyears. Suffice it to say that I am convinced today's FIRSTTEA 4 is the finest iighting organization within the UnitedStates Army.
JAMES F. HAMLTBrigadier General, USACommanding
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3J UNCLASSIFIEDSecunty Classification
DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA.- R & D(Securi$y clasification of till., bodyr of abe reel and lndozin anotation must be onword when the ove.rall eport fa claswi fle)
I ORWbINATING ACTIVITY (Cosporafteauthor) Ia.. REPORT SECURITY CLAiSIFICArI0Ir'
Confidential
H3 lQ DA, DAFD, Wahhington, D. C. 20310 hGRU4RE"RTTILE Senior Officer Debriefing Report (BG James F. Hamle~t, Comiander,
3d Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division -Inclusive Dates 13 Dec 71 - 20 Jun 72
14. DESCRIPTIVE NOThS (2rp .fispl and MeflUsie. dbfta~
-Senior Officer Debrief ing Report. 13 Dec 1 Jj7a AuTNONi~Sl (Pjralr7u. m$do. Romal ai e)
BC James F. Hamlet
4. REPORT DATE Va. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 7b. NO. OF REPS
17 November 1972 33Sa. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. 9& ORIOINATORS REPORT NUMMUERIS)
b. PROJECT NO 72B012
NjA 6C. OTHER RgI'oRT NOISI (Any oMIer Ilunba tt may be asigned
d.
10 DISTRIOUTION SYAT964ENT
11. SUPPLUMENTARY NOTES sit. 9PONSORINIS MILITARY ACTIVII V
