Avicenna Daneshnameh Part 1: LOGIC

DĀNESHNĀMEH

Part I:

LOGIC

ÓÖÝ§ �¿BÄrÃAe

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D~~~~neshn~~~~meh part I: Logic

a

CONTENTS

[Preface:] Exposition of the purpose and utility in the science of logic

The Beginning of the Science of Logic

1. Elucidation of that which is called “Single” among Expressions and Concepts

2. Elucidation of Universal and Particular Expressions

3. Exposition of Essential and Accidental Universals

4. Exposition of Genus, Species, Difference, Property and Common Accident

5. Explication of the character of Definition and Description

6. Elucidation of the meaning of Noun, Verb and Particle

7. Explication of what a Proposition is

8. Explication of the types of Propositions

9. Explication of the Predicative Proposition: Affirmation, Negation, Universality,

Particularity and whatever pertains to it

10. Explication of the character of Connective and Disjunctive Conditional Propositions,

in the same manner as was done for Predicative Propositions

11. Explication of the character of Contradiction

12. Exposition of the character of Conversion

13. On Recognizing the Syllogism

14. Explication of the Connective Syllogism

15. Exposition of the Moods of the Syllogisms of the First Figure

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ز ��

(1) *�� آ�دن )�'� �$�د &�ا�� از ل$# � و �"�! �

(2) *�� آ�دن ل$. آ�- و ,+وى

�دن آ�- ذا0- و ��/-� (3) ��ز�

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(5) *!�ا آ�دن �9ل �9 و ر�8

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� آ� چ� ��د*!�ا آ�دن ?<ّ! (7)

!ّ>? A�B? ا آ�دن�!*� (8)

AA و ,+وّ�� 9��- و ا��Eب و C�8 و آ�ّ!�دن ?<ّ!*!�ا آ (9)

�د � Fر ا�� و )�'� ا��ر&45 و ��$�45 ه�ى Gّ� -H�I*!�ا آ�دن �9ل ?<ّ! (10)

��( ه� �� )ن روى آ� در 9��- آ�دK!�� (11) *!�ا آ�دن �9ل

7L� دن �9ل�� (12) ��ز�

(13) در FG&��I ?!�س

(14) *!�ا آ�دن ?!�س ا?�Gا�-

�دن �9ل ?!�8 �ى 4LI اول� (15) ��ز�

D~~~~neshn~~~~meh part I: Logic

b

16. Syllogisms of the Second Figure

17. Syllogisms of the Third Figure

18. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Connective [Conditionals]

19. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Disjunctive [Conditionals]

20. Composite Syllogisms

21. Syllogism by reductio ad absurdum

22. Disclosure of the character of Induction

23. Disclosure of the character of Analogy

24. The Way of the Dialecticians in Proving the Absent from the Present

25. Explication of the Form and Matter of the Syllogism

26. Exposition of the types of Primitive Premises in Syllogisms

27. Explication of the Status of these Premises

28. Further Comment on the Account of Demonstration

29. The Types of Problems in the Demonstrative Sciences

30. Explanation of the term “Essential” as used in the Premises of Demonstrative

[Sciences]

31. The [various] types of Principles of Demonstration and that which is Predicate in

them

32. Exposition of the character of Demonstrative Syllogisms

33. Explication of the types of Scientific Questions

34. Directives giving Protection against Fallacies

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ى �� دّو�� م (16)

ى �� ّ�� م (17)

ى ا�� از ��ت �� (18)

ى ا�� از ��ت�� (19)

ى ��آ�� (20)

�س ! � (21)

(22) ن)�دن &ل ا��$�اء

(23) ن)�دن &ل ��ل

(24) را2 1*ل�ن ان*ر دل�� .�دن .-ی� از �ه*

ت �س4�*ا آ�دن ص�رت �س و �ّد (25)

�� 7)�ى �$*�ت 4�6�5 ان*ر (26) .زن)�دن

(27) �$*�ت4�*ا آ�دن 1ی8هى ای5

�ح �� &*ی9 .�هن را� ��6�. (28)

(29) ا 7م �7�� ; )ى .�هن�

(30) آ@ ان*ر �$*�ت .�هن� ?�ی�*ذات�ت�7�� آ�دن ل�>

(31) ا 7م �Dدى .�هن و CنB@ ان*ر ای6ن �A)�ل .�د

ى .�هن�� (32) .زن)�دن &ل

7)�ى E� (33)ل� ; )�4�*ا آ�دن

(34) وص�� آ@ از �-لEت ای)�� ده�*

D~~~~nishn~~~~meh

1

Praise and glory upon the Lord, the Creator, the Bestower of reason

Blessings upon His elected messenger, Muhammad, the chosen,

and upon his household and companions

[Preface]

The great command of our lord – the just prince, the assisted [by God] and triumphant,

the pillar of religion – ‘Alâ’ al-Dawla – honor of the nation, crown of the people – Abû

Ja‘far Muhammad, son of Doshmanziâr, [2] my master, the Commander of the Faithful –

long be his life, prosperous his fortune, and may his kingdom increase – came to me, the

bondsman and servant of his court, who have attained in his service all my wishes –

security, grandeur, eminence, fulfillment, engagement in science and [residence in his]

proximity – that I, the servant of this grand court, must compose a book in the Persian

language in which I gather together, with utmost brevity, the principles and [main] points

of five sciences from the sciences of wisdom of the ancients:

(i) The science of Logic, which is the science of the balance.

[3] (ii) The science of Physics, which is the science of those things that can be seen

with the senses and which are in motion and change.

(iii) The science of Astronomy and the structure of the universe: the character

[and] form of the motion of the heavens and the stars, so that it becomes revealed

how the truth of this could be known.

(iv) The science of Music: explication of the cause of the consonance and

dissonance of sounds and the composition of melodies.

(v) The science of that which is outside of nature.


1

Ai eja ‘fÄÍBrbI iBŒfÍj¯E fÃËAfa j¿ sÍBNm Ë pBƒm .ÔË ÆAiBÍ Ë OÎI ½ÇA jI Ë ,Ó°ñv¿ fÀZ¿ ÔË ‘fÍlŒ jJ¿BÎ‚ jI eËie Ë

[É¿f´¿]

Ò»Ëf»A ÕÝ§ ÅÍf»Afz§ ,iÌvÄ¿ ,f÷ÍÛ¿ ¾eB§ �¼¿ ,B¿ fÃËAfa –ilI ÆB¿j¯ É· ÅÎÄ¿ÛÀ»AjÎ¿A Ó»Ì¿ /iBÍlÄÀqe ÅIfÀZ¿ j°Ü ÌIA ÉÀÖÜA XBM Ë Ò÷¼À»Ajb¯ Ë [2] Ë ÊfÄI ÅÀI f¿E ,ÆËl¯A jI sÎÇBqeB‚ Ë ,kËjÎ‚ ObI Ë ,eBI kAie sÎÃBŒfÃk ÓÄÀÍA kA :sÍÌa ÔBÈ¿B· ÉÀÇ ÔË O¿fa ifÃA ÂAÉN¯BÍ É· ,ÔË ÊBŒie ÂeBa Å¿ É· fÍBI É· ;ÅNqAe �ÍelÃ Ë Á¼Ï ÅNaAej‚ Ë OÍB°· Ë ÊÌ¸q Ë ÓŒilI Ë BÈ¼uA ÔË ifÃA É· Ôie ÓmiBƒI ÁÄ· ±ÎÄvM ÓIBN· iAÌŒilI o¼V¿ ÆE ÂeBa .iBvNaA OÍB¬I ,ÂiËE ejŒ ÆBNÄÎrÎ‚ OÀ¸Y ÔBÈÀ¼§ kA Á¼§ WÄ‚ ÔBÈN¸Ã Ë

/.OmËkAjM Á¼§ ÔË É· µñÄ¿ Á¼§ Ó¸Í

,ÆfÍe fÍBrI ÷oZI É· OmBÇlÎ† ÆE Á¼§ É· PBÎ¨ÎJW Á¼§ Â÷Ëe Ë [3] .fÃAtejŒ Ë sJÄU ifÃA Ë

ÆBŒiBNm Ë BÈÃBÀmE sJÄU PiÌu ¾BY Ë Á»B§ eBÈÃË PDÎÇ Á¼§ Â÷Ìm Ë .ÅNnÃAe ÆE O´ÎÝ OnÍBrI ÆÌ† É· fÃAÊeÌÀÃkBI É¸ÃBÄ†

.BÈÄZ» ÆeBÈÃË BÇkAËE kBmBÃ Ë kBm KJm ÆeÌÀÃkBI Ë Ó´ÎmÌ¿ Á¼§ ÂiBÈ† Ë

.OmA O¨ÎJW kA ÆËjÎI É‡ÃE Á¼§ ÁVÄ‚ Ë

D~~~~nishn~~~~meh

2

It was so resolved that upon completion of the science of logic, one contrive [4] to make

a beginning from the superior science, and [from there] proceed gradually to the inferior

sciences, contrary to the established custom and habit. If, therefore, at some point there

should be no alternative other than to refer to one of the inferior sciences, reference will

be made.

So although I – servant that I am – did not consider myself [to be] of the level of this

science, but regarded it as surpassing my capacity, [still] I deemed that if I should comply

with and obey the command of my benefactor, compliance would issue in a favorable

outcome. [Thus] I trusted in my Creator and applied myself to obeying the command.


2

É· fÍE Êej· /É¼ÎY ,µñÄ¿ Á¼§ kA fÍE ÉNaAej‚ ÆÌ† É· eBN¯A iBÎNaA ÆBÄ† Ë [4] É¸ÃE ²ÝbI ,fÍE Êfq ÅÍjÍk ÔBÈÀ¼Ï WÍifNI Ë ,eÌq Êej· ÅÍjI Á¼§ kA kB«E ÔBÈÀ¼§ kA ÓÀ¼Ï O»AÌY kA eÌJÃ ÊiB† ÓÍBU jŒA o‚ .OmA PeB§ Ë Ámi

.fÍE Êej· O»AÌY ,ÅÍjÍk

Ai Á¼§ ÅÍA Ë ,ÁNnÃAfÃ Á¼§ ÅÍA ÊBNÍB‚ Ai ÅNrÍÌa É· fÄ† jÇ ,ÂeBa Å¿ o‚ OÀ¨Ã Ó»Ë ÆB¿j¯ Ë O§BW ÆÌ† É· ÂejI ÆBÀŒ ,ÂfÍe sÍÌa if³ kA ÆËl¯A iBŒfÍj¯E jI Âej· ½÷·ÌM Ë ;eiËE iBI µÎ¯ÌM O§BW ÓNNnVa jI ,ÂjI sÍÌa

/.Âfq ¾Ì¬r¿ ÔiAejI ÆB¿j°I Ë sÍÌa

D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic

3

Exposition of the Purpose and Utility in the Science of Logic

[5] Knowledge is of two kinds: one is conception (in Arabic called taşawwur), e.g. if

someone says “man” or “fairy” or “angel” (or whatever is similar to this), you

understand, conceive and grasp [what he means by this]. The second [kind] is assent, e.g.

when you assent that “fairy exists,” or that “man is under command” or whatever is

similar to this; and this in Arabic is called taşdīq.

Now, each of these two is of two kinds. [6] One [kind] is that which can be grasped by

thought; and there is no alternative [here], for it can [only] be elicited through inquiry by

way of reasoning; for example, conceiving and apprehending the whatness of soul, or for

example, assenting to and affirming the immortality of soul.

The other [kind] is that we conceive [something] and assent to it, neither by means of

thought nor by the inquiry of reason, but rather: (a) we know it by primary reason: e.g.

we know that any [number of] things [that are] equal to one thing (in that each one of

them is equal to it) are also equal to one another; [7] (b) or [we know it] by the senses:

e.g. we know that the sun is bright; (c) or we have received [our conceptions and

affirmations] from the great and the wise, such as from the author of religious laws and

the imāms; (d) or [our conceptions and affirmations] are a thing on which the agreement

of men rests and upon which our upbringing has been based: e.g. we say, “lying is

disgraceful,” or “one ought not to do injustice”; (e) or in another respect that will be

mentioned later.

Everything whose conception or affirmation must be elicited by thought, requires that

prior to it we know something else, so that by means of this we may know the unknown.

[8] An example of this in the case of conception is: if we do not know what man is, and

someone explains to us, saying, “man is an animal that speaks,” we would first need to

have known, and conceived of, the meaning of “animal” and the meaning of “speaks.”

We would then know what we did not know [in regard to] the meaning of “man.”

µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbÃ sbI - ÓÖÝ§ �¿BÄrÃAe

3

ÔË ifÃA ÊfÍB¯ Ë µñÄ¿ Á¼§ ifÃA ~j« ÆeÌÀÃ kBI [5] jŒA É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÃAÌa iÌvM ÔkBNI É· ÆfÎmi ifÃA Ó¸Í :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe ÅNnÃAe iÌvM Ë ÓÄ· ÁÈ¯ ÌM (fÃB¿ ÅÍfI É† jÇ Ë) ÉNqj¯ BÍ Ôj‚ BÍ Âej¿ :fÍÌŒ Ón· É· ÔËjNI É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÆfÍËjŒ Â÷Ëe Ë [.fÇAÌa Ó¿ É† ÅÍfI É·] ÓIBÍ ifÃA Ë ÓÄ· ÔkBNI Ai ÅÍA Ë ;fÃB¿ ÅÍfI É† jÇ Ë ,#OnÃB¿j¯ jÍk Âej¿$Ë #OnÇ Ôj‚$

.fÄÍÌŒ µÍfvM

ÊiB† Ë ,ÅN¯BÍifÃA fÍBq ÉrÍfÃBI É· OnÃE Ó¸Í /.fÃA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe Ëe jÇ ÅÍA Ë [6] ÔlÎ† É‡I ÆfÎmi ifÃA É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÆeiËE ÔBVI fÍBq eja ÊAi kA K¼ñI Ai ËA É· ,eÌJÃ .ÔÌI Æej· µÍfvM Ë ,ÆAËi Æej¿BÄI ÆfÍËjŒ É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ;ÔË Æej· iÌvM Ë ,ÆAËi

K¼ñI ÉÃ Ë ÉrÍfÃA OÈU kA ÉÃ ,ÁÍËjNI ÔÌI Ë ,ÁÎIBÍifÃA Ai ËA É· OnÃE jNÍe Ë É·) lÎ† �Í BI fÄqBI jIAjI É† jÇ É· ÁÎÃAe É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÁÎÃAe eja ¾÷ËBI :É¸¼I ,eja É· ÁÎÃAe É¸ÃBÄ† ,÷oZI BÍ /.fÃÌI jIAjI lÎÃ jNÍe BI �Í (fÃÌI ÔË fÄ† �Í jÇ [7] KYBu kA É¸ÃBÄ† ÆBÍBÃAe Ë ÆBŒilI kA ÁÎqBI ÉN¯jÍh‚ BÍ .OmA ÅqËi LBN¯E

ÔË jI B¿ tiËj‚ Ë ,eÌI ÔË jI Âej¿ ¶B°MA É· fqBI ÔlÎ† BÍ .ÆB¿B¿A Ë ÆBN¨Íjq ÔËjI BÍ .#Æej· fÍBJÃ ÁNm$ Ë #OmA Oqk ®Ëie$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fqBI ÊeÌI

.fÍE Êej· eBÍ jNnƒm É· BÈÍËi kA jNÍe

fÍBI ÔË kA sÎ‚ ,ÆeiËE fÍBI ÔBVI ÉrÍfÃBI ÔÌI µÍfvM BÍ ÔË iÌvM É† jÇ Ë /.ÁÎÃAfI ÔÌI Ai ÉNnÃAeBÃ BM ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAe jNÍe ÔlÎ† É·

Ë eÌI É† Âej¿ É· fqBJÃ ÉNnÃAe Ai B¿ jŒA :É¸ÃE - iÌvM LBI ie ÅÍA ¾BR¿ [8] OnbÃ B¿ É· fÍBI ,#BÍÌŒ eÌI ÔiÌÃBU Âej¿$ É· fÍÌŒ Ë ,fÍBÀÃ kBI Ai B¿ Ón·

o‚ ;ÆBrÍBI ÁÎqBI ÊfÎmi ifÃA Ë BÍÌŒ ÓÄ¨¿ Ë ,iÌÃBU ÓÄ¨¿ ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAe .ÁÎÃAfI Âej¿ ÓÄ¨¿ kA ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAfÃ É‡ÃE ÊBNÃE


4

An example of this in the case of affirmation and assent is: if we do not know that the

world is created, and someone explains to us, saying, “the world is [endowed] with form,

and whatever is [endowed] with form is created,” we would need to have affirmed and

known [beforehand] that the world is [endowed] with form, as well as affirmed and

known [9] that whatever is [endowed] with form is created. We would then know what

we did not know [before] about the createdness of the world.

Hence anything that we do not know but wish to know, we will know by the things that

we have first known; [i.e.] whatever is unknown [to us] comes to be known by the

known. However, not every known leads the way to every unknown, since for every

unknown there exists an appropriate known, through which [that unknown] may be

known. [Moreover,] there exists a path by which it is possible to proceed from the

known to the unknown, so that [the unknown] comes to be known.

Now, the science of logic is the science in which it becomes evident what the modes are

of the coming-to-be-known of the unknown through the known, viz., which are the true

[modes]; which are the ones close to the truth; which are false; and of how many [10]

kinds each are.

The science of logic is the science of the balance, while the other sciences are the

sciences of profit and loss. The salvation of man is through the purity of soul, and the

purity of soul consists in the conception of the beings within it and in keeping distant

from the defilement of nature. The way to both of these is through science. But any

science that is not weighed in the balance [of logic] is not certain, hence is not truly a

science. Consequently, there is no alternative but to learn the science of logic.

Now, these sciences of the ancients have the character that the one who studies them does

not at first know what utility there is in that which he is studying; then, at the end, he

realizes all at once and grasps its utility and purpose. Therefore, the reader of this book

must not lose heart on hearing things that do not disclose their utility quickly.


4

É· fqBJÃ ÉNnÃAe Ai B¿ jŒA :É¸ÃE - µÍfvM Ë ÆfÍËjŒ LBI ie ÅÍA ¾BR¿ Ë Ë ,Omi÷Ìv¿ Á»B§$ É· fÍÌŒ Ë fÍBÀÃ kBI Ai B¿ Ón· Ë ,OmA TfZ¿ Á»B§ É· ÉNnÃAe Ë ÁÎqBI ÊfÍËjŒ B¿ É· fÍBI .#eÌI TfZ¿ eÌI i÷Ìv¿ É† jÇ

TfZ¿ eÌI i÷Ìv¿ É† jÇ É· /ÉNnÃAe Ë ÁÎqBI ÊfÍËjŒ lÎÃ Ë .Omi÷Ìv¿ Á»B§ [9] .ÁÎÃAfI Á»B§ ÓQfZ¿ ¾BY kA ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAfÃ É‡ÃE ÊBNÃE o‚ .eÌI

ÉNnÃAe Ai ÆBrÍA ¾÷ËA É· ÁÎÃAe BÇlÎ‡I ,ÁÎÃAfI É· ÁÎÇAÌa Ë ÁÎÃAfÃ É† jÇ o‚

ejI ÊAi ÉNnÃAe jÇ ÉÃ Å¸Î»Ë .eÌq ÉNnÃAe ÉNnÃAfI ,eÌI ÉNnÃAeBÃ É† jÇË .ÁÎqBI AiËA fÍBq ÔË kA É· ,ÔË iÌaifÃA OnÇ ÉNnÃAe Ai ÉNnÃAeBÃ jÇ É· ;ÉNnÃAeBÃ jÈI .eÌq ÉNnÃAe BM ÉNnÃAeBÄI ÉNnÃAe kA Æfq fÍBq ÊAi ÆAfI É· OnÎÇAi Ë ÅNnÃAe

ÉNnÃAeBÃ Æfq ÉNnÃAe ¾BY eÌq fÍf‚ ÔË ifÃA É· OmA Á¼§ ÆE µñÄ¿ Á¼§ Ë ,eÌI O´Î´ZI �ÍelÃ É· eÌI ÂAf· Ë ,eÌI O´Î´ZI É· eÌI ÂAf· É· ,ÉNnÃAfI

.eÌI ÉÃÌŒ /fÄ† Ó¸Í jÇ Ë ,eÌI ¡¼« É· eÌI ÂAf· Ë [10]

ÔiBNNmi Ë .OmA ÆBÍk Ë eÌm Á¼§ jNÍe ÔBÈÀ¼§ Ë ,OmËkAjM Á¼§ µñÄ¿ Á¼§ Ë iËfI Ë ,ÔË ifÃA OmBÈÎNnÇ ÅNnI PiÌvI ÆBU Ó·B‚ Ë ,OmA ÆBU Ó·BƒI Âej¿ ËkAjNI É· ÓrÃAe jÇ Ë ,OmA sÃAfI Ëe jÇ ÅÍfI ÊAi Ë ,O¨ÎJW sÍÜE kA ÆeÌI ÅNaÌ¿E kA OnÎÃ ÊiB† o‚ .eÌJÃ sÃAe O´Î´ZI o‚ ,eÌJÃ ÅÎ´Í ,eÌJÃ ÉNbm

.µñÄ¿ Á¼§

É· fÃAfÃ iB· ¾÷ËBI ÔË ‘fÃkÌ¿E É· OnÃE OÎuBa AjÃBNÄÎrÎ‚ ÔBÈÀ¼§ ÅÍA Ë ÆE ‘fÍB°I Ë ,fÃAfI iBJ¸ÎI jaFI o‚ ,ekÌ¿E ÓÀÇ É‡ÃE ifÃA OnÎ† ÊfÍB¯ eÌrÃ •ÄM ¾e Ai LBN· ÅÍA ‘fÄÃAÌa É· fÍBI o‚ .ÔË ~j¬I Ë fmi ifÃA

.fÍBÀÄÃ Ai ÊfÍB¯ eËk É· ÓÍBÇlÎ† ÆfÎÄrI


5

THE BEGINNING OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC

1. Elucidation of that which is called “Single” among Expressions and Concepts

[11] [Knowing single and composite expressions:] It must be known that expressions are

of two kinds: One is called single [i.e. when none of the parts of the expression signify

any part of the meaning], such as when you say “Zaid” or “Muhammad,” or as when you

say “man” or “wise.” The other is called composite or compound [i.e. when some of the

parts of the expression signify some part of the meaning], such as when you say “man is

wise,” or “the wise man.” As long as the character of single expressions is not known,

the character of composite expressions will not be known.

2. Elucidation of Universal and Particular Expressions

Every single expression is either universal or particular. [12] A universal [expression] is

one that can apply with the same meaning to many things equally: e.g. “man,” for man

applies with the same meaning to Zaid, ‘Amr and Bakr. If it happens that [a universal

expression] has been applied to one thing, you can imagine applying it to many things,

for from that meaning you can, by the imagination, think of many things; for instance,

you can think of many suns and many moons. A particular [expression] is one that

cannot apply with the same meaning to other than a single thing, and you cannot apply

that same meaning of it to anything else: e.g. [13] “Zaid,” for the meaning of Zaid

belongs to none other than Zaid. Hence if you call another thing Zaid, you do so with

another meaning and not with the same meaning.

Now, the devotees of science are not concerned with the character of particular

expressions or particular concepts; their concern is rather with universal concepts,

[though] there is no doubt that every universal has [a number of] particulars [subsumed]

under it.


5

µñÄ¿ Á¼§ kB«E [11] BÈÎÄ¨¿ Ë BÈ¤°» kA fÄÃAÌa ej°¿ É‡ÃE Æej· fÍf‚ (1) .eÌI ÉÃÌŒ Ëe ¥°» É· fÍE ÉNnÃAe É· fÍBI .K·j¿ Ë ej°¿ ¥°» ÅNnÃAe

ÓÄ¨¿ ÕAlUA kA ÓzÏ jI ¥°» ÕAlUA kA ÓzÏ É· OnÃE ÆEË]fÄÃAÌa ej°¿ Ai Ó¸Í .#BÃAe$Ë #Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† Ë #fÀZ¿$ Ë #fÍk$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† [fÄ¸Ã O»Üe kA ÓzÏ jI ¥°» ÕAlUA kA ÓzÏ É· OnÃE ÆEË] fÄÃAÌa ±÷»Û¿ Ë K÷·j¿ Ai Ó¸Í Ë .#BÃAe Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ BÍ #OmBÃAe Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† [fÄ· O»Üe ÓÄ¨¿ ÕAlUA

.fÍBÎÃ ÉNnÃAe K÷·j¿ ÔBÈ¤°» ¾BY ,fÍBÎÃ ÉNnÃAe ej°¿ ÔBÈ¤°» ¾BY BM Ë

ÔËlU Ë Ó÷¼· ¥°» Æej· fÍf‚ (2) ÔBÇlÎ† jI ÓÄ¨¿ �ÎI É· eÌI ÆE Ó÷¼· Ë /.ÔËlU BÍ ,eÌI Ó÷¼· BÍ ej°¿ Ó¤°» jÇ [12] fÍk jI ÓÄ¨¿ �ÎI Âej¿ É· ,#Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,jIAjI fN¯A É· fÍBq iBÎnI Á÷ÇÌM ÌM ,eÌI ÊeBN¯A lÎ† �Í jI É· eÌI ÆBÄ† jŒA Ë .j¸I jI Ë ËjÀ§jI Ë ,fN¯A ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE kA ÓÃAÌM ÁÇÌI É· ,ÓÄ¸¯A iBÎnI ÔBÇlÎ† jI Ai ËA É· Æej· ÓÃAÌM Ë ,iBÎnI ÔBÈIBN¯E ÆfÎrÍfÃA ÓÃAÌM É¸ÃBÄ† .ÆfÎrÍfÃA iBÎnI ÔBÇlÎ†

,eÌI Ai lÎ‡¸Í lU É· fÍBrÃ ÓÄ¨¿ �ÎI É· eÌI ÆE ÔËlU Ë .iBÎnI ÔBÈIBNÇB¿ É· ,#fÍk$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ÆfÄ¸¯A jNÍe ÔlÎ†jI AiË ÓÄ¨¿ ÆBÀÇ ÓÃAÌNÃ Ë jNÍe ÓÄ¨ÀI ,ÓÃAÌa fÍk Ai jNÍe ÔlÎ† jŒA o‚ .eÌJÃ Ai fÍk lU fÍk ÓÄ¨¿

.ÓÄ¨¿ ÆBÀÈI ÉÃ ,ÓÃAÌa

É¸¼I ,ÔËlU ÔBÈÎÄ¨¿ Ë ÔËlU ¦B°»A ¾BZI OnÎÃ Ó»Ì¬r¿ Ai Á¼§ ½ÇA Ë BÈÍËlU Ai Ó÷¼· jÇ É· OnÎÃ �q Ë .OmA Ó÷¼· ÔBÈÎÄ¨ÀI ÆBrÍA ½¬q

.eÌI jÍk ifÃA


6

3. Exposition of Essential and Accidental Universals

The universal, in relation to its particulars, is either essential or accidental. The essential

[universal] is that which, when you know its meaning and the meaning of its particular,

you of necessity know [the following] three factors: (i)You know that [the given]

particular has the meaning [conveyed by the universal]. For instance, when you know

what animal is, what man is, what number is, and what four is, you cannot fail to know

that man is animal, and likewise you cannot fail to know that four [14] is number.

However, if instead of animal and number you put existent or white, it is possible for you

not to know whether man exists, or four exists, or whether man is white or not. (ii) You

know that first the essential concept (meaning) must exist, in order that it [can then apply

to] a particular thing. For instance, a thing must first be animal, in order that it [can] then

be man; and it must first be number, in order that it [can] then be four; and it must first be

man, in order that it [can] then be Zaid. [15] (iii) You know that nothing has given that

concept (meaning) to the particular, rather, it has it through itself. For instance, you

rightly know that nothing has made man animal, or made four number; otherwise, if that

thing did not exist, there could be a man that is non-animal, and similarly there could be a

four that is non-number, and this is impossible.

The meaning of our saying, “something made something [else] such-and-such,” is that

the thing was not in itself that way, but that something from the outside rendered it thus.

Now, if a thing cannot be other than the way [it is], then another thing has not made it

such. Indeed, that thing which made man, made [therewith] animal; but it did not make

man [16] animal, for man is himself animal, four is itself number, and blackness is itself

color. And this is not in the way whiteness is for man, for there is something that makes

man white [both] within his nature and outside of his nature. Nor is it in the way

existence is for man, for there must be something which gives man existence.


6

Óyj§ Ë ÓMAg Ó÷¼· ÆeÌÀÃ kBI (3) ÆÌ† É· eÌI ÆE ÓMAg Ë .Óyj§ BÍ eÌI ÓMAg BÍ Ai sÍÌa ÔBÈÍËlU j¿ Ó÷¼·

:ÉÄÍEjÇ ÓÃAfI ¾BY Ém ,ÓÃAfI ÔË ÔËlU ÓÄ¨¿ Ë ,ÓÃAfI ÔË ÓÄ¨¿ É· ÓÃAfI ÆÌ† É¸ÃBÄ† ,OnÇ ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE Ai ÔËlU ÆE É· ÓÃAfI É¸ÃE Ó¸Í

É· ÓÃAÌNÃ ,eÌI É† iBÈ† Ë ,eÌI É† iBÀq Ë ,eÌI É† Âej¿ Ë ,eÌI É† ÆAÌÎY .OmiBÀq /iBÈ† É· ÓÃAfÃ É· ÓÃAÌNÃ ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ Ë ,OnÃAÌÎY Âej¿ É· ÓÃAfÃ [14] É· Æej· ÓÃAÌM ,ÓÈÃ fÎƒm BÍ ,ÓÈÃ eÌUÌ¿ iBÀq Ë ÆAÌÎY ¾fI jŒA Å¸Î»Ë

.OnÎÃ BÍ OmfÎƒm Âej¿ BÍ ,OnÇ iBÈ† BÍ ,OnÇ Âej¿ É· ÓÃAfÃ ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE BM eÌI É· fÍBI OmA ÓMAg É· ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE OnbÃ É· ÓÃAfI É¸ÃE jBÍe Ë Âej¿ ËA ÊBNÃE BM eÌI ÆAÌÎY lÎ† OnbÃ É· fÍBI É¸ÃBÄ† .eÌI Ai ÔËlU lÎ† ÆE BM eÌI Âej¿ É· fÍBI Ë ,eÌI iBÈ† ËA ÊBNÃE BM eÌI iBÀq OnbÃ É· fÍBI Ë ,eÌI ÊeAfÃ ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE Ai ÔËlU ÆE lÎ† ˆÎÇ É· ÓÃAfI É¸ÃE ÂÌm Ë / .eÌI fÍk ËA ÊBNÃE [15] Ai Âej¿ lÎ† ˆÎÇ É· ÓÃAfI OmifI É¸ÃBÄ† .eÌI eÌa kA ÆE Ai ËA É¸¼I ,eÌI

ÆAÌÎYBÃ ÔeÌI Âej¿ ,ÔeÌJÃ lÎ† ÆE jŒA ÷ÜAË ,ej¸Ã iBÀq Ai iBÈ† Ë ,ej¸Ã ÆAÌÎY .eÌI ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA Ë ,iBÀqBÃ ÔeÌI iBÈ† ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ Ë

ÔeÌbI lÎ† ÆE É· eÌI ÆE ,#ej· ÅÎÄ† Ai ÔlÎ† ÔlÎ†$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ ÓÄ¨¿ Ë ÔlÎ† É· fÍBrÃ jŒAË ,ej· ÅÎÄ† ÔlÎ† Ai ËA ÆËjÎI kA Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌJÃ ÅÎÄ† eÌa Ai Âej¿ É· lÎ† ÆE ÔiE .eÌI Êej¸Ã ÅÎÄ† Ai ËA ÔlÎ† o‚ ,eÌI ÅÎÄ† lU eÌa

eÌa Âej¿ É· ,ej¸Ã ÆAÌÎY / Ai Âej¿ Å¸Î»Ë ;ej¸I Ai ÆAÌÎY ,ej¸I [16] ÆBÄ† ÉÃ ÅÍA Ë .OmA ÉÃÌŒ eÌa ÓÇBÎm Ë OmiBÀq eÌa iBÈ† Ë OnÃAÌÎY ÔË ©JW ifÃA fÄ· fÎƒm Ai Âej¿ É· eÌI ÔlÎ† É· ,Ai Âej¿ ÔfÎƒm É· OmA fÍBI ÔlÎ† É· ,Ai Âej¿ j¿ ÓNnÇ É· OnÃBÄ† ÉÃ Ë ;ÔË ©JW kA ÆËjÎI Ë

.fÇe ÓNnÇ Ai Âej¿ É·


7

Hence every concept that embraces these three conditions is an essential concept, and

anything that lacks any one of these conditions is accidental. [Yet] there is an accidental

[characteristic] which can never be separated from the thing, not even by the imagination:

for instance, evenness [cannot be separated] from thousand; or from triangle [one cannot

separate] its three angles being equal to [17] two right angles (the explanation of which

will be made known later). Or for instance, [one cannot separate] from man [the ability

to] laugh by nature. However, these are characteristics which are subsequent to the

reality of the thing; and of this, too, we must speak in more detail.

Man possesses two characteristics that are analogous: one essential, the other accidental.

As for the essential [characteristic], it is [having the faculty of] speech/reason, and its

explanation is that man has a soul [capable of] speech – that soul from which comes

speaking, discernment and the characteristics belonging to man. The other, the accidental

[characteristic], is [his being capable of] “laughter,” and its explanation is that man’s

nature is such that when he sees or hears something perplexing [and] strange, he becomes

perplexed, [18] and if there be no hindrance from either [his] nature or disposition, he

may laugh. [However,] prior to these two characteristics, it is necessary that the soul first

exist, in order that man exist. So when this soul becomes coupled with body, and man

becomes man, then do laughing and wonderment come about. Thus the later

characteristic [only] comes about when man has become man; accordingly, you can say

that man must first possess a human soul in order to become human, and in order that he

may be [capable of] laughing by nature. But you cannot say that he must first be [capable

of] laughing by nature, in order that he [then] have a human soul and become human.

Consequently, the former characteristic is in reality essential, and the second

characteristic, even though it is never separated from man, is not essential but is

accidental.

