Bargaining Over Berlin

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Southern Political Science ssociation

Bargaining over Berlin: a Re-analysis of the First and Second Berlin CrisesAuthor(s): Stephen G. WalkerSource: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Feb., 1982), pp. 152-164Published by: Cambridge University Presson behalf of the Southern Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2130288.

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Bargainingover Berlin:a Re-analysisof the First and SecondBerlin Crises

STEPHEN G. WALKER

IT HAS BEEN over thirty years since the 1948BerlinBlockade, andalmost two decades have passed since the 1961 confrontationoverthe Berlin Wall. Nevertheless, heserelicsof the Cold War remaininterestingas episodesof crisisbargaining. Sovietdecision makersinitiated the blockadeof Berlin in 1948 with two bargaininggoalsinmind. Their maximumgoal was to convince the other occupyingpowers, France, the United Kingdom,and the United States, thattheir recentdecisionto unify the threezones of occupationin WestGermanywas unacceptable. In the event that the West Germanreunificationdecision could not be reversed,the minimum Sovietgoal was to force the otherthreepowersout of Berlin. A successfulWesternairlift over the Sovietblockadeof land and water routes toBerlin ended in 1949 with a Russian agreement to remove theblockade. This outcome was a diplomaticvictory for the Westernallies, since both Sovietgoals were thwarted.'The second Berlincrisisfollowed a seriesof ultimatumsfrom theSoviet government over the last two years of the EisenhowerAd-ministration and culminated in the first year of the KennedyAd-

I This sketch of the 1948 Berlincrisis is based upon two recent reviewsof themonographic iteraturedealing with the Berlinproblem. See Glenn H. SnyderandPaul.Diesing, Conflict Among Nations:Bargaining,DecisionMaking, and SystemStructure n InternationalCrises Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1977),559-561;AlexanderL. George and RichardSmoke,Deterrence n AmericanForeignPolicy:Theoryand Practice(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1974), 107-139.

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BARGAINING OVER BERLIN 153ministration with the construction of the wall between East andWestBerlin. Unlike the 1948crisis,when the maximumSovietgoalwas to prevent the formal division of Germany, this time the Rus-sians wanted to make the division official. Their bargainingobjec-tives were to force the Western Powersout of Berlin and to gainrecognition that German reunification was no longer possiblewithout the mutual consentof the existingEast and West Germangovernments. As tensions heightened between Washington andMoscow, the Sovietsalso wanted to stop the emigration of refugeesfromEast Germany hrough Berlin into West Germany. The Allieswere not forced out of Berlin,but the successfulestablishmentof theBerlin Wall curbed the refugee flow and constituted a partialdiplomaticvictory for the EasternBloc.2Within each crisis the two sidesselecteda series of actions whichled to these outcomes. In this essay the goal is to analyze theirbargainingmoves from a crisismanagementperspectiveand answersome questionsassociatedwith this area of inquiry.Models and Measuresof CrisisManagement

Internationalcrisismanagement s concernedwith the identifica-tion and analysisof strategiesandtactics which will realize the goalsof the participantsin a conflict situation and, at the same time,avoid potentially undesirableconsequencessuch as war or submis-sion in the form of a military or diplomatic victory by theopponent.3 In a recentreview and appraisalof scholarlyefforts tounderstand nternationalcrises one analyst concludes, "A body of[crisismanagement]propositionsexists; t is unclear,however,howmuchconfidenceone shouldplace in this knowledgefor usein crisismanagementsituations."4 In particular,there is ambiguityregard-ing the most effective actions for eliciting a de-escalatoryresponsefrom the opponent. In Table 1 are four types of crisis bargainingmoves. The tactics which can be constructed rom these movesvaryaccording to the direction (escalation or de-escalation) and the2 Snyderand Diesing, ibid., 564-567; Georgeand Smoke, bid., 390-446.3 Snyderand Diesing, ibid., 207. See alsoAlexanderL. George, David K. Hall,and William E. Simons, The Limits of CoerciveDiplomacy (Boston:Little, Brownand Company, 1971), 8-15; RaymondTanter, "International risisBehavior:AnAp-praisalof the Literature." Jerusalem ournalof InternationalRelations, II (Winter-Spring, 1978), 340-374.4 Tanter, op. cit., 366.



