BACK_FROM_THE_BRINKMURRAYRS5_August08(1)[1]

BACK FROM THE

BRINK

STRATEGIES FOR REALIGNING

POLICE CULTUREIN POST-CONFLICT

TIMOR-LESTE

Ray Murray

BACK FROM THE BRINK

THE AUTHOR

Ray Murray has worked in developing countriesmanagement adviser since 1996. In tUnited Kingdom GovernmentNations Development Programmeprojects. Ray spent five years developing and successfully implementing a Strategic Management System into the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabularywhich has been used as a model in other Pacific region countriesyears have been spent working in TimorGovernment-funded program within the Ministry of Interiorpersonnel in both the Ministry and Management Adviser to the Secretary of State for Security and works for the Australian Federal Police on the

Figure 1. Author delivering

AcknowledgementsMaxine Smart, Dixean Walkerthis discussion paper. The author is also grateful to assisted in much of the cultural aspects of the

1 For further information seecommissioner.asp>.

BACK FROM THE BRINK – A DISCUSSION PAPER

2

in developing countries across the Asiamanagement adviser since 1996. In that time Ray has worked for

Government–Department for International Developmentrogramme and Australian Federal Police years developing and successfully implementing a

Strategic Management System into the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabularyused as a model in other Pacific region countries

working in Timor-Leste on a joint UK andfunded program within the Ministry of Interior, building capacity of

personnel in both the Ministry and the PNTL. Ray is currently the Senior Management Adviser to the Secretary of State for Security and works for the

on the Timor-Leste Police Development

elivering water to PNTL Headquarters o

Dixean Walker and Jim Roberts all contributedis discussion paper. The author is also grateful to Maria Bernardino who

assisted in much of the cultural aspects of the document.

<http://www.lawandjustice.gov.pg/www/html145

A DISCUSSION PAPER

across the Asia–Pacific as a hat time Ray has worked for AusAID, the

epartment for International Development, United Australian Federal Police -funded

years developing and successfully implementing a Strategic Management System into the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary1,

used as a model in other Pacific region countries. The last five oint UK and Australian

building capacity of Ray is currently the Senior

Management Adviser to the Secretary of State for Security and works for the Leste Police Development Program.

on 25 May 2006

all contributed to the editing of Maria Bernardino who

http://www.lawandjustice.gov.pg/www/html145-the-


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DOCUMENT MAP

Introduction Describes the scope of the paper.

PART A ANALYSIS

Contextual analysis Provides an overview of the PNTL for the period 2000–08 to give first-time readers a snapshot of PNTL cultural issues.

PART B DISCUSSION PAPER

National culture Broadly defines cultural issues at the national level and how these might influence the culture within the PNTL.

What is police culture? Outlines PNTL culture; discusses how culture is perpetuated, informal police cultures and the development of positive cultural norms introduced into the PNTL. Describes the cultural challenges faced by the PNTL as well as provides an understanding of the importance of considering culture in the development of strategy.

Identified change Provides examples of both overarching and specificstrategies for PNTL change strategies that if implemented would

improve the culture and development of the PNTL.

New approaches to Presents arguments for changing the methodology management of change of development and change management withinstrategies the PNTL. Designed to encourage discussion on aid

delivery and provide alternatives to the other formula in use for the last eight years.

Conclusion Outlines the main points and calls for serious discussion by donors and the Government and communities of Timor-Leste to devise workable solutions that ensure the successful implementation of change strategies in the PNTL.

Discussion topics Presents a list of topics and strategies that the Timor-Leste Government and donors should discuss and agree on for the future.

Bibliography Lists references and readings.


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THE AUTHOR..............................................................................................................................................................2DOCUMENT MAP.......................................................................................................................................................3TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................................................................................................................4PREFACE ....................................................................................................................................................................5GLOSSARY..................................................................................................................................................................6INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................................................8

PART A - ANALYSIS

CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE PNTL 2000 TO 2008..................................................................................................11UN missions in Timor-Leste .............................................................................................................................................11The formation and development of the PNTL by the UN.................................................................................................122006 turmoil in Timor-Leste ............................................................................................................................................14Post-2006 – new beginnings............................................................................................................................................16

PART B - DISCUSSION PAPER

NATIONAL CULTURE – A BROAD DEFINITION.......................................................................................................................18POLICE CULTURE ..........................................................................................................................................................20How is the culture perpetuated? ..................................................................................................................................... 22

Alignment with national culture ..........................................................................................223Informal police cultures ...................................................................................................................................................24Development of cultural norms in the PNTL....................................................................................................................25

Existing culture (PNTL) and subcultures................................................................................ 26G-RDTL expectations.......................................................................................................... 26Community expectations .................................................................................................... 27Emerging future culture...................................................................................................... 27

STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE PNTL CULTURE.................................................................................................................27Overarching strategies for the PNTL – The 'umbrella' approach.....................................................................................28Ethics and values .............................................................................................................................................................28The 'what has worked in the past' strategy.....................................................................................................................29Service delivery strategy..................................................................................................................................................29Ownership strategy .........................................................................................................................................................30

Development phase ........................................................................................................... 30Design phase .................................................................................................................... 31Implementation phase........................................................................................................ 31

Community participation strategy...................................................................................................................................31Human rights strategy.....................................................................................................................................................32NEW APPROACHES FOR ONGOING MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE STRATEGIES WITHIN THE PNTL...............................32Transitionary period for implementation of rules and regulations to ensure that they align with the culture...............32Getting a policy approvedl is only the beginning ............................................................................................................35'Vertical slice' approach to training.................................................................................................................................36Removal of the 'cut and paste' paradigm to development .............................................................................................37Backfilling for capacitybbuilding .....................................................................................................................................37Failure to launch from the design phase .........................................................................................................................38No more'prophet worshipping or death by planning ......................................................................................................38Serious, not superficial analysis of issues ........................................................................................................................40Serious analysis - Prioritising and sequencing .................................................................................................................41Serious analysis - Cultural or technical ............................................................................................................................42Serious analysis - Issues or symptoms .............................................................................................................................42Less is more (for systems and procedures) .....................................................................................................................43CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................................................44DISCUSSION TOPICS ................................................................................................................................................45BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................................46


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PREFACE

The author recognises the valuable contribution to the development of Timor-Leste made by the various United Nations missions during the past nineyears. Without their presence, the development of the nation as a whole would not have progressed to the current degree, and it is unlikely that the country would have structures and systems in place today. That said, it is important to present the facts to move forward, and those facts must include various criticisms and the highlighting of errors made by UNPol in particular, as well as Special Representatives of various United Nations missions. To those many members of the UN who have provided excellent contributions to the development of Timor-Leste over the years, I hope that you see the criticisms in this document as an objective assessment of the situation and the UN’s work undertaken in Timor-Leste.

Ray MurrayAugust 2008

NOTEThe views expressed are the author’s own, and do not

reflect the views of the Government of Australia and

its agencies, including the Australian Federal Police.


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GLOSSARY

AFP Australian Federal Police

CIVPOL UN civilian police known in Timor-Leste as UNPol

DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations - Deputy Head of Mission

F-FDTL Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste, the armed forces of Timor-Leste containing many former members of the guerrilla fighters, Falintil

FRETILIN Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente, the governing political party in Timor-Leste until June 2007

G-RDTL Governo-República Democrática De Timor-Leste, Government of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

IDP Internally displaced persons

ISF International Security Force

JTF Joint Task Force

NGO Non-government organisation

PNTL Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste, the national police force of Timor-Leste, formerly known as the East Timor Police Service (ETPS) and Timor-Leste Police Service (TLPS)

POLRI Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Indonesian National Police

RRR Plan Reform, Rebuilding and Restructuring Plan developed and implemented by UNMIT under the Supplemental Agreement

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations - Head of Mission in Timor-Leste

TLPDP Timor-Leste Police Development Program, funded by the Australian Government currently through the AFP

TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian national army


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UN United Nations and various missions in Timor-Leste including:UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East Timor), UNTAET(United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor), UNOTIL (United Nations Office in Timor-Leste), UNMISET(United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor) and UNMIT(United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste)

UNPol See CIVPOL


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INTRODUCTION

‘Police play an important role in all countries, but a far more critical role in developing countries. Police have a legal mandate to use force, to detain and restrict civilian movement, and to take lives in the broader interests and protection of the government and its communities.’

There has been much written about Timor-Leste’s national police (PNTL) since the country plunged into civil unrest in 2006. In May of that year, PNTLmanagement was in crisis following the shooting of nine police officers by members of the Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) and the Minister of Interior’s distribution of arms to civilians under very questionable circumstances.

Many of the reports sought to find why the PNTL management splinteredfollowing 25 May 2006.2 Most of the reports’ conclusions highlighted a number of weaknesses, including internal factors such as:

political control of the PNTL (and F-FDTL) lack of shared experiences and vision corruption and nepotism lack of legislation, policies and systems lack of accountability at relevant levels lack of a single police culture inadequate training and resources prevalence of ‘elite task forces’ within the PNTL lack of leadership and management unchecked disciplinary problems within the PNTL.

These internal factors were exacerbated by external social factors: high levels of unemployment (especially youth unemployment)3

community perceptions of physical insecurity lack of basic foods4

history of violence within society weak community and social cohesion (east/west tension)

2 It is a common misconception that the PNTL collapsed completely during this period; all districts outside of Dili continued to function, as did some of the units within Dili such as theimmigration unit and police academy. When the international forces arrived in late May 2006they stood down all police in Dili. Consequently while many PNTL officers returned to work—particularly in administration areas—they were not in uniform and therefore not visible to the public. The PNTL culture took a battering which rendered the organisation ineffective.3 And the emerging threat of youth gangs, especially in Dili.4 Rice shortages after May 2006 caused civil disturbances especially within the IDP camps dependent on government handouts.


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lack of understanding and a commitment to democracy lack of access to reliable information political instability at all levels negative attitude of G-RDTL to donor assistance5

lack of coordination and consultation in donor assistance poor planning and decision-making by the G-RDTL in support of the

international programs of assistance raised expectations from oil and gas revenue not being met fear of further aggression by the Indonesian TNI or militias supported by

them (especially closer to borders) donor frenzy - allowing the government to donor-shop, leading to

non-strategic development6

lack of capacity by NGOs to contribute to conflict prevention; and over-zealous expectations by international watch groups on the progress

of human rights and other social reforms – these could not be sustained because of weak systems and procedures.7

Since its inception and a subsequent attempt to ensure that it functioned effectively, the PNTL has been assisted by the UN and its various missions to develop structures and systems, as well as build the capacity of personnel.

