Balane Wills

7/27/2019 Balane Wills

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SSUUCCCCEESSSSIIOONN RREEVVIIEEWWEERR 11SSTT SSEEMM 22000066--22000077

JJeenn LLaayyggoo 33DD Digests c/o 3C 06-07: Alvin Saga, Cecille Natividad, CJ Tan, Julie Domingo, Mars Rongo, Lea Mateo, Nina Rances & Ryan Quan 11

Based on Jottings and Jurisprudence on the Law onSuccession by Prof. Balane and Cases according to the

2006 Syllabus of Justice Hofilea

ART. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition byvirtue of which the property, rights andobligations to the extent of the value of theinheritance, of a person are transmittedthrough his death to another or others eitherby his will or by operation of law.

The Code has simplified the concept of succession andtreats it simply as one of the 7 Modes of Acquiring

Ownership as enumerated in Art712 of the NCC.

7 MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP1. Occupation2. Intellectual Creation3. Law4. Donation5. Estate and Intestate Succession6. Tradition7. Prescription

Overlap of Codal Definition with Art776 Article 774 talks of property, rights and obligations

to the extent of the value of the inheritance. Article 776 talks of the inheritance as including

all the property, rights and obligations of a personwhich are not extinguished by his death.

For clarity and better correlation, Prof. Balaneopines that Art774 should rather read:

Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of whichthe inheritance of a person is transmitted through his death toanother or others either by his will or by operation of law.

And the inheritance which is transmitted through apersons death is defined by Article 776 to includeall the property, rights and obligations of a personwhich are not extinguished by his death.

What are Transmitted by Succession?

Only Transmissible Rights and Obligations. General Rule if the right or obligation is strictly

personal [intuitu personae], it is intransmissible;otherwise it may be transmitted.

Rule Regarding Pecuniary Obligations A literal construction of Art774 appears to imply

that money obligations of the deceased would passto the heirs, to the extent that they inherit from him.

Seemingly, this article mandates that theheirs receive the estate, and then pay offthe creditors.

However, Philippine procedural law, as influencedby the common-law system, lays down a differentmethod for the payment of money debts, as foundin Rules 88 to 90 of the Rules of Court. It is onlyAFTER the debts are paid that the residue ofthe estate is distributed among the successors.

Rule 90, Sec1 provides for the When the Order for theDistribution of Residue is made. According to the rule, when the debts, funeral

charges and expenses of administration, theallowance to the widow and the inheritance taxhave all been paid, that is the only time that thecourt shall assign the RESIDUE of the estate topersons entitled to it.

The rule also provides that there shall be nodistribution until the payment of the obligationsenumerated above, have been made or providedfor. However, if the distributees give a bond for thepayment of the said obligations within such timeand of such amount as fixed by the court, thedistribution may be allowed.

In our system therefore, money debts are, properlyspeaking, not transmitted to the heir nor paid bythem. The estate pays them and it is only what isleft after the debts are paid [residue] that aretransmitted to the heirs.

Justice JBL Reyes observed that Philippine rules ofSuccession Mortis Causa proceed from an imperfectblending of 3 Systems with Contrasting Philosophies

1. GERMANIC CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL HEIR

Heir directly and immediately steps into theshoes of the deceased upon the latters death

At one single occasion [uno ictu]

Without need of any formality

En mass

Automatic Subjective Novation

2. FRANCO-SPANISH SYSTEM

Acquisition of estate by universal title but onlyupon acceptance by the heir at any time, withretroactive effect.

Acceptance may be made any time exceptwhen the creditors or the court requires it bedone within a certain time.

This is the system followed by the NCC, byhaving the following features:a) Universality of Property Rights and

Obligations

b) Transmitted from the moment of deathc) En bloc, as an entire massd) Transmitted even before judicial

recognition of heirship.

3. ANGLO-AMERICAN [COMMON LAW] SYSTEM

Estate must first be liquidated, assetsmarshaled and the debts paid or settledunder judicial supervision, by an interveningtrustee or personal representative[administrator or executor] before the netresidue is taken over by the successor.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS


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This is the system followed by the Rules ofCourt, in that:a) Executor or administrator has possession

and management of the estate as longas necessary for the payment of debtsand expenses of administration, withauthority to exercise the right ofdisposition.

b) Section 3 Rule 87 action to recover titleor possession of lands in the hands ofthe executor or administrator can bemaintained by the heir only upon theorder of the Court assigning such land tothe heir or devisee.

c) Section 1 Rule 90 heirs may recovertheir share only upon:

Payment of debts, expensesand taxes

Hearing conducted by the court Court assigns the residue of the

estate to the heirs.

As a result of the blending of these 3 systems, JBLReyes says that we are thus faced with divergent, if not

contradictory principles. Do the successors acquire the WHOLE of the

transmissible assets and liabilities of the decedent?

Art774 by virtue of succession theproperty, rights and obligations, to theextent of the value of the inheritance of aperson, are transmitted by and at themoment of his death, implying a transferat that instant of the totalityor universalityof assets and liabilities.

Do the successors only acquire the RESIDUUMremaining after payment of the debts, as implied by

the Rules of Court? Art1057 within 30 days after the court

has issued an order for the distribution ofthe estate in accordance with the RoC,the heirs, devisees and legatees shallsignify to the court having jurisdiction,whether they accept or repudiate theinheritance.

The order of distribution under the RoC isissued only after the debts, taxes andadministration expenses have been paid;hence it is arguable that the acceptancecan no longer refer to assets alreadydisposed of by the administrator, but mustbe limited to the net residue.

But if title vests in the heir as of the deathof the decedent then the acceptance ofthe heir becomes entirely superfluous,and the law should limit itself to regulatingthe effects the effects of a repudiation byan heir or legatee, and its retroactiveeffect.

Or do the successors acquire only the NAKEDTITLE at the death of the predecessor, but withpossession or enjoyment vested in the

administrator or personal representative until aftersettlement of the claims against the estate?

RESULT of these divergent rules Creditors must nowpursue their claims during the settlement proceedingsand not against the heirs individually.

CASEUni on Ban k v . Santi baez

- On May 31, 1980, First Country Credit Corporation (FCCC)and Efraim M. Santibanez entered into a loan agreement inthe amount of P128,000 which was intended for thepayment of the purchase price of 1 unit of a tractor. In viewof this, Efraim and his son, Edmund executed a promissorynote in favor of FCCC.

- On Dec. 13, 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into anothersimilar loan agreement which was intended to pay thebalance of the purchase price of another unit of a tractor.And again, father and son executed a promissory note forthe said amount in favor of FCCC.

- However, sometime in Feb 1981, Efraim died, leaving aholographic will and subsequently testate proceedings were

commenced before the RTC of Iloilo with Edmund beingappointed as the special administrator of the estate of thedecedent.

- During the pendency of the testate proceedings, Edmundand his sister, Florence Santibanez Ariola, executed a jointagreement on July 22, 1981 wherein they agreed to dividebetween themselves and take possession of the 3 tractors; 2for Edmund and 1 for Florence, each of them to assumeindebtedness of their late father to FCCC.

- On August 20, 1981 a deed of assignment with assumptionof liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and UnionSavings and Mortgage Bank, wherein FCCC as theassignor, assigned all its assets and liabilities to UnionSavings and Mortgage Bank.

- Not long after, demand letter for the settlement of theaccount were sent by Union Bank to Edmund but the latter

refused to pay. Thus Union Bank filed a complaint for sum ofmoney against the Edmund and Florence before the RTC ofMakati.

- However the case was dismissed. The lower court said thatthe claim should have been filed with the probate court werethe testate estate of Efraim was pending. Furthermore, theagreement was void considering that the probate court didnot approve the agreement and no valid partition until afterthe will has been probated.

- Also, the list of assets and liabilities of Union Bank did notclearly refer to the decedents account. Also, it wascontended that the obligation of the deceased had passed tohis legitimate children and heirs already, in this caseEdmund and Efraim. CA affirmed RTC decision.

