Date post: | 08-May-2015 |
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Avoiding Cyberterrorism Threats Inside Hydraulic Power
Generation Plants
Manuel Humberto Santander Pelá[email protected]
Agenda
• Introduction• Power Plant Generation SCADA• SCADA protocols• Cyber Terrorism Risks• Remediation
SCADA
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
• Platform used to monitor and control all the variables of a real-time process
• Several variables to monitor– Vibrations on the turbine rotor– Flow speed of oil inside a turbine rotor– Amount of electric charge passing inside an
electricity transmission line
Electrical process
• Three big steps– Generation– Transmission– Distribution
• Energy is created using any of the following methods– Thermoelectrical plans– Nuclear plants– Hydro electrical plants
Electrical process (2)
• SCADA platform is vital to perform the following when generation takes place:– Ensure turbines are not having
revolutions more than supported– Generators are not working overloaded– Energy being generated matches the
amount of energy that the transmission line can handle
Electrical process (3)
• Transmission– Energy being generated needs to be
distributed to reach the final users– 115 KV is the power used to transmit in
the wire lines– Final destination are the substations that
handles energy of a specific amount of instalations
– Large number of blocks in a city
Electrical process (4)
• SCADA platform is vital to perform the following when transmission takes place:– Monitoring of voltage in transmission
lines looking for high amount of electricity flowing
– None of them can get overloaded because protections get activated and a blackout appears in all the installations that are controlled by the affected substations
Electrical process (5)
• Distribution– Energy being generated needs to be
distributed to reach the final users– 115 KV is the power used to transmit in
the wire lines– Final destination are the substations that
handles energy of a specific amount of instalations
– Large number of blocks in a city
Electrical process (6)
• SCADA platform is vital to perform the following when distribution takes place:–Monitoring of voltage in transmission
lines looking for high amount of electricity flowing
–Monitoring of voltage in user meters looking for high amount of electricity flowing
Electrical System
Source: United States Department of Energy
Hydroelectrical Plant Process
Source: circuitmaniac.com
Hydroelectrical Turbine
Source: United States Army Corps of Engineers
Agenda
• Introduction• Power Plant Generation SCADA• SCADA protocols• Cyber Terrorism Risks• Remediation
SCADA Network inside Power Plant
Unit Controller
Turbine SpeedRegulator
VoltageRegulator
Generator Protection Controller
Cooling and oil pumpcontroller
HMI Console
Substationcontroller
SwitchController
Voltage MeterReader
HMI Console
ProtectionController
SUBSTATIONSCADA
GENERATION POWER SCADA
SCADA Network inside Power Plant (2)
• Generation Power Plant– Unit Controller: Controls all the
subsystems making the generator to be able to inject active power to the electrical network
– Voltage regulator: Controls the frequency of the active power being produced by the generator. Must match the frequency in the electrical network
SCADA Network inside Power Plant (3)
• Generation Power Plant– Turbine speed regulator: Controls the
speed of the turbine– Cooling and oil pump controller: Controls
refrigeration and lubrication of the rotor system of the turbine so there’s no heat or friction
– Generator protection controller: Controls excessive voltage changes in the generator
SCADA Network inside Power Plant (4)
• Substation SCADA– Substation Controller: Controls all the
systems to make possible the energy being transmitted all across the electrical network
– Switch controller: If there is too much energy on a line trying to overcome its capacity, the switch opens the circuit and the energy stops flowing
SCADA Network inside Power Plant (5)
• Substation SCADA:– Voltage meter: Meters the amount of
electricity flowing in the input and output lines so the Substation Controller can tell if there is a problem regarding the transmission line capacity being overcome its capacity
Agenda
• Introduction• Power Plant Generation SCADA• SCADA protocols• Cyber Terrorism Risks• Remediation
SCADA Protocols
• Modbus• IEC 104• DNP3
Modbus
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
Modbus (2)
• Client/server protocol which operates in a request/response mode
• Three variants:– Modbus serial RS-232/RS-485: Implemented on
serial networks – Modbus TCP: Used for SCADA platforms where
delay is not an issue (Water supply)– Modbus UDP: Used for SCADA platforms where
delay is a big issue (Energy)
Modbus (3)
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
Modbus (4)
• Modbus protocol structure
– Address field: • Request frames: Address of the device being targeted
by the request• Response frame: Address of the device responding to
request
Modbus (5)
• Modbus protocol structure
– Function field• Function requested by the HMI to be performed by the
field devices• In response packets, when the function performed is
succeeded, the field device echoes it. If some exception occurred, the most significant bit of the field is set to 1
Modbus (6)
Function NameFunction
CodePhysical Discrete Inputs Read Discrete Inputs 2
Read Coils 1Write Single Coil 5Write Multiple Coils 15
Physical Input Registers Read Input Register 4Read Holding Registers 3Write Single Register 6
Write Multiple Registers 16
Read/Write Multiple Registers
23
Mask Write Register 22Read FIFO Queue 24Read File Record 20Write File Record 21
Type of access
Data Access
Bit access Internal Bits or Physical Coils
16-bit access
Internal Registers or Physical Output Registers
File Record Access
Modbus (7)
Function NameFunction
CodeRead Exception Status 7Diagnostic 8Get Com Event Counter 11Get Com Event Log 12Report Slave ID 17Read Device Identification
43
Encapsulated Interface Transport
43
Type of access
Diagnostics
Other
Modbus (8)
• Modbus protocol structure
– Data field• In request paquets, contains the information required
to perform the specific function• In response packets, contains the information
requested by the HMI
Modbus (9)
• Modbus protocol structure
– Error check Field• CRC-16 on the message frame• If packet has errors, the field device does not process it• Timeout is assumed, so the master sends again the
packet to attempt again a function execution
IEC 104
• Standard for power system monitoring, control and communications for telecontrol and teleprotection for electric power systems
• Completely compatible with:– IEC 60870-5-1: Transmission frame formats for
standard 60870-5– IEC 60870-5-5: Basic application functions
IEC 104 (2)
• It has the following features:– Supports master initiated messages and
master/slave initiated messages– Facility for time sinchronization– Possibility of classifying data being transmitted
into 16 different groups to get the data according to the group
– Cyclic and spontaneous data updating schemes are provided.
IEC 104 (3)
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
IEC 104 (4)
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
IEC 104 (5)
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
IEC 104 (6)
• Link levelLink service
class Function Explanation
S1 SEND / NO REPLY
Transmit message. No ACK or answer required
S2 SEND / CONFIRMTransmit message. ACK required
S3 REQUEST / RESPOND
Transmit message. ACK and answer required
IEC 104 (7)
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
IEC 104 (8)
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
• Control field for unbalanced transmissions
IEC 104 (8)
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
• Control field for balanced transmissions
DNP3
• Set of communication protocols used between components of a SCADA system
• Used for communications between RTU and the IED (field devices)
• Implements the communication levels established by the enhance performance architecture (EPA)
DNP3 (2)
• Enhance performance architecture (EPA)
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
DNP3 (3)
• Message exchange
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
DNP3 (4)
• Frame format
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
DNP3 (5)
• Control Byte
Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications
Agenda
• Introduction• Power Plant Generation SCADA• SCADA protocols• Cyber Terrorism Risks• Remediation
Cyberterrorism Risks
• Many awful thins can happen to a power plant– Stop generation because of partial or
total damage to the generator– Stop generation because of partial or
total damage to the transmission substation
– Stop generation because of partial or total damage to the turbine
Cyberterrorism Risks (2)
• Many awful thins can happen to a power plant– Transformer explosion because lack of
transmission line protection capacity–Massive water leakage because of
explosion of the turbine container
• All of them can happen because of unauthorized manipulations of the HMI and after the configs are updated
Network technologies in SCADA Systems
• Many SCADA networks still use RS232/RS485 bus to communicate all components– But also because of the need to access
data in a fast way, we also have serial-to-ip gateways to access serial RTU and IED
– Lots of hybrid SCADA networks having serial and IP components
– Access is open to anyone with connectivity access
Network technologies in SCADA Systems (2)
• Many SCADA networks still use RS232/RS485 bus to communicate all components– Admin protocols is not being crypted, so
anyone can sniff all the contents, perform a MITM and send to client/server fake content to each other. Insecure services like telnet are mandatory because lack of support
– Latency is an issue
Lack of authentication in application protocol
• The SCADA protocols does not perform bi-directional authentication to ensure that all parties are trusted– Only commands are sent– Data is sent to the IP address configured
as master– All the IP spoofing vulnerabilities works
on any MTU or Field device– Any command can be sent
Default configurations in HMI
• Insecure services used– rlogin– rcp– rexec
• OS Admin privileges used to operate• Trust perimeter created within HMI
and external RTU and IED to manipulate configuration parameters
What could be done?
• Reset a link state communication or send Test Communication packet several times provoking temporal DoS to the IED controllers– Spoof the HMI IP address and send the
following using TCP: 0x56405c00100020074e3
– Spoof the HMI ip address and send the following using TCP: 0x56405f201000200b717
What could be done? (2)
• Send commands to the IED controllers– Registers are linked to turn on and off
specific devices like oil and refrigeration pumps
– A Modbus command to change registers is enough to disable any of those pumps
– Command depends on the place where the pump is configured
What could be done? (3)
• Execute metasploit to the HMI and try to find remote admin exploits– No patches are installed– Too much vulnerabilities around– The odds of finding remote privilege
escalation vulnerabilities are too high– Are passwords strong enough in the HMI
software and OS?– Is there any password at all configured?
What could be done? (3)
• MITM attacks to the substation elements and generation plant elements– TCP sequence prediction on this
elements is pretty high– Prone to session hijacking (http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_XD8heYNrc)
Agenda
• Introduction• Power Plant Generation SCADA• SCADA protocols• Cyber Terrorism Risks• Remediation
What you cannot do with SCADA
• Protocol delay is usually a BIG issue in SCADA– Water supply and Oil SCADA tolerates big
delays because it does not have consequences in the process
– Power SCADA is critical. A delay higher than 12 miliseconds could end in a massive blackout because of failure to open a breaker in a substation
– Be careful on what you do to protect your SCADA
SCADA Network inside Power Plant
Unit Controller
Turbine SpeedRegulator
VoltageRegulator
Generator Protection Controller
Cooling and oil pumpcontroller
HMI Console
Substationcontroller
SwitchController
Voltage MeterReader
HMI Console
ProtectionController
SUBSTATIONSCADA
GENERATION POWER SCADA
Monitor your network
• Control Access from outsiders– SCADA Network needs to send
information for reports and status checking
– You can establish a secure way to get into the SCADA Network for remote support
– If no commands need to be sent, one-way communications using waterfall works pretty good.
Monitor your network (2)
Source: Waterfall Security
Monitor your network (3)
• Use Network Intrusion Prevention System– You definitely can use conventional IPS if they
are fast enough to avoid delays in your network
– Not all of them support SCADA protocols– If you have snort, you can write rules for
Modbus and DNP3. Otherwise, you need to write your own rules
– Industrial Defender Solution works pretty good as it includes lots of SCADA signatures
Monitor your network (4)
• Control Access from outsiders– Energy market central regulators are
able to control your power generation SCADA and make you generate what you won at the electricity market
– Be able to override control from your local market control center if for some reason you notice abnormal operations that put your generation infrastructure in risk
Monitor your network (5)
Source: FERC
• SCADA platforms are designed to last from 10 to 20 years– Too many technology changes happens
in that time– Lots of security issues to deal with– Need a solution to avoid any changes
inside computers, as intrusions perform changes in filesystem, configurations and system process
Control unauthorized changes to Master Terminal Unit
Control unauthorized changes to Unit Controllers and IED controllers
• Configuration and firmware changes can be done on-site and remotely
• Can you tell all the times where those changes have been done for all the IED and Unit controllers?
• Can you tell if that change actually contains the valid firmware and/or configuration?
• Check IndustrialDefender Manage
Control unauthorized changes to Master Terminal Unit (3)
• Control any changes inside your SCADA servers–Mcafee Integrity control works pretty
good– Defines what can be changed by who– Lots of custom logs to choose from– Can send events to any SIEM configured
in the Network
Monitor attacks to Master Unit
• Host IPS is definitely needed as any attack could change the integrity and stability of a process
• Availability is critical to a SCADA system and cannot be altered
• Conventional Host IPS performs extensive use of CPU and can affect performance inside SCADA
Monitor attacks to Master Unit (2)
• Industrial Defender Protect works pretty good
• Works seamless with Siemens Spectrum Platform
• Does not load the machine or needs extensive bandwith to perform its checks
• Central console to perform operations inside the platform
Questions? Comments?
Manuel Humberto Santander Peláezhttp://manuel.santander.name
http://twitter.com/[email protected] / [email protected]