‘UNTAET first recruited several hundred policemen (sic) including about three hundred former POLRI police officers and established the National Police service of Timor-Leste (PNTL) in August 2001.’ 8,9

5 There appeared to be little commitment and/or respect from the G-RDTL toward international assistance. For example, in a site in Barrio Pâté, Dili was handed over for the development of a forensics site by the Minister of Interior. Approximately $90 000 was spent on the restoration of the site before the Minister re-allocated the site to the Rapid Intervention Unit. There was no explanation given to the donor.6 While the donor community all agreed on coordination within sectors, this was not always achievable. Even the most cooperative donors became recalcitrant when their own development agendas were not being met.7 The UN had provided a countrywide Human Rights Awareness Campaign but failed to implement structures and procedures within the various oversight mechanisms to process, coordinate and determine cases. This meant that many cases remained outstanding several years after being reported. 8 Paper presented by Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident Representative of the UNDP in Timor-Leste, Dr Sukehiro Hasegawa, to the Berlin Centre for International Peace Operations on 27 January 2006, titled ‘Lessons Learned from Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Support Missions in Timor-Leste’.9 According to the Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, dated 2 October 2006, the recruitment of PNTL by UNTAET may have been one of the first of many critical mistakes made by the various UN missions. The report states at p. 18:‘The current functioning of the police service, PNTL, and the Defence Force, F-FDTL, in particular, is hampered by a perceived lack of legitimacy arising from the manner of their creation. PNTL was founded with a core of Timorese who had served previously in the Indonesian police force.’


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Other donors also contributed to the development of the PNTL during this period, particularly closer to 2006 when it was anticipated that the UN mission would end and bilateral donors would take over PNTL capacity development. Based on the findings of the majority of the post-crisis 200610 reports, donors—in particular the various UN missions—were responsible for both the development and implementation of subordinate legislation for the PNTL. There is clear evidence that the majority of these policies and procedures were ‘cut and pasted’ from various other countries without being properly analysed for their suitability for the Timor-Leste local environment. While it is recognised that law and order are linked intrinsically to sound economic growth, particularly in developing countries, the framework for any justice system must blend with local customs, culture and practices for it to be fully accepted and sustainable by the law enforcers, and ultimately the communities.

Part A of this paper provides a contextual analysis11 of the development of the PNTL to assist in understanding many of the discussion points in Part B. The aim of Part B of the paper is to encourage discussion on a number of issues. It defines culture in the broader sense relating to Timor-Leste; defines a police culture as it relates to the PNTL; and highlights the impact of government and community expectations that need to be taken into consideration in managing cultural change within the PNTL and maintaining law and order in Timor-Leste. In an attempt to encourage discussion on changes to capacity building methodology, this paper identifies some strategies to improve the PNTL culture. Finally, it discusses the need for new approaches for ongoing management of change strategies within the PNTL to achieve coordinated development of the PNTL by donors and acceptance by both the PNTL and the communities of Timor-Leste.

10 ‘Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis Asia Report’, no 120, 10 October 2006; ‘Crisis in Timor-Leste: Looking beyond the surface reality for causes and solutions’, Richard Curtain, 27 July 2006,Report of UN Independent Special Commission of Enquiry, October 2006, et al.11 The analysis provides a brief overview of the situation for the period. For more detailed information on the development of Timor-Leste see other published articles such as ‘Asia Report’ no. 120, October 2006 and no. 143, January 2008; and Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, October 2006.


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PART A - ANALYSIS

CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE PNTL 2000 to 2008

UN missions in Timor-Leste

The first of four United Nations peace missions to East Timor12 was established in 1999, along with UNAMET, to assist in the national vote for independence. In October 1999 a further mission called UNTAET was established and mandated to bring law and order quickly into the country following the withdrawal of Indonesia. This was done in an environment that saw most of the country razed to the ground, leaving civilians severely traumatised and, in many cases, internally displaced and in need of guidance and direction. The mission was also responsible for governing the state and taking it forward to independence. Post-independence—from May 2002 to May 2005—UNMISET was a peacekeeping mission responsible for providing support to the public administration, the development of law enforcement, and the continued security and stability of Timor-Leste. UNOTIL, authorised by Security Council Resolution 1599 and adopted on 28 April 2005, continued a UN presence undertakinginstitution-building activities. A major focus of this mission was institutional capacity building within state ministries and the agencies responsible for maintaining security, law and order, justice and civil administration. This mission moved the UN from its core business of peacekeeping to assisting the government in developing a sustainable assistance framework.

Following the crisis in May 2006, and at the request of the G-RDTL, four nations13 formed the International Security Forces (ISF) to assist the government in controlling civil unrest. The ISF remained in charge of security within the country until 25 August 2006 when a new mission (UNMIT), under UN Resolution 1704, provided a broader mandate to assist the government in rebuilding core institutions. The mission was further strengthened by a trilateral agreement among the governments of Timor-Leste and Australia and the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, signed on 26 January 2007. Under this agreement, a trilateral coordination body was established to serve as the mechanism to discuss security issues relevant to the management and stabilisation of the security environment and operations in Timor-Leste, and to ensure full coordination between the participants through close consultation and information sharing. Australia signed as lead agency for the ISF.14

12 Now known as Timor-Leste13 The original configuration of the ISF, which included police and military from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia. 14 Australian Defence Force and New Zealand Defence Force


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The formation and development of the PNTL by the UN

From 2000 to 2002, the UN established the PNTL by recruiting 1700 new officers and hiring 300 others who had served in the Indonesian national police (POLRI). These officers were expected to bring both experience and expertise to the newly formed force.15 Training commenced in March 2000 and continued until the PNTL had grown to 3100 personnel. Although clearly inadequate, an initialthree-month course16 was to be supplemented by further six months training in the field by the UN. This training however, was not structured and remained largely ad hoc with the quality of training delivery dependent on the skills,expertise and motivation of individual UNPol trainers. Training was hindered also by:

language difficulties UNPol officers coming from forty-two different countries with varying

levels of policing practice lack of uniform policing administration or procedures for the PNTL lack of a good orientation program for new UN personnel limited literacy and numeracy among many of the PNTL trainees.

The appointment of former POLRI officers and then providing them with a shorter training period, potentially led to distrust within the ranks of the other recruited officers as well as Timorese society.17

A change in focus for both UNMISET and UNOTIL emerged following a number of independent reviews undertaken throughout 2002.18 These reviews, including the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)19, claimed that the UN had failed ‘to properly undertake institutional building’, particularly within the administration of the PNTL.

The JAM Report was hailed by the donor community as the next logical step forward for the development of the PNTL. Following the publication of these reports, UNMISET set up an Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Committee in March 2003. This committee was co-chaired by then-Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato and then-DSRSG, Dr Sukehiro Hasegawa. An action plan was developed by the UN staff of Dr Hasegawa and presented to the committee at its April 2003 meeting. The action plan covered forty-three activities recommended by the JAM Report as being critical for strengthening the PNTL. The committee was a large amorphous body of up to 100 people drawn from all

15 Simonsen, Sven Gunnar 2006, Building ‘National’ Armies – Building Nations?, Armed Forces and Society, vol. 33.16 About 300 ex-POLRI were fast-tracked through a four-week training course to take up many of the management positions. 17 Hood, Ludovic 2006, Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999—2004, International Peacekeeping 13(1) (March 2006) pp. 60-77.18 The World Bank’s ‘Joint Assessment Mission Report’ on PNTL November 2002 and Kings College Report ‘A Review of Peace Operations – A Case for Change’, 2002.19 See Note 18.


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stakeholder groups attending the meetings. The meetings were conducted as a presentation of results rather than a development of strategy.20 The committee was ineffective and eventually became a UN exit-strategy checklist for the end of the mission on 20 May 2004. Much of the work undertaken barely grazed the surface of the real issues that the committee was established to address. For example, a strategy ‘to develop a policy on community policing’ was written, presented and passed21 at one meeting. The document was a 500-word discussion paper on relations between the PNTL and Suco chief. There were many further examples of strategies being put into place that were neither workable nor sustainable.22. Following attempts by the government and other donors to rein in the process, the committee held its last meeting on 23 August 2003. The UN continued to advance the action plan but it failed, as the strategies were either too shallow or did not fit the local environment.

In his paper of January 2006, SRSG Dr Hasegawa stated that the main challenge remains how to change the mindset of police towards democratic policing. In a speech in Berlin in January 2006, Dr Hasegowa stated:

‘The consolidation of peace in Timor-Leste, which was achieved by the smooth transition from post-conflict recovery and reconstruction to state institution building, provides valuable insights and important lessons for future peacekeeping and peace-building operations. In my view, the experience of United Nations support to post-conflict Timor-Leste also reveals an operational shift taking place in peace-keeping operations in implementing an integrated and holistic approach to peace-keeping and peace-building activities.’.23

Clearly, the events of May 2006 and the continuous cycle of violence that followed are due in part to an under-developed PNTL. This situation indicatesthat a cut and paste24 development approach was not successful and, indeed,has never been successful in any mission of the UN.25 Changing the mindset of the PNTL can only be achieved if the mindset of UNPol is changed. There needs

20 In 2003, the author was the Adviser to the Minister of Interior for the Institutional Capacity Development Committee.21 Meeting of the Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Committee held on 30 June 2003.22 Rules of Organisation Procedure were written by UN advisers and translated into Tetum to give ‘ownership’ to the documents.23 Hasegawa, op cit, p. 5. This appears to conflict with the recommendations of the Kings College Report 2002 where at p. 54 recommendation ‘xx’ it states: ‘Missions should be disaggregated and split into one structure for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and another for governance and public administration. Sectoral responsibilities could be outsourced to other UN agencies or Member States while the UN performs certain core functions. (UN Secretariat, Member States)’24 Refer to discussion on ‘cut and paste’ on page 39.25 However, Dr Hasegawa claimed in his speech in Berlin in January 2006 that: ‘The progress was remarkable in comparison with what had been attempted in Somalia and Rwanda, where I assisted in establishing national police forces in 1993 and 1995-96.’ Hasegawa, op cit, p. 7.