- Hence this appeal.WON the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs isvalid.- No, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after

the will has been probated by the probate court. This isspecially because when the joint agreement executed byEdmund and Florence partitioning the tractors amongthemselves were executed, there was already a pendingproceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographicwill covering the said tractors. Thus the probate court hadalready acquired jurisdiction over the said tractors whichthey cant be divested of. Any extrajudicial agreement needscourt approval.


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WON the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of thedeceased is valid.- No, the assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent by

Edmund and Florence is not binding. Such assumption wasconditioned upon the agreement above. Hence, when theagreement of partition between Edmund and Florence wasinvalidated, then the assumption of the indebtedness cannotbe given and force and effect. Also, the court should have

filed it money claim against the decedents estate in theprobate court. Furthermore, it cannot go after Florence forshe took no part in the documents related to the tractors,specifically the promissory notes and the continuingguaranty agreement; they should have gone after Edmundbeing a co-signatory to the promissory notes and guaranty.

WON the Union Bank can hold the heirs liable on theobligation of the deceased.- No, Union Bank cannot hold the heirs liable on the obligation

of the deceased because it had not sufficiently shown that itis the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings andMortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets andliabilities. Furthermore, the documentary evidence clearlyreflects that the parties in the deed of assignment withassumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union

Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of BancomPhilippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the participationtherein of Union Bank as a party can be found. As a result,Union Bank has no personality to file the complaint andtherefore cannot hold the heirs liable for the obligation of thedeceased.

In a sense, it can be said that even money debts aretransmitted to and paid for by the heirs, but this wouldbe by mere indirection Because whatever payment is thus made from the

estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs anddistributes, since the amount of the paid claim infact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs

would have been entitled to receive.

BUT only the payment of MONEY DEBTS has beenaffected by the Rules of Court. The transmission ofother obligations not by nature personal follows the rulein Art774 and is transmitted by succession.

CASE

Estate of K.H. Hemady v . Luzo n Surety

- Luzon Surety filed a claim against the Estate based on 20different indemnity agreements or counter bonds, eachsubscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K.H.

Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor in all of them, inconsideration of Luzon Suretys of having guaranteed, thevarious principals in favor of different creditors.

- Luzon Surety also prayed for allowance, as a contingentclaim, of the value of the 20 bonds it had executed inconsideration of the counterbonds, and further asked forjudgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stampsaffixed to the bonds with 12% interest.

- Before the answer was filed, the lower court dismissed theclaims of Luzon Surety, on two grounds: (1) that thepremiums due and cost of documentary stamps were notcontemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part

of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since thewere not liabilities incurred after the execution of thecounterbonds; and (2) that whatever losses may occur afterHemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate, becauseupon his death he ceased to be guarantor.

Whether losses are chargeable to Hemadys Estate.

- YES. While in our successional system the responsibility ofthe heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed thevalue of the inheritance they receive from him, the principleremains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rightsof the deceased but also to his obligations.

- Under the CC, the heirs, by virtue of the rights of successionare subrogated to all the rights and obligations of thedeceased and cannot be regarded as third parties withrespect to a contract to which the deceased was a party,touching the estate of the deceased.

- By contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulateguaranty or suretyship contain no provision that the guarantyis extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or thesurety.

- Although Art. 2056 requires that one who is required tofurnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses

integrity, capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property toanswer for the obligation which he guarantees, it will benoted that the law requires these qualities to be present onlyat the time of the perfection of the contract of guaranty

- The contract of suretyship entered into by K.H. Hemady infavor of Luzon Surety not being rendered intransmissibledue to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulationsof the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, hiseventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon hisdeath to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise tocontingent claims provable against his estate.

- The SC reversed the order of the lower court and insteadordered the case be remanded to the CFI.

- The general rule is that a partys contractual rights andobligations are transmissible to the successors.

-

Art. 1311 of NCC: Contracts take effect only as between theparties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where therights and obligations arising from the contract are nottransmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provisionof law.

- Art. 774 of NCC: Succession is a mode of acquisition byvirtue of which the property, rights and obligations to theextent of the value of the inheritance of a person aretransmitted through his death to another or other either byhis will or by operation of law.

- Art. 776 of NCC: The inheritance includes all the property,rights and obligations of a person which are notextinguished by his death.

- The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of thedeceased party is not altered by the provision in the Rules ofCourt that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated

and paid from the estate before the residue is distributedamong said heirs. The reasons is that whatever payment ismade from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs,since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes orreduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitledto receive.


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Alv arez v. IAC

- Aniceto Yanes owned a parcel of land identified as Lot 773in Negros Occidental. He was survived by his children,Rufino, Felipe, and Teodora.

- Aniceto left his children with Lots 773 and 823.- Teodora cultivated part of Lot 823.

- Rufino and his children left the province to settle in otherplaces as a result of the outbreak of WWII.

- After the liberation, Rufinos children went back to the landto get the their share in the sugar produce. They wereinformed that Santiago already owned Lot 773, and had thecorresponding TCTs.

- Santiago sold the land to Fuentabella.- After Fuentabella died, the administratrix of his estate

(Arsenia) filed a motion requesting authority to sell Lot 773(already subdivided to Lots 773-A and 773-B).

- The motion was granted and Arsenia sold the lands toAlvarez.

- Teodora and Rufinos children (Yaneses) filed a complaint inCFI Negros Occidental for the return of the possession andownership of Lots 773 and 823.

- During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the land toSiason.

- CFI ordered Alvarez to reconvey Lots 773 and 823 to theYaneses.

- Execution of the decision was unsuccessful with regard toLot 773 as it was already in the name of Siason.

- Another action was instituted by the Yaneses, this timeimpleading Siason.

- Siason claims that he was a purchaser in good faith andthus, he has title to Lot 773.

- CFI dismissed the complaint against Siason and ordered thechildren of Alvarez to solidarily pay the Yaneses Php20,000, representing the actual value of Lot 773.

WON it was correctly ruled that the children of Alvarez bemade responsible for the liability of their father (Alvarez).

- YES. The rights and obligations of the deceased aregenerally transmissible to his legitimate children and heirs.

- As heirs of the late Alvarez, the children cannot escape theconsequences of their fathers transaction, which gave riseto the present claim for damages.

- The children are, however, liable only to the extent of thevalue of their inheritance.

- Art. 774, NCC: Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtueof which the property, rights and obligations to the extent ofthe value of the inheritance, of a person are transmittedthrough his death to another or others either by his will or byoperation of law.

- Art. 776, NCC: The inheritance includes all the property,rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguishedby his death.

ART. 775. In this Title, decedent is the generalterm applied to the person whose property istransmitted through succession, whether ornot he left a will. If he left a will, he is alsocalled the testator.

Decedent general term, person whose property istransmitted

Testator specific term, person who transmits hisproperty via a will.

It is unfortunate that the Code does not use the termIntestate to refer to a decedent who died without a will,This would have prevented the ambiguity now inherentin the term decedent

ART. 776. The inheritance includes all theproperty, rights and obligations of a personwhich are not extinguished by his death.

Overlap of Codal Definition with Art776 Article 774 talks of property, rights and obligations

to the extent of the value of the inheritance. Article 776 talks of the inheritance as including

all the property, rights and obligations of a personwhich are not extinguished by his death.

For clarity and better correlation, Prof. Balaneopines that Art774 should rather read:

Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of whichthe inheritance of a person is transmitted through his death toanother or others either by his will or by operation of law.

And the inheritance which is transmitted through apersons death is defined by Article 776 to include allthe property, rights and obligations of a person whichare not extinguished by his death.

ART. 777. The rights to the succession aretransmitted from the moment of the death ofthe decedent.

Time of Vesting of Successional Right

Prof. Balane says the terminology used in this article isinfelicitous because the right to the succession is nottransmitted; but rathervested. To say that it is transmitted upon death implies that

before the decedents death, the right to thesuccession was possessed by the decedent [whichis absurd].

To say that it vests upon death implies that beforethe decedents death the right was merely inchoate[which is correct].

THE LAW PRESUMES THAT THE PERSONSUCCEEDING

1. Has a right to succeed by

a) Legitime [compulsory succession],b) Will [testamentary succession], orc) Law [intestate succession]

2. Has the legal capacity to succeed, and

3. Accepts the successional portion


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The vesting of the right occurs immediately uponthe decedents death; i.e. without a momentsinterruption. From this principle, the following

consequences flow1. The law in force at the time of the decedents

death will determine who the heirs should be

New Civil Code August 30, 1950

2. Ownership passes to the heir at the very momentof death, who therefore, from that momentacquires the right to dispose of his share.

3. The heirs have the right to be substituted for thedeceased as party in an action that survives.

Because the heir acquires ownership atthe moment of death and become partiesin interest.

It should be emphasized that the operation of Art. 777 isat the very moment of the decedents death, meaningthe transmission by succession occurs at theprecise moment of death and therefore the heir,

devisee, or legatee is legally deemed to haveacquired ownership at that moment, even if,particularly in the heirs case, he will generally notknow how much he will be inheriting and whatproperties he will ultimately be receiving, and not atthe time of declaration of heirs or partition ordistribution.

CASESUson v . Del Rosar io

Law in force at time of decedents deathdetermines who the heirs should be.

- Maria Unson was the legal wife of Faustino Nebrada.Faustino died in 1945 leaving 5 parcels of land with no other

heir except his legal wife.- However, it was the common-life, Maria del Rosario whotook possession of the lands, depriving Unson theenjoyment and possession of the same.

- Thus, the legal wife filed a case for recovery of ownershipand possession of the said parcels of land against delRosario.

- Maria de Rosario contended that Unson and Faustinoagreed to separate some time in 1931. Unson was given aparcel of land as alimony on the condition that the latter willrenounce her right to inherit any property that may be left bythe husband upon his death.

- Whether or not Unson is entitled to recover the parcels ofland in question.

- The SC held for Maria Unson.

- The Civil Code provides that the inheritance of a person istransmitted to another at the moment of his death.

- Accordingly, the Supreme Court said that the parcels of landof Faustino passed from the moment of his death to his onlyheir, Maria Unson.

- The contention that Unson and Faustino agreed that theformer would NOT inherit anything from the latter cannot bemade effectual. Future inheritance cannot be validly madethe subject of any contract nor can it be renounced.

- Del Rosario also argued that her illegitimate children withFaustino have the right to inherit by virtue of the provision of

the new Civil Code granting successional rights toillegitimate children.

- Said argument is untenable. It is true that the new CivilCode grants successional rights to illegitimate children andthat this right shall be given retroactive effect even thoughthe event which gave rise to said right may have occurredunder the former legislation. (Faustino died in 1945, TheNCC took effect in 1950).

- However, according to the NCC, this new right must notprejudice or impair any vested or acquired right.

- In this case, and as already explained, the right over theparcels of land vested upon Unson from the moment ofdeath of Faustino. Thus, the new right cannot be enforcedw/out prejudice to Unsons vested right over the properties.

- Rights over the inheritance of a person are transmitted uponhis death to another.

- The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death ofthe ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executedand delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.

De Bor ja v. De Bor ja

Ownership passes to heir at thevery moment of death, with right to dispose

- Francisco De Borja and Jose De Borja were co-administrators of the testate estate of Josefa De Borja,Franciscos wife and Joses mother

- When Francisco died, Jose became the sole administrator inthe testate proceedings of his mother before the CFI ofRizal.

- It appears that after the death of Josefa, widower Franciscomarried Tasiana Ongsingco.

- Following the death of Francisco, Tasiana was appointed asspecial administratrix in the testate proceedings of Franciscobefore the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

- Multiple suits ensued between the children of the firstmarriage and Tasiana until at some point, when both parties

agreed to enter into a compromise agreement on October12, 1963.

- In the said agreement, Jose De Borja, personally and asadministrator of the estate of Josefa, and TasianaOngsingco, expressed their mutual desire to end the suitsbetween them by selling the Poblacion portion of theJalajala, Rizal properties of Francisco, from the proceeds ofwhich P800,000, representing P200,000 from each of the 4children from the first marriage, shall be paid to Tasiana asfull and complete payment and settlement of Tasianashereditary share in the estate of Francisco as well as ofJosefa, and to any properties bequeathed or devised to herby Francisco, by will or by donation purportedly conveyedfor consideration or otherwise.

- The CFI of Rizal approved the agreement whereas the CFIof Nueva Ecija did not.

- Tasianas grounds for her opposition to the agreement after

it was submitted to the court for approval were: 1) no suchagreement is valid without first probating the will ofFrancisco; 2) it compromises the validity of the marriagebetween Francisco and Tasiana; and, 3) the resolutory 60-day period had lapsed so that the agreement had ceased tobe valid.

- Tasiana cited Guevara v. Guevara which did not allow anextrajudicial settlement of a decedents estate if there hasbeen left a will, stating that it was against the law and publicpolicy.


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- Thus, pending probate of Franciscos will when theagreement was made, it was invalid.

Whether or not the compromise agreement was invalid withoutfirst probating the will of Francisco.- NO. The compromise agreement was valid.- Guevara v. Guevara was inapplicable.- Following a review of the provision in the agreement where

full and complete payment was made to Tasiana in theamount of P800,000, it was clear that there was no attemptto settle or distribute Franciscos estate before the probateof his will.

- Its object was conveyance by Tasiana of her individualshare and interest, actual or eventual, in the estates ofFrancisco and Josefa.

- A hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted orvested immediately from the moment of the death of suchcausante or predecessor in interest (Art. 777, NCC.)

- Thus, there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisitecontracting capacity) disposing of his or her hereditary shareimmediately after such death, even if the actual extent ofsuch share is not determined until the subsequent liquidationof the estate.

- The effect of such alienation is limited to what is ultimately

adjudicated to the vendor heir.- Moreover, as surviving spouse of Franciscos, Tasiana was

a compulsory heir so that her successional interest existedindependent of Franciscos will and testament and wouldexist even if such were not probated at all.

- Also, the agreement bound the parties, in their individualcapacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even absenta previous authority from the Court.

- The only difference between an extrajudicial compromiseand one submitted and approved by the court is that thelatter is enforceable by execution proceedings.

Whether or not the agreement compromises the status andvalidity of the marriage between Francisco and Tasiana.- NO. In the very opening paragraph of the agreement itself,

she was described as the heir and surviving spouse ofFrancisco De Borja which was a definite admission of hercivil status.

Whether or not the compromise agreement had ceased to bevalid.- NO. Joses act of seeking a court order for the approval and

enforcement of the agreement is justified as said agreementhad not been abandoned and not invalidated by the inabilityof the parties to reach a novatory accord in a quest for amore satisfactory compromise following Tasianas unilateralattempts to back out from the same.

- A hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted orvested immediately from the moment of the death of suchcausante or predecessor in interest (Art. 777, NCC.)

- Thus, there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite

contracting capacity) disposing of his or her hereditary shareimmediately after such death, even if the actual extent ofsuch share is not determined until the subsequent liquidationof the estate.

- The effect of such alienation is limited to what is ultimatelyadjudicated to the vendor heir.

- The only difference between an extrajudicial compromiseand one submitted and approved by the court is that thelatter is enforceable by execution proceedings.

Boni l la v. Barcena

Heirs have right to be substituted for deceasedin an action that survives.

- On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minorsRosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of PoncianoBonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance

of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located inAbra.

- On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed a motion to dismissthe complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is deadand, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue.

- During the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed thedeath of Fortunata Barcena and asked for substitution byher minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein;but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed thecase on the ground that a dead person cannot be a realparty in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

- Whether the court acted correctly in dismissing thecomplaint on the ground that the plaintiff, who had diedpending the proceedings, has no more personality to sue.

- While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue incourt, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing thecase up to its completion.

- The court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of thedeceased. If thereafter she died, Section 16, Rule 3 of theRules of Court provides that "whenever a party to a pendingcase dies . . . it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform thecourt promptly of such death . . . and to give the name andresidence of his executor, administrator, guardian or otherlegal representatives." This duty was complied with by thecounsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifestedbefore the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died onJuly 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of partiesin the case.

- Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to thesuccession are transmitted from the moment of the death of

the decedent." From the moment of the death of thedecedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of hisproperty, subject to the rights and obligations of thedecedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights theretoexcept by the methods provided for by law. The moment ofdeath is the determining factor when the heirs acquire adefinite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure orcontingent. The right of the heirs to the property of thedeceased vests in them even before judicial declaration oftheir being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or rightto the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished byher death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death.Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties inlitigation and became parties in interest in the case. Thereis, therefore, no reason for the Court to disallow their

substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.- Likewise, when counsel asked that the minor children be

substituted for the deceased and suggested that the unclebe appointed as guardian ad litem for them because theirfather is busy earning a living for the family, it is grave errorfor the court to refuse the request for substitution on theground that the children were still minors and cannot sue,because it ought to know that Section 17, Rule 3 of theRules of Court, directs the Court to appoint a guardian adlitem for the minor.

- From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirsbecome the absolute owners of his property, subject to the


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rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot bedeprived of right thereto except by the methods provided forby law. The moment of death is the determining factor wherethe heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whethersuch right to be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs tothe property of the deceased vests in them even beforejudicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate orintestate proceedings.

Cases for A rt icles 774-777

Heirs of Spouses Sandejas v. Lina

- Eliosoro Sandejas was appointed administrator for thesettlement of the estate of his wife, Remedios.

- He eventually sold parcels of land to Alex Lina, who agreedto buy it for P1M.

- Eliosoro eventually died and Alex Lina was appointed newadministrator of the estate of Remedios.

- The heirs of Sandejas now filed a MR for the appointment ofa new administrator.

- Lina filed a Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale.

Whether or not Eliosoro is legally obligated to convey title tothe property which is found by the lower court to be a contractto sell.- NO. Because the condition is the procurement of court

approval and not the payment of the purchase price.

Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction over theapproval of the sale.- YES. SC held that probate court has jurisdiction over it since

it covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates andthe probate of wills of deceased persons, including theappointment and removal of administrators and executors. Italso extends to incidental and collateral matters such asselling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering real propertybelonging to the estate.

- The stipulation requiring court approval does not affect thevalidity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the sellingheirs. It merely implies that that the property may be takenout ofcustodia legis, only with courts permission.

Whether or not Lina can apply to the court for the approval ofthe sale.- Because the other heirs did not consent to the sale of their

ideal shares in the disputed lots, it is only limited to the pro-indiviso share of Eliosoro.

- The proper party must be the one who is to be benefited orinjured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to theavails of the suit.

Whether or not Eliosoro is in bad faith- NO. SC held that he is not in bad faith because: (1) he

informed Lina of the need to secure court approval prior tothe sale of the lots, and (2) he did not promise he couldobtain the approval.

How much is Eliosoros share in the property?- SC held that his share is 11/20 of the entire property

because he owned of these lots plus a further 1/10 of theremaining half, in his capacity as one of the legal heirs.

Limjoc o v . Intestate of Flagrante

- Assailed is the decision of the Public Service Commissiongranting a certificate of public convenience to install,maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to theIntestate Estate of Pedro O. Fragrante.

- Fragrante died pending the conclusion of his application to

Commission.- The Commission granted the application in view of the

financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the iceplant

Whether the substitution of the legal representative of theEstate of Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the casepending before the Commission be allowed.- Yes. Had Fragante not died, he would have the right to

prosecute his application to its final conclusion. This rightdid not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a partof the assets of his estate, for such a right was propertydespite the possibility that the application may be denied. Acertificate of public convenience once granted shoulddescend to the estate as an asset. Such certificate wouldcertainly be property and the right to acquire such belonged

to the decedent in his lifetime and survived to his estate andjudicial administrator after his death.

Whether the Estate of Fragante is a person within the meaningof the Public Service Act.- Yes. The Supreme Court of Indiana declared that a

collection of property to which the law attributes the capacityof having rights and duties, such as the estate of adeceased, is an artificial person, and to rule otherwise wouldresult in a failure of justice. In this case, there would also bea failure of justice if the estate would not be regarded as aperson as it would prejudice Fragantes investment of Php.35T.

Whether the Estate of Fragante can be considered as a citizen

of the Philippines.- Yes. The fiction of extension of the citizenship of Fragante

is grounded upon the same principle as that of the extensionof his personality.

- The decedents rights which by their nature are notextinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel ofthe assets of his estate, which, being placed under thecontrol and management of the administrator, can not beexercised but by him in representation of the estate for thebenefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees and heirs.

- Real property, as estate or interest, have also been declaredto include every species of title, inchoate or complete andembrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory orexecuted.

- It is the estate or mass of property, rights and assets left bythe decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes

vested and charged with his rights and obligations whichsurvive after his demise. This doctrine is an abrogation ofart. 661 of the Civil Code brought about by the enactment ofthe Code of Civil Procedure.


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ART. 778. Succession may be:(1) Testamentary(2) Legal or Intestate, or(3) Mixed

ART. 779. Testamentary succession is that which

results from the designation of an heir, madein a will executed in the form prescribed bylaw.

ART. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partlyby will and partly by operation of law.

3 KINDS OF SUCCESSION ACCDG TO ART. 778:1. TESTAMENTARY

That which results from the designation ofan heir, made in a will.

2. LEGAL OR INTESTATE

Lost definition: takes place by operationof law in the absence of a valid will.

3. MIXED That effected partly by will and partly by

operation of law.

Some observations Enumeration cannot satisfactorily accommodate

the system of legitimes.

Legal or intestate succession operates only indefault of a will [Arts960 and 961], while thelegitime operates whether or not there is awill, in fact prevails over a will.

There are instances where the rules onlegitime [Arts 887..] operate, to the exclusionof the rules on intestacy [Arts 960..]

It is therefore best for clarity, to classifysuccession to the legitime as a separate anddistinct kind of succession, which, for want ofa better term, can be denominatedcompulsory succession.

Until the effectivity of the Family Code, there wasone exceptional case of succession by contract[contractual succession] found in Article 130 of CivilCode.

ART 130. The future spouses may give each otherin their marriage settlements as much as one-fifth of theirpresent property, and with respect to their future property,only in the event of death, to the extent laid down by theprovisions of this Code referring to testamentary

succession.

Donations propter nuptias of future property,made by one of the future spouses to theother, took effect mortis cause, and had onlyto be done in the marriage settlements, whichwere governed only by the Statute of Frauds.

It was the only instance of ContractualSuccession in our civil law.

This has been eliminatedby the Family Codein Article 84 paragraph 2:

Donations of future property shall be governed bythe provisions on testamentary succession and theformalities of wills.

Since under the provision, any donation offuture property between the affianced coupleis to be governed by the rules of testamentarysuccession and the forms of wills, contractualsuccession no longer exists in this jurisdiction.

Such a donation becomes an ordinary case oftestamentary succession.

FOUR KINDS OF SUCCESSION ACCORDING TOIMPORTANCE [Prof. Balane]

1. COMPULSORY

Succession to the legitime

Prevails over all other kinds

2. TESTAMENTARY [Art. 779]

Succession by will

3. INTESTATE

Succession in default of a will4. MIXED [Art. 780]

Not a distinct kind really, but acombination of any two or all of the firstthree.

ART. 781. The inheritance of a person includesnot only the property and the transmissiblerights and obligations existing at the time ofhis death, but also those which have accruedthereto since the opening of the succession.

Article 781 is best deleted; it serves only to confuse. The inheritance includes only those things enumerated

in Article 776. Whatever accrues thereto after thedecedents death [which is when the succession opens]belongs to the heir, not by virtue of succession, but byvirtue of ownership.

To say, as Art781 does, that accruals to the inheritanceafter the decedents death are included in theinheritance is to negate the principle in Art777 thattransmission takes place precisely at the moment ofdeath. Once the decedent dies and the heir inherits, the

fruits of the property or inheritance belongs to theheir by accession, and not by succession. This is

so even if the heir does not actually receive theinheritance. Art781 should have left well enough alone.

Question If the assets left behind by the decedent arenot sufficient to pay the debts, may the creditors claimsthe fruits produced by the decedents property after hisdeath? Or do these fruits pertain to the heirs? But wouldnt the debts be deducted from the estate

first before the properties are distributed to theheirs?


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ART. 782. An heir is a person called to thesuccession either by the provision of a will orby operation of law.

Devisees and legatees are persons towhom gifts of real and personal property arerespectively given by virtue of a will.

HEIR person called to the succession either by willor by law

DEVISEE persons to whom gifts of real property aregiven by virtue of a will.

LEGATEE persons to whom gifts of personalproperty are given by virtue of a will.

The distinction between an heir and a devisee orlegatee is important because on this distinctiondepends the correct application of Art854 on preterition.

In cases of preterition, the institution of an heir isannulled, while the institution of legatees and deviseesis effective to the extent that the legitimes are notimpaired.

The codal definitions are neither clear nor very helpful.They are so open-ended that an heir can fall under thedefinition of a legatee/devisee and vice-versa. I give X my fishpond in Navotas by definition of

heir, is not X called to the succession by provisionof a will and therefore an heir?

I give X of my estate if in the partition, Xreceives a fishpond, can X, by definition, not beconsidered a devisee, having received a gift of realproperty by will?

The definitions of the Spanish Code in conjunction withCastans explanations are more helpful:

HEIR one who succeeds to the WHOLE or anAliquot part of the inheritance

DEVISEE / LEGATEE those who succeed todefinite, specific, and individualproperties.

Case for Arts. 778-782

DKC Holdings Corp. v. CA

- DKC entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buywith Encarnacion Bartolome, whereby DKC was given theoption to lease or lease with purchase a land belonging toEncarnacion, which option must be exercised within 2 yearsfrom the signing of the Contract.

- In turn, DKC undertook to pay Php 3,000 a month for thereservation of its option.- DKC regularly paid the monthly Php 3,000 until

Encarnacions death. Thereafter, DKC coursed its paymentto Victor, the son and sole heir of Encarnacion. However,Victor refused to accept these payments.

- Meanwhile, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudicationover all the properties of Encarnacion, including the subjectlot. Thus, a new TCT was issued in the name of Victor.

- Later, DKC gave notice to Victor that it was exercising itsoption to lease the property tendering the amount of Php15,000 as rent.

- Again, Victor refused to accept the payment and tosurrender passion of the property.

- DKC thus opened a savings account in the name of Victorand deposited therein the rental fee.

- DKC also tried to register and annotate the Contract on thetitle of Victor but the Register of Deeds refused to register orannotate the same.

- Thus, DKC filed a complaint for specific performance and

damages.- In the course of the proceedings, a certain Lozano, who

claimed that he was and has been a tenant-tiller of the lot for45 years, filed a Motion for Intervention.

- The RTC denied Lozanos Motion and dismissed thecomplaint filed by DKC.

- Whether the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy enteredinto by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with DKC wasterminated upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir,Victor, even after her demise.

- The SC held that Victor is bound by the Contract of Leasewith Option to Buy.

- Article 1311 of the NCC provides: Contracts take effect onlybetween the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in casewhere the rights and obligations arising therefrom are nottransmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3)

provision of law.- In this case, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal

provision making the rights and obligation under the contractintransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rightsand obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible.

- Where the service or act is of such a character that it maybe performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms,shows the performance by others was contemplated, deathdoes not terminate the contract or excuse nonperformance.

- In this case, there is no personal act required from the lateEncarnacion. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion todeliver possession of the property may very well beperformed by Victor.

- Also, the subject matter of the contract is a lease, a propertyright. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance

of a contract which involves a property right, and the rightsand obligations thereunder pass to the personalrepresentatives of the deceased.

- Since DKC exercised its option in accordance with thecontract, the SC held that Victor has the obligation tosurrender possession of and lease of premises for 6 years.However, SC held that the issue of tenancy should beventilated in another proceeding.

- The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound bycontracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interestexceptwhen the rights and obligations arising therefrom arenot transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3)provision of law.

- Where acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise ofspecial knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience,judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal qualification

of one or both parties, the agreement is of personal nature,and terminates on the death of the party who is required torender such service.

- There is privity of interest between an heir and his deceasedpredecessor he only succeeds to what rights hispredecessor had and what is valid and binding against thelatter is also valid and binding against the former.

- The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of acontract which involves a property right, and the rights andobligations thereunder pass to the personal representativesof the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused


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by the death of the party when the other party has a propertyinterest in the subject matter of the contract.

SECTION 1 WILLS

Subsect ion 1 Wil ls in General

ART. 783. A will is an act whereby a person ispermitted, with the formalities prescribed bylaw, to control to a certain degree thedisposition of his estate, to take effect afterhis death.

Operative Words in the Definition1. ACT

The definition of a will as an act is too broadand should have been more clearly delimitedwith a more specific term such as instrumentor document, in view of the provision of

Art804 that every will must be in writing. NUNCUPATIVE or oral wills are not

recognized in our Code, unlike the SpanishCivil Code wherein military wills could be oral.

2. PERMITTED

Will-making is purely statutory.

3. FORMALITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW

The requirement of form prescribedrespectively for attested and holographic wills.

4. CONTROL TO A CERTAIN DEGREE

The testators power of testamentarydisposition is limited by the rules on legitimes.

5. AFTER HIS DEATH

Testamentary succession, like all other kindsof succession in our Code, is mortis causa.

The present Civil Code seems to limit the concept of awill to a disposition of property to take effect upon andafter death.

It is only when the will disposes of property, witherdirectly or indirectly, that it has to be probated. Whenthere is no disposition of property, it is submitted that,although the instrument may be considered as a will, itdoes not have to be probated; its dispositions which are

CCHHAARRAACCTTEERRIISSTTIICCSSOOFFWWIILLLLSS

1. PURELY PERSONAL

Articles 784, 785 and 787

2. FREE AND INTELLIGENT

Article 839 The testators consent should not be vitiated by

the causes mentioned in Article 839paragraphs 2-6 on Insanity, Violence,Intimidation, Undue Influence, Fraud andMistake.

3. SOLEMN AND FORMAL

Articles 804-814 and 820-821

The requirements of form depend on whetherthe will is attested or holographic.

Articles 805-808 and 820-821 govern attestedwills. Articles 810-814 govern holographic wills.Article 804 applies to both.

4. REVOCABLE AND AMBULATORY

Article 828

5. MORTIS CAUSA

Article 783

This is a necessary consequence of Articles774 and 777.

6. INDIVIDUAL

Article 818

Joint wills are prohibited in this jurisdiction.

7. EXECUTED WITH ANIMUS TESTANDI

This characteristic is implied in Article 783

Rizals valedictory poem Ultimo Adios wasnot a will. An instrument which merelyexpresses a last wish as a thought or advicebut does not contain a disposition of property

and was not executed with animus testandi,cannot be legally considered a will.

8. EXECUTED WITH TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

Articles 796 803 on testamentary capacityand intent

9. UNILATERAL

This characteristic is implied in Article 783

10. DISPOSITIVE OF PROPERTY

Article 783 seems to consider the disposition ofthe testators estate mortis causa as thepurpose of will-making.

11. STATUTORY

Will-making is a permitted by statute.

CHAPTER 2

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION


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provided by law, such as the acknowledgment of anatural child or the order that the patria potestas of thewidow shall continue after her remarriage, can be giveeffect even without probating the will.

Questions Would a document merely appointing an executor,

not containing any dispositive provision, have to

comply with the formal requirements of a will inorder to be effective? Would such a documenthave to be probated?

Justice Hofilena says NO, because thereis no disposition and such appointmentwould not be under the category of a will.Therefore, the formal requirements of awill do not apply.

Would a document containing only a disinheritingclause have to be in the form of a will and beprobated? [Article 916]

YES. According to Art916, disinheritancecan be effected only through a willwherein the legal cause therefore shall be

specified. A valid disinheritance is in effect a

disposition of the property of the testatorin favor of those who would succeed inthe absence of the disinherited heir.Unless the will is probated, thedisinheritance cannot be given effect.

CASESVitug v. CA

- Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators ofDolores Vitugs (deceased) estate. Rowena Corona was theexecutrix.

- Romarico, the deceaseds husband, filed a motion with the

probate court asking for authority to sell certain shares ofstock and real properties belonging to the estate to coveralleged advances to the estate, which he claimed aspersonal funds.

- The advances were used to pay estate taxes.- Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances

came from a savings account which formed part of theconjugal partnership properties and is part of the estate.Thus, there was no ground for reimbursement.

- Romarico claims that the funds are his exclusive property,having been acquired through a survivorship agreementexecuted with his late wife and the bank.

- The agreement stated that after the death of either one ofthe spouses, the savings account shall belong to and be thesole property of the survivor, and shall be payable to andcollectible or withdrawable by such survivor.

- The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement andgranted the motion to sell.

- CA reversed stating that the survivorship agreementconstitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not complywith the formalities of a valid will. Assuming that it was adonation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation (donationbetween spouses).

- WON the survivorship agreement was valid.- YES.- The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be

embodied in a will. A will is a personal, solemn, revocableand free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his

property and rights and declares or complies with duties totake effect after his death. The bequest or devise mustpertain to the testator.

- In this case, the savings account involved was in the natureof conjugal funds.

- Since it was not shown that the funds belonged exclusivelyto one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.

- It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take

effect after the death of one party. It is also not a donationbetween spouses because it involved no conveyance of aspouses own properties to the other.

- It was an error to include the savings account in theinventory of the deceaseds assets because it is theseparate property of Romarico.

- Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.- A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which

a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights anddeclares or complies with duties to take effect after hisdeath.

- Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC.However, its operation or effect must not be violative of thelaw (i.e. used as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or totransfer property in fraud of creditors or to defeat thelegitime of a forced heir).

ART. 784. The making of a will is a strictlypersonal act; it cannot be left in whole or inpart to the discretion of a third person, oraccomplished through the instrumentality ofan agent or attorney.

This provision gives the will its purely personalcharacter.

NON-DELEGABILITY OF WILL-MAKING

It is the exercise of the disposing power thatcannot be delegated.

Obviously, mechanical aspects, such as typing, donot fall within the prohibition.

ART. 785. The duration or efficacy of thedesignation of heirs, devisees or legatees, orthe determination of the portions which theyare to take, when referred to by name, cannotbe left to the discretion of a third person.

What Constitute the Essence of Will-Making or theExercise of the Disposing Power? The ff are non-delegable:

1. The designation of heirs, devisees or legatees2. The duration of efficacy of such designation,

including such things as conditions, terms,substitutions;

3. The determination of the portions they are toreceive.


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ART. 786. The testator may entrust to a thirdperson the distribution of specific property orsums of money that he may leave in generalto specified classes or causes, and also thedesignation of the persons, institutions orestablishments to which such property or

sums are to be given or applied.

Exception to the Rule on Non-Delegability of Will-Making. Without this provision, the things allowed to bedelegated here would be non-delegable.

TWO THINGS MUST BE DETERMINED BY THETESTATOR

1. The property or amount of money to be given;and

2. The class or the cause to be benefited.

TWO THINGS MAY BE DELEGATED BY THETESTATOR

1. The designation of persons, institutions, orestablishments within the class or cause;

2. The manner of distribution

Question Suppose the testator specified the recipientsby specific designation but left to the 3

rdperson the

determination of the sharing, ex. I leave P500,000 forthe PNRC, the SPCA, and the Tala Leprosarium, to bedistributed among these institutions in such proportionsas my executor may determine. Valid? One View Article 785 seems to prohibit this,

because the recipients are referred to by name andtherefore the portions they are to take must bedetermined by the testator. Article 786 applies onlywhere the testator merely specifies the class or the

cause but not the specific recipients. Contra This actually involves a lesser discretion

for the 3rd

person than the instances allowed byArticle 786 and should be allowed.

ART. 787. The testator may not make atestamentary disposition in such manner thatanother person has to determine whether ornot it is to be operative.

This rule is consistent with, and reinforces, the purelyperson character of a will, laid down in Article 784.

This article should be interpreted rationally. It is not to

be so interpreted as to make it clash with the principleexpressed in Articles 1041-1057 of the NCC that theheir is free to accept or reject the testamentarydisposition.

What this article prohibits is the delegation to a 3rd

person of the power to decide whether a dispositionshould take effect or not.

Case for Arts . 783-787

Del Rosario v . Del Rosario

- Don Nicolas left a will awarding parts of his estate to hisnephews, Don Enrique and plaintiff, Don Ramon subject tocertain conditions. (See case page 322)

- He also left a part of his estate to his siblings, one of whichis Dona Luisa. And upon the latters death, her share shallbe divided between her two nephews after P1,000 has beengiven to Dona Luisas male children.

- Doa Honorata, Don Nicolas wife, left her estate to hishusband. Upon the husbands death, it shall be passed on toher husbands siblings. However, upon the death of hersister-in-law, Dona Luisa, same provisions shall apply aswhat is stated in her husbands will.

- Plaintiff now institutes this present case against theexecutor, who is one of his uncles, Don Clemente. He seeksto be entitled to a certain part of the share of the estates leftto Dona Luisa during her life, and he asks that the executorbe directed to render accounts and to proceed to thepartition of the estate.

Whether or not he is entitled to any share of the estate left bythe spouses.- Plaintiff is not entitled to any allowance under the will of Don

Nicolas because:a. He is only allowed such amount if widow

remarries and he is still continuing studies,which are not present in this case.

b. His interest in the share of Dona Luisa in DonNicolas will was given to him as an heir and notas a legatee.

- He is not entitled to live in the widows house because suchwas terminated upon the widows death.

- He is entitled to be paid the sum of P1500 given to DonEnrique in addition to the P1500 pesos already received byplaintiff under the 9th clause of Dona Honoratas will

because:a. The will specifically awarded the said amounts

to him as a legatee and the fact that they werecalled natural sons of Don Clemente only servesas a further description and needs no proof to begiven.

b. By virtue of the right of accretion, plaintiff is alsoentitled to the other P1500 share of Don Enriquesince the latter died before Don Honorata.

- He is entitled to the share of the estate left by the will ofDona Honorata to Dona Luisa during her life, after deductingP1,000 because:

a. The share of plaintiff from Dona Luisas share isgiven to him whether or not Dona Luisa diesbefore or after Dona Honorata.

b. His right in the share of Dona Luisa is expresslyleft to him as a legacy.

- The reservation of property in a will to the name of specificpersons shall be considered as a legacy.

- Where the will authorizes the executor to pay the legacies,expressly or by natural inference, action will lie by thelegatee against the executor to compel allowance andpayment hereof. If the executor is not authorized, action willlie against the heirs. An heir on the other hand, can maintainno such action against the executor.


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ART. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits ofdifferent interpretations, in case of doubt, thatinterpretation by which the disposition is tobe operative shall be preferred.

Articles 788-794 lays down the rules of construction and

interpretation. The underlying principle here is that testacy is preferred

to intestacy, because the former is the express will ofthe decedent whereas the latter is only his implied will.

In statutory construction, the canon is: That the thingmay rather be effective than be without effect.

A similar principle in contractual interpretation is foundin Art1373, which provides that if some stipulation ofany contract should admit of several meanings, it shallbe understood as bearing that import which is mostadequate to render it effectual.

ART. 789. When there is an imperfect description,or when no person or property exactlyanswers the description, mistakes andomissions must be corrected, of the errorappears from the context of the will or fromextrinsic evidence, excluding the oraldeclarations of the testator as to hisintention; and when an uncertainty arisesupon the face of the will, as to the applicationof any of its provisions, the testatorsintention is to be ascertained from the wordsof the will, taking into consideration thecircumstances under which it was made,excluding such oral declarations.

2 KINDS OF AMBIGUITY REFERRED TO1. LATENT not obvious on the face of the will

When there is an imperfect description orwhen no person or property exactly answersthe description

a) Latent as to PERSONI institute to of my estate my first cousin Joseand the testator has more than onefirst cousin named Jose.

b) Latent as to PROPERTY I deviseto my cousin Pacifico my fishpond inRoxas City and the testator has

more than one fishpond in RoxasCity.

2. PATENT obvious on the face of the will When an uncertainty arises upon the face of

the will, as to the application of any of itsprovisions

a) Patent as to PERSONI institute of my estate to some of my firstcousins.

b) Patent as to PROPERTY Ibequeath to my cousin Pacifico someof my cars.

In both cases, the ambiguity is evidentfrom a reading of the testamentaryprovisions themselves; the ambiguity is

patent[patere to be exposed]

HOW TO DEAL WITH AMBIGUITIES The provisions of this article do not make a

distinction in the solution of the problem ofambiguities whether latent or patent.

Hence, the distinction between the 2 kindsof ambiguity is, in the light of the codalprovisions, an all but theoretical one.

The ambiguity should, as far as possible, becleared up or resolved, in order to give effect to thetestamentary disposition.

Based on principle that testacy ispreferred to intestacy.

Ambiguity may be resolved using any evidenceadmissible and relevant, excluding the oral

declarations of the testator as to his intention.

Reason for the statutory exclusion is thata dead man cannot refute a tale.

ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken intheir ordinary and grammatical sense, unlessa clear intention to use them in another sensecan be gathered, and that other can beascertained.

Technical words in a will are to be takenin their technical sense, unless the context

clearly indicates a contrary intention, orunless it satisfactorily appears that he wasunacquainted with such technical sense.

Similar rules are laid down in Rule 130 Sections 10 and14 of the Rules of Court

Sec10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legalmeaning The language of a writing is to be interpreted accordingto the legal meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless theparties intended otherwise.

Sec14. Peculiar signification of terms The terms of a writingare presumed to have been used in their primary and generalapplication, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a

local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were soused and understood in the particular instance, in which case theagreement must be construed accordingly.

In contractual interpretation, a similar principle isexpressed in Article 1370 par1:

Art1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave nodoubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literalmeaning of its stipulations shall control.


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ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive aninterpretation which will give to everyexpression some effect, rather than onewhich will render any of the expressionsinoperative; and of two modes of interpretinga will, that is to be preferred which will

prevent intestacy.

A similar rule is found in Rule 130 Sec11 of the RoCSec11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all

provisions In the construction of an instrument where there areseveral provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible,to be adopted as will give effect to all.

In contractual interpretation, Articles 1373 and 1374 laydown similar principles

Art1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit ofseveral meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that importwhich is most adequate to render it effectual.

Art1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall beinterpreted together, attributing to the doubtful one that sense whichmay result from all of them taken jointly.

ART. 792. The invalidity of one of severaldispositions contained in a will does notresult in the invalidity of the otherdispositions, unless it is to be presumed thatthe testator would not have made such otherdispositions if the first invalid disposition hadnot been made.

This article makes applicable to wills theSEVERABILITY OR SEPARABILITY PRINCIPLE in

statutory construction frequently expressly provided in aseparability clause.

The source of this article is Art2085 of the German CivilCode which provides that the invalidity of one of severaldispositions contained in a will results in the invalidity ofthe other dispositions only if it is to be presumed thatthe testator would not have made these if the invaliddisposition had not been made.

ART. 793. Property acquired after the making of awill shall only pass thereby, as if the testatorhad possessed it at the time of making thewill, should it expressly appear by the will

that such was his intention.

This article creates problems which would not haveexisted had it not been so nonchalantly incorporated inthe Code, an implant from the Code of Civil Procedureand ultimately from American law.

The problem springs from the fact that this articlemakes the will speak as of the time it is made, ratherthan at the time of the decedents death [which is morelogical because that is when the will takes effectaccording to Article 777].

Illustration X executes a will in 1985 containing alegacy: I give to M all my shares in BPI. The testatordies in 1990, owning at the time of his death ten timesas many BPI shares as he did when he made the will.

Under Article 793, the shares acquired after thewill was executed are NOT included in thelegacy.

Article 793 therefore departs from the codalphilosophy of Articles 774 and 776 and constitutesan EXCEPTION to the concept of succession aslinked to death and rendered legally effective bydeath.

Prof. Balane suggests the provisions be reworded as:Property acquired after the making of a will passesthereby unless the contrary clearly appears from thewords or the context of the will.

In the meantime, it is suggested that a liberalapplication of the article be allowed. Can the word expressly in this article be

interpreted to mean clearly even if it might bestretching a point?

ART. 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover allthe interest which the testator could device orbequeath in the property disposed of, unlessit clearly appears from the will that heintended to convey a less interest.

This article should be read together with Art929, whichprovides that if the testator, heir, or legatee owns onlya part of or an interest in the thing bequeathed, thelegacy or devise shall be understood limited to such

part or interest, unless the testator expressly declaresthat he gives the thing in its entirety.

GENERAL RULE in a legacy or devise the testatorgives exactly the interest he has in the thing.

EXCEPTIONS he can give a less interest [Art794] or agreater interest [Art929] than he has.

In the latter case, if the person owning the interestto be acquired does not wish to part with it, thesolution in Art931 can be applied wherein thelegatee or devisee shall be entitled only to theJUST VALUE OF THE INTEREST that shouldhave been acquired.


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ART. 795. The validity of a will as to its formdepends upon the observance of the law inforce at the time it is made.

ASPECTS OF VALIDITY OF WILLSA. EXTRINSIC refers to the requirement of form /

formal validity1. Governing law as to TIME

a. Filipinos law in force when the will wasexecuted [Art795]

b. Foreigners same rile. The assumptionhere is that the will is beingprobated in the Philippines.

2. Governing law as to PLACE Filipinos or Foreigners

a. Law of citizenshipb. Law of domicilec. Law of residenced. Law of place of execution, ore. Philippine law

Articles 815-817 - Rules of formal validitya. Filipino Abroad - According to the law in

the country in which he may be andmay be probated in the Philippines

b. Alien abroad - Has effect in thePhilippines if made according to: Lawof place where he resides, Law of hisown country or Philippine law

c. Alien in the phils. - Valid in Phils. as ifexecuted according to Phil. laws, if:Made according to law of countrywhich he is a citizen or subject, andMay be proved and allowed by law ofhis own country.

B. INTRINSIC refers to the substance of theprovisions / substantive validity

1. Governing law as to TIMEa. Filipinos law at the time of death,

in connection with Art2263.b. Foreigners depends on their

personal law [Art16, par2 andArt1039]

2. Governing law as to PLACEa. Filipinos Philippine law [Art16 par2

and Art1039]b. Foreigners their national law [Art16

par2 and Art1039]

Art2263 provides that Rights to the inheritance of aperson who died, with or without a will, before theeffectivity of this Code [August 30, 1950], shall begoverned by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previouslaws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance ofthose who, with or without a will, die afterthe beginningof the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated anddistributed in accordance with this new body of lawsand by the Rules of Court; but the testamentaryprovisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be

RREE--CCAAPP OOFF TTHHEERRUULLEESS OONNIINNTTEERRPPRREETTAATTIIOONNAANNDDCCOONNSSTTRRUUCCTTIIOONN OOFFWWIILLLLSS

2. In case of doubt, testacy is preferred anddisposition should be interpreted in manner whichwould make it operative.

3. Two kinds of Ambiguities Latent imperfect description or when no

person or property exactly answers todescription.