But as for your saying “Zaid is sitting,” or “is sleeping,” or “is old,” or “is young” – there

is no doubt that these are accidental, although one changes more quickly and another

remains longer. [19]


7

BÈÀ¸Y ÅÍkA É† jÇ Ë .eÌI ÓMAg ÔË ,eÌI AiË Á¸Y Ém ÅÍA É· ÓÎÄ¨¿ jÇ o‚ elÎajI lŒjÇ É· fÍBrÃ É· eÌI Óyj§ Ë .eÌI Óyj§ ÔË ,eÌJÃ AiË Á¸Y �Í Ém ÆeÌI ,S¼R¿ kA É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ÓN°U ,iAlÇ kA É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÁÇÌI lÎÃ ÉÃ Ë ,lÎ† kA kA É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ,eÌq ÉNnÃAe ÅÍA jÎn°M jNnƒm É· ÉÀÖB³ Ëe / fÄ‡ÀÇ ËA �ÍËAk [17] .fÃÌI lÎ† O´ÎÝ oƒm É· fÃA ÓÖBÈN°u ÆBrÍA Å¸Î»Ë ,©JñI Ó·BÃfÄa ,Âej¿

.ÁÎÍÌNI jNYjrI lÎÃ Ai ÅÍA É· fÍBI Ë

.Óyj§ Â÷Ëe Ë ÓMAg Ó¸Í :�ÍelÃ jNÍfI Ó¸Í ,OmA O°u Ëe Ai Âej¿ j¿ ,eÌI BÍÌŒ Åbm ÆBU AiË É· eÌI ÆE ÔË jÎn°M Ë ,#µWBÃ$ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓMAg B÷¿A ,Óyj§ jNÍe Ë .fÍE ËA kA Ó¿ej¿ ÔBÈ÷uBa Ë lÎÀM Ë ÅN°Œ Åbm É· ÆBU ÆE ÔlÎ† ÆÌ† É· OnÃBÄ† ÔË ©JW ifÃA É· OnÃE ÔË jÎn°MË ,#�YBy$ É¸ÃBÄ† ©JW kA eÌJÃ ÊfÃiAekBI jŒA Ë /.fÍE O°Nq AiË ,eÌÄq BÍ fÄÎI KÍj« Ë O°Nq [18]

eÌJI ÆBU É· fÍBI O°u Ëe ÅÍA kA jNrÎ‚ Ë ;efÄbI É· fÍBq ,ÔÌa kA BÍ ,eÌq Âej¿ Âej¿ Ë ,eÌq O°U ÅM BI ÆBU ÅÍA ÆÌ† o‚ .eÌJI Âej¿ BM ,OnbÃ Âej¿ É· fÍE ÓÀÇ ÊBNÃE ±uË ÅÎnƒm o‚ .fÍE ÔiAe O°Nq Ë Ó·BÃfÄa ÊBNÃE Ó¿ej¿ ÆBU Ai Âej¿ É· fÍBI OnbÃ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM Ai ½J³ ÅÍA kAË ,eÌq Âej¿ É· fÍBI OnbÃ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌNÃ Ë .©JñI fqBI ÆAfÄa BM Ë ,eÌq Âej¿ BM eÌI ÅÎrÎ‚ ±uË o‚ .eÌq Âej¿ Ë fqBI Ó¿ej¿ ÆBU Ai ËA BM ©JñI fqBI ÆAfÄa ÓMAg elÎbÃjI Âej¿ kA lŒjÇ É· fÄ† jÇ Â÷Ëe ±uË Ë O´Î´ZI OmA ÓMAg

.OmA Óyj§ É· ,OnÎÃ

BÍ ,#OmjÎ‚$ BÍ ,#OmA ÉN°a$ BÍ ,#OmA ÉNnrÃ fÍk$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃE B÷¿AË Ë eejŒjI jMeËk Ó¸Í É· fÄ† jÇ ,OmA Óyj§ É· OnÎÃ �q ,#OnÃAÌU$

.fÃBÀI jMjÍe Ó¸Í


8

4. Exposition of Genus, Species, Difference, Property and Common Accident

There are altogether five [kinds of] universal terms: three essential, two accidental. The

essential is of two kinds:

(a) The first is that when you ask in regard to [some] things, “what are they?,”

seeking [to learn] by that question the reality of their meaning, answer is given to that by

an essential term. For instance, if you ask “what are man, ox and horse?,” it will be

answered, “they are animals”; and if you ask “what are blackness, whiteness and

redness?,” it will be answered, “they are colors”; and if you ask “what are ten, five and

three?,” it will be answered, “they are numbers.” Similarly, if it is asked “what are Zaid,

‘Amr and Kh~led?,” it will be answered, “they are men.” [20] Hence “animal,” “color,”

“number,” and “man” fall within the answer [to the question] of the whatness of these

things; in Arabic this is called the answer to m~ huwa? [“What is?”]

(b) The other [kind of essential universal term] is that given as answer when you

ask about the which-ness of each [thing] in itself; e.g. [if] you ask “which animal is

man?,” it will be replied, “the rational [animal].” Thus “rational” is the answer to [the

question] “which is?” regarding man; in Arabic it is said in answer to [the question] ’ayyu

shay’in? [“Which thing is it?”]. Or for instance, [if] it is asked, “four is which number?,”

it will be replied “that [number] which on being halved twice arrives at one.”

[21] Everything which is an essential universal, and is the response to [the question]

“Which thing is it?,” is called difference (faÕl). As for that essential universal which is in

response to [the question] “What is?” (m~ huwa?), it is more general and more particular

[than the former]. For instance, body is more general than animal, but more particular

than substance; animal is more general than man, but more particular than body;

similarly, number is more particular than quantity, but more general than even (for

example); even is more particular than number, but more general than four; and four is

more particular than even, but more general than this four or that four. Hence everything

that is a more general universal is the genus of a more particular [universal], and

everything that is a more particular universal is the species of a more general [universal].

There may be a thing that is both genus and species; [22] and there may be a thing that is


8

ÂB§ ~j§ Ë ÉuBa Ë ½v¯ Ë ªÌÃ Ë oÄU ÆeÌÀÃkBI (4) [19] :fqBI ÉÃÌŒ Ëe ÓMAg Ë .Óyj§ Ëe Ë ÓMAg Ém :fÃA WÄ‚ ÉÀÇ Ó÷¼· ¦B°»A

smj‚ ÆAfI É· #?fÃA É†$ É· BÇlÎ† kA ÓmjƒI ÆÌ† É· eÌI ÆE Ó¸Í ,OnbÃ ÓmjƒI ÆÌ† É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÇe ÓMAg ¥°» ÆAfI LAÌU ,ÓÇAÌa ÆBrÍA ÓÄ¨¿ O´ÎÝ

ÆÌ† Ë .#fÃA ÆAÌÎY$ É· fÄÇe LAÌU #?fÃA É† KmA Ë ËBŒ Ë Âej¿$ É· .#fÃA ÉÃÌŒ$ É· fÄÇe LAÌU #?fÃA É† Óajm Ë ÔfÎƒm Ë ÓÇBÎm$ É· ÓmjƒI .#fÃiBÀq$ É· fÄÇe LAÌU #?fÃÌI É† Ém Ë WÄ‚ Ë Êe$ É· ÓmjƒI ÆÌ† Ë fÄÇe LAÌU #?fÃÌI É† f»Ba Ë ËjÀ§ Ë fÍk$ É· fÄmjƒI ÆÌ† ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ Ë

LAÌU ifÃA #Âej¿$ Ë #iBÀq$ Ë #ÉÃÌŒ$ Ë #ÆAÌÎY$ o‚ / .#fÃA Âej¿$ É· [20] .fÄÃAÌa #?ÌÇ B¿$ LAÌU Ai ÅÍA ÔkBNI Ë .fN¯A BÇlÎ† ÅÍA ÔlÎ† É†

;eÌI ÆE LAÌU ,sÍeÌa ifÃA ÓmjƒI Ó¸Í jÇ Ó¿Af· kA ÆÌ† É· eÌI ÆE Ó¸Í Ë #µWBÃ$ o‚ .#µWBÃ$ É· fÄÍÌŒ #?OmA ÆAÌÎY ÂAf· Âej¿$ É· ÓmjƒI É¸ÃBÄ†

É¸ÃBÄ†Ë .fÄÍÌŒ #?ÕÏq ÷ÐA$ LAÌU ÔkBNI Ë eÌI Âej¿ Ó¿Af· LAÌU /.fmi Ó¸ÎI Æej· ÉÀÎÃ iBIËfI É¸ÃE fÄÍÌŒ #?OmiBÀq ÂAf· iBÈ†$ É· fÄmjƒI

ÆE B÷¿AË .fÄÃAÌa ½v¯ AjÃE ,eÌI #?ÕÏq ÷ÐA$ LAÌU Ë eÌI ÓMAg Ó÷¼· É† jÇ Ë [21] :É¸ÃBÄ† ,jN÷uBa Ë eÌI jN÷¿B§ ÔË kA ,eÌI #?ÌÇ B¿$ LAÌU ifÃA É· ÓMAg Ó÷¼· OmA jN÷¿B§ É· ÆAÌÎY Ë ;jÇÌŒ kA OmA jN÷uBa Ë ,ÆAÌÎY kA OmjN÷¿B§ ÁnU Ë ÔfÄ† kA OmA jN÷uBa iBÀq ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ Ë ,ÁnU kA OmA jN÷uBa Ë Âej¿ kA

.iBÈ† kA OmA jN÷¿B§ Ë iBÀq kA OmA jN÷uBa O°U Ë ;õÝR¿ O°U kA OmA jN÷¿B§ É† jÇ o‚ .iBÈ† ÆE Ë iBÈ† ÅÍkA OmA jN÷¿B§ Ë O°U kA OmA jN÷uBa iBÈ† Ë .eÌI jN÷¿B§ ªÌÃ ,eÌI jN÷uBa Ó÷¼· É† jÇ Ë ,eÌI jN÷uBa oÄU ,eÌI jN÷¿B§ Ó÷¼·

;oI Ë eÌI oÄU É· eÌI ÔlÎ† Ë /.ªÌÃ ÁÇ Ë eÌI oÄU ÁÇ É· eÌI ÔlÎ† Ë [22]

É· eÌI ÔlÎ† Ë .ÔfÄ† Ë jÇÌŒ :BÈ»BR¿ ÅÍA ifÃA É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌJÃ ªÌÃ ÔlÎ† jÍk Ë


9

genus only, and is not a species below any [other] thing: e.g., in the [above] examples,

substance and quantity. Or there may be a thing that is species only, and that is not the

genus of any species because there is no essential universal below it in answer to [the

question] “what is?” (m~ huwa?); rather, below it are only particulars, such as man, four,

blackness – for blackness does not differ from blackness by nature, as does color from

color: for color differs from color as does blackness from whiteness and is opposed to it

with an essential difference. Blackness, however, does not differ from blackness

substantially or [by essential] difference, but [23] by extrinsic factors: e.g. one is the

blackness of the raven, another the blackness of ink: raven and ink are things extrinsic to

the nature of blackness. The existence of blackness in the raven is not an essential state

for blackness, even though it cannot now be separated from the raven; however, in

imagination it could be that this same exact blackness did not exist in the raven but in

some other thing.

In sum, particulars subsumed under [the same] species differ from one another by

something accidental; e.g. Zaid differs from ‘Amr in that Zaid is, for example, taller,

whiter, older, the son of someone else, [24] and from another town – and these are all

accidental characteristics.

It has thus become clear what the character is of the species that does not become genus;

and this is called the Species of species, i.e. the species of all the species that are below it.

Hence it is evident that the essential universal is either genus, or species or difference.

As for the accidental universal, either it belongs to a single universal alone (just as

laughter belongs to man), and this is called property; or it belongs to more than one

universal (just as movement belongs both to man and to another thing, or blackness

belongs both to the raven and to another thing); [25] and this is called common accident.

Consequently, every universal term is either genus (e.g. animal), or species (e.g. man in

relation to animal), or difference (e.g. rational), or property (e.g. laughing), or common

accident (e.g. mover, white, black).


9

LAÌU ifÃA ÓMAg Ó÷¼· ÔË jÍk É· AjÍk ,eÌJÃ ªÌÃ ˆÎÇ oÄU Ë ;oI Ë eÌI ªÌÃ É¸ÃBÄ† Ë Âej¿ É¸ÃBÄ† ,oI Ë fÃÌI PB÷ÍËlU ÔË jÍk É¸¼I ,eÌJÃ #?ÌÇ B¿$

É· ©JñI eiAfÃ ÓÍAfU ÆE jNÍe ÓÇBÎm kA ÓÇBÎm É· ,ÓÇBÎm É¸ÃBÄ† Ë iBÈ† Ë ,ÔfÎƒm kA ÓÇBÎm É· eiAe ÓÍAfU ÆE ÉÃÌŒ kA ÉÃÌŒ É· AjÍk ,ÉÃÌŒ kA ÉÃÌŒ

,½v¯ Ë jÇÌNI eiAfÃ ÓÍAfU ÓÇBÎm kA ÓÇBÎm B÷¿AË .eiAe O°»Bb¿ ÓMAg ½v°I Ë .eAf¿ ÓÇBÎm Ó¸Í Ë eÌI ®Ak ÓÇBÎm Ó¸Í É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓÃËjÎI ÔBÈ»BZI /Å¸Î»Ë [23] OnÎ»BY ®Ak ifÃA ÓÇBÎm ÆeÌI Ë ,ÓÇBÎm ©JW kA ÆËjÎI fÃA BÇlÎ† eAf¿ Ë ®Ak ÁÇÌI Å¸Î»Ë . ®Ak kA Æfq fÃAÌNÃ AfU ÆÌÄ·A É· fÄ† jÇ ,ÓMAg ÉÃ ,Ai ÓÇBÎm j¿ .ÔeÌI jNÍe ÔlÎ† ifÃA É· ,ÔeÌJÃ ®Ak ifÃA ÉÄÎÏ ÓÇBÎm ÅÎÀÇ É· ÓNnÍBq

,fÃiAe Óyj§ ÔlÎ‡I ÓÍAfU jNÍe kA �Í ,fÃÌI ªÌÃ �Í jÍk É· BÈÍËlU É¼ÀVI Ë jMjÎ‚ Ë ,õÝR¿ eÌI jMfÎƒm Ë jMkAie fÍk É· eiAe ÆAfI ÓÍAfU ËjÀ§ kA fÍk É¸ÃBÄ† .fÃA Óyj§ ÔBÈ°uË ÉÀÇ ÅÍA Ë .jNÍe ÔjÈq kA Ë /eÌI jNÍe Ón· jn‚ Ë [24]

,fÄÃAÌa ªAÌÃA ªÌÃ Ai ÅÍA Ë eÌrÃ oÄU É· Ó§ÌÃ eÌI ÉÃÌN† É· fq AfÎ‚ o‚ eÌI oÄU BÍ ÓMAg Ó÷¼· É· f¿E fÍf‚ o‚ .fÃA ÔË jÍk É· BÈ§ÌÃ ÉÀÇ ªÌÃ ÓÄ¨Í

.½v¯ BÍ eÌI ªÌÃ BÍ

Ai ÅÍA Ë ,Ai Âej¿ Ó·BÃfÄa É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI Ai Ó÷¼· �Í j¿ BÈÄM BÍ ,Óyj§ Ó÷¼· B÷¿AË ÔlÎ† ÁÇ Ë Ai Âej¿ ÁÇ ÆfÎJÄU É¸ÃBÄ† eÌI Ai Ó¸Í kA sÎI BÈÎ÷¼· BÍ ,fÄÃAÌa É÷uBa .fÄÃAÌa ÂB§ ~j§ Ai ÅÍAË /Ai jNÍe ÔlÎ† ÁÇ Ë Ai ®Ak ÁÇ ÓÇBÎm ÆÌ†Ë ,Ai jNÍe [25]

;ÆAÌÎY kA Âej¿ ÆÌ† ,eÌI ªÌÃ BÍ ;ÆAÌÎY ÆÌ† ,eÌI oÄU BÍ Ó÷¼· Ó¤°» jÇ o‚

,eÌI ÂB§ ~j§ BÍ ;MYBy ÆÌ† ,eÌI ÉuBa BÍ ;µOBÃ ÆÌ† ,eÌI ½v¯ BÍ .ÊBÎm Ë fÎƒm Ë ÊfÄJÄU É¸ÃBÄ†


10

5. Explication of the Character of Definition and Description

In definition, the purpose is to discern the reality of a thing’s essence; [here] the

distinction [of the thing from other things] follows of itself. In description, [on the other

hand,] the purpose is to denote a thing, even though its essence is not really discerned; the

very denoting [of the thing] is to distinguish [it from other things].

Definition, [26] then, [involves] the essential characteristics of a thing. Defining a thing

consists in your taking the genus that is closest to it (e.g., animal in the case of man), and

then supplying its essential difference (e.g., rational). Thus, you say: “man is a rational

animal”; this, then, is the definition of man. Likewise, when you say: “four is a number

which upon being halved twice arrives at one.”

As for description, it is, for instance, such as when you say: “man is a laughing, crying,

wide-nailed animal”; or “four is a number which, when multiplied by itself, sixteen

results”; or “four is a number which results from the multiplication of two by itself.”

Now, it is necessary that in definition and description four kinds of error not be

committed. All four [of these errors] fall under a single notion, namely: every unknown

thing that you wish to make known, you must [make known] by means of a thing which

is more known than it; otherwise [27] there would be no utility [in your making it

known].

As regards those four errors that split off from this notion:

(a) One is that of making something known by itself; e.g., in the definition of

time it is said, “Time is the duration of motion.” But time and duration are the same

thing, and whoever [finds] the definition of time difficult, will also [find] the definition of

duration difficult: his asking “What is time?” is [tantamount to] his asking “what is

duration?”


10

Ámi Ë ÷fY ¾BY Æej· AfÎ‚ (5) .fÍE ©JNI eÌa ÓÍAfU Ë ,OmA lÎ† PAg O´ÎÝ ÅNaBÄq ,÷fY ifÃA ~j« O´Î´ZI ÔË PAg É· fÄ† jÇ ,lÎ‡I OmA ÆeAe ÆBrÃ ,Ámi ifÃA ~j« Ë

.eÌI Ai Æej· AfU ,ÆeAe ÆBrÃ eÌa Ë .fÍBÎÃ ÉNaBÄq

ÅÍjM �ÍelÃ É· eÌI ÆE Æej· ÷fY Ë .eÌI lÎ† ÓMAg ÔBÈ°uË kA ÷fY /o‚ [26] ,ÔiBÎI ÔË ÓMAg ½v¯ ÊBNÃE Ë ,Ai Âej¿ ÆAÌÎY É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÔjÎNI lÎ† oÄU .eÌI Âej¿ ÷fY ÅÍA o‚ ;#OmA µWBÃ ÆAÌÎY Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ o‚ ,µOBÃ É¸ÃBÄ† .#fmi Ó¸ÎI Æej· ÉÀÎÃ iBIËfI É· OmA ÔiBÀq iBÈ†$ ÓÍÌŒ É· ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ Ë

,#ÅaBÃ ÅÈ‚ ,ÆBÍjŒ ,ÆAfÄa OnÎÃAÌÎY Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ É· eÌI ÆBÄ† Ámi B÷¿AË BÍ ,#fÍE ÊelÃBq ÅNrÍÌa ifÃA ÔË Ljy kA É· OmA ÔiBÀq iBÈ†$ BÍ

.#fÍE OnÇ ÅNrÍÌa ifÃA Ëe Ljy kA É· OmA ÔiBÀq$

ÓÄ¨¿ �Í ifÃA iBÈ† jÇ É· ,fN¯ÌÎÃ Bña ÉÃÌŒ iBÈ† Ámi Ë ÷fY ifÃA É· fÍBI Ë É· ÓÇAÌa Ë eÌI ÉNaBÄqBÃ É· ÔlÎ† jÇ É· fÍBI :É· OnÃE ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE B÷¿A .fN¯A .eÌJÃ ÊfÍB¯ ˆÎÇ / ÷ÜAË ,eÌI jM ÉNaBÄq ÔË kA É· ÓÄ· ÔlÎ‡I ,ÓÄ· ÉNaBÄq [27]

:fÄ¯B¸q ÓÄ¨¿ ÅÍA kA É· Bña ÓÄ¨¿ iBÈ† ÆE B÷¿AË

fÄÍÌŒ ÆB¿k ÷fY ifÃA É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÃBmBÄq eÌbI ÁÇ Ai lÎ† É· OnÃE Ó¸Í É· Ai o¸ÃE Ë .eÌI lÎ† �Í ÆB¿k Ë P÷f¿ Ë #OmA sJÄU P÷f¿ ÆB¿k$ É· É· ÔË ÆfÎmj‚ Ë ,eÌI ½¸r¿ P÷f¿ ÷fY Ai ËA ÁÇ ,eÌI ½¸r¿ ÆB¿k ÷fY

#?OnÎ† P÷f¿$ É· eÌI ÔË ÆfÎmj‚ #?OnÎ† ÆB¿k$


11

(b) Another, is that of making one thing known by means of something [else]

which is similar to it in obscurity and clarity; e.g., it is said, “blackness is that color

which is the opposite of whiteness”; but this is no better than [28] when it is said,

“whiteness is that color which is the opposite of blackness,” for blackness and whiteness

are of the same order in terms of obscurity and clarity.

(c) Third, is that of making one thing known by means of another thing that is

more obscure; e.g., in the definition of fire it is said: “[fire] is that body which resembles

the soul.” Yet soul is much more obscure than fire.

(d) Fourth, is that of making a thing known by means of that by which it becomes

recognized; e.g., in the definition of the sun it is said: “the sun is the star which emerges

in the day.” Thus, the sun is made known by means of day; yet it is not possible for

anyone [29] to recognize day except by means of the sun, for in reality day is the time in

which the sun has emerged. Hence if sun is difficult [to define], so too would day be, or

rather, more so.

These four conditions are extremely important in definitions and descriptions in order

that error does not occur.


11

eÌI ÔË ÆÌ‡ÀÇ lÎ† ÆE É· ,fÄÃBmBÄq ÔlÎ‡I Ai ÔlÎ† É· OnÃE jNÍe Ë ÔfÎƒm ÷fy É· OmA ÉÃÌŒ ÆE ÓÇBÎm$ É· fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓÖAfÎ‚ Ë ÓŒfÎqÌƒI ÷fy É· OmA ÉÃÌŒ ÆE ÔfÎƒm$ É· fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃE /kA OnÎÃ jNÎ»ËA ÅÍA Ë .#OmA [28] .ÓÖAfÎ‚ Ë ÓŒfÎqÌ‚ ifÃA fÃAÊBNÍBU �ÎI ÔfÎƒm Ë ÓÇBÎm É· ,#OmA ÓÇBÎm

É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÃBmBÄq jM ÊfÎqÌ‚ ÔË kA ÔlÎ‡I Ai ÔlÎ† É· OnÃE ÂÌ÷Îm Ë iBÎnI o°Ã Ë ,#fÃB¿ o°ÄI É· OmA ÁnU ÆE ÔË$ :É· sME ÷fY ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ

.sME kA OmA jM ÊfÎqÌ‚

,eÌq ÉNaBÄq ÔÌI É· lÎ† ÆFI fÄÃBmBÄrI Ai ÔlÎ† É· OnÃE ÂiBÈ† Ë .#fÍEjI kËjI É· OmA ÊiBNm ÆE LBN¯E$ :É· LBN¯E ÷fY ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,LBN¯FI ÷ÜA fmBÄrI Ai kËi /Ón· É· fÍBrÃ Ë ,fÄÃBmBÄq kËjI Ai LBN¯E o‚ [29] ÆÌ† o‚ .eÌI Êf¿E jI ÔË ifÃA LBN¯E É· eÌI ÆB¿k ÆE kËi O´Î´ZI É· AjÍk

.eÌI jM ½¸r¿ É¸¼I ,eÌI ½¸r¿ kËi ,eÌI ½¸r¿ LBN¯E

.fN¯ÌÎÃ ¡¼« BM Æej· Ámi Ë ÷fY ifÃA OmA Á÷È¿ Obm ¢jq iBÈ† ÅÍA


12

6. Elucidation of the meaning of Noun, Verb and Particle

Every single expression is either a noun, verb, or particle (in Arabic noun is called ’ism,

while as for verb, the grammarians call it fi‘l and the logicians kalima). Noun (’ism) and

verb (kalima) both have complete meaning. For example, if someone asks, “who did you

see?,” and you reply, “Zaid,” the answer is complete; or if someone asks, “what did Zaid

do?,” and you reply, “he left,” the answer is complete. But particle does not have a

complete meaning: for example, if it is asked, “where is Zaid?,” [30] and you reply “to”

or “on” or “in,” it would be no answer as long as you do not say “to the house” or “in the

mosque” or “on the roof.”

However, the difference between noun (’ism) and verb (kalima) is that noun conveys

meaning, but does not convey the temporal aspect of that meaning; e.g., “man” or

“honesty.” The verb (kalima), on the other hand, conveys [both] meaning and the

temporal aspect of that meaning; e.g., “he hit,” which signifies [the act of] hitting and

that it was in past time. And likewise when you say “he may hit.” Also, [the verb]

always signifies the person with whom the meaning is [associated], like “the hitter” or

“the crawler.” However, that person or that thing is not specified so that you know which

it is.

[31] If someone asks, “Are ‘yesterday’ (d§ ), ‘last year’ (p~r), ‘of last year’ (p~r§n‘h)

nouns or verbs?,” the answer is that they are nouns. If he then says that each of these

three signifies time and must [therefore] be a verb, we would reply: not everything that

signifies time is a verb; for [a verb] must first signify a meaning, and then signify the

time of that meaning. For example, [when] you say “he hit,” you signify [first, the act of]

hitting, and then the time of that hitting. Now, our saying ‘yesterday’ (d§ ), has the core

of its meaning in time, [but] it is not such that it signifies a meaning and then the time of

that meaning.

This much that has been said about single expressions is sufficient. We must now speak

of composite expressions. [32]


12

²jY Ë sÄ· Ë ÂBÃ ÓÄ¨¿ Æej· fÍf‚ (6) Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÁmA Ai ÂBÃ ÔkBNI Ë ;²jY BÍ ,sÄ· BÍ ,eÌI ÂBÃ BÍ ,ej°¿ Ó¤°» jÇ Ai Ëe jÇ ÉÀ¼· Ë ÁmA Ë .fÄÃAÌa ÉÀ¼· ÆBÎ´ñÄ¿ Ë fÄÃAÌa ½¨¯ ÆBÍÌZÃ Ai sÄ·j¿ ,#Ai fÍk$ :ÓÍÌŒ #?ÔfÍe Aj·$ :É·fmj‚ Ón· jŒA É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ÂBÀM ÓÄ¨¿ LAÌU ,#O¯jI$ :ÓÍÌŒ #?ej· É† fÍk$ :É· fmj‚ Ón· jŒA Ë eÌI ÂBÀM LAÌU /#?OmBV· fÍk$ :fÍÌŒ jŒA É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌJÃ ÂBÀM ÓÄ¨¿ Ai ²jY B÷¿AË .eÌI ÂBÀM

ÓÍÌNÃ BM eÌJÃ LAÌU ˆÎÇ #ifÃA$ ÓÍÌŒ BÍ #jI$ ÓÍÌŒ BÍ #L$ :ÓÍÌŒ [30] .#ÂBI jI$ BÍ ,#fVn¿ ifÃA$ BÍ ,#ÉÃBbI$

jI eÌJÃ ½Î»e Ë ,ÓÄ¨¿ jI eÌI ½Î»e ÁmA :É· OnÃE ÉÀ¼· Ë ÁmA ÆBÎ¿ ¶j¯ Å¸Î» jI eÌI ½Î»e ÉÀ¼· B÷¿AË .#ÓNmie$ Ë #Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE ÓÎ· É¸ÃE jI Ë Æek jI eÌI ½Î»e É· ,#elI$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE ÓÎ· Ë ÓÄ¨¿ jI eÌI ½Î»e ÉrÎÀÇ Ë .#fÃlI$ ÓÍÌŒ ÆÌ† ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ Ë .eÌI ÉNqhŒ ÆB¿k ifÃA lÎ† ÆE BÍ o¸ÃE Å¸Î»Ë .ÊfÃla BÍ ÊfÄÃk :ÆÌ† eÌI Ai ËA ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE É· Ón·

/ .On¿Af· É· ÓÃAe É· ,eÌJÃ Å÷Î¨¿

É· eÌI ÆE LAÌU #?ÉÀ¼· BÍ On¿BÃ ÉÄÍiB‚ Ë iB‚ Ë Ôe$ :É· fmj‚ Ón· jŒA [31] ,eÌI ÉÀ¼· É· fÍBI Ë ÆB¿k jI OmA ½Î»e Ém jÇ ÅÍA É· fÍÌŒ jŒA o‚ .On¿BÃ jI eÌI ½Î»e É· fÍBI OnbÃ É· ,eÌI ÉÀ¼· ÆB¿k jI eÌI ½Î»e É† jÇ ÉÃ É· ÁÎÍÌŒ jI ÓÄ· ½Î»e ,#elI$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓÄ¨¿ ÆE ÆB¿k jI eÌI ½Î»e ÊBNÃE Ë ÓÄ¨¿ ÉÃ ,OnÃB¿k sÎÄ¨¿ o°Ã #Ôe$ B¿ iBN°Œ Ë ,Æek ÆE ÆB¿k jI ÊBNÃE Ë Æek

.sÃB¿k jI eÌI ½Î»e ÊBNÃE Ë ÓÄ¨¿ jI eÌI ½Î»e É· OnÃBÄ†

ÔBÈ¤°» ifÃA ÆÌÄ·A .eÌI ÊfÄnI ej°¿ ÔBÈ¤°» ifÃA f¿E ÉN°Œ É· iAf´¿ ÅÍA / .ÅN°Œ fÍBI Åbm K÷·j¿


13

7. Explication of what a Proposition is

From these single expressions, diverse compositions arise. Among the latter, there is one

kind that we must now [consider], namely, the kind that is [variously] called proposition

(qad§ya), [declaratory] statement or assertoric speech. This is that which, on hearing it,

you may say “it is true,” or “it is false.” For example: if someone says, “for man, there is

reward and punishment,” you can say that it is so; and if he says, “man is a flyer,” you

can say that it is not so. [33] If someone says, “whenever the sun rises, it is day,” you can

say that it is so; and if he says, “whenever the sun rises the stars are visible,” you can say

that it is not so. If he says, “number is either odd or even,” you can say that it is so; and if

he says, “number is either black or white,” you can say that it is not so. But if someone

says, “teach me something or some problem,” the answer to him in no way consists in

your saying “it is so,” or “it is not so.” [34] [Similarly,] if he says, “come with me to the

mosque,” the answer to him is not that “it is so,” and “you spoke the truth,” or “it is not

so,” and “you lied.”

8. Explication of the Types of Propositions

Propositions are of three types:

(a) One is called Predicative, e.g., “man is an animal,” or “man is not an animal.”

(b) One is called Connective Conditional, e.g., “since it is like this, it is like this;

and if it is like that, it is like that”; and “it is not [the case] that since it is like this or like

that, it is like this or like that.”

(c) One is called Disjunctive Conditional, e.g., “either it is like this [35] or it is

like that”; or “it is not [the case] that it is either like this or like that.”


13

eÌI É† É· É÷Îz³ Æej· AfÎ‚ (7) [32] ÉÃÌŒ Ó¸Í ÆÌÄ·A Ai B¿ ÆBrÍA kA Ë .fÍE KÎ·jM ÆÌŒBÃÌŒ ,ej°¿ ÔBÈ¤°» ÅÍA kA ÂkBU Åbm Ë fÄÃAÌa jJa Ë fÄÃAÌa É÷Îz³ AjÃE É· OmA ÉÃÌŒ ÆE ÅÍA Ë ,fÍBI ÓÀÇ É· fÍBq Ë #OmA OmAi$ ÓÍÌŒ É· fÍBq ÔÌÄrI ÆÌ† É· eÌI ÆE ÅÍA Ë .fÄÃAÌa ÓÃAÌM ,#OnIB´§ Ë LAÌQ Ai Âej¿$fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA :ÆE ¾BR¿ .#On«Ëie$ ÓÍÌŒ ÅÎÄ† ÉÃ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ,#OmA ÊfÃj‚ Âej¿$ fÍÌŒ jŒA Ë ,OmA ÅÎÄ† É· ÅN°Œ ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ,#eÌI kËi ,fÍEjI LBN¯E É· ÊBŒ jÇ$ É· fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA Ë /.OmA [33] ,#fÃÌI AfÎ‚ ÆBŒiBNm ,fÍEjI LBN¯E É· ÊBŒ jÇ$ :fÍÌŒ jŒAË .OmA ÅÎÄ† É· ,#O°U BÍ OmA ¶BW BÍ ,iBÀq$ :fÍÌŒ jŒAË .OmA ÅÎÄ† ÉÃ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ,#ÔfÎƒm BÍ eÌI ÓÇBÎm BÍ ,iBÀq$ :fÍÌŒ jŒAË .OmA ÅÎÄ† É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ÔAÉ¼×n¿ BÍ ÔlÎ† Aj¿$:fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA B÷¿AË .OmA ÅÎÄ† ÉÃ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ÅÎÄ† ÉÃ$ BÍ #OmA ÅÎÄ†$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃE eÌJÃ ÉÃÌŒ ˆÎÈI ÔË LAÌU ,#kÌ¿BÎI

#OmA ÅÎÄ†$ É· eÌJÃ ÆE ÔË LAÌU ,#ÔE fVnÀI Å¿ BI$ :fÍÌŒ jŒAË /.#OmA [34] .#ÓN°Œ ®Ëie$ Ë #OmA ÅÎÄ† ÉÃ$ BÍ ,#ÓN°Œ OmAi$Ë

É÷Îz³ OÀn³ Æej· AfÎ‚ (8) :fÃA Án³ Ém BÇ É÷Îz³

.#iÌÃBU OnÎÃ Âej¿$ BÍ #OmiÌÃBU Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÃAÌa Ó¼ÀY Ai Ó¸Í Ë ;eÌI ÅÎÄ† ,eÌI ÅÎÄ† ÆÌ†$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÃAÌa ½v÷N¿ ÓOjq Ai Ó¸Í Ë

.#eÌI ÆBÄ† BÍ ÅÎÄ† ,eÌI ÆBÄ† BÍ eÌI ÅÎÄ† ÆÌ† ÉÃ$ Ë ;#eÌI ÆBÄ† ,eÌI ÆBÄ† jŒA BÍ ;#eÌI ÆBÄ† BÍ /eÌI ÅÎÄ† BÍ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÃAÌa ½v°Ä¿ ÓOjq Ai Ó¸ÍË [35]

.#eÌI ÆBÄ† BÍ eÌI ÅÎÄ† BÍ É· OnÎÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ


14

9. Explication of the Predicative Proposition:

Affirmation, Negation, Universality, Particularity

and whatever pertains to it

The characteristic of the predicative proposition is that through it we make a judgment

that something is something, or that something is not something: e.g., we say, “man is an

animal,” or “man is not an animal.” That [proposition in] which we say “is,” is called

affirmative, and that [proposition in] which we say “is not,” is called negative. That part

[of the proposition] about which the judgment is made (such as, in this example, “man”)

is called the subject; [36] and that part [of the proposition] by which the judgment is

[conveyed] – viz., that it is or is not – is called the predicate (such as, in this example,

“animal”).

Each of these two [sc. subject and predicate] is sometimes a simple expression: e.g.,

“man is an animal”; and sometimes a composite expression: e.g., “whoever does not

digest his food must have a sickness in his stomach”; for, [in the latter case,] the whole of

our saying “[whoever] does not digest his food” is the subject, and the whole of our

saying “must have a sickness in his stomach” is the predicate. However, it is possible

that you replace each of these two phrases with a simple expression: thus you may

designate the person who has not digested his food, A, [37] and the person whose

stomach has a sickness, B; therefore, [if] you then say “A is B,” it will have the same

meaning. Or it may be that of these two parts one is a single [expression], the other a

composite.

If someone asks, “Our saying: ‘Zaid is non-sighted’ or ‘is not-at-home’ – is it affirmative

or negative?,” we would reply that it is affirmative, for “non-sighted” is as a whole a

single predicate: if you affirm it, the proposition would be affirmative; and if you negate

it, the proposition would be negative. Hence, since we said “he is non-sighted,” we

affirmed it by the term “is.” Consequently, the proposition became affirmative; [38] this

is called the Deviant Affirmative. But if we want [the proposition] to be negative, we

would say, “Zaid is not sighted.”


14

OÎ¼· Ë K¼m Ë LBVÍA Ë Ó¼ÀY É÷Îz³ Æej· AfÎ‚ (9) eÌI ÅÍA iÌaifÃA É‡ÃE Ë OÍËlU Ë

,OmA ÔlÎ† ÔlÎ† É· ÁÎqBI Êej· Á¸Y ÔË ifÃA É· eÌI ÆE Ó¼ÀY É÷Îz³ OÎuBa ÆAÌÎY Âej¿$ ÁÎÍÌŒ BÍ #OnÃAÌÎY Âej¿$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,OnÎÃ ÔlÎ† ÔlÎ† BÍ ,ÁÎÍÌŒ #OnÎÃ$ É· AjÃE Ë ,fÄÃAÌa KUÌ¿ ,ÁÎÍÌŒ #OnÇ$ É· AjÃE .#OnÎÃ

,eÌI #Âej¿$ ¾BR¿ ÅÍifÃA É¸ÃBÄ† ,OmËjI Á¸Y É· ÔË kA ÊiB‚ ÆE Ë .fÄÃAÌa K»Bm É¸ÃBÄ† (OnÎÃ BÍ OnÇ É·)eÌI ËfI Á¸Y É· ÔË kA ÊiB‚ ÆE Ë /,fÄÃAÌa ªÌyÌ¿ [36]

.fÄÃAÌa ¾ÌÀZ¿ ,eÌI #ÆAÌÎY$ ¾BR¿ ÅÍifÃA

Ë ,#OnÃAÌÎY Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fqBI ej°¿ Ó¤°» ÓÇBŒ Ëe ÅÍkA Ó¸Í jÇ Ë ÓN¯E AjÍË ‘f¨¿ ,eiAÌNÃ ÂB¨W Aj· jÇ$ ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fqBI K÷·j¿ Ó¤°» ÓÇBŒ Ë ,OmA ªÌyÌ¿ #eiAÌNÃ s¿B¨W$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ �¼ÀU BVÃE É· ,#fqBI ÊfÎmi É· fÍBq Å¸Î»Ë .OmA ¾ÌÀZ¿ #fqBI ÊfÎmi ÓN¯E AiË ‘f¨¿$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ �¼ÀU s¿B¨W É· Ai o¸ÃE É· fÍBq É· ,ÓÈÃ É¼ÀU Ëe ÅÍkA Ó¸Í jÇ ¾fI ej°¿ Ó¤°» ÂBÃ (L) fqBI ÊfÎmi ÓN¯E Ai tAÊf¨¿ É· Ai o¸ÃE Ë /,ÓÄ· ÂBÃ (A) eiAÌNÃ [37]

Ëe ÅÍkA É· fqBI Ë .eiAe ÓÄ¨¿ ÅÎÀÇ #OmA (L) (A)$ ÓÍÌŒ ÊBNÃE o‚ .ÓÄ· .K÷·j¿ Ó¸Í Ë eÌI ej°¿ Ó¸Í ÊiB‚

BÍ OmA KUÌ¿ ,OmA ÉÃBbI ÉÃ BÍ ,OmBÄÎIBÃ fÍk É· B¿ iBN°Œ$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA PBJQA jŒA ,OmA ¾ÌÀZ¿ Ó¸Í É¼ÀVI #BÄÎIBÃ$ É· ,OmA KUÌ¿ :ÁÎÍÌŒ #?K»Bm ÁÎN°Œ ÆÌ† o‚ .eÌI K»Bm É÷Îz³ sÎÄ· Ó°Ã jŒA Ë ,eÌI KUÌ¿ É÷Îz³ sÎÄ· Ai ÅÍA Ë fq / KUÌ¿ É÷Îz³ o‚ .ÁÍej· PBJQA #OmA$ ¥°¼I ,#OmBÄÎIBÃ$ [38]

.#BÄÎI OnÎÃ fÍk$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ ,eÌI K»Bm É· ÁÎÇAÌa jŒAË .fÄÃAÌa É»Ëf¨¿ VJUÌ¿


15

Now, the difference between these two [propositions] is that if Zaid did not exist in the

world, you could say “Zaid is not sighted,” because that Zaid which does not exist, is not

sighted. But you could not say “Zaid is non-sighted” except when Zaid in fact exists. If

it is asked, “Our saying: ‘Zaid is not non-sighted’ – is it affirmative or negative?,” we

would reply that it is negative, because “non-sighted” is the predicate, and the term “is

not” has negated it. This is called Deviant Negative.

This having become known, one must [next] know that the subject [of a proposition] is

either a universal expression or a particular expression. [39] An example of a particular

subject is your saying, “Zaid is a writer,” or “is not a writer.” This is called a Singular or

Individual [proposition]; the first [example] is affirmative, the second negative.

But as for when the subject is universal, there are two alternatives.

(a) Either it is not made clear to how many the judgment [applies]: whether [it

applies] to all or to some – e.g., when you say, “Man is a mover,” and do not say whether

all men or some men. This is called Indefinite Affirmative. And again, when you say,

“Man is not a mover,” and this is called Indefinite Negative.

(b) Or it is made clear [what] the quantity of the judgment is; this is called

Definite [proposition], [40] and the term indicating the quantity is called Sūr. Definite

[propositions] are of four kinds:

(i) One is when the judgment applies affirmatively to all: e.g.,

“Everything that is a man is an animal,” or, “every man is an animal.” This is called the

Universal Affirmative [proposition] and its quantity-indicator (sūr) are the terms

“everything” and “every.”

(ii) Another is when the judgment is applied to all negatively and by

denial: e.g., “None [among] men is immortal.” This is called the Universal Negative

[proposition] and its quantity-indicator (sūr) is the term “none.”

(iii) Third is when the judgment is applied to some positively and by

affirmation: e.g., “Some man is a writer.” This is called the Particular Affirmative

[proposition], [41] and its quantity-indicator (sūr) is the term “some.”


15

:ÓÍÌŒ É· fÍBq ,eÌJÃ ÆBÈU ifÃA fÍk jŒA ,É· OnÃE Ëe jÇ ÅÍA ÆBÎ¿ ¶j¯ Ë :ÓÍÌŒ É· fÍBrÃ Ë .eÌJÃ BÄÎI ,OnÎÃ É· fÍk ÆE AjÍk ,#BÄÎI OnÎÃ fÍk$

É· B¿ iBN°Œ$ É· fÄmj‚ jŒA Ë .eÌI ÔBVI fÍk É· ÊBNÃE ÷ÜA #OmBÄÎIBÃ fÍk$ #BÄÎIBÃ$ É· AjÍk ,OmA K»Bm :ÁÎÍÌŒ #?K»Bm BÍ OmA KUÌ¿ ,BÄÎIBÃ OnÎÃ fÍk .fÄÃAÌa É»Ëf¨¿ VJ»Bm Ai ÅÍAË ,Omej· Ó°Ã Ai ËA #OnÎÃ$ ¥°»Ë OmA ¾ÌÀZ¿

¥°» BÍ eÌI Ó÷¼· ¥°» BÍ ªÌyÌ¿ É· fÍE ÉNnÃAe É· fÍBI ,f¿E ÉNnÃAe ÅÍA ÆÌ† ÅÍAË ,#OnÎÃ jÎIe BÍ OmjÎIe fÍk$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃE ÔËlU ªÌyÌ¿ ¾BR¿ /.ÔËlU [39] .OmA K»Bm Â÷Ëe Ë OmA KUÌ¿ ÅÎNnbÃ ;fÄÃAÌa ÉÎvbq Ë fÄÃAÌa ÉuÌvb¿ Ai

.eÌJÃ ÆËjÎI Ëe kA eÌI Ó÷¼· ªÌyÌ¿ ÆÌ† B÷¿AË

:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓajI jI BÍ ,OmA ÉÀÇ jI :OmfÄ† jI Á¸Y É· eÌI Êej¸Ã AfÎ‚ BÍ É¼ÀÈ¿ VJUÌ¿ Ai ÅÍA Ë ;Âej¿ ÓajI BÍ Âej¿ �ÀÇ ÓÍÌNÃ Ë ,#OmA ÊfÄJÄU Âej¿$

.fÄÃAÌa É¼ÀÈ¿ VJ»Bm Ai ÅÍAË #ÊfÄJÄU OnÎÃ Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ Ë .fÄÃAÌa

ÔfÄ† jŒAfÎ‚ ¥°» Ë /,fÄÃAÌa ÊiÌvZ¿ Ai ÅÍA Ë ,Á¸Y ÔfÄ† eÌI Êej· AfÎ‚ BÍ [40] :OmA ÉÃÌŒ iBÈ† ÊiÌvZ¿ Ë .fÄÃAÌa iÌm Ai

,eÌI Âej¿ É† jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,PBJQBI eÌI Êej· ÉÀÇ jI Á¸Y É· OnÃE Ó¸Í Ë fÄÃAÌa KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· Ai ÅÍA Ë ,#OnÃAÌÎY Ó¿ej¿ jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ ,#eÌI ÆAÌÎY

.eÌI #jÇ$ Ë #É† jÇ$ ¥°» ÔË iÌm Âej¿ ˆÎÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,Ó°Ã Ë K¼nI fÄqBI Êej· ÉÀÇ jI Á¸Y É· OnÃE jBÍe Ë

.eÌI #ˆÎÇ$ ¥°» ÔË iÌm Ë fÄÃAÌa K»Bm Ó÷¼· Ai ÅÍAË ,#OnÎÃ ÉÃAfÍËBU ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓNnÇ Ë PBJQBI fÄqBI Êej· ÓajI jI Á¸Y É· OnÃE ÂÌ÷ÎmË .eÌI #ÓajI$ ¥°» ÔË iÌm Ë /fÄÃAÌa KUÌ¿ ÔËlU Ai ÅÍAË ,#OmjÎIe Âej¿ [41]


16

(iv) Fourth is when the judgment is applied to some by denial and

negation: e.g., “Some men are not writers.” This is called the Particular Negative, and its

quantity-indicator (sãr) is the expression “some…are not”; it also has another quantity-

indicator, namely, “not all,” “not everything,” and “not every.” For when you say, “Not

all men are writers,” or “not everything that is a man is a writer,” or “not every man is a

writer,” you make a judgment of non-being, therefore it is negative; and you do not make

your judgment about all, because when you say “not all,” [42] it is possible that some

exist. Hence these statements that we [have just] noted are particular negative.

The judgment [borne by] an indefinite [proposition] is a particular judgment. For when

you say “Man is such-and-such,” your saying “man” may apply to all men, or it may

apply to [some] men, in that all men are men, and some men also are men. Hence, [the

statement applies] with certainty to some men, and with doubt to all men. Thus if

someone says, “some men are such-and-such,” it does not necessarily follow that some

others are contrary to that, because when all are, some are also. Consequently, the

judgment applying to some is not prevented from likewise applying to the others;

however, it applies with certainty to some, but with doubt to all.

[43] Thus, it has become evident that the judgment of an indefinite [proposition]

corresponds to the judgment of a particular [proposition]; and it has become evident that

predicative propositions are eight [in number]:

[FOUR INDEFINITE]:

1. Affirmative Singular;

2. Negative Singular;

3. Affirmative Indefinite;

4. Negative Indefinite;

FOUR DEFINITE:

5. Universal Affirmative;

6. Universal Negative;

7. Particular Affirmative;

8. Particular Negative.

Of these eight, the Singular [proposition] is not used in the sciences, while the indefinite

[conveys] a particular judgment. Thus the propositions that are of use in the sciences are

the remaining four definite propositions. As for the indefinite, wherever it is used in

place of the Universal it leads to error and confusion, as we shall make clear in another

place; consequently, it must be avoided.


16

:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓNnÎÃ Ë Ó°ÄI fÄqBI Êej· ÓajI jI Á¸Y É· OnÃE ÂiBÈ† Ë OnÎÃ$ ¥°» ÔË iÌm Ë fÄÃAÌa K»Bm ÔËlU Ai ÅÍAË ,#jÎIe Âej¿ ÓajI OnÎÃ$ #É† jÇ ÉÃ$ ¥°» Ë OmA #ÉÀÇ ÉÃ$ ¥°» ÔË Ë OmjNÍe ÔiÌm AiË Ë ,eÌI #ÓajI É† jÇ ÉÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ ,#OmA jÎIe Âej¿ �ÀÇ ÉÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ÆÌ† É· AjÍk .#jÇ ÉÃ$ Ë Êej· ÓNnÎÃ Á¸Y ,#OmA jÎIe Ó¿ej¿ jÇ ÉÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ ,#OmA jÎIe OmA Âej¿ /,#ÉÀÇ ÉÃ$ ÓÍÌŒ ÆÌ† É· AjÍk ,ÓqBI Êej¸Ã ÉÀÇ jI Á¸Y Ë eÌI K»Bm o‚ ,ÓqBI

.OmA K»Bm ÔËlU ÁÎN°Œ É· B¿ iBN°Œ ÅÍA o‚ .eÌI ÓajI É· fÍBq [42]

ÌM iBN°Œ ,#OmA ÅÎÄ† Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ ÆÌ† É· AjÍk ,OmA ÔËlU Á¸Y ½ÀÈ¿ Á¸Y Ë Âej¿ �ÀÇ É· ,fqBI Ai Ó¿ej¿ É· fÍBq Ë ,fqBI Ai Âej¿ �ÀÇ É· fÍBq #Âej¿$

.�rI Âej¿ �ÀÇ Ë OmA ÅÎ´ÎI Âej¿ ÓajI o‚ .OmA Âej¿ lÎÃ Ó¿ej¿ Ë ,fÃA Âej¿ ÓajI É· OnÎÃ KUAË BVÃE kA #OmA ÅÎÄ† Âej¿ ÓajI$:fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA É¸ÃBÄ† kBI ÓajI jI Á¸Y o‚ .eÌI lÎÃ ÓajI ,eÌI ÉÀÇ ÆÌ† É· AjÍk ,eÌI ÆE ²ÝbI jNÍe / .�rI ÉÀÇ jI Ë ,eÌI ÅÎ´ÎI ÓajI jI Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ djI jNÍe jI É· eiAfÃ

ÔBÇ É÷Îz³ É· f¿E fÍf‚ Ë ,eÌI ÔËlU Á¸Y ÆÌ‡ÀÇ ½ÀÈ¿ Á¸Y É· f¿E fÍf‚ o‚ [43] ,ÉJ»Bm �¼ÀÈ¿ ,ÉJUÌ¿ �¼ÀÈ¿ ,ÉJ»Bm �uÌvb¿ ,ÉJUÌ¿ �uÌvb¿ :fÃA OrÇ Ó¼ÀY

.K»Bm ÔËlU Ë KUÌ¿ ÔËlU Ë K»Bm Ó÷¼· Ë KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· :ÊiÌvZ¿ iBÈ† Ë

o‚ ,OnÍËlU Á¸ZI É¼ÀÈ¿ Ë fÍBÎÃ iB¸I BÈÀ¼§ifÃA ÉuÌvb¿ ,OrÇ ÅÍA kA Ë BV· jÇ ,É¼ÀÈ¿ B÷¿AË .ÊiÌvZ¿ iBÈ† BÈÀ¼§ ifÃA ÓÃf¿E iB¸I ÔBÇ É÷Îz³ fÃBÀI ;ÁÎÄ· AfÎ‚ jNÍe ÔBVI É¸ÃBÄ† ,sÍÌrM Ë fÄ¸¯A ¡¼« ,Ó÷¼· ÔBVI fÍE ÊejI iB¸I

.Æej· fÍBI lÎÇj‚ ÔË kA o‚


17

One must know that the judgment of every proposition is either (a) inescapable and

binding: e.g., “man is a body” – and this is called Necessary; [44] or (b) [one that] may or

may not be [the case]: e.g., “man is a writer” – and this is called Possible; or (c) [one

that] cannot be [the case]: e.g., “man is an angel” – and this is called Impossible.

Now, the term possible applies to two notions: (i) it applies to [what simply] can be and

nothing more, or, in sum, to whatever is not impossible. (The necessary falls under this

[sense of the] possible, for the necessary does not exist as long as it is not possible for it

to exist.) (ii) It applies to [what] may or may not be: this is the true possible, and the

necessary does not fall under this. [For] everything that is possible to exist in this

[second] sense [of the possible], it is possible that it not exist. But [for] everything that is

possible to exist in the former sense, it is not possible [45] not to exist. This much is

enough regarding the clarification of the character of predicative propositions.

10. Explication of the character of

Connective and Disjunctive Conditional Propositions,

in the same manner as was done for Predicative Propositions

Just as predicative [propositions] consist of two parts (a subject and a predicate),

conditional [propositions] also have two parts.

As for the connective conditional, it consists of two parts and nothing more: an

antecedent and a consequent. The antecedent is that [part] with which the condition is

associated, while the consequent is that [part] which is the reply. An example of this is

when we say, “if the sun rises, it is day”: [46] our saying “if the sun rises” is the

antecedent, and “it is day” is the consequent.


17

É¸ÃBÄ† ,KUAË Ë fqBI ÓNÄÍE jÇ BÍ É÷Îz³ jÇ Á¸Y É· fÍE ÉNnÃAe É· fÍBI Ë ,ÆeÌIBÃ Ë ÆeÌI fÍBq BÍ /;fÄÃAÌa ÔiËjy Ai ÅÍA Ë ,#OmA ÁnU Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ [44] ,ÆeÌI fÍBrÃ BÍ ;fÄÃAÌa Å¸À¿ Ai ÅÍA Ë ,#OmA jÎIe Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ†

.fÄÃAÌa ©ÄNÀ¿ Ai ÅÍA Ë ,#OmA ÉNqj¯ Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ†

É‡ÃE jI É¼ÀVI Ë ,oI Ë eÌI fÍBq jI Ó¸Í :fN¯A ÓÄ¨¿ Ëe jI #Å¸À¿$ ¥°» Ë .eÌJÃ ,eÌI fÍBrÃ BM KUAË É· AjÍk ,fN¯A Å¸À¿ ÅÍA jÍk ifÃA KUAË Ë .eÌJÃ ©ÄNÀ¿ fN¯ÌÎÃ ÔË jÍk ie KUAË Ë OmA Ó´ÎÝ Å¸À¿ ÅÍA Ë ,eÌIBÃ Ë eÌI fÍBq jI jNÍe Ë Å¸À¿ É† jÇ ÉÃ Ë ;eÌJÃ É· eÌI Å¸À¿ ,eÌJI É· ÓÄ¨¿ ÅÍfI eÌI Å¸À¿ É† jÇ Ë ifÃA OmA OÍB°· if³ ÅÍA Ë .eÌJÃ É· /eÌI Å¸À¿ ,eÌJI É· ÅÎrÎ‚ ÓÄ¨ÀI eÌI [45]

.Ó¼ÀY ÔBÇ É÷Îz³ ¾BY ÆeÌÀÃ

½v°Ä¿ Ë ½v÷N¿ ÓNjq ÔBÇ É÷Îz³ ¾BY Æej· AfÎ‚ (10) f¿E Êej· Ó¼ÀY ie É· ÔËi ÆE jI ÁÇ

lÎÃ Ai ÓWjq ,¾ÌÀZ¿ Ó¸Í Ë ªÌyÌ¿ Ó¸Í ,eÌI ÊiB‚ Ëe Ai Ó¼ÀY É¸ÃBÄ‡ÀÇ .eÌI ÊiB‚ Ëe

¢jq É· eÌI ÆE Â÷f´¿ Ë .Ó»BM Ó¸Í Ë Â÷f´¿ Ó¸Í :oI Ë eÌI ÊiB‚ Ëe Ai ½v÷N¿ B÷¿A :ÁÎÍÌŒ ÆÌ† É· OnÃE ÅÍA ¾BR¿ .eÌI LAÌU É· eÌI ÆE Ó»BM Ë ,eÌI ÆËj´¿ ÔÌI

iBN°Œ Ë OmA Â÷f´¿ #fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ B¿ iBN°Œ /,#eÌI kËi ,fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ [46] .OmA Ó»BM #eÌI kËi$ É· B¿


18

But as for the disjunctive conditional, it may be that a single antecedent has a [only] a

single consequent, or it may be that it has many consequents. An example of the first

[case] is when you say, “either this number is even, or it is odd”: the first [part] is the

antecedent, the second [part] the consequent – and here there is no more than a single

[consequent]. An example of the [second case] is when you say, “that number is either

equal to that [other] number, or it is less, or more”: here a single antecedent has two

consequents. Or it may be that there are more than two [consequents], or an unlimited

number: e.g., “every number is either two or three or four…”; and this has no limit.

[47] Thus the difference between the antecedent and the consequent [on the one hand],

and the subject and the predicate [on the other], is that a simple expression [can] stand in

place of the subject and the predicate, but it [cannot] stand in place of the antecedent and

the consequent, because each one of these [latter] is in itself a proposition. E.g., “If the

sun rises, it is day”: your saying “the sun rises” is a proposition, and your saying “it is

day” is [also] a proposition. However, the conditional [particle] bars the antecedent from

being a proposition, for when you say “if the sun rises,” with the introduction of the term

“if” this speech is excluded from being a proposition, so that it is neither true nor false.

[Likewise,] the [particle] of the reply bars the consequent from being a proposition, for

when you say “then it is day,” it too is neither true nor false.

[48] Similarly, with the disjunctive [conditional]: for when you say, “this number is

either odd…”: if the word “either” were not there, this antecedent would be a

proposition; [likewise with] “…or it is even”: if the word “or” were not there, this

consequent would be a proposition. This, then, is one difference between the antecedent

and the consequent [on the one hand], and the subject and the predicate [on the other].

Another difference is that [in the case of] subject and predicate, you say that the subject is

(or is not) the predicate, e.g., “Zaid is (or is not) alive.” But [in the case of] antecedent

and consequent, you do not say that the antecedent is (or is not) the consequent.

However, there are two differences between the antecedent and consequent of the

connective, and the antecedent and consequent of the disjunctive.


18

iBÎnI BÈÎ»BM É· fqBI Ë ,eÌI Ó»BM �Í Ai Â÷f´¿ �Í É· fqBI ½v°Ä¿ ifÃA B÷¿AË .#eÌI ¶BW iBÀq ÅÍA BÍ eÌI O°U iBÀq ÅÍA BÍ$:ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE ¾÷ËA ¾BR¿ .eÌI jNÍe ¾BR¿ Ë .eÌJÃ Ó¸Í lU BVÄÍA Ë ,OmA Ó»BM Â÷Ëe Ë ,OmA Â÷f´¿ ÅÎNnbÃ

BVÄÍA É· ,#sÎI BÍ Á· BÍ ,eÌI iBÀq ÆE fÄ‡ÀÇ BÍ ,iBÀq ÆE$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE ,fqBI ÉÃAj· ÓI É· fqBI Ë ,eÌI Ëe kA sÎI É· fqBI Ë .OmA Ó»BM Ëe Ai Â÷f´¿ �Í / .OnÎÃ ÉÃAj· Ai ÅÍAË #iBÈ† BÍ Ém BÍ eÌI Ëe BÍ ÔiBÀq jÇ$:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ†

Ë ªÌyÌ¿ É· OnÃE ,¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ªÌyÌ¿ ÆBÎ¿ Ë ,Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ ÆBÎ¿ ¶j¯ o‚ [47] AjÍk ,fNnÍA ÉÃ Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ ÔBVI Ë ,fNnÍBI ej°¿ Ó¤°» ÆBrÍA ÔBVI ¾ÌÀZ¿ LBN¯E jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† .fÃA ÓNÎz³ sÍÌa o°ÄI Ó¸Í jÇ Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ É· #eÌI kËi$ ÌM iBN°Œ Ë OmA É÷Îz³ #fÍEjI LBN¯E$ ÌM iBN°Œ ,#eÌI kËi ,fÍEjI :ÓÍÌŒ ÆÌ† É· AjÍk ejJI ÓNÎz³ kA Ai Â÷f´¿ ,¢jq ¥°» Å¸Î»Ë .OmA É÷Îz³ ÉÃ BM ,frI ÓNÎz³ kA Åbm ÅÍA #jŒA$ ¥°» Æf¿E ifÃA BI ,#fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ ÆÌ† É· AjÍk ,ejJI ÓNÎz³kA Ai Ó»BM j¿ LAÌU ¥°» Ë .®Ëie ÉÃ Ë OmA OmAi

/ .®Ëie ÉÃ Ë eÌI OmAi ÉÃ ÁÇ ,#eÌI kËi ÊBNÃE$ ÓÍÌŒ

¥°» jŒA ,#OmA ¶BW BÍ ,iBÀq ÅÍA$ :ÓÍÌŒ ÆÌ† É· ,½v°Ä¿ ifÃA ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ Ë [48] ÔeÌJÃ #BÍ$ ¥°» jŒA ,#OmA O°U BÍ$ Ë ;ÔeÌI É÷Îz³ Â÷f´¿ ÅÍA ÔeÌJÃ #BÍ$ ªÌyÌ¿ ÆBÎ¿ Ë ,Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ ÆBÎ¿ On³j¯ Ó¸Í ÅÍA o‚ .ÔeÌI É÷Îz³ Ó»BM ÅÍA

.¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë

¾ÌÀZ¿ ªÌyÌ¿ É· ,eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ªÌyÌ¿ É· BVÃE ,ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE ¶j¯ jNÍe Ë É· BVÃE ÓÍÌNÃ Ë .#OnÎÃ BÍ ,OmA ÊfÃk fÍk$:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,OnÎÃ BÍ ,OmA ,½v÷N¿ Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ ÆBÎ¿ Å¸Î»Ë .OnÎÃ BÍ OmA Ó»BM Â÷f´¿ É· ,eÌI Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿

/ .OmA ¶j¯ Ëe ½v°Ä¿ Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ Ë


19

[49] (a) One [difference] is that the antecedent of the connective [conditional] cannot

become the consequent, nor can the consequent become the antecedent, without altering

the meaning [of the proposition]. For example, when you say, “if the sun rises, it is day,”

the judgment [here] cannot remain the same judgment if the antecedent becomes the

consequent, and the consequent becomes the antecedent. However, in the disjunctive

[conditional] you [can] make whichever [consequent] you wish into the antecedent and

the meaning remains the same. For example, if you wish, you [can] say, “number is

either even or odd,” or if you wish, you [can] say, “number is either odd or even.”

(b) The other difference is that the consequent of the connective [conditional] is

in accord with the antecedent and is its counterpart, e.g., being day [in relation to] the

rising of the sun. But the consequent of the disjunctive [conditional], on the other hand,

is opposed to, and incompatible with the antecedent, e.g., being even [in relation to]

being odd. It is for this reason that the [50] validation and affirmativeness of the

connective [conditional] consists in your maintaining the existence of this consonance

(e.g., “if the sun rises, it is day”). [On the other hand,] the denial and negativeness of the

connective [conditional] consists in your maintaining the non-existence of this

consonance (e.g., “it is not the case that when the sun rises, it is night”). But it may be

that the antecedent and the consequent are negative, yet the proposition is in itself

affirmative due to your having asserted this consonance: e.g., “if the sun does not rise, it

is not day”; this is affirmative on the ground that a judgment has been made regarding the

actuality and correlation of the non-existence of day with the non-rising of the sun.

[51] The indefiniteness and definiteness of the connective [conditional] consists in this.

Whenever you say, “if (or when) the sun rises, it is day,” and you do not add “always,”

“every time” or “sometimes,” this would be an indefinite conditional. But if you say

“every time,” it would be a universal affirmative [proposition]. Or if you say,

“sometimes, when the sun rises it is cloudy”: this is a particular affirmative [proposition].

Or if you say, “it is never the case that when the sun rises it is night”: this is a universal

negative [proposition]. Or if you say, “not every time the sun rises is it cloudy”: this is a

particular negative [proposition]. It may be that the connective proposition is universal,


19

ÓÄ¨¿ Ë ,eÌI Â÷f´¿ É· Ó»BM Ë ,eÌI Ó»BM É· fÍBrÃ ,½v÷N¿ Â÷f´¿ É· OnÃE Ó¸Í [49] ÅÎÀÇ Á¸Y É· fÍBrÃ ,#eÌI kËi fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† .eÌI ÔBVI É· ÂAf· jÇ ,½v°Ä¿ ifÃA B÷¿AË .Â÷f´¿ Ó»BM Ë ,eÌq Ó»BM Â÷f´¿ Ë ,eÌI Á¸Y

O°U BÍ iBÀq$ :ÓÍÌŒ ,ÓÇAÌa jŒA É¸ÃBÄ† .eÌI ÔBVI ÓÄ¨¿ Ë ÓÄ· Â÷f´¿ ÓÇAÌa .#O°U BÍ eÌI ¶BW BÍ iBÀq$ :ÓÍÌŒ ÓÇAÌa jŒA Ë ,#¶BW BÍ eÌI

É¸ÃBÄ† ,fqBI ÔË iAe ôÂòe Ë Â÷f´¿ BI eÌI µ¯AÌ¿ ,½v÷N¿ Ó»BM É· OnÃE jNÍe ¶j¯ Ë ,Â÷f´¿ BI iBŒkBmBÃ Ë eÌI ±»Bb¿ ,½v°Ä¿ Ó»BM B÷¿AË .Æf¿E jI LBN¯E BI ÆeÌI kËi ÆeÌI KUÌ¿ Ë PBJQA /É· OmAi ½J³ ÅÍkA Ë .ÆeÌI ¶BW BI ÆeÌI O°U É¸ÃBÄ† [50]

fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÔiBŒkBm ÅÍA ÓNnÈI ÓÄ· Á¸Y É· OnÃE ½v÷N¿ ,ÔiBŒkBm ÅÍA ÆeÌIBÄI ÓÄ· Á¸Y É· OnÃE ½v÷N¿ ÆeÌI K»Bm Ë Ó°Ã Ë .#eÌI kËi Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ É· fqBI Ë .#eÌI Kq ,fÍEjI LBN¯E ÆÌ† É· eÌJÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† Êej· PBJQA Ai ÔiBŒkBm ÅÍA ÆÌ† eÌI KUÌ¿ sÍÌa o°ÄI É÷Îz³ Ë ,fÃÌI K»Bm KUÌ¿ ½J³ ÆE kA ÅÍA Ë ,#eÌJÃ kËi ,fÍBÎÃjI LBN¯E jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓqBI

/.Ai Æf¿EBÃ jI LBN¯E j¿ Omf¿E Êej· ÆeÌIBÃ kËi ÔiAe ôÂòe Ë ÓNnÈI Á¸Y É· OmA

LBN¯E (ÆÌ† BÍ) jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· OnÃE ½v÷N¿ ÔiÌvZ¿ Ë Ó¼ÀÈ¿ Ë [51] ÓWjq ÅÍA ,#ÓÇBŒ$ BÍ #ÔiBI jÇ$ Ë #ÉrÎÀÇ$ É· ÓÍÌŒ ÉÃ Ë ,#eÌI kËi fÍE jI ÆÌ† É· ÊBŒ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ .eÌI Ó÷¼· KUÌ¿ ,#ÔiBI jÇ$ ÓÍÌŒ jŒA B¿A .eÌI ½ÀÈ¿ LBN¯E ÆÌ† É· eÌJÃ lŒjÇ$:ÓÍÌŒ BÍ .eÌI KUÌ¿ ÔËlU ÅÍA ,#eÌI jIA fÍEjI LBN¯E jIA fÍEjI LBN¯E É· ÊBŒ jÇ ÉÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ .eÌI K»Bm Ó÷¼· ÅÍA ,#eÌI Kq ,fÍEjI ÔË ‘iB‚ Ëe jÇ Ë ,eÌI Ó÷¼· ½v÷N¿ �Îz³ É· fqBI Ë .eÌI K»Bm ÔËlU ÅÍA ,#eÌI jÎIe iÌÃBU ÓajI ,fÃÌI jÎIe Âej¿ ÓajI ÊBŒ jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ / É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ÔËlU [52]

.#ÊBŒ jÇ$ ÔA ÉN°Œ É· eÌI Ai ½J³ ÆE kA Ó÷¼· ÅÍA Ë ,#fÃÌI


20

while both its parts are particular: e.g., [52] “whenever some men are writers, some

animals are writers.” This is universal on account of your saying “whenever.”

As regards affirmation in the disjunctive [conditional], it consists in your asserting the

dissonance [between the antecedent and the consequent]: e.g., “either it is like this, or it is

like that.” The negation [of the disjunctive conditional] consists in your denying this

dissonance: e.g., “it is not the case that number is either even or white; rather, it is either

even or odd.” The universal [disjunctive conditional] consists in this dissonance being

permanent: e.g., “always, it is either like this or like that.” The particular [disjunctive

conditional] consists in this dissonance being [present] some of the time: e.g.,

“sometimes it happens that men are either in a ship or drowned”; [53] this “sometimes”

[refers to] that time when [men are] at sea. The true disjunctive [conditional] is one

wherein this dissonance exists, but where the judgment does not reside outside its

components: e.g., “this number is either equal to that number, or it is less, or more.”

11. Explication of the character of Contradiction

The contradiction of a proposition is a proposition that is opposed to it by affirmation or

negation. If one is affirmative, the other is negative; and if one is negative, the other is

affirmative. [On the basis] of the form of their opposition, one of [the propositions] must

necessarily be true, and the other, false: they will then be contradictory to one another.

The conditions [governing] the form of this opposition are [the following].

(a) The meaning of the subject and predicate, as well as of the antecedent and the

consequent, must be the same; otherwise, the two [propositions] would not be

contradictory to each other. E.g., someone says, “the lamb has a father,” while another

says, “the lamb does not have a father.” [54] In one case, by “lamb” is meant sheep,

while in the other a celestial sign (of the Zodiac) is meant. Their statements [here] are

not contradictory to each other; this opposition is with respect to the subject. Or it is said,

“sugar is sh§r§n,” [sweet] and, “sugar is not sh§r§n” (i.e. not made of milk (sh§r)). Both of

these are true and are not contradictory to one another; this opposition is with respect to


20

:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓÄ· PBJQA Ai ÔiBŒkBmBÃ ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE ½v°Ä¿ ifÃA LBVÍA B÷¿A ,ÓÄ· Ó°Ã Ai ÔiBŒkBmBÃ ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE K¼m Ë .#eÌI ÆBÄ† BÍ ,eÌI ÅÎÄ† BÍ$

Ó÷¼· Ë .#eÌI ¶BW BÍ O°U BÍ É¸¼I ,fÎƒm BÍ O°U BÍ iBÀq eÌJÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ÆBÄ† BÍ eÌI ÅÎÄ† BÍ ÂAf¿$:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ÁÖAe ÔiBŒkBmBÃ ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE eÌI ÓÇBŒ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ÓÇBŒ ÔiBŒkBmBÃ ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE ÔËlU Ë .#eÌI ifÃA É· OmA ÊBNÃE #ÊBŒ$ ÅÍA /Ë ,#eÌI É³j« BÍ ,eÌI ÓNr· ifÃA BÍ Âej¿ É· [53]

ÆE kA ÆËjÎI Á¸Y Å¸Î»Ë eÌI ÔiBŒkBmBÃ ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE O´Î´ZI ½v°Ä¿Ë .eÌI BÍie .#sÎI BÍ Á· BÍ eÌI jIAjI BÍ iBÀq ÆE BI iBÀq ÅÍA$:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌJÃ tBÈNÀn³

|Î´Ã ¾BY Æej· AfÎ‚ (11) ,eÌI KUÌ¿ ÔË jŒA .ÓJ»Bm Ë ÓJUÌÀI ÔË ±»Bb¿ eÌI ÓN÷Îz³ ,É÷Îz³ |Î´Ã ÆBrÍA ²Ýa PiÌu kA Ë .eÌI KUÌ¿ ÅÍA ,eÌI K»Bm ÔË jŒA Ë ;eÌI K»Bm ÅÍA .fÃÌI |Î´Ã Ai jNÍej¿ �Í ÊBNÃE ,eÌI ®Ëie Ó¸Í Ë eÌI OmAi Ó¸Í É· fÍBI ÉÄÍEjÇ

:É· OnÃE ²Ýa ÅÍA PiÌu ÔBÈWjq Ë

jNÍf¸Íj¿ Ëe jÇ ÷ÜAË ,eÌI Ó¸Í Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ Ë ¾ÌÀZ¿Ë ªÌyÌ¿ ÓÄ¨¿ É· fÍBI Ai Ê÷jI$ fÍÌŒ ÔjNÍe Ë #eÌI if‚ Ai Ê÷jI$ É· fÍÌŒ Ón· É¸ÃBÄ† .fÃÌJÃ |Î´Ã Ai ÔBÈ»Ì³ .fÄÇAÌa ÆBÀmE XjI Ó¸ÎI Ë fÄÇAÌa fÄ°mÌŒ #Ê÷jI$ Ó¸ÎI /.#eÌJÃ if‚ [54] É· fÄÍÌŒ BÍ Ë .OmA ªÌyÌ¿ KÃBU kA ²Ýa ÅÍA Ë fÃÌJÃ jNÍf¸Í |Î´Ã ÆBrÍA ÅÍA .OnÎÃ Êej· jÎq kA É· ÓÄ¨Í ,#OnÎÃ ÅÍjÎq j¸q$ Ë #OmA ÅÍjÎq j¸q$ Ë .OmA ¾ÌÀZ¿ KÃBU kA ²Ýa ÅÍA Ë ;fÃÌJÃ jNÍf¸Í |Î´Ã Ë fÃÌI OmAi Ëe jÇ ¡¼« Ë eÌI ÊfÎqÌ‚ BÈÀ¼§ ifÃA ÊBNÍBU iBÎnJI Ë ,BVÄÍA OmA ÊiB¸qE ¾BY ÅÍA

.fÄ¸¯A


21

the predicate. Now, in this case the [situation] is obvious, but in many places in the

sciences it is concealed and leads to error.

(b) Another condition is that there must not be opposition between whole and

part: e.g., one says, “the eye of so-and-so is black,” and again, “the eye of so-and-so is

white, not black.” [In the first case,] by blackness is meant the blackness of the pupil,

[while in the second case,] by the denial of blackness is meant the white [55] area [of the

eye].

(c) Another condition is that both judgments be either in potentiality or in

actuality, not such as when someone says, “this fire is burning” (i.e. potentially), and

another says, “it is not burning” (i.e. actually, when it is not burning anything). Both of

these utterances are true and are not contradictory to one another.

(d) Another [condition] is that what supplements [the meaning of either

proposition] be the same for both: not such as when someone says, “ten is more” (i.e.

than nine), and another says, “ten is not more” (i.e. than eleven). These are both true and

are not contradictory.

(e) Another [condition] is that the time be the same and not two [different] times;

and [likewise] that the place be the same and not two [different] places.

In sum, the judgment of both [propositions] must be [made] in the same respect and must

have the same predicate [56] and the same subject. Hence if the subject is universal, one

of the propositions must be universal, the other particular; for it may be that both

universal [propositions] are false (e.g., “every man is a writer,” and “no man is a writer”);

and it may be that both particular [propositions] are true (e.g., “some men are writers,”

and “some men are not writers”). Hence the contradictory of “every” is “not every,” and

the contradictory of “none” is “some.” Once these conditions have been met, one [of the

propositions] would necessarily be true, and the other false. Know the character of

conditionals on the basis of [the same] reasoning.


21

:fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌJÃ ²Ýa ÓŒiB‚ Ë ÓNÀÇ ifÃA É· fÍBI É· OnÃE ¢jq jNÍe Ë ,ÓÇBÎnI Ë ,#ÊBÎm ÉÃ ,OmA fÎƒm ÆÝ¯ Ár†$ Ë ,#OnÇBÎm ÆÝ¯ Ár†$ .fÄÇAÌa Ai ÔfÎƒm / ÊBNÍBUj¿ ,ÓÇBÎm Ó°ÄI Ë fÄÇAÌa ÊfÍe ÓÇBÎm [55]

:fÍÌŒ Ón· É¸ÃBÄ† ÉÃ ,½¨°I BÍ eÌI P÷ÌÍ BÍ Á¸Y Ëe jÇ É· OnÃE ¢jq jNÍe Ë ÓÄ¨Í ,#ÊfÃkÌm OnÎÃ$:fÍÌŒ jNÍe Ë ,P÷ÌÍ ÓÄ¨Í ,#OmA ÊfÃkÌm sME ÅÍA$ fÃÌJÃ |Î´Ã Ë ,eÌI OmAi Åbm Ëe jÇ ÅÍA Ë .ekÌnÃ Ai ÔlÎ† É· ÊBNÃE ,½¨°I

.AijNÍf¸Íj¿

:fÍÌŒ Ón· É¸ÃBÄ† ÉÃ ,eÌI Ó¸Í Ëe jÇ ÆBrÍA O¯ByA É· eÌI ÆE jNÍe Ë ÓÄ¨Í ,#OnÎÃ jNrÎI Êe$ :fÍÌŒ jNÍe Ë ,ÉÃ kA ÓÄ¨Í ,#OmA jNrÎI Êe$

.fÃÌJÃ |Î´Ã Ë OnNmAi Ëe jÇ ÅÍA Ë .ÊekBÍ kA

.ÊBNÍBU Ëe ÉÃ eÌI Ó¸Í ÊBNÍBU Ë ,O³Ë Ëe ÉÃ eÌI Ó¸Í ,O³Ë É¸ÃE jNÍe Ë

.ªÌyÌ¿ ÆBÀÇ Ë fÍBI / ¾ÌÀZ¿ ÆBÀÇ Ë ,fÍBI OÈV¸Í kA Ëe jÇ Á¸Y É¼ÀVI Ë [56] É· ;ÔËlU Ó¸Í Ë ,eÌI Ó÷¼· É÷Îz³ Ó¸Í É· fÍBI ,fqBI Ó÷¼· ªÌyÌ¿ jŒA o‚

ˆÎÇ$ Ë #OmjÎIe Ó¿ej¿ jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ†) fÃÌI ®Ëie Ó÷¼· Ëe jÇ É· fÍBq ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ†) fÃÌI OmAi ÔËlU Ëe jÇ É· fÍBq Ë ;(#OnÎÃ jÎIe Âej¿ #É†jÇ ÉÃ$ ,#É†jÇ$ |Î´Ã o‚ .(#OnÎÃ jÎIe Âej¿ ÓajI$ Ë #OmjÎIe Âej¿ ÉÄÍEjÇ ,eÌI ÊeiËE ÔBVI BÈWjq ÅÍA ÆÌ† Ë .eÌI #ÓajI$ ,#ˆÎÇ$ |Î´Ã Ë eÌI

.ÆAfI BÈÎWjq ¾BY pBÎ³ ÅÍjI Ë .eÌI ®Ëie Ó¸Í Ë eÌI OmAi Ó¸Í


22

12. Exposition of the character of Conversion

Conversion involves your turning the subject [of a proposition] into a predicate, and the

predicate into a subject – [57] or making the antecedent a consequent, and the consequent

an antecedent – while retaining the affirmative or negative [quality of the proposition],

and while retaining its truth.

As for the universal negative, it admits of conversion and results in the universal negative

again: for whenever it is true that “no A is B,” it is true that “no B is A”; otherwise its

contradictory would be true, viz. “some B is A.” That “some” is necessarily something,

say C. So C is that B which is A, and the same thing is both A and B. So there is an A

which is B; yet we had said that “no A is B” is true; and this is impossible. Thus, it has

become evident that when no A is B, no [58] B is A.

As for the universal affirmative, it is not necessary that its conversion be in every case a

universal affirmative; for one can say, “every man is animal,” but one cannot say, “every

animal is man.” However, it is necessary that its conversion be a particular affirmative,

because whenever all As are B, some Bs must be A, otherwise no B would be A – [in that

case] it becomes necessary, as has [just] been shown, that no A is B, yet we had said that

“every A is B.”

The conversion of the particular affirmative yields a particular affirmative; thus when

you say, “some As are B,” it is necessary that some Bs be A, [59] on the basis of the

same argument that we have stated.

As for the particular negative, it is not necessary that it have a conversion, for you can

say, “not every animal is man,” but you cannot say, “not every man is animal.”


22

o¸§ ¾BY ÆeÌÀÃ kBI (12) Â÷f´¿ BÍ ;ÓÄ· / ªÌyÌ¿ ,¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ÓÄ· ¾ÌÀZ¿ ,ªÌyÌ¿ É· eÌI ÆE o¸§ ¾BY [57] .eÌI ÔBVI ÓNmAi Ë ÔiAe ÔBVI ÓJ»Bm Ë ÓJUÌ¿ Ë ,ÓÄ· Â÷f´¿ Ó»BM Ë ÓÄ· Ó»BM

É· eÌI OmAi ÊBŒ jÇ É· ,fÍE kBI K»Bm Ó÷¼¸I ÁÇ Ë ejÍh‚ o¸§ ,K»Bm Ó÷¼· B÷¿A ÔË |Î´Ã ÷ÜAË ,OnÎÃ ÆÝ¯ iBNmBI ˆÎÇ É· eÌI OmAi ,OnÎÃ iBNmBI ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ .AeBI ÆBÀÈI ,eÌI ÔlÎ† ÉÄÍEjÇ djI ÆE ,OmA ÆÝ¯ iBNmBI kA ÓajI É· eÌI OmAi ;iBNmBI ÁÇ Ë eÌI ÆÝ¯ ÁÇ ÉÄÎÏ ÔË Ë ,OmA ÆÝ¯ É· eÌI ÔiBNmBI ÆE ÆBÀÈI o‚ ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ É· OmA µY É· ÁÍeÌI ÉN°Œ Ë ,eÌI iBNmBI ÔË É· OnÇ ÓÃÝ¯ o‚

,eÌJÃ iBNmBI ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ ÆÌ† É· f¿E fÍf‚ o‚ .OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA Ë ,OnÎÃ iBNmBI .eÌJÃ ÆÝ¯ iBNmBI / ˆÎÇ [58]

ÅN°Œ ÆAÌM É· ,eÌI KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· ÔË o¸§ ÉÄÍEjÇ É· fÍBÎÃ KUAË ,KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· B÷¿AË Å¸Î»Ë .#OmA Âej¿ ÓÃAÌÎY jÇ$ É· ÅN°Œ ÆAÌNÃ Ë ,#OnÃAÌÎY Ó¿ej¿ jÇ$ É· ,fÃÌI iBNmBI ÆBÃÝ¯ �ÀÇ É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· AjÍk ,KUÌ¿ ÔËlU o¸§ AiËA fÍE KUAË

É¸ÃBÄ† fÍE KUAË Ë ,eÌJÃ ÆÝ¯ iBNmBI ˆÎÇ ÷ÜAË ,fÃÌI ÆÝ¯ ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI É·fÍBI .OmA iBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ É· ÁÍA ÉN°Œ Ë ,eÌJÃ iBNmBI ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ É· fq Êej· AfÎ‚

iBNmBI ÆBÃÝ¯ ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI KUÌ¿ ÔËlU ÆE o¸§ ,KUÌ¿ ÔËlU Ë

.ÁÎN°Œ É· OVY ÆBÀÈI / ,fÃÌI ÆÝ¯ ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI É· fÍBI ,#fÃÌI [59]

ÉÃ$ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM É· AjÍk ,eÌI o¸§ Ai ËA É· fÍBÎÃ KUAË ,K»Bm ÔËlU B÷¿AË .#OnÃAÌÎY Ó¿ej¿ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌNÃ Ë ,#On¿ej¿ ÓÃAÌÎY jÇ


23

13. On Recognizing the Syllogism

To every unknown there is a path by which it becomes known. As regards conceiving or

conception, that path consists of definition and description, both of which we have

[already] mentioned. As regards affirming or assent, the path consists of reasoning.

Reasoning is of three kinds: syllogism, induction, and analogy. (But to argue from what

is present [manifest] to what is absent is also a part of analogy.) The most reliable of

these three is the syllogism, and of all syllogisms, the demonstrative syllogism. But as

long as we do not know what the syllogism as a whole is, we cannot know what the

demonstrative syllogism is.

[60] The syllogism, as a whole, is a discourse in which a number of statements are made,

such that if these statements are admitted, there follows of necessity another statement.

For example, if someone says, “every body is [endowed] with form,” and “everything

that is [endowed] with form is created,” this speech is a syllogism; because whenever

both of these propositions are admitted and conceded, there follows of necessity another

speech, viz., “every body is created.” [61] Likewise, if someone says, “if the world is

[endowed] with form, then the world is created; but the world is [endowed] with form”;

this, too, is a syllogism. For this is a speech composed of two propositions which,

whenever both are admitted, a third speech follows of necessity -- [a speech] other than

these two, although it is a part of one of them -- and that speech is: “the world is created.”

Now, syllogism is of two kinds: one is called connective, the other exceptive.

14. Explication of the Connective Syllogism

[62] Connective syllogism involves the bringing together of two propositions, each of

which has one part in common and is different in the other part. From these [two

propositions] there then results, of necessity, another proposition [made up] of those two

parts that were not shared in common. An example of this is what we said [before], viz.,


23

pBÎ³ ÅNaBÄq ie (13) ,Ai Æej· i÷ÌvM Ë Ai ÆfÎmi ifÃA B÷¿A .eÌq ÉNnÃAe ÔÌI É· OnÎÇAi ÉNnÃAeBÃ jÈI ,Ai Æej· µÍfvM Ë Ai ÆfÍËjŒ B÷¿AË .ÁÍej· eBÍ Ai Ëe jÇ ÅÍA Ë ,Ámi Ë Om÷fY ÊAi ÆejI ½Î»e B÷¿A) .¾BR¿ Ë ÕAjŃmA Ë pBÎ³ :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ém O÷VY Ë .OmA O÷VY ÊAi kA Ë ,OmA pBÎ³ Ém jÇ ÅÍkA fÀN¨¿ Ë (.OmA ¾BR¿ �¼ÀU kA ÁÇ KÍB¬I fÇBq kA ÅNnÃAe ÁÎÃAÌNÃ ,eÌI É† É¼ÀVI pBÎ³ É· ÁÎÃAfÃ BM Ë .ÓÃBÇjI pBÎ³ BÈmBÎ³ �¼ÀU

/ .eÌI É† ÓÃBÇjI pBÎ³ É·

fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ ÆÌ† É· eÌq ÉN°Œ ÓÃBÄbm ÔË ifÃA É· eÌI ÓÄbm É¼ÀVI pBÎ³ Ë [60] ¾BR¿ .ÉÄÍEjÇ fÍE ÂkÜ jNÍe ÔiBN°Œ BVÃE kA ,eÌI Êf¿E ÉN°Œ ÔË ifÃA É· ÓÃBÄbm ÅÍA ,#OmA TfZ¿ Ôi÷Ìv¿ jÇ Ë ,OmA i÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$:fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA ÅÍA Êej· ÁÎ¼nM Ë ,fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ É÷Îz³ Ëe jÇ ÅÍA É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· AjÍk ,eÌI pBÎ³ Åbm ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ Ë / .#OmA TfZ¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ :É· fÍE ÂkÜ jNÍe ÓÄbm BVÄÍA kA ,eÌq [61] Á»B§ Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA TfZ¿ Á»B§ o‚ ,OmA i÷Ìv¿ Á»B§ jŒA$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA

É· É÷Îz³ Ëe kA ±»Û¿ OmA ÓÄbm ÅÍA É· AjÍk ,eÌI pBÎ³ lÎÃ ÅÍA ;#OmA i÷Ìv¿ ‘iB‚ É· fÄ† jÇ ,Ëe jÇ ÅÍA lUfÍE ÂkÜ Â÷Ìm ÓÄbm ,fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ Ëe jÇ É· ÊBŒ jÇ

.#OmA TfZ¿ Á»B§$ :É· OnÃE Åbm ÅÍA Ë OmA ÆBrÍA kA Ó¸Í

/ .ÓÖBÄRNmA Ai Ó¸Í Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÓÃAjN³A Ai Ó¸Í :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe pBÎ³ Ë


24

whenever it is conceded that “every body is [endowed] with form,” and “everything that

is [endowed] with form is created,” there follows of necessity [the proposition], “every

body is created.” There are, therefore, two propositions here:

(i): “every body is [endowed] with form”;

[63] (ii): “everything that is [endowed] with form is created.”

The first premise has “body” as one part, and “[endowed] with form” as the other part;

while the second premise has “[endowed] with form” as one part, and “created” as the

other part. Consequently, “[endowed] with form” is a part of both [premises]. However,

one [premise] has “body” alone, and the other has “created” [alone]. This [third]

proposition that has resulted of necessity, has “body” as one part, and “created” as

another part. Now, matters revolve around these three parts: “body,” “[endowed] with

form,” and “created,” which are called terms. Thus, “[endowed] with form” and

everything that is similar to it is called the middle term; “body,” which becomes the

subject in the resulting [proposition] is called the minor term; and “created,” which

becomes the [64] predicate in the resulting [proposition] is called the major term. Both

of those two propositions that are in the syllogism are called premises, and that

proposition which results of necessity is called the conclusion. That [proposition] in

which is [contained] the subject of the conclusion is called the minor premise, and that in

which is [contained] the predicate of the conclusion is called the major premise. The

coming together of these two premises is called connection, and the form of [this] coming

together is called figure.

Now, this form is of three kinds: (a) either the middle term is the predicate in one premise

and the subject in the other -- and this is called the first figure; [65] or (b) the [middle

term] is the predicate in both [premises] -- and this is called the second figure; or (c) the

[middle term] is the subject in both [premises]; -- and this is called the third figure. The

case of the antecedent and consequent [in] a connective [conditional proposition] is the

same as that of the subject and predicate of a predicative [proposition]. No syllogism

results from two negative [propositions], nor from two particular [propositions].

[Likewise,] whenever the minor is negative and its major is particular, no syllogism

results. Thus each figure has its own characteristics.


24

ÓÃAjN³A pBÎ³ Æej· AfÎ‚ (14) [62] ÔkBJÃA ÊiB‚ �Í ifÃA Ai Ëe jÇ Ë ,fÃiËE ejŒ Ai É÷Îz³ Ëe É· eÌI ÆE ÓÃAjN³A pBÎ³ Ëe ÆE kA É· ,jNÍe ÔAÉ÷Îz³ fÍE KUAË ÆBrÍA kA o‚ .ÓÍAfU ÊiB‚ jNÍfI Ë ,eÌI Êej· ÁÎ¼nM ÊBŒ jÇ É· ÁÎN°Œ É¸ÃE ÅÍA ¾BR¿ .eÌJÃ ÔkBJÃA ÆBrÍA ifÃA É· eÌI ÊiB‚ É· fÍE ÂkÜ BVÄÍA kA ,#OmA TfZ¿ Ôi÷Ìv¿ jÇ Ë Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ :É· fÍE ÓÀnU jÇ$ É¸ÃE Ó¸Í :OmA É÷Îz³ Ëe BVÄÍA o‚ .#OmA TfZ¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$

�Í Ai ÅÎrÎ‚ �¿÷f´¿ Ë .#OmA TfZ¿ Ôi÷Ìv¿ jÇ$ É¸ÃE jNÍe Ë /;#Omi÷Ìv¿ [63] #i÷Ìv¿$ ËlU �Í Ai Â÷Ëe �¿÷f´¿ Ë ;#i÷Ìv¿$ ËlU jNÍe Ë ,OmA #ÁnU$ ËlU Ai Ó¸Í Å¸Î»Ë .OmA Ëe jÇ ËlU #i÷Ìv¿$ o‚ .#TfZ¿$ ËlU jNÍe Ë ,OmA tËlU �Í ,f¿E ÂkÜ É· É÷Îz³ ÅÍAË .#TfZ¿$ Ai Ó¸Í Ë ,OmBÈÄM #ÁnU$

Ë ÁnU jI :OmA ÊiB‚ Ém ÅÍjI iB· tejŒ Ë .#TfZ¿$ ËlU �Í Ë OmA #ÁnU$ fÃB¿ ÔÌI É†jÇ Ë Ai #i÷Ìv¿$ o‚ .fÄÃAÌa ÷fY Ai ÆBrÍA Ë ;TfZ¿ Ë i÷Ìv¿

ÅÎÈ· ÷fY fÍE ÂkÜ É‡ÃE ifÃA eÌq ªÌyÌ¿ É· Ai #ÁnU$ Ë ;fÄÃAÌa ÅÎBÃBÎ¿ ÷fY .fÄÃAÌa ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY fÍE ÂkÜ É‡ÃE ifÃA eÌq ¾ÌÀZ¿ É· / Ai #TfZ¿$ Ë ;fÄÃAÌa [64] ÂkÜ É· Ai É÷Îz³ ÆE Ë ,fÄÃAÌa É¿÷f´¿ OmA pBÎ³ ifÃA É· Ai É÷Îz³ Ëe jÇ ÆE Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÅÎÈ· V¿f´¿ eÌI ÔË ifÃA ÉVÎNÃ ªÌyÌ¿ É· AjÃE Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÉVÎNÃ fÍE Ëe ÅÍA Æf¿E ejŒ Ë .fÄÃAÌa ÅÎÈ¿ V¿÷f´¿ eÌI ÔË ifÃA ÉVÎNÃ ¾ÌÀZ¿ É· AjÃE Ë

.fÄÃAÌa ½¸q Ai Æf¿E ejŒ PiÌu Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÆAjN³A Ai É¿÷f´¿

ªÌyÌ¿ Ë ,É¿÷f´¿ �Í ifÃA eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ ÅÎNÃBÎ¿ ÷fY BÍ :eÌI ÉÃÌŒ Ém PiÌu ÅÍAË Ai ÅÍA Ë eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ Ëe jÇ ifÃA BÍ /.fÄÃAÌa ÅÎNnbÃ ½¸q Ai ÅÍAË ,jNÍe ifÃA Á¸Y Ë .fÄÃAÌa Â÷Ìm ½¸q Ai ÅÍA Ë eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ Ëe jÇ ifÃA BÍ .fÄÃAÌa Â÷Ëe ½¸q [65] kA Ë .OmA Ó¼ÀY ¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ªÌyÌ¿ Á¸Y É· OmA ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ ½v÷N¿ kA Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ eÌI K»Bm Ôj¬u É· ÊBŒjÇ Ë .fÍBÎÃ pBÎ³ ÔËlU Ëe kA Ë ,fÍBÎÃ pBÎ³ K»Bm Ëe

.OmBÈNÎuÌva Ai Ó¼¸q jÇ o‚ .fÍBÎÃ pBÎ³ eÌI ÔËlU sÍjJ· Ë


25

15. Exposition of the Moods of the Syllogisms of the First Figure

The first figure has two merits: one is that its syllogisms do not require any proof in order

to establish that they are syllogisms (which is not the case for the other two figures); [66]

the other is that all four definite [propositions] (namely, the universal affirmative,

universal negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative) can be made into the

conclusion of this figure, whereas in the second figure no conclusion is affirmative, and

in the third figure no conclusion is universal, as will become evident [below].

In order for the conjuncts of the first figure to become a syllogism, two conditions [must

be fulfilled]: (i) their minor must be affirmative;

(ii) their major must be universal.

If this is not the case, it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false;

[67] but everything whose conclusion is not in every case true, when its premises are

true, is not a syllogism. Consequently, as these are the two [requisite] conditions, the

syllogisms of this figure are four [in number].

(a) First Syllogism: [consisting of] two universal affirmatives.

Example: If someone says, “every A is B,” and “every B is C”; from here the conclusion

follows that “every A is C.” Thus when you say, “every body is [endowed] with form,”

and “everything [endowed] with form [68] is created,” from here the conclusion follows

that “every body is created”; and this is a universal affirmative conclusion.

(b) Second Syllogism: [consisting of] two universals, but with the major negative.

For example, when someone says, “every A is B,” and “no B is C,” the conclusion

follows that “no A is C.” E.g.: “every body is [endowed] with form,” and “nothing [that

has been endowed] with form is pre-eternal”; whence it necessarily follows that “no body

is pre-eternal”; and this conclusion is a universal negative.


25

¾÷ËA ½¸q ÔBÈmBÎ³ ¾BY ÆeÌÀÃkBI (15) Omie É· fÍBJÃ ÓN÷VY AiËA ÔBÈmBÎ³ É¸ÃE Ó¸Í :OmA O¼Îz¯ Ëe Ai ¾÷ËA ½¸q jÇ É¸ÃE jNÍe Ë / ;(jNÍe ½¸q Ëe ¾BY OmA ÅÎÄ† ÉÃ Ë) fÃApBÎ³ É· fÄ· [66] ÔËlU Ë KUÌ¿ ÔËlU Ë K»Bm Ó÷¼· Ë OmA KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· É·) Ai ÊiÌvZ¿ iBÈ† Ë ,eÌJÃ KUÌ¿ ÉVÎNÃ ˆÎÇ Â÷Ëe ½¸q ifÃA Ë ,ej· fÍBq ÉVÎNÃ ÔË ifÃA (K»Bm

.eÌq AfÎ‚ eÌa É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌJÃ Ó÷¼· ÉVÎNÃ ˆÎÇ Â÷Ìm ½¸q ifÃA

:OmA ¢jq Ëe Ai ÅÎNnbÃ ½¸q ÔBÈÃAjN³A Æfq pBÎ³j¿ Ë .eÌI KUÌ¿ É· fÍBI ÆBqAj¬u É· OnÃE Ó¸Í .eÌI Ó÷¼· É· fÍBI ÆBqAjJ· É· OnÃE jNÍe Ë

É† jÇ Ë ,eÌI / ®Ëie ÉVÎNÃ Ë fÃÌI OmAi BÈ¿f´¿ É· fÍBq ,eÌJÃ ÅÎÄ† jŒAË [67] .eÌJÃ pBÎ³ ÆE ,fÃÌI OmAi sMB¿f´¿ ÆÌ† ,¾BY ÷½· Ó¼§ eÌJÃ OmAi ÔË �VÎNÃ

.fÃÌI iBÈ† ½¸q ÅÍA ÔBÈmBÎ³ ,OmA ¢jq Ëe ÅÍA ,¢jq ÆÌ† o‚

.KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :ÅÎNnbÃ pBÎ³ kA ,#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë OmA iBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA :ÔË ¾BR¿ Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† .#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ BVÄÍA ,#OmA TfZ¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ BVÄÍA kA ,#OmA TfZ¿ / Ôi÷Ìv¿ jÇ Ë [68]

.OmA KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· �VÎNÃ ÅÍA Ë

.K»Bm ÔjJ· Å¸Î»Ë Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :Â÷Ëe pBÎ³ ,#eÌJÃ ÆBÀÈI iBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë ,OmA iBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· É¸ÃBÄ†

Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† .#eÌJÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ÅÍA Ë #eÌJÃ ÁÍf³ ÁnU ˆÎÇ$ É· fÍE ÂkÜ BVÄÍA kA ,#eÌJÃ ÁÍf³ i÷Ìv¿ ˆÎÇ Ë

.OmA K»Bm Ó÷¼· ÉVÎNÃ


26

(c) Third Syllogism: [consisting of] particular affirmative minor and universal

affirmative major. [69] E.g., someone says, “some substances are soul,” and “every soul

receives the form of knowledge”; hence, “some substances receive the form of

knowledge”; and this is a particular affirmative conclusion.

(d) Fourth Syllogism: [consisting of] particular affirmative minor and universal

negative major. E.g., someone says, “some substances are soul,” and “no soul is body”;

hence, “some substances are not body.”

The syllogisms of the connective [conditionals] are also in this way.

16. Syllogisms of the Second Figure

The [requirements] of the syllogism of the second figure are:

(i) that one premise be affirmative, the other negative;

(ii) that the major premise be in every case universal.

Consequently, the syllogisms [70] of [the second figure] are four.

(a) First [Syllogism]: [consisting of] two universals and a negative major.

E.g., “every A is B,” and “no C is B”; whence the conclusion: “no A is C.” The proof of

it is that since our saying, “no C is B,” is true, therefore its conversion (viz., “no B is C”)

is [also] true (as has been stated in the section on conversion). Hence when we say,

“every A is B,” and “no B is C,” this conclusion, viz., “no A is C,” is true.


26

/ .Ó÷¼· KUÌ¿ ÔjJ· Ë ÔËlU KUÌ¿ Ôj¬u kA :Â÷Ìm pBÎ³ ,#ejÍh‚ Á¼§ PiÌu Ón°Ã jÇ Ë OmA o°Ã BÇjÇÌŒ ÓajI$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· É¸ÃBÄ† [69]

.OmA KUÌ¿ ÔËlU ÉVÎNÃ ÅÍA Ë ;#ejÍh‚ Á¼§ PiÌu BÇjÇÌŒ ÓajI$ o‚

.Ó÷¼· K»Bm ÔjJ· Ë ÔËlU KUÌ¿ Ôj¬u kA :ÂiBÈ† pBÎ³ o‚ ,#OnÎÃ ÁnU o°Ã ˆÎÇ Ë OmA o°Ã BÇjÇÌŒ ÓzÏ$:fÍÌŒ Ón· É¸ÃBÄ†

.#OnÎÃ ÁnU BÇjÇÌŒ ÓajI$

.eÌI ÆBm ÅÍjI ÁÇ PÝv÷N¿ ÔBÈmBÎ³ Ë

Â÷Ëe ½¸q ÔBÈmBÎ³ (16) ;K»Bm Ó¸ÍË ,eÌI KUÌ¿ É¿÷f´¿ Ó¸Í É· OnÃE Â÷Ëe ½¸q pBÎ³ ÓNmie ¢jq

.eÌI iBÈ† ÔË / ÔBÈmBÎ³ o‚ .eÌI Ó÷¼· ¾BY jÈI ÔjJ· É¿÷f´¿ Ë [70]

.K»Bm ÔjJ· Ë Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :ÅÎNnbÃ BVÄÍA kA ,#OnÎÃ iBNmBI ÆBÀÈI ˆÎÇ Ë OmA iBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ†

ÆBÀÈI ˆÎÇ$ B¿ iBN°Œ ÆÌ† É¸ÃE ÆBÇjI .#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ µY (#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI iBNmBI ˆÎÇ$ É·) ÔË o¸§ o‚ ,OmA µY #OnÎÃ iBNmBI iBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$ É· ÁÎÍÌŒ ÆÌ† o‚ .o¸§ LBI ifÃA Omf¿E ÉN°Œ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ$ :É· eÌI Omie ÉVÎNÃ ÅÍA ,#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈIiBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë OmA

.#OnÎÃ


27

(b) Second [Syllogism]: [consisting of] two universals and a negative minor.

E.g., “no A is B,” and “every C is B”; conclusion: “no A is C.” For [71] if you convert

the minor, and invert the two premises, it becomes thus: “every C is B,” and “no B is A”;

conclusion: “no C is A.” This conclusion admits of conversion and becomes the former

conclusion, viz., “no A is C.”

(c) Third [Syllogism]: [consisting of] a particular affirmative minor and a

universal negative major. E.g., “some As are B,” and “no C is B”; conclusion: “some As

are not C.” For the major admits of conversion and then becomes the fourth [syllogism]

[72] of the first figure and yields the same conclusion.

(d) Fourth [Syllogism]: [consisting of] a particular negative minor, and a

universal affirmative major. E.g., “some A is not B,” and “every C is B”; conclusion:

“some A is not C.” But this conclusion cannot be established by way of conversion

because the minor is a particular negative and does not admit of conversion, while the

major is a universal affirmative whose conversion is a particular: [73] when you bring the

convert [of the major] together with the minor, [there will be] two particulars, and from

two particulars no syllogism follows. Hence in order to show that [this syllogism] yields

a conclusion there are two strategies: (i) one is called demonstration by supposition, (ii)

the other [is called] demonstration by reductio ad absurdum.

(i) As for the way of supposition, it consists in this. When you have said, “some

A is not B,” that “some” is necessarily something – say, D. Then we say, “no D is B,”

and “every C is B.” The conclusion follows that “no D is C.” Once this has become

established, we say, “some A is D,” and “no D is C.” Hence from this statement it has

been established that “some A is not C.”


27

.K»Bm Ôj¬u Ë Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :Â÷Ëe É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ Ë OnÎÃ iBNmBI ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† Ai ÅÎN¿f´¿ Ë ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u ÆÌ† / É· AjÍk ;#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ$ [71] ,#OnÎÃ ÆÝ¯ iBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë OmA iBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ$ É· eÌq ÅÎÄ† ,ÓÄ· ½ÍfJM ÅÎrÎ‚ �VÎNÃ Ë ejÍh‚ o¸§ ÉVÎNÃ ÅÍA Ë #OnÎÃ ÆÝ¯ ÆBÀÈI ˆÎÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ

.#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ ˆÎÇ$ :É· eÌq

.ÔjJ· K»Bm Ó÷¼· Ë ,Ôj¬u KUÌ¿ ÔËlU kA :ÂÌ÷Îm fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OnÎÃ iBNmBI ÆBÀÈI ˆÎÇ Ë fÃiBNmBI ÆBÃÝ¯ ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ÂiBÈ‡I ÊBNÃE Ë ejÍh‚ o¸§ ÔjJ· É· AjÍk ,#fÃA ÆBÀÈI ÉÃ ÆBÃÝ¯ ÓajI$ É·

.eiE ÉVÎNÃ ÅÎÀÇ Ë eÌq ¾÷ËA ½¸q / [pBÎ³] [72]

.ÔjJ· KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· Ë ,Ôj¬u K»Bm ÔËlU kA :ÂiBÈ† É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OmiBNmBI ÆBÀÈI jÇ Ë OnÎÃ iBNmBI ÆÝ¯ ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,Æej· Omie fÍBrÃ o¸§ ÊAjI Ai Æf¿E ÉVÎNÃ ÅÍA Ë .#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ ÓajI$ Ë OmA KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· ÔjJ· Ë ,ejÍhƒÃ o¸§ Ë OmA K»Bm ÔËlU Ôj¬u É· AjÍk

,fÃÌI ÔËlU Ëe ÔiËE ejŒ Ôj¬u BI Ai ÔË o¸§ ÆÌ† Ë / ;eÌI ÔËlU ÔË o¸§ [73] :OmA jÎIfM Ëe Ai ÔË ÆeiËE ÉVÎNÃ Æej· fÍf‚ j¿ o‚ .fÍBÎÃ pBÎ³ ÔËlU Ëe kA Ë

.ô±ô¼óa Ai Ó¸Í Ë fÄÍÌŒ ~AjN¯A Ai Ó¸Í ÆE ,#OnÎÃ iBNmBI ÆÝ¯ ÓajI$ ÓN°Œ ÆÌ† :É· OnÃE ~AjN¯A ÊAi B÷¿A iBNmBI ÆE ˆÎÇ$ ÁÎÍÌŒ o‚ .AeBI #ÆE$ lÎ† ÆE ,eÌI ÔlÎ† É»BZ¿Ü #ÓajI$ ÆÌ† .#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆE ˆÎÇ$ :É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ Ë OnÎÃ ÅÍkA o‚ .#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆE ˆÎÇ Ë OmA ÆE ÆÝ¯ ÓajI$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ ,fq Omie ÅÍA

/ .#eÌI ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· fq Omie ¾Ì³


28

[74] (ii) As for the way of reductio ad absurdum, it consists in this. If our

[conclusion] “some A is not C,” is false, then all A must be C. We have said that “every

C is B,” hence all A must be B. But we had said that “not every A is B” – this is

impossible, so the conclusion is true.

17. Syllogisms of the Third Figure

The [requisite] conditions for the syllogisms of this figure are:

(i) that the minor always be affirmative;

(ii) that one [75] premise (whichever it may be) be universal.

Consequently, the syllogisms of this figure are six [in number].

(a) First [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two universal affirmatives.

E.g., “every B is A,” and “every B is C”; conclusion: “some A is C.” For when you

convert the minor, [the syllogism] becomes: “some As are B,” and “every B is C,” and it

returns to the third syllogism of the first figure, yielding the conclusion [“some A is C”].

(b) Second [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two universals, [with] the major negative.

[76] E.g., “every B is A,” and “no B is C”; conclusion: “some A is not C.” For when

you convert the minor, it becomes the fourth [syllogism] of the first figure.

(c) Third [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two affirmatives, [with] the minor

particular. E.g., “some Bs are A,” and “every B is C”; conclusion: “some As are C.” For

when you convert the minor, it becomes the third [syllogism] of the first figure.


28

#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ ÓajI$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ jŒA :ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE ±¼a ÊAi B÷¿AË [74] ,#OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ$ É· ÁÎN°Œ Ë .eÌI ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ ÉÀÇ fÍBI o‚ ,OmA ®Ëie .#OmA iBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· ÁÍeÌI ÉN°Œ Ë .eÌI iBNmBI ÆÝ¯ ÉÀÇ É· fÍBI o‚

.OmA Omie ÉVÎNÃ o‚ ,OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA

ÂÌ÷Îm ½¸q ÔBÈmBÎ³ (17) É¿÷f´¿ /Ó¸Í Ë ,ÉÄÍEjÇ eÌI KUÌ¿ Ôj¬u É· OnÃE ½¸q ÅÍA ÔBÈmBÎ³ ¢jq [75]

.fÃÌI sq ½¸q ÅÍA ÔBÈmBÎ³ o‚ .eÌI Ó÷¼· (eÌI É· ÂAf· jÇ)

.KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :ÅÎNnbÃ fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë OmA ÆÝ¯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† eÌq ÅÎÄ† ,ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u ÆÌ† É· AjÍk .#eÌI ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ kA ÓajI$ É· ½¸q kA ÂÌ÷Îm pBÎÍ Ë ,#eÌI ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë fÃÌI iBNmBI ÆBÃÝ¯ ÓajI$ É·

.fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ÅÍA Ë eejŒkBI ¾÷ËA

/ .K»Bm ÔjJ· Ë ,Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :Â÷Ëe fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë OnÃÝ¯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† [76] [pBÎ³] ÂiBÈ‡I ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u ÆÌ† É· AjÍk .#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É·

.eÌq ÅÎNnbÃ ½¸q

.ÔËlU Ôj¬u Ë ,KUÌ¿ Ëe kA ÂÌ÷Îm fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë fÃA ÆÝ¯ ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† [pBÎ³] ÂÌm ,ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u ÆÌ† É· AjÍk .#fÃA ÆBÀÈI ÆBÃÝ¯ ÓajI$ É·

.eÌq ÅÎNnbÃ ½¸q


29

(d) Fourth [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two affirmatives, [with] the major

particular. E.g., “every B is A,” [77] and “some Bs are C”; conclusion: “some As are C.”

For when you convert the major and say: “some Cs are B,” and “every B is A,” the

conclusion follows that “some Cs are A”; and then its conversion would be true, viz.,

“some As are C.”

(e) Fifth [Syllogism]: its minor is universal affirmative; its major particular

negative. E.g., “every B is A,” and “some B is not C”; [78] the conclusion follows that

“some A is not C.” This cannot be demonstrated by conversion, just as we stated in that

other case [sc. the fourth syllogism of the second figure]; however, it can be

demonstrated by [the method of] supposition and reductio ad absurdum.

As for [the method of] supposition, it is thus: let that B which is not C, be D, so

that no D is C. So we shall say, “every B is A,” and “some B is D”; the conclusion

follows that “some A is D.” We shall then say, “no D is C”; the conclusion follows that

“some A is not C.”

As for the method of reductio ad absurdum, it is this: if our [conclusion] “some A

is not C” is false, then every A is C. If we say, “every B is A,” and “every A is C,” the

conclusion follows that “every B is C.” [79] But we had said that “not every B is C.”

This is impossible, hence the conclusion that resulted is true.

(f) Sixth [Syllogism]: [consisting] of particular affirmative minor, and universal

negative major. E.g., “some Bs are A,” and “no B is C”; conclusion: “some A is not C.”

For when you convert the minor, it becomes the fourth [80] [syllogism] of the former [sc.

first] figure.

Likewise, for connective [conditionals] there are also two other figures where you replace

the subject and predicate with the antecedent and consequent.


29

.ÔËlU ÔjJ· Ë ,KUÌ¿ Ëe kA :ÂiBÈ† fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#fÄÃBÀÈI ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI Ë /,OnÃÝ¯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† [77] ÓajI$ ÓÍÌŒ Ë ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai ÔjJ· ÆÌ† É· AjÍk .#fÃA ÆBÀÈI ÆBÃÝ¯ ÓajI$ É· ÆBÃBÀÈI ÓajI$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OmA ÆÝ¯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë ,fÃAiBNmBI ÆBÃBÀÈI

.#fÄÃBÀÈI ÆBÃÝ¯ ÓajI$ É· eÌI Omie ÔË o¸§ ÊBNÃE Ë ,#fÄÃÝ¯

.K»Bm ÔËlU sÍjJ· Ë ,eÌI KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· sÍj¬u :ÁVÄ‚ / ,#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ ÉÃ Ë ,OmA ÆÝ¯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† Æej· AfÎ‚ fÍBrÃ o¸Ï Ai ÅÍA Ë .#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ [78]

.±¼bI Ë Æej· fÍBq ~AjN¯BI Å¸Î»Ë ,ÁÎN°Œ Ai jNÍe ÆE É· ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ ˆÎÇ BM ,AeBI ÆE ,OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI É· iBNmBI ÆE :É· eÌI ÆBÄ† ~AjN¯A B÷¿A ;#OnÃE iBNmBI ÓajI Ë OnÃÝ¯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :É· ÁÎÍÌŒ o‚ .eÌJÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆE ,#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆE ˆÎÇ$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ ÊBNÃE .#OmA ÆE ÆÝ¯ ÓajI$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ

.#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÆÝ¯ ÓajI$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ #OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ jŒA :É· OnÃE ±¼a µÍjO B÷¿AË jÇ Ë OnÃÝ¯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ É· ÁÎÍÌŒ ÆÌ† .OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ o‚ ,On«Ëie É· ÁÍeÌI ÉN°Œ Ë /.#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ [79] .OmA Omie f¿E É· ÉVÎNÃ ÆE o‚ ,OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA .#OnÃBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ ÉÃ$

.Ó÷¼· K»Bm ÔjJ· Ë ,ÔËlU KUÌ¿ Ôj¬u kA :Árq

ÉVÎNÃ ,#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI iBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë ,OmA ÆÝ¯ ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI$:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† / ÂiBÈ‡I ,ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u ÆÌ† É· AjÍk .#OnÎÃ ÆBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$ É· fÍE

.eÌq ÅÎrÎ‚ ½¸q [pBÎ³] [80] Â÷f´¿ ,¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ªÌyÌ¿ ¾fI É· Ai PÝv÷N¿ j¿ eÌI jNÍe ½¸q Ëe lÎÃ ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ Ë

.ÓÄ· Ó»BM Ë


30

18. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Connective [Conditionals]

Exceptive syllogisms [derived] from connective [conditionals] consist of a connective

[premise] and an exceptive [premise]. For example, you say, “if so-and-so has a fever,

his pulse is fast”; this is a connective [premise]. And you add, “but so-and-so has a

fever”; this is the exceptive. From here the conclusion results that “so-and-so has a fast

pulse.”

These syllogisms are of two kinds. [81]

(a) One is that the exceptive be identical to the antecedent and yield a conclusion

identical to the consequent, as we have [just] said.

(b) The other is that the exceptive be the contradictory of the consequent, e.g., in

[the above] example you say: “but his pulse is not fast.” [This] yields a conclusion

contradictory to the antecedent, viz., “therefore so-and-so does not have a fever.”

If you make the contradictory of the antecedent the exceptive, saying, “so-and-so does

not have a fever,” the conclusion does not result that “the pulse of so-and-so is fast (or is

not fast).” Similarly, if you make the exceptive identical to the consequent, as when you

say, “but his pulse is fast,” the conclusion does not result that “he has (or does not have) a

fever.”

19. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Disjunctive [conditionals]

If the disjunctive consists of two parts, and you make the exceptive identical to either one

of them, [82] it yields [as] conclusion the contradictory of the other. For example, you

say, “this number is either even or odd,” “but it is even”; therefore you will say, “it is not

odd”. [Or else] “but it is odd”; therefore you will say, “it is not even.” But if you make

the contradictory of either part the exceptive, it would yield a conclusion identical to the

other [part]. For example, you say, “but it is not odd”; therefore “it is even;” [or] “it is

not even”; therefore “it is odd.” This is the case in true disjunctives, whereas in those

that are not true [disjunctives] it may be the case that it is not thus.


30

PÝv÷N¿ kA ÓÖBÄRNmA ÔBÈmBÎ³ (18) j¿ jŒA$:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓÖBÄRNmAË fÍE Ó¼v÷N¿ kA PÝv÷N¿ kA ÓÖBÄRNmA ÔBÈmBÎ³ KM Å¸Î»Ë$ :ÓÍÌŒ kBI Ë .OmA ½v÷N¿ ÅÍA Ë ,#eÌI lÎM ÔË –i ,eiAe KM Ai ÆÝ¯ .#eÌI lÎM –i Ai ÆÝ¯$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ BVÄÍA kA ;OmBÄRNmA ÅÍA Ë ,#Ai ÆÝ¯ eiAe

/ :eÌI ÉÃÌŒ Ëe BÈmBÎ³ ÅÍAË

;ÁÎN°Œ É¸ÃBÄ† ,Ai Ó»BM ÅÎ§ eiE ÉVÎNÃ Ë eÌI Â÷f´¿ ÅÎ§ BÄRNmA É· eÌI ÆE Ó¸Í [81] –i Å¸Î»Ë$ :¾BR¿ ÅÍBI ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI Ó»BM |Î´Ã BÄRNmA É· eÌI ÆE jBÍe .#OnÎÃ KM Ai ÆÝ¯ o‚$ É· Ai Â÷f´¿ |Î´Ã eiE ÉVÎNÃ .#OnÎÃ lÎM ÔË

É· fÍBÎÃ ÉVÎNÃ ,#eiAfÃ KM Ai ÆÝ¯$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· Ai Â÷f´¿ |Î´Ã ÓÄ· BÄRNmA jŒAË :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ÓÄ· Ó»BM ÅÎ§ BÄRNmA jŒA ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ Ë .#OnÎÃ BÍ OmlÎM ÆÝ¯ –i$

.#teiAfÃ BÍ teiAe KM$ É· fÍBÎÃ ÉVÎNÃ ,#OmA lÎM ÔË –i Å¸Î»Ë$

PÝv°Ä¿ kA ÓÖBÄRNmA ÔBÈmBÎ³ (19) eiËE ÉVÎNÃ / fqBI É· ÂAf· jÇ ÅÎ§ kA ÓÄ· BÄRNmA Ë eÌI ËlU Ëe kA ½v°Ä¿ jŒA [82] ,#OmA O°U Å¸Î» ;¶BW BÍ eÌI O°U BÍ iBÀq ÅÍA$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,Ai Â÷Ëe |Î´Ã B÷¿AË ,#OnÎÃ O°U$ :ÓÍÌŒ o‚ ,#OmA ¶BW Å¸Î»Ë$ ;#OnÎÃ ¶BW$ :ÓÍÌŒ o‚ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,jNÍe ÅÎ§ eiËE ÉVÎNÃ ,fqBI É· ÂAf· jÇ ,ÓÄ· |Î´Ã BÄRNmA jŒA ,#OmA ¶BW$ o‚ #OnÎÃ O°U Å¸Î»$ ;#OmA O°U$ o‚ ,#OnÎÃ ¶BW Å¸Î»$ .eÌI ÅÎÄ† ÉÃ É· fqBI Á¸Y Ó´ÎÝBÃ ifÃA Ë ,eÌI Ó´ÎÝ PÝv°Ä¿ ifÃA Á¸Y ÅÍAË


31

But if the disjunctive has more than two parts, whichever part you make the exceptive

from that whole [set] will negate the remainder. E.g., “this number is either greater [than

that number], or it is less, or it is equal”; “but this number is greater”; conclusion:

“therefore it is not equal or less.” And [if] you make the contradictory of any of the parts

the exceptive, the conclusion would be the remainder [of the proposition] in the way that

it is, [83] until one [part] remains. E.g., “but it is not greater”; conclusion: “either it is

equal or it is less.”

20. Composite Syllogisms

It is not the case that all conclusions come from a single syllogism or that two premises

are [always] sufficient; rather, it may be that a single problem is resolved by many

syllogisms. For example, a conclusion is drawn from two premises, and that conclusion

then becomes once more the premise for another syllogism and so on in this way until it

is the final [84] conclusion of the problem. Not all syllogisms are expressed in this well-

arranged order, but there are many instances when some premises are omitted, either for

[the sake of] brevity or for [some] expedient; and there are many instances when the

premises are inverted out of order. However, in reality, it comes back in the end to these

syllogisms of which we have spoken.

We will provide this discourse with an example [drawn] from the science of geometry,

and this example is the first figure from the book of Euclid.

We have a line AB, and we want to draw on this line, [85] by demonstration, a three-

sided figure (called a triangle) each side of which is equal to the other sides. We assert:

whenever we make point A the center of the compass, open [the compass] to point B and

[draw] a circle around A; then come back once again and make point B the center, and

draw a circle [with the radius extended] as far as point A around B – [the two circles thus

formed] will necessarily intersect one another. Let us mark the point of intersection C,

and let us draw a straight line from that point to A, and [another] straight line to B.


31

ÆE kA ÓÄ· BÄRNmA É· ÂAf· jÇ ÅÎ§ ,eÌI Ëe kA sÎI BÇËlU Ai ½v°Ä¿ jŒA B÷¿A Ë ;jIAjI BÍ Á· BÍ OnÃËl¯A BÍ iBÀq ÅÍA$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ejÎŒjI Ai Ó³BI ,É¼ÀU |Î´Ã Ë ;#OnÎÃ Á· Ë jIAjI o‚$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OnÃËl¯A iBÀq ÅÍA Å¸Î»Ë

.fÃB¿ Ó¸Í É· ÊBNÃE BM /,eÌI É· ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ eÌI Ó³BI ÉVÎNÃ ÓÄ· BÄRNmA É· ÂAf· jÇ [83] .#Á· BÍ OmjIAjI BÍ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OnÎÃ ÆËl¯A Å¸Î»Ë$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ†

K÷·j¿ ÔBÈmBÎ³ (20) Ó¸Í É· eÌI É¸¼I ;fqBI oI É¿÷f´¿ Ëe BÍ fÍBÎI pBÎ³ Ó¸Í kA BÇ ÉVÎNÃ �ÀÇ ÉÃ ÆE kBI ,fÃiE ÉVÎNÃ É¿÷f´¿ Ëe kA É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌq Omie iBÎnI ÔBÈmBÎÍ É¼×n¿

�VÎNÃ / ÅÍjaE BM eÌq ÓÀÇ ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ Ë Ai jNÍe ÓmBÎ³ eÌq É¿÷f´¿ ÉVÎNÃ [84] eÌI iBÎnI Å¸Î»Ë ,fÄÍÌŒ ÉNmAiE KÎMjM ÅÍjI Ai BÈmBÎ³ ÉÀÇ ÉÃ Ë .eÌI É¼×n¿ É· eÌI iBÎnI Ë .Ai O¼ÎYj¿ BÍ Ai iBvNaAj¿ ,fÄÄ¸°ÎI Ai BÇ É¿÷f´¿ ÓzÏ É· B¿ É· fÍE BÈmBÎ³ ÅÍfI jaE O´Î´ZI Å¸Î»Ë ,fÄÄ· jÎaDM Ë ÁÍf´M Ai BÇ É¿÷f´¿

.ÁÎN°Œ

kA AeBI ÅÎNnbÃ ½¸q ¾BR¿ ÅÍA Ë ÉmfÄÇ Á¼§ kA ÁÍiËE Ó»BR¿ Ai Åbm ÅÍA Ë .pfÎ¼³A LBN·

Ó¼¸q ÆBÇjJI / ¡a ÅÍjI É· ÁÎÇAÌa ÓÀÇ Ë ,AeBI #LA$ ÔË ÆBrÃ OnÎ÷ña Ai B¿ [85] .eÌI jNÍf¸Í fÄ‡ÀÇ ÔË kA ÔÌ¼È‚ jÇ É· (fÄÃAÌa S¼R¿ Ai ËA É·) Ìm Ém ÁÎÄ· #L$ �ñ´Ã BM Ë ÁÎÄ· iBŒj‚ l·j¿ Ai #A$ �ñ´Ã É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· ÁÎÍÌŒ Ë ÁÎÄ· ÔÌ§e ÔiËfI Ë ÁÎÄ· l·j¿ Ai #L$ �ñ´Ã Ë ÁÎÖBÎI kBI Ë ,#A$ ejŒ ÁÎÄ· ÊjÍAe Ë ÁÎÖBrNI �ñ´Ã ÊBNÃfÍjI jI .fÃjI É»BZ¿Ü Ai jNÍej¿ �Í ,#L$ ejŒ ÁÎÄ· ÊjÍAe #A$ �ñ´Ã

.#L$ ÉI OmAi Ó÷ñaË ÁÍiËE #A$ ÉI OmAi Ó÷ña O¿Ý§ ÆE kA Ë ÁÎÄ· O¿Ý§ #X$


32

C

B A

We say, then, that this figure which is enclosed by the points ABC is [86] a triangle with

all three sides equal. The proof of this is that the two lines AB and AC are equal, for they

have been traced from the center to the circumference. Likewise, the two lines BA and

BC are equal, because each one of them is equal to line AB. Hence on line AB we have

constructed a triangle whose three sides are equal.

So in speech syllogism is employed in this way; in reality it is such as I am going to say.

There are four [87] syllogisms here, all from the first figure.

(a) The first [syllogism] is this: The two lines AB and AC are two straight lines

that extend from the center to the circumference; every straight line that extends from the

center to the circumference is equal; conclusion: the two lines AB and AC are equal.

(b) Another [syllogism]: The same is the case for the two lines BA and BC.

(c) Third [syllogism]: The two lines AC and BC are two lines that are equal to

the single line AB; any two lines that are equal to a single line are equal to one another.

[88] Conclusion: the two lines AB and AC are both equal.


32

X

L A

OmA ÓR¼R¿ / OmA #X ,L ,A$ ÔBÇ Éñ´Ã ÆBÎ¿ ifÃA É· ½¸q ÅÍA É· ÁÎÍÌŒ o‚ kA É· AjÍk ,fÃjIAjI #X A$ Ë #L A$ ¡a Ëe É· OnÃE ÅÍA ÆBÇjI .jIAjI Ì¼È‚ Ém jÇ [86] ¡a Ëe Ë ,fÃjIAjI #X L$ Ë #A L$ ¡a Ëe ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ Ë .fÃA Êf¿E ¡ÎZÀI l·j¿ ¡a jI o‚ .fÃA #L A$ ¡a jIAjI Ó¸Í jÇ É· AjÍk ,fÃjIAjI #X L$ Ë #X A$

.fÃjIAjI ËA ÔÌ¼È‚ Ém jÇ É· ÁÍej· ÓR¼R¿ #L A$

:ÅN°Œ ÁÇAÌa Å¿ É· eÌI ÅÎÄ† O´Î´ZI Ë .fÃjI iB¸I ÅÎÄ† pBÎ³ Åbm ifÃA o‚ .¾÷ËA ½¸q kA ÉÀÇ OmA pBÎ³ / iBÈ† BVÄÍA [87]

¡ÎZÀI l·j¿ kA É· fÃA OmAi ¡a Ëe #X A$ Ë #L A$ ¡a Ëe :OnÄÍA ÅÎNnbÃ Ëe É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ;fÃÌI jIAjI fÄÍE ¡ÎZÀI l·j¿ kA É· OmAi Óña Ëe jÇ Ë ,fÃf¿E

.fÃjIAjI #X A$ Ë #L A$ ¡a

.Ai #X L$ Ë #A L$ ¡a Ëe j¿ ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ :jBÍeË

jÇ Ë ,fÃA #L A$ ¡a �Í jIAjI É· fÃA ¡a Ëe #X L$ Ë #X A$ ¡a Ëe :ÂÌ÷ÎmË #L A$ ¡a Ëe É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ / .fÃÌI jIAjI Ëe jÇ ,fÃÌI ¡a �Í jIAjI É· Ó÷ña Ëe [88]

.fÃjIAjI Ëe jÇ #X A$ Ë


33

(d) Fourth [syllogism]: The figure ABC that has been constructed on line AB, is

bounded by three equal lines; everything that is bounded by three lines that are equal is a

triangle whose three sides are equal. Conclusion: the figure ABC, constructed on line

AB, is a triangle with all its three sides equal.

It is necessary that other problems be resolved according to this reasoning.

21. Syllogism by reductio ad absurdum

Among composite syllogisms there is one called syllogism by reductio ad absurdum.

[89] The difference between this syllogism and the preceding one (called direct or

straight syllogism) is that the syllogism by reductio ad absurdum establishes its

conclusion by [proving] the invalidity of its contrary; and it proves the invalidity of its

contrary by showing that it necessarily results in an impossibility. Everything from

which an impossibility results of necessity, is [itself] impossible; for, since the impossible

does not exist, that which cannot but be from the impossible never exists.

This syllogism by reductio ad absurdum is composed of two syllogisms: One is a

syllogism which I discovered among the unknown conjunctive syllogisms; and one is the

exceptive syllogism. Example of this: someone wants to establish [90] that every A is B;

he says, “if not every A is B, while we know that every C is B (this is, for example,

without doubt), it necessarily follows from this that not every A is C.” However, this is

impossible, for the opponent admits, for example, that this is impossible. Hence our

saying that “every A is B” is true.

In tackling this discourse by direct syllogisms, people have undertaken a lengthy labor,

and have themselves abandoned it. Now Aristotle has alluded to what I am going to say;

however, he went as far as saying that the reductio ad absurdum comes from the

conditional [syllogism]. Hence the demonstration of [the fact] that reductio ad absurdum

comes from the conditional is what I am going to speak of.


33

,OmA jIAjI ¡a Ém ÔË ejNI OnÇ #L A$ ¡a jI É· #X L A$ ½¸q :ÂiBÈ†Ë ÉVÎNÃ .jIAjI tÌ¼È‚ Ém jÇ eÌI ÓR¼R¿ ÔË ,fÃÌI jIAjI ¡a Ém ÔË ejNI É† jÇ Ë .jIAjI tÌ¼È‚ Ém jÇ OmA ÓR¼R¿ ,OnÇ #L A$ ¡a jI É· #X L A$ ½¸q É· fÍE

.fÍE Êej· pBÎ³ ÅÍjI BÈ¼×n¿ jNÍe É· fÍBI Ë

±¼a pBÎ³ (21) ÆBÎ¿ ¶j¯ Ë / .fÄÃAÌa ±¼a pBÎ³ Ai ËA É· OmA ÓmBÎ³ K÷·j¿ ÔBÈmBÎ³ �¼ÀU kA [89] pBÎ³ É· OnÃE (fÄÃAÌa ÁÎŃn¿ pBÎ³ Ë OmAi pBÎ³ Ai ËA É·) ÅÎrÎ‚ Ë ±¼a ½WBI ÆAfI Ai ËA ²Ýa Ë ,fÄ· ½WBI Ai ËA ²Ýa É· ÆAfI fÄ· Omie Ai ÔÌ§e ±¼a ,É· AjÍk ,eÌI ¾BZ¿ fÍE ÂkÜ ¾BZ¿ ÔË kA É†jÇ Ë ,eiËE ÂkÜ ¾BZ¿ ÔË kA É· fÄ·

.eÌJÃ OnÎÃ tiB† ¾BZ¿ kA É¸ÃE lŒjÇ ,eÌJÃ ¾BZ¿ ÆÌ†

ÔBÈmBÎ³ �¼ÀU kA OmA ÓmBÎ³ Ó¸Í :pBÎ³ Ëe kA OmA K÷·j¿ ±¼a pBÎ³ ÅÍA Ë É¸ÃE ÅÍA ¾BR¿ .ÓÖBÄRNmA pBÎ³ Ó¸Í Ë ;ÂA ÊeiËE ÆËjÎI Å¿ É· KÍj« ÓÃAjN³A ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ jŒA$ :fÍÌŒ ,OmA iBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ É· / Æej· fÇAÌa Omie Ón· [90] kA (OmA �q ÓI õÝR¿ ÅÍA É·) OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ É· ÁÍA ÉNnÃAeË ,OmiBNmBI j´¿ Áva É· OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA Å¸Î»Ë .#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ É· fÍE KUAË BVÄÍA .eÌI ÷µY #OmA iBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ o‚ .OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA É— õÝR¿ eÌI

eÌa Ë fÃAÉN¯jŒ sÎ‚ kAie ÔiB· Omie ÔBÈmBÎÍ Åbm ÅÍA ÆejIkBI ifÃA ÆB¿ej¿ Ë ËA Å¸Î»Ë ,ÅN°Œ ÁÇAÌa Å¿ É· OmA Êej· ÅÍfI PiBqA oÎ»BWBñmiA Ë .fÃA ÊeBÈÃ ÓWjq kA ±¼a É¸ÃE Æej· fÍf‚ o‚ .OmA ÓWjq kA ±¼a :É· OnN°Œ iAf´¿ ÅÍA

.ÅN°Œ ÁÇAÌa Å¿ É· OmA ÅÍA ,OmA


34

The first syllogism [by reductio ad absurdum] consists of a conjunctive connective and a

predicative. For example, [91] if our saying that “every A is B” is false, then “not every

A is B” is true; now, [let us say] “every C is B” (by agreement); the conclusion that

follows is the condition that “if every A is B is false, then not every A is C.” However,

[let us say] “every A is C” (by agreement), and this is the exceptive. The conclusion

follows that “every A is B” is not false; therefore it is true.

If someone takes the contradictory of a conclusion in whose truth there is agreement, and

[if] he combines it with a premise which is true by agreement, the conclusion follows

directly without [recourse to] reductio ad absurdum. E.g., he says, “every A is C; and

every C is B; therefore every A is B.” [92] However, in speech there are many situations

where [syllogism by] reductio ad absurdum is more appropriate and the speech becomes

briefer.

22. Disclosure of the Character of Induction

Induction involves making a universal judgment about a subject, based on the particulars

found in that subject. For example, it is said, “every animal moves its lower jaw when it

chews.” If every single particular relating to this judgment could be found, so that none

[93] is excluded, the judgment regarding the universal would [in that case] be certain.

However, people who [use] induction, on finding many or the majority [of the

particulars] in a given way, make a judgment regarding all [of them]. But this is not

necessary, for it is possible that what has not been seen is contrary to what has been seen,

and that a hundred thousand [cases] are in agreement and [only] a single one opposed;

e.g., the crocodile, which moves its upper jaw and not the lower. Dialecticians and the

mutakallimãn for one trust to this [sc. manner of reasoning].


34

:É· B¿ iBN°Œ jŒA / É· ÅÎÄ† .Ó¼ÀY Ë OmA ½v÷N¿ ÓÃAjN³A kA pBÎ³ ÅÎNnbÃ [91] ,OmA OmAi #OmiBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ$ o‚ ,On«Ëie ,#OmiBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$

OmiBNmBI ÆÝ¯ VÀÇ jŒA$ É· ÓWjq fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ;#OmiBNmBI ¶B°MBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ$ Ë :fÍÌŒ Ë fÄ· É¿÷f´¿ Ai ÉVÎNÃ ÅÍA kBI Ë ,#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ o‚ ,On«Ëie jÇ$ Å¸Î» ,#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ ÉÃ o‚ ,On«Ëie OmiBNmBI ÆÝ¯ VÀÇ jŒA$

#OmiBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ;OmBÄRNmA ÅÍAË ,¶B°MBI ,#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ .OmA ÷µY o‚ ,OnÎÃ ®Ëie

�¿÷f´¿ ÆFI Ai ËAË ,On³B°MA ÔË ÓNmifI É· ejÎNI Ai ÉVÎNÃ |Î´Ã eÌa Ón· jŒAË É· fÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,OmAi fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ±¼a ÓI eÌa ,fÄ· KÎ·jM ,OmA ¶B°MA É· µY / #.OmiBNmBI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ o‚ ,OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ Ë ,OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃÝ¯ jÇ$ jM ÊBMÌ· Åbm Ë eÌI jMiÌaifÃA ±¼a É· eÌI ÊBNÍBU iBÎnI Åbm ÆBÎ¿ ifÃAÅ¸Î»Ë [92]

.eÌq

ÕAjŃmA ¾BY ÆeÌÀÃ (22) PB÷ÍËlU ifÃA Á¸Y ÆE É· ½J³ ÆEkA Ó÷¼· Ó§ÌyÌ¿ jI fÄÄ· ÓÀ¸Y É· eÌI ÆE ÕAjŃmA .#fÃBJÄU ÅÍjÍk j¯k ÆfÎÖBa O³ÌI ÓÃAÌÎY jÇ$ :fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄIBÍ ªÌyÌ¿ ÆE Ó÷¼· jI Á¸Y ,fÈVÃ / ˆÎÇ BM Á¸Y ÅÍjI ÅN¯BÍ PB÷ÍËlU kA Ai Ó¸Í jÇ fÄÃAÌNI jŒA [93] ÅÎÄ† Ai jNrÎI BÍ Ai ÔiBÎnI ÆÌ† ,fÄÄ· ÕAjŃmA É· ÓÃB¿ej¿ Å¸Î»Ë .eÌI ÓÄÎ´Í ²Ýa ÊfÍeBÃ É· ÆeÌI fÍBq É· AjÍk ,eÌI ÔiËjy ÉÃ ÅÍAË ;ÉÀÇ jI fÄÄ· Á¸Y ,fÄIBÍ ÅÍjIk j¯k É· `BnÀM É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ±»Bb¿ Ó¸Í Ë fÃÌI µ°÷N¿iAlÇ fu Ë ,eÌI ÊfÍe .OmA ÅÍjI eBÀN§A Ó¸Í Ai ÆBÀ÷¼¸N¿ Ë ÆB÷Î»fU Ë .fÃBJÄVÃ ÅÍjÍk Ë ,fÃBJÄVI Ai


35

23. Disclosure of the Character of Analogy

Analogy is weaker than induction. [94] It involves making a judgment about something

on the basis of what has been observed in [another thing that] resembles it. It is said, for

example, “the soul of man is a power that must not endure after the [death of the] body,

just as vision [does not endure after the destruction of] his eye.”

Analogy is mostly employed in matters of governance and in fiqh (jurisprudence). It is

not a necessary [reasoning], for it may be that the judgment [based on] one similar thing

is contrary to the judgment [based on] another similar thing. For there are many things

that are similar in one sense, but contrary in a thousand other senses: on the basis of one

of them the judgment would (or could) be true, while on the basis of another it would not

and could not be true. So analogy is suitable for consolation and the spreading of [95]

belief, but it is not suitable for certainty. However, if the claim is particular, viz., “some

A is B,” analogy is itself a direct argument of the third figure. E.g., “that is the example

of A, and that is the example of B”; conclusion: “some A is B.”

24. The Way of the Dialecticians in Proving the Absent from the Present

At first, the dialecticians possessed this [reasoning by] analogy that we have mentioned;

[96] later on, however, they came to realize that this is not a necessary judgment, but they

did not know of any other way. [So] they thought up a ploy and declared, “we seek the

cause.” An example of this is that they came and found some character for a thing, such

as, for example, [in the case of] a house, its having been made. They called the “house”

the principle, and its having been “made” the judgment. They then went away and

beheld the sky and found it similar to the house. Since they viewed the sky too [as] a

body with shape and form, they declared the sky to have been made; but they did not say

that the sky is made because it is similar to a house – for they realized that not everything

that is similar to something [else] [97] is of [the same] character – but they said, “Let us

establish the cause that a house [is a thing that] has been made is that it is a body with

shape and form; therefore everything that has this characteristic of being with shape and

form is [a thing that has been] made.” And they sought to establish this in two ways.


35

¾BR¿ ¾BY ÆeÌÀÃ (23) É‡ÃAfI ÔlÎ† jI fÄÄ· Á¸Y É· eÌI ÆE ¾BR¿ Ë /.OmA ÕAjŃmA kA jM Onm ¾BR¿ [94] ÅM oƒm fÍBI É· OmA ÓM÷Ì³ Âej¿ o°Ã$ :É· õÝR¿ fÄÍÌŒ .fÄÄÎI ËA ‘fÄÃB¿ ifÃA

.#ÔË Ár† ÓÖBÄÎI É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÃBÀÃ

AjÍk OnÍiËjy ÉÃ ÅÍA Ë .fÃjI iB¸I É´¯ ifÃA Ë ÔjÎIfM ÔBÇiB· ifÃA jNrÎI ÅÍA Ë É· fÃA BÇlÎ† iBÎnI É· ,eÌI jNÍe ‘fÄÃB¿ Á¸Y ²Ýa ÔfÄÃB¿ Á¸Y É· fÍBq É·

,eÌI Omie Á¸Y ÆBrÍA kA Ó¸Í jI Ë :±»Bb¿ ÓÄ¨¿ iAlÈI Ë fÃÌI ÊfÄÃB¿ ÓÄ¨¿ �ÎI Ë fÍBq Ai ÓqÌa ¾e ¾BR¿ o‚ .fÍBrÃ Ë eÌJÃ Omie jNÍe jI Ë ,eÌI É· fÍBq BÍ ÓzÏ$ É· ,eÌI ÔËlU ÔÌ§e jŒA B÷¿A Ë .fÍBrÃ Ai ÅÎ´Í Ë ,Ai ÆBÀŒ / ÆfÄ¸¯A [95]

ÆE$ :ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† .ÂÌ÷Îm ½¸q kA eÌI Omie O÷VY eÌa ¾BR¿ ,#OmiBNmBI ÆÝ¯ .#OmiBNmBI ÆÝ¯ ÓajI$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ ,#OmiBNmBI ¾BR¿ ÆE Ë OnÃÝ¯ ¾BR¿

fÇBq kA KÍB¬I ÆejI ½Î»e ifÃA ÆBÎ»fU ÊAi (24) fÄNnÃAfI oƒm /ÆE kA Ë OmeÌI ÁÍej· eBÍ É· ¾BR¿ ÅÍA ÆBÎ»fU Ome ifÃA OnbÃ [96] É· fÄN°Œ Ë fÃfÎrÍfÃA ÓN¼ÎY .fÄNnÃAfÃ ÓÇAi jNÍe Ë ,OnÎÃ KUAË Á¸Y ÅÍA É· ÓÀ¸Y Ai ÔlÎ† Ë fÃf¿BÎI ÆBrÍA É· OnÃE ÅÍA ¾BR¿ Ë .#ÁÎÄ· O÷¼§ K¼W B¿$

Ë .Á¸Y Ai ÓQfZ¿ Ë fÃfÃAÌa ½uA Ai ÉÃBa :ÓQfZ¿ Ai ÉÃBa õÝR¿ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄN¯BÍ Ai ÆBÀmE É¸ÃAfI .fÄN¯BÍ ÉÃBa fÄÃB¿ Ai ËA Ë fÃfÍjNÃ ÆBÀmE ifÃA Ë fÃfrI ÊBNÃE É· fÄN°NÃ Ë fÃfÃAÌa TfZ¿ Ai ÆBÀmE ,PiÌu Ë ½¸q BI fÃfÍe ÓÀnU lÎÃ

É† jÇ ÉÃ É· fÄNnÃAe É· AjÍk ,OmA ÉÃBa ‘fÄÃB¿ ÔË É· AjÍk OmA TfZ¿ ÆBÀmE ÉÃBa É¸ÃE O÷¼§ É· ÁÎÄ· Omie$ :fÄN°Œ Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI ÔË Á¸ZI /eÌI ÔlÎ† ‘fÄÃB¿ [97] O°u ÅÍA AiË É† jÇ o‚ ,PiÌu Ë ½¸q BI OmA ÁnU ÔË É· OnÃE OmA TfZ¿ :fÄNnU ÉÃÌŒËfI ÓNmie ÅÍAË .#eÌI TfZ¿ lÎÃ ÔË ,eÌI PiÌuË ½¸q BI É· eÌI


36

(a) One, by the earlier method, which is called conversion and rejection. For

example, “everything that we have seen [possessing] shape and form, we have seen [as]

having been made; and everything that we have seen [that is] without shape and form has

not been made.” But this method is weak, for there may exist a thing that is [98] contrary

to this and [which] they have not seen; or it may be that all [things] are that way except

the sky – for there are many things that have the same character, and among which there

is one contrary to all. Hence, from finding everything – with a single exception – with

the same character, it does not necessarily follow that that single exception also is of the

same character.

(b) Then some who were a bit more astute came to realize that this argument is

not very solid. Putting forward an alternative way, they deemed it to be thoroughly

correct and now adopt this stance: [99] They come up with this thing which they call

principle and enumerate all its properties insofar as they can. They say, for example, “the

house has existence; stands by itself; possesses this or that character; is a body [endowed]

with form; and has been made. Its having been made is not due to existence (otherwise

every existent thing would have been made), nor is it due to its subsisting by itself

(otherwise everything that subsists by itself would have been made), nor is it due to this

or that [character]. Therefore its having been made is due to its being a body [endowed]

with form. Therefore [100] every body that is [endowed] with form has been made;

therefore the sky has been made.”

Now this is a more seemly method, good in dialectic; however, it is not true or certain.

To elucidate the uncertainty of this [method] there exist ways that are more difficult, but

we shall show by means of a few simpler ways that this is uncertain.

(a) First, it may be that the judgment relating to that thing which they call

principle is not due to any cause, but rather due to, for example, houseness – and in [the

character] of houseness there is nothing in common with the house.


36

ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÃAÌa ejW Ë o¸§ Ai ÆE É· ,eÌI ÅÍjNrÎ‚ µÍjñI Ó¸Í Ë ½¸q ÓI É† jÇ Ë ,ÁÍfÍe TfZ¿ ÁÍfÍe PiÌu Ë ½¸q BI É† jÇ$ :É· õÝR¿ É· ÆeÌI fÍBq É· AjÍk ,OmA Onm µÍjW ÅÍA Ë .#eÌJÃ TfZ¿ ÁÍfÍe PiÌu

lVI eÌI ÆBÄ† ÉÀÇ É· eÌI fÍBq Ë ,fÃA ÊfÍfÃ ÆBrÍA Ë ÅÍA ²ÝbI / OnÇ ÔlÎ† [98] ²Ýb¿ eÌI Ó¸Í ÆBrÍA ÆBÎ¿ ifÃA Ë ,Á¸Y Ó¸ÎI fÃÌI BÇlÎ† iBÎnI É· ,ÆBÀmE É· ÉÄÍEjÇ fÍBÎÃ KUAË ,Á¸Y �Í jI OmA Ó¸Í ÆE lU É† jÇ ÅN¯BÍ kA o‚ .ÉÀÇ

.eÌI Á¸Y ÆE jI lÎÃ Ó¸Í ÆE

ÓÇAi .OnÎÃ ÔÌ³ Åbm ÅÍA É· fÄNnÃAe fÃeÌI jN·jÍk ÓNb» É· ÓÃBn· o‚ / .fÃAÊeBNnÍA ÊAi ÅÍjI ÆÌÄ·A Ë OmA Omie Obm É· fÄNqAfÄ‚ Ë fÃeiËE jNÍe fÃjÀrI ÔË ÔBÈ°uË ÉÀÇ Ë fÃiËE sÎ‚ fÄÃAÌa ½uA É· Ai lÎ† ÅÍA Ë fÄÍBÎI [99] Ë ÆÝ¯ Ë OmA o°ÄI ÁÍB³ Ë ,OmA OnÇ ÉÃBa$ :õÝR¿ É· fÄÍÌŒ .fÄÃAÌM É¸ÃBÄ† ÓNnÇ ½J³ kA ÉÃ sÎQfZ¿ Ë .OmA TfZ¿ Ë Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU Ë ,OmA iBNmBI ÁÍB³ jÇ ÷ÜAË) OmA Ón°ÄI ÁÍB³ ½J³ kA ÉÃ Ë ,(ÔeÌI TfZ¿ ÓNnÇ jÇ ÷ÜAË) OmA sÎQfZ¿ o‚ .OmA ÔiBNmBI kA ÉÃ Ë OmA ÓÃÝ¯ kA ÉÃ Ë ,(ÔeÌI TfZ¿ Ón°ÄI o‚ .eÌI TfZ¿ i÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ / o‚ .Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU É· OnÃE ½J³ kA [100]

.#OmA TfZ¿ ÆBÀmE

.OnÎÃ ÓÄÎ´Í Ë Ó´ÎÝ Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA tÌa ¾fU ifÃA Ë OmA jM ÊfÄÃB¿ µÍjW ÅÍA Ë jNÃBmE ÊAi fÄ‡I Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA jMiAÌqe É· OmBÈÇAi ,ÅÍA ÓÄÎ´ÍBÃ Æej· fÍf‚ ifÃAË

.OmA ÓÄÎ´ÍBÃ ÅÍA É· ÁÎÄ· AfÎ‚

½J³ kA ÉÃ ,fÄÍÌŒ ÓÀÇ ½uA É· Ai lÎ† ÆE j¿ Á¸Y É· fqBI :É· OnÃE ÅÎNnbÃ .eÌJÃ kBJÃA ˆÎÇ Ai ÉÃBa j¿ ÓNÃBa ifÃA Ë ,eÌI ÓNÃBa ½J³ kA õÝR¿ É¸¼I eÌI ÓJJm


37

(b) Another is that it is no easy task to enumerate all of the properties [of a thing]:

[101] an argument is needed [to show] that all of the properties have been enumerated

and none left out. But [the dialecticians] never concern themselves with this; rather, they

say, “If a property has been left out, [then] it is up to you who are the opponent to say

[what it is]”; yet my ignorance [of what property may have been left out] – I who am, for

example, the opponent – is no reason that it does not exist. Or they say, “If [this property

which you claim has been omitted] existed, it would not have been hidden from you and

I; just as if an elephant were standing here, you and I would see it.” This, too, does not

amount to anything, for there exist in things many characters that I seek, and that he also

seeks, which are not seen at once. But it never happens that when an elephant stands

right before someone, it goes unseen or that one is cast into doubt [about it]. These two

defects exist in this way.

[102] (c) Third is this: Let it be such that he has found all the characteristics – for

example, the house has three characteristics, A, B, C. [However,] the division of the

causes is not merely into three, but many more. For example, the house has been made

either on account of A, or on account of B, or on account of C; or on account of

houseness and A, or houseness and B, or houseness and C; or on account of A and B, or

B and C, or A and C; or on account of houseness and A and B, or a similar combination

of one with the other. For it may be that on account of a single character there is no

judgment, but when they become two or three the judgment ensues. [103] For instance,

blackness comes from alum and gallnut; ten comes from four and six, and any one of

these alone does not [yield] that judgment. Hence all these divisions must be ruled out so

that [only] one remains.

(d) The fourth defect is this. Let us also grant [the following]: let us be

accommodating and suppose that the division [of the characteristics] are A, B, and C –

one by one, and no other. And let us concede that it is neither from A nor from B: [104]

[in that case] it does not of necessity follow that [the judgment] comes from C, in the

sense that wherever there is a C, [there too] the judgment is. For it may be that C has two

parts: one part that is the cause of that judgment, and another part that is not; and just

because A and B do not yield this judgment it does not of necessity follow that it comes


37

BÈ°uË ÉÀÇ É· fÍBI ÓN÷VY /:OmA ÆBmE ÔiB· ÉÃ BÈ°uË �ÀÇ ÆejÀq É¸ÃE jBÍe Ë [101] É¸¼I ,fÄqBJÃ ¾Ì¬r¿ ÅÍfI lŒjÇ ÆBrÍA Ë .OmfÃBÀÃ ±uË ˆÎÇ Ë OmejÀq

õÝR¿ Å¿ ÅNnÃAeBÃ Ë ,#ÓÀva É· ÌM ÓÍÌNI É· fÍBI OmfÃB¿ Ó°uË jŒA$ :fÄÍÌŒ ÊfÎqÌ‚ ÌM jI Ë Å¿ jI ,ÔeÌI jŒA$ :fÄÍÌŒ BÍ .OnÎÃ É· OnÎÃ ÆE ½Î»e ÁÀva É· ÔlÎ† lÎÃ ÅÍAË .#ÓÀÍfÍfI ÌM Ë Å¿ ,ÔeÌI ÊeBNnÍA Ó¼Î‚ BVÄÍA jŒA É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÔeÌJÃ ifÃA Ë ,fÄ· K¼W lÎÃ ËA Ë ÁÄ· K¼W Å¿ É· BÇlÎ† ifÃA eÌI ÓÄ¨¿ iBÎnI É· ,OnÎÃ Ai ËA Ë tfÄÎJÃ É· eÌI ÊeBNnÍA Ón· Ár† sÎ‚ É· eÌJÃ lŒjÇ ½Î‚ Ë .fÄÎJÃ O³Ë

/ .ÊAi ÅÍifÃA OnÇ KÎ§ Ëe ÅÍA .fN¯A �q

ÓÃÝ¯ :eÌI ±uË Ém Ai ÉÃBa õÝR¿ - O¯BÍ ±uË �ÀÇ É· AeBI ÅÎÄ† :É¸ÃE Â÷Ìm Ë [102] õÝR¿ ;eÌI jNrÎI ÔiBÎnI É· ,oI Ë eÌI Ém ÉÃ BÈN÷¼§ OÀn³ .ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÔiBNmBI Ë ½J³ kA BÍ ;ÓÃBÀÈI ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÔiBNmBI ½J³ kA BÍ ,eÌI ÓÃÝ¯ ½J³ kA BÍ TfZ¿ ÉÃBa kA BÍ ;ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÓNÃBa ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓNÃBa ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÓÃÝ¯ Ë ÓNÃBa BÍ ;ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÓÃÝ¯ ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÔiBNmBI ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓÃÝ¯ ½J³ ½J³ kA fÍBq É· ;jNÍe BI Ó¸Í KÎ·jM ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇË ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓÃÝ¯ Ë ÓNÃBa ½J³ kA É¸ÃBÄ† / .fÃÌq Ém ÆÌ† BÍ ,fÍE Á¸Y fÃÌq Ëe ÆÌ† ,eÌJÃ Á¸Y ˆÎÇ Ai ÓÄ¨¿ �Í [103] .eÌJÃ Á¸Y ÆE BÈÄM Ai Ó¸Í jÇ Ë sq Ë iBÈ† kA fÍE Êe Ë ËkB¿ Ë �Ak kA fÍE ÓÇBÎm

.fÃB¿ Ó¸Í BM fÄ· ½WBI Ai ÂBn³A ÉÀÇ ÅÍA É· fÍBI o‚

ÂBn³A É· ÁÍiAfÄ‚ Ë ÁÍjÎŒ ÆBmE Ë ÁÎÄ· Á÷¼n¿ lÎÃ ÅÍA :É· OnÃE KÎ§ ÂiBÈ†Ë ÁÎ¼nM Ë .OnÎÃ jNÍe Ë ,ÆB¸Í ÆB¸Í ,OmA ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÔiBNmBI Ë OmA ÓÃÝ¯ ÓÃBÀÈI kA É· fÍBÎÃ KUAË / :OmAi ÔiBNmBI kA ÉÃ Ë OmA ÓÃÝ¯ kA ÉÃ É· ÁÎÄ· [104] ÓÃBÀÈI É· fÍBq É· AjÍk .eÌI Á¸Y ÆE eÌI ÓÃBÀÈI BV· jÇ É· ÓÄ¨¿ ÆFI ,eÌI Á¸Y ÅÍA É¸ÃAfI Ë .eÌJÃ Án³ �Í Ë eÌI Á¸Y ÆE O÷¼§ Án³ Ó¸Í :eÌI Án³ Ëe AjÍk .eÌI ÓÃBÀÈI Án³ Ëe jÇ kA É· fÍBÎÃ KUAË ,OnÎÃ Ai ÔiBNmBI Ë Ai ÓÃÝ¯


38

from both parts of C . For once it has become evident that the cause is outside of A and

B, it does not of necessity follow that everything that is outside of A and B is a cause.

Indeed, the cause does reside in that characteristic which is outside of A and B, and it

does not depart from there. However, it may be that the one remaining characteristic is of

two kinds, [105] and one of its kinds is not a cause, while the other is a cause. For

instance, if at first these four divisions were made: A, B, C1, and C2, and it was again

established that the cause was not A or B, it would not of necessity follow that each of

the remaining Cs is a cause; it would, however, be one of these two Cs. Similarly, now

that three parts are made and C is taken as a whole, it does not of necessity follow that

because it was not divided every C is a cause. Indeed, the cause does reside within the

totality of things that are C, but not every C [is a cause].

It thus becomes manifest for this reason that this way is not certain, but that [106] it is

good in dialectic, for the superficial and the mass of people do not know the defect of this

and accept it.

25. Explication of the Form and Matter of the Syllogism

The form of the syllogism is this conjunction and composition that occurs among the

premises, as has been said. As for the matter of the syllogism, [these] are the premises:

the more solid they are, the more solid the syllogism is. [107] Syllogisms are, in form,

all of one kind; however, not all consist of true premises, for there are many syllogisms

whose premises are [based] on opinion and not on truth.

In sum, the premises of any syllogism are one of two [kinds].

(a) Either they are premises that have first been established by a syllogism or an

argument (in truth or in opinion), and when they have been established, they are then

made the premise of the syllogism, for they have not been accepted in themselves and it

is possible for someone to doubt them.


38

É† jÇ É·fÍBÎÃ KUAË ,OmA ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓÃÝ¯ kA ÆËjÎI É· f¿E fÍf‚ O÷¼§ ÆÌ† É· ÓÃÝ¯ ÆËjÎI É· eÌI ±uË ÆAifÃA O÷¼§ ,ÔiE .eÌI O÷¼§ eÌI ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓÃÝ¯ ÆËjÎI Ëe eÌI ÊfÃB¿ É· ±uË Ó¸Í ÆE É· fÍBq Å¸Î» .fÈVÃ BVÃE kA Ë ,eÌI ÔiBNmBI Ë ¾÷ËA kA jŒA É¸ÃBÄ† .eÌI O÷¼§ ÉÃÌŒ �Í Ë eÌJÃ O÷¼§ ÔË kA ÉÃÌŒ �Í Ë ,eÌI / ÉÃÌŒ [105] Ó¸Í Ë ÅÎÄ† ÓÃBÀÈI Ó¸Í Ë ÔiBNmBI Ó¸ÍË ÓÃÝ¯ Ó¸Í :ÔfÃej· iBÈ† OÀn³ ÅÍA É· Ôf¿BÎÃ KUAË ,OnÎÃ iBNmBI Ë ÆÝ¯ O÷¼§ É· Ôfq Omie kBI Ë ,ÆBÄ† ÓÃBÀÈI .ÔeÌI ÆBÀÈI Ëe ÅÍkA Ó¸Í Å¸Î»Ë ;ÔeÌI O÷¼§ ÔeÌI ÊfÃB¿ É· ÆBÀÈI ÂAf· jÇ É¸ÃAfI fÍBÎÃ KUAË ,O¯jŒ É¼ÀVI Ai ÆBÀÈI Ë ,ej· OÀn³ Ém ÆÌÄ·A É· ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ É· OmBÇlÎ† �¼ÀU ÅÍA ifÃA O÷¼§ ,ÔiE .eÌI O÷¼§ ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ É· ej¸Ã OÀn³

.ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ ÉÃ Å¸Î»Ë ,fÃA ÆBÀÈI

,OmÌ¸ÎÃ ¾fU ifÃA /Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA ÅÎ´Í ÉÃ ÊAi ÅÍA É· eÌq ÂÌ¼¨¿ KJm ÅÍfI o‚ [106] .fÃjÍhƒI Ë fÄÃAfÃ ÅÍA KÎ§ Âej¿ Ó¿B§ Ë ÔjÇB£ É·

pBÎ³ P÷eB¿ Ë pBÎ³ PiÌu Æej· AfÎ‚ (25) ÉN°Œ É¸ÃBÄ† ,fN¯A PB¿÷f´¿ ÆBÎ¿ ifÃA É· eÌI ±Î»DM Ë ÆAjN³A ÅÍA pBÎ³ PiÌu

.eÌI jM Omie pBÎ³ eÌI jM Omie fÄ†jÇ Ë ,fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ pBÎ³ P÷eB¿ B÷¿AË .f¿E ,fÃÌI OmAi ÓMB¿÷f´¿ kA ÉÀÇ ÉÃ Å¸Î»Ë ,fÃÌI ÉÃÌŒ �Í ÉÀÇ PiÌvI BÈmBÎ³ Ë / [107]

.fÃÌI O´Î´ZI ÉÃ Ë fÃÌI ÆBÀNI ÆBrÍA PB¿÷f´¿ É· fÃÌI BÈmBÎ³ iBÎnI É·

:eÌJÃ ÆËjÎI Ëe kA ÓmBÎ³ jÇ PB¿÷f´¿ É¼ÀVI Ë O´Î´ZI) fÃÌI Êej· Omie ÓN÷VY Ë ÓmBÎÍ OnbÃ AjÃBrÍA É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ BÍ ,fÄÄ· pBÎ³ �¿÷f´¿ Ai ÆBrÍA ÊBNÃE fÃÌI Êej· Omie Ai ÆBrÍA ÆÌ† Ë ,(ÆBÀNI BÍ .Ón· fÄ· ÷�q ÆBrÍA ifÃA É· fÍBqË ,fÃA ÉÃ ÉN¯jÍh‚ sÍÌa o°ÄI AjÃBrÍA É· AjÍk


39

[108] (b) Or they are premises that have been accepted as such, on the ground that they

are in themselves true.

Whenever the premises of the syllogism are such as the former type we stated [i.e. (a)],

they will have necessarily been established by means of other premises. But there is a

limit to this [procedure] and it reaches premises that are not established by other

premises; these are in truth principles. If they are good, true and right, the syllogisms

built on them will be right and true. But if they are false, that which has been built on

them would be false. Therefore, once we know the types of these primitive premises, we

would know the types of the principles of syllogisms and the matters of the syllogisms so

that [we would know] which are demonstrative, which dialectical, which sophistical,

[109] which rhetorical, and which poetic.

26. Exposition of the types of Primitive Premises in Syllogisms

The premises that are adopted and employed in syllogisms, without being established by

any argument, are of thirteen kinds: (i) the primary; (ii) the perceptible; [110] (iii) the

experiential; (iv) the transmitted; (v) those premises whose syllogism is always present to

the mind; (vi) [premises apprehended by] the estimative [faculty]; (vii) the widely-known

(in truth); (viii) [premises] accepted [on trust]; (ix) the indisputable; (x) the specious; (xi)

the widely-known (in appearance); (xii) the [premises based on] suspicion; (xiii) the

imaginary.


39

eÌa ÆBrÍA É· Á¸Y ÆE jI ,fÄqBI ÉN¯jŒ AjÃBrÍA ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ BÍ Ë [108] .fÃA Omie

AjÃBrÍA ÉÄÍEjÇ ,ÁÎN°Œ ÅÎrÎ‚ Án³ ifÃA É· fÄqBI ÆBÄ† pBÎ³ PB¿÷f´¿ É· ÊBŒjÇ Ë ÆBrÍA É· fmi ÓMB¿÷f´ÀI Ë ,eÌI jaE Ai ÅÍA Ë .fÄqBI Êej· Omie jNÍe ÓMB¿÷f´ÀI Ë ÷µY Ë fÃÌI �ÎÃ jŒA .fÃÌI ½uA O´Î´ZI ÆBrÍAË fÄÄ¸Ã Omie PB¿÷f´¿ jNÍfI Ai ,fÃÌI ½WBI jŒAË .fÃÌI ÷µY Ë Omie fÄqBI Êej· BÄI ÆBrÍA jI É· BÈmBÎ³ ,Omie ÅÎrÎ‚ PB¿÷f´¿ ÅÍA ÂBn³A ÆÌ† o‚ .fqBI ½WBI fÄqBI Êej· BÄI ÆBrÍA jI É‡ÃE Ë On¿Af· ÓÃBÇjI BM ,ÁÎÃAfI BÈmBÎ³ ÔBÈM÷eB¿ Ë BÈmBÎ³ ÔBÈ¼uA ÂBn³A ,ÁÎÃAfI .On¿Af· Ôj¨q Ë On¿Af— ÓIBña Ë On¿Af— / Óñ»B¬¿ Ë On¿Af— Ó»fU [109]

BÈmBÎ³ ifÃA ÅÎrÎ‚ PB¿÷f´¿ ÔBÈNÀn³ ÆeÌÀÃ kBI (26) Omie ÓN÷VZI AjÃE É¸ÃE ÓI ,fÃjI iB¸I Ë fÃjÎNI BÈmBÎ³ ifÃA É· BÇ É¿÷f´¿ kA

:fÃA ÉÃÌŒ ÊelÎm ,fÄÄ· Ó¸Í Ë <4> ,PB÷ÎIjVM Ó¸Í Ë <3> / ,PBmÌnZ¿ Ó¸Í Ë <2> ,PBÎ»÷ËA Ó¸Í <1> [110]

,ÉrÎÀÇ eÌI jyBY ½´§ ifÃA ÆBrÍAjI pBÎ³ É· PB¿÷f´¿ ÆE Ó¸ÍË <5> ,PAjMAÌN¿ ,PÜÌJ´¿ Ó¸Í Ë <8> ,O´Î´ZI PAiÌÈr¿ Ó¸Í Ë <7> ,PB÷ÎÀÇË Ó¸Í Ë <6>

,jÇB¤I PAiÌÈr¿ Ó¸Í Ë <11> ,PBÈJr¿ Ó¸Í Ë <10> ,PBÀ÷¼n¿ Ó¸Í Ë <9>

.PÝÎbN¿ Ó¸Í Ë <13> ,PBÃÌÄ¤¿ Ó¸Í Ë <12>


40

(i) The Primary

As for the primary premises, they are those which reason first renders necessary in man;

[111] he cannot doubt them and does not know of ever having doubted them. If he

imagines that he came into this world all at once, with his reason the same as it is, neither

hearing nor learning anything other than someone’s teaching him the meaning of both

parts of that premise until he conceives it; and [if] he then wanted not to assent and to

doubt – he could not doubt. Thus, for example, if he knew at that time, by conception,

what whole is and what part is; and [if he knew] what bigger is, and what smaller is, he

would not be able [112] to withhold assent to the fact that the whole is greater than the

part; similarly, he could not doubt that things that are equal to the same thing, are

themselves also equal to one another – [and this] not on account of the estimative

declaring it thus, as we shall remark later.

(ii) The Perceptible

As for perceptible premises, they are those premises whose truth we know through

sensation. [113] For example, we say, “the sun rises and sets”; “the moon waxes and

wanes.”

(iii) The Experiential

The experiential are those premises which can be known neither by reason alone, nor by

sensation alone, but which can be known by means of both [together]. For instance, each

time when sensation perceives an action from a thing (or one of its states), and perceives

it in that way on every occasion, reason knows that it is not because of chance, or else it

would not always be the case, and would not be [for the most part]. An example of it is

the burning [action] of fire, [114] or the secretion of bile [induced by] scammony, and

whatever is similar to this.


40

PBÎ»ËA <1> fÃAÌNÃ Ë / ;fÄ· KUAË AiËA Âej¿ ifÃA ¾÷ËA eja É· eÌI ÆE PBÎ»ËA PB¿÷f´¿ B÷¿A [111] ÷�q ÆE ifÃA ÔË É· eÌI ÓN³Ë lŒjÇ É· fÃAfÃ Ë ,fÄ· ÷�q ÔË ifÃA É· Æej·

ÔlÎ† Ë ,ejbI ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ ,f¿E Á»B§ ÅÍA ifÃA O¨¯e �ÎI É· eiAfÄ‚ jŒA Ë .OqAe fÍkÌ¿BÎI É¿÷f´¿ ÆE ËlU Ëe jÇ ÓÄ¨¿ Ai ËA Ón· É· ÷ÜA ,OaÌ¿BÎÃ ÔlÎ† Ë fÎÄrÃ .Æej· fÃAÌNÃ ÷�q - fÄ— ÷�q Ë fÄ¸Ã µÍfvM É· OmAÌa kBI Ë ,ej· i÷ÌvM BM É† ËlU Ë ,eÌI É† ÷½· É· O³Ë ÆE ifÃA i÷ÌvM Á¸ZI ÓNnÃAfI jŒA ,õÝR¿ É¸ÃBÄ† fÄ¸Ã µÍfvM É· / Æej· ÓNnÃAÌNÃ ,eÌI É† jMeja Ë ,eÌI É† jNŒilI Ë ,eÌI [112] BÇlÎ† jÇ É· Æej· ÷�q ÓNnÃAÌNÃ ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ Ë ,OmËlU kA jNÈ¿ ÷½— É¸ÃAfI ÁÇË É· AjÃE ½J³ kA ÉÃ - fÃÌI jNÍf¸Í jIAjI lÎÃ ÆBrÍA ,fÃÌI lÎ† �Í jIAjI É·

.ÁÎÄ· eBÍ jNnƒm É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÍB¿j¯

PBmÌnZ¿ <2>

.ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAe ÷oZI ÆBrÍA ÓNmAi É· fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PBmÌnZ¿ PB¿÷f´¿ B÷¿AË .#fÇB¸I Ë fÍAl°ÎI ÊB¿$ Ë ,#eÌq Ëj¯ Ë fÍEjI LBN¯E$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† / [113]

PBIjV¿ <3>

;÷oY BÈÄNI ÉÃ Ë ÅNnÃAe fÍBrI eja ÓÖBÈÄNI ÉÃ É· fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PBIjV¿ ,fÄÎI Ó¼¨¯ ÔiBI jÇ ÔlÎ† kA ÷oY ÆÌ† É¸ÃBÄ† .ÅNnÃAe fÍBq Ëe jÈI Å¸Î»Ë On³B°÷MA KJm kA ÉÃ É· eja fÃAe ,fÄÎI ÆBÄ† BÇiBI �ÀÇ Ë fÄÎI Ó»BY Ai ËA BÍ / sME ÅNaÌm É¸ÃBÄ† ÔË ¾BR¿ .ÔeÌJÃ ¾BY ÅÍjNrÎI Ë ÔeÌJÃ ÉrÎÀÇ ÷ÜAË

.fÃB¿ ÅÍfI É†jÇ Ë ,Ai Aj°u BÎÃÌÀ´m Æej· ¾BÈmA Ë [114]


41

(iv) The Transmitted

As for the transmitted, they are those premises that have been established for reason on

[the basis of] the testimony of many people. For instance, we know that in the world

there is Cairo and Baghdad, although we have not seen them. The condition for the

transmission [of a tradition] is that no doubt enter into it; everything concerning which

doubt can occur to someone, is not yet a transmitted [tradition] for that person. [115]

Hence it is not becoming for someone to say, “You must assent to such-and-such a thing,

for the judgment of this is the same as the judgment of another thing which you have

affirmed”; for if it were the case that the judgment of [this thing] were the same as the

judgment of that [other thing], we would not be able to doubt, just as we were not able to

in [the one case]. Transmitted [tradition] produces certainty in its own truth, so that the

hearer does not need to ponder about the speakers. [116]

(v) Premises that have syllogisms with themselves in nature

Some premises that have need of a syllogism are such that their syllogism can be

obtained through seeking [for it]. The seeking for a syllogism is the seeking for the

middle term, because the minor and the major terms are themselves [already] present in

the problem.

Some [syllogisms] are such that whenever the premise is recalled, the middle term is

recalled; for instance, you know at once that odd is one less than even. Not [117]

everyone in whose nature a syllogism is found knows what it is, or is able to express it in

words; however, by his own reason he knows correctly what its conclusion is.

(vi) [Premises apprehended by] the estimative [faculty]

Estimative [premises] are those false but extremely powerful premises in the soul,

regarding which the soul cannot at first fall into doubt. Their cause is the estimative

faculty, not the intellect; and they are of such an order that two states result.


41

PAjMAÌN¿ <4>

,Ai ejaj¿ eÌI Êfq Omie o· iBÎnI ÓÇAÌNI É· eÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PAjMAÌN¿ B÷¿A ¢jq Ë .ÁÍA ÊfÍfÃ É· fÄ† jÇ ,eAf¬I Ë Omjv¿ ÆBÈU ifÃA É· ÁÍA ÉNnÃAe É¸ÃBÄ† o· ÆeBN¯A fÃAÌM ÷�q ÔË BI É· ÔlÎ† jÇ Ë ,fN¯ÌÎÃ �q ÔË ifÃA É· OnÃE jMAÌM ÅÍfI É· fÍBI$ :É· fÍÌŒ É· fmjÃ Ai Ón· o‚ /.eÌJÃ jMAÌM kÌÄÇ Ai o¸ÃE ,Ai [115] É· ,#ÓÍÊfÍËjŒ ÔÌI É¸ÃE kA ,OmA lÎ† jNÍe Á¸Y ÆÌ† ÔË Á¸Y É· ,ÔËjNI lÎ† É¸ÃBÄ† ,Æej· ÷�q ÓÀÎNnÃAÌNÃ ,ÔeÌI ÆE Á¸Y ÆÌ† ÔË Á¸Y É· ÔeÌI ÆBÄ† jŒA OUBY Ai ÊfÃÌÄq É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄ¸¯A ÅÎ´Í eÌa O´Î´ZI jMAÌM Ë .ÁÎNnÃAÌNÃ ÆE ifÃA

/.fÄ· ½¿DM ÆBŒfÄÍÌŒ ifÃA É· fÍBÎÃ

©JO ifÃA fÃiAe ÅNrÍÌa BI pBÎ³ É· ÓMB¿f´¿ <5> [116]

Ai ÆBrÍA pBÎ³ É· fÃA ÆBÄ† OmA OUBY pBÎÍ Ai ÆBrÍA É· PB¿÷f´¿ kA ÓzÏ ÷fY É· AjÍk ,OmA ÅÎNÃBÎ¿ ÷fY K¼W ,pBÎ³ K¼W Ë .ÆeiËE fÍBq OmfI K¼ñI

.fÃÌI jyBY É¼×n¿ ifÃA eÌa ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY Ë ÅÎÈ·

ie É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÍE eBÍ ¡mËA ÷fY ,fÍE eBÍ É¿÷f´¿ É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· eÌI ÆE ÓzÏ Ë ÔË ©JW ifÃA É· o· jÇ / ÉÃ Ë ,eÌI Á· Ó¸ÎI O°U kA ¶BW É· ÓÃAfI O§Bm [117] sÍÌa ejbI Å¸Î»Ë ,ÅN°Œ fÃAÌNI ÆBIlI BÍ ,eÌI É† É· fÃAe eÌq AfÎ‚ ÓmBÎ³

.eÌI É† ÉVÎNÃ É· AjÃE fÃAfI OmifI

PBÎÀÇË <6> ifÃA o°Ã É¸ÃBÄ† ,o°Ã ifÃA ÔÌ³ Obm Å¸Î»Ë ,½WBI fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PBÎÀÇË É· eÌI ÊBNÍBU ÆAfI Ë ,½´§ ÉÃ eÌI ÁÇË ÆE KJm Ë .Æej· fÃAÌNÃ ÷�q iB· ¾÷ËBI ÔË

.eÌI ÊeBN¯A ¾BYËe AiËA


42

(a) One is that reason does not have any judgment regarding them so that it [can]

then know by means of an argument; thus reason is silent about them.

[118] (b) The other is that the estimative [faculty] wishes to know that thing on the

basis of sensible [things], whereas that thing is not sensible, for it is prior to the sensible

and is not perceived by the estimative because only the sensible enters the estimative.

And what wonder is it that something does not enter the estimative, for the estimative

itself does not enter the estimative.

The estimative does not bring a contrary against anything that is primary in the intellect;

thus, it does not introduce any doubt about [the fact] that the whole is greater than the

part. Hence when the existence of things that are contrary to the sensible is established

by way of the primary [things], the estimative grants the premises but does not grant the

conclusion, because it is contrary to its capacity. [119] For example, the estimative says,

“Anything to which one cannot point, viz., where it is, and which cannot be [either]

outside of the world or inside it, that thing does not exist.” And it says, “there is no

alternative but that outside the world there be either void or plenum.” And, “it is not

possible that a thing become greater than it is other than by an increase coming to it from

the outside or by there arising within it spaces.” But the argument of reason itself

establishes that these are all false.

[120] (vii) The widely-known

As for the widely-known (which have [nothing] other than being widely-known), they are

premises which the mass of men and those like them consider to be primary in the nature

of reason, while it is not thus. However, from his childhood on man hears them, and all

[121] or most cities are in agreement regarding them.

[These premises are] either (a) something which the intellect does not [declare]

necessary by its first nature, but [which] man’s habitude [does declare necessary]; such as

the concepts of shame and mercy and everything similar.

Or (b) the cause of [these premises] is induction.

Or (c) their cause is that there exists an intricate condition whereby the condition

of the state and the judgment alter. However, that condition being intricate, the mass of


42

ÔË ifÃA eja o‚ ,fÃAfI O÷VZI É· ÊBNÃE BM eÌJÃ Á¸Y ËA ifÃA Ai eja É· Ó¸Í /.eÌI tÌ¿Ba

lÎ† ÆE Ë ,fÃAe PBmÌnZ¿ Á¸Y jI Ai lÎ† ÆE É· fÇAÌa ÁÇË É· eÌI ÆE jNÍeË [118] lU É· AjÍk ,fÍBÎÃ ifÃA ÁÇË ifÃA Ë eÌI pÌnZ¿ kA sÎ‚ É· ,eÌJÃ pÌnZ¿ ÁÇË É· ,fÍBÎÃ ÁÇË ifÃA ÔlÎ† É· eÌI KV§ ÆÌ† Ë .fÍBÎÃ ÁÇË ifÃA pÌnZ¿

.fÍBÎÃ ÁÇË ifÃA eÌa

ifÃA eiËBÎÃ ÷�q É¸ÃBÄ† ,eiBÎÃ ²Ýa Ai ËA ÁÇË ,OnÎ»÷ËA ½´§ ifÃA É· lÎ† jÇ Ë É· BÇlÎ† ÓNnÇ eÌq Omie PB÷Î»ËA ÊAi kA ÆÌ† o‚ .ËlU kA eÌI jNÈ¿ ÷½· É¸ÃE ,fÄ¸Ã ÁÎ¼nM Ai ÉVÎNÃ Ë fÄ· ÁÎ¼nM Ai PB¿÷f´¿ ÁÇË ,fÄmÌnZ¿ ²ÝbI ÆBrÍA PiBqA ÔÌI É† jÇ$ :É· fÍÌŒ ÁÇË É¸ÃBÄ† / .OmA ÔË sÃAÌM ²Ýa É· AjÍk [119] lÎ† ÆE ,eÌI Á»B§ ÆËifÃA BÍ eÌI Á»B§ ÆËjÎI É· fÍBrÃ Ë ,OmBV· É· ej· ÆAÌNÃ fÍBrÃ$ Ë ,#eÌI Ý¿ BÍ eÌI Ýa Á»B§ ÆËjÎI É· OnÎÃ ÊiB†$:É· fÍÌŒ Ë .#eÌJÃ ifÃA BÍ fmi ÔÌI ÆËjÎI kA ÓMeBÍk É¸ÃFI ÷ÜA ,eÌq jNÈ¿ OnÇ É¸ÃE kA ÔlÎ† É· /.OmA ½WBI ÉÀÇ ÅÍA É· fÄ· Omie eÌa eja O÷VY Ë .#fN¯A BÈUjó¯ ÔË ÆBÎ¿

PAiÌÈr¿ <7> [120]

É÷¿B§ ‘fÄÃB¿ Ë É÷¿B§ É· fÃA ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ,fÃiAfÃ ÔiÌÈr¿ lU É· PAiÌÈr¿ B÷¿A Ó·eÌ· kA Å¸Î»Ë ;eÌI ÆBÄ† ÉÃ Ë ,OmiB· ¾÷ËBI eja ©JW ifÃA É· ,fÃiAfÄ‚ ÅÎÄ† .fÄqBI Êej· ¶B°÷MA ÆE jI ,BÇjÈq jNrÎI BÍ / ,BÇjÈq �ÀÇ Ë eÌÄq ÆE Âej¿ [121]

Âjq ÓÄ¨¿ kA ,Âej¿ ÔÌa Å¸Î»Ë ,©JW ¾÷ËBI fÄ¸Ã KUAË ½´§ É· eÌI ÔlÎ† BÍ .fÃB¿ ÅÍfI É†jÇ Ë OÀYi Ë .eÌI ÕAjŃmA ÔË KJm BÍ

eejŒjI Á¸Y Ë ¾BY ¢jq ÆAfI É· eÌI �ÍiBI ÓWjq BVÃE É· eÌI ÆE ÔË KJm BÍ ¾BR¿Ë .ejÎNI ¢jq ÓI ÆBÄ‡ÀÇ o‚ ,fÃAfÃ Âej¿ �÷¿B§ Ë eÌI �ÍiBI ¢jq ÆE Å¸Î»Ë


43

men do not know it, hence they accept it thus unconditionally. An example of the

widely-known [premises] is when it is said, “justice is necessary,” or “it is not fitting to

tell lies”; or for instance when it is said, “one ought not to expose one’s nakedness in

front of [other] people,” [122] or “an innocent person ought not to be harmed.” Or when

it is said, “God is capable of everything and knows everything.” Among these [widely-

known opinions], some are true, such as the former examples; but their truth becomes

established by argument. If man imagines that he has come into this world all at once,

endowed with reason, and strives to doubt [the truth of these premises], he could doubt

[them]. And some are false, except conditionally. For example, it cannot be said, [123]

“God has power over the impossible; He is a knower and cognizant of [the fact] that he

has a companion.”

There are many widely-known [things] that are pure falsehood, while [some] widely-

known [things] are superior to others. Some widely-known [things] are the same for all

people, as when it is said, “lying is disgraceful”; and some are widely-known among a

[particular] group, just as among doctors they are one thing, among astronomers another,

among craftsmen another, and others for other trades. The contradictory of the true is the

false, while the contradictory of the widely-known is the base. In sum, the widely-known

is that which the mass of men accept; however, those which [124] are widely-known and

no more are these premises and what resembles these premises. Hence if you take the

true widely-known absolutely, the primary [things], some of the sensible [things], the

experiential [things] and the transmitted [things] would be widely-known [things].

However, there is [another class of] widely-known besides these, as has been said.

(viii) Premises accepted [on trust]

The premises accepted [on trust] are those that are received from a virtuous and wise

person, possess firmness, and are neither primary nor perceptible.

(ix) The Indisputable

The indisputable are those premises which, once the opponent concedes them, you then

use them against him, [125] whether they be true or widely-known or accepted or not.


43

É¸ÃBÄ† Ë #ÅN°Œ fÍBrÃ ®Ëie$ Ë ,#OnJUAË eAe$:fÄÍÌŒ É· eÌI ÆBÄ† PAiÌÈr¿ Ë ,#ÆeikE fÍBJÃ ÊBÄŒ ÓI Ai o·$ Ë ,#eBrŒ fÍBJÃ/PiÌ§ ,ÆB¿ej¿ sÎ‚$:fÄÍÌŒ [122] ÓzÏ É¼ÀU ÅÍkA .#fÃAe Ai ÔlÎ† jÇË OmieB³ ÔlÎ† jÇ jI ÔAfa$:fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† jŒA Ë .eÌq Omie O÷VZI sÎNmAi Å¸Î»Ë ,ÅÎrÎ‚ ÔBÈ»BR¿ É¸ÃBÄ† ,OmA OmAi fÈU Ë ,eÌI eja BI Ë ,fq ½uBY O¨¯e �ÎI ÆBÈU ÅÍifÃA É· eiBNÃA ÆBÄ† Âej¿

fÍBrÃ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÓWjrI ÷ÜA OmA ®Ëie ÓzÏ Ë .Æej· ÷�q fÃAÌM ,fÄ· ÷�q É· fÄ· .#OmiBÍ AiË É¸ÃFI BÃAe Ë OmA Á»B§ Ë ,¾BZ¿ jI OmA ieB³ ÔAfa$ :É· /ÅN°Œ [123]

Ë .eÌI jM ÔÌ³ ÔiÌÈr¿ kA ÔiÌÈr¿ Ë ,eÌI ²ju ®Ëie É· eÌI iÌÈr¿ iBÎnI Ë .OmA Oqk ®Ëie fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ÆBn¸Í Ai Âej¿ �ÀÇ j¿ PAiÌÈr¿ kA ÓzÏ Ë eÌI jNÍe ÆB¸ql‚ ÆBÎ¿ ie É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ÓÇËjŒ ÆBÎ¿ ie PAiÌÈr¿ kA ÓzÏ Ë ½WBI ÷µY |Î´ÃË .jNÍe Ai jNÍe �rÎ‚ Ë jNÍe ÆAjŒeËie Ë jNÍe ÆBÀVÄ¿ ÆBÎ¿ifÃA Å¸Î»Ë fÃjÍhƒI Âej¿ �÷¿B§ É·eÌI ÆE iÌÈr¿ É¼ÀVIË .©ÎÄq iÌÈr¿ |Î´ÃË eÌI ÆÌ† o‚ .PB¿÷f´¿ ÅÍA fÄÃB¿ Ë fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ ÅÍA ,oI Ë eÌI sÍiÌÈr¿ /É¸ÃE [124] PAjMAÌN¿ Ë PBIjV¿Ë PBmÌnZ¿ ‘iB‚ Ë PBÎ»÷ËA ,ÔjÎŒ ¶ÝWBI Ai Ó´ÎÝ iÌÈr¿ .f¿E ÉN°Œ É· ÅÎÄ† ÅÍA ,eÌI ÆBrÍA kA ÆËjÎI É· eÌI ÔiÌÈr¿ Å¸Î»Ë fÃÌI iÌÈr¿

PÜÌJ´¿ <8>

iAÌNmA Ë ,ÁÎ¸Y Ë ½yB¯ Ón· kA fÃÌq ÉN¯jÍh‚ É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ PÜÌJ´¿ B÷¿AË .pÌnZ¿ ÉÃ Ë fÃÌI Ó»÷ËA ÉÃ Ë ,fÄqBI ÉNqAe

PBÀ÷¼n¿ <9>

/ ,ÔiAe iB¸I ÔË jI o‚ ,fÄ· ÁÎ¼nM Áva ÆÌ† É· fÃÌI BÇ É¿÷f´¿ ÆE PBÀ÷¼n¿ ÅM �Í iÌÈr¿ PBÀ÷¼n¿ Ë .tBJ¿ ÓÇAÌa Ë tBI ¾ÌJ´¿ BÍ iÌÈr¿ BÍ ÷µY ÓÇAÌa [125]

.Âej¿ O§BÀU Á÷¼n¿ PAiÌÈr¿ Ë ,OmA Áva É· fÃA


44

The indisputable [premises] are the widely-known of one person, who is the opponent,

while the widely-known are [those premises] granted by the totality of men.

(x) The Specious

The specious are premises which by deceit present themselves as true, or widely-known,

or accepted, or indisputable, or resembling these, without in reality being them.

(xi) The Widely-known in appearance

The widely-known in appearance are those premises that upon first hearing them [126] it

is imagined that they are widely-known; but when you look at the truth, they are not

widely-known. For example, it is said, “you must aid your friend in truth and in

falsehood.” On a first hearing, it [is acceptable], but when it has been well thought

through with oneself, it is realized that it is not widely-known, for the widely-known is

contrary to it, viz., that one must not aid anyone, whether friend or enemy, in falsehood.

(xii) The Premises based on Suspicion

The premises based on suspicion are premises that become accepted through the

domination of doubt, [127] while reason knows that it may be that they are not true. For

example, someone says, “so-and-so is lurking around the neighborhood at night, so he

has some mischief in mind”; or “so-and-so has sent a message to our enemy, so he is

engaged in enmity with us.”

(xiii) The Imaginary

The imaginary are those premises that move the soul so that it covets something or is

repelled from something. It may be that the soul knows that they are false, as when

someone says to someone else, “this thing that you are eating is bile that has been

thrown-up,” while [in fact] the thing [in question] is honey. Although one knows that it

is false, [128] [one’s] nature is repelled and does not want [the honey]. Hence the true

and the widely-known are also imagined; however, the purely imagined are such as these.


44

PBÈJr¿ <10>

iÌÈr¿ BÍ fÃA ÷µY ÆBrÍA É· fÄÍBÀÃ ÅÎÄ† É¼ÎZI É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ PBÈJr¿ B÷¿AË .fÃÌI ÆBrÍA ÉÃ O´Î´ZI Ë fÃB¿ ÆBrÍBI É¸ÃE BÍ Á÷¼n¿ BÍ ¾ÌJ´¿ BÍ fÃA

jÇB¤I PAiÌÈr¿ <11>

É· fN¯A ÁÇË ÅÎÄ† / ÆfÎÄq ¾÷ËBI É· fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ ÆE ,jÇB¤I PAiÌÈr¿ B÷¿AË [126] fÍBI$ :fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† .fÃÌI iÌÈr¿ ÉÃ ÔjNÄI O´Î´ZI ÆÌ† Ë ,fÃiÌÈr¿ ÆBrÍA ÆÌ† o‚ ,fN¯A iB¸I ÆfÎÄq ¾÷ËBI ,#ÓÄ· ÔiBÍ ½WBI Ë µZI Ai sÍÌa OmËe É· ÔË ²Ýa iÌÈr¿ É† ,OnÎÃ iÌÈr¿ É· fÍE ÉNnÃAe ,eÌa BI fÍE ÊfÎrÍfÃA �ÎÃ .Æej· ÔiBÍ ½WBI jI eÌI ÅÀqe BÍ eÌI OmËe É· Ai o¸‡ÎÇ fÍBJÃ É· ,OmA

PBÃÌÄ¤¿ <12>

É· fÍBq É· fÃAe eja Ë /,fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ ÆBÀŒ �J¼¬I É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ PBÃÌÄ¤¿ B÷¿AË [127] ÓñÎ¼bM o‚ ,eejNÎ¿ O÷¼Z¿ ejŒ KrI ÆÝ¯$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌJÃ Omie

B¿ Ó·BÄÀqfI ÔË o‚ ,OmeBNmj¯ ÂBÎ‚ B¿ ÅÀqfI ÆÝ¯$Ë ,eiAe jm ifÃA .#On»Ì¬r¿

PÝÎb¿ <13>

ÔlÎ† kA BÍ eiE xjY ÔlÎ† jI BM fÃBJÄVI Ai o°Ã É· fÃA ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PÝÎb¿ B÷¿AË :É· Ai Ón· fÍÌŒ Ón· É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÃA ®Ëie É· fÃAe o°Ã É· fqBI Ë .ejÎŒ Pj°Ã É· fÄ† jÇ ,eÌI ÅÎJNÃA lÎ† ÆE Ë #OmeiËEjI ÔAj°u ÔiÌa ÓÀÇ ÌM É· lÎ† ÅÍA$ ,eÌI ½Îb¿ lÎÃ iÌÈr¿ Ë ÷µY o‚ .fÇAÌbÃ Ë ejÎŒ Pj°Ã ©JW / On«Ëie É· fÃAe [128]

.eÌI ÅÎÄ‡ÄÍA ²ju ½Îb¿ Å¸Î»Ë


45

27. Explication of the Status of these Premises

Primary [premises], perceptible [premises], experiential [premises], transmitted

[premises] and those [premises] whose syllogism is in [one’s] nature are [all] premises of

the demonstrative syllogism. The use of demonstration is [the attainment of] certainty

and the discovery of truth. Widely-known and indisputable [premises] are premises of

the dialectical syllogism. There is no doubt that primary [premises] and everything that

was enumerated along with them, if [employed] in dialectic, it would be better. [129]

However, they do not occur in dialectic insofar as they are true but insofar as they are

widely-known and indisputable.

Now, dialectic has several uses.

(a) One is that [in the case of] those meddlesome prattlers who lay claim to

science, who have incorrect doctrines, and who proceed on an arduous path, you [can], by

knowing the truth via demonstration, demolish them by dialectic.

(b) Another is that if there are people whom you wish to persuade of some truth

or some expediency, and whom you cannot [persuade] by means of demonstration, you

[would be able to] induce belief in them by means of dialectic and the widely-known.

[130] (c) Third is that the students of the particular sciences (such as geometry,

medicine, physics and everything similar) have principles to conform to [which] are

established by other sciences (and ultimately the principles of all sciences are established

by metaphysics). Consequently, the student is then not satisfied; [but] when you prove

those principles to him by means of dialectical syllogisms, he becomes satisfied.

(d) Fourth is that with the power of dialectical syllogisms one can prove both

what is the case [131] and what is not the case. Hence, when in a problem dialectical

syllogisms are brought in [to prove] what is the case, and other syllogisms are brought in

[to prove] what is not the case, and those syllogisms are considered well, it may finally

turn out that the truth comes to be disclosed among them.

But as for how the principles of dialectic can be known and its art acquired, it is of no

concern to us in this book where our aim is the truth.


45

PB¿÷f´¿ ÅÍA ÔBÇB_ÍBU Æej· AfÎ‚ (27) pBÎ³ �¿÷f´¿ ,eÌI ©JW ifÃA ÔË pBÎ³ É‡ÃE Ë jMAÌN¿ Ë ÓIjVM Ë pÌnZ¿ Ë Ó»÷ËA PBÀ÷¼n¿ Ë PAiÌÈr¿ .÷µY Æej· AfÎ‚ Ë OmA ÅÎ´Í ÆBÇjI ‘fÍB¯ Ë .eÌI ÓÃBÇjI

ifÃA jŒA ,f¿E ÊejÀq ÔË BI É†jÇ Ë Ó»÷ËA É· OnÎÃ ÷�q Ë ,fÃA Ó»fU pBÎ³ �¿÷f´¿ Å¸Î»Ë ,fÃA ÷µY É· ¾fU ifÃA fN¯ËA AjÃE OÈU kA ÉÃ Å¸Î»Ë ;eÌI /jNÈI ,fÃÌI ¾fU [129]

.fÃA Á÷¼n¿ Ë fÃiÌÈr¿ É· AjÃE OÈU kA

:OmBÇ ÊfÍB¯ Ai ¾fUj¿ Ë ÊAi Ë fÃiAe OmAiBÃ ÔBÈJÇh¿ Ë ,fÄÄ· sÃAe ÔÌ§e É· ÓÃBÎ»Ìz¯ É· OnÃE Ó¸Í

.ÓÄ¸rI Ai ÆBrÍA ,¾fVI o‚ ,ÆBÇjI ÊAi kA ÷µY ÅNnÃAfI ,fÃjI iAÌqe

BÍ ,fÄÄ· teBŃ§A ÆBrÍA É· ÓÇAÌa Ó÷Ý É· fÃÌI ÓÃBn· jŒA É¸ÃE jNÍe Ë /.ÓÄ¸¯A eBŃ§A Ai ÆBrÍA PAiÌÈr¿ Ë ¾fU ÊAjI ,ÓÃAÌNÃ ÆBÇjI ÊAjI Ë ,ÓNZ¼v¿

É†jÇ Ë PB÷Î¨ÎJW Ë ÷KW Ë ÉmfÄÇ ÆÌ†) ÔËlU ÔBÈÀ¼§ ÆBŒfÃkÌ¿E É· OnÃE Â÷ÌmË [130] ÔBÈ¼uA Ë)eÌq Omie jNÍe ÔBÈÀ¼Ï Ë fÎ¼ŃI eÌI BÈ¼uA Ai ÆBrÍA ,(fÃB¿ ÅÍfI tÌa ÊBNÃE ¾e Ai ÊfÃkÌ¿E o‚ .(eÌq Omie É¨ÎJñ»A fÏ B¿ Á¼Ï jaE BÈÀ¼§ �ÀÇ

.eÌq tÌa ÔË ¾e ,ÓÄ· PBJQA ÔËjI Ai BÈ¼uA ÆE Ó»fU pBÎÍ ÆÌ† ,eÌJÃ

OnÎÃ ÁÇ Ë ,Æej· / PBJQA ÆAÌM Ai OnÇ ÁÇ Ó»fU pBÎ³ P÷ÌÍ É· OnÃE ÂiBÈ† Ë [131] ,OnÎÃ jI BÈmBÎ³ Ë ,OnÇ jI fÍE ÊeiËE Ó»fU ÔBÈmBÎ³ É¼×n¿ ifÃA ÆÌ† o‚ .Ai

.fÍE AfÎ‚ ÆBÎ¿ ÆE ifÃA ÷µY É· fqBI jaE ,fÍE Êej· ½÷¿DM Ì¸ÎÃ BÈmBÎ³ ÆE Ë

Ai B¿ ,Æej· Kn· ÔË O§BÄu Ë ÅNnÃAe Ó»fU ¾ÌuA ÆAÌM ÉÃÌN† É¸ÃE B÷¿A Ë .OnÎÃ iB¸I OmA ÷µY ÔË ifÃA B¿ eAj¿ É· LBN· ÅÍifÃA


46

As for the premises of the estimative [faculty] and the specious, they are the premises of

sophistical and fallacious syllogisms. In sophistical and fallacious syllogisms there is no

use [132] other than injury. Or if there is a use, it is that you [can] test someone who is

making a claim as to whether he knows or does not know; in that case it is called

probative syllogism. Or else [its use] is to rebuke the artless pretender, so that people do

not learn from him and recognize his rank; in that case it is called polemical syllogism.

As for the [premises that are] widely-known in appearance, the [premises] accepted [on

trust], and the premises based on suspicion, these are premises [belonging to] the

rhetorical syllogism. The use of rhetoric lies in the political governance of men, in the

branches of the religious law, [133] in giving counsel, enmity, censure, in praise and

blame, in magnifying or abbreviating speech, and everything resembling this. There is a

separate science and book [devoted] to rhetoric which is of no concern to us here. We

have recognized that if within the aims of rhetoric primary and widely-known [premises]

are used, it is well and good; however, it is not a condition that it must in every case be

such.

As for the imaginary, they are the premises of poetical syllogisms, and there is a

particular book [devoted] to it which is of no concern to us at present. If true premises

occur in poetry, [134] or widely-known [premises], it is not on account of truth that they

are employed, but on account of [their] imaginative [character].

Of all these syllogisms we are concerned with two sorts: the demonstrative – in order that

we may use [them]; and the fallacious – in order that we may avoid [them].


46

fÃÌI Óñ»B¬¿ Ë ÓÖBñn¯Ìm pBÎ³ PB¿÷f´¿ ,PBÈJr¿ Ë PBÎÀÇË PB¿÷f´¿ B÷¿A Ë ,eÌI ÊfÍB¯ jŒA Ë .ÆBÍk ÷ÜA / OnÎÃ ÊfÍB¯ ˆÎÇ Óñ»B¬¿ Ë ÓÖBñn¯Ìm pBÎ³ ie Ë [132] pBÎ³ Ai ËA ÊBNÃE Ë ,fÃAfÃ BÍ fÃAe BM fÄ· ÔÌ§e É· Ai Ón· ÓÖB¿kBÎI É· eÌI ÆE Ë fÃkÌ¿BÎÃ ÔË kA ÆB¿ej¿ BM ,Ai jÄÇ ÓI Å· ÔÌ§e Ó»B¿kBI BÍ .fÄÃAÌa ÓÃBZN¿A

.fÄÃAÌa ÔeBÄ§ pBÎ³ AiË ÊBNÃE Ë ,fÄÃAfI ÔË OJMj¿

Ë .fÃÌI ÓIBña pBÎ³ PB¿÷f´¿ ,PBÃÌÄ¤¿ Ë PÜÌJ´¿ Ë jÇB¤I PAiÌÈr¿ B÷¿A Ë Ë PiÌr¿ ifÃA Ë / O¨Íjq ÔBÈaBq ifÃA Ë ,eÌI Âej¿ OmBÎm ifÃA ÉIBña ‘fÍB¯ [133] Æej· eja Ë Åbm Æej· –ilI ifÃA Ë sÇÌ¸Ã Ë sÍBNm ifÃA Ë LBN§ Ë O¿Ìva iB¸I BVÄÍA Ai B¿ É· ,ÓIBN· Ë OmA ÓÀ¼§ ÉÃBŒAfU Ai ÉIBña Ë .fÃB¿ ÅÍfI É†jÇ Ë ,fÍE ÊejI iB¸I ÔiÌÈr¿ Ë Ó»÷ËA ,ÉIBña ÔBÈyj« ifÃA jŒA É· ÁÍA ÉNnÃAe Ë .fÍBÎÃ

.fÍBI ÆBÄ† ÉÄÍEjÇ É· OnÎÃ ¢jq Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI �ÎÃ

ÆÌÄ·A Ai B¿ Ë OnÎIBN· É÷uBa AjÃE Ë ,fÃA Ôj¨q pBÎ³ PB¿÷f´¿ PÝÎb¿ B÷¿AË jÈI kA ÉÃ ,iÌÈr¿ BÍ /,fN¯A j¨q ifÃA OmAi PB¿÷f´¿ jŒA Ë .OnÎÃ iB¸I [134]

.Ai Ó¼ÎbN¿ jÈI kA É· ,fÄqBI Êf¿E iB¸I Ai ÓNmAi

Ë ;ÁÍiAe iB¸I BM - ÓÃBÇjI :fÍE iB¸I LBI Ëe BÈmBÎ³ ÅÍA É¼ÀU kA Ai B¿ Ë .ÁÎÄ· lÎÇj‚ ÔË kA BM - Óñ»B¬¿


47

28. Further Comment on the Account of Demonstration

Every demonstrative science is comprised of three things: one is called subject, one the

essential traits, and one the principles.

[135] The subject is the thing whose character is to be examined in that science; e.g. the

human body [is examined] in medicine, length in geometry, number in arithmetic, and

sound in the science of music. It is not necessary for the master of any one of such

sciences to establish that its subject exists. If the existence of the subject of the science is

evident, tant mieux; but if it is not, he establishes it in another science. However, there is

no alternative for him but to know the subject of his own science by definition.

Essential traits are those characteristics that fall [entirely] within the subject of that

science [and] which do not fall outside it; e.g., the ‘triangular’ or the ‘square’ with regard

to some quantities; [136] and ‘straightness’ or ‘crookedness’ with regard to some others –

these traits are essential with regard to the subject of geometry. Or for example,

‘evenness’ and ‘oddness’ (and everything similar) with regard to number; or ‘harmony’

and ‘discordance’ with regard to sound; or ‘health’ and ‘illness’ with regard to the human

body. In every science it is necessary that first the definition of these things be known; as

for their existence, this is known at the end by reasoning, for these characters are the ones

which that science establishes.

As for the principles, these are the premises that are fundamental to that science; for the

student [137] must first affirm these principles in order that he may then know that

science.

Put otherwise, we say that every science has a subject, problems, and principles; [and] we

have [already] said what the principles and the subject are.


47

Ai ÆBÇjI SÍfY j¿ `jq jNrÎI (28) Ë ÓMAg iBQE Ai Ó¸Í Ë fÄÃAÌa ªÌyÌ¿ Ai Ó¸Í :eÌI lÎ† Ém Ai ÓÃBÇjI ÓÀ¼§ jÇ j¿

/ .ÔeBJ¿ Ai Ó¸Í

Ó¸ql‚ Âej¿ ÅM É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÄ· ÔË ¾BY ifÃA j¤Ã Á¼§ ÆE ifÃA É· eÌI lÎ‡ÃE ªÌyÌ¿ [135] É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ,Ai LBnY Á¼§ j¿ iBÀq É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ,Ai ÉmfÄÇ j¿ ÊkAfÃA É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ,Ai É· eÌJÃ ÂkÜ BÈÀ¼§ ÅÎÄ† ÅÍkA ÓÀ¼§ jÇ fÃËAfa jI Ë .Ai Ó´ÎmÌ¿ Á¼§ j¿ kAËE

Ë , òÁô ø̈Ã òË B}ÈøJò¯ eÌI AfÎ‚ ÔË ªÌyÌ¿ ÓNnÇ jŒA .OnÇ ÔË ªÌyÌ¿ É· fÄ· Omie ªÌyÌ¿ É¸ÃE kA teÌJÃ ÊiB† Å¸Î»Ë ;fÄ· Omie eÌa jNÍe ÓÀ¼§ ifÃA ,eÌJÃ jŒA

.fmBÄrI ÷fZI sÍÌa Á¼§

,fN¯ÌÎÃ ÔË ÆËjÎI É· fN¯A Á¼§ ÆE ªÌyÌ¿ ifÃA É· eÌI BÈNÎuBa ÆE ÓMAg iBQE B÷¿AË ÓzÏ j¿ Ô‹· Ë ÓNmAi É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ,Ai / BÇ ÊkAfÃA ÓzÏ j¿ ©Ij¿ Ë S¼R¿ É¸ÃBÄ† [136] É†jÇ Ë Ó³BW Ë ÓN°U É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ,Ai ÉmfÄÇ ªÌyÌ¿ j¿ eÌI ÓMAg BÇjQA ÅÍA Ë .Ai É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ,Ai kAËE j¿ ÔiAËkBmBÃ Ë ÔiAËkBm É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ,Ai iBÀq j¿ fÃB¿ ÅÍfI BÇlÎ† ÅÍA ÷fY ¾÷ËBI É· fÍBI ÓÀ¼§ jÇ ifÃA Ë .Ai Âej¿ ÅM j¿ ÔiBÀÎI Ë ÓNmie É· fÃÌI BÈ»BY ÆE BÈ»BY ÅÍA É· ,fÄÃAfI O÷VZI jaE ,ÆBrÍA ÓNnÇ B÷¿AË ,fÄÃAfI

.fÄ· Omie Ai ÆBrÍA Á¼§ ÆE

ÔeBJ¿ ÆFI Ai / ÊfÃkÌ¿E É· fÄqBI Á¼§ ÆE ½uA É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ÔeBJ¿ B÷¿AË [137] .fÃAfI Ai Á¼§ ÆE ÊBNÃE BM ÆfÍËjŒ fÍBJI OnbÃ

ÔeBJ¿ Ë OmA ½ÖBn¿ Ë OmA ªÌyÌ¿ Ai ÓÀ¼§ jÇ É· ÁÎÍÌŒ jNÍe ÔËjI Ë

.eÌI É† É· ÁÎN°Œ ªÌyÌ¿ Ë ÔeBJ¿ ;OmA


48

29. The Types of Problems in the Demonstrative Sciences

The subjects of the problems of the demonstrative sciences are either (a) part of the

subject of that science, or (b) they are part of the essential traits that we spoke of.

(a) If they are part of the subject of the science:

(i) Either they are the subject itself: e.g., in geometry it is said, “every quantity is

[either] congruent with another [138] quantity of the same genus, or is incongruous,” and

this is what is sought to be established; or e.g., it is said in arithmetic, “every number is

the half of its two [neighbors], for both of them are of the same distance from it; just as 4

is the half of 5 and 3, 6 and 2, 7 and 1; and just as 5 is the half of 6 and 4, 3 and 7, 2 and

8, and 1 and 9.”

(ii) Or they are the subject of the science [together] with a trait. For example, it

is said, “every quantity that is incongruous with another quantity, is incongruous [139]

with all its congruents.” For in this problem “quantity” has been taken [together] with

“incongruent.” Or e.g., it is said in the science of arithmetic, “every number that you

divide in two, the [square] of its half is one quarter of the [square] of the whole of it”; for

[here] “number” has been taken [together] with “dividing in two” in the subject.

(iii) Or they are a species of the subject of the science; e.g., it is said, “Six is a

perfect number,” for six is a species of number.

(iv) Or they are a species [together] with a trait; [140] e.g., it is said in geometry,

“every straight line perpendicular to another straight line forms two right angles.”

(b) Or they are an [essential] trait; e.g., it is said in geometry, “[for] every triangle, its

three angles are equal to two right angles.”

As for the predicate in the problems of the demonstrative sciences, it is an essential trait

specific to the essence of the subject of that science.


48

ÓÃBÇjI ÔBÈÀ¼§ ½ÖBn¿ ÂBn³A (29) kA BÍ ,eÌI Á¼§ ÆE ªÌyÌ¿ É¼ÀU kA ÆBrÍA PB§ÌyÌ¿ BÍ ÓÃBÇjI ÔBÈÀ¼§ ½ÖBn¿

.ÁÎN°Œ É· ÓMAg iBQE É¼ÀU :eÌI Á¼§ ªÌyÌ¿ É¼ÀU kA jŒA

/jNÍe �iBr¿ ÔiAf´¿ jÇ$:É· fÄÍÌŒ ÉmfÄÇ ifÃA É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ o°Ã BÍ É¸ÃBÄ† Ë ,fÄÄ· Omie É· fÄÇAÌa ÅÍA Ë ,#ÅÍBJ¿ BÍ ,eÌI eÌa oÃBV¿ iAf´¿ [138] ÔiËe Ai Ëe jÇ É· ,eÌI sÍÌa �ÃAj· Ëe �ÀÎÃ ÔiBÀq jÇ$:É· LBnY ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ ,eÌI ÓœÍ Ë O°Ç Ë ,Ëe Ë sq Ë ,Ém Ë WÄ‚ �ÀÎÃ iBÈ† É¸ÃBÄ† ;eÌI Ó¸Í ÔË kA OrÇ Ë Ëe �ÀÎÃ Ë OmA O°Ç Ë Ém �ÀÎÃ Ë OmA iBÈ† Ë sq �ÀÎÃ WÄ‚ É¸ÃBÄ† Ë

.#OmA ÉÃ Ë Ó¸Í �ÀÎÃ Ë OmA ,eÌI ÔiAf´¿ ÅÍBJ¿ É· ÔiAf´¿ jÇ$:fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÔjQA BI eÌI Á¼§ ªÌyÌ¿ BÍ #ÅÍBJ¿$ BI Ai #iAf´¿$ É¼×n¿ ÅÍA ie É· ,#eÌI ÔË ÆB·iBr¿ �ÀÇ / ÅÍBJ¿ [139] �ÀÎÄI Ljy ,ÓÄ· ËfI É· ÔiBÀq jÇ$:LBnY Á¼§ ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ†Ë .fÄN¯jŒ ifÃA fÄN¯jŒ #Æej· Ëe$ BI Ai #iBÀq$ É· ,#eÌI ÔË �ÀÇ Ljy �Í iBÈ† ÔË

.ªÌyÌ¿ sq É·,#OmA ÷ÂBM ÔiBÀq sq$ :fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI Á¼§ ªÌyÌ¿ kA Ó§ÌÃ BÍ

.iBÀq kA OmA Ó§ÌÃ jI É· ÁÎŃn¿ Ó÷ña jÇ$ :É· ÉmfÄÇ ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† /,ÔjQA BI eÌI Ó§ÌÃ BÍ [140]

.#ÉÀÍB³ Ëe ÆÌ† fÄ· ÉÍËAk Ëe fNnÍA ÁÎŃn¿ Ó÷ña

ÉÀÍB³ Ëe fÄ† ÔË �ÍËAk Ém ÓR¼R¿ jÇ$ :ÉmfÄÇ ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,eÌI ÔjQA BÍ .#fÃÌI

ªÌyÌ¿ PAgj¿ ÷xBa ÓMAg eÌI ÔjQA ,ÓÃBÇjI ÂÌ¼§ ½ÖBn¿ ifÃA ¾ÌÀZ¿ B÷¿AË

.Ai Á¼§ ÆE


49

30. Explanation of the term “Essential”

as used in the Premises of Demonstrative [Sciences]

By essential here is not simply meant what we said earlier only; rather, that [141] is

meant and [more] besides. In sum, by essential is meant here something that belongs to

the essence. Either it is something that permeates the definition of its subject, and you

know that this [thing] belongs to the essence by itself. Or it is something in whose

definition the subject enters, in that the essence has the subject of the art in itself and not

on account of something that is more general (e.g., motion [belongs] to man not on

account of humanity but on account of corporeity, and corporeity is more general than

humanity), nor on account of a subject that is more particular than it (e.g., writing with

respect to body, which is on account of humanity, for as long as human does not exist,

body does not become writer). [142] However, it is like flat-nosedness [in relation] to the

nose, or straightness [in relation] to the line: for the nose is incorporated in the definition

of flat-nosed, as is the line in the definition of straightness.

In the problems of the demonstrative sciences the predicate is essential, and certainly no

extrinsic state is discussed or is made predicate: a geometer never looks to see whether

the straight line or the curved line is better, and he never looks to see whether the straight

is opposed or not to the curved, because goodness and opposition are not among the

essential [characters] of the line, and the subject of the science of geometry [143] is not

grasped in their definition; nor are they grasped in the definition of the subjects of the

problems of the science of geometry. Rather, in this case either the master of dialectics

speaks, or the scientific master, for essential goodness and opposition are his subject.

Consequently, the predicates of the problems of the demonstrative sciences are essential,

but not any essential; rather, this second essential, for the former essential is itself evident

in that it itself makes the subject evident. So why should the evident be sought for by

argument and demonstration?


49

fÄÍÌŒ ÓÃBÇjI PB¿÷f´¿ ifÃA É· ÓMAg ¥°» Æej· jÎn°M (30) Ë fÄÇAÌa / ÆE É· ,oI Ë ÁÎN°Œ jNrÎ‚ B¿ É· fÄÇAÌa ÆE BÈÄM ÉÃ ÓMAhI BVÄÍA [141] BÍ .eÌI eÌa kA Ai PAg É· fÄÇAÌa ÔlÎ† ÓMAhI BVÄÍA É¼ÀVI Ë .fÄÇAÌa ÆE lU ÔeÌbI Ai PAgj¿ ÅÍA É· ÔA ÉNnÃAe Ë fÍE eÌa ªÌyÌ¿ ÷fY ifÃA É· eÌI ÔlÎ† O§BÄu ªÌyÌ¿ PAg É· fÍE ÔË ÷fY ifÃA ªÌyÌ¿ É· eÌI ÔlÎ† BÍ .eÌI eÌa

Ai Âej¿ sJÄU É¸ÃBÄ†) OmA jN÷¿B§ ÔË kA É· eÌI ÔlÎ† jÈI kA ÉÃ Ë eÌI eÌa kA Ai ,(Ó¿ej¿ kA OmA jN÷¿B§ ÓÀnU Ë ,OmA ÓÀnU jÈI kA É· ,OmA Ó¿ej¿ jÈI kA ÉÃ jÈI kA É· ,Ai ÁnU ÔjÎIe É¸ÃBÄ†) OmA jN÷uBa ÔË kA É· OnÎ§ÌyÌ¿ jÈI kA ÉÃ Ë Ónñ¯A ÆÌ† eÌI ÆBÄ† Å¸Î»Ë / .(eÌrÃ jÎIe ÁnU ,eÌJÃ ÆBnÃA BM É· OnÎÃBnÃA [142] .fÍE ÓNmAi ÷fY ifÃA ¡aË fÍE Ónñ¯A ÷fY ifÃA ÓÄÎI É· ,Ai ¡a ÓNmAi Ë ,Ai ÓÄÎI

Ë fÄÄ¸Ã SZI KÍj« Ó»BY kA ÉNJ»A Ë ,eÌI ÓMAg ¾ÌÀZ¿ ÓÃBÇjI ÂÌ¼§ ½ÖBn¿ ifÃA Ë lŒjÇË ,ejŒ ¡a BÍ jMÌ¸ÎÃ OmAi ¡a É· ejNÄÃ pfÄÈ¿ lŒjÇË .fÄÄ¸Ã ¾ÌÀZ¿ AiËA ÔBÈÎMAg kA ÉÃ Ô÷fy Ë ÓÍÌ¸ÎÃ É· AjÍk ,eÌJÃ BÍ eÌI ÷fy Ai ejŒ j¿ OmAi É· ejNÄÃ ifÃA ÆBrÍA ÉÃ Ë ,eÌrÃ ÉN¯jŒ ÆBrÍA ÷fY ifÃA / ÉmfÄÇ Á¼§ ªÌyÌ¿ Ë ,OmA ¡a [143] ¾fU fÃËAfa BÍ ¾BY ÅÍifÃA É¸¼I ;fÃÌq ÉN¯jŒ ÉmfÄÇ Á¼§ ½ÖBn¿ PB§ÌyÌ¿ ÷fY

.eÌI ÔË ªÌyÌ¿ ÓMAg Ô÷fy Ë ÓÍÌ¸ÎÃ É· ,ÓÀ¼§ fÃËAfaBÍ fÍÌŒ Åbm

ÓMAg ÅÍA É· ,ÓMAg jÇ ÉÃ Ë fÃÌI ÓMAg ÓÃBÇjI ÔBÈÀ¼§ ½ÖBn¿ PÜÌÀZ¿ o‚ .fÄ· ÂÌ¼¨¿ Ai ªÌyÌ¿ eÌa ÔË É· eÌI ÂÌ¼¨¿ eÌa ÅÎrÎ‚ ÓMAg É· AjÍk ,Â÷Ëe

?ÆBÇjI Ë O÷VZI Æej· K¼W Ai ÂÌ¼¨¿ fÍBq ÆÌ† o‚


50

31. The [various] Types of Principles of Demonstration

and that which is Predicate in them

There are four principles and primary foundations in demonstrative science:

[144] (a) The definitions which at the outset are established as principles; e.g. the

definition of ‘point,’ ‘line,’ and ‘figure’ in Euclid’s book.

(b) Primary premises and those [premises] other than primary, namely, those in

which there is no doubt; these are called axioms; e.g., in [Euclid’s] book it has been set

down as a principle that all things that are equal, their halves are equal; and if you

subtract from equals an equal [amount], those which remain would be equal.

(c) The posited principle which is the principle of the science and in which there

is doubt; [145] however, its truth [depends] on another science, and in this science it must

be taken by conformity; then it would be the posited principle which the student accepts

and [regarding which] there would not be for him a contrary belief.

(d) The postulate, and this is like the posited principle; however, the student has a

belief contrary to that principle, yet for the time being he forbears. The example of both

of these [sc. the postulate and the posited principle] are the principles one reads of in

Euclid’s book under the name of that which there is no choice but to agree upon; for

example, he says that you must accept that “around every point [taken as] center [146] it

is possible to draw a circle.” Here many people say that the circle does not exist in

reality, of course, nor is it possible that the circle exist in the way the geometers say, viz.,

that there is a center from which all straight lines [leading] to the periphery are equal.

These, then, are the [various] types of the principles of demonstrative science. It is

necessary that the predicates of the premises of the earlier principles be first. The first

[predicate] is [of a sort] that there is not a more general intermediary between it and the

subject. For example, animality and laughter in relation to man: he has each of them

without [147] a more general intermediary; and not like voluntary motion which man


50

eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ ÆBrÍA ifÃA É‡ÃE Ë ÆBÇjI ÔeBJ¿ ÂBn³A (31) / .fÃA iBÈ† ÓÃBÇjI Á¼§ ifÃA ÅÎ»÷ËA ¾ÌuA Ë ÔeBJ¿

¡a Ë Éñ´Ã ÷fY pfÎ¼³A LBN· ifÃA É¸ÃBÄ† ,fÄÄ· ½uA AfNIBI É· BÇ÷fY Ó¸Í [144] .½¸q Ë

Ai ÅÍA Ë ;OnÎÃ ÷�q ÆBrÍA ifÃA É· É¼ÀVÃE kA ,Ó»÷ËA lU Ë Ó»÷ËA PB¿÷f´¿ jBÍeË ÊeBÈÃ ½uA LBN· ÆE ifÃA É¸ÃBÄ† .fÄÃAÌa ©¿BU Á¼§ Ë fÄÃAÌa ²iB¨N¿ Á¼§ jIAjI kA ÆÌ† Ë ,fÃÌI jIAjI ÆBrÍA ÔBÇ ÉÀÎÃ fÃÌI jIAjI É· BÇlÎ† jÇ :É· Omf¿E

.fÃÌI jIAjI fÃBÀI É· Ó³BI ,jIAjI ÓÄ· ÆBv´Ã

ÔË ÓNmie Å¸Î»Ë /,eÌI ÷�q ÔË ifÃA Ë eÌI Á¼§ ½uA É· ªÌyÌ¿ ½uA Â÷Ìm Ë [145] É· eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ ½uA ÊBNÃE Ë ÅN¯jŒ fÍBI fÎ¼ŃI Á¼§ ÅÍifÃAË ,eÌI jNÍe ÓÀ¼Ï

.eÌJÃ ÆE ±»Bb¿ ÔeBŃ§A ÔË �ÍelÃ Ë ejÍhƒI AjÃE ÊfÃkÌ¿E

ÊfÃkÌ¿E É· eÌI ÆE Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ ½uA ÆÌ‡ÀÇ ÔË Ë ,OmA ÊieBv¿ ÂiBÈ†Ë ÅÍA ¾BR¿ Ë .O³Ë ifÃA fÄ· ÓÀÇ OZ¿Bn¿ Å¸Î»Ë ½uA ÆE ²Ýa eiAe ÔeBŃ§A OnÎÃ ÊiB† É¸ÃE ÂBÄI fÄÃAÌa ÓÀÇ AiË pfÎ¼³A LBN· ifÃA É· OmBÈ¼uA ÆE Ëe jÇ l·j¿ �ñ´Ã jÇ jI$ :É· ÔjÍhƒI fÍBI É· fÍÌŒ ÓÀÇ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÔËjI Æej· ¶B°÷MA kA

Ë ,ÉNJ»A OnÎÃ O´Î´ZI ÊjÍAe É· fÄÍÌŒ Âej¿ iBÎnI BVÄÍA Ë .#Æej· fÍBq / ÊjÍAe [146] É· fqBI sÍl·j¿ É· ,fÄÍÌŒ ÆBmfÄÈ¿ É¸ÃBÄ† eÌI eÌUÌ¿ ÊjÍAe É· ÆeÌI fÍBrÃ

.fÃÌI jIAjI ÊiBÄ¸I ÔË kA OmAi ÔBÈña �ÀÇ

ÅÎrÎ‚ ÔBÈ¼uA PB¿÷f´¿ PÜÌÀZ¿ Ë .fÃA ÓÃBÇjI Á¼§ ÔBÈ¼uA ÂBn³A ÅÍA o‚ ,jN÷¿B§ eÌJÃ ÉñmAË ªÌyÌ¿ ÆBÎ¿ Ë ÔË ÆBÎ¿ É· eÌI ÆE Ó»÷ËA Ë .fÄÍBI ÅÎ»ËA ,jN÷¿B§ fÃA ÉñmAË /ÓI AiË Ó¸Í jÇ É· ,Ai Âej¿ Ó·BÃfÄa Ë ÔiÌÃBU É¸ÃBÄ† [147]


51

possesses on account of animality, while animality is more general than humanity.

As for predicates of the premises that are not primary principles (those that have once

been the conclusion [of a syllogism] but have now become premises), it is possible that

they not be primary [predicates], but they must be essential and necessary if the problem

is to be necessary. For whenever the premises are not necessary, it is possible that their

judgment change; and if their judgment changes, then it is not incumbent upon reason to

assent to their conclusion; [148] hence their conclusion is not necessary.

The essential in the premises of demonstration are of both kinds, whereas in the problems

it is one kind, for it is possible that the middle term be the essential in the former [sense]

for the minor term. However, it is then not possible that the major term be essential in

the same [sense] for the middle term; otherwise, it would be essential also in this [sense]

for the minor, for the essential of the essential in this [sense] is essential. Hence it would

be essential in the conclusion and in the problem; and you [already] know that it is not

possible.

It is possible that the middle term be essential [in the] second [sense] for the minor, and

the major the essential [in the] former [sense] for the middle. And it is possible that both

be essential [149] in the second sense.

32. Exposition of the character of Demonstrative Syllogisms

What had to be said regarding the foundations, principles and problems has been said.

Now syllogisms must be spoken about. The demonstrative syllogism is of two kinds.

One is the true demonstrative, and it is called “demonstration [of the reason] why” (in

Arabic called demonstration of lima). The other is also a demonstration, but it is not a

demonstration [of the reason] why; rather, it is “demonstration [150] of existence” (in

Arabic called demonstration of anna).


51

Ó¿ej¿ kA ÔiÌÃBU Ë ;OmA ÔiÌÃBU ½J³ kA Ai Âej¿ É· ,OmAÌbI sJÄU ÆÌ† ÉÃ .OmA jN÷¿B§

Ë fÄqBI ÊeÌI ÉVÎNÃ iBJ¸Í É·) eÌJÃ ÅÎNnbÃ ½uA É· ÓMB¿÷f´¿ PÜÌÀZ¿ B÷¿A Ë ÔiËjy Ë fÃÌI ÓMAg É· fÍBI Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI Ó»÷ËA ÉÃ É· fÍBq ,(fÃÌq É¿÷f´¿ ÆÌÄ·A É· fÍBq fÃÌJÃ ÔiËjy PB¿÷f´¿ É· ÊBŒjÇ É· ,ÆeÌI fÇAÌa ÔiËjy É¼×n¿ jŒA

�VÎNÃ ÉI É· eja jI eÌJÃ KUAË ÊBNÃE eejNI ÆBrÍA Á¸Y ÆÌ† Ë ,eejNI ÆBrÍA Á¸Y .eÌJÃ ÔiËjy ÆBrÍA �VÎNÃ o‚ / ,eËjNI ÆBrÍA [148]

÷fY É· fÍBq É· ,ÉÃÌŒ �Í ½ÖBn¿ ifÃAË ,eÌI ÉÃÌŒ ËejÇ ÆBÇjI PB¿÷f´¿ ifÃA ÓMAgË ÅÎÀÈI ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY É· fÍBrÃ ÊBNÃE Å¸Î»Ë .Ai ÅÎÈ· ÷fYj¿ eÌI ÅÎrÎ‚ ÓMAg ¡mËA ÓMAg ÓMAg É· ,Ai ÅÎÈ· j¿ ÔËi ÅÍjI ÁÇ eÌI ÓMAg ÷ÜAË ,Ai ¡mËA j¿ eÌI ÓMAg ÔËi .fÍBrÃ É· ÔAÉNnÃAe Ë eÌI ÓMAg É¼×n¿ Ë ÉVÎNÃ ifÃA o‚ .eÌI ÓMAg ,ÔËi ÅÍjI

¡mËA j¿ ÅÎrÎ‚ ÓMAg ÅÎÈ¿ Ë ,Ai ÅÎÈ· j¿ eÌI ÅÎnƒm ÓMAg ¡mËA ÷fY É· fÍBqË

.ÅÎnƒm ÓÄ¨ÀI fÃÌI / ÓMAg Ëe jÇ É· fÍBq Ë ,Ai [149]

ÓÃBÇjI ÔBÈmBÎ³ ¾BY ÆeÌÀÃkBI (32) BÈmBÎ³ ifÃA ÆÌÄ·A .f¿E ÉN°Œ ,½ÖBn¿ Ë ÔeBJ¿ Ë ¾ÌuA ifÃA ÅN°Œ OnÍBI É‡ÃE

.OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe ÓÃBÇjI pBÎ³ .fÍE ÅN°Œ Åbm É· fÍBI

.fÄÃAÌa òÁø» ÆBÇjI ÔkBNI Ë fÄÃAÌa ÓÍAj† ÆBÇjI AiËA Ë ,OmA Ó´ÎÝ ÓÃBÇjI Ó¸Í Ë OmA ÓNnÇ/ÆBÇjI É· ,OnÎÃ ÓÍAj† ÆBÇjI Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA ÆBÇjI ÁÇ jNÍe Ë [150]

.fÄÃAÌa úÆC ÆBÇjI ÔkBNI


52

In sum, all demonstrations are demonstrations [of the reason] why, if by “why” is meant

the “why” of a belief or the “why” of a claim, for the middle term in every syllogism is

the cause of the belief in the conclusion. However, here we do not mean this [sense of]

why, rather, we mean the why of the state of the thing in its existence – viz., why is it in

itself in this way? – not “why did you say such-and-such?” For there are many times

when, by establishing [the answer to] “why did you say [that]?”, we know that what you

said exists; however, we do not know what the cause is that it is in that way.

For example, if someone says, “at such-and-such a place there is a fire,” and you ask him,

[151] “Why did you say that?”, and he answers you, saying, “because there is smoke

there” – he has answered [the question] “why did you say that?” and has established that

there is a fire there. However, he has not established and not shown why fire has been

produced there and what the cause was. Thus the existence of smoke is the middle term;

however, it is the cause of existence in that you know that [the fire] exists, but it is not

the cause of the why of existence, so that you know why this fire that is there exists. Thus

if someone claims: “such-and-such a thing will burn there,” and you say, [152] “Why did you say

that?”, he says, “Because there is a fire there and wherever there is fire things burn” – here he has

supplied both the why of speech and the why of existence. Hence this is called the demonstration

[of the reason] why (lima), and the former the demonstration of existence (anna).

The condition of the demonstration [of the reason] why (lima) is not that which is known

among the logicians, for they suppose that the middle term must in all circumstances be

the cause of the major term, just as fire (in the example we mentioned) is the cause of

burning. Rather, the middle term must be the cause of the existence of the major term in

the minor term, although it is not the cause of the major term, but is, for example, its

effect. However, it is because of [the middle term] that this major has been produced in

the minor, so that it is the cause of the why. [153] For example, you say, “man is

animal”; “every animal is body,” although body is the cause of animality, and animality is

not the cause of body. But animality is the cause that man is body, for corporeity belongs

first to animality and because of animality does it belong to man. For if animality existed

without corporeity, humanity would have been that way too.


52

ÓÍAj† Ë fÄÇAÌa eBŃ§A ÓÍAj† Aj‡I jŒA ,fÃÌI ÓÍAj† ÆBÇjI BÈÃBÇjI �ÀÇ É¼ÀVI Ë ÔAj† ÅÍA ÉÃ BVÄÍA Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI ÉVÎNÃ eBŃ§A O÷¼§ ÓmBÎ³jÈI ¡mËA ÷fY É· ,ÔÌ§e OmA ÅÎÄ† Aj† É· - ÁÎÇAÌa ÓÀÇ sÎNnÇ ifÃA lÎ† ¾BY ÔAj† É· ,ÁÎÇAÌa ÓÀÇ É· fÍEÊej· Omie É· eÌI iBI iBÎnI É· ,#?ÓN°Œ ÅÎÄ† Aj†$ ÉÃ - sÍÌa ÔeÌbI É· OmA KJm É† É· ÁÎÃAfÃ Å¸Î»Ë ,OnÇ ÓN°Œ É‡ÃE É· ÁÎÃAfI BM #?ÓN°Œ Aj†$

.OmA ÆBÄ†

:É· / ÓÍÌŒ Ai ËA ,#OmA sME ÊBNÍBU ÆÝ°I$ :É· fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA õÝR¿ [151] LAÌU ,#OmeËe BVÃE É· AjÍk$ :fÍÌŒ Ë fÇe LAÌU AjM ÔË ;#?ÓN°Œ Aj†$ AfÎ‚ Ë ej¸Ã Omie Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA sME BVÃE É· ej· Omie Ë eAe #?ÓN°Œ Aj†$

¡mËA ÷fY eËe ÆeÌI o‚ .OmeÌI KJm É† Ë Omfq ½uBY BVÃE sME Aj† É· ej¸Ã ,OnÎÃ ÓNnÇ ÔAj† O÷¼§ Ë ,OnÇ É· ÓNnÃAe É· OmA ÓNnÇ O÷¼§ Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA lÎ† ÆÝ¯ É· fÄ· ÔÌ§e Ón· jŒA o‚ .OmAj† OmBVÃE É· sME ÅÍA É· ÓÃAfI É· sME BVÃE É· AjÍk$ :fÍÌŒ ÔË ,#?ÓN°Œ Aj†$/:ÓÍÌŒ ÌM Ë ,ÅNaÌm fÇAÌbI BVÃE [152] ÁÇ Ë OmA ÉN°Œ iBN°Œ ÓÍAj† ÁÇ BVÄÍA ,#ekÌnI Ai lÎ† eÌI sME BV· jÇ Ë OmA

. úÆC ÆBÇjI Ai ÅÎrÎ‚ Ë ,fÄÃAÌa òÁø» ÆBÇjI Ai ÅÍA o‚ .ÓNnÇ ÓÍAj†

fÍBI ÅÎNÃBÎ¿ ÷fY É· fÃiAfÄ‚ É· ,fÄÃAe ÆBÎ´ñÄ¿ ÆBÎ¿ É· OnÃE ÉÃ òÁø» ÆBÇjI ¢jqË ÅNaÌm O÷¼§ ÁÍej· eBÍ É· ¾BR¿ ÅÍifÃA sME É¸ÃBÄ† ,ÉÄÍEjÇ eÌI ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY O÷¼§ É· É· fÄ† jÇ ,ÅÎÈ· ÷fY ifÃA eÌI ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY ÆeÌI O÷¼§ É· fÍBI ¡mËA ÷fY É¸¼I .OmA ÅÍAeÌI Êfq ½uBY ÔË KJnI Å¸Î»Ë eÌI ÔË ¾Ì¼¨¿ õÝR¿ É¸¼I eÌJÃ ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY O÷¼§ ÓÃAÌÎYjÇË OnÃAÌÎY Âej¿$:ÓÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† /.eÌI ÓÖAj† KJm BM ,ÅÎÈ· ifÃA ÅÎÈ¿ [153] Å¸Î»Ë .OnÎÃ ÁnU O÷¼§ ÓÃAÌÎYË OmA ÓÃAÌÎY O÷¼§ ÁnU É·fÄ†jÇ ,#OmA ÁnU KJnIË OmAi ÓÃAÌÎYj¿ ÓÀnU OnbÃ É· ,OmA ÁnU Âej¿ É· OnÃE O÷¼§ ÓÃAÌÎY .ÔeÌI ÆBÄ† ÁÇ Ó¿ej¿ ,O÷ÎÀnU ÓI ÔeÌI eÌUÌ¿ ÓÃAÌÎY jŒA É· ,OmAi Âej¿ j¿ ÓÃAÌÎY


53

33. Explication of the types of Scientific Questions

Scientific questions are in all of four kinds: [154] (a) hal (“is it?”), asking about existence

and non-existence; (b) mā (“what?”), asking about whatness; (c) ayyu (“which?”), asking

about whichness; (d) lima (“why?”), asking about the cause. As for “how many?”,

“how?”, “when?”, and “where?”, these do not fall within [the scope] of scientific

questions.

(a) The question hal (“is it?”) is of two kinds: One is when you ask, “does such-

and-such a thing exist?”; the other is when you ask, “is such-and-such a thing this way?”

(b) The question mā is of two kinds: [155] One is when you say, “ what is the

meaning of the word you [used]?”. For example, if someone says “triangle,” you will

say, “what is the meaning of triangle? What do you mean by triangle?”. The other is

when you say, “what is the triangle in itself?”

The first question of mā (“what?”) is prior to hal (“is it?”), for first it is necessary that

you know what he is saying so that you can then concern yourself with whether it exists

or not. The other question of mā (“what?”) is after hal (“is it?”), for as long as you do not

know if it exists, you do not say “what is it?”. The answer to the question mā (“what?”)

is the explanation of the name or definition of the essence.

[156] (c) As for the question ayyu (“which?”), it asks either about [specific] difference

or property.

(d) As for the question lima (“why?”), it is of two kinds: One is, “Why did you

say that?”; the other is, “Why is that?”.

The question hal (“is it?”) and lima (“why?”) involve affirmation; the question mā

(“what?”) and ayyu (“which?”) involve conception.


53

ÓÀ¼§ K»Bñ¿ ÔBÈNÀn³ Æej· AfÎ‚ (33) .fmj‚ ÓNnÎÃ Ë ÓNnÇ kA ÆEË ,#½Ç$ Ó¸Í/.OmA ÉÃÌŒ iBÈ† ÉÀÇ ÓÀ¼§ ÔBÈJ¼ñ¿ [154] Ë .fmj‚ Ó¿Af· kA ÆEË ,#÷ÔA$ K¼ñ¿ Â÷ÌmË .fmj‚ ÔlÎ† É† kA ÆE Ë ,#B¿$ jNÍeË #BV·$Ë #Ó·$Ë #ÉÃÌN†$Ë #fÄ†$ B÷¿AË .fmj‚ KJm kA ÆE Ë ,#Á»$ K¼ñ¿ ÂiBÈ†

.fN¯ÌÎÃ BÈÀ¼§ ÔBÈJ¼ñ¿ ifÃA

É¸ÃE jNÍe Ë ;OnÇ lÎ† ÆÝ¯ É· ÓmjƒI É· Ó¸Í :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe #½Ç$ K¼ñ¿ Ë .OnÇ ÅÎÄ† lÎ† ÆÝ¯ É· ÓmjƒI

,#?ÌM ¥°» ÓÄ¨¿ eÌI É†$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE Ó¸Í /:OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe #B¿$ K¼ñ¿ Ë [155] ÓÇAÌbÎ¿ É† Ë ?S¼R¿ ÓÄ¨¿ eÌI É†$:ÓÍÌŒ ÌM ,#S¼R¿$fÍÌŒ Ón· É· õÝR¿

#?sÍÌa o°ÄI eÌa S¼R¿ eÌI É†$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE jNÍeË .#?S¼RÀI

É† É· ÓÃAfI É· fÍBI OnbÃ É· ,OmA #½Ç$ kA jNrÎ‚ #B¿$ kA ÅÎrÎ‚ K¼ñ¿ Ë kA jNÍe #B¿$ K¼ñ¿Ë .OnÎÃ BÍ OnÇ É¸ÃAfI ÔÌq ¾Ì¬r¿ ÊBNÃE BM fÍÌNÎ¿ Ë .OmA lÎ† É† É· ÓÍÌNÃ OnÇ É· ÓqBI ÉNnÃAfÃ BM É· ,OmA #½Ç$ oƒm

.PAg ÷fY BÍ ,eÌI ÂBÃ jÎn°M #B¿$ K¼ñ¿ LAÌU

.É÷uBa kA BÍ ,fmj‚ ½v¯ kA BÍ ,#÷ÔA$ K¼ñ¿ B÷¿A [156]

Aj†$ É· jNÍe Ë ,#?ÓN°Œ Aj†$ :É· Ó¸Í :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe #Á»$ K¼ñ¿ B÷¿AË #?OnÇ

kA #÷ÔA$ Ë #B¿$ K¼ñ¿ Ë ,fÃA µÍfvM ½J³ kA #Á»$ K¼ñ¿ Ë #½Ç$ K¼ñ¿ Ë

.fÃi÷ÌvM ½J³


54

34. Directives giving Protection against Fallacies

Just as when we were teaching how definition and description must be done we gave

directives on how you [can] avoid [making] error [in] definition, so likewise since [157]

we have explicated how syllogism and demonstration are, we give directives by a few

principles so that there is protection from error in syllogism. There is no need to lengthen

out the speech and to mention all the causes of fallacy.

(a) The first thing is that you must become habituated to analyzing truly

complicated syllogisms so that you know quickly whether [a given] speech is a syllogism

and which syllogism it is, or whether it is not a syllogism.

(b) Another is that you divide the syllogism, analyze it to the limit, and consider

it so that the middle term is in the same respect and the same state in both premises; for if

[158] there is a little excess or defect the syllogism would not be a syllogism and there

would be error. For example, in conversion, if someone says, “No house is in man,” and

then again, “No man is in the house,” this speech would be false, [whereas] the

conversion of the universal negative must be true. The cause of this is that in the former

premise “house” was subject, and “in man” was predicate. And conversion consists in

your making the predicate, exactly as it is, the subject, and the subject, predicate. In the

original [proposition] “man” alone was not predicate, while “house” alone was the

subject. But in the conversion “man” alone became the subject, while “house” together

with “in” [became] the predicate. Consequently, a correct [conversion] did not result, for

one had to say, “nothing that is in man is a house.”

[159] (c) Third is that, when you have divided the syllogism, you consider it so that

there is no opposition between the major term and the minor, and between the two parts

of the conclusion. You must keep in mind the conditions of contradiction in such a

situation so that you know whether there is agreement or not.


54

fÄÇe ÓÄÀÍA PBñ»B¬¿ kA É· BÈNÎuË (34) ÔBña kA É· ÁÍej· O÷ÎuË ,Æej· fÍBI ÉÃÌN† Ámi Ë ÷fY É· ÁÍfÍkÌ¿BÎI É¸ÃBÄ‡ÀÇ ,eÌI ÉÃÌN† ÆBÇjIË pBÎ³ É· ÁÍej· AfÎ‚ /ÆÌ† lÎÃ ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ ,ÓÄ· lÎÇj‚ ÉÃÌN† ÷fY [157] fÍBÎÃ OUBY Ë .fN¯A ÓÄÀÍA pBÎ³ ifÃA ¡¼« kA BM fÄ† Ó¼uBI ÁÎÄ· ÓÀÇ O÷ÎuË

.Éñ»B¬¿ LBJmA �ÀÇ Æej· eBÎI Ë Åbm ÆfÎr· kAifI

BM ÓNmAjI ÉN°qE ÔBÈmBÎ³ ÆejI kBJI Æej· fÍBI PeB§ AjM É· OnÃE ÔlÎ† ¾÷ËA Ë .OmA pBÎ³ ÉÃ BÍ ,OmA pBÎ³ ÂAf· Ë OmA pBÎ³ Åbm ÅÍA É· ÓÃAfI eËk

�Í jI ¡mËA ÷fY BM ,ÔjNÄI Ë ÔjIkBI ÷fY jnI Ë ÓÄ· ½Îv°M Ai pBÎ³ É¸ÃE jNÍe Ë ,eÌI ÓÃBv´Ã Ë PeBÍk ÉÍB¿iAÌa/jŒA É· ,eÌI É¿÷f´¿ Ëe jÇ ifÃA ¾BY �Í jI Ë ÔËi [158] :É· fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA É· ,o¸§ ifÃA É¸ÃBÄ† .fN¯A ¡¼« Ë eÌI pBÎ³ ÉÃ pBÎ³

ÅÍA ,#OnÎÃ ÉÃBa ifÃA Âej¿ ˆÎÇ$ :É· fÍÌŒ kBI Ë ,#OnÎÃ Âej¿ ifÃA ÉÃBa ˆÎÇ$ ifÃA É· OnÃE ÅÍA KJm Ë .eÌI OmAi É· fÍBI Ó÷¼· K»Bm o¸§ Ë ,eÌI ®Ëie Åbm É· eÌI ÆE o¸§ Ë .eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ #Âej¿ ifÃA$Ë ,eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ #ÉÃBa$ ÅÎrÎ‚ �¿÷f´¿ #Âej¿$ BÈÄM ½uA ifÃA Ë .¾ÌÀZ¿ Ai ªÌyÌ¿ Ë ,ÓÄ· ªÌyÌ¿ ÉÄÎÏ Ai ¾ÌÀZ¿ ªÌyÌ¿ #Âej¿$ BÈÄM o¸§ ifÃAË ,eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ #ÉÃBa$ BÈÄM Ë ,eÌJÃ ¾ÌÀZ¿

É· ÓN°Œ É· ÓNnÍBI É· f¿E LAÌu ÉÃ ÂjUÜ ,¾ÌÀZ¿ #ifÃA$ BI #ÉÃBa$ Ë ,fq /.#OnÎÃ ÉÃBa eÌI Âej¿ ifÃA É· lÎ† ˆÎÇ$

ÅÎÈ· Ë ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY ÆBÎ¿ BM ÔjNÄI ,ÓqBI Êej· ½Îv°M Ai pBÎ³ ÆÌ† É¸ÃE Â÷Ìm Ë [159] ÊBNÍBU ÅÎÄ† ifÃA |Î´Ã ÔBÈWjq É· fÍBI Ë .eÌJÃ ²Ýa ÉVÎNÃ ‘iB‚ Ëe ÆBÎ¿ Ë

.OnÎÃ BÍ OnÇ ¶B°MA É· ÓÃAfI BM ,ÔiAe eBÍ


55

(d) Fourth is that [the meaning] of the terms be questioned. For there are many

times when there is a single term [160] with a double meaning, but it is supposed that it

has a single meaning – and this is a great calamity. Therefore the meaning must be

adhered to, not the [given] term. This also is part of the conditions of contradiction, but

we have stated the use separately.

(e) Fifth is that it is necessary that no confusion occur at the place where a

pronoun is. For example, it is said, “He did,” where it may be that “he” refers to one

case, but it is thought to refer to another case. Likewise, it is said, “He saw it,” for “it” is

a pronoun referring to different cases. [161] For example, it is said, “whoever has known

a thing, vey [“he/she/it”] is like what he knew.” This term vey refers to the known and

the knower, and each of the two has a different meaning.

(f) Sixth is that you avoid the indefinite and not take it in place of the universal,

for there are many things which, if said as indefinite, reason becomes deceived and

accepts, while if said as universal, reason becomes awake and does not accept. For

example, it is said, “someone who is a friend of your enemy is not your friend;” it may be

that this [162] speech is accepted; but if this is made definite and it is said, “everyone

who is a friend of the enemy, is an enemy,” or “no friend of the enemy is a friend,”

reason does not accept [this] and says that it is not necessary that all be such.

(g) Seventh is that you consider the premises of the syllogism so that the cause of

your adherence to them is not that you, having thought to find their contradictory,

concede them because of your failure to discover [their contradictory] – for it may be that

there is a contradictory for them but you have not found it. You then adhere [to the

premises] when you know that it is not possible that [163] they have a contradictory,

[and] not when you have not found it.


55

Ë ,Ëe ÓÄ¨¿ Ë eÌI /Ó¸Í ÂBÃ É· eÌI ÔiBÎnI É· ,fÍEÊfÎmj‚ ÂBÃ kA É¸ÃE ÂiBÈ† Ë [160] ÓÄ¨ÀI É· fÍBI o‚ .OmA –ilI ÓN¯E ÅÍA Ë OmA Ó¸Í ÓÄ¨¿ É· fÍE ÉNqAfÄ‚

Ai ÊfÍB¯ Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA |Î´Ã ÔBÈWjq É¼ÀU ifÃA ÁÇ ÅÍAË .ÂBÄI ÉÃ ,fÍE ÊfÍËjNI .ÁÎN°NI AfU

,#ej· ÔË$fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† .fN¯ÌÎÃ ±¼Nb¿ eÌI jÎÀy É· ÓÍBU É· fÍBI É¸ÃE ÁVÄ‚Ë :fÄÍÌŒ É· ÅÎÄ‡ÀÇ Ë ;fÃiAfÄ‚ jNÍe ÔBU Ë eejŒkBI jNÍe ÔBU #ÔË$ É· fqBI É· É¸ÃBÄ† / .eejŒkBI ±¼Nb¿ ÔBÈÍBVI Ë eÌI jÎÀy #ÅÎq$ ÅÍA É· ,#tfÍfI$ [161] #ÔË$ ¥°» ÅÍA ,#OnÃAe É· eÌI ÆBÄ† ÔË ,OnÃAe Ai ÔlÎ† É· jÇ$ :fÄÍÌŒ

.eÌI ±¼Nb¿ ÓÄ¨¿ Ai Ëe jÇ Ë ,eejŒkBI ÊfÄÃAfI Ë ÉNnÃAfI

É· eÌI lÎ† iBÎnI É· ,ÔjÎNÃ Ó÷¼· ÔBVI AiË Ë ÓÄ· lÎÇj‚ ½ÀÈ¿ kA É¸ÃE Árq Ë Ë eÌq iAfÎI eja fÄÍÌŒ Ó÷¼· ÆÌ† Ë ,ejÍhƒI Ë eÌq Ê÷j« eja fÍE ÉN°Œ ½ÀÈ¿ ÆÌ† fqBI ,#eÌJÃ ÌM OmËe ,eÌI OmËe ÌM ÅÀqe BI É· Ón·$ :fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† ,ejÍhƒÃ É· Ón· jÇ$ :É· fÄÍÌŒ Ë fÄÄ· iÌvZ¿ Ai ÅÍA jŒA Ë ,fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ Åbm /ÅÍA É· [162] ejÍhƒÃ eja ,#eÌJÃ OmËe ,ÅÀqe OmËe ˆÎÇ$ BÍ #eÌI ÅÀqe ,eÌI ÅÀqe OmËe

.fÃÌI ÅÎÄ† ÉÀÇ É· OnÎÃ KUAË fÍÌŒ Ë

É· eÌJÃ ÆE ÆBrÍBI ÆfÍËjŒ KJm BM ÔjNÃ ifÃA pBÎ³ ÔBÇ É¿÷f´¿ ifÃA É¸ÃE ÁN°Ç Ë Êej· ÁÎ¼nM ÓqBI ÉN¯BÎÃ ÆÌ† ,ÓIBÍ |Î´Ã Ai ÆBrÍA É· ÓqBI ÊfÎrÍfÃA ÅNrÍÌa É· ÓÃAfI É· ÔËjŒ ÊBNÃE .ÓqBI ÉN¯BÎÃ ÌM Ë eÌI |Î´Ã AjÃBrÍA É· eÌI É· - ÓqBI

.ÓN¯BÎÃ ÌM É· ÉÃ ,eÌI |Î´Ã Ai ÆBrÍA /É· ÆeÌI fÍBrÃ [163]


56

(h) Eighth is that you see to it that you have not made of the problem (or of

something whose meaning is the meaning of the problem) its own premise by having

changed the term. For example, it is said, “the reason that every moving [thing] must

have a mover is that nothing moves itself.” This premise and problem have the same

meaning.

(i) Ninth is that you see to it that you do not establish one thing by another thing

which [164] itself is established by [the first thing]. For example, someone says, “the

reason that the soul does not die is that it acts eternally.” If again it is asked, “Why does

it act eternally?”, it is answered, “because it does not die.”

(j) Tenth is that you guard against taking the widely-known or the [apprehensions

of the estimative faculty] in place of the truth; and that you keep the indications that have

been said, so that if the premise is primary or true it becomes evident, and if it is other it

becomes evident. Hence you will be busy with true [premises], whether a true [premise]

whose truth does not need an argument [165] or whether a true [premise] that has been

established by argument and syllogism. You will make that the premise of the syllogism,

for whenever you know the syllogism, know and employ demonstration, and keep these

directives, you cannot make an error or know that you do not know.

Peace be upon the one who follows the right path

This is the end of the book of logic that was spoken of.

Next we shall speak regarding the higher science, i.e., the divine science.


56

ÊfÎÃAejŒ ¥°» É¸ÃAfI ÓqBI Êej¸Ã ÅNrÍÌa �¿÷f´¿ Ai É¼×n¿ BM ÔjNÄI É¸ÃE ÁNrÇË É¸ÃE jI ½Î»e$ :É· fÄÍÌŒ É¸ÃBÄ† .OmA É¼×n¿ Á¸Y ÔË Á¸Y É· ÔlÎ† BÍ ÓqBI É¼×n¿ Ë É¿÷f´¿ ÅÍAË ,#fJÄVÃ eÌa lÎ† ˆÎÇ É· OnÃE ,fÍBI ÊfÄÃBJÄU Ai ÊfÄJÄU jÇ

.fÃA Á¸Y �ÎI

fÇAÌa Omie ÔÌI / lÎ† ÆE É· ÓÄ¸Ã Omie ÔlÎ‡I Ai ÔlÎ† BM ÔjNÄI É¸ÃE ÁÈÃ Ë [164] ÊfÄÄ· iB· ÁÍAe É· OnÃE ejÎÀÃ o°Ã É¸ÃE jI ½Î»e$ :É·fÍÌŒ Ón· É¸ÃBÄ† .Æfq É· AjÍk$ :fÍÌŒ ,#?OmA ÊfÄÄ· iB· ÁÍAe Aj†$ :É· fÄmjƒI ÆÌ† kBI Ë .#OmA

.#ejÎÀÃ

ÆE Ë ;ÓqBI ÉN¯jNÃ ÷µY ÔBVI Ai ÓÀÇË BÍ Ai ÔiÌÈr¿ É· ÔiAfÇBNÃ É¸ÃE ÁÇe Ë fÍf‚ eÌI ÷µY BÍ eÌI Ó»÷ËA É¿÷f´¿ jŒA BM ,ÔiAe ÊBNÃ OmA Êf¿E ÉN°Œ É· BÈN¿Ý§ sÎÝ É· ÓÝ ÓÇAÌa ,ÔÌq ¾Ì¬r¿ ÷µZI o‚ .fÍE fÍf‚ eÌI jNÍe jŒAË ,fÍE

�¿÷f´¿ Ai ÆE Ë .Omfq Omie pBÎ³ Ë O÷VZI É· ÓÝ ÓÇAÌa /Ë fÍBJÃ O÷VY Ai [165] Ë ,ÔiAeiB¸I Ë ÉNnÃAfI ÆBÇjI Ë ,ÓqBI ÉNnÃAe pBÎ³ É· ÊBŒjÇ É· ,ÓÄ· pBÎ³

.ÓÃAfÃ É· ÓÃAfI BÍ ÓÄ· Bña É· Æej· ÓÃAÌNÃ ,ÔiAe ÊBNÃ BÈN÷ÎuË ÅÍA

ÔfÈ»A ©JMA Å¿ Ó¼§ ÂÝn»AË

.f¿E ÉN°Œ É· µñÄ¿ LBN· jaE OnÄÍA .ÓÈ»A Á¼§ ÓÄ¨Í ,ÅÍjI Á¼§ ifÃA ÁÎÍÌŒ Åbm oƒm ÅÍkË

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Avicenna Daneshnameh Part 1: LOGIC

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