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BARGAINING OVER BERLIN 155escalatorymove, dependinguponwhetherits conflict intensitywashigher or lower than the actor'spreviousmove.8It is also possible to constructtwo measuresof resolvewith theCorsondata. The first is the degree of continuity in the seriesofmovesmade by the actorwho is initiatingthe presentmove. Thisindicatoris a measure of resolvewhich places the presentmove inthe context of the directionof the immediatelyprecedingmove bythe same actor. The two sequencesof moveswhich communicateflexible resolve are an escalationprecededby a de-escalation, andvice versa. The sequenceswhich indicate a firm resolveeither toescalate or de-escalate, respectively, are two escalations in a rowand two de-escalations n a row. The secondmeasure of resolveisthe rangeof varietyin an actor'spresentmove, whichmay also com-municate flexible or firm resolve. If actor A's move incorporatesonly one type of action at one level of intensityprior to actor B'sresponse,or if A'scombination of actions are all in the same direc-tionpriorto B'sresponse, henthe movecommunicates irmresolve.However, if the variety of A's activities ranges in direction bothaboveandbelow the intensityof A'sprecedingmove, then it signalsflexible resolve.9In his analysisof Corson'sdata, TanteridentifiesJuly2, 1948andAugust16, 1961asthe points which markthe peakintensityforeachBerlin crisis. On July 1, 1948, the U.S.S.R. formally withdrewfrom the BerlinCommand and by July3rd had refused to lift theirblockade of traffic into Berlinuntil plans for a separateWest Ger-man governmentwere dropped. On August15, 1961, the Westernpowersvigorouslyprotested he Sovietborderclosureof August13th

8Corson,ibid., used the opinionsof expertjudgesto placeeachobservation n acontinuum,which containednumericalweightsat selected ntervalsalongits length.Thesenumericalvalues are irrelevant orsimplyrankingone observation s more orlessintensethan anotherone.9 Whenthe varietyof activities n a moverangesabove andbelowthe positionofthe precedingmove on the Corsonscale, the numericalscale values for the move'shighest and lowest activitiesare combined with the numericalscale value of thepreceding move according to this formula: CNI = (HA - PM) - (PM - LA) + PM,where CNI= the CompositeNumericalIndex of the scalevalueof the move in ques-tion, HA= the numerical scale value of the move's Highest Activity, LA= thenumericalscale value of the move'sLowestActivity,and PM= the numericalscalevalue of thePrecedingMovebythesameactor. Thisindexranks he movein questionby indicating he move'snetchangeaboveorbelowthepositionof theactor'spreviousmoveon the Corsonscale. Approximately 0 percentof the 108movesextrapolatedfromCorson'sBerlindata required he calculationof this index.



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156 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 44, 1982between East and West Berlin; by August 17th both sides haddeployed armed forces along the border.'0 In the followinganalysis,the movesby East and Westsurrounding hesecrisispeaksare extrapolatedfrom the Corsondata and classifiedaccordingtotheir escalatoryor de-escalatorydirection and their flexibleor firmresolve."Thisset of movesconstitutes he bargaining nteractionsduring avery intense phase of each crisis, when crisis managers are par-ticularly interested in identifying tactics which will elicit de-escalatory responses. An analysisof the response patternsto dif-ferent types and combinationsof these moves duringthis phase ofthe two crisesmay answer someimportantcrisismanagementques-tionsregarding he effectiveimplementationof the tacticsassociatedwith the bargaining moves in Table 1. Are escalatory or de-escalatory actics morelikelyto elicit a de-escalatoryresponse? Arethe flexible tacticsassociatedwith G.R.I.T. and coercivediplomacymore successful han the firmtactics characteristicof brinkmanshipor appeasement? Which is more closely associated with a de-escalatoryresponse,the sequenceof movesor the rangeof activitieswhich constitute a move? What combinationsof resolve and direc-tion are the mosteffective bargainingtactics?During the intense confrontationphase of an internationalcon-flict, it is plausible on theoreticalgroundsto assumethat escalationratherthan de-escalation s the more likely response o any tacticalmove. The confrontation tself is a productof the attempts by eachparticipanteither to dominate or to resistdomination. Under thesecircumstancesan escalatorymove is likely to be counteredwith an

10 Tanter, op. cit., 88-91.11The observations or the 1948 crisisspan the period between June 7, 1948andAugust1, 1948, while the data for the 1961crisis nclude observations etweenJune10, 1961and September12, 1961. Although he time frame is slightly ongerforthesecondcrisisthan for the first one, each ending datecorrespondso the end of the in-tense phase for each crisis (SeeTanter, ibid., 84-85). The beginningdatesmarktheoccurrence f a dramaticeventwhichprecipitated confrontationbetween East andWest. OnJune 7, 1948, the Westannouncedhe LondonConference's ecommenda-tions for a separateWest Germanstate, and on June4, 1961,the U.S.S.R. deliveredthe latest six-monthultimatumregardingBerlin. Thetimeframes oreach crisisalsoencompassapproximately he samenumberof bargainingmovesin the Corsondataset. There are no significantdifferences n the distribution f de-escalatoryesponsesamongthe movesbeforeand after the datesidentifiedbyTanterasthepointsof peakintensity .10;Yatescorrected hi-squarep > .05). Consequently, t is reasonableto consider hesemovesas a set whoseelementsdonot comefromgenericallydifferentphasesof the two conflicts.



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BARGAINING OVER BERLIN 157escalatoryresponse n order to avoid dominationand demonstrateresolve.'2 A de-escalatorymove is also likely to be met with anescalatoryresponse n this context, if both sidesprefer to dominateratherthancompromise. According o SnyderandDiesing, in bothBerlincrises each bloc leaderrankeddominationoverthe opponentas a firstpreferenceandcompromiseas a secondpreference,becausetheseoutcomesprovided them with the two greatestpayoffs. Eachone also wanted to avoid war and submission,becausethe payoffsassociated with these outcomes were less than the payoffs fordomination or compromise.'3

If this analysis of preferenceorderingsby Snyderand Diesing iscorrect, then the probabilityof a de-escalatoryresponseto eitherescalatory or de-escalatory actics during the most intensephaseofeach conflict is less than 50-50. Indeed, Tanter's(1974: 155-162)previousanalysis of the Corsondata for the crisisphases of the twoBerlinconflictsshowsno significantcovariationbetweenthe actionsof one side and the responsesof the other side. This absence ofcovariation is consistentwith the hypothesisthat a de-escalatoryresponse is unlikely no matter what tactic is pursued. This pointhas importantimplicationsfor assessing he effectivenessof varioustypes or combinationsof tactics.Methodologically, it would appear that under these cir-cumstances the normal social science definition of a "significant"finding shouldbe revised. Instead of definingthe nullhypothesisof"no relationship"between tactic and responseas an equiprobabledichotomousdistributionof escalatoryand de-escalatoryresponses,the nullhypothesis or the expectedfrequencydistribution houldbeset at p < .50. At what level below p = .50 is determinedby iden-tifying the level below p = .50 where the liklihoodof observingat

12 Snyder and Diesing, op. cit., 14, describe the confrontation phase of a crisis asfollows: "The collision of challenge and resistance produces a confrontation, which isthe core of the crisis . . . and is characterized by high or rising tension and predomi-nately coercive tactics on both sides, each standing firm on its initial position and issu-ing threats, warnings, military deployments, and other signals to indicate firmness, toundermine the other's firmness, and generally to persuade the other that he must bethe one to back down if war is to be avoided." (Underlining is Snyder and Diesing's.)13 Ibid., 92-93, 113-114, 268-275, 482. Snyder and Diesing argue that the motiva-tions of both sides within each crisis were symmetrical, i.e., each one ranked the fouroutcomes in the same order. However, they assert that the preference order for thewar and submission outcomes varied across the two crises. In the 1948 crisis each sidepreferred submission (3rd) over war (4th), while in the 1961 crisis these preferenceswere reversed.



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158 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 44, 1982least the actual frequencyof de-escalatoryresponsesby chance is c.05. The closerthe expected probabilitycan be set to p = .50 andstill have the actual frequencyof de-escalatoryresponsesoccurringby chance be p < .05, the moresignificantthe associationbetweenthese responsesand their tactical stimuli.'4Consequently, the following analysis of crisis bargaining overBerlin involvestwo steps. First, the frequencydistributionsof de-escalatoryand escalatory responses o varioustactics are retrievedandpresented. Second,the frequencyof de-escalatoryresponses oeach tactic is analyzed under different assumptionsof expectedprobability,rangingfrom p = .50 to p = .05.15 With thisinforma-tion, it is possibleto identify the most effectivetactics. Even if theodds are against any tactic eliciting a de-escalatoryresponse,it isstill conceivable that the odds are worse for some tactics than forothers-which is importantfor crisis managersto know.Bargainingover Berlin

The decisiontree in Table 2 containsthe distributionof responsesfor the eight possiblevariantsof de-escalatory acticswhen both thesequenceand the range measuresof resolve are takeninto account.The varietyof appeasementtactics is low for the two Berlincrises.The only one to appearfrequently s the "pure"appeasement actic[H], in which both the sequenceand the range communicatefirmde-escalatoryresolve. This variant is also ratherineffective. Thenull probabilityof a de-escalatoryresponsewould have to be as lowas (p = .20), in order to hypothesizethat there is a statisticallysignificant(p c .05) relationshipbetweenthis tactic and the actual

14 This reasoning esemblesheargumentadvancedby somestudentsof clusterblocanalysis n computing ndicesof voting agreementand determininghow strong theagreementmustbe in order o be significant. Insteadof selecting ome arbitraryevelof strength, uch as a votingagreement ndexvalueof .4 or .8, they argue hat it is bestto select a high enough evelof agreement o that the liklihoodof gaining hat level ofagreementby chanceis quite low. See G. David Garson,Political ScienceMethods(Boston:HolbrookPress, 1976), 211-213, and PeterWilletts,"ClusterBloc Analysisand Statistical Inference," American Political Science Review LXVI (June, 1972),569-582.

15 The probabilities re calculated romthe binomialdistribution ccording o theformula which appears n Table 2. The logic of the binomial distributionand theconceptof probabilityare reviewedclearlyand extensively n HubertM. Blalock,Jr.,Social Statistics(New York: McGraw-Hill,1960), 97-134, and more succinctly inDickinsonL. McCaw and George Watson,Political and Social Inquiry (New York:John Wiley & Sons, 1976),283-287.



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160 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 44, 1982frequency of de-escalatory responses. By contrast, the G.R.I.T.variants [A] and [C] are more effective in eliciting a de-escalatoryresponse. A greater proportion of de-escalatory responses isassociatedwith these tactics; the null probabilityof a de-escalatoryresponse can also be set closer to (p = .50) without rejecting thehypothesisthat there is a statisticallysignificant (p < .05) relation-ship between the responsesand G.R.I.T. tactics [A] and [C].

The decision tree for escalatorytactics is in Table 3. A "pure"brinkmanship actic [H] is least effective;more effective brinkman-ship variants are [F] and [G] in which the rangeof one move com-municates flexibility. Coercive diplomacy tactics are most fre-quent, and variant [D] is as effective as G.R.I.T.'s [A] tactic. Thenull probabilityof a de-escalatoryresponsecan be set at (p = .30)without rejectingthe hypothesisthat there is a statistically signifi-cant (p < .05) relationshipbetween the actual frequency of de-escalatory responsesand this type of coercivediplomacytactics. Acomparisonof Tables 2 and 3 indicates that flexible, controlledpressure actics areboth the most frequentand most effective com-binations of moves, while "pure" appeasementand brinkmanshiptactics are least frequent and least effective. Coercivediplomacytactics and the "semi-flexible" rinkmanshipactics [F] and [G] aregenerally more effective controlled pressure tactics than theG.R.I.T. variantsexcept for G.R.I.T. tactic [A].

ConclusionThe generalizabilityof these findings to the analysis of other in-ternational crises is limited by two sets of considerations. First,their validity is subject to the constraints imposed by the smallnumber of observations and the small differences in effectivenessamong the various bargaining tactics. For five of the eight de-escalatorytactical variantsin Table 2, there are no more than twoobservationsper tactic. For most of the de-escalatory variants,therefore, the evidence is simply insufficientto make an empiricaljudgmentabout theireffectivenessas tactics. Second,as Alexander

Georgehas noted, the effectivenessof the more frequent coercivediplomacy tactics depends ultimately upon the answers to threequestions. What response is expected of the opponent? Howstronglydisinclined is the opponenttoward this response? Whichspecifictactics arelikelyto be most effectivegiventhe answers o the



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