Patent based on the face of the will as tothe application of any of its provisions

4. In case of ambiguity, may resort to any evidence,even extrinsic evidence, but may not resort tooral declarations of the testator as to hisintention.

5. Words of a will shall be taken in their ordinaryand grammatical sense, unless:

Another sense or meaning is clearlyintended to be used, and

That other sense or meaning can beascertained

6. Technical words shall be taken in technicalsense, except:

When context clearly indicates otherwise

Will was drawn solely by the testator and hewas not acquainted with the technicalmeaning of such word.

7. Words are to receive interpretation which will giveit some effect.

8. Invalidity of one disposition in a will does notmean the other dispositions are also invalid.

But invalidity of one provision affects theother if it is to be presumed that the testator

would not have made such other dispositionif the first invalid disposition had not beenmade.

9. Property that is acquired by the testator after thewill was executed shall only be transmitted alongwith those in the will, if the testator expresslystates in the will that such is his intention.

10. A devise of legacy shall transmit the whole extentof the testators interest in the property disposed.

Except when it clearly appears that thetestator intended to convey a less interest.


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permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes,betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected;however, their amount shall be reduced if in no othermanner can every compulsory heir be given his fullshare according to this Code.

Art16 par2 provides that intestate and testamentarysuccessions, both with respect to the order of

succession and to the amount of successional rightsand to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,shall be regulated by the national law of the personwhose succession is under consideration, whatevermay be the nature of the property and regardless of thecountry wherein said property may be found.

While Art1039 provides that Capacity to Succeed isgoverned by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Cases for Arts . 788-795

Uriarte v. CFI

-Vicente Uriarte instituted a special proceeding for thesettlement of the estate of Don Juan Uriarte before the CFIof Negros.

- Vicente Uriarte contends that he is an acknowledged son ofthe deceased and that as the natural son, he should beconsidered as the sole heir. (It appears that Vicenteinstituted a case before the same court for hisacknowledgment as a natural son, however such case is yetto attain finality.)

- Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to the special proceedingalleging that Don Juan Uriarte executed a Last Will andTestament in Spain.

- In another occasion, Juan Zamacona commenced a specialproceeding for the probate of the last will of Don Juan beforethe CFI of Manila.

- At the same time, Juan Zamacona also filed a Motion to

Dismiss on the special proceeding instituted by Vicentealleging that by virtue of the will executed by Don Juan,there is no legal basis to proceed in the intestate proceedingand that Vicente has no legal standing to initiate saidproceeding.

- The CFI of Negros accordingly dismissed the case. Toprotect his interest, Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motionpraying that he be allowed to Intervene before the CFI ofManila or that the proceedings therein be dismissed.

Whether or not the testate proceeding filed by Juan Zamaconashould take precedence over the intestate proceedinginstituted by Vicente- The SC held that in accordance with well settled

jurisprudence, testate proceedings for the settlement of theestate of a deceased person shall take precedence overintestate proceedings over the same.

- This doctrine is in accord with the principle that TESTACY ispreferred to INTESTACY.

- Thus, in if in the case of intestate proceedings pendingbefore a court, it is found that the decedent had left a lastwill, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replacethe intestate proceedings even if at the stage anadministrator has already been appointed.

Which of the two courts is the proper venue for the settlementof estate of Don Juan- The SC held that the proper venue should have been with

the CFI of Negros.- The Courts of First Instance is granted the original and

exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of probate (thisincludes testate and intestate proceedings)

- In this light, both the CFI of Manila and Negros havejurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, the question boilsdown to where the proper venue lies.

- Venue in the settlement of an estate, if the decedent is aninhabitant of foreign country, is in the CFI of any province onwhich the decedent had an estate. This is true for both theCFI of Manila and Negros.

- Although as declared above that an intestate intestateproceeding should give way to testate proceedings, recordsshow that expediency would have been achieved ifZamacona filed the petition in the Negros Court.

- The Negros court was already informed of the existence of awill by Higinio and that in fact the latter was requested tosubmit a copy of the said will.

- But since venue is a waiveable defect, Vicente is barred bylaches from raising the same as it was almost a year when

he raised the objection.- Testacy is preferred to Intestacy.- If in the case of intestate proceedings pending before a

court, it is found that the decedent had left a last will,proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace theintestate proceedings even if at the stage an administratorhas already been appointed.

- This is without prejudice that should the alleged will berejected or disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as anintestacy.

Enriqu ez, et al. v. Abadia, et al.

- In 1923, Fr. Sancho Abadia of Talisay, Cebu executed adocument purporting to be his Last Will and Testament

covering his properties the estimated value of which wasP8000 when he died in 1943.- Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its

probate in the CFI of Cebu, to the opposition of the latepriests cousins and nephews.

- One of the witnesses (the other two have died) related thatin his presence and of his co-witnesses, Fr. Abadia wroteout in longhand in Spanish which the testator spoke andunderstood; signed on the left hand margin each of the threepages, numbered the same with Arabic numerals, andsigned the last page after declaring that it was his last will,after which the three witnesses signed on the last page aswell.

- In 1923, long before the New Civil Code was in force,holographic wills (as the one prepared by Fr. Abadia,determined as such by the lower court) were invalid.

- The law at the time also required numbering correlativelyeach page in letters and signing on the left hand margin bythe testator and by the three attesting witnesses on each ofthe three pages, among others, which were not followed inthe present will.

- However, the lower court said that since the New Civil Codewas already in effect at the time of the hearing and themaking of the decision in 1952, a liberal view ought to betaken to carry out the intention of the testator which is thecontrolling factor and which may override any defect in form.


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Whether or not the provisions of the New Civil Code whichallowed holographic wills may be applied to validate Fr.Abadias will.- NO. No subsequent law with more liberal requirements or

which dispenses with such requirements as to executionshould be allowed to validate a defective will and therebydivest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate byintestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature

cannot validate void wills.- Art. 795 of the New Civil Code provides: The validity of a

will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law inforce at the time it is made.

- The above provision weight of authority to the effect that thevalidity of a will is to be judged not by the law in force at thetime of the testators death or at the time the supposed will ispresented in court for probate or when the petition isdecided by the court but at the time the instrument wasexecuted.

- The wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estateamong his heirs and among the legatees is given solemnexpression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, thelegacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.

- The position that subsequent statutes should be applied tovalidate wills defectively executed according to the law in

force at the time of execution is untenable.- The reason for the above is that from the day of the death of

the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees anddevisees under it becomes a vested right, protected underthe due process clause of the constitution.

- Art. 795 of the New Civil Code provides: The validity of awill as to its form depends upon the observance of the law inforce at the time it is made.

- The above provision weight of authority to the effect that thevalidity of a will is to be judged not by the law in force at thetime of the testators death or at the time the supposed will ispresented in court for probate or when the petition isdecided by the court but at the time the instrument wasexecuted.

- No subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which

dispenses with such requirements as to execution should beallowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest theheirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestatesuccession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannotvalidate void wills.

In re Estate of Calderon

- This is an appeal made by the attorneys for Basilla Salteras,Potenciana de la Cruz and Benigno Calderon, the latter asthe natural guardian of the minors Maria and JosefaCalderon from an order which directed that the administratorbe authorized to make a conveyance of property, a houseand lot, situate in Binondo to Petronila Eugenio.

- The case questions on 1) How and what manner theprovisions made by the testator, the deceased Miguel Fable,

in clause 12 of his will should be complied with; and 2) Whoshould receive pro rata the legacy specified in the saidclause.

- The said clause states that the

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