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Basic Tax Planning for Private Equity Funds and Hedge Funds I. Facts Generally speaking, a private equity fund is a fund (i.e., an ownership arrangement involving central management and control of a set of assets and liabilities) that: (1) primarily invests in start-up companies and/or distressed companies and sells them once a significant return is obtainable; (2) primarily has investors consisting of wealthy individuals, pension funds, and governments; and (3) is generally not subject to securities regulation by a government body. A group of individuals is planning to set up a private equity fund (PEF), which will have the following investors (where their nature as either a Host Country or foreign person is as defined under Host Country’s income tax law): HI, a Host Country wealthy individual; FI, a foreign wealthy individual; HPEN, a Host Country pension fund and tax-exempt entity under Host Country’s income tax law; FPEN, a foreign pension fund; and FGOV, a foreign government. PEF will be making investments both in business entities formed and operating in Host Country (“Host Country business entities”) and in business entities formed and operating abroad (“foreign business entities”). PEF will fund its investments only with contributed capital and not with any borrowings. “Savvy”, an individual who is considered a Host Country person for purposes of Host Country’s income tax law, will be making the investment decisions for PEF and will be compensated with a 20 percent “carried interest”, i.e., a 20 percent interest in the profits of PEF. THE FORUM BELGIUM Howard M. Liebman and Olivier Rousselle ..... 4 CANADA Jocelyn Blanchet ....... 12 DENMARK Christian Emmeluth ...... 17 FRANCE Stéphane Gelin and Johann Roc’h ....... 20 GERMANY Dr. Rosemarie Portner ..... 24 ITALY Carlo Galli .......... 31 THE NETHERLANDS Carola van den Bruinhorst and Dennis Langkemper.... 35 SPAIN Javier Martín Martín and Montserrat Turrado Alonso . . 39 SWITZERLAND Walter H. Boss ........ 47 UNITED KINGDOM Robin Vos and Tracey Neuman ........ 52 UNITED STATES Herman B. Bouma....... 57
Transcript

Basic Tax Planning forPrivate Equity Fundsand Hedge Funds

I. Facts

Generally speaking, a private equity fund is a fund (i.e., an ownership arrangement

involving central management and control of a set of assets and liabilities) that: (1)

primarily invests in start-up companies and/or distressed companies and sells them

once a significant return is obtainable; (2) primarily has investors consisting of

wealthy individuals, pension funds, and governments; and (3) is generally not

subject to securities regulation by a government body.

A group of individuals is planning to set up a private equity fund (PEF), which will

have the following investors (where their nature as either a Host Country or foreign

person is as defined under Host Country’s income tax law): HI, a Host Country

wealthy individual; FI, a foreign wealthy individual; HPEN, a Host Country pension

fund and tax-exempt entity under Host Country’s income tax law; FPEN, a foreign

pension fund; and FGOV, a foreign government. PEF will be making investments

both in business entities formed and operating in Host Country (“Host Country

business entities”) and in business entities formed and operating abroad (“foreign

business entities”). PEF will fund its investments only with contributed capital and

not with any borrowings.

“Savvy”, an individual who is considered a Host Country person for purposes of

Host Country’s income tax law, will be making the investment decisions for PEF and

will be compensated with a 20 percent “carried interest”, i.e., a 20 percent interest

in the profits of PEF.

THE FORUM

BELGIUMHoward M. Liebmanand Olivier Rousselle . . . . . 4

CANADAJocelyn Blanchet . . . . . . . 12

DENMARKChristian Emmeluth . . . . . . 17

FRANCEStéphane Gelinand Johann Roc’h . . . . . . . 20

GERMANYDr. Rosemarie Portner . . . . . 24

ITALYCarlo Galli . . . . . . . . . . 31

THE NETHERLANDSCarola van den Bruinhorstand Dennis Langkemper. . . . 35

SPAINJavier Martín Martín andMontserrat Turrado Alonso . . 39

SWITZERLANDWalter H. Boss . . . . . . . . 47

UNITED KINGDOMRobin Vos andTracey Neuman . . . . . . . . 52

UNITED STATESHerman B. Bouma. . . . . . . 57

1

2

TAX MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL FORUM

THE TAX MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL FORUMis designed to present a comparative study of typicalinternational tax law problems by FORUM memberswho are distinguished practitioners in majorindustrial countries. Their scholarly discussions focuson the operational questions posed by a fact patternunder the statutory and decisional laws of theirrespective FORUM country, with practicalrecommendations whenever appropriate.

