[b] Hardt, M. - Deleuze, An Apprenticeship in Philosophy [U of Minnesota Press 1993]

8/12/2019 [b] Hardt, M. - Deleuze, An Apprenticeship in Philosophy [U of Minnesota Press 1993]

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Gilles Deleuze

An Apprenticeship in Philosophy

Michael Hardt

-iii-

1993 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota

Cover photographs of ar!ch "pino#a$ Henri ergson$ and %riedrich &iet#sche'copyright

by Roger-(iollet in Paris)

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-iv-

ContentsAcknowledgments vii

Introduction: Hegel and the Foundations of Poststructuralism ix

Preliminar !emark "he #arl Deleuze: $ome %ethodological

Princi&les xvii

Cha&ter '( )ergsonian *ntolog: "he Positive %ovement of

)eing '
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Cha&ter +( ,ietzschean #thics: From #fficient Power to an

#thics of Affirmation +-

-v-

)7 he eing of eco*ing' he /thical "ynthesis of the /fficient .ill)0 he otal Criti

Cha&ter .: $&inozian Practice: Affirmation and /o0-

$&eculation

3)1 "!bstance and the Real =istinction' "ing!larity

3) /@pressive Attrib!tes and the %or*al =istinction' Univocity

Re*ar4' ntological "pec!lation3)3 he Poers of eing

*ntological #x&ression

3): he 5nterpretation of the Attrib!tes' Proble*s of a Materialist ntologyRe*ar4' "pec!lative Prod!ction and heoretical Practice

3)7 Co*batting the Privileges of ho!ght

Re*ar4' %ro* %orsch!ng to =arstell!ng

Power

3)0 he r!e and the Ade

3)8 .hat a ody Can =o

Practice

3)6 Co**on &otions' he Asse*blages of Co*posable eing

3)9 he Constit!tion of Reason

Re*ar4' heoretical Practice and Practical Constit!tion3)1B he Art of rgani#ation' oard a Political Asse*blage

Cha&ter 1: Conclusion: An A&&renticeshi& in Philoso&h ''+

:)1 ntology:) Affir*ation

:)3 Practice

:): Constit!tion

,otes '+.

2orks Cited '..
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Index '.3

-vi-

Acknowledgments

5 o!ld li4e to ac4noledge$ ith respect and affection$ to of *y teachers$ CharlesAltieri and Antonio &egri)

-vii-

Introduction

Hegel and the Foundations of Poststructuralism

Continental poststr!ct!ralis* has proble*ati#ed the fo!ndations of philosophical andpolitical tho!ght) Perhaps da##led by the i*pact of this theoretical r!pt!re$ diverse

A*erican a!thors have e*braced this *ove*ent as the ina!g!ration of apostphilosophical c!lt!re here philosophical clai*s and political !dg*ents ad*it no

!stification and rest on no fo!ndation) his proble*atic$ hoever$ settles too easily intoa ne opposition that obsc!res the real possibilities afforded by conte*porary

Continental theory) At the hands of both its s!pporters and its detractors$

poststr!ct!ralis* has been incorporated into a series of Anglo-A*erican debates-beteen*odernists and post*odernists$ beteen co**!nitarians and liberals-in s!ch a ay as to

*isdirect and bl!nt its force) he i*portance of poststr!ct!ralis* cannot be capt!red by

posing a ne series of oppositions$ b!t only by recogni#ing the n!ances and alternativesit proposes ithin *odernity$ ithin the philosophical tradition$ ithin the conte*porary

field of social practices) 5f e loo4 closely at the historical develop*ent of

poststr!ct!ralist tho!ght$ at the co*ple@ social and theoretical press!res it enco!nteredand the tools it constr!cted to face the*$ e can recapt!re so*e of its critical andconstr!ctive poers) Poststr!ct!ralis*$ e find$ is not oriented si*ply toard the

negation of theoretical fo!ndations$ b!t rather toard the e@ploration of ne gro!nds for

philosophical and political in

-i@-

artic!lation and affir*ation of alternative lineages that arise fro* ithin the tradition

itself)

he roots of poststr!ct!ralis* and its !nifying basis lie$ in large part$ in a generalopposition not to the philosophical tradition tout courtb!t specifically to the Hegelian

tradition) %or the generation of Continental thin4ers that ca*e to *at!rity in the 190Bs$

Hegel as the fig!re of order and a!thority that served as the foc!s of antagonis*)=ele!#e spea4s for his entire cohort' E.hat 5 detested above all as Hegelianis* and the

dialecticF 2E+ettre G Michel CressoleF 11B) 5n order to appreciate this antagonis*$

hoever$ e *!st reali#e that$ in the do*ain of Continental theory d!ring this period$
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Hegel as !bi

oIve$ ,ra*sci$ "artre$ and obbio$ Hegel had co*e to do*inate the theoretical

hori#on as the inel!ctable centerpiece of philosophical spec!lation$ social theory$ andpolitical practice) 5n 1906$ it appeared to %ranJois ChKtelet that every philosopher had to

begin ith Hegel' ELHegel deter*ined a hori#on$ a lang!age$ a code that e are still at

the very heart of today) Hegel$ by this fact$ is ourPlato' the one ho deli*its-ideologically or scientifically$ positively or negatively-the theoretical possibilities of

theoryF 2Hegel) Any acco!nt of Continental poststr!ct!ralis* *!st ta4e this

fra*eor4 of generali#ed Hegelianis* as its point of depart!re)

he first proble* of poststr!ct!ralis*$ then$ is ho to evade a Hegelian fo!ndation) 5norder to !nderstand the e@tent of this proble*$ hoever$ e have to recogni#e the serio!s

restrictions facing s!ch a proect in the specific social and historical conte@t) ChKtelet

arg!es$ in c!rio!sly dialectical fashion$ that the only viable proect to co!nterHegelianis* is to *a4e Hegel the negative fo!ndation of philosophy) hose ho neglect

the initial step of addressing and actively reecting Hegel$ he clai*s$ those ho atte*pt

si*ply to t!rn their bac4s on Hegel$ r!n the ris4 of ending !p as *ere repetitions of theHegelian proble*atic) ECertainly$ there are *any conte*porary philosophical proects

that ignore Hegelianis*N) hey are dealing ith the false *eaning of absol!te

beginnings$ and$ *oreover$ they deprive the*selves of a good point of s!pport) 5t is

better-li4e Mar@ and &iet#sche-to begin ith Hegel than to end !p ith hi*F 2:)Hegelianis* as s!ch a poerf!l vorte@ that in atte*pting to ignore it one o!ld

inevitably be s!c4ed in by its poer) nly anti-Hegelianis* provided the negative point

of s!pport necessary for a post-Hegelian or even a non-Hegelian proect)

%ro* this point of vie$ the early or4s of ,illes =ele!#e are e@e*plary of the entiregeneration of poststr!ct!ralist thin4ers) 5n his early investigations into the history of

philosophy e can see an intense concentration of the generali#ed anti-Hegelianis* ofthe ti*e) =ele!#e atte*pted to confront Hegel

-@-

and dialectical tho!ght head-on$ as ChKtelet said one *!st$ ith a rigoro!s philosophical

ref!tationD he engaged Hegelianis* not in order to salvage its orthhile ele*ents$ not

to e@tract Ethe rational 4ernel fro* the *ystical shell$ F b!t rather to artic!late a totalcriti

a!tono*y$ a theoretical separation fro* the entire Hegelian proble*atic) he

philosophers that =ele!#e selects as partisans in this str!ggle 2ergson$ &iet#sche$ and

"pino#a appear to allo hi* s!ccessive steps toard the reali#ation of this proect)Many recent critics of %rench poststr!ct!ralis*$ hoever$ have charged that the

poststr!ct!ralists did not !nderstand Hegel and$ ith a facile anti-Hegelianis*$ *issed

the *ost poerf!l thr!st of his tho!ght) 1 =ele!#e is the *ost i*portant e@a*ple toconsider in this regard beca!se he *o!nts the *ost foc!sed and precise attac4 on

Hegelianis*) &onetheless$ perhaps since this c!lt!ral and philosophical paradig* as so

tenacio!s$ the atte*pted deracination fro* the Hegelian terrain is not i**ediatelys!ccessf!l) .e find that =ele!#e often poses his proect not only in the traditional
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lang!age of Hegelianis* b!t also in ter*s of typical Hegelian proble*s-the

deter*ination of being$ the !nity of the ne and the M!ltiple$ and so on) Parado@ically$

in his effort to establish Hegel as a negative fo!ndation for his tho!ght$ =ele!#e *ayappear to be very Hegelian)

5f Hegelianis* is the first proble* of poststr!ct!ralis*$ then$ anti-Hegelianis*

adversaries beca!se it possesses s!ch an e@traordinary capacity to rec!perate opposition)Many Anglo-A*erican a!thors$ see4ing to disco!nt the r!pt!re of Continental

poststr!ct!ralis*$ have rightly e*phasi#ed this dile**a) ?!dith !tler presents the

challenge for anti-Hegelians in very clear ter*s' EReferences to a >brea4> ith Hegel areal*ost alays i*possible$ if only beca!se Hegel has *ade the very notion of >brea4ing

ith> into the central tenet of his dialecticF 2Subjects of Desire16:) 5t *ay see*$ then$

fro* this perspective$ that to be anti-Hegelian$ thro!gh a dialectical tist$ beco*es aposition *ore Hegelian than everD in effect$ one *ight clai* that the effort to be an

EotherF to Hegel can alays be folded into an EotherF ithin Hegel) here is in fact a

groing literat!re that e@tends this line of arg!*ent$ clai*ing that the or4 ofconte*porary anti-Hegelians consists *erely in !nconscio!s repetitions of Hegelian

dra*as itho!t the poer of the Hegelian s!bect and the rigor and clarity of the

Hegelian logic)

he proble* of rec!peration that faces the anti-Hegelian fo!ndation of poststr!ct!ralis*offers a second and *ore i*portant e@planation for o!r selection of =ele!#e in this st!dy

Altho!gh n!*ero!s a!thors have *ade i*portant contrib!tions to o!r criti

=ele!#e has gone the f!rthest in e@tricating hi*self fro* the proble*s of anti-

Hegelianis* and constr!cting

-@i-

an alternative terrain for tho!ght-no longer post-Hegelian b!t rather separate fro* the

proble* of Hegel) 5f o!r first reason for proposing =ele!#e as an e@e*plary

poststr!ct!ralist thin4er as that he is representative of the antagonis* to Hegelianis*$o!r second is that he is ano*alo!s in his e@tension of that proect aay fro* Hegel

toard a separate$ alternative terrain) here are to central ele*ents of this passage that

=ele!#e develops in different registers and on different planes of tho!ght' anondialectical conception of negation and a constit!tive theory of practice) .e cannot

!nderstand these ele*ents$ 5 repeat$ if e *erely oppose the* to Hegelian conceptions of

negation and practice) .e *!st recogni#e their n!ances and pose the* on an alternative

plane) hese to the*es$ then$ negation and practice$ !nderstood ith their ne for*s$co*prise the fo!ndation of the ne terrain that post-str!ct!ralis* has to offer for

philosophical and political tho!ght$ a terrain for conte*porary research)

+et !s briefly e@a*ine the general o!tlines of these to central ele*ents of =ele!#e>sproect) he concept of negation that lies at the center of dialectical tho!ght see*s to

pose the *ost serio!s challenge for any theory that clai*s to be anti- or post-Hegelian)

E&ondialectical difference$ F ?!dith !tler rites$ Edespite its vario!s for*s$ is the labor


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of the negative hich has lost its >*agic>F 216:) he nondialectical concept of negation

that e find in =ele!#e>s total criti

dialectic) he dialectical negation is alays directed toard the *iracle of res!rrection' 5tis a negation Ehich s!persedes in s!ch a ay as to preserve and *aintain hat is

s!perseded$ and conse

O166) &ondialectical negation is *ore si*ple and *ore absol!te) .ith no faith in thebeyond$ in the event!al res!rrection$ negation beco*es an e@tre*e *o*ent of nihilis*'

5n Hegelian ter*s$ it points to the death of the other) Hegel considers this p!re death$ Ethe

absol!te +ord$ F *erely an abstract conception of negationD in the conte*porary orld$hoever$ the absol!te character of negation has beco*e dreadf!lly concrete$ and the

*agical res!rrection i*plicit in the dialectical negation appears *erely as s!perstition)

&ondialectical negation is absol!te not in the sense that everything present is negated b!t

in that hat is negated is attac4ed ith f!ll$ !nrestrained force) n the one hand$ a!thorsli4e =ele!#e propose this nondialectical concept of negation not in the pro*otion of

nihilis*$ b!t *erely as the recognition of an ele*ent of o!r orld) .e can sit!ate this

theoretical position in relation to the field of En!clear criticis*$ F b!t not in the sense that

n!clear eapons pose the threat of negation$ not in the sense that they pose the !niversalfear of death' his is *erely the Estanding negationF of a Hegelian fra*eor4$ preserving

the given order) he negation of the bo*b is nondialectical in its act!ality$ not in theplanning

-@ii-

roo*s of .ashington b!t in the streets of Hiroshi*a$ as an agent of total destr!ction)

here is nothing positive in the nondialectical negation$ no *agical res!rrection' 5t is

p!re) n the other hand$ ith an eye toard the philosophical tradition$ e can locate thisradical conception of negation in the *ethodological proposals of certain "cholastic

a!thors s!ch as Roger acon) he p!re negation is the first *o*ent of a precriticalconception of criti

s4epticis* of the "cholastics)

he radicality of negation forces =ele!#e to engage

s total criti

e*phasi#e that$ on one hand$ the reection of Hegelian ontology does not lead =ele!#e to

so*e for* of deontological tho!ght) Altho!gh he denies any preconstit!ted str!ct!re ofbeing or any ideological order of e@istence$ =ele!#e still operates on the highest planes of

ontological spec!lation) nce again$ to reect Hegelian ontology is not to reect ontology

tout court) =ele!#e insists instead on alternatives ithin the ontological tradition) n the

other hand$ hoever$ e sho!ld be caref!l fro* the o!tset to disting!ish this fro* aHeideggerian ret!rn to ontology$ *ost i*portantly beca!se =ele!#e ill only accept

Es!perficialF responses to the


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li*its !s to a strictly i**anent and *aterialist ontological disco!rse that ref!ses any

deep or hidden fo!ndation of being) here is nothing veiled or negative abo!t =ele!#e>s

beingD it is f!lly e@pressed in the orld) eing$ in this sense$ is s!perficial$ positive$ andf!ll) =ele!#e ref!ses any Eintellect!alistF acco!nt of being$ any acco!nt that in any ay

s!bordinates being to tho!ght$ that poses thin4ing as the s!pre*e for* of being) 3 here

are n!*ero!s contrib!tions to this proect of a *aterialist ontology thro!gho!t the historyof philosophy-s!ch as "pino#a$ Mar@$ &iet#sche$ and +!creti!s-and e ill refer to the*

in o!r disc!ssion to provide ill!strative points of reference) .e ill foc!s$ hoever$ on

=ele!#e>s constit!tive conception of practice as a fo!ndation of ontology) he radicalnegation of the nondialecticalpars destruense*phasi#es that no preconstit!ted order is

available to define the organi#ation of being) Practice provides the ter*s for a *aterial

pars construens;practice is hat *a4es the constit!tion of being possible) he

investigation of the nat!re of poer allos =ele!#e to bring s!bstance to the *aterialistdisco!rse and

-@iii-

to raise the theory of practice to the level of ontology) he fo!ndation of being$ then$

resides both on a corporeal and on a *ental plane$ in the co*ple@ dyna*ics of behavior$in the s!perficial interactions of bodies) his is not an Alth!sserian Etheoretical practice$

F b!t rather a *ore practical conception of practice$ a!tono*o!s of any Etheoricist

tendency$ F a Epractical practiceF that is oriented principally toard the ontological ratherthan the episte*ological real*) he only nat!re available to ontological disco!rse is an

absol!tely artificial conception of nat!re$ a hybrid nat!re$ a nat!re prod!ced in practice-

f!rther re*oved than a second nat!re$ an nth nat!re) his approach to ontology is as ne

as the infinitely plastic !niverse of cyborgs and as old as the tradition of *aterialistphilosophy) .hat ill be i*portant thro!gho!t o!r disc!ssion is that the traditionally

f!nda*ental ter*s-s!ch as necessity$ reason$ nat!re$ and being-tho!gh sha4en fro* theirtranscendental fi@ity$ still serve as a fo!ndation beca!se they ac

deli*ited by the o!ter bo!nds of the conte*porary i*agination$ of the conte*porary

field of practice)

5 elaborate these conceptions of nondialectical negation and constit!tive practice in=ele!#e>s or4 by reading the evol!tion of his tho!ght$ that is$ by folloing the

progression of critical

he evol!tion of =ele!#e>s tho!ght !nfolds as he directs his attention se

or4 on ergson offers a criti

absol!tely positive *ove*ent of being that rests on an efficient and internal notion ofca!sality) o the negative *ove*ent of deter*ination$ he opposes the positive *ove*ent

of differentiationD to the dialectical !nity of the ne and the M!ltiple$ he opposes the

irred!cible *!ltiplicity of beco*ing) he

of the orld$ hoever$ of the being of beco*ing$ p!shes =ele!#e to pose theseontological iss!es in ethical ter*s) &iet#sche allos hi* to transpose the res!lts of

ontological spec!lation to an ethical hori#on$ to the field of forces$ of sense and val!e$


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here the positive *ove*ent of being beco*es the affir*ation of being) he the*atic of

poer in &iet#sche provides the theoretical passage that lin4s ergsonian ontology to an

ethics of active e@pression) "pino#a covers this sa*e passage and e@tends it to practice)?!st as &iet#sche poses the affir*ation of spec!lation$ "pino#a poses the affir*ation of

practice$ or oy$ at the center of ontology) =ele!#e arg!es that "pino#a>s is an ontological

conception of practiceD "pino#a conceives practice$ that is$ as constit!tive of being) 5n theprecritical orld of "pino#a>s practical philosophy$ =ele!#e>s tho!ght finally discovers a

real a!tono*y fro* the Hegelian proble*atic)

-@iv-

ne lesson to be learned fro* this philosophical proect is to highlight the n!ances thatdefine an antagonis*) nce e stop clo!ding the iss!e ith cr!de oppositions and

recogni#e instead the specificity of an antagonis*$ e can begin to bring o!t finer

n!ances in o!r ter*inology) %or e@a*ple$ hen 5 pose the

poststr!ct!ralist tho!ght 5 *ean to contest the clai* that this tho!ght is properly

characteri#ed as antifo!ndationalis*) o pose the iss!e as an e@cl!sive opposition is$ ineffect$ to credit the ene*y ith too *!ch force$ ith too *!ch theoretical terrain)

Poststr!ct!ralis* does criti

i**anent oneD against a given$ teleological fo!ndation e find a *aterial$ open one) : A

si*ilar n!ance *!st be *ade in o!r disc!ssion of ca!sality) .hen e loo4 closely at=ele!#e>s criti

the for*al ca!se$ b!t also an e

to his philosophical proect) =ele!#e>s ontology dras on the tradition of ca!sal

arg!*ents and develops notions of both being>s Eprod!ctivityF and its Eprod!cibility$ Fthat is$ of its aptit!des to prod!ce and to be prod!ced) 5 ill arg!e that efficient ca!sality$

in fact$ provides a 4ey to a coherent acco!nt of =ele!#e>s entire disco!rse on difference)he n!ances in the !se of Efo!ndationF and Eca!salityF are perhaps best s!**ari#ed bythe distinction beteen order and organi#ation) y the order of being$ of tr!th$ or of

society 5 intend the str!ct!re i*posed as necessary and eternal fro* above$ fro* o!tside

the *aterial scene of forcesD 5 !se organi#ation$ on the other hand$ to designate thecoordination and acc!*!lation of accidental 2in the philosophical sense$ i)e)$

nonnecessary enco!nters and develop*ents fro* belo$ fro* ithin the i**anent field

of forces) 5n other ords$ 5 do not conceive of organi#ation as a bl!eprint of develop*entor as the proected vision of an avant-garde$ b!t rather as an i**anent creation or

co*position of a relationship of consistency and coordination) 5n this sense$ organi#ation$

the co*position of creative forces$ is alays an art)

hro!gho!t this st!dy e ill enco!nter !nresolved proble*s and propositions that arepoerf!lly s!ggestive b!t perhaps not clearly and rigoro!sly deli*ited) .e do not loo4

to =ele!#e here$ hoever$ si*ply to find the sol!tions to conte*porary theoretical

proble*s) More i*portant$ e in

proposals of a ne proble*atic for research after the poststr!ct!ralist r!pt!re$ to test o!rfooting on a terrain here ne gro!nds of philosophical and political tho!ght are


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possible) .hat e as4 of =ele!#e$ above all$ is to teach !s the conte*porary possibilities

of philosophy)

-@v-

Preliminar !emark"he #arl Deleuze: $ome %ethodological Princi&les

5n the 5ntrod!ction toInstincts et institutions,a collection of te@ts edited by =ele!#e in

1973$ e see the general o!tlines of a philosophical and political proect beginning to

ta4e shape as a theory of the instit!tion) EContrary to the theories of la that p!t thepositive o!tside of the social 2nat!ral rights and the social in the negative 2contract!al

li*itation$ the theory of the instit!tion p!ts the negative o!tside of the social 2needs in

order to present society as essentially positive and inventive 2original *eans ofsatisfactionF 2i@) his sche*atic presentation of a theory of the instit!tion already gives

!s to f!nda*ental ele*ents of =ele!#e>s proect' 5t designates the attac4 on Ethe

negativeF as a political tas4 and it poses the central prod!ctive obect of philosophy as theconstr!ction of a p!rely positive$ inventive society) .e can already recogni#e latent here

a poerf!l notion of constit!tion and a s!ggestive gli*pse of a radically de*ocratic

theory) Ad*ittedly$ tho!gh$ at this early point =ele!#e>s !se of Ethe negativeF and Ethe

positiveF is rather vag!e and th!s the proposition can only provide an initial int!ition of aproect) ne co!ld atte*pt to read =ele!#e>s boo4 on H!*e$Empiricism and

Subjectivity,ith its foc!s on association and belief$ as an early atte*pt to address

directly this politicophilosophical proect)1 Hoever$ the general develop*ent of=ele!#e>s tho!ght does not i**ediately follo this lineD it beco*es clear that =ele!#e

re

here is not the space nor the ter*s for this constr!ctive proect itho!t first cond!cting

a broad destr!ctive operation) =ele!#e>s early or4 th!s

-@vii-

alays ta4es the for* of a criti

Hegel better$ after all$ than the strict contin!ity beteen Christianity and bo!rgeoistho!ght 5t is i*portant to establish and clarify the ter*s of this antagonis* fro* the

o!tset in order to gain a clear perspective on the sense and traectory of =ele!#e>s overall

proect) he vario!s mots d'ordreheralded by =ele!#e in this period-the destr!ction ofthe negative$ the affir*ation of the positive-lac4 their f!ll poer and significance hen

they are not fir*ly gro!nded in an antagonistic engage*ent of Hegel) As =ele!#e hi*self

asserts hile reading &iet#sche$ in order to gain an ade

2iet!sche and Philosophy6$ 10) his$ then$ constit!tes o!r first *ethodological
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principle for reading =ele!#e'"ecogni!e the object and the terms of the primary

antagonism)

=ele!#e>s deto!r$ tho!gh$ is not only an attac4 b!t also the establish*ent of ne terrain'he early int!ition of a positive political proect is recast by *eans of the long passage

that e ill follo-fro* ergson to &iet#sche and finally to "pino#a) =ele!#e re

his long passage thro!gh the history of .estern philosophy forges a *!ltifario!s edificeon the highest planes of *etaphysical *editation that s!pports and infor*s the entire

breadth of =ele!#e>s or4) ne can certainly recogni#e$ even in the early or4s$ a desire

to *ove aay fro* philosophy$ to depart fro* his training and branch o!t into otherfields' biology$ psychology$ art$ *athe*atics$ politics$ literat!re) Many read =ele!#e>s

or4 as a reection of .estern philosophical tho!ght and hence the proposition of a

postphilosophical or post*odern disco!rse) 5ndeed$ =ele!#e hi*self provides n!*ero!sstate*ents to s!bstantiate s!ch an interpretation) Hoever$ hen e loo4 closely at his

arg!*ents$ e find that not only is his tho!ght sat!rated ith the .estern philosophical

tradition$ b!t even hen his e@a*ples see* E!nphilosophicalF the coherence of hispositions and the *ode of e@planation that s!pports the* re*ain on the highest logical

and ontological planes) 3 5f$ then$ e are to read =ele!#e>s or4 as an attac4 or betrayal

of ele*ents of the .estern *etaphysical tradition$ e have to !nderstand this as an

affir*ation of other ele*ents of that sa*e tradition) 5n other ords$ e cannot read=ele!#e>s or4 as tho!ght Eo!tsideF or EbeyondF the philosophical tradition$ or even as

an effective line of flight fro* that bloc4D rather e *!st see it as the affir*ation of a

2discontin!-

-@viii-

o!s$ b!t coherent line of tho!ght that has re*ained s!ppressed and dor*ant$ b!tnonetheless deeply e*bedded ithin that sa*e tradition) =ele!#e does not anno!nce the

end of *etaphysics$ b!t on the contrary see4s to rediscover the *ost coherent and l!cidplane of *etaphysical tho!ght) : 5f e anted to insist on his reection of a certain for*

of philosophical in

say 2borroing a phrase fro* Alth!sser that =ele!#e develops Ea nonphilosophical

theory of philosophy)F 5n any case$ if in the co!rse of this st!dy o!r references to theresonances beteen =ele!#e>s or4 and other positions in the philosophical tradition

see* at ti*es e@cessive$ it is precisely to e*phasi#e the properly philosophical nat!re of

his tho!ght) Here$ then$ e have o!r second *ethodological principle'"ead Deleu!ephilosophically)

=ele!#e>s o!rney thro!gh the history of philosophy ta4es a pec!liar for*) /ven tho!gh

=ele!#e>s *onographs serve as e@cellent introd!ctions$ they never provide a

co*prehensive s!**ary of a philosopher>s or4D instead$ =ele!#e selects the specificaspects of a philosopher>s tho!ght that *a4e a positive contrib!tion to his on proect at

that point) As &iet#schean or as "pino#ist$ =ele!#e does not accept all of &iet#sche or all

of "pino#a) 5f a philosopher presents arg!*ents ith hich =ele!#e *ight find fa!lt$ hedoes not criti
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then$ that =ele!#e is an !nfaithf!l reader Certainly not) 5f his readings are partial$ they

are nonetheless very rigoro!s and precise$ ith *etic!lo!s care and sensitivity to the

selected topicsD hat =ele!#e forfeits in co*prehensiveness$ he gains in intensity offoc!s) 5n effect$ =ele!#e>s early or4s are Ep!nct!al interventionsF-he *a4es s!rgical

incisions in the corp!s of the history of philosophy) his leads !s to o!r third

*ethodological principle'"ecogni!e Deleu!e's selectivity)

5n each of the stages of this philosophical o!rney$ =ele!#e adds a specific point thatb!ilds and depends on the previo!s res!lts) /ach of =ele!#e>s philosophical *onographs

is directed toard a very specific

of these philosophical s tho!ght) ften$=ele!#e>s e@planations appear inco*plete beca!se he ta4es for granted and fails to repeat

the res!lts of his previo!s research) 2%or e@a*ple$ as e ill see belo$ *any of

=ele!#e>s clai*s for &iet#sche>s attac4 on the dialectic re*ain obsc!re !nless e readinto the* a ergsonian criti

=ele!#e>s early or4 constr!cts an odd sort of history of philosophy in hich the

connecting lin4s depend not on act!al philosophical historiography b!t on the evol!tionof =ele!#e>s on tho!ght) y evol!tion 5 do not *ean to s!ggest a !nilinear or

teleological progression$ b!t rather a sort of theoretical process of aggregation)

-@i@-

%oc!sing on this progression highlights the *ove*ent in =ele!#e>s tho!ght$ and hat

e*erges is the process of =ele!#e>s on philosophical ed!cation$ his apprenticeship inphilosophy) he lines of this ed!cational o!rney help e@plain the co!nterhistorical

develop*ent ergson-&iet#sche-"pino#a that g!ides =ele!#e fro* ontology to ethics

and politics) 7 Hence$ e can posit a final *ethodological principle'"ead Deleu!e's

thought as an evolution)

.hen e loo4 at =ele!#e>s early or4 fro* a historical perspective$ as an evol!tion$ the

*ost stri4ing fact is that he rote his first boo4 hen he as rather yo!ng 2he as

tenty-eight years old in 1973 henEmpiricism and Subjectivityappeared and thenaited eight years before p!blishing his ne@t boo4) /ight years *ight not see* li4e a

very long brea4 for so*e a!thors$ b!t for =ele!#e$ ho after 190 consistently p!blished

a boo4 each year$ eight years represents an enor*o!s gap) E5t>s li4e a hole in *y life$ aneight-year hole) hat is hat 5 find interesting in lives$ the holes they have$ the lac!nas$

so*eti*es dra*atic$ so*eti*es notN) Perhaps it is in the holes that the *ove*ent ta4es

placeF 2E"ignes et QvQne*entsF 16) his eight-year hole in =ele!#e>s intellect!al life

does in fact represent a period of *ove*ent$ a dra*atic reorientation of his philosophicalapproach) =!ring this period$ in effect$ he shifts fro* the H!*e-ergson a@is that

characteri#es his very early or4 to the &iet#sche-"pino#a identity that carries his or4

to its *at!rity) 5n order to read this hole in =ele!#e>s intellect!al life$ e *!st try tointerpret hat this reorientation can *ean$ hat ne possibilities it affords =ele!#e$ and

ho it characteri#es the evol!tion of his tho!ght)


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his foc!s on the evol!tion of =ele!#e>s philosophical ed!cation best e@plains hy 5

have chosen in the folloing st!dy to deal e@cl!sively ith his early ritings) 5n these

or4s =ele!#e develops a technical vocab!lary and concept!al fo!ndation that serve hi*thro!gh the entire traectory of his career) he positions of the later or4s can appear

obsc!re$ even !ntenable$ hen e do not place the* in the conte@t of these early

investigations) 5ndeed$ so*e of the *ost spectac!lar innovations in hat one *ight callhis *at!re or4-the *aor independent philosophical te@ts 2Diff#rence et r#p#titionand

$he %ogic of Sense$ the collaborations ith %Qli@ ,!attari$ the cine*a st!dies$ and the

latest or4s-are in large part reor4ings of the cl!ster of proble*s developed in thisfor*ative period of intense and independent research) he profo!nd originality of

=ele!#e>s voice is perhaps d!e to the fact that d!ring these years he as not folloing the

sa*e co!rse as the *aority of his generation) 0 his is the period of =ele!#e>s

s!bterranean research-the period in hich he forged ne paths$ o!tside of the li*elightand co**onplaces of p!blic %rench c!lt!ral debates-that perhaps alloed hi* to s!rface

ith s!ch a

-@@-

profo!nd i*pact later) 5f$ in fact$ as Michel %o!ca!lt s!spected$ this difference does co*eto *ar4 o!r cent!ry$ if o!r ti*es do beco*e =ele!#ian$ this early or4$ the s!bterranean

=ele!#e$ ill hold the 4ey to the for*ative develop*ents that *ade this ne paradig*

possible)

-@@i-

Cha&ter '

)ergsonian *ntolog

"he Positive %ovement of )eing

5n the or4 of Henri ergson$ one *ight e@pect to find a psychology or apheno*enology of perception) 5t *ay see* strange at first$ then$ that hat =ele!#e finds

principally is an ontology' an absol!tely positive logic of being rooted in ti*e) As e

have noted$ tho!gh$ =ele!#e does not *ove directly to the positive proect b!t rather

approaches first by *eans of a critical$ aggressive *o*ent' E.hat ergson essentiallyreproaches his predecessors forN)F 2E+a conception de la diffQrence che# ergsonF 89)

=ele!#e reads ergson as a pole*ic against the do*inant philosophical tradition$ and the

fa!lts of his predecessors are fo!nd in their *ost concentrated for* in Hegel>s logicDergson criti

finds Hegel occ!pying an e@tre*e$ e@aggerated position) =ele!#e does not clai* that a

direct antagonis* against Hegel is hat pri*arily drives ergson>s tho!ght$ b!t hisreading of ergson contin!ally retains the attac4 on Hegel as its on critical edge) 5n

=ele!#e>s interpretation$ ergson does not challenge the central criteria for being

inherited fro* the ontological tradition-si*plicity$ reality$ perfection$ !nity$ *!ltiplicity$and so on-b!t rather he foc!ses on the ontological *ove*ent that is posed to address

these criteria) E=ifferenceF is the ergsonian ter* that plays the central role in this

disc!ssion of ontological *ove*ent) .e sho!ld be especially attentive at this point$


13/132

beca!se =ele!#e>s interpretation of ergson 2for*!lated as early as 1970 stands at the

head of a long disco!rse on difference in %rench tho!ght that constit!tes a theoretical

to!chstone for poststr!ct!ral-

-1-

is*) Here e find a partic!lar and rigoro!s !sage of the ter*) 5n =ele!#e>s reading$

ergson>s difference does not principally refer to a

s difference relates pri*arily to the

te*poral$ not the spatial$ di*ension of being) he essential tas4 that =ele!#e sets for

hi*self in the investigation of ergson>s concept of difference$ then$ is tofold) %irst$ he*!st !se ergson>s critis

dialectic and its negative logic of being$ as a false conception of difference) his attac4 is

directed against to fo!ndational *o*ents of Hegel>s logic' the deter*ination of being

and the dialectic of the ne and the M!ltiple) "econd$ he *!st elaborate ergson>s

positive *ove*ent of being in difference and sho ho this *ove*ent provides a viablealternative for ontology) 5t is precisely the aggressive *o*ent against Hegelian logic that

prepares the gro!nd for the prod!ctive *o*ent)

=ele!#e>s or4 on ergson$ hoever$ presents a co*plication-and at the sa*e ti*e anopport!nity-for st!dying the evol!tion of his tho!ght beca!se it is cond!cted in to

distinct periods' one in the *id-197Bs and another in the *id-190Bs) he *aor res!lt of

the first period is an article titled E+a conception de la diffQrence che# ergson$ F hichas p!blished in%es #tudes bergsoniennesin 1970 b!t ritten at least to years earlier

and presented to the EAssociation des a*ies de ergsonF in May 197:) his early article

is very dense and contains the *aor points of =ele!#e>s reading of ergson) =ele!#e

p!blished to other ergson te@ts in this period$ b!t neither s!bstantially *odifies theearly essay) he first is a chapter on ergson for a collection edited by Merlea!-Ponty$

%es philosophes c#l&bres21970$ and the second is a selection of ergson te@ts$#moire

et vie21978) he res!lt of =ele!#e>s second period of ergson st!dy is(ergsonism,

p!blished in 1900) his short boo4 ta4es !p *!ch of the arg!*ent presented in the early

article b!t shos a change in foc!s and offers so*e very interesting additions to the

original interpretation$ additions that sho the infl!ence of =ele!#e>s intense &iet#scheperiod in the intervening years) hese to phases of ergson st!dy$ then$ provide an

e@cellent opport!nity to read the orientation of =ele!#e>s early proect$ beca!se they

straddle not only the or4 on &iet#sche 2190 b!t also the long p!blication gap$ theEeight-year holeF that$ as =ele!#e s!ggests$ *ay be a site of considerable reorientation of

the proect)

'(' Determination and #fficient Difference

=ele!#e>s early reading of ergson is gro!nded on an attac4 against the negative processof deter*ination) he specter that loo*s over this

--


14/132

tion thro!gho!t Modern philosophy is Hegel>s reading and critis letters and$ t!rning it bac4 against "pino#a$ *a4es it

a central *a@i* of his on logic' E*nis deter*inatio est negatioF 2Science of %ogic113) 1 his phrase describes for Hegel the process of deter*ination and the state of

deter*inateness) he%ogicbegins ith p!re being in its si*ple i**ediacyD b!t this

si*ple being has no

fro* it) =eter*inate being s!bs!*es this opposition$ and this difference beteen being

and nothingness at its core defines the fo!ndation of the real differences and

cons!*ption$ fro* hich he had long been a s!ffererD this as in har*ony ith his

syste* of philosophy$ according to hich all partic!larity and individ!ality pass aay inthe one s!bstanceF 2%ectures on the History of Philosophy78) his pole*ic against

"pino#a constit!tes one of Hegel>s strongest arg!*ents for the ontological *ove*ent of

negation' eing not deter*ined thro!gh negation ill re*ain indifferent and abstract$ and

finally$ since it is not held different fro* its opposite$ it ill fade

-3-

into nothingness) Hegel insists that if e are to recogni#e difference$ the real difference

that characteri#es the partic!larity and individ!ality of being$ e *!st first recogni#e the

negative *ove*ent of beingD or else$ e *!st disappear along ith "pino#a inEacos*is*$ F in the indifference of p!re$ positive ontology)

=ele!#e>s early reading of ergson see*s to accept the Hegelian for*!lation that the

deter*ination of being *!st be characteri#ed by negation) Rather than challenging that


15/132

for*!lation$ =ele!#e charges that the process of ontological deter*ination itself

!nder*ines the real gro!nding of beingD he clai*s that the difference constit!ted by the

negative *ove*ent of deter*ination is a false notion of difference) Hence$ the process ofdeter*ination both destroys the s!bstantial nat!re of being and fails to grasp the

concreteness and specificity of real being) Here$ ith the reection of deter*ination$ e

can recogni#e the anti-Hegelian approach of =ele!#e>s early or4$ his reaction to thedialectic of negation) 5n this process$ hoever$ =ele!#e>s critical *ethod ta4es on an

interesting for*) He does not attac4 the dialectic directly$ b!t rather he introd!ces a third

philosophical position that he locates beteen ergson and the dialectic) =ele!#eengages this pro@i*ate ene*y on the specific fa!lt that *ar4s its ins!fficiency$ and then

he proceeds to sho that Hegel$ the f!nda*ental ene*y$ carries this fa!lt to its e@tre*e)

5n the ergson st!dies$ =ele!#e engages Mechanicis* and Platonis* as the pro@i*ate

ene*ies$ and in the &iet#sche st!dy he brings in ant) he advantage of first addressingthese pro@i*ate ene*ies is that they provide a co**on gro!nd on hich to or4 o!t the

attac4 that can be s!bses tho!ght

evolves e ill see that he has contin!ally greater diffic!lty in finding a co**on terrain

for addressing the Hegelian position) More i*portant$ tho!gh$ this *ethod oftriang!lation shos !s that even in this early or4 =ele!#e has a proble*atic relation to

opposition) 5t is clear that =ele!#e is attac4ing the dialectic as the f!nda*ental ene*y$b!t this *ethod affords hi* an obli

have to stand in direct opposition)

+i4e ergson$ the Mechanicists try to theori#e an e*pirical evol!tion of the differences

of being$ b!t in doing so Mechanicis* destroys the s!bstantial$ necessary s ergsonian challenge to Mechanicis* ta4es the for* of a c!rio!s

proposition' 5n order for being to be necessary$ it *!st be indeter*inate) his disc!ssion

of ontological deter*ination t!rns on an analysis of the nat!re of difference) he for* of

difference proposed by the process of deter*ination$ =ele!#e arg!es$ alays re*ainse@ternal to being and therefore fails to provide it ith an essential$ necessary fo!ndation)

hese are the ter*s =ele!#e !ses to criti


16/132


17/132

an endF 290) nce again$ the disc!ssion of difference is perfectly consistent ith a ca!sal

ontological arg!*ent' ergson>s efficient difference is contrasted to Plato>s final

difference) he 4ey to the arg!*ent t!rns$ as it did in the case of Mechanicis*$ on theneed for difference to s!stain a s!bstantial nat!re$ on its ontological centrality) ergson

presents difference as causa sui,s!pported by an internal dyna*ic$ hile Plato>s

difference is forced to rely on the e@ternal s!pport of finality) Hence$ Platonic differenceis not capable of s!pporting being in its s!bstantiality and necessity)

his e@planation of the fa!lts of Mechanicis* and Platonis* provides !s ith a *eans of

!nderstanding the ergsonian distinction that =ele!#e finds so i*portant beteen

Edifferences of nat!reF and Edifferences of degree)F E.hat ergson essentiallyreproaches his predecessors for is not having seen the real differences of nat!reN) .here

there ere differences of nat!re$ they only recogni#ed differences of degreeF 289) At

ti*es it see*s as if =ele!#e and ergson are !sing these ter*s to disting!ish beteen

the originality of this conception in the history of philosophy$ this interpretation proves

inade

of degreeF are those that i*ply accidents$ causae per accidens) 7 Ehin4ing internaldifference as s!ch$ as p!re internal difference$ arriving at a p!re concept of difference$

raising difference to the absol!te-that is the sense of ergson>s effortF 29B) .hile

Mechanicis* and Platonis* do s!cceed in thin4ing difference$ they only arrive at

contingent differences *per accidens+;ergson>s conception of internal difference leads!s to recogni#e s!bstantial differences *per se+)

Hegelianis*$ hoever$ is the f!nda*ental target e find at the base of each of these

critis te@ts$ foresee the obections that he o!ld *a4e to a

dialectic of the Hegelian type$ hich he is *!ch f!rther fro* than that of PlatoF 290)

ne *ight e@pect that ith the criti

has the eapons for s!ch an attac4 at his disposal) 5nstead$ he t!rns bac4 to the process of

deter*ination and the basic negative *ove*ent of the dialectic$ to the fo!nding *o*ent

of Hegel>s logic) E5n ergsonNthe thing differs ith itselffirst, immediately) Accordingto Hegel$ the thing differs ith itself beca!se it differs first ith all that it is notF 290) 5n

ergson$ the thing i**ediately differs ith itselfD in other ords$ the difference of the

thing is s!stained thro!gh an internal$ efficient prod!ction) he co**on fa!lt ofMechanicis* and Platonis* is that they both conceive of difference as dependent on an

e@ternal s!pportD hoever$ they each identify specific e@ternal s!pports 2an e@ternal

*aterial thing in Mechanicis* and a f!nction or finality in Plato$ and th!s the e@teriorityof difference in each case is li*ited) Hegelian dialectics ta4es e@ternal difference to its


18/132

e@tre*e$ to absol!te e@teriority$ Eall the ay to contradiction)F he dialectic presents the

thing differing ith an !nli*ited other$ Eith all that it is notF-this is absol!te e@teriority)

5n effect$ if e ignore the

difference to its e@tre*e)

he ergsonian criti

dialectic) %ro* the very first *o*ents of Science of %ogic-fro* p!re being tonothingness to deter*inate being-the dialectic is constit!ted by a dyna*ic in hich the

ca!se is absol!tely e@ternal to its effect' his is the essence of a dialectic of contradiction)

he process of the *ediation in the opposite necessarily depends on an e@ternal ca!sality)As s!ch$ Hegel>s logic of being is v!lnerable to a "cholastic response' A conception of

being fo!nded on an e@ternal ca!se cannot s!stain the necessity or s!bstantiality of being

beca!se a ca!se e@ternal to its effect cannot be

-8-

necessaryD the s!ccessive e@ternal *ediations that fo!nd dialectical being cannot

constit!te causae per seb!t *!st rather be recogni#ed as causae per accidens) h!s$

beca!se of the contingency of this e@ternal ca!sal *ove*ent$ the being of the dialectic is

the e@tre*e case of a Es!bsistent e@teriority)F he core of a ergsonian attac4 on theHegelian concept of dialectical *ediation$ then$ is that it cannot s!stain being as

necessary and s!bstantial)

&ot only does the Hegelian dialectic$ li4e Mechanicis* and Platonis*$ introd!ceaccident into being$ b!t it also fails to grasp the concreteness and sing!larity of being'

E&o$ if the obection that ergson co!ld raise against Platonis* as that it re*ained a

conception of difference that is still eternal,the obection that he *a4es to a dialectic ofcontradictions is that it re*ains a conception of difference that is only abstractF 290-98)he logic of this f!rther attac4 is not i**ediately clear) Ho does it follo that the

difference of dialectical difference is abstract *erely fro* the condition that its s!pport is

absol!tely e@ternal =ele!#e bac4s !p this clai* by

nce again$ the arg!*ent is *ost clearly !nderstood in ter*s of ca!sality) %irst$ ergson

clai*s that a dialectic of opposites re*ains a *ere Eco*binationF of to ter*s$ not a

synthesis$ beca!se the ter*s re*ain absol!tely e@ternal to one another and th!s cannotfor* a coherent$ necessary ca!sal chain) his charge is bac4ed once again by the

principle that an e@ternal ca!se cannot be necessary) "econd$ ergson clai*s that the

res!lt of this co*bination of abstract concepts cannot prod!ce so*ething concrete andreal) his clai* is based on another f!nda*ental principle of ca!sality' An effect cannot

contain *ore reality or perfection than its ca!se) he heart of a ergsonian attac4 on the

Hegelian concept of dialectical synthesis$ then$ is that its res!lt *!st re*ain bothcontingent and abstract)


19/132

Up to this point e have considered =ele!#e>s ergsonian attac4 on Hegel>s negative

ontological *ove*ent as it is presented in =ele!#e>s first phase of ergson st!dy$ and

*ainly in the early article E+a conception de la difference che# ergson)F =ele!#e hasattrib!ted difference ith an ontologically fo!ndational role and then constr!cted a scale

for eval!ating vario!s conceptions of difference based on their capacity to f!lfill this role)

.e have fo!nd that$ beca!se of the ontological de*ands at its core$ =ele!#e>s disc!ssionon difference can be clearly !nderstood if it is contin!ally referred to a "cholastic

disco!rse on ca!sality) ergson>s internal

-6-

difference$ appearing as an efficient ca!sality$ grasps differences of nat!re or differencesthat s!pport s!bstance in its necessity and realityD the e@ternal difference presented by the

pro@i*ate ene*ies$ Mechanicis* and Platonis*$ is only capable of carrying differences

of degree that cannot s!pport being as necessaryD finally$ the Hegelian dialectic$ ith its

absol!tely e@ternal negative *ove*ent$ can grasp neither differences of nat!re nor

differences of degree-the being of the dialectic re*ains not only contingent b!t alsoabstract) Ehat hich carries neither degrees nor n!ances is an abstractionF 298) 0 he

negative *ove*ent of dialectical deter*ination$ hile p!rporting to establish the basisfor real difference$ act!ally ignores difference altogether) =ele!#e has *anaged to t!rn

Hegel>s arg!*ent for deter*ination co*pletely !pside don) Hegel proposes the

negative *ove*ent of deter*ination on the basis of the charge that "pino#a>s positive*ove*ent re*ains abstract and indifferentD here$ hoever$ on the basis of classic

ontological arg!*entation$ =ele!#e t!rns the charge of abstraction against Hegel and

clai*s that dialectical deter*ination ignores difference' Ene has s!bstit!ted for

difference the ga*e of deter*inationF 290) he antagonistic proect against Hegel isclearly the driving force of this arg!*ent) .hen =ele!#e clai*s that Enot only is vital

difference not a deter*ination$ b!t it is rather the contrary-given the choice it o!ld beindeter*ination itselfF 29$ it is very clear Eagainst ho*F these concepts are directed)5ndeed$ the acceptance of the ter* Eindeter*inationF to describe ergson>s difference

sho!ld be read principally as a ref!tation of the negative *ove*ent of the dialectic) .e

sho!ld note here that this early article is the only occasion on hich =ele!#e attac4s theHegelian dialectic directly$ on its on ter*s$ and perhaps for this reason it is his *ost

poerf!l criti

ergson phase of st!dy$ in his or4 on &iet#sche or inDiff#rence et r#p#tition,he alaysaddresses an e@trapolation or derivation of the dialectic)

his direct antagonistic fo!ndation$ hoever$ already raises a serio!s proble*' he

radical opposition to the dialectic appears to force !s to read ergsonian being as

Eindeter*inateF in the Hegelian sense) .e ill find later$ hoever$ that Hegel>s clai*sabo!t the attrib!tes of the state of deter*inate being-

es internal difference) 8 =ele!#e feels the need to

correct this false i*pression$ arning !s not to conf!se ergsonian Eindeter*inationF

ith irrationality or abstraction' E.hen Lergson tal4s abo!t deter*ination he does notinvite !s to abandon reason$ b!t to arrive at the tr!e reason of the thing in the process of

*a4ing itself$ the philosophical reason that is not deter*ination b!t differenceF
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955569http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955569http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955569http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955569http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955569http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955569


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2EergsonF 99) .e ill find$ in fact$ that ergson>s Eindeter*inationF has little to do

ith Hegel>s Edeter-

-9-

*ination$ F b!t rather it relates to an idea of the creativity and originality of real being'-l'impr#visible.the !nforeseeable) ergson>s ter* is neither consistent ith nor opposite

to Hegel>s) .e ill ret!rn to the specifics of ergson>s positive ontologyD it is s!fficient

at this point to recogni#e the force and the initial conses arg!*ent)

'(+ %ulti&licit in the Passage from 4ualit to 4uantit

.hen =ele!#e ret!rns to ergson in the *id-190Bs to rite(ergsonism,he ta4es !p

again *any of his early arg!*ents$ b!t his pole*ical fo!ndation changes slightly) he

analysis still contains an attac4 against the negative *ove*ent of deter*ination$ b!t no

the central critical foc!s is directed toard the proble* of the ne and the M!ltiple) hisreorientation$ hoever$ does not by any *eans *ar4 a depart!re fro* the earlier analysis$

b!t si*ply a progression' .e can i*agine that =ele!#e has *erely contin!ed in hisreading of Ehe =octrine of eingF in Hegel>s Science of %ogic,*oving fro* chapter

on deter*inate being to chapter 3 on the constr!ction of being-for-self thro!gh the

dialectical relationship of the ne and the M!ltiple) 5t is still the opposition to Hegel>sontological proble*atic that provides the dyna*ic for =ele!#e>s e@position of ergson>s

positionD it is as if =ele!#e has *erely descended one level deeper into Hegel>s logic of

being$ ith ergson$ his (irgil$ close at his side)

5t sho!ld co*e as no s!rprise$ therefore$ that hen =ele!#e approaches the proble* of

the ne and the M!ltiple in(ergsonism,his criti

theories in philosophy that co*bine the one and the *!ltiple) hey share thecharacteristic of clai*ing to reconstr!ct the real ith general ideasF 2(ergsonism:3-::)

=ele!#e provides !s ith to e@a*ples of this generali#ing negative *ove*ent' E.e are

told that the "elf is one 2thesis and it is *!ltiple 2antithesis$ then it is the !nity of the

*!ltiple 2synthesis) r else e are told that the ne is already *!ltiple$ that eingpasses into nonbeing and prod!ces beco*ingF 2::) =ele!#e has three arg!*ents ready in

his arsenal fro* the earlier attac4 on deter*ination) 21 Contradiction is a *isreading of

difference that can only be achieved by posing general$ i*precise ter*s that are abstractfro* reality) eing in general$ nonbeing in general$ the ne in general$ the M!ltiple in

general' hese ter*s are too large$ too abstract to grasp the specificity and sing!larity of

realityD they are c!t too big and hang loosely on reality$ as ergson says$ Eli4e baggyclothesF 2::) 2 he negative *ove*ent of the dialectic violates the real relations of

being) Eergson critici#es the dialectic for being afalse movement,that is$

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a *ove*ent of the abstract concept$ hich goes fro* one opposite to the other only by

*eans of i*precisionF 2::) As e fo!nd earlier$ pole*ics abo!t false and real

*ove*ents of being have their fo!ndation in ca!sal ontological arg!*ents' he dialecticof contradiction can only i*ply causae per accidens) 23 %inally$ the dialectical synthesis

cannot grasp the plane of reality by co*bining opposed abstract concepts'

f hat !se is a dialectic that believes itself to be re!nited ith the real hen it

co*pensates for the inade

attained by co*bining the inade

he sing!lar ill never be attained by correcting a generality ith another generality)2::

As e have noted$ the principle that an effect cannot contain *ore reality than its ca!se

denies the poer of the dialectical synthesis to *ove fro* abstraction to reality$ fro*

generality to sing!larity)

.e sho!ld pa!se for a *o*ent$ tho!gh$ to eval!ate =ele!#e>s characteri#ation of the

dialectic) Ehe "elf is one 2thesis and it is *!ltiple 2antithesis$ then it is the !nity of the

*!ltiple 2synthesisF-certainly$ Hegel>s treat*ent of the ne and the M!ltiple is *!ch

*ore co*ple@ than this) 5s =ele!#e *erely setting !p a stra *an A Hegelian co!ldell obect that =ele!#e>s characteri#ation is presented in Einappropriate for*F since it

e@presses the ne and the M!ltiple as propositions' Ehis tr!th is to be grasped and

e@pressed only as a beco*ing$ as a process$ a rep!lsion and attraction-not as being$ hichin a proposition has the character of a stable !nityF 2Science of %ogic18) his is

certainly a valid charge against =ele!#e>s *oc4 dialecticD e have seen elsehere$

hoever$ that =ele!#e>s principal charge is not that the dialectic fails to recogni#e being

in ter*s of a dyna*ic$ a process$ b!t that the *ove*ent of the dialectic is a false*ove*ent) +et !s vent!re into the co*ple@ity of Hegel>s arg!*ent$ then$ to ga!ge the

validity of =ele!#e>s attac4) %or Hegel$ the *ove*ent beteen the ne and the M!ltiplerepresents a higher level of *ediation than the *ove*ent of deter*ination and

constit!tes a logical passage fro* the

the res!lt of the previo!s develop*ent$ gives ay to the abstract$ posited !nity of being-

for-one) his ne enters the

*ove*ent of self-relation'

he one as infinitely self-related-infinitely$ as the posited negation of negation-is the

*ediation in hich it repels fro* itself its on self as its absol!te 2that is$ abstractotherness,2the many$ and in relating itself

-11-

negatively to this its non-being$ that is$ in s!blating it$ it is only self-relationD and one is

only this becomingin hich it is no longer deter*ined as having a beginning,that is$ isno longer posited as an i**ediate$ affir*ative being$ neither is it as res!lt$ as having


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restored itself as the one$ that is$ the one as e

hich it is posits and contains it thro!gho!t only as s!blated)

2Science of %ogic188

he infinitely self-related one$ a posited indeter*ination$ enters into relation ith itsabstract and *!ltiple other$ its nonbeing$ and thro!gh the s!blation of this opposition e

get the beco*ing of the ne$ a reali#ed ideality)

5t is very easy to apply =ele!#e>s charges against the negative ontological *ove*ent to

this passage) he initial *ove*ent of the ne into its opposite$ into its nonbeing$ isco*pletely e@ternal and can only i*ply an accidental relation) %!rther*ore$ this

*ove*ent beteen ter*s 2Hegel calls the* Eabsol!teF clai*s to arrive at a deter*inate

synthesis) Ehe one one Nis the reali#ed ideality$ posited in the oneD it is attractionthro!gh the *ediation of rep!lsion$ and it contains this *ediation ith itself as its

determinationF 218:) he *ere fact of abstract *ediation res!lts in a real deter*ination)

As e have seen$ !st as =ele!#e charges that e@ternal *ediation i*plies an accidentalrelation$ he also ref!ses a dialectics of contradictions the poer of real synthesis' he

Eco*biningF and EoiningF of abstract ter*s cannot have a real$ concrete res!lt) o these

to attac4s e can add the charge that the very ter*s that Hegel !ses are i*precise) %or

this arg!*ent$ =ele!#e invo4es Plato and his *etaphor of the good coo4 ho ta4es careto *a4e his c!ts in the right place according to the artic!lations of reality 2see

(ergsonism:7 and EergsonF 97) .hat Hegelian ter*inology lac4s is close attention

to the specificity and sing!larity of real being' Hegel appears as a careless dialecticalb!tcher hen co*pared to Plato>s fine talents) o arrive at a sing!lar conception of !nity

and *!ltiplicity in real being e have to begin by as4ing$ in Platonic fashion$ .hich

being$ hich !nity$ hich pl!rality E.hat ergson calls for-against the dialectic$

against a general conception of opposites 2the ne and the M!ltiple-is an ac!teperception of the >hat> and the >ho *any> of hat he calls the >n!ance> or the potential

n!*berF 2(ergsonism:7)

.hat has =ele!#e gained$ then$ in this second phase of ergson st!dy$ by refoc!sing hisattac4 fro* the proble* of deter*ination to that of the ne and the M!ltiple$ fro* the

disc!ssion of

clear abo!t the sta4es in the disc!ssion) =escribing the defects of the conception of oneand *any a*ong the ancient ato*ists$ ho give precedence to *!ltiplicity$ he pro-

-1-

vides a s!ggestive analogy' EPhysics ith its *olec!les and particles s!ffers fro* the

ato*$ this principle of e@tre*e e@ternality$ hich is th!s !tterly devoid of the &otion$ !st

as *!ch as does the theory of the "tate hich starts fro* the partic!lar ill ofindivid!alsF 2Science of %ogic108) he passage fro*

heart of an ontological proble*$ a political proble*) he sta4es are

to Hegel that the relationship beteen the ne and the M!ltiple is an 2analogicalfo!ndation for a theory of social organi#ation$ an ontological basis for politics) o attac4


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other or a force of *ediation beca!se its difference rises fro* its very core$ fro* Ethe

e@plosive internal force that life carries ithin itselfF 2E+a conception de la diffQrence

che# ergsonF 93) 6 his #lan vitalthat ani*ates being$ this vital process ofdifferentiation$ lin4s the p!re essence and the real e@istence of being' E(irt!ality e@ists in

s!ch a ay that it is reali#ed in dissociating itself$ that it is forced to dissociate itself in

order to reali#e itself) =ifferention is the *ove*ent of a virt!ality that is act!ali#ngitselfF 293) ergson sets !p$ then$ to concepts of being' (irt!al being is p!re$

transcendental being in that it is infinite and si*pleD act!ali#ed being is real being in that

it is different$ s originality) he central constr!ctive tas4

of =ele!#e>s reading of ergson$ then$ is to elaborate the positive *ove*ent of being

beteen the virt!al and the act!al that s!pports the necessity of being and affords being

both sa*eness and difference$ both !nity and *!ltiplicity)

his disc!ssion of ontological *ove*ent relies on ergson>s clai* of a f!nda*ental

difference beteen ti*e and space$ beteen d!ration and *atter) 9 "pace is only capable

of containing differences of degree and th!s presents *erely a

occ!rs beteen d!ration$ hich >tends> for its part to ta4e on or bear all the differences of

nat!re 2beca!se it is endoed ith the poer of

space$ hich never presents anything b!t differences of degree 2since it is a

the pri*ary ontological *ove*ent beca!se d!ration$ hich is co*posed of differences

-1:-

of nat!re$ is able to differ

that is ca!se of itself *causa sui+beco*es s!bstance that differs ith itself) 5ndeed$=ele!#e characteri#es the distinction beteen d!ration and *atter precisely in the

traditional ter*s of a s!bstance-*ode relationship' E=!ration is li4e a natura naturans,

and *atter a natura naturataF 2(ergsonism93$ *odified) .hy is it$ tho!gh$ thatd!ration can differ ith itself and *atter cannot he e@planation follos fro* o!r first

observations abo!t ergson>s difference) he disc!ssion of difference in ergson is not

directed toard disting!ishing a

ti*e) 5n the second phase of ergson st!dy$ =ele!#e e@tends this distinction beteen

d!ration and *atter to the to distinct types of *!ltiplicity' "pace reveals a *!ltiplicity

of e@teriority$ a n!*erical *!ltiplicity of

differentiation$ a *!ltiplicity of organi#ation 2(ergsonism36) %!rther*ore$ =ele!#e


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arg!es not only that the do*ain of d!ration provides a *ore profo!nd *!ltiplicity than

space$ b!t also that it poses a *ore profo!nd !nity) he *odal nat!re of space$ in effect$

does not afford it an inherent !nity) o recogni#e the essential nat!re of being as as!bstantial !nity$ then$ e have to thin4 being in ter*s of ti*e' Ea single i*e$ one$

!niversal$ i*personalF 286)

&o that along ith ergson and =ele!#e e have adopted an ontological perspective

fir*ly gro!nded in d!ration$ e still need to see ho the virt!al and the act!alco**!nicate) ergson>s disc!ssion is very strong in analy#ing the !nfolding of the

virt!al in the act!al-hat =ele!#e calls the process of differentiation or act!ali#ation) 5n

this regard$ ergson is a philosopher of the e*anation of being$ and the Platonicresonances are very strong) his is precisely the conte@t in hich =ele!#e notes the

Platonic passage very dear to ergson in hich he co*pares the philosopher to the good

coo4$ Eho c!ts according to the nat!ral artic!lationsF 2EergsonF 97) Recogni#ing theconto!r of being in the real differences of nat!re is the tas4 of the philosopher$ beca!se

the process of differentiation is the basic *ove*ent of life)Elan vitalis presented in

e@actly these ter*s' E5t is alays a case of a virt!ality in the process of being act!ali#ed$a si*-

-17-

plicity in the process of differentiating$ a totality in the process of dividing' Proceeding

>by dissociation and division$ > by >dichoto*y$ > is the essence of lifeF 2(ergsonism9:)

P!re being-as virt!ality$ si*plicity$ totality-e*anates or act!ali#es thro!gh a process ofdifferentiation$ a process that *ar4s or c!ts along the lines of the differences of nat!re)

his is ho differentiation addresses the ontological criteria of

that is bring the* bac4 to the virt!ality act!ali#ed in the*$ in order to see thatdifferentiation is never a negation b!t a creation$ and that difference is never negative b!t

essentially positive and creativeF 2(ergsonism1B3) "econd$ as e have seen$ =ele!#e

arg!es that ergson>s ontological *ove*ent relies on an absol!tely i**anent$ efficientprod!ction of being driven by Ethe e@plosive internal force that life carries ithin itself)F

here is no roo* for Platonic finalis* as a force of order) 5n this conte@t$ then$ e can

!nderstand ergson>s ontological *ove*ent as creative e*anation of being free fro* theorder of the Platonic 5deal 21B7-0)

Hoever$ as =ele!#e *a4es very clear$ if e are to !nderstand ergson>s e*anation of

being correctly$ e sho!ld not conceive it as a differentiation in space b!t an

Eact!ali#ationF in ti*e) 2&ote that here the disc!ssion relies heavily on the pri*ary%rench *eaning of actuelas Econte*poraryF his is here ergson>s theory of *e*ory


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co*es into play) 5n the past ergson finds p!re being-Ea recollection that is p!re$ virt!al$

i*passive$ inactive$ in itselfF 2(ergsonism81) he creative *ove*ent fro* the past

!nity to the present *!ltiplicity is the process of act!ali#ation) "it!ating ergson>se*anation of being in ti*e allos =ele!#e to de*onstrate the force of his ter*inology$

hich reveals the i*portant difference beteen ergson>s and other conceptions of

ontological *ove*ent) his disc!ssion is presented thro!gh an enig*atic constellation ofter*s that constit!tes a very co*ple@ arg!*ent) he general goal of this disc!ssion is to

offer an ade

that e conceive of the ergsonian e*anation of being$ differentiation$ as a relationshipbeteen the virtualand the actual,rather than as a relationship beteen thepossibleand

the real) 1B After setting !p these to co!ples 2virt!al-act!al and possible-real$

-10-

=ele!#e proceeds to note that the transcendental ter* of each co!ple relates positively to

the i**anent ter* of the opposite co!ple) he possible is never real$ even tho!gh it *ay

be act!alD hoever$ hile the virt!al *ay not be act!al$ it is nonetheless real) 5n otherords$ there are several conte*porary 2act!al possibilities of hich so*e *ay be

reali#ed in the f!t!reD in contrast$ virt!alities are alays real 2in the past$ in *e*ory and*ay beco*e act!ali#ed in the present) =ele!#e invo4es Pro!st for a definition of the

states of virt!ality' Ereal itho!t being act!al$ ideal itho!t being abstractF 290) he

essential point here is that the virt!al is real and the possible is not' his is =ele!#e>sbasis for asserting that the *ove*ent of being *!st be !nderstood in ter*s of the virt!al-

act!al relationship rather than the possible-real relationship) o !nderstand this

eval!ation e need once again to refer to the ca!sal arg!*ents of "cholastic ontology) A

f!nda*ental principle of ca!sality that e had occasion to invo4e earlier is that an effectcannot have *ore reality than its ca!se) he ontological *ove*ent fro* the virt!al to the

act!al is consistent ith this principle since the virt!al is !st as real as the act!al) heprogression fro* the possible to the real$ hoever$ is clearly a violation of this principleand on this basis *!st be reected as a *odel of ontological *ove*ent) .e sho!ld note

that$ even tho!gh =ele!#e *a4es no e@plicit reference to the "cholastics here$ the *ode

of e@planation and the very ter*s of the disc!ssion are thoro!ghly "cholastic) (irt!al isthe "cholastic ter* to describe the ideal or transcendentalD the virt!al "cholastic ,od is

not in anyay abstract or possible$ it is the ens realissimum,the *ost real being) %inally$

act!ali#ation is the "cholastic *eans of describing the fa*iliar Aristotelian passage fro*the virt!al into act) 11 5n this conte@t$ ergson>s !sage beco*es even *ore interesting'

ergson>s Eact!ali#ationF *aintains the Aristotelian *eaning and adds to it the te*poral

di*ension s!ggested by the *odern %rench !sage) 5n ergson$ the passage fro*

virt!ality to act ta4es place only in d!ration)

.hat is at sta4e for =ele!#e in this enig*atic gro!p of ter*s-in reecting the possible and

advocating Eact!ali#ationF over Ereali#ationF-is the very nat!re of the e*anation of being

and the principle that directs it) =ele!#e elaborates this eval!ation by adding a f!rther

constellation of ter*s) he process of reali#ation is g!ided by to r!les' rese*blance andli*itation) n the contrary$ the process of act!ali#ation is g!ided by difference and

creation) =ele!#e e@plains that$ fro* the first point of vie$ the real is tho!ght to be in


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the i*age of 2th!s to resemble the possible that it reali#es-Eit si*ply has e@istence or

reality added to it$ hich is translated by saying that$ fro* the point of vie of the

concept$ there is no differencebeteen the possible and the realF 2(ergsonism98$e*phasis added) %!rther*ore$ since all the possibilities cannot be reali#ed$

-18-

since the real* of the possible is greater than the real* of the real$ there *!st be a

process of limitationthat deter*ines hich possibilities ill EpassF into reality h!s$=ele!#e finds a sort of prefor*is* in the co!ple possibility-reality$ in that all of reality is

already given or deter*ined in the possibleD reality pree@ists itself in the Epse!do-

act!alityF of the possible and only e*anates thro!gh a li*itation g!ided by rese*blances296) herefore$ since there is no difference beteen the possible and the real 2fro* the

point of vie of the concept$ since the i*age of reality is already given in the possible$

the passage of reali#ation cannot be a creation)

n the contrary$ in order for the virt!al to beco*e act!al$ it *!st createits on ter*s ofact!ali#ation) Ehe reason for this is si*ple' .hile the real is the i*age and li4eness of

the possible that it reali#es$ the act!al$ on the other hand does notrese*ble the virt!ality

that it e*bodiesF 2(ergsonism98) he differencebeteen the virt!al and the act!al is

hat re

original prod!ction of the *!ltiplicity of act!al being thro!gh differentiation) .e can

partially !nderstand this co*ple@ disc!ssion as a criti

sta4es of the disc!ssion appear *ore clearly$ tho!gh$ if e pose the iss!e in ter*s of the

principle that deter*ines the coherence of being$ as a criti

of organi!ation) /arlier e cited a distinction that =ele!#e *a4es beteen theE*!ltiplicity of orderF and the E*!ltiplicity of organi#ationF 236) he reali#ation of the

possible clearly gives rise to a *!ltiplicity of order$ a static *!ltiplicity$ beca!se all ofreal being is pregiven or predeter*ined in the Epse!do-act!alityF of the possible) he

act!ali#ation of the virt!al$ on the other hand$ presents a dyna*ic *!ltiplicity in hich

the process of differentiation creates the original arrange*ent or coherence of act!al

being' his is the *!ltiplicity of organi#ation) he *!ltiplicity of order is Edeter*inateFin that it is prefor*ed and staticD the *!ltiplicity of organi#ation is Eindeter*inateF in

that it is creative and original-organi#ation is alays !nforeseeable) 1 .itho!t the

bl!eprint of order$ the creative process of organi#ation is alays an art)

.e have shon that =ele!#e presents the ergsonian act!ali#ation of being as a dyna*icand original e*anation$ as a creative evol!tion free fro* the ordering restraints of both

Platonic finalis* 2final ca!se and the reali#ation of the possible 2for*al ca!se)

Hoever$ this for*!lation begs the i*portant


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-16-

basis of ergsonian organi#ation his is precisely the point on hich one co!ld *o!nt a

Hegelian co!nteroffensive) 5f e ret!rn to Hegel>s critis

positive *ove*ent of being as an !nrec!perative e*anationis*'

5n the oriental conception of emanationthe absol!te is the light hich ill!*ines itself)

nly it not only ill!*ines itself b!t also emanates) 5ts e*anations are distancingsfro* its!ndi**ed clarityD the s!ccessive prod!ctions are less perfect than the preceding ones

fro* hich they arise) he process of e*anation is ta4en only as a happening,the

beco*ing only as a progressive loss) h!s being increasingly obsc!res itself and night$the negative$ is the final ter* of the series$ hich does not ret!rn to the pri*al light)

2Science of %ogic736-39

Clearly$ it is tr!e that ergson>s *ove*ent$ li4e that of "pino#a$ does lac4 the Ereflection-

into-selfF that Hegel identifies as the *issing ele*ent here) Hoever$ as e have seen$ergson insists that Es!ccessive prod!ctionsF are not Eless perfectFD the *ove*ent is not

a Eprogressive loss$ F b!t rather$ the differentiation constit!ted by #lan vitalis a creative

process that prod!ces ne e

in "pino#ian fashion that act!ality is perfection) Hoever$ the Hegelian attac4 serves as apress!re to bac4 !p this ergsonian clai* ith an i**anent creative *echanis*) Hegel

recogni#es that a positive ontological *ove*ent can acco!nt for the beco*ing of being

2as e*anation$ b!t$ he as4s$ Ho can it acco!nt for the being of beco*ing %!rther*ore$Hegel>s analogy beteen physics and politics ret!rns as a serio!s political challenge)

Along ith the ancient ato*ists$ =ele!#e and ergson ref!se the prefor*is* of the

*!ltiplicity in the !nityD they ref!se the order of the "tate$ and insist instead on the

originality and freedo* of the *!ltiplicity of organi#ation) %ro* a Hegelian perspective$this is !st as *ad as trying to base a "tate on the individ!al ills of its citi#ens) he

attac4 on order 2the order of finalis*$ of the possible$ of the dialectic creates both thespace for and the need for an organi#ational dyna*ic' the organi#ation of the act!al$ the

organi#ation of the *!ltiplicity) Responding to this is the final tas4 posed in =ele!#e>s

reading of ergson)

'(1 "he )eing of )ecoming and the *ganization of the Actual

he s tho!ght see*s to prove ins!fficient for =ele!#e) he need for

act!al organi#ation obvio!sly beco*es *!ch *ore i*portant as =ele!#e *oves to his

second phase of ergson st!dy$ as he

-19-

shifts foc!s fro* the iss!e of

analysis !p to this point e have seen that ergson is very effective in describing the

e*anative *ove*ent fro* a !nity to a *!ltiplicity$ the process of differentiation or


29/132


30/132

both &iet#sche and "pino#a$ for e@a*ple$ =ele!#e presents in the final pages his densest

and *ost el!sive arg!*ent that points the ay toard f!t!re research) 5n this final

section of(ergsonism,=ele!#e tries to e@plain the h!*an capacity for creativity$ thecapability to ta4e control of the process of differentiation or act!ali#ation and to go

beyond the EplaneF or EplanF of nat!re' EMan is capable of b!rning the plans$ of going

beyond both his on plan and his on condition$ in order finally to e@press nat!ring&at!re 0natura naturans1F 21B8) he e@planation of this h!*an freedo* and creativity$

tho!gh$ is not i**ediately obvio!s) Certainly$ society is for*ed on the basis of h!*an

intelligence$ b!t =ele!#e notes that there is not a direct *ove*ent beteen intelligenceand society) 5nstead$ society is *ore directly a res!lt of Eirrational factors)F =ele!#e

identifies Evirt!al instinctF and Ethe fable-*a4ing f!nctionF *la fonction fabulatrice+as

the forces that lead to the creation of obligations and of gods) hese forces$ hoever$

cannot acco!nt for the h!*an poers of creativity1:

%or sol!tion$ e have to go bac4 to analy#e the gap that e@ists beteen h!*an

intelligence and sociali#ation) E.hat is it that appears in the interval beteen intelligence

and societyN .e cannot reply' 5t is int!itionF 21B9) he int!ition is that sa*eEe@plosive internal force that life carries ithin itself that e noted earlier as the positive

dyna*ic of being) Here$ hoever$ this notion is filled o!t *ore clearly) More precisely$

=ele!#e adds soon after$ hat fills this gap beteen intelligence and sociability is the

origin of int!ition$ hich is creative e*otion 211B) his original prod!ction ofsociability thro!gh creative e*otion leads !s bac4 to ergson>s plane of !nity in *e*ory$

b!t this ti*e it is a ne *e*ory) EAnd hat is this creative e*otion$ if not precisely a

cos*ic Me*ory$ that act!ali#es all the levels at the sa*e ti*e$ that liberates *an fro*the plan or the level to hich he belongs$ in order to *a4e hi* a creator$ ade

hole *ove*ent of creationF 2111$ *odified) .ith the cos*ic Me*ory$ =ele!#e has

arrived at a *ystical ergsonian sociability that is available to the Eprivileged so!lsF

2111 and that is capable of tracing the design of an open society$ a society of creators)he incarnation of the cos*ic Me*ory Eleaps fro* one so!l to another$ >every no and

then$ > crossing closed

-1-

desertsF 2111) .hat e have here so!nds distinctly li4e a ea4 echo of the voice ofSarath!stra on the *o!ntaintops' creative pathos$ prod!ctive e*otion$ a co**!nity of

active creators ho go beyond the plane of nat!re and h!*an beings) Hoever$

s!ggestive as this brief e@planation of a ergsonian social theory *ight be$ it re*ains inthis final section obsc!re and !ndeveloped) %!rther*ore$ the rest of =ele!#e>s or4 on

ergson does not serve to s!pport this theory) 5n effect$ e have to refer to =ele!#e>s

&iet#sche to give these clai*s real coherence and a solid gro!nding) 17

his final section of(ergsonismis the *ost notable positive arg!*ent in the secondphase of ergson st!dy that does not appear in the first$ and it perfectly corresponds to

the shift fro* the proble*atic of

that e noted in the attac4 on Hegel) his tofold shift beteen the to ergson st!diesshos clearly one aspect of the *ove*ent that ta4es place in =ele!#e>s Eeight-year holeFD
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955570http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955570http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955570http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955570http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955570http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955570http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108955570


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in effect$ =ele!#e feels the press!re to bring the ontological to the social and the ethical)

5n(ergsonism=ele!#e s!cceeds in addressing this press!re to an e@tent) More i*portant$

hoever$ this reorientation anno!nces the need for and the advent of &iet#sche in=ele!#e>s tho!ght) &iet#sche gives =ele!#e the *eans to e@plore the real being of

beco*ing and the positive organi#ation of the act!al *!ltiplicity) %!rther*ore$ by

shifting the terrain fro* the plane of logic to that of val!es$ &iet#sche allos =ele!#e totranslate the positive ontology he has developed thro!gh the st!dy of ergson toard a

positive ethics)

!emark: Deleuze and Inter&retation

efore t!rning to &iet#sche$ let !s ta4e a *o*ent to consider to critisreading of ergson that ill help !s clarify the characteristics of =ele!#e>s interpretative

strategy) At the o!tset of o!r essay$ e noted that the pec!liarities of =ele!#e>s or4

re

=ele!#e>s or4 so !n!s!al is that he brings to each of his philosophical st!dies a very

specific

criti

=ele!#e>s narro foc!s is hat see*s to conf!se so*e of his readers and to irritate

others) he criti

--

criti

diffic!lties' %irst$ by failing to recogni#e =ele!#e>s selectivity$ these a!thors conflate=ele!#e>s positions ith those of the philosophers he addresses$ and second$ by ignoringthe evol!tion of =ele!#e>s tho!ght$ they conf!se the different proects that g!ide his

vario!s or4s) 5n addition$ the diversity of perspective beteen these to critics ill

serve to ill!strate the slippage that res!lts fro* the gap beteen the Anglophone and the%rench traditions of ergson interpretation)

hro!gho!t Ehe &e ergsonis*F 2chapter 0 ofDialectic of ihilism$ Rose reads

ergson>s or4 and =ele!#e>s interpretation as if they constit!ted a perfect contin!!*)

"he concl!des her brief disc!ssion of(ergsonismith an a*big!o!s attrib!tion thatill!strates this conf!sion very clearly' En =ele!#e>s reading ergson prod!ces a

aturphilosophiehich c!l*inates at the point hen #lan vital>beco*es conscio!s of

itself in the *e*ory of >*an>F 2Rose 1B1) o bac4 this clai* she cites the final page of(ergsonism211 in the /nglish edition$ hich s!pports the second half of her sentence

in part b!t does not s!pport the first half at all) &ot only does =ele!#e not *ention

aturphilosophiein this passage$ b!t he has spent the previo!s pages 21B0-1 arg!ingthat ergson shos ho e can go beyond the plan of nat!re and create a ne h!*an

nat!re$ beyond the h!*an condition) Here =ele!#e is draing principally on ergson>s

late or4%es deu sources de la morale et de la religion2193) Rose derives the idea of


32/132

aturphilosophienot fro* =ele!#e b!t fro* ergson>s earliest or4$Essai sur les

donn#es imm#diates de la conscience21669$ hich she reads as consistent ith the or4

of Co*te 2Rose 96) 2herefore$ to add to the conf!sion$ e have a co*pletely ahistoricalreading of ergson that fails to disting!ish beteen his early and late or4s) he central

point here$ tho!gh$ is not that ergson>s tho!ght does or does not constit!te a

aturphilosophie;rather$ it is that this aspect does not for* a part of =ele!#e>s proect$that this is not hat =ele!#e ta4es fro* ergson)

.e find a si*ilar proble* of interpretation in the essay by Madeleine arthQle*y-

Mada!le$ a %rench ergson specialist$ and it is interesting that in her reading it is

precisely these sa*e pages of(ergsonismthat create the greatest irritation) Her reaction$hoever$ co*es fro* a very different perspective fro* that of Rose$ since she is

gro!nded in the %rench spirit!al reading of ergson rather than the Anglo-"a@on

positivist reading) arthQle*y-Mada!le>s pri*ary obection is tha

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[b] Hardt, M. - Deleuze, An Apprenticeship in Philosophy [U of Minnesota Press 1993]

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