Bahrain, british imperialism english

Bahrain, British Imperialism5 Oct 2012

Chris Bambery(British Journalist)

www.bcsl.org.uk

Introduction

Britain’s role in strengthening the Khulaifi presence

Bahrain, a war prize

The situation before the First World War

The situation after the Second World War

American and British Protection

Footnotes

4

6

6

7

9

11

12

Index

3

www.bcsl.org.uk

Bahrain, and British Imperialism5 Oct 2012

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Bahrain, British Imperialism 2 Oct 2012

The deep links between the ruling circles of Britain and Bahrain were dem-onstrated by the presence of King Hamad at Queen Elizabeth 11’s diamond jubilee celebration dinner held at Windsor Castle in the spring of 2012. Ha-mad’s visit went ahead despite the killings, torture, sackings and demoli-tions being administered to those demanding democracy and self-determi-nation for the Bahraini people.

Britain was the key force in shaping modern Bahrain and in installing and defending the al Khalifah ruling house. That and its continuing support for the regime mean it must accept a large responsibility for the kingdom’s cur-rent problems.

This paper looks at the record of British rule in Bahrain and at how it cre-ated popular resistance the echoes of which are clear in today’s democracy movement.

Britain has been present in the Gulf since the sixteenth century. In the fol-lowing century its naval vessels would drive out the earlier arrivals, the Por-tuguese, establishing themselves as the dominant European trading and naval force in those waters.1

By the beginning of the nineteenth century concern over its vital trade routes with India, the alarm raised by Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt and concern over the power of local Arab fleets led Britain to impose direct control.2

Claiming these Arab fleets were pirates, in reality they were acting to keep out British interlopers, various British expeditions were mounted to defeat the local Arab rulers and their fleets.

After demonstrating their military power the British then turned to coming to terms with these rulers. The first ones they turned their attentions on were the al Khalifah rulers of Bahrain.

Introduction

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rate religious courts. The Shia courts received no state funding and in any dispute involving members of both communities a Sunni judge would resolve the issue.

Bahrain, a war prize

Yitzhak Nakash argues:“The Al Kalifa conquest of Bahrain altered the class struc-ture on the islands to something little better than serf-dom. Because Bahrain did not submit peacefully to the Al Kalifas, the ruling family under Islamic law considered all property in the islands as booty, confiscating most agri-cultural land and leasing it back to the Bahraini Shi’is. By the 20 century the ruling family had become the largest owner of property and date gardens in Bahrain, control-ling as much as 80 percent of agricultural land.”7

Leaving aside what Islamic law justifies this the ruling family owned land which was in great demand and ex-torted rack renting rents from their tenants. The Shi’a population were subject to a poll tax, water, date garden-ing and fish taxes.8

In 1867 the al Khalifah controlled port of Zubarah, whose ownership was contested with Qatar, rose in revolt. Sheik Muhammed asked the British Resident in the Gulf, Colo-nel Lewis Pelly, for help in retaking the port. He also asked for aid from Iran. Before either could respond Muham-mad mobilised sufficient force to capture the city but in a move to detach himself from Britain attempted to ally himself with Iran. The British intercepted his communica-tions with them and Pelly appeared before Bahrain with a naval flotilla, Blockading, bombarding the capital and burning the Sheik’s fleet. When it capitulated Pelly sim-ply dismisses Mohammad and installed his brother Ali.9

Regime change at the whim of British was always likeli-hood. In 1869 a British flotilla arrived and allowed sup-porters of Isa bin Ali al Khalifah to seize control and install their man as Sheik.10

Bu 1890 the British demanded legal responsibility for the judicial control of their subjects, not the local authori-ties. The Political Resident in Bahrain assumed not only judicial control over British citizens but also for the native courts and law enforcement.

Two years later the Sheik and the British agent in Bushire signed an ‘Exclusive Protection Agreement’ which stated

Britain's role in strengthening the Khulaifi presence

The al Khalifah’s had taken control of Bahrain when in 1782 they led the forces of the al Utub tribes in driving Persian forces from the island. Their conquest coincided with growing British interest in the Gulf. The East India Company had established factories (trading outlets) in Basra, Bushire and Bandar Abbas. As well as keeping the waterway clear of pirates the British grew anxious about the presence of French and Dutch merchants and of the Russia’s expansion into the Caucuses to the north of Per-sia’s borders.

In 1798 the British signed treaties with the rulers of Mus-cat and three years later with those of Persia.3

In June 1816 the East India Company’s resident (agent) in the Persian port of Bushire (Bushehr), Lieutenant William Bruce, received a letter from Sheik Abd Allah al Khalifah asking whether it was true the British were in league with the ruler of Muscat to attack Bahrain. Bruce sailed on a naval vessel to the island kingdom and drew up a treaty of friendship with al Khalifah whereby Bahraini vessels could trade with the Company’s Indian ports and vica versa and allowing it to establish a resident in Bahrain who would be free of any restrictions.4

In his report to Company head quarters in Mumbai, Bruce extolled the benefits of Bahrain’s port and said the British should settle there as ‘a check’ on ‘Persia, Turkey and the Arab States.’5

In 1820 the British demanded the al Khilafah’s sign an agreement that goods seized by pirates could not be traded in Bahrain.

In 1861 the British sent a naval force to Bahrain, seized two dhows and foisted a ‘perpetual treaty of peace and friendship’ on the al Khalafi’s whereby the British Politi-cal Resident had responsibility for settling any disputes over trade and for maintaining security in Bahrain’s wa-terways. British residents had to be treated as ‘favour-able people.’6

The al Khalifah’s promised to end piracy in return for Brit-ish protection.

By this time the al Kalafi’s had encouraged a system to develop where the Shia and Sunni population had sepa-

6


tions give different meanings to the word. But all mean-ings have one element in common, viz, that a protected state has no freedom of action in foreign affairs, except through or by the remission of the protecting State.”16

The situation before the First World War

In the immediate years before the First World War the British strengthened their overall position in the Gulf and in Bahrain in particular as the Ottoman’s tried to re-es-tablish their presence in the region. 17

Negotiations got underway in 1915 after the arrival of Brit-ish warships and officials and then a visit by Sheik Isa’s son, Abdullah, to London, a deal was reached with the al Khalifahs. They demanded equality with the other rulers in the Gulf, the right to appoint the Majlis (the toothless parliament) free from any British interference, the right to deal directly with London and ownership of the Qatari port of Zubarah (this was eventually recognised at Qa-tari in 2001 by the International Court of Justice). In re-turn a British Order in Council gave greater power to the Political Resident. Two years later the British authorities in London and Delhi agreed he would be responsible to the Government of India unless affairs had international repercussions when the Foreign Office in London would step in.

Britain refused all of Sheik Isa’s demands and began to see both him and Abdullah as a threat to their position citing, rather hypocritically, the family’s own self interest and lack of involving Bahraini citizens in decision mak-ing.

A taste of how the British viewed the al Khalifah ruler Sheik Isa Bin Ali comes from the then Resident, Major Dickson, who urged in March 1920:“The occasional presence of a warship in Bahrain har-bour would do much to keep our prestige alive among a set of people who are only too apt to forget that the Brit-ish Empire exists and does take an interest in Bahrain af-fairs. Personally also I know my own work will be greatly facilitated if Sheikh Isa were to occasionally wake up and see a warship lying out in his harbour.”18

After negotiations with Isa’s son Abdullah it was agreed a municipal council would be formed with Abdullah as President presiding over four of Isa’s appointees and four foreigners chosen by Dickson. Its first meeting was

that the al Khalifahs were not to enter into any agree-ment or even communicate “with any power other than the British government.” No agents of other states could enter Bahrain without British permission.11

Formally Bahrain was part of the Ottoman Empire but in 1892 the British government sent a note to the authori-ties in Constantinople [Istanbul] stating:“Bahrain being under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen of England… no interference by the Otto-man authorities with the natives of that island can be admitted.”12

They refused to withdraw their claim to Bahrain but as-sured the British they would not force the issue.

An ‘Exclusive Agreement’ signed off by Sheik Isa con-tained the following terms:

“1st. That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British Government.2ns. That without the assent of the British Government I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the Agent of any other Government.3rd. That I will on no account cede, sell or mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British Government.”13

This agreement was the model for treaties with seven other rulers along the coast.

Fred Halliday points out:“The main agents of British policy were the colonial ad-ministrators sent to the Gulf who, under the Indian sys-tem, took the name of ‘Political resident’ and subordi-nate ‘Political Agents. The Resident was until 1947 based in Bushire on the Iranian side; he then moved to Bahrain and remained there until 1971.”14

In 1895 a rebellion against the Sheik broke out. The Brit-ish Agent in the Gulf helped crush it leaving consider-able casualties. Ottoman forces then tried to take the island but were defeated by the British.15

An 1899 minute from the Foreign Department of the British Government of India, responsible for Gulf affairs, spells out Bahrain’s position:“Politically we have a ‘Protectorate’ already. Different na-

7


Shia should now both pay taxes Britain recognised there was no equality between them and Bahrain was a Sunni dominated kingdom.22

The British noted:“Conditions in Bahrain have stabilised themselves under the rule of Shaikh Hamad. But the rule has been substan-tially rule by the Political Agent.”23

On 10 August 1925 the following advertisement ap-peared in the Personal Column of the Times:"Young Gentleman, aged 22/28. Public School and/or University education, required for service in an Eastern State. Good salary and prospects to suitable man, who must be physically fit; highest references; proficiency in languages an advantage."24

A young Oxford graduate and former administrative of-ficer in the British Colonial Service, Charles Belgrave, an-swered and found himself being interviewed by the Brit-ish agent in Bahrain. The Sheik wanted an English official to be his personal adviser. Belgrave got the post and ef-fectively ran the country from 1926 until 1957. Formally he was a financial adviser but he ran the judicial system and the police appointing Baluchi, Omani, Yemeni and Iraqis to man it.25

Around the same time another event was to occur which transform Bahrain. British oil companies had dismissed finding any significant oil in the Arabian peninsula, con-centrating instead on their Iraqi and Iranian fields, but in 1929 the Bahrain Petroleum Country Limited (BAPCO), a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil of California but registered in Canada to get round the British veto on American companies entering Bahrain, signed the coun-try’s oil rights in a concession from the al Khalifah. Three years later oil exports began and revenues flowed in to the coffers of the royal family. 26

Belgrave enjoyed warm relations with the American oil-men, as he did later with the US navy.27

The Great Depression of the 1930s hit Bahrain hard and the traditional pearl fishing industry was undermined by Japanese exports of artificial pearls, but it was offset by the development of the country’s oil fields. Some 40-50 percent of state revenue went to the royal family through the civil list while Sheik Hamad took a third of all oil rev-enues. The al Khalifahs now had greater economic power than the country’s merchants.28

marked by angry demonstrations.19

The British decided they wanted Isa to quit and did not want Abdullah to succeed. When it suited them they were prepared to acknowledge the grievances of the Shia population to use against the Sheik. In December 1921 a new agent arrived, Major Daly, who received a deputation whose address stated:“…the Shiah community is in a state of great humiliation and subject to public massacre. They have no refuge, the evidence of none is accepted, their property is subject to plunder and themselves liable to mal-treatment every moment.”20

Daly even gave refuge to one man whose father had been killed.

The rising tide of Arab nationalism meant there were criticism of Britain’s role in Bahrain and police stations came under attack. Scared too by this development the Sheik turned to Daly for advice.

In February a Shia villager was rescued from arrest by his friends and family. Anger exploded with shops in Man-amah shutting and the bazaar coming to a halt. Faced with this Sheik Hamad agreed to accept a delegation who presented their grievances, which were: the instigation of proper courts of law, an end to the Sheik’s camels graz-ing in villager’s gardens, an end to forced labour, an end to the Sheik’s calves being left with bakers to be fattened and the proper running of the prison. Hamad agreed to them but there was widespread suspicion he would do nothing about them.21

After disturbances on the island in 1923 in which Persian (Iranian) merchants were attacked and with growing con-cern in London over Sheik Isa’s rule, the British Political Resident, Colonel Knox, arrived with two warships and demanded Sheik Isa Bin Ali abdicate, he refused, but Knox simply announced the abdication and that Isa’s son, Hamad, would run the kingdom. The reforms Knox outlined included that the political agent would be re-sponsible for the political and administrative as well as judicial affairs of all foreigners, a customs service would be created ending al Kalifah personal control of customs and its revenues, the royal family could no longer simply take what they wanted from their subjects, there was no right of association except by the sanction of the politi-cal agent and Prince Hamad and lastly, while Sunni and

8


and naval base and the following year it became the Roy-al Navy’s main base in the Gulf.32

The racism of the British administrators shines through, so the British agent in Bahrain argued, on the eve of World War Two, “We certainly do not want to administer their disgusting territories and people.”33

The situation after the Second World War

The end of the Second World War heralded the great wave of Arab nationalism symbolized by Abdul Gamal Nasser in Egypt and the Algerian struggle for independence. Opposition to British and al Khalifa rule was spurred on by Indian independence, the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in 1953 and then the humiliation of the British empire with the collapse of the Anglo-French-Israeli inva-sion of Egypt in 1956.

Bahrain was not unaffected. One obvious target was Charles Belgrave. Yitzhak Nakash argues:“By the late 1940s, Shi’is as well as Sunnis, had come to regard Belgrave as the symbol of colonialism in Bahrain. Among the local population he was known simply by his designation as ‘the adviser.’ Bahrainis associated Bel-grave with the Al-Khalafi as the source of their poverty and suffering.”34

A huge grievance was British and US support for Israel. In May 1948 a US aircraft carrier and its escort visited Bah-rain and its officers were invited to a lavish dinner with Sheik Salman and Belgrave. The day before Washington had recognized the state of Israel. Of 60 invitations to prominent Bahrainis, only 15 accepted, the rest citing the US’s action as reason for their refusal.35

Rebellion broke out again in 1953 and 1954, culminating in a general strike in July 1954. The initial spur was clash-es between Sunni and Shi’ia which led to moves to over-come sectarian division. In direct response to Nasser’s calls from Cairo for Arab unity Shi’a and Sunni national-ists met, in October 1954, in the al-Khamis mosque, the first to be established on the island at the direct instiga-tion of the Prophet, and drafted a charter of demands against British rule.

Reformers from both the Sunni and Shi’ite communities organized a Higher Executive Committee (HEC) demand-ing greater national autonomy, the convening of a legis-

1938 saw strikes over the preferential treatment given to foreign oil workers, Sunni and Shia Bahrainis were united together:“… the demands raised were for local control of educa-tion, the right to organize trade unions, the replacement of the British ‘Political Agent’ and the expulsion of for-eign workers from the Bahrain Petroleum Company.”29

Three strike leaders were exiled.

When students and oil workers threatened a general strike in support of the Majlis movement in November 1938, the regime arrested some prominent reformers and deported them to India.

During the Second World War the US federal authorities financed the building of a refinery for high grade aviation fuel and three plants to build ferry cans and oil tanks. Af-terwards these were handed to BAPCO. All of this meant that Bahrain was home to a growing working class re-cruited from the islands. It was quickly going to exert its influence.30

The importance of Bahrain for Britain grew as its relations with Iran worsened after Reza Shah of the new Pahlavi dynasty took power in a coup in 1923. The New Shah tried to reduce British power in Iran, for instance banning Imperial Airways from flying over the country and award-ing routes instead to Germany’s Lufthansa. Britain had to withdraw its remaining troops, quit its naval bases at Henjam and Basidu and in a case brought to the League of Nations increased its share of Anglo-Persian Oil Com-pany’s revenues from 16 to 21 percent, though having to accept an extension of the country’s lease on the oilfields until 1961. The Shah also formally laid claim to Bahrain and Teheran regularly claimed that the British authori-ties did not provide adequate protection for the Shi’ite population.

There were suggestions in London that Bahrain should be made a British Protectorate but the Government of India objected to any change in the status quo of the Gulf as that might benefit Iran. Therefore the official position was:‘The Principality is an independent Arab State under the protection of His Majesty’s Government, but not a British Protectorate.”31

In 1934 the British purchased land in Bahrain for an air

9


in favour of military intervention on behalf of the Sheik stating:“We have the resources. We must take the necessary measures to make them available.” 41

Regarding Belgrave he stated:“We cannot accept the removal of another high-rank-ing British adviser to an Arab ruler in the foreseeable future.”42

His colleagues were less keen on military intervention with Selwyn Lloyd telling Eden in words which could have applied to the future Suez operation, that: “The effect on our friends, particularly the Americans, would be deplorable and the operation would be a prop-aganda gift to the Egyptians and our other enemies.”43

Selwyn Lloyd argued Belgrave had to go because he had become the symbol for all that was wrong in Bahrain. Sheik Salman wanted Belgrave to say and his adviser showed no sign of going. London discussions eventually ended in August with the announcement of his retire-ment. By then events in Suez had overtaken everything.The opposition Committee of National Unity had entered negotiations with the government and relative peace had ensued but news of the Suez invasion lit a fuse.44

On 3 November protests against the imperialist attack swept Bahrain with the torching of foreign businesses. The ruling Al Khalifa fled the capital, Manama, taking temporary refuge in the village of Refae Al Gharbi where only Sunni Arab families who had served as royal body-guards were allowed to live. Eventually the al Khalifa’s and the British put down the rebellion, declaring martial law and outlawing strikes, but both were aware of the rising tide of Arab nationalism.45

Sheik Salman responded by arresting leading figures in the Higher Executive Committee, charged with plotting to kill him and Belgrave. They were tried by a tribunal made up of Belgrave and three members of the royal family which deported five to St Helena. A state of emer-gency was declared and Bahrain returned to al Khalifah rule.46

Belgrave himself would depart Bahrain in 1957, formally because of illhealth. He was replaced by another British “adviser.”

lature, the right to form trade unions, and the creation of proper courts. Lengthy Protracted negotiations between the king and the HEC led to royal recognition of a Com-mittee of National Unity, in return for HEC dropping its demand for a national assembly. Activists in the trade unions reacted to this by forming the National Liberation Front-Bahrain, pressing for more fundamental changes in the country’s political structure.

In 1954 striking workers elected their own political party, the united Higher Executive Committee which pressed for parliamentary democracy. 36

Two years later, King Hussein of Jordan, bending to the pressure of Arab nationalism, had dismissed Sir John Glubb, head of the British trained and armed Arab League, who was seen as a symbol of British influence in the Middle. The Bahraini opposition focused on demand-ing Belgrave’s removal.37

The Bahrain Patriotic Liberation Front (later the Demo-cratic and Progressive Tribune) and the Bahrain Patriotic Liberation Front, which was linked to the Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party, itself founded by Bahrainis living in Iran, were at the centre of growing unrest. In March 1956 the island was paralysed by student protests and a strike by BAPCO workers. British troops killed ten demonstra-tors and jailed many more. Leaders such as Abdul Rah-man Al-Baker, Abdul Aziz Al-Shamlan and Abdul Ali Al-Alaywat, were exiled to St Helena in the south Atlantic, where Napoleon ended his days.38

But the repression did not quell the unrest which was boosted by Egypt’s defiance of the Anglo-French attempt to conquer the Suez Canal in league with Israel. In Decem-ber the British foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd stopped off en route to Cairo and tens of thousands of protesters chanting ‘Selwyn Go Home’ blocked the route from the airport to Manama. His car was stoned by protesters de-manding Belgrave’s removal and the British minister had to reach the capital by boat.39

A few days after the stoning of Selwyn Lloyd’s car the Higher Executive Committee called a strike over the kill-ing of five protesters.40

After the stoning of Selwyn Lloyd’s car, Prime Minister Anthony Eden convened a discussion at Downing Street on the situation in Bahrain and the Gulf. He was gung ho

10


munists and Ba’athists 50 Fred Halliday notes a key shift:“The merchants who had worked in the 1954-56 move-ment took no part in this wave. The class character of the opposition had changed…”51

The town of Muharraq, nicknamed Port Said in honour of the Egyptian city’s resistance to the British two years earlier, was liberated for several days. British helicopters dropped tear gas on the town. 52In the middle of all this Prince Philip visited saying on arrival, “I hope I am not interrupting a war.” 53

Police and security forces were used to break the move-ment, jailing and exiling its leaders.54

Although the uprising was suppressed it left a rich legacy of rebellion.

In 1966 the British Agent recruited a former colonial of-ficer from Kenya, Ian Henderson, who had been involved in the counter-insurgency operations during the Mau Mau rebellion, to create the State Intelligence service, which “became an efficient and repressive instrument of the Al Khalifah.”55

Henderson remained in charge until 1998.

British troops also remained and in May 1966 the Econo-mist noted:“If the troops were not there the government would probably be overthrown, even if only temporarily.”56

American and British Protection

In 1967 Harold Wilson’s government in London an-nounced they would withdraw all British forces east of Suez. The British were quitting HMS Jufair in Bahrain. Worried about Iranian and Iraqi ambitions to control the Gulf the US stepped in. In 1970 the reached agreement with the Sheik to take over HMS Jufair. The American ne-gotiator reported:“His Highness was very clear that Bahrain desired a con-tinued US presence.”57

The al Kalihah’s were now under US ‘protection’ but the British continued to run the security forces through ap-pointees.

In the post-war decades until British withdrawal in 1971,

By 1958 members of the al Khalifah family held 14 out of 60 of the key government posts with British officials taking 23. By 1965 the al Khalifah’s held 25 of the top 63 posts. The police and detective force was based on for-eigners; in 1959 only 202 police out of a total of 739 were Bahrainis while 127 were North Yemenis, 61 Omanis and the same number of South Yemenis. Seventeen of the 29 officers were British:‘The chief CID men, three Cypriots known in Bahrain as “Ben, Bob and Green,” were especially loathed; the former two retired from the service after being severely wounded by a bomb planted in Bob’s car in 1966.’47

The overthrow of the British backed monarchy in Iraq in 1958 was a major blow top Britain’s position in the Gulf. Selwyn Lloyd immediately flew to Washington where it was agreed Kuwait should be granted independence to appease nationalist sentiment there, but Britain had to maintain control in the other Gulf States. Selwyn Lloyd telegraphed London saying:“At all costs these oilfields must be kept in Western hands.”48

The first protests after 1956 came in 1962 when second-ary school teachers struck and were subject to mass ar-rest. In 1963 women took part in demonstrations for the first time in celebration of the unity between Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

In 1965 unrest broke out again with a strike over lay offs by BAPCO. The strikers demanded not just reinstatement but the right to organize trade unions, the freeing of po-litical prisoners and an end to the state of emergency and police harassment. Students rallied to the protest move-ment.

March 1965 saw a full scale uprising against Britain’s control of Bahrain following sackings of oil workers. Demonstrations started with high school students who were attacked by security forces prompting a nation wide uprising under the slogan ‘down with colonialism’. The uprising lasted for about one month, during which 6 Bah-rainis were killed and many others injured and jailed dur-ing the protests. They demanded: the reinstatement of those dismissed, the right to form trade unions, freedom of assembly, freedom for all political prisoners, the re-moval of all British and other foreign employees and the lifting of the state of emergency in force since 1956.49

A front of Progressive Forces was formed including Com-

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but because of its opposition to a new security law being proposed by Sheik Isa, who would be given the power to arrest anyone threatening national security in his eyes, He responded by suspending constitution and by direct rule through the State Security Law. The National Assem-bly never met again.60

Thousands were jailed and the media kept on a tight leash. Without British support the al Khalifahs turned to the Saudis for help and expertise in internal control. The culmination of that came in 2011 when Saudi forc-es crossed the causeway to help suppress the uprising which was an integral part of the Arab Spring.

The presence of a former Scotland Yard senior policeman, John Yates, as the current adviser to King Hamad upholds a tradition established by Belgrave and Henderson – it constitutes a living legacy of British imperialism.61

It is a tradition which should not be upheld in the 21st century by the Queen, prime minister David Cameron and the British banks and corporations who make a tidy penny in Bahrain.

the British leased naval facilities in Bahrain to the US. Af-ter 1971 the US agreed to pay $4 million a year in return for base rights but Bahrain withdrew from this deal in 1973 in protest over America’s support for Israel in its war of that year with neighbouring Arab states. The US only received limited facilities again in 1977 after lengthy negotiations and Bahrain only became a major US base during the 1990-91 Gulf War when 20,000 US person-nel were based there with Bahrain being key to the air operation against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. In 1995 Bahrain became home to the US Fifth Fleet and to US regional command. In addition to paying for the lease of the base the US began major arms sales to what it now regarded as a key ally.58

In 1972 Sheik permitted elections to a National Assem-bly. Eventually 27,000 males elected 30 members to it. It divided into a People’s Bloc, the old National Front under another name, and a Religious Party based among the rural Shi’ia. 59

It met in two sessions, in December 1973 and July 1974

12

The Gulf Example of Political Change19 Jun 2012

1. Hooshang Amirahmadi , Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in

the Persian Gulf, Palgrave, 1996, P4.

2. Farhang Mehr , A Colonial Legacy: The Dispute Over the Islands of Abu Musa,

and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs, University Press of America, 1997, P41-42

3. Hass an Ali Radhi, Judiciary and Arbitration in Bahrain: A Historical and Analyti-

cal Study, Brill, 2003, P10.

4. Hass an Ali Radhi, Judiciary and Arbitration in Bahrain: A Historical and Analyti-

cal Study, Brill, 2003, P12.

5. James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the

British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf, Oxford University Press, 2007, P50-51.

6. Michelle L. Burgis, Boundaries of Discourse in the International Court of Justice:

Mapping Arguments in Arab Territorial Disputes, Brill, 2009, P152 and Hassan Ali

Radhi, Judiciary and Arbitration in Bahrain: A Historical and Analytical Study, Brill,

2003, P13.

7. Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World, Prin-

ceton University Press, 2007, P59.

Footnotes

13

The Gulf Example of Political Change19 jun 2012



9. Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf: A Mari-

time Political Geography, Routledge, 1999, P128.

10. David Frank Winkler, Amirs, Admirals & Desert Sailors: Bahrain, the U.S. Navy,

and the Arabian Gulf, Naval Institute Press, 2007, P13.

11. Michelle L. Burgis, Boundaries of Discourse in the International Court of Jus-

tice: Mapping Arguments in Arab Territorial Disputes, Brill, 2009, P152.

12. Gökhan Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraqm 1890-1908, Routledge,

2006, P137.

13. Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, Penguin, 1974, P429.


15. Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf: A Mari-

time Political Geography, Routledge, 1999, P130.

16. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, University of

California Press, 1967, P139.

17. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, University of

California Press, 1967, P144-146.

18. Mahdi Abdalla Al-Tajir , Bahrain, 1920-1945: Britain, the Shaikh, and the Ad-

ministration, Routledge, 1987, P4-5.


ministration, Routledge, 1987, P29.





22. Hassan Ali Radhi, Judiciary and Arbitration in Bahrain: A Historical and Analyti-

cal Study, Brill, 2003, P41-42.



24. Life, 17 November, 1952.




14









and the Arabian Gulf, Naval Institute Press, 2007, P17-19.





33. Simon C. Smith, Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,

and the Trucial States, Routledge, 2004, 1950-71, P3.





36. Fred Lawson, Contemporary Bahrain, in Peter J. Chelkowski, George Lenczowski

and Robert J. Pranger (editors), Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in

Honor of George Lenczowski, Duke University Press, 1988, P124 .


and the Trucial States 1950-1971,Routledge, 2004 , P9.

38. Marhamah Hasan Marhamah, Voices: An Annotated Anthology of Contempo-

rary Bahraini Poetry Trafford Publishing, 2009, P18-19.

39. Marhamah Hasan Marhamah, Voices: An Annotated Anthology of Contempo-

rary Bahraini Poetry Trafford Publishing, 2009, P18-19 and Fred Halliday, Arabia

Without Sultans, Penguin, 1974, P445.

40. David Commins , The Gulf States: A Modern History, IB Tauris, 2012, P145.






15

The Gulf Example of Political Change19 jun 2012






47. Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, Penguin, 1974, P445-446.

48. Ḥayim Gordon, Looking Back at the June 1967 War, Greenwood, 1999, P17.


50. Fred Lawson, Contemporay Bahrain, in Peter J. Chelkowski, George Lenczowski


Honor of George Lenczowski, Duke University Press, 1988, P125 and Fred Halliday,

Arabia Without Sultans, Penguin, 1974, P446.


52. Miriam Joyce , Ruling Shaikhs and Her Majesty’s Government, 1960-1969,

Routledge, 2003, P65.

53. Miriam Joyce , Ruling Shaikhs and Her Majesty’s Government, 1960-1969,

Routledge, 2003, P66.

54. Fred Lawson, Contemporay Bahrain, in Peter J. Chelkowski, George Lenczowski


Honor of George Lenczowski, Duke University Press, 1988, P125 and Fred Halliday,

Arabia Without Sultans, Penguin, 1974, P446.

55. Leon Carl Brown, Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of

Regional and Outside Powers, IB Tauris, 2004, P50.




58. Lobna Ali Al-Khalifa , Foreign Direct Investment in Bahrain, Universal Publish-

ers, 2004, P113-114.

59. Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim, The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims,

Palgrave, 2001, P125.

60. Laurence Louėr, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in

the Gulf, Columbia University Press, 2009, P156-157.

61. http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2012/05/if_you_take_my_advice_-_

id_rep.html - accessed 29 May 2012.

16


About BCSL

There has been an increasing talk about the Kingdom of Bahrain and the political trends and challenges the country is facing since the increase of the political crisis started on February 14th 2011 when Bahrain emerged as a part of the so called “Arab Spring Revolts” that roiled Arab world in 2011.

This has raised fundamental questions about Bahrain’s sophisticated ever political issues, despite, that Bah-rain is located and surrounded by, as described as, conservative and stabilized countries.

The international interest about Bahrain, and at the same time the lack of insightful readily available informa-tion, are behind the drive to establish, on the 3rd of May 2012, “The Bahrain Center for Studies in London (BCSL)”, as an independent research centre, aims to, study the case and status of the uprising in Bahrain, its influential factors and expected future affairs.

BCSL will prepare and publish researches and studies and will also organize debating sessions evolving around the domestic affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain and its strategic aspects related to political, economic and security policies and including its relation at regional and international levels. BCSL encourages discussions and dialogues in respect of Bahrain, and seeks to increase the interest of re-searchers, decision-makers, and actors in public opinion and motivate them to address the different aspects of the issues of Bahrain. BCSL wishes that this will contribute to a sound understanding and insightful of Bahrain case.BCSL interests BCSL is mainly concerned with all issues related to Bahrain within the context of its regional and the interna-tional relations and politics in particular that relates to the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) states.

Research interests programs include, but not limited to, the followings: 1. Political Issues.2. Political Association & Parties, Trade Unions and Civil Society Institutions.3. Human Rights Issues.4. Legal and Constitutional Affairs. 5. The issues of Security, Defense and armed equipment6. Media 7. The links and entanglements between Bahrain issues and other GCC States, in a regional and international context.8. Economic and Oil

BCSL also pays particular attention to the political/ democratic development of the GCC states and other Arab countries.

For ideas of research, and if interested to write about one of the above listed topics, please communicate with the Head of BCSL through the following e-mail address: [email protected]

For general inquiries, you may please contact BCSL on the following email address: [email protected]

www.bcsl.org.uk

Twitter.com/bhcslFacebook.com/bhcsl

18


Chris Bambery is a freelance journalist, broadcaster and author whose books in-clude “A Rebel’s Guide to Gramsci,” “Ireland’s Permanent Revolution” and “Scot-land, Class and Nation.” His major history of the Second World War focusing on imperialism and resistance will be published by Pluto Press next year.

Chris appears regularly on television and radio, including Russia Today, IRIB TV, Press TV, The Islam Channel, Al Alam, BBC Radio Scotland, Radio Clyde and Talk Sport and in addition works as a television producer.

He is a regular contributor to ‘The Military History Monthly’ and other publica-tions and has an in depth and up to date knowledge on a range of issues includ-ing labour history, political theory, class poverty and race in Britain, imperialism and war, international relations, Scottish and Italian history and politics, Middle Eastern affairs, politics and 19th and 20th century history.

Copyright ©

Bahrain Centre For Studies in London (BCSL)[email protected]

Facebook.com/BHCSL@BHCSL

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