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to be a paradigm shift from cutting and pasting development programs from Kosovo, Rwanda, Somalia, and other UN missions, in which many of the UNPolpreviously worked before coming to Timor-Leste, to a mission where detailed analyses are expertly undertaken to marry the customs and culture of Timor-Leste to the strategies for development.26

2006 turmoil in Timor-Leste

While tensions were starting to increase as early as January 2006 when the Petitioners within the F-FDTL voiced their concern with the government, the PNTL was not severely impacted until violence erupted on 28 April 2006 outside the government palace, leaving two civilians dead and six wounded. This was the last day of demonstrations by the Petitioners.27 Further violence occurred that day at Comoro Market, leaving one civilian killed and twelve injured, and at Taci Tolu, where two civilians were killed and five wounded. The PNTL struggled to contain the situation in so many areas that day but only managed to quiet the local unrest, not bring it under control. On the same day, the F-FDTL was deployed to assist the PNTL in restoring order and containing the Petitioners. On 8 May 2006, an incident in Gleno left one police officer dead and another seriously injured. The officers were from the east and the attacks were presumably associated with the east/west divide referred to in President Xanana Gusmão’s speech of 23 March 2006.28 Also on 8 May Minister of the Interior, Rogerio Lobato, distributed weapons and ammunition to two civilian groups. It had been alleged that this distribution of weapons was intended to be a show of force by Mr Lobato in an attempt to take over the leadership of the country, either at the meeting of the FRETILIN Party Congress, held in Dili on 17-19 May,or by a coup using both civilian and PNTL officers at a later date. A well-timedcoup could have taken advantage of the swiftly deteriorating political climate within the country, sweeping Mr Lobato into power and eliminating his opposition at the same time.

Additional weapons and ammunition were distributed by Mr Lobato on 21 May 2006. As this information was becoming public knowledge within the Ministry and the PNTL, a growing number of people became concerned as to the outcome of these actions by the Minister of the Interior. On 23 May F-FDTL Major Alfredo Reinado attacked both F-FDTL and PNTL officers; five people were killed and seven injured.29 Further attacks on 24 May left six dead and ten

26 Discussed further in Section ‘Removal of the Cut and Paste Paradigm to Development.27 The Petitioners were so irate, some 600 F-FDTL Officers who had been dismissed by the Government were demonstrating with demands to be re-engaged and identified personnel to be placed in key positions.28 The President’s address to the nation stated that the decision to dismiss was within the competency of the Chief of the Defence Force but implied that the petitioners’ claims were primarily due to discrimination between easterners against westerners.29 The number of persons injured varies depending on which report is read. An explanation of the variations could be that many were injured but did not require hospital treatment and were


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injured. The crisis was fully realised on the 25 May when six people were trapped and burnt to death in a house owned by the Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato. Nine unarmed PNTL officers were shot and killed by F-FDTL, along with 27 severely wounded. Another person died and two were wounded at Caicoli. Dili was largely abandoned by all security personnel and for the remainder ofthe day, fires burned and frequent volleys of gunshots were heard as youth gangs took to the streets. The first of the international forces arrived on 26 May and began to take control of the security situation in Dili. The PNTL Headquarters had been attacked and many of the offices had been strafed bybullets. The executive management of the PNTL split into groups and deserted their posts—as had most of the regular members of the PNTL within Dili.

The introduction of the Joint Task Force managed to contain most of the violence, but youth gangs30 continued to mount guerrilla-type raids and stonedvehicles across the city. The civil unrest also caused IDP31 camps to spring up around the city and in some of the regional centres. These camps became hot spots for crime32 and tended to act as barometers for continued civil unrest in the country. Camp numbers swelled during heightened periods of violence.

The G-RDTL asked the UN provide an Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste into the events of April-May 2006.33 In its report dated 2 October 2006, it was clear that the mandate included the ability to discuss structural and systemic weaknesses in government organisations that contributed to the incidents.34 However, the report confined its comments tothe actions of UNOTIL and to the events relating to April and May 2006 only. The successes and failures of the UN missions from 2002 onwards were not covered by the report. Given the level of involvement of the UN missions during this time, the various missions fared well within the report.

counted in some reports, while others reported on the number of injuries serious enough to require hospital treatment. 30 For further information regarding youth gangs see ‘A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste’, James Scambary, 7 September 2006.31 Internally displaced persons32 Despite the best efforts of the G-RDTL and donors, the camps have now become semi-permanent within Dili. The camps at the airport and in front of the Timor Hotel at Colmera have caused many problems for the international forces. Gang members can quickly blend into the camps and it is then difficult for international troops to track them down. A further concern is the large number of police working in Dili who reside in the IDP camps.33 Terms of Reference B (4) (a) ‘To establish the facts and circumstances relevant to incidents on 28 and 29 April, 23, 24 and 25 May and related events or issues that contributed to the crisis, including issues related to the functioning of the security sector’..34 B Findings 224(d) states: ‘The operational planning and response to the violence by PNTL during April and May was deficient, a matter for which the PNTL General Commander and the Minister of the Interior bear responsibility.’


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Post-2006 – new beginnings

The UN mission was extended on 25 August 2006 by Security Council Resolution 1704. A further trilateral agreement was signed between the G-RDTL, UN and Australia setting out the roles that each would undertake in restoring law and order to Timor-Leste. Australia’s main role was with the continuing presence of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). A ‘Supplemental to the Agreement’document was signed by the UN and G-RDTL on 1 December 2006 and provided the new UN mission (UNMIT) with wide-ranging powers inter alia to:

[Extract of Section 3.1 of the Supplemental Agreement]

The United Nations police officers shall be considered to be:Paragraph (a) ‘vested with all police powers which are conferred on and enjoyed by PNTL police officers by and pursuant to the national laws of Timor-Leste;’

Paragraph (b) ‘capable of being granted by the judicial institutions of Timor-Leste any such authority to carry out arrests, detention, entry, search and seizure, investigations or questioning that may be granted to PNL police officers by such institutions under and pursuant to the national laws of Timor-Leste.’

[Extract of Section 3.2 of the Supplemental Agreement]

United Nations police officers shall at all times remain:Paragraph (a) ‘under the exclusive command and control of the Police Commissioner’.35

The Supplemental Agreement further limited the powers of the Minister of Interior in Section 4.2: The Minister shall not exercise any authority or powers that he or she may enjoy under or pursuant to the national laws of Timor-Leste to take decisions or to issue directives, standing orders, instructions or orders with respect to:

the conduct of police operations; orthe maintenance and enforcement of good conduct, good order and discipline subject to Section 11.10 and 11.11 below36, and

35 Police Commissioner is defined as the ‘United Nations Commanding Officer’ and under Section 5 is deemed to the interim PNTL General Commander and vested with all powers and authority of that position.36 Section 11.10 decisions regarding appointment, retention and promotion of PNTL personnel shall rest with and be taken by the Minister, in consultation with UNMIT and 11.11 All decisions regarding the discipline and dismissal of individual PNTL personnel shall rest with and be taken by the Minister of recommendation of the Police Commissioner, except those that fall within the powers of the PNTL General Commander.


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Section 4.3: The Minister shall consult with the UNMIT Deputy SRSG for Security and the Rule of Law on any decision which he or she may intend to take to establish policy which may impact on the conduct of police operations or the maintenance and enforcement of good conduct, good order and discipline.

The UN, together with the Joint Task Force, conducted the screening process37

from September 2006 until the signing of the Supplemental Agreement on 1 December 2006. The AFP Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP) implemented a training program for those officers who passed the screening. The screening and certification process proved to be slow and at the end of 2007 a total of 1317 PNTL officers had passed the provisional certification course; a further 1309 officers awaited provisional certification.38 A JTF officerstated that the communities of Timor-Leste demanded a ‘squeaky clean’police.39 This might be so in a developed country where public knowledge of transparency and accountability is high; however, within Timor-Leste all the communities wanted was the PNTL to return to the streets.40

The screening process did not confine itself to the incidents of April and May 2006. It reviewed all disciplinary cases of officers from the start of the PNTL in 2000.41 However, as disciplinary systems and procedures were weak duringmost of that time, a number of PNTL officers passed the screening process whoshould have failed. Furthermore, some popular high-profile officers did not pass the screening and were set aside. These examples do not give the screening process legitimacy in the eyes of the PNTL or the broader community. The Supplemental Agreement42 states:

‘ … any PNTL officer, having been registered as a PNTL police officer and subsequently has his or her registration cancelled, is terminated forthwith and that he or she is precluded from service during the currency of this Supplemental Arrangement in any position within the PNTL.’.43

It would appear that post-UN, the government of the day may re-engage those officers who fail the registration process. The PNTL now has up to 300 officers

37 All PNTL officers were stood down following 25 May 2006 and had to undergo a screening process to be re-admitted to the PNTL. The screening process undertook to review all disciplinary records of the PNTL and required officers to undertake a training course, as well assix-months mentoring by UNPol officers, to be re-admitted.38 UNMIT Annual Report 2007.39 Conversation between the JTF officer and the author August 2006.40 Meeting with the Prime Minister, President, Minister for Interior and Suco chiefs in late July 2006 - attended by the author.41 In many cases the files had been lost, the discipline had been carried out, or cases that were years old remained open due to poor investigation or lack of evidence. 42 Chapter II Fundamental Principles, Section 2 PNTL Personnel, paragraph 2(b).43 Page 4, Section 2.2 of the Supplemental Agreement.


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who may not return as police officers; their futures remain unknown two years after the crisis. This in itself has the potential to create a group of disgruntled petitioners similar to those within the F-FDTL. The mentoring process established by UNMIT has failed to fully engage the PNTL44 and should not be used by UNMIT as a measure of success for this mission. Even if the mentoring was successful, many of the PNTL who are yet to go through the certification process will not be able to complete it due to UNMIT ending on 25 February 2009. The G-RDTL needs to consider the efficacy of continuing with the registration, certification and mentoring program. The reform, restructuring and rebuilding Plan of the PNTL and the Ministry of Interior, which was to be submitted to the government ninety days after the commencement of the Supplemental Agreement on 1 December 2006, are still works in progress as of 31 March 2008. The PNTL’s management, administrative and operational difficulties still exist and in some cases have deteriorated.45

With less than twelve months until the UN mission ends, it is important to ensure that not only is the mandate carried out completely, but also thelegislation, policy, systems and procedures under development are fully implemented.

PART B - DISCUSSION PAPER

National culture – a broad definition

The definitions on culture detailed below are designed to encourage further thought and discussion on the importance of culture in development of any capacity building assistance within the PNTL. One of the key tests for any development program should be: ‘How does this fit within the culture of the PNTL?’. Furthermore, this test should trickle down into every development activity undertaken.

In its broader sense46, culture describes societies or groups of people based onhow they are perceived or perceive themselves, sharing similar ideals, values,

44 Report on the PNTL Evaluation of the UNPol Mentoring Program, February 2008.45 Lack of appropriate legislation following the change of government; the interim arrangements for the appointment of a Comandante-Geral and deputies; increase of salaries and allowances without proper policy and procedures; and the ongoing screening processweakening morale are just some of the many issues impacting on the PNTL.46 There are many kinds and levels of culture at the broadest level such as global culture, the culture of the eastern hemisphere, the Lusophone, Francophone and Anglophone cultures to name a few. This paper however confines itself to the discussion of national culture in the broader cultural context.


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religious beliefs, way of life, and customs.47 In Timor-Leste for example, the Portuguese culture is very evident in daily life. However, also in evidence are less ubiquitous Indonesian cultural influences. As Timor-Leste was a Portuguese colony from the early 17th century until 1975, the blending of both cultures continued over time, with patterns of behaviour and expectations emerging and becoming assimilated into the local society.48 This cultural assimilation was so strong that it endured through the occupation by Indonesia—although again, the culture was dynamic and blended, with some aspects of the Indonesian culture being transmitted through the teaching of Bahasa Indonesian in schools.

Many of the cultural changes49 from Indonesia were overlaid on pre-existing core assumptions and, given the inherent dislike of Indonesia50, would seem to be paradoxical post-1999. The expression of cultural ambiguities and paradoxes may exist until new cultural adaptations generate new belief systems and core assumptions over time.51 This seems to be true in the case of Timor-Leste, though the Indonesian occupation may not have been long enough to affect core beliefs and assumptions.

Louis52 asserts that culture is ‘[a] set of understandings or meanings shared by a group of people that are largely tacit among members and are clearly relevant and distinctive to the particular group which are also passed on to new members.’ This view sees culture as being embedded in social life. Culture is a natural progression for individuals coming together in social groups, in

47 Kluckhohn, FR & Strodtbeck, FL 1961, ‘Variations in value orientations’, Evanston IL, Row, Peterson & Wuthmow, R, and Witten, M 1988 ‘New directions in the study of culture’. Annual Review of Sociology (14) pp 49–67.48 ‘Indonesia's attempt to integrate the East Timorese failed quite simply because the population had already been integrated into, and partly assimilated to, Portuguese civilisation. Jakarta's army did not invade a Portuguese 'colony' but an overseas province of Portugal. However, placed in terms of socio-economic development, East Timor was officially considered an integral part of Portugal—as integral as Lisbon or Coimbra—and Portuguese schoolchildren were taught that Tatamailau, south of Dili, was 'the highest mountain in Portugal'. Portugal's approach was to embrace the Timorese as fellow Portuguese.’ Dr Geoffrey Hull, Director of Linguistic Survey of East Timor, University of Western Sydney, <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/arts/ling/stories/s113139.htm>.49 The Bahasa Indonesian language was used widely throughout the country (then a province of Indonesia), with the language being used in schools and business. For further information regarding the impact of culture on language, see ‘The Importance of Teaching Culture in the Foreign Language Classroom’, Thanasoulas, D 2001. Because of the colonial education system and the 23-year Indonesian occupation, approximately 13.5 % of Timorese speak Portuguese, 43.3 % speak Bahasa Indonesian, and 5.8 % speak English. The most common of the local languages, Tetum, is spoken by approximately 91% of the population, of which 46.2% only speak Tetum Prasa, the form of Tetum dominant in the Dili district. The local languages Mambae, Kemak and Fataluku are also widely spoken. (World Factbook East Timor, 2006).50 The changing of the official language to Portuguese was an attempt at minimising Indonesian influences within the newly created nation. Unfortunately, with Bahasa Indonesian so widely used throughout the country, the changing of the official language was a contributor to the split between the population and the government.51 Trice H & Beyer J 1993, ‘The cultures of work organization’, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.52 Louis M 1980, op cit.


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communities, and as a nation. This would appear to be true in the case of Timor-Leste as it emerged from colonisation and occupation and developed further as a nation post-2002. However, traditional values and beliefs remained firmly entrenched within society and in many cases were overlooked in developing legislation, policy and procedures within the government.

Allaire and Firsirotu53 contend that culture is ‘a system of knowledge, of standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating and acting … that serve to relate human communities to their environmental settings.’ They argue that culture is formed from social interactions with distinct observable practices such as language, use of symbols and artefacts, ceremonies and customs, methods of problem solving, use of tools or technology, and design of work settings. Social groups create this through social interaction and use them to confront the broader social environment54, implying that cultural change is structured and can be managed.

With independence in 2002 came the struggle by the country’s leaders to assert their own national identity following centuries of colonisation and occupation. While culture can be managed, it takes time to evolve and the Timorese leaders did not have this luxury. They set out, with the assistance of the UN, to systematically forge a national identity and provide a vision for the future. These changes to the culture of Timor-Leste by the government were not completely compatible with the overall expectations of the population and may have been one of the triggers for the ensuing violence in 2006. Weakening of the national culture impacted negatively on the civil service as a whole, and in particular on the culture of the PNTL.

Police culture

A police culture is almost tangible, underpinned by good discipline, the uniform, the respect for the law and the trust of fellow officers.

There has been much discussion on police culture, but most articles concentrate on the negative aspects or the deviant behaviour of police55 without covering the positive aspects of police being the upholders of the law. A police culture should have well-articulated and identifiable qualities, with an overarching philosophy of good discipline. Police officers should be able to say they:

(1) keep public peace and order(2) prevent attempts to destabilise the democratic order of the country(3) impartially apply the rule of law

53 Allaire Y & Firsirotu ME 1984, ‘Theories of organization culture’, Organisational Studies, vol. 5, pp. 193–226.54 Wuthnow and Witten, 1988, op cit.55 Chan 1997, Fitzgerald 1989, Manning 1977, Prenzler 1997, Skolnick 1966 & Wood 1997


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(4) perform other police services for the public(5) are non-discriminatory.

Goldsmith56 argues that:

In an environment perceived as hostile and unpredictable, the police culture offers its members reassurance that the other officers will 'pull their weight' in police work, that they will defend, back-up and assist their colleagues when confronted with external threats, and that they will maintain secrecy in the face of external investigations. In return for loyalty and solidarity, members of the police culture enjoy considerable individual autonomy to ‘get on with the job.

This quid pro quo can be both a negative and positive cultural trait for police: at the very least it provides them with a sense of belonging, and if negative, it provides a sense of entitlement and lack of accountability. In the case of the PNTL, members were provided very basic training over three months and then turned out into a newly created police environment without the support and networks provided to recruits in countries with established police organisations. Because of this, many subcultures developed based on the geographic location, input by various UNPol, and individual leaders’ cultural and/or political affiliations.

UNPol’s mandate was to manage policing in Timor-Leste until the formal handover to the PNTL in December 2003. The PNTL officers emerged from the recruit training into an artificial policing environment still being managed by UNPol with its eclectic mix of police cultures. UNPol officers were rotated every six months, causing much disruption in some areas as new officers came in and set up systems and procedures according to what they were familiar with in their home forces.57 There was not one standardised administrative or operational policing system operating throughout the country during this time.58 The PNTL operated under both UNTAET regulations and Indonesian law until much of the legislative framework was completed in 2004.

Following the handover by the UN in late 2003, a number of the PNTL specialist units designed and purchased their own uniforms. By early 2006 there were seven different uniforms in use within the PNTL, all with a number of different logos and operating procedures. There was some concern, expressed by donors and the media, that some of these units may present a threat to the PNTL and to the overall stability of the country. This was caused mainly by the units not 56 Goldsmith A 1990, ‘Taking Police Culture Seriously: Police Discretion and the Limits of Law’,Policing and Society, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 91–114.57 There is no evidence of successor planning and no handover/takeover for UNPols. There have been many instances where all computers files were wiped clean and no records or files were left for the incoming officer. 58 This problem was discussed at a workshop on budgeting for PNTL conducted at the Police Academy in February 2004 by the author.


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having clear terms of reference and not understanding their roles within the broader PNTL. There are numerous examples of inappropriate police actions signifying negative PNTL cultural traits. These include a police officer threatening to shoot the petrol bowsers at a service station after the staff refused to fill his jerry cans. He then proceeded to the office and ripped the memorandum from the Comandante-Geral instructing the company to fill only registered police motor vehicles off the wall; civilian staff threatened after refusing requests for cash without proper procedures being followed; a police officer assaulting catering staff when delivery of meals was late; and daily examples of police vehicles being driven aggressively, forcing other vehicles off the road. Many of these cases go unreported due to fear of the police.

How is the culture perpetuated?Police culture is perpetuated through recruit training at the police academy—the culture being inculcated into new members from their first day. Recruits are not automatically accepted into the culture by virtue of passing out of the academy.59 The academy is seen as reinforcing the positive cultural values of the police, and while these rules, symbols, values and ethics are seen as important, the cement that binds them all together in the field is trust, esprit de corps and reliance on fellow officers in times of crisis.60 In the case of Timor-Leste, recruitment and selection was done initially by the UN; a homogenous police culture with shared values and ethics failed to materialise, leaving the PNTL either adopting cultural norms from various UNPol officers or developing their own cultural norms according to their own perceptions or previous experiences.

Some recruits based their perception of police on what they had experienced under Indonesian occupation.61 The gap in PNTL perceptions was further widened by the adoption throughout the country of various policing (operational and administrative) procedures in the initial stages of the PNTL development. Many commands had different administrative forms and operational procedures from those being used at police headquarters. Correction did not start until 2004 following the JAM Report findings which expressed donors’ concern that the capacity development of the PNTL was not keeping pace with overall institutional strengthening.

59 The ‘rite of passage’ for recruits may occur after demonstrated acceptance of the operational culture in the field. This may include, in some instances ‘de-training’ of the values and ethics learned at the academy.60 There is evidence that many of the earliest PNTL recruits still identify with their class number. The class number is also recorded on the personnel database.61 Mainly based on the Indonesian POLRI as the only model experienced by the recruits. Additionally about 300 initial recruit officers were ex-POLRI officers and were recruited to positions of authority.


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Other areas affecting the development of a homogeneous police culture of the PNTL are:

insufficient time for the UN mission to complete its mandate political interference in both the UN mandate and the PNTL operations large number of nations involved in the UN missions with a continuous

changeover of personnel lack of consistent in-field training following recruit training negative behaviour being overlooked, or seen as too difficult to address

thereby reinforcing many negative cultural aspects within the PNTL the east/west ethnic divide62

lack of experienced ‘capacity development’ advisers within the various UN missions63

lack of resources to support capacity development across the country language and cultural differences and expectations both within the PNTL

and within the various UN missions continuous cycle of change introduced into the PNTL or change fatigue donor frenzy, providing ad hoc training and assistance to the PNTL Indonesian POLRI seen as a police model by many PNTL and the

community expectations of development partners too high or too sophisticated for the

needs of the PNTL64

incongruence between emerging PNTL culture and the expectations of the community.

With such a large and diverse influences affecting the organisational culture, it is remarkable that the PNTL did not disintegrate further during 2006.

Alignment with national culture

PNTL culture must concur with overall national culture as it develops over timeand with society’s subsequent expectations of what constitutes a good police service. The PNTL should also influence the national culture by making the general population aware of its role in society, such as upholding the laws and regulations governing the country, and the consequences of breaking these laws. A police culture that is out of step with the national culture can lead to communities living in fear of police. The PNTL needs clear vision and focus on its role in society, particularly in relation to accountability and human rights.

62 The Policia Nationalista Group was formed in 2004 by a number of eastern PNTL Officers critical of the management of the PNTL. At the time of the crisis, the case against the ringleaders of this group had been determined by the Office of Inspectorate within the Ministry of Interior, but the findings had not been made public.63 The UN continued to fund UNPols who lacked specialist expertise in their areas of placement. Also there is a difference between those advisers who have specialist skills and those who are able to transfer those skills to the local PNTL.64 Including human rights and gender NGOs negatively reporting on the PNTL before systems and procedures are in place to address these issues.


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The PNTL is currently out of step, due to a lack of understanding Portuguese.65

The majority of the PNTL are either not aware of the legislation they aregoverned by, or if so, have a copy that has been badly translated to either Tetum or Bahasa Indonesian.66 This is exacerbated by the poor literacy level of the PNTL. It is difficult to uphold the law without a good legislative framework and impossible to align with community expectations without clarifying the legislative framework within the operating environment.

Informal police cultures

Subcultures consist of distinctive clusters of ideologies, cultural norms and other practices such as trust in fellow police officers, loyalty, service commitment anddistrust of management.67 This also applies to a police subculture. Differences among subcultures within an organisation may lead to discord. In PNTL policing, one of the areas of most tension was the operational and administrative arms of the organisational structure. Many operational police see administration as an easier job within policing.68 Tensions may also be evident when there are differences among subcultures within the police, particularly if they are competing for the same resources.

As the PNTL developed during 2000-06, both formal and informal groups emerged: the Rapid Intervention Unit, Reserve Police Unit, Border Patrol Unit and Immigration Unit were formally endorsed by the government under the Organic Law of 2004. Informally, the Policia Nationalista, a group of dissatisfied police officers, was formed due to inter alia, dissatisfaction with the PNTL management and the government.

In 2004 each of the formal specialist units designed and purchased uniforms in different styles to the approved uniform of the PNTL. This growing trend of separate identities and subsequent emerging command-and-control problems were of particular concern to donors and other interested stakeholders. Many of these specialist units saw themselves as superior to the general PNTL, and in

65 In many instances the legislation was cut and pasted from various Lusophone countries. The author makes no comment on the appropriateness or otherwise of adopting Portuguese as the national language; whatever language the government chose would have brought about similar challenges. The problems referred to are those of a vast majority of the population not understanding the national language and donors/UNPols not having competence in either official language.66 Much of the translation is undertaken by non-legal translators which itself causes problems regarding the interpretation of laws.67 Trice H 1993, ‘Occupational subcultures in the workplace’, Ithaca, NR: ILR Press, p. 174.68 There has been very little progress to date regarding the assimilation of the 41 civilian positions (including appointment to Director posts) within the PNTL. Most have been given little opportunity to undertake their duties in relation to the roles. In addition, the Administration does not have a ‘service’-oriented philosophy to support the operational areas.


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some instances reported directly to the Minister of Interior69 rather than to the Comandante-Geral.70 This exacerbated management issues, with the commanders of these various units either making decisions in isolation or under the command of the Minister of Interior.

Post-crisis 2006, international forces stood down the PNTL within Dili and proceeded to develop a screening process which allowed for the re-integration of PNTL officers. The standing down of the PNTL was not seen as a priority by the then Minister of Interior, Dr Alcino Baris71 or the Suco chiefs72 who expressed concern that the PNTL were not returning to the streets to assist in the control of the gangs.

In hindsight, this stand down affected both morale and whatever was left of the overall police culture within the PNTL. With the screening process initiated by the JTF and UN, many of the newly formed subcultures from the crisis, as well as the existing subcultures within the PNTL, were driven underground.73 Many of these subcultures are still currently in existence.74

Development of cultural norms in PNTL

Cultural norms give an organisation its personality.

The cultural norms expected by the government are clearly spelt out in the oath taken by each graduating officer at the academy. This is memorised and usually led by the valedictorian at each passing-out parade.

69 This political interference disempowered the Commandant-Geral and saw the Minister and Vice-Minister directing operations throughout the PNTL. Had the Commandant-Geral been able to manage the PNTL without this interference, then the PNTL may have been more effective during the crisis of April-May 2006. 70 The political interference also hindered the UNPol in developing a good line of command within the PNTL.71 The former Minister of Interior Dr Alcino Baris was working towards reconciliation within the PNTL as the first priority and had brought the former Comandante-Geral and deputies together to try to resolve the issues in August 2006,72 Meeting held in August 2006 at the Ministry of Interior Building chaired by the President and Prime Minister.73 Similar to those of the Fretilin guerilla movement and the Seven-Seven, Five-Five and other clandestine youth groups formed during the Indonesian occupation.74 Some are associated with rebel factions and alleged to have stolen weapons and other resources under their control.


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Article 6 of the oath for the PNTL reads:

I swear that I will fulfil all my duties and perform the functions that have been invested in me as a member of the National Police of Timor-Leste without fear, without malice and without hatred, and that I will do my utmost to keep and consolidate public peace and order by preventing any sort of attempt against the democratic order and strictly abiding by the rule of law.

I swear that I will carry out my functions without discrimination on any ground such as colour, race, gender, marital status, ethnical origin, language, social or economic status, political or Ideological convictions, religion, education and physical or mental condition.

The early stages of the development of culture within the PNTL should beginwithin the police academy valorising the contents of the oath. Each officer should have a sense of unity ingrained, a sense of trust of fellow officers, a sense of duty, and a sense of pride in the PNTL; all of these encased in a fervour to uphold the laws of the country and the oath of office.

A breach of the oath constitutes a disciplinary offence, though rarely enforced due to lack of good disciplinary management. The prevalence of negative and at times competing subcultures also means that developing cultural norms, and changing the existing culture, would require strategies for change to align with positive cultural norms already existing in the culture of the PNTL.

Existing culture and subcultures in the PNTL

A detailed analysis of the PNTL needs to be undertaken to identify a number of existing cultures within the PNTL. This analysis will highlight both positive and negative traits. It is important to retain those traits that will assist the PNTL in moving forward as well as minimise the effects of those negative traits that mayimpede the progress of the PNTL.

G-RDTL expectations

The government has the overall mandate for internal security within Timor-Leste. Through legislation, it has delegated some of its powers to the PNTL to maintain civil order. The government also has certain expectations of the PNTL regarding its operations and support in providing internal security for the country, as well as it accountability to the government for its actions. While internal security is not the sole responsibility of the PNTL, it must take a lead role in ensuring the government and community are made aware of, and comply with, legislation pertaining to internal security.


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Community expectations

The various community groups, including the business community, international community and NGOs have certain expectations of the PNTL and these must be taken into consideration when defining the overall PNTL culture. A survey of community perceptions of the PNTL undertaken by the Asia Foundation in 200575

provided invaluable information regarding what the community expected from the police. Its findings could be used as a baseline for information to align community perceptions with an emerging PNTL culture.

Emerging future culture

The PNTL must also be aware of, and participate fully in, the overall plans of the country to ensure that policing strategy keeps pace with development. To do this will require changes to the culture of the PNTL allowing it to evolve into an efficient and effective police service. Identification of positive traits should initially encompass those espoused in the oath of office. These can be expanded once there is evidence of traction within the PNTL; however, it is necessary to get the core functions working first. Negative traits should be identified and discussed widely within the PNTL. They should provide the solutions themselves as to how these will be eliminated over time. Changing culture relies on management making a long-term commitment and having both the determination and vision for the PNTL moving forward. This vision must contain the expectations of both the government and the communities to ensure that it remains in harmony with the overall emerging national culture. Changing police culture will require a concerted effort by the PNTL and an endorsement by the government and communities to ensure that the PNTL develops appropriately. Internal security, crime and the fear of crime are national issues that should be addressed by all sectors of the nation. A country that allows its police to be solely responsible for addressing these issues will merely add a further issue, fear of police.

Strategies to improve PNTL culture

The following strategies are not exhaustive but are designed to provide examples of how the PNTL can develop outside the frameworks undertaken over the last eight years, or those touted by experts who fly in and out of the country delivering their opinions with no true understanding of the real culture of Timor-Leste. If the government and donors are serious about developing the PNTL, it is time to start thinking of methods that suit the unique environment of Timor-Leste.

75 Source Asia Foundation, Dili Timor-Leste


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Implicit in the development of strategies for the PNTL is the undertaking ofappropriate analysis at all levels.76

Overarching strategies for the PNTL – The ‘umbrella’ approach

No police service can operate without good discipline and administrative and procedural accountability for actions taken by its officers. Without discipline, no administrative or operational function will be effective. By its very nature, the PNTL needs to rely heavily on good discipline to bring about law and order within the country. Good discipline should not be seen merely as a motivational factor for success; rather, it should be inculcated into every function carried out by the PNTL. Discipline is what holds the PNTL together and should define the culture of the PNTL. Discipline should be accepted as a necessary consequence for officers who do not obey the regulations of the PNTL. It needs to be woven into all improvement strategies, policies and procedures. Discipline should not only be seen as a negative reinforcement; it should take into consideration the ‘identification of non-compliance methodology’ discussed elsewhere.

A further overarching strategy is that of leadership and management. Without leaders who are able to control their commands effectively, the PNTL will continue to be seen as an ineffective organisation that is a potential threat to overall national security. The UN mandate of August 2006 provided UNPol with the authority to rectify this situation by UNPol assuming the various commands across the country. This should have provided firm leadership, vision and direction, but almost two years further on, the PNTL is still grappling with the same internal issues. UNPol has again failed to implement anything but the simplest of strategies. The volume and complexity of changes required to move the PNTL forward cannot be achieved with inexperienced officers within the existing PNTL.77 Management and leadership, training and experience, should be provided at every possible opportunity as an overarching strategy for the PNTL.78

Ethics and values

To ensure that there is a cultural shift toward a more transparent and accountable policing service, all strategies should be tested for the ability to support both ethics and values within the PNTL. All development activities should incorporate ethics and values in some regard as part of a whole-of-organisational approach to instilling appropriate behaviours within the PNTL.

76 Refer to ‘Serious, not superficial analysis of issues’ on page 40.77 The only clear strategy to overcome the leadership and management problems is for the government to consider as a matter of urgency, the recruiting of international contract officers to fill the management and leadership void. These officers should be appointed to targeted areas within operations and administration. 78 Though training should not be seen as the panacea for all leadership and management inexperience that exists within the PNTL.


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‘What has worked in the past’ strategy

Previous successes and lessons are important to consider when developing strategy and this should be part of the overall analysis undertaken prior to implementation. The core functions of policing need to be analysed to ensure that these strategies are undertaken first. Developing a sophisticated model for policing can hinder implementation and can cause even the most basic of strategies to fail. However, not all systems and procedures within the PNTL are failing; many function quite well—some police commands function effectively. In affecting further change, it must be remembered that areas that work well need to be identified. Failure to consider impacts in multiple areas may prevent any project from gaining traction, thus reinforcing the need for serious issue analysis prior to developing the change project plan. The development of the strategies discussed above need also to be aligned with the new approaches for ongoing management of change strategies discussed in the next section.

Service delivery strategy

One of the main influences of cultural change within the PNTL needs to be geared toward delivery of services to the government and the community. PNTL’s recognition of its mission to provide both internal services to the PNTL,and external services to the government and communities, is an essential part of the re-development of its culture. An emphasis on achievable and measurable services expected to be delivered by the PNTL is a necessary part of the overall analysis.

Any change in culture must include the service delivery from all areas of the PNTL. One of the tests to be used in the analysis of each PNTL directory/unit is the identification of services to be delivered, the strategy to measure them, and their effectiveness. Performance indicators should be put into place to ensure that service delivery is monitored and kept to the fore. Training needs to ensure that each of the areas recognises what service delivery is, and how to recognise services and service delivery within their own areas.


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‘Ownership’ strategy

Capacity building is seen as the ability of individuals to perform work related functions, solve problems and set and achieve work related objectives over time. In developing countries, this capacity building is usually undertaken by international aid agencies using technical experts as advisers. At the beginning of the process the individuals targeted for capacity building (the counterparts)need to develop a sense of ownership of the process for it to be sustainable over time. Ownership is important but is separate and distinct from consultation and participation.79 One of the essential results of the capacity building of identified counterparts is the transference of ownership. Without ownership any intervention will not be successful.

Each change intervention is different, and may require different approaches to ensure success. However, there are a number of logical steps in developing ownership of counterparts that may be followed:

Development phase

Involve stakeholders/counterparts in determining the focus and scope of the change project80 and provide them with information on the benefits of the change project.

Seek inputs from the stakeholders/counterparts on their expectations ofwhat should be included in the project and what impact the change project will have on all stakeholders.81

Design a development plan which includes tasks to be completed;timeframes, who will undertake the tasks, monitoring, evaluation and review.

Analyse the development plan.

Identify challenges and incorporate strategies to overcome or minimise within the development plan.

Prioritise and determine sequence of the requirements.

Complete and circulate a design map while seeking support and understanding from the stakeholders/counterparts.

79 Consultation and participation are critical steps toward the development of ownership.80 It is important to ensure that counterparts understand why the project needs to be undertaken and what the benefits will be.81 The impact of any change program can be far-reaching and it is important to ensure that all areas, both within and outside the PNTL, are assessed for the potential impact of changes.


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Determine the cost of the change project in terms of financial and human resources requirements.

Circulate the final design map for the approval phase.

Stakeholders evaluate and assess the program.

Design phase

Depending on the change project, stakeholders may or may not be involved in the development phase (e.g. the software design will be left to the IT experts if it is not deemed important for personnel to learn the skills). Where experience and skill levels are low, and depending on the type of change project82, it may be designed by advisers who provide feedback on its progress. Failure to grasp a true understanding of the key concepts of the change project can cause alienation and loss of momentum toward acceptance and eventual ownership by stakeholders/counterparts.

The development plan should be followed loosely, remembering that the environment and situations may change. These changes may require a review of strategies as well as the prioritising and sequencing of the project.

In designing a change project, it is important that the core functions of the project are working. The design of the core functions should be seen as the main priority; add-ons and advancements to the project should be completed after the core is working. Over-complication of the project is one of the biggesthindrances to implementation. Complicated projects will cause confusion and counterparts may lose interest in its outcomes.

Implementation phase

This phase is where true ownership starts to evolve, and counterparts begin to see both the benefits and rewards of the project. Project implementation mustinclude a handover/changeover plan in which the counterpart can see when they will assume responsibility. This should be after the achievement of certain performance indicators, or demonstrated competence in completing tasks within the project.

Community participation strategy

All projects that affect the communities of Timor-Leste require communication with as many members of the community as possible, including NGOs, business

82 Development of policy, systems, procedures and plans are examples where it may be better for counterparts to be exposed to the completed model to gain an understanding. See ‘Backfilling for capacity building’ on page 37 for further information.


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owners, community leaders and churches. While this is a time-consuming exercise, it can be achieved in part by the PNTL regularly publishing a newsletter or bulletin providing information about progress to date on changes being undertaken, and future planned changes, which could elicit inputs fromcommunity members or groups. This could be supplemented by media campaigns as well as community meetings held by various district commanders.Communication is a vital tool for the PNTL in improving its image and in keeping a positive relationship with the communities it serves.

Human rights strategy

Human rights must be taken into consideration when assessing the impact of all change projects within the PNTL. In cultural change for the PNTL, one of the biggest impacts will be the international human rights policy and procedures tobe implemented. It must be noted however that human rights policy is a national issue and cannot be solved by the PNTL alone. Without a concerted effort by government and communities, the PNTL will find it very difficult to put into practice the principles they are trying to uphold and they will be out of step with communities’ realities.

NEW APPROACHES FOR ONGOING MANAGEMENT OF CHANGESTRATEGIES WITHIN THE PNTL

The strategies detailed below highlight a number of different courses of action in approaching capacity building and in changing the culture within the PNTL.83

The purpose of this section is to encourage discussion by those involved in aid delivery and to develop new implementation strategies for institutional strengthening and capacity building in Timor-Leste.

Transitionary period for implementation of rules and regulations Law and order are intrinsically linked to sound economic growth. This principle is most evident in developing countries. But whose law?

In developed countries, administrative and legal accountability are perceived as individual responsibility for breaking the rules. Right and wrong are generally black or white. When a police officer is the transgressor, much of the investigation is about determining right from wrong, and then holding the officer to account for their actions. The punishment is then a further reinforcement ofobeying the laws in the future. In Timor-Leste the relationships among officers and subordinates is very fluid. They are influenced by familial relationship,societal position, status within political parties/youth groups, and international social connection. Determining right from wrong may not necessarily follow

83 While this paper has been written specifically for the PNTL some of the capacity building strategies could apply to other sectors, or to capacity building as a whole.


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written rules and regulations because of these social or cultural pressures. A Timorese is not viewed as an individual, but as an integral part of the village, and in many instances punishment of the individual can have a flow-on effect within the community. Actions clearly articulated in legislation as misdemeanours may be culturally justifiable to the Timorese, and not seen as being as critical as they do to the internationals assisting in development. There is also the traditional justice84 for Suco chiefs and councils to settle disputes. Major crimes85 may also be settled in this forum through the payment of buffalo, pigs and money. Contrary to the laws of the country, the police may assist in the negotiations for the settlement of these disputes, or fail to investigate upon hearing that traditional justice has been carried out. International programs/advisers who continue to push for strict compliance without recognising this cultural incongruence will continue to fail in their efforts.

Society’s overall expectation is that there is justice. However, there is also an expectation by society for forgiveness of certain transgressions86,or for certain people within the community. This does not necessarily make that activity less corrupt in the eyes of the country’s judiciary, but it does mean that there needs to be a different approach to the methodology and implementation of changes to laws, policies and systems within the government.

In Los Palos in 200787, a truck driver hit and killed a couple on a motor bike. It was alleged the truck driver was drunk at the time of the accident. Following negotiations within the community, the driver was ‘fined’ one buffalo and one pig—his entire personal assets. The driver was a major contributor to the community income and punishing him further would bring hardship to the whole community. The couple’s six children would continue to be cared for by the extended family. Loss of life may be seen as ‘God’s will’. In managing this case itself, the whole community was satisfied with the outcome. The police were called to the scene of the accident, but did not take any further action. In a similar case in 200488, a police officer hit and killed one person and seriously injured the pillion passenger. He was drunk at the time. He was imprisoned for eighteen months and fined $US5000. His wife and children, being left without an income, as well as the extended family89 having to pay for the fine, were perceived to be the victims of this punishment. 84 Decree-Law No. 5/2004 on community authorities.85 Although clearly beyond the competency designated within the Decree-Law No. 5/2004, rapes, road accident deaths and incest are not uncommon complaints to be handled by the community itself. 86 For example, there was talk that the previous government was planning an amnesty for the former Minister of Interior and Defence personnel petitioners. (Discussed at an interview with former Minister of Interior, Rogerio Lobato and the author in late October 2006.) Rogerio Lobato was pardoned by the President in late April 2008.87 Interview by the author with residents from Los Palos February 2008.88 PNTL Case File Ministry of Interior 2005.89 Any debt is seen as a ‘family’ debt and therefore if it is not able to be paid by the immediate family, then the extended family must meet the commitment. Debts may carry over from one generation to another until fully cleared.


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With this type of collective thinking within communities, it will be very difficult to change both PNTL and community thinking toward rules and regulations of international standards. Continuing on the same path as the previous six years in Timor-Leste would not only be a waste of time and money for international partners, but it also has the potential of turning the Timorese communities away from foreign rules and regulations90 and adopting the more traditional approaches to the management of Timor-Leste. This would not be good for the interests of the Timorese, nor for the development partners trying to alleviate poverty and encourage fiscal responsibility.

To continue with the same development strategy for the PNTL has the possibility of doing more harm than good. Unless a new path of action is undertaken, the PNTL will continue along the same downward spiral.

PNTL officers are under enormous pressure due to their relationships and position within the communities of Timor-Leste. The country has a relatively small population of fewer than one million people who traditionally have very large families, which means that the immediate and extended families of the officers stretch across all levels of society. It is very rare to find PNTL officers who would not have a conflict of interest91 in undertaking the day-to-day duties of policing. A hastily trained police within a fractured culture places a huge amount of responsibility on individual grassroots PNTL officers to comply with regulations not fully explained, or congruent with their lifestyle.

For change intervention to be considered successful by development partners92, full compliance with rules and regulations93 is required and does not take into consideration the blurring of human rights violations. Any deviation from these rules and regulations is deemed a failure.94 In the case of PNTL, this may necessitate some disciplinary action to be initiated or, at the very least, the perception of the PNTL by the international community is diminished. While it is acknowledged that indiscipline within the PNTL should not be condoned95, to continue to enforce change intervention blindly without providing a logical and sequenced plan of implementation of the legislation, policy, system or procedures is doomed to failure.

90 There is already evidence of both change and donor fatigue within the government and communities of Timor-Leste.91 This can also include bias due to family feuds, business relationship, political affiliations,gang and other organisation memberships. 92 Within a policing environment context.93 These rules and regulations are international standards.94 Human Rights Watch and the US Department of Justice regularly report and highlight the problems associated with human rights abuse in Timor-Leste, but fail to provide acceptable environmental solutions.95 Especially issues relating to human rights, the rights of children and vulnerable people.


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Each change strategy implemented that requires a shift in the overall culture within Timor-Leste or the PNTL should have a built-in transition period of between three to five years96 to ensure that PNTL personnel are assisted and guided through the change process successfully. Strategies for the transitionary period may include the following.

Development of an implementation plan to include:- identification of strategies; performance indicators and timeframes- identification of counterparts to be trained in implementation- identification of inputs and outputs for the implementation plan- environmental analysis of the implementation plan- impact assessment on the overall PNTL- development of a training program for the implementation- development of a monitoring and review mechanism- establishing a database for results.

Identification of non-compliance methodologyProcedures to deal with personnel who fail to comply with regulations which may include:- interviews with personnel to determine cause97

- case management98

- providing re-training in areas of non-compliance for personnel if needed

- up-skilling or transferring personnel if required- changing environmental factors in the workplace99

- seeing any disciplinary action as the new beginning not the end.

Concentrating on the results of the implementation strategies, as a measure of success.

Implementation should take up the majority of time in any capacity development planning process. This has not been the case with the development of the PNTL where the development of policy is seen as the end of the project and not the beginning.

Getting a policy approved is only the beginning

Most of the changes being undertaken within the PNTL are either within legislation, policy, or systems and procedures. It is clear that many of the

96 In some cases this could be extended to ten years.97 This could include reviewing of personnel files to obtain a profile of non-compliant personnel and emphasising the need for compliance.98 Particularly for repeat offenders.99 Personnel may have undertaken non-compliant actions due to lack of resources; lack of leadership, or a number of other environmental factors identified in the environmental analysis.


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changes taking place are not gaining traction due to the failure of the international designers to either: (a) take into consideration the local environment or, (b) fail to build into the design mechanism an implementation program. Most international input ends with the development of the legislation, policy, systems or procedures for the PNTL. This is not the end; it is only the beginning! There is no quick fix for implementation of change strategies, it is a long, hard process. It is more important to get the strategy right than the designframeworks.100 Many require continuous review and amendment during the implementation phase. To walk away from the project upon completion of the design phase is committing the design to failure.

The development of legislation, policies and systems that do not incorporate a plan for implementation will at best be superficial, and could in fact, be detrimental to the needs of the PNTL. There is ample evidence of this within the PNTL from 2002 onwards. To be successful any implementation must be infused throughout the PNTL to ensure that true ownership101 is taken onboard.

‘Vertical slice’ approach to training

Much of the training undertaken is wasted because it is either too broad, tootechnical or too detailed for various sections of the audience. In many instances the same program is delivered to all officers. On most occasions, the commanding officer will attend the training and, by the first break, will have found a reason to slip away and may not return to the training room during the course. The commanding officer then has all these enthusiastic people returning from the training session, wanting to implement new concepts or procedures that he/she does not understand because of the missed training. Enthusiasm to affect the changes soon diminishes through the rest of the unit and the impact of the training and momentum for change is lost.

This can be overcome by recognising that various levels of the organisation require different knowledge on a particular subject. For example, the development of a strategic plan requires that management have an understanding of the strategic direction of the organisation, as well as an idea of what the planning process is, what it will achieve, and how it will measure its success. It does not require detailed knowledge of data gathering and analysis, strategy and performance indicators development, or implementation strategies. These are all the domain of the middle management of the organisation who will require that knowledge to ensure that the planning process proceeds. The other personnel within the organisation will need to have a clear picture of what

100 There are few design frameworks that get it right the first time.101 There is a misunderstanding between ‘consultation’ and ‘ownership’. While the PNTL should be consulted prior to development of any intervention, true ownership does not occur until the implementation stage. To believe that a change strategy has ownership because the PNTL were consulted in the development stage is not good capacity building practice.


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changes will affect them and why, as well as what tasks they will need to undertake in order to bring about these changes. There are three sets of training that need to take place and the inclusion of the wrong people in the wrong training is not only a waste of time, but also contributes to implementation strategy failure.

Removal of the ‘cut and paste’ paradigm to development

International development assistance has emerged as a cut and paste industry. It shouldn’t be.

Over the last ten to fifteen years the internet has spread to the most remote areas of all developing countries, vastly improving advisers’ ability to research information quickly. However, it has also meant that many documents can be cut and pasted from one country/organisation to the next, with little thought put into the localisation of the content. This has seen some legislation being developed for the PNTL with traffic regulations governing level crossings for trains; policies, procedures and plans pasted from Mozambique, Angola, Brazil,Portugal, Kosovo, Sudan, Rwanda, the US, Australia; and many other strategies from unrelated websites such as universities, hospitals and local government.102

It is appreciated that some of the contents of these documents may be applicable within the context of development within Timor-Leste. However, theirpresentation without analysis and ‘fit’ with the local environment is less than desirable for good capacity development. That this is happening across all government departments and agencies further supports the case that most capacity development advisers within the country believe that development of the legislation, policy, systems or procedures is the end point in capacity building, and that implementation is an automatic strategy following approval of the document.

Backfilling for capacity building

Timor-Leste is in a unique position having been built from the ashes of the Indonesian occupation. The majority of the PNTL officers have not held positions of authority within a police organisation before and consequently have never experienced a fully functioning, effectively operating, policing operation or command. This is similar to providing textbook training on building and operating a computer to people who have never seen or operated a properly functioning computer before. Until they see the end result working, they will have no idea of the capacity or capabilities of the machine. PNTL officers have

102 PNTL documents have included a paragraph taken from ‘Serving the American Public: Best Practices in Performance Measurement – June 1997; an overview from the OHR Mission Implementation Plan 2006-07 (replacing the words Bosnia and Herzegovina); an overview from Wikipedia; and an overview from the Feinberg School Department of Medicine ‘promotion process’.


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no model upon which to practise their acquired skills and knowledge gained over the last eight years through various training and development. These skills and knowledge can be quickly forgotten or applied inappropriately, which is not sound capacity development. In designing systems and procedures, it may be better to develop and present the model for implementation as previously discussed.

There are a large number of advisers working within the PNTL who have little or no experience in capacity building. Having technical expertise and being able to apply and pass on that knowledge and skills are two distinctly different skill sets. Working within the PNTL, there are a large number of UNPol advisers who are themselves from developing countries, or their own country has a history of human rights abuses. This begs the question of whether they have the technical expertise or the ability to apply that knowledge and skill to capacity building. If these personnel are competent in capacity building, why are they not addressing these issues in their own police services, some of whom have international aid programs themselves? Taking technically competent personnel out of an organisation receiving international aid for capacity development further weakens their own policing organisation.

Failure to launch from the design phase

The shelves are groaning with policies, plans, rules of organisation procedure,and training manuals for long-gone systems. It seems that each new mission started from the very beginning and then successfully reported the completion of a plan, policy or procedure before it moved on. Missing from the shelves,however, are the implementation plans detailing how the developed policy or plan, will be executed and what resources, activities and training will be neededto ensure that true ownership by the PNTL is achieved.

An example of this continuous design phase approach was the meeting in August 2007, where the UN conducted a workshop at the Timor Hotel that included presentations by both F-FDTL and PNTL planning. As the PNTL presented their strategies for implementation, a comparison was done by the author against the 2002-03 Institutional Capacity Building Committee Plan of Action developed following the JAM Report in 2002. Approximately 80 per centof the strategies103 within the ICBC Plan of Action remain incomplete five years later. Despite thousands of hours of planning and development, the PNTL was stuck in the design cycle and had not progressed to the implementation cycle.

No more prophet worshipping or death by planning

Lack of implementation is a key problem highlighted throughout the document. One of the main reasons for failure to implement is caused by the myriad of 103 Some of the strategies in the earlier document were not completed but were not relevant to the current plan due to changes in direction of the PNTL.


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experts coming into the country with the latest fads or quick-fix solutions to the problems of the PNTL. Implementation is hard work, and there are no easy solutions. Many of the strategies implemented today will take twelve to twenty-four months to start taking effect, and in some instances this may be much longer.

There is evidence, particularly relating to planning within the PNTL, that the implementation process has barely commenced, before someone else comes up with another new concept or idea, which catches the attention of the government and/or donors. Everything is suspended to worship the new prophet (and to design a new plan), promising quick solutions and easy pickings, only to be replaced yet again, by the next great idea brought in by a new set of experts. Forget the next model! It is time to take stock of the situation and start the hard process of implementing the core functions.

Timor-Leste has been planned to death: there are national plans, whole-of-government plans, department plans, agency plans, strategic plans, 2020 plans, five-year plans, sector investment plans, special activity plans, and annual action plans—just to name a few. Many departments have more than one donor program or project underway, and each requires a long-term plan and an annual plan. Civil servants are expected to contribute to each level of planning for the government as well as donor plans – for ownership, as well as to undertake their duties. While the importance of planning is recognised across all areas, it is also important to recognise that having so many plans is confusing, and is onereason that planning implementation fails.104 Stakeholders need to respond to the reality that planning and implementation are two distinct, yet related processes.

There are quite a number of reasons why implementation fails in Timor-Leste,and unless these are addressed, development and implementation will continue to produce mediocre results in strengthening the systems, structures and services of the government. Some of the main reasons for failure are:

too much attention to the policy or plan itself without thinking about implementation

the dreaded committee approach to planning/implementation which fails to launch about 80 per cent of the time due to: - group think – not challenging the real issues;- everyone is an expert – there are no workers;- no single responsibility if the plan fails;- bringing in the paradigms – it works at home; so it must work here;

and

104 The Sector Investment Program undertaken by the World Bank had the potential to unify much of this process, but failed to launch in the years before 2006 and went into hibernation post-crisis. It is hoped it will metamorphose sometime in the latter part of 2008.


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- political appointment rather than for expertise makes the committee large and unwieldy.

lack of vision by leaders lack of appropriate analysis – perceptions rather then true analysis lack of implementation management – no implementation plan complicating the implementation by adding in all the whistles and bells

rather then trying to get the core functions working first ignoring changed circumstances placing unrealistic timeframes ignoring the culture and subcultures within the organisation an Inwards Planning Approach – ignoring the rest of the community no separating certainty from uncertainty – are we certain this strategy will

work? What if? no bad news reporting – reporting on the 14% success and forgetting

about the 86 per cent failure ignoring flow-on impact and consequences that strategies implemented

may have interpretation problems – same information: different understanding of

the problem failure to communicate ignoring development in other areas of the organisation – lack of

coordination no Plan ‘B’.

This is not an exhaustive list but it certainly highlights some of the issues that need to be taken into consideration when undertaking a serious analysis of issues for implementation plans.

Serious, not superficial analysis of issues

Another reason that so many implementation projects fail is through the lack of appropriate and thorough social and environmental analysis, and the application of this analysis to the implementation plans. Projects have been designed without any analysis at all, including the prioritising and sequencing of the strategies to be implemented.

Projects within the PNTL affect communities within the country and it is important to ensure that the impact of these changes is known and communities are made aware of the impacts of these changes.

An analysis of the social impacts should:

1. identify which community groups will be affected and the nature and extent of the impact to these groups


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2. identify areas in which the community groups can participate in the change process

3. develop strategies to manage any negative impacts the changes may have on the community

4. provide awareness campaigns and communicate progress regularly with each of the affected groups

5. incorporate these changes within the implementation plan.

An analysis of the environmental impacts should identify:

1. internal issues105 that may impact either positively or negatively on the project

2. external issues106 that may impact either positively or negatively on the project

3. other issues that may arise due to the project such as resource requirements; training and/or additional personnel

4. any opportunities that may advance the project

5. the impact within the PNTL and more broadly within government and community.

Serious analysis - prioritising and sequencing

In developing implementation plans, strategy needs to be prioritised and sequenced to ensure that objectives and activities are undertaken in a logical and strategic way. For example, an objective to increase safety on the roads requires inter alia:

strengthening of the administration systems of the PNTL that support the Traffic Directorate

improving both internal and external communications systems within the PNTL so that internally there is consistency of the application of road rules throughout the PNTL; and externally to ensure that other departments and agencies involved in roads and traffic have an understanding of the objective and can support the work done by the PNTL

improving discipline in the PNTL to ensure that they lead by example

105 Internal issues are generally able to be changed through management and control. 106 External issues are generally outside the control of the organisation and consequently strategies may only minimise the effects.


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developing operating procedures within the PNTL

developing traffic training programs within the PNTL

reviewing the personnel requirements of the Traffic Unit to ensure there are sufficient numbers to support the objective.

This is far more complex than just starting a road-safety awareness campaign. Each one of the tasks above is a possible reason for failure of the objective if not addressed. Sequencing involves doing everything in a systematic process,with the first activity to be undertaken not necessarily seen as the priority in the area that the strategy is targeting. Sequencing requires planning of how things are going to be done and performance indicators for success should reflect the real environment – is it realistic to assume that the administration will be strengthened sufficiently to allow for this program to be undertaken in the timeframe allocated?

Serious analysis - Cultural or technical

The development of cultural strategies requires a change in the way people think or do things. These strategies require implementation over a long period of time; success requires good leadership to guide the process of change. Cultural change strategies can also be extremely complex, requiring multiple inputs to progress the strategy through to completion. Cultural change performance indicators should be qualitative, and must require benchmarking and assessments to determine the level of acceptance and change. One of the major challenges facing the PNTL is the change in attitude toward discipline. This will require enormous changes in many of its sections to ensure that the cultural strategy is effective. While there can be quantitative indicators developed for cultural change, these will tend to measure the efficiency of the implementers, rather then the change itself. For example, the redrafting of the disciplinary procedures is not going to bring about the cultural change required, but it will certainly clarify what is expected from the PNTL officers.

Technical changes, such as a change in leave forms for the Human Resources Department, only require the provision of the forms, training and monitoring the inflows of the forms to bring about the change process. Performance indicators for technical change are more likely to be quantitative or process indicators.

Serious analysis - Issues or symptoms

In determining strategy, many weaknesses developed in an analysis are symptoms of other issues rather than an analysis of the root cause. For example, poor morale could be a result of many issues such as:


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1. low salary2. lack of promotion opportunities3. dissatisfaction with management4. dissatisfaction with work being undertaken5. dissatisfaction with working environment—to name a few. These are symptoms low morale. They are not the root cause. Attempting to solve the low morale problem by increasing salaries only, is like providing aspirin for a case of malaria. It might reduce the pain and fever, but the underlying condition still exists and will resurface continually until the real issue is addressed.

Less is more (for systems and procedures)

From the beginning, one of the biggest problems faced by the PNTL was the complexity within the organisation. It is important to have all the specialist units, linkages to international databases, electronic data and other resources associated with modern policing, but not to the detriment of the core functions of policing. Basic police functions should have been the foundations on which expansion into other areas took place. Basic policing does not require computers and other sophisticated programs to function effectively. Had this strategy been in place from the beginning, then the foundations of the PNTL would have been stronger.


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CONCLUSION

The PNTL cannot afford to remain in the design phase any longer. It must move forward and start implementing the core functions of the police if it is to be sustainable, post-UN and post-ISF. All these complex and inter-related issues need to be addressed strategically before real and sustainable changes in policing can occur.

Many factors limit the implementation of democratic policing strategies into the PNTL. Such factors include a lack of effective law and justice institutions and agencies; a weak and inexperienced civil service; civil unrest and other security problems; cultural incongruence between organisations and communities;political instability; lack of legitimacy in internal security institutions; and inappropriate or insufficient aid assistance from international institutions. However, one of the most significant limiting factors has been the lack of implementation of strategies developed by the various donors, as well as the lack of attention to critical areas of police culture, accountability, ethics and transparency to ensure that the PNTL is effectively undertaking its mandate within Timor-Leste. There has been an overemphasis on the tangible strategies such as development of policy and procedures without any thought given to intangible strategies such as culture, attitudes and behaviour. Rules and regulations will not be followed unless there is a significant shift in the attitudes and behaviour of the PNTL – this is a given and cannot be emphasised enough.

We have seen the same development strategies tried and failed over the last eight years; it is time to say ‘enough is enough, let’s try something new’. The strategies to improve the PNTL culture outlined in this paper should encouragediscussion among donors, the government and the communities of Timor-Leste to generate workable solutions. Included in this discussion should be the new approaches for ongoing management of change strategies within the PNTL. Theroad is littered with the carcasses of policies and plans that have failed to gain traction or failed to be implemented, and this must be brought to a halt.

As the UN missions wind down and donor fatigue continues to grow, Timor-Leste generally, and the PNTL in particular, have only a limited window of opportunity for these changes to take place. Let’s not waste any more time in bringing the PNTL back from the brink!


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DISCUSSION TOPICS

Is the current system of development working across all sections?If yes, then how can it be improved?If no, then what needs to be done to get it working?

How do we align strategy to the culture of the PNTL?Reviewing culture within the PNTL - (analysing the culture of the PNTL).Methodology of change - (of culture - if needed).Aligning long-term cultural change to short-term strategy development.

New approaches to management of change strategies within the PNTLReviewing the approaches to change within this document – can they work?Serious analysis – no plan will be successful without it!Vertical approach to training – appropriate training for appropriate staffCut and pasting – getting serious about strategies that fitBackfilling capacity building – a concept approach rather then a bit-by-bit approachLet’s move on – get into the implementation Get rid of the prophets, they’re holding us backImplementation, Implementation, Implementation!Less is more – keep it simple

New approaches to coordination

What does the government want? (A chance to say what they really think!)

Let’s move on – Strategies for the future

Next steps – An agreed approach to some serious development strategy


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