THE TAX MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL FORUMis published quarterly by Tax ManagementInternational, 29th Floor, Millbank Tower, 21-24Millbank, London SW1P 4QP, England. Telephone:(+44) (0)20 7559 4800; Fax: (+44) (0)20 7559 4840;E-mail: [email protected]

© Copyright 2007 Tax Management International,a division of BNA International Inc., a subsidiary ofThe Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington,D.C. 20037 USA. Reproduction of this publicationby any means, including facsimile transmission,without the express permission of The Bureau ofNational Affairs, Inc. is prohibited except as follows:1) Subscribers may reproduce, for local internaldistribution only, the highlights, topical summaryand table of contents pages unless those pages aresold separately; 2) Subscribers who have registeredwith the Copyright Clearance Center and who paythe $1.00 per page per copy fee may reproduceportions of this publication, but not entire issues.The Copyright Clearance Center is located at 222Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Massachusetts (USA)01923; tel. (508) 750-8400. Permission to reproduceBNA material otherwise may be obtained by calling(202) 452-4471; fax (202) 452-4084. For CustomerService, in the United States call (800) 372-1033.

Additional copies of this publication are available toexisting subscribers at half price when they are sentin the same envelope as a standard subscription.Orders should be sent to BNA International inLondon.

Note: Because tax and legal matters are frequentlysubject to differing opinions and points of view,signed articles contained in the FORUM express theopinions of authors and not necessarily those of TaxManagement International or its editors.

ISSN 0143-7941 www.bnai.com

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Deborah J. Hicks

BNA International Inc.

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Deborah J. Hicks

BNA International Inc.

London

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BNA International Inc.

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EDITORIAL

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is now available on the internet at

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Register for your free trial today

MEMBERS

CHAIRMAN &CHIEF EDITOR

Leonard L. SilversteinBuchanan Ingersoll PCWashington, D.C.

BELGIUM

Howard M. LiebmanJones DayBrussels

Jacques MalherbeLiedekerkeBrussels

CANADA

Heather KerrCouzin Taylor LLP/Ernst & Young L.P.

Toronto

Jay NiederhofferDeloitte & Touche LLPToronto

CHINA

Qinghua XuErnst & YoungParis

Anthony M. FayWhite & Case LLPBeijing

DENMARK

Christian EmmeluthCopenhagen

FRANCE

Stéphane GelinCMS Bureau FrancisLefebvre

Paris

Henri de FeydeauPaul, Hastings, Janofsky &Walker LLP

Paris

GERMANY

Dr. Jörg-Dietrich Kramer

Dr. Rosemarie PortnerPricewaterhouseCoopersDüsseldorf

HONG KONG

Susan LeungHerbert SmithHong Kong

Debbie AnnellsAzure Tax LtdHong Kong

IRELAND

Joan O’ConnorDeloitteDublin

ITALY

Paolo MariottiStudio Legale MariottiRome

Carlo GalliMaisto e AssociatiMilan

JAPAN

Yuko MiyazakiNagashima Ohno andTsunematsu

Tokyo

Masatami OtsukaJones Day Showa LawOffices

Tokyo

THE NETHERLANDS

Carola van den BruinhorstLoyens & LoeffAmsterdam

Peter LierKPMG Meijburg & Co.Amsterdam

SPAIN

Luis F. BrionesBaker & McKenzieMadrid

Javier MartínErnst & YoungMadrid

SWITZERLAND

Dr. Peter R. AltenburgerAltenburgerZürich

Walter H. Bossvon Meiss Blum &Partner

Zürich

UNITED KINGDOM

Peter Niasand Nicola Purcell

McDermott, Will &Emery, London

Ashley GreenbankMacfarlanesLondon

UNITED STATES

Patricia R. LesserBuchanan Ingersoll PCWashington, D.C.

2

II. Questions

A. Basic Host Country tax planning for a private equityfund

1. Investment in a Host Country business entity

With respect to an investment by PEF in a Host Country

business entity (HBE), describe, separately with respect to

each investor, how HBE, PEF, and the investor’s investment in

PEF should be set up so as to minimise taxation under Host

Country’s income tax law. In particular, discuss: (1) how HBE

should be set up for Host Country income tax purposes (for

example, as a corporation or a partnership); (2) how PEF

should be set up for Host Country income tax purposes (for

example, as a corporation or a partnership); (3) whether PEF

should be formed under Host Country law or a foreign law; (4)

whether PEF should have its management office in Host

Country or elsewhere; and (5) whether the investor in PEF

should make its investment in PEF directly or through a

special entity.

2. Investment in a foreign business entity

With respect to an investment by PEF in a foreign business

entity (FBE), describe, separately with respect to each

investor, how FBE, PEF, and the investors investment in PEF

should be set up so as to minimise taxation under Host

Country’s income tax law. Consider the same issues as set

forth under Section II.A.1., above.

3. Overall preferred structure

In light of the answers to the questions at Sections II.A.1.

and 2., above, what is the overall preferred structure for

purposes of minimising taxation under Host Country’s

income tax law, taking into account all of the investors and

PEFs investments in both HBE and FBE? For this purpose,

consideration may be given to the use of one or more

special entities and the use of one or more private equity

funds in a “parallel” arrangement.

B. Basic Host Country tax planning for a hedge fund

Suppose the individuals were setting up a hedge fund (HF)

rather than a private equity fund. Generally speaking, a

hedge fund is similar to a private equity fund except that a

hedge fund invests in marketable stocks, securities, and

other financial instruments (“passive assets”). Types of

assets may include stocks, fixed income securities,

convertible debt, foreign currencies, exchange-traded

futures, forwards, swaps, options, and other derivatives.

Assume that HF will fund its investments not only with

contributed capital but also with substantial borrowings.

Perform the same analysis as required under Section II. A.,

above but, instead of assuming investments in HBE and

FBE, assume investments in passive assets generating

Host Country-source income and investments in passive

assets generating foreign-source income.

C. Host Country income taxation of income from acarried interest

How will Savvy be taxed on income from his carried interest

under Host Country’s income tax law?

3

Basic Tax Planning for Private Equity Funds and Hedge Funds

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3

Host CountryBELGIUM

Howard M. Liebman and Olivier RousselleJones Day, Brussels, Belgium

Howard M. Liebman is a partner of the Brussels office of

Jones Day. He is a member of the District of Columbia

Bar and holds A.B. and A.M. degrees from Colgate

University and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. Mr.

Liebman has served as a Consultant to the International

Tax Staff of the U.S. Treasury Department. He is

presently the EC correspondent for European Taxation,

an IBFD publication, and Chairman of the American

Chamber of Commerce in Europe Legal & Tax

Committee. He is also the co-author of the BNA Portfolio

999-2nd T.M., Business Operations in the European

Union, (2005).

Olivier Rousselle is an associate in the Brussels office of

Jones Day. He received his law degree from the

Université Catholique de Louvain-La-Neuve, an LL.M

from Hamline Law School and a Master of Tax

Management from the Solvay Business School.

I. Preferred structure of a private equity fundfor Belgian income tax purposes

Private equity investors may invest in Belgium either through a

holding company subject to the normal tax regime (including

the benefits of the participation exemption) or through a

closed private collective investment vehicle for private equity

purposes (PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK). In both cases, the

investment vehicle would have legal personality. Both tax

regimes are described in detail below.

A. Standard holding company tax regime

Traditionally, special purpose vehicles are often established in

the country of the target in order to obtain the benefit of the

domestic tax consolidation in place in most European

countries.1 This allows the acquisition vehicle to deduct the

interest on any debt contracted for the purpose of acquiring

the target company against the operