Badiou and Law

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ALAIN BADIOU WITHIN NEO-PRAGMATISM:OBJECTIVITY AND CHANGE

Talia Morag *

I NTRODUCTION

In this paper I propose a reading of Alain Badious Logics of Worlds , through which I try to localize Alain Badiou in thecontemporary scene of neo-pragmatism. This may sound as aninherently incorrect attempt. Badiou is a systematic thinker who

proposes a theory of objectivity and change. In this respect, he iscertainly not a pragmatist. What is more, as will be explicated in this

paper, his theory carries an undeniable metaphysical weight, which isnormally rejected by pragmatists.

Nevertheless, Badious theory contains, whether explicitly or implicitly, some important pragmatic features that permit theinterpretation in which I here engage. This paper is thus meant tointroduce to the scene of neo-pragmatism the Badiouian dialecticalspirit. The pragmatic reading, in turn, will settle and clarify the meaningof central Badiouian concepts.

When I say pragmatism, I do not mean a theory of truth or amethod, but a philosophical attitude, characterized by a few centraltheses formulated by Hillary Putnam. 1

This paper follows three intertwined paths. The first isidentificatory, that is, the demonstration that Badious philosophy canindeed be interpreted pragmatically, since it complies with Putnamstheses and other pragmatic features. The second is theoretical, that is,the (pragmatist) interpretation of certain aspects of Badious theory of objectivity and change.

* University of Sydney. I would like to thank my teachers David Macarthur and PaulRedding for their comments, inspiration, and support. I would also like to thank Udi Fuchs for his comments all along the writing process and invaluable help. I thank wholeheartedly Anat

Matar and especially Robert Hockett for their remarks and insightful conversations. Many thanksto the organizers of and participants in the Law and Event Symposium held at the Cardozo LawSchool of Yeshiva University in November 2007, in particular David Carlson, Carrie Maylor, andMary Cate Ryan.

1 HILARY PUTNAM , Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity , in WORDS AND LIFE (James Conanted., 1994).


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2240 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:5

The third path is ideological. Four pictures of change are presented, each with its regulative principle. These pictures areschematized and ordered in a table at the end of the paper. In order tofollow that path I have elaborated on the issue of world-inclusion,which is not discussed in Logics of Worlds .

I. DEMOCRATIC MATERIALISM

Regulative Principle of Integration

The first thesis of pragmatism Putnam presents is anti-skepticism .As Charles S. Peirce put it, doubting an entire system of knowledge is amere make believe. 2 Philosophical doubt is inauthentic. Most of our

knowledge, at any given time, is safe from doubt.Conversely, real doubt requires justification just as much as belief. 3 This is the doubt that poses a challenge to a system of beliefsin such way that the latter may go though change. Such change isgradual rather than the full erasing of one theory and the installation of anew one in its place.

Badious anti-skepticism is his campaign against what he callsdemocratic materialism, which is, in fact, Badious reading of contemporary liberalism. I will not justify this reading by comparing itto other formulations of liberalism, but will offer arguments so as tostrengthen Badious general view. 4

The social world, according to democratic materialism, is

composed of homogeneous elements. These are people, individuals,who are all living human bodies. The homogeneity of the elements of asocial world implies that they should be treated equally by the sociallaw.

The first democratic value is thus the equality of individuals inrespect of the law. And that value is incarnated in the law of humanrights. All individuals should respect, and in turn be granted thoserights. In other words, the homogeneity of people becomes in the worldof democratic materialism the homogeneity of citizens in the eyes of thedemocratic law.

The elements of the world of democratic materialism are bound invarious groups or communities. Each community is, in effect, its own

2 Charles Sanders Peirce, What Pragmatism Is , THE MONIST , Apr. 1905, at 161-81.3 PUTNAM , supra note 1, at 152.4 ALAIN BADIOU , LOGIQUES DES MONDES (2006) [hereinafter L OGICS OF WORLDS ]. This

view is articulated mainly in the following sections of Logics of Worlds : The first section of thePreface, at 9-17, the section of lifeless worlds, book 4, section 1, at 442-45, and the conclusion, at530-37.


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2008] BADIOU WITHIN NEO-PRAGMATISM 2241

world. Members of the community-world share the same values, andthe structure of the community-world is organized by social-communalcategories. Each community-world thus has, as it were, its ownlanguage.

If a community respects the law of human rights then its world becomes included in the world of democratic materialism. Examine thisworld-inclusion. The community-world in question and its way of lifeare granted legitimacy . As it is democratic materialism that labels thecommunity legitimate, the democratic law is no longer exterior to thecommunity but penetrates into the community-world.

The members of the community become citizens of democracy,obeying the democratic law. In other words, the exterior tag of legitimacy that the community-world receives from democraticmaterialism is a sort of breach in its borders. The inclusion in questionis thus integration . That is, the borders of the community-world do notsurvive, as it were, the inclusion within the world of democraticmaterialism.

Democratic materialism is the world that integrates all legitimateworld-communities. It is meant to be an exterior point of view fromwhich all the world-communities are judged: either they are legitimateor not. This privileged perspective democratic materialism claims tohave at its disposal has two consequences.

The first is cultural relativism. The democratic value of legitimacy becomes the only objective value by which communities and their respective ways of life are judged. An ethical comparison betweenthose ways of life is no longer possible. There is no objective way of

judging which is better or worse than the other.The particular values of each community can be judged as goodonly from within that community. From the objective point of view,exterior to the community-world, its values are seen as mere attributes,as social categories, ordered by language.

The objectivity of the defining values of each integratedcommunity-world is thus overrun by the exterior legitimacy tag. Inother words, the values which characterize communities do not have a

place in the ontology of democratic materialism.This is not pluralism, which would be an objective co-existence of

various values. The ideology of integration into one world regardscomparative value-judgment as objectively meaningless. And so,

democratic materialism results in cultural relativism.This relativism goes hand in hand with ethical absolutism, which isthe second consequence of the supposed privileged perspective of democratic materialism. With no objective value from within thecommunity, the only objective good around is that in reference towhich legitimacy is determinedhuman rights.


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Democratic materialism thus identifies ethics with human rights.This consequence is, in a way, unintentional. The democratic or liberalattempt to separate the right from the good, by allowing everyoneto choose their own good, deprives those goods from objectivityand thus amounts to cultural relativism. The latter, in turn, results in theidentification of the good with the right. And that is the only Good,and the only Right, Absolutely.

This absolutism is yet to be realized. Intentional or not, self-conscious or not, this absolutism functions as the regulative principle of democratic materialism. Guided by it, democratic materialism isengaged in two intertwined processes. One is the inquiry into humanrights and the affiliated value of legitimacy, an inquiry that is supposedto end in their final formulation.

The second is the process of integration of more world-communities that are non-democratic and thus Objectively not-good.They must be integrated so as to become Good and to realize theequality their members should have with the citizens of the world of democratic materialism.

The vision toward which these processes are directed is whatBadiou calls a lifeless world. Once all individuals are equalized ascitizens under the same Law of human rights, no real change will be

possible. Namely, whatever re-grouping of elements in newcommunities takes place, the social order will remain the same. In fact,since any group, no matter how newly formed, is labeled by the samelegitimacy tag, re-grouping cannot have the significance of genuinechange.

The only modifications are the labeling of more communities, or the relabeling of existing ones. The proliferation of communities andtheir respective languages would result in the refinement of theavailable social categories according to increasingly individualisticnuances.

An objection could be raised at this point: this picture need not perhaps be called lifeless. The modifications in question, those of personal and communal pursuits of goods, which are of greatimportance, would still be very much alive and in constant evolution.Could it be that the derogatory-sounding term lifeless, which refers tothe Ideal Law of democratic materialism, privileges the right over thegood?

But it is the vision of democratic materialism that privileges theright and grants it primacy. The term "lifeless" merely describes thatvery bias, which allows any way of life, as long as it accords withspecific, unchangeable, human rights, those achieved at the end of their


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inquiry 5. If the term lifeless is to imply a certain criticism, it is notsome grand call for change in the law, but an objection to a framework that hopes for the impossibility of such change.

The absolutism of democratic materialism amounts to a strictontology for the social world: it has a natural or factual factor- human

beings, and a separate value factorthe categories of languagesadmitted as legitimate, and nothing else . Socially, there are only bodiesand languages , 6 or alternatively there are only individuals and communities .7 With no possible change to these existential statements,they have an undeniable metaphysical flavor. They state what is Reallythere.

Badiou objects to both relativism and absolutism. I will hereelaborate on his objections and re-present them in pragmaticterminology, through my characterization of democratic materialism asan ideology of social Realism, that resorts to and claims for ametaphysically privileged standpoint.

Cultural relativism, which denies communal values an objectivestatus, should be rejected as a form of make-believe skepticism. Onecan never be ethically indifferent to communal values, equalizing themall under the same global value-tag of legitimacy. For one is alwayssituated within a certain way of life one judges as good and hence asbetter than others.

This is the skepticism Badiou is profoundly opposed tothe onewhich denies the objective reality of the values around which acommunity is formed. In fact, as will be shown in Part V, the forming of a community around an ideal plays a central role in Badious theory of

objectivity.The second aspect of Badious criticism is his real doubt in the processes conducted under the absolutist regulative principle of democratic materialism. Whereas the democratic vision is of peace andtolerance among the integrated communities, this contemporary pursuitof democracy does not express itself in a peaceful manner.

The individuals and communities that do not speak the normativelanguage of democracy must be integrated, whatever it takes, includingthe violation of the human rights in the name of which the integration isconducted.

This violent incoherence is Badious empirical justification for hisreal doubt in the contemporary democratic system. But this doubt is not

meant to undermine the entire system. Badiou does not doubt that thereare indeed only bodies and languages. It is the absolutist-arbitraryfeature of this ontology that he wishes to dispose of.

5 See Appendix infra at 1. Democratic Materialism.6 Preface to L OGICS OF WORLDS , supra note 4, at 9.7 Id. at 17.


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II. BADIOU S THEORY OF OBJECTIVITY

World and World Inclusion

Badious first philosophical move is characteristic of pragmatism,for it entails, in effect, the denial that there could be a metaphysically

privileged standpoint from which one could absolutize or relativize.One is always contextually situated within a system, which Badiou callsa world . A world can be a country under a certain regime, a scientific

paradigm, or other systems. One can also be situated in a fragment of aworld like a lab class in physics, or a conversation in the UniversitysMain Quad.

A world is composed of discrete elements or individuals. Putnam

discusses two logical options to define an object in such a world.8 According to one logical system, each element is an object. According

to another system, that of the Polish logician Lezniewski, 9 any possiblesum of those elements is an object.

According to the Polish logician, then, an object can be scattered inspace and time, and can be composed of, say, the apple I ate yesterdayand my computer. The reasoning of the Polish logician could be thatfor any set of elements a common predicate can be found. Each conceptis thus arrived at by the comparison of elements of one set,independently of other concepts.

Badiou adopts a different logical definition of an object. In asense, it is closer to that of the Polish logician. He allows his objects to

be scattered in space and time, in such way that they are commonly predicated. The logical system Badiou uses is category-theory. Incategory-theory, an object is, generally speaking, a conceptuallycharacterized set of elements from the world in question.

However, the concepts in the Badiouian world, as well as thecomparisons that give rise to them, are dependent on all the other concepts and comparisons in that world. The approach to objects andtheir conceptual characterization rendered by category theory is thusholistic . There is no way to define an object independently of others.Holism is an important characteristic of pragmatism. 10

Putnams point is to show that neither of the two definitions heconsiders is metaphysically privileged. Putnam does not advocate any

particular logical theory in relation to objectivity, but discusses a fewgeneral themes (among which are the theses of pragmatism, to be

8 HILARY PUTNAM , THE MANY FACES OF R EALISM 18 (1987).9 Putnam refers to Lezniewski. See id .

10 Putnam discusses holism as a characteristic of pragmatism in H ILARY PUTNAM ,PRAGMATISM : A N OPEN QUESTION 13-19 (1995).


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gradually demonstrated in this paper). Conversely, Badiou claims thatthe logical theory (category-theory) that he uses, does give the betterdefinition of an object. It is not metaphysically privileged, but, as I willhere showpragmatically privileged.

One important advantage to Badious use of category theory, as Iwill explain later, is that it does not give the elements of a world aprimitive status, where such a status is obviously metaphysical.Conversely, the logical systems Putnam considers treat the elements as

prior to the object, which is then defined over the elements (that arethus Elements).

I shall now explicate and interpret the core of Badious theory of objectivity. 11 Since it is (read here as) pragmatic, that is, since it relieson use, interest, purpose and value, its explanation requires at least onespecific example (and Logics of Worlds , by the way, includes manyexamples). Although Badious philosophy is mostly associated with thesocial world, I rather exemplify my interpretation through a simpler,less emotional world (than politics, art or love). Take a clothes store.

Since the definition of an object depends on other objects, my point of departure will be an assumed object, in such way that it is possible to later show its coherence with other objects of the world.Say that here we assume that among the objects of the world, all theshirts in the store are an object, and the pants are another.

Each element of every object, each shirt and each pair of pants, has particular intensional features, such as color or style. Each elementthereby defines an atomic component of the object in the sense that allthe other elements share its intensional features to a certain degree .

This is one way of defining an atomic component. I will later demonstrate a second way.All the elements of an object belong to all its atomic components.

The degree of belonging of each element to an atomic component is(related to) the degree of similarity that element has with the elementthat designates the component. It is the degree to which an elementshares the intensional features in question.

For example, the flowery Hawaiian shirt defines an atomiccomponent of the object shirts insofar as all the other shirts aresimilar to it to a certain degree. Some or none can be exactly like it. AHawaiian shirt that has palm trees on it belongs to that atomiccomponent to quite a high degree, in comparison to the other shirts.

Another shirt is not Hawaiian at all. It is an elegant black shirtwith little grey and pink flowers at its collar. It belongs to the

11 LOGICS OF WORLDS , supra note 4. My account is based on the second and third books of Logics of Worlds (it is subsections 7, 8, and 9 in section 1, book 1, at 234-44, although particularly obscure, that include the key concepts of a prototype theory of objectivity thatcategory-theory can offer philosophy).


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component to a certain degree, weaker than that of the other Hawaiianshirt. Another shirt is of completely solid red color. This shirt belongsto the component to an even weaker degree.

This degree of belonging has no exact or independent value. It iscomparative. The comparison is double: all the elements of the objectare compared to the defining element of the component, and thosecomparisons are compared to each other. As Paul Redding noted, theelement designating the atomic component is a prototype, marking thecomponent with its intensional features.

The comparison of the elements of an object to the element thatdesignates the atomic component is evidently a comparison in a certainrespect . This respect reflects interest, use, what one might count asinteresting (what is drawn on the shirts like flowers or palm trees), whatthe elements (the shirts) are fit for (which has to do with their style Hawaiian, elegant, sportive) and what one might count as important (thesize of what is drawn compared to the size of the shirt, its location onthe shirt). The color of the little flowers, in the shirt-example discussedhere, did not count as important in this evaluation.

Of course, whether it is my interest and emphasis or yours or theshop keepers, who displays the shirts in a certain order, is not relevanthere. Many respects are possible, as there are many intensionalcharacteristics to any prototype, to any element of an object that iscomparable to the other elements of that object.

The intensional respects in which elements are compared may or may not be noticed, but in any case, they are noticeable. And to noteone thing is also to ignore another. That is, being noticeable is always

in relation to some interest or emphasis that is thus implied in anyintensional characteristic.The prototype intensional character of the atomic component

involves interest, use, and emphasis, as is evident in this example aswell as in Badious examples in Logics of Worlds . That is to say, theatomic organization of an object incorporates value. Objectivity,therefore, cannot be separated from value. This is the second thesis of

pragmatism according to Putnamthe thesis that there is no fundamental dichotomy between facts and values or in other words,the thesis of entanglement of fact and value. 12

Moreover, the intensional definitions of an atomic component arenot essential. They have common characteristics, some necessarythey

have to be a shirt, for examplebut they do not have some underlyingmysterious essence. What defines a component is one element andthose that appear identical to it, if they exist, like other floweryHawaiian shirts (I shall soon demonstrate the second non-essentialist

12 This thesis is the second mentioned here, but in Putnams original text it is the third thesismentioned. P UTNAM , supra note 1, at 142.


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manner of defining an atom 13). Non-essentialism is another importantfeature of pragmatism.

It is worthwhile noting, that Badiou uses the term degree in afew senses that can be concluded from his examples. Sometimes hemeans simply the intensity of the similarity between elements taken in acertain conceptual respect. Other times a degree is the level of importance of an element relatively to other elements of a certainobject, or relatively to all elements in the world, and againimportantin a certain respect.

In any case, as I explained before, degrees do not correspond tosome fixed value (numeric or other). They are comparative, and receivetheir meaning only through an order-relation to other degrees. Degreesof a certain conceptual respect are ordered between a minimum and amaximum, where those are world-relative, that is, contextual, and arethe only fixed values for a given world. Unless things are identical or absolutely different, their similarity or difference will be more or less,in comparison to other similarities and differences in the relevant respect .

Examine the atomic component of the object to which all the pants belong, designated by an elegant black pair. Another pair is Indianstyle. It is red with little stars all over, and so it belongs to thecomponent to a very weak degree, in the respects here considered (color and style). Another pair is dark khaki and elegant. Its degree of similarity to the black pair is quite high and so is its degree of belongingto the component designated by that black pair of pants.

Take the flowery Hawaiian shirt, considered in the component

described before, and the dark khaki elegant pants, considered in theatomic component designated by the elegant black pants. Now localize the first on the second. That is, relativize the degree of belonging of the shirt in question to the shirt atomto the khaki pants:

The flowery Hawaiian shirt absolutely belongs to the atom itdesignates and marks with a certain style and print. Compared with thekhaki pants, it is casual, a bit too noisy perhaps, but also cheerful. Thislocalization just gave us a new atomic component, with its own

prototype intensional characteristics. Some elements of the world-store,like the Indian pants, belong to it to quite a high degree.

Take the inverse localization. Compared with flowery Hawaiianshirt, the khaki pants are elegant, solid and serious. This localization

also gives a new atom, to which the black pants, for example, belong, toa high degree. Perhaps those black pants are even the prototype of thatatom. In any case, the localization of the Hawaiian shirt on the khaki

pants gives a different atom to the inverse localization. The two

13 Like Badiou, I use the terms atomic component and atom interchangeably.


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elements initially considered are thus incompatible .What about the compatibility of the black shirt with the flowers at

its collar and the khaki pants? The shirts degree of belonging to thecomponent in question (the one designated by the Hawaiian floweryshirt) is weak in the respect of the relative size of the flowers and in therespect of style. Relativized to the pants, its black color becomesimportant, and so does the color of the little flowersas they all belongto the autumn family of colors like the khaki pants. Its elegance is alsoaccentuated in comparison to the khaki pants. Another atom is thusfound, that of autumn colored elegant clothing. The black pants belongto it too, and so do other elements in the store.

If we localize the khaki pants on the black shirt with the flowers,the color of the pants is accentuated, as well as their elegance. Theatom here found is the same one arrived at by the inverse localization.The khaki pants and black shirt with the flowers at its collar are thuscompatible .

An object , says Badiou, is a set in which any two elements arecompatible (the identification of an atomic component and of itsrespective object with a set of elements is justified below). Thiscompatibility, for any two elements, takes another two objects intoaccount, that is, their atomic components (one for each object).

As shown in the above discussion on compatibility, atoms exposed by localization may or may not have elements that belong to them to themaximal degree. That is to say, the prototypical features of an atommay or may not be all manifested in one or more prototypical elements.

Whereas each element may define an atomic component through

its intensional features, an atomic component does not have to be sodefined. It can also be defined through prototypical characteristicsexposed by localizations rather than demonstrated in a specificelement. 14

Therefore, elements are not the primitive entity over whichatomic components and thereby objects are constructed. But neither areconceptual prototypical characteristics primitive, since atoms can bedefined by elements. Asking which comes first the element or theconcept seems like a wrong question in a system where fact and valueare entangled.

Not only are objects construed holistically, in such way thatinvolves entire regions of the world if not all of it, but they are

embedded with interest, use and value. In other words, they are pragmatically determined, according to the relevant context. What is anobject in one world is not necessarily an object in another world.

14 These two ways of defining an atom are those to be understood in Badious slogan: if one,not more than one, and otherwisenone. L OGICS OF WORLDS , supra note 4, bk. 3, sec. 1,subsec. 4, at 227 (authors translation).


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This objectivation assumes two worldly logical roles of concepts.First, concepts are the respect in which elements are similar anddifferent to one another. Every world has its corresponding grid-likenetwork of similarities and differences between all the elements of theworld. This grid, which Badiou calls the transcendental , is engravedwith all the concepts in respect of which an element can be similar or different to another. The world-grid is its holistic regularity, its law.

The other role of concepts is the intensional characterization theygive to prototypical atomic components. The elements of a componentquantize a concept, insofar as each component has a definite number of elements, with various degrees of belonging.

There is no question of borderline cases for each component, sincethe quantization, as was explained before, is done by interest, emphasisand the like. A pragmatic world-grid decides according to its context if a degree of belonging to a component is weak, weaker or minimal.

The quantization of the atomic component allows its considerationas a mathematical set , defined extensionally by its elements. The atomiccomponent characterized intensionally is also a set in which that sameelement and the others in the component are members.

So, the concepts of the world have two aspects. The first aspectthey have is intensional and entails either comparative meaningembedded in the world-grid or a prototypical meaning that structuresthe atomic components of objects. The second aspect of the concepts of the world is extensional. According to the extensional aspect, the worldis just a system of sets, where the elements retain their number, and theconcepts their labels .

In such a system, emptied, as it were, from intensionality, a labelreceives its extensional meaning from its relations of belonging to andinclusion in or of other sets, tagged by other labels. These relations of

belonging and inclusion constitute what Badiou called the language of the situation in Being and Event , where a situation is, in fact, theextensional aspect of a world.

I would like to note here that indeed within set-theory the set is primitive (and not the elements, built essentially on the empty set). Buteven if in set-theory there are only sets, concepts do not have priorityover elements. For it is the pragmatic entanglement of fact and valuethat allowed the quantization of sets by categories in the first place. 15

15 Those who are familiar with Badious philosophy will notice that indeed I here reverse theorder of Logics of Worlds and Being and Event . For Badiou, the extensional situation and thecontextual world are independently construed, and inter-connect as a matter of a decision. Iinterpret this decision in the following as a less robust sort of realism, in accordance with themore natural and non-metaphysical move made herefrom the intensional world to theextensional situation. This pragmatic move will also prove consistent within the Badiouianframework, whereas the independence of situation and world might imply their possibleseparation which in turn results in an inconsistency.


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Badious postulate of materialism is the decision that every atomis real. 16 That is to say, the extensional system of sets of the world,which also has its intensional side, is the real carving of the worldsreality. The quantization of concepts and the construction of objects,which involves interest, use and value, are as objective as can be. Of course, since there is a plurality of worlds with their respectiveextensional systems of sets, then there is also a plurality of suchobjective carvings of reality.

Before I identify the kind of realism Badiou promotes here, Iwould first like to examine what it means for a world to be includedwithin another world. Say the fragment of the world-store I describedabove is actually a part of a feature film. The shirts and pants and therest of them are not physical elements of the ordinary world. They arefilmed elements.

If the physical actual me is sitting in the movie theater wearing ashirt, my shirt and a shirt in the movie are not part of the sameextension. Mine is labeled shirt, whereas the shirt in the movie islabeled filmed shirt.

From my point of view in the fragment-cinema of the ordinaryworld that includes the film-world, the extension of the world of thefilmed store has another label added to it, namely filmed.

Intensionally, the difference between the inclusive world and theincluded one lies in what Badiou calls the register of appearance .17 Filmed elements have different intensional characteristics than ordinarythings. For example, they are only two dimensional.

It may happen that my shirt is an elegant black shirt with little

flowers at its collar, just like the shirt in the movie. My shirt is not in the movie, but it can be compared to the one in the movie.There can be trans-worldly similarities and differences, in such

way that in the inclusive world, elements from both worlds will bequantized in the same prototypical component. In this case thecomponent would be shirts that look like mine, whether in the ordinaryworld or in movies.

This of course does not mean that the place of my shirt in theordinary worlds system of sets is the same place the shirt in the moviehas. Each belongs to components the other does not. And evenregarding the component to which they both belong, they remainseparate elements within that component. The same would equally

apply even in the case where, in fact, it is my shirt that was filmed inthat movie. Each world has its own extension , even if one can be included in

another. The extensional meaning of an element is by no means a kind

16 Id. at 232.17 See, e.g. , id. at 235.


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of Platonic Idea or some sort of thing-in-itself that can wander fromworld to world. The rejection of the thing-in-itself is a central view of any pragmatist philosophy. Extension, or as Badiou often calls it being qua being is no more than a labeled system of sets that carves a worldssmall r realitya specific world, in a specific context.

The only way to have in Badious worlds something equivalent toa thing-in-itself would be to have a world of all worlds, a world whoseextension would have some sort of privileged status. Then, perhaps, itwould make sense to say that the same shirt appears in many worlds.

This is, however, not the case. Badiou keeps reminding us thatthere is no set of all sets, and so there is no world of all worlds. 18 In

Being and Event , the multiplicity of situations and the fact that eachextensional situation has its own language was very clear. If there is nosituation of all situations, there is no meta-language of a privilegedstatus from which all other languages can be accessed.

In Logics of Worlds it seems sometimes that Badiou talks of theextension of a world as if there were something special about it, that canappear in many worlds, as if the extension was somehow dislocatedfrom its own world. 19 But the Ideaic talk of the extension of a world,should be rejected so as to keep one of Badious most precious

principles against privileged extension (which equals a world of allworlds or meta-language), and in accord with the pragmatic readinghere proposed. As I described above, extensions of worlds can beshared by other worlds only by way of inclusion, which carries with itan additional tag.

In passing, I would like to remark that here we have a typical case

of one metaphysics chosen over another. Badious metaphysicalstatement of the inexistence of the Absolute, the set of all the sets, or thesituation of all situations, cancels the metaphysical stand which allowsthe Ideaic talk of the same extension appearing in many intensionalworlds.

It seems that in order to free reality from any metaphysical weight,to keep it a pluralistic reality, with a small r, Badious philosophy takesa metaphysical stand regarding the Absolute (does it have to?). For sucha philosophy to still be considered within pragmatism, this metaphysicsshould have a pragmatic value, and indeed it has. I shall return to this

point in the last Part.In any case, Badiouian realism, as here presented, is as pragmatic

18 See in particular Badious discussion on the inconsistency of the concept of the Universe inLOGICS OF WORLDS , supra note 4, bk. 2, sec. 1, subsec. 1, at 119-21.

19 This is apparent in Badious comments about what happens to a set once it has appearedin a world. L OGICS OF WORLDS , supra note 4, bk. 3, sec. 1, at 235 (authors translation).Another example is the discussion on Ariane and Blue Beard, and their appearance in variousworlds, even if the thing in itself that appears is reduced to their proper names it still impliessome meta-language. L OGICS OF WORLDS , supra note 4, bk. 2, sec. 1, at 126.


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and pluralistic as Putnams, albeit much heavier in theory. But thistheory allows for an elaborate explication of a coherence-type holism,which demonstrates the entanglement of fact and value, so important toany small r realist such as Putnam himself. Badious theory of objectivity says pluralistically: there are only objects and languages .

III. THE THEORETICAL WORLDS OF PHYSICS

Regulative Principle of Compliant Inclusion

Small r realism and the pragmatic emphasis on the role of interest, value and use, imply that the exposure of new interests or values may result in real change. The systematic order of each world is

not, generally speaking, written in stone. This immanent option for realchange conforms to Putnams third thesis of pragmatism, 20 that is, fallibalism .

I will explain in detail what fallibalism and real change are aboutin Badious theory in Part 5. In this Part I propose a new conception of change in the theoretical worlds of physics, with the aid of theBadiouian terminology laid out so far. It is the existence of lifelessworlds that allows the picture I here propose, worlds to whichfallibalism does not apply. For the worlds of physics, although under constant change, have, as I will here explain, a lifeless core.

I touched upon the characteristics of a lifeless world in thedescription of democratic materialism in the first Part. I will here

shortly re-explain these features in the terminology developed in the previous Part.

The sets in the extensional system of the lifeless world cannot gothrough any significant re-grouping. They can undergo two kinds of modifications. The first is the quantization of sub-sets within theexisting sets. Intensionally this means that a certain range of degrees of

belonging to an atom becomes an atom in its own right.This can happen relentlessly when a set includes a (definite)

infinity of elements, that is, a continuity whose quantization is done bycutting more and more segments. Color is one such example in theworld of theoretical physics, where all possible wave-lengths exist in anordered continuity. One can always further divide the spectrum to getmore and more shades.

The other kind of modification is the re-interpretation of thecurrent system that does not change the groupings of the sets but merely

20 Third mentioned in this paper, but second in Putnams original text. P UTNAM , supra note1, at 142.


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re-labels them. One such occasion can be when the world is recognizedto be included in a different world, and its extensional system of setsconsequently receives a new additional tag.

According to todays physics, the theoretical world of Newtonian physics is a lifeless world. The laws of this world cannot go throughreal change. It can only be modified by refinement and re-labeling, asdiscussed above.

Accordingly, the theory of Special Relativity did NOT replace Newtonian physics. The objects and laws of the latter did not changeand they never will. Rather, the world of Newtonian physics wasthereon included in the world of Special Relativity. When examinedfrom that inclusive world, Newtonian laws received the additional tagapproximation for low velocities. The Badiouian event or theKuhnian revolution happened on the borders of the Newtonian

paradigm, which remained unaltered.The transition from the inclusive world to the included one, the

approximation in question, is perfectly smooth and coherent. Thistransition could imply perfect reduction . Such a reduction would

breach the borders of the Newtonian world in such way that the realityof its laws and objects would become dependent on the inclusive worldof Special Relativity. The two theories would basically converge intoone (reduction in a theoretical world and its implied convergence areanalogous to integration in the social world of democratic materialism).But Newtonian physics did NOT converge into Special Relativity. Itremained a separate world, included in the new one.

The progress of physics, and progress it is, leaves the well-

established parts of the included theory unaltered. The live part of physics is the inclusive world under construction, which also determinesthe contemporary point of view on the included world.

This is why Kuhn talks of replacement of paradigms. Acontemporary paradigm would be the theoretical world that is the mostactive, where research is taking place, rather than teaching. It is thecontemporary point of view from which included worlds such as the

Newtonian one are seen. But theoretically , the theoretical included Newtonian world is nevertheless still there, unchangeable, lifeless.

The construction of the world of Quantum Mechanics did notinduce any real change in Newtonian physics either. Its new inclusionmerely re-labeled or re-interpreted it as approximation for big enough

objects. The transition here is equally smooth, and the discipline of physics would not have it any other way. Its regulative principle is of what I call compliant inclusion , where the borders of coherence are one-way openfrom the inclusive world to the included one.

Compare to the cinematic world, which is one-way visible from theordinary world, in the shirts-pants example discussed in the previous


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Part. That inclusion did not require the integration of one world in theother and neither did it even imply an apparent agreement. Indeed, somethings can only happen in movies (or in love or in war or in a

philosophy classroom for that matter).Conversely, the regulative principle of compliant inclusion does

not tolerate disagreement between affiliated theoretical worlds of physics. Take the theory of General Relativity that includes the Specialone, and the theory of Quantum Mechanics. They are affiliated worlds,as they have the same classical core, so to speak.

Their border, however, entails a famous disagreement and is thusconsidered undefined. More specifically, there is one experiment that

perhaps will never take place, which does not have a fixed worldaddress. That is, its description is unsettled and its predictionrespectively ambivalent.

According to the regulative principle of compliant inclusion, thediscipline is now engaged in the construction of a new theory, whichshall include both General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, andsettle their transition.

The theory under construction, the contemporary live part of theoretical physics, 21 is apparently headed to be all-inclusive, afundamental Theory of Everything, from which the transition to all theother worlds of physics will be smoothly regulated.

Indeed, the purpose of the faculty of fundamental physics today, isto find all those fundamental objects and their respective laws, and thenclose their department. No more research, only teaching and perhapsre-labeling. Whether physics is actually dying or not, its purpose is to

arrive at a lifeless state.22

I will discuss in Part V in further detail the manner in which aninclusive theoretical world of physics is formed. Part 5 will explain aworlds change in general , that is, in the logical terms of Badious

Logics of Worlds . Badious picture of change will allow an account for both a theoretical world of physics and a social world.

This is not meant to muddle and confuse two very different typesof worlds. The claim is that the abstract account can be used in variouscontexts. In fact, this abstraction, common to all worlds, provides, as Iwill attempt to show in Part V, two different pictures for social andscientific change.

But before I turn to my interpretation of Badious picture(s) of

change, I will first present Putnams picture for social change.Putnams picture is not at all meant to describe scientific change.However, there are still analogies to be made.

21 There are of course other live parts in the worlds of physics that are included infundamental physics, insofar as those are not fully established.

22 See Appendix infra at 2. Physics.


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As will be explained in the next Part, the scientific picture presented above is an inspiration to Putnams picture of social change.Moreover, if we look at the abstract structure alone (as can be seen fromthe respective diagrams at the end of the paper) both pictures are of compliant inclusion, although Putnams picture of social change hasneither a lifeless core nor an end to its inquiry.

The rest of the paper then, still follows the same paths introduced before, with an emphasis on the comparison of Putnam (in the next Part)and Badiou (in Part V). The last Part will conclude the comparison byreferring to one of the original pragmatistsWilliam James.

IV. PUTNAM S DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Regulative Principle of Agreement

Putnam adopts and elaborates Deweys ideas of deliberativedemocracy, which he regards as the enlightenment yet to come. 23 When new interests or needs are exposed, they are to be discussed in amanner similar to that of scientific discourse. As was noticed by theearly pragmatists, scientific progress is also linked to democraticdiscourse ethics.

Consultation and deliberation within the scientific communityare guided by democratic values such as tolerance, the willingness tolisten to new opinions, the ability to converse openly. One can easilysee how these values are appropriate to the regulation of scientific

inquiry.The purpose of the scientific discourse, whether achievable or not,

is the settlement of opinion or fixation of belief, as Peirce says. 24 The ideal common to all physicists in the scientific community, is toreach the end of inquiry, total agreement, absolute fixation. 25

According to deliberative democracy, the democratic values of the discourse of scientific inquiry can and should also apply to theethical inquiry of a social world. And so, as appropriate to a pluralist,Putnam promotes a number of democratic moral images, that aresupposed to guide us in times of real social change. Think for yourself,

23 I base this section mainly on the following texts by Hilary Putnam: H ILARY PUTNAM , MANY FACES OF R EALISM (1987); H ILARY PUTNAM , PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE (forthcoming); andHILARY PUTNAM , R ENEWING PHILOSOPHY 180-202 (1992).

24 Charles Sanders Peirce, The Fixation of Belief , P OPULAR SCI. MONTHLY , Nov. 1877, at 1-15.

25 It is important to keep physics and philosophy separate here. Whereas philosophically thereis good reason to reject the ideal of the end of inquiry as a possible horizon, this is neverthelessthe regulative principle of the community of physicists. It is a useful principle for that specificdiscipline, rather than a philosophically justified one.


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says Putnam, speak your criticism, be a part of a community or state,have a sense of fraternity.

Deliberative democracy is thus a non-rigid democratic regimewhose reforms, no matter how radical, are achieved in a democraticmanner. Democracy is a method of inquiry in the social world. In other words, the principle that regulates the contemporary state of the socialworld is also the principle of its change. Badiou would say that there issomething lifeless in this picture, insofar as there seems to be no wayout of contemporary principles.

Indeed, there is also a dimension of compliant inclusion toPutnams ethical inquiry and social progress. Each moral image in theco-existing plurality is appropriate for a different occasion, and thus hasan independent reality. A new moral image that may result fromdeliberation will re-interpret and thus improve the old ones, nowincluded in the better one open society.

A new moral image could even cancel an older one, as when theEnlightenment canceled Platos image of a ruling class of philosophers.But it is a new image, not the alteration of a contemporary one.

This is what I mean by saying that inclusive change happens at the borders of a world. The old image, unless cancelled, remains thereincluded, and is marked with a new tag or interpretation by the new andmore inclusive image.

Putnam does not advocate any end to this inquiry, some final limitto the ongoing inclusive social progress he has in mind. 26 UnlikeBadiou, Putnam is not worried by the Absolute. He feels no need tostate its inexistence in order to oppose the end of inquiry. For Putnam,

the concept of the Absolute simply has no role in philosophy.Democratic consultation and deliberation is aimed at reaching afixation of a new belief, a consensual settlement of opinion within themembers of the society. The possibility of agreement, in turn,

presupposes a common underlying interest.Indeed, when it comes to physics, say, there is ideally such an

interest. The purpose common to the community of physicists isinscribed in the regulative principle of total inclusion.

Putnam does not claim that all problems of a social world can beresolved by democratic deliberation, but he is hopeful. Real change of asociety, a change which would entail the progress Putnam advocates,would be that which results from deliberation and consequent

agreement.Progressive change then, results from the exposure of anunderlying common interest, which can reconcile the problematicnew needs or interests that raised the problem to begin with. That is to

26 See Appendix infra at 3. Deliberative Democracy.


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say, these new needs or interests, although problematic, cohere in acertain way with the contemporary situation. It is this coherence that

permits the conservation of the older moral image and that makes thedemocratic change inclusive, something that happens on the borders of a contemporary image.

Badiou is highly suspicious of such coherence and the inclusivechange it entails, when it comes to social worlds. For Badiou, realchange of a social world happens not at its borders, but within thatworld.

V. BADIOU S DIALECTIC MATERIALISM

Regulative PrincipleConsequences of an Event

Badious model of change is, I here claim, inspired by the other science which influenced the original pragmatists, especially Dewey,that is, evolutionary biology. 27 My interpretation here averages the useof the term event from both Logics of Worlds and Being and Event ina way that I believe to be loyal to both. I will exemplify the Badiouianchange through the clothes-store example.

In a world, a mutation occurs. An imperative, which does notcohere with the worldly law, is said, and positively defines a previouslynegatively defined group of elements. In the world-store for example,imagine one of the sales-people screaming lets dress creatively!

This imperative brings to the surface a set that was not defined as

such before. In this case it is the set of clothing combinations that look funny and unusual, like the elegant black pants with the Hawaiian shirtwith the palm trees.

These funny combinations were present before in a sense, but sincethey were not acknowledged by the law of fashion of that store, they didnot appear as such. In that sense, they did not exist before theimperative acknowledged their existence as a positively defined set.The utterance of the imperative brings the previously inexistent set intoworldly existence. The unfashionable combinations of clothes in thestore are thereby emancipated!

In a social world, this newly defined set is normally said to be of people previously ignored by the law and the rights it grants others.Depending on the relevant world and law, this group could be slaves,the proletariat, women, homosexuals, and other groups of people weignore and do not even know about since they do not exist in our currentlaw.

27 This section is based on books 5, 6, and 7 of L OGICS OF WORLDS , supra note 4.


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One may say that Badious picture of social change is just another moral image, that of emancipation. Indeed, this is the way change

begins, but this is not the real change discussed in Logics of Worlds .Real change is not the new self-consciousness or enhanced appearanceof a pre-existing set, no matter how inexistent it previously was.

In Badious theory, the defining imperative (like the imperative to be creative), which brings about the emancipation of a certain set, is atrace of an event . The event turns the world-store into a site . Theobjective world-store, regulated by its grid, receives a momentarysecond aspect, as a collection of elements that does not quantize yet anyconcept.

The site is nevertheless quantized as a set and it has an extension, but as if before some intensional quality defines it as such. This set,in its momentary second aspect of extension without intension, does not

belong to or include any other set. It is not coherent with theextensional language of the contemporary situation.

Since it counts as a set nevertheless, it is real according to the postulate of materialism. What kind of reality can an extension havewithout intension? Without a worldly intensional concept, one mustadmit, this is no small r. The legislative mutation is conditioned by ametaphysical instant of incoherence.

Characteristically of metaphysics, Badious is supposed to makesomething possible, which in this case is real change. If Badiou is to beconsidered within pragmatism, such metaphysics would have senseinsofar as it can be useful. This use, I shall soon explain, is ethical.

Like in any evolutionary theory, the fate of the mutation depends

on the environment in which it occurs. If the new definition, the re-labeling as it were, of the previously ignored set is to have any impact,then objects in the world have to cohere with it. That is, the worldlyobjects have to be defined through the holism of compatibility, in such away that also relates to that new positive aspect brought about by theimperative.

But since the defining imperative does not cohere with thecontemporary worldly law, there are no such objects. In other words,the localization of the newly defined set on the not-yet conceptualizedsite has no result. In yet other words, the newly defined atomiccomponent of the previously inexistent set is not compatible with anyother component of the site.

Unless a new object is created. Elements of such an object arethose with the capacity to decide their own identity, to take charge of their own quantization, that is, people.

This is the ethical moment of a world. It is a moment where people have the chance of self-definition, to identify themselves with acompletely new concept. This new concept has to be of a special kind,


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body will be the first to become apparent. As it is a point of tensionwhich divides the world in two, the bodys localization on it, that is thesites new characterization relative to the body, is ambivalent.

At the store, some people are up for a party and some people arenot. This tension was not apparent before the new body was formed.The predicate up for a party was not a part of the world grid, and didnot define any object. It was not yet relevant.

But now, as the body is localized on the site, the previouslyimplicit tension is exposed: a few people are smiling, but the firstreaction of most people is to look with disdain and suspicion at the sales

person who uttered the irregular imperative. The environment thuschallenges the body to act .

A couple of people that belong to the new body decide they aregoing to take hold of that tension point. One person puts disco music onthe CD player, the other gets dressed quickly with a combination unseen

before and encourages another to have some sense of humor.The confrontation of the body with the environmental tension

requires the body to form an organ that would quantize a new concept.It is the atomic component fun motivation, to which each element of the body belongs from here on, to a certain degree. This organ iseffective , as it imposes its localization on the elements of the world.

Each person at the store is obliged to take a standis she or he upfor a party or notand is thus predicated relatively to the new body,that is, to one of its atomic organs. What was before mere tension isnow a new predicate of the world-grid. The localization has modifiedthe law.

The localization of the organ on the tension is such that it iscompatible with one side of the tension and incompatible with the other. If the compatibility achieved manages to overcome the incompatibility,then the point of tension is won and the body survives. It now has anewly defined component which brought about a new concept to theworld, and that evolution has induced a re-labeling of the worldlyobjects, by making explicit a previously implicit predicate.

The body stays alive as long as its evolution continues from one point of tension to another. In the course of its life, the body will createmore and more concepts for its organization, in order to deal with thetensions of the environment.

As a result, the environment goes through modification of re-

labeling and its law is challenged by the alternative rules of the bodyformed around the alternative imperative. Furthermore, if the bodygrows, it does so by taking over, as it were, elements of theenvironment. The world as a whole has changed. It includes now a newobject (which is, I remind, the new body, and not the emancipated set).The body does not merely adapt to a constant environment. Rather, it


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evolves, brings about new concepts to the world, and in turn modifiesthe environment in which it lives. 28

This dialectic process of confrontation of an alternative imperativewith contemporary law is what Badiou calls truth. Truth, as long as itlasts, keeps its body apart from its worldly environment.

Badiou says there are only bodies and languages, except that thereare truths, 29 which effectively means that there are only objects andlanguages, except that there are bodies; or, there is only an objectiveenvironment in the coherent state of the world, except when a trueindividual-body brings about the challenge of incoherence; or alternatively, there is only a stable system of law, except that there isreal doubt that brings about real change.

When it comes to physics, the self-organizing body is the creationof a new inclusive world. As the body evolves, new concepts areformed in the inclusive world under construction, and the includedworld is gradually re-interpreted.

When the world on the border of which it arose is completely re-labeled, the new inclusive world is established and arrives at an almostlifeless state. The body or the inclusive world is still alive, insofar asone day a new body may generate on its border.

The generation of bodies in the worlds of physics happens on their borders, which are to become borders of coherence, according to theregulative principle of compliant inclusion. Coherence is rightly

presupposed, and democratic deliberation is the way to proceed.But in the social world, there is no way to know if and what kind

of coherence one can expect. The process of change is not of

deliberation in the exploration of new horizons, but of action, where oneand the same world goes through a dialectic split. 30 Social change is not a discourse of be a member of your current

community, but a practice of create a new community. Social changeis not the inclusive imperative to join the open society, the one whichis open to those who comply with its laws. The imperative is rather:Change the order of your society by committing to your own identity.

28 I thank Tracy McNulty for her question in the Symposium at Cardozo Law School, whichhelped me clarify this point.

29 See, e.g. , Preface to L OGICS OF WORLDS , supra note 4, at 12.30 See diagrams in the Appendix, infra , to compare the change of the theoretical worlds of

physics to that of the social world.


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VI. BADIOU , PUTNAM , AND W ILLIAM JAMES

Ethics and Metaphysics

The ethics of democratic materialism is identical to its law. Theethical inquiry into human rights, which is supposed to apply to theentire society, is conducted by the system of the all-inclusive socialworld. In other words, ethics is imposed on the elements of the world,on people, by the law.

Human rights, as what quantizes people as the citizens of democracy, are as objective as what they quantize. But can they still beconsidered as ethics? Not if one takes ethics to be a first personcommitment as both Badiou and Putnam take it to be.

The ethics of dialectic materialism, which Badiou advocates, is the

commitment a person makes to a certain ideal, to an exception to thelaw of a certain world. That is to say, whereas the worldly law impliesno ethics at all, the mutative law, the exceptional imperative, is theavailable ethics in a given world.

One can be ethical, insofar as one identifies oneself with analternative ideal. If that ideal or imperative becomes integrated in theworldly law, it ceases to be of ethical significance.

Nevertheless, in Badiouian philosophy, ethics and law remainidentical, even if the law in question is an alternative to thecontemporary law. In other words, the good and the right are stillvery much related.

The Badiouian framework allows a person to be present in many

worlds, not only the social world. What happens, then, when the ethicsof a social world conflicts with that of a personal world? A framework that leaves ethics dependent on the law, whether by affirmation or negation, is problematic.

I feel that there is a certain trade-off in the choice between Badiouand Putnam regarding the picture of change. Putnams optimismregarding social change is perhaps too nave. Also, Badious logicalterminology allows for a demonstration of the difference between socialand scientific change, as developed in this paper.

When it comes to ethics, however, Putnams views, too elaborateto discuss in this particular work, are perhaps more appropriatelycomplex, where the lack of world-terminology leaves more room tosocial and personal overlap.

Finally, the main difference between Putnam and Badiou is their attitude toward metaphysics. This difference is due to the fact thatPutnam is a neo-pragmatist whereas Badiou is not, even if his

philosophy can be considered within and illuminated by neo- pragmatism.


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Putnams fourth thesis of pragmatism is that practice is primary in philosophy. As mentioned by David Macarthur, there are quite a fewhints in the paper where Putnam enumerates those theses, as well as inother papers, that Putnam refers to metaphysics.

Whereas Putnam perhaps finds interest in the insights metaphysicsmay provide, he does not formulate one himself. In particular, in whatregards this current work and its pictures of inclusion, Putnam takes nostand in regards total inclusion to the Absolute, God and Design.

Badiou, conversely, has two metaphysical elements in his theory.The first was already discussed, that is the metaphysical instant of theevent. The pragmatic value of the not-yet-conceptualized capital RReal site, was that this formalism enabled the creation of a body aroundthe new ideal. That is, the metaphysical value was ethical.

The second metaphysical element is Badious clear positionagainst total inclusion. It is precisely that metaphysical stand due towhich, within Badious philosophy, being qua being cannot have anymetaphysical content, but is the mere formal extension of a given world.There is no meta-language, there is no set of all sets, there is no worldof all worlds, and there is no Absolute or God or Design.

In fact, Badiou even has a mathematical proof against theAbsolute. I will not here attend to the subtleties of Badiousmetaphysical proof of the inexistence of God. Such a proof has no

place within pragmatism. But even if the proof has no pragmatic value,the metaphysical stand it is supposed to support may be still consideredwithin a pragmatic point of view.

I will conclude my paper with a short presentation of the pragmatic

ethical value that may be found in relation to the metaphysical issue of the Absolute. I shall thus turn to William James, who is in that respect,Badious exact inverse .

William James talks about the pragmatic meaning of the belief inGod (the Absolute, Design). I will here address two of the values hearticulates. The first is the possibility to take what he calls a moralholiday.

James says:[S]ince in the Absolute finite, evil is overruled already, we may,therefore, whenever we wish, treat the temporal as if it were

potentially eternal, be sure that we can trust its outcome, and withoutsin, dismiss our fear and drop the worry of our finite responsibility.

In short . . . we have a right ever and anon . . . to let the world wag inits own way, feeling that its issues are in better hands than ours andare none of our business. 31

Suffice it to say that James wrote those lines in 1906.

31 WILLIAM JAMES , What Pragmatism Means , in PRAGMATISM : A NEW NAME FOR SOMEOLD WAYS OF THINKING 73 (1907).


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Perhaps Jamess proposed pragmatic value is more appropriate asconsolation in cases where a certain moral dilemma is so hard toresolve, that one can never be sure to have made the right choice.Instead of obsessing over irresolvable issues, one may take a moralholiday from useless anxiety.

Without the Absolute, there is no discourse of some hypothesized justice in the long run. One cannot ignore what one judges as evilwithout taking responsibility for ones inaction. The inexistence of Godrequires one to ethically engage in reality. On the other hand, some

people could find that position as a declaration of no hope. Such anattitude could be paralyzing.

Indeed, as Robert Hockett noted, a metaphysical position tends to be associated with, and even reinforce, attitudes and actions that couldsometimes seem contradictory. Two contradictory metaphysicalstatements may result in the same effect. Pragmatically, of course, myinterest here is more on the side of effects.

The second pragmatic value of God according to James is that of the promise for a future, and a perhaps better future, a vagueconfidence in the future, 32 enough to make us feel safe and have hope.Such hope in a better future might promote, once more, inaction. But, itcould also motivate and encourage people to engage in the present for a

better future.Without a God, we are left with the present. Badiou talks about

our ethical obligation as an opportunity to create the present. There isno use in the hope for future change, simply because change does not

belong to the future. Change is a contemporary exception to the law of

the world, it is the creation of new facts in the name of new values.Without a God, change comes when we engage in our own design.

32 Id.


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APPENDIX

Legend

1. Democratic Materialism


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2. Physics

3. Deliberative Democracy


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4. Dialectic Materialism

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Badiou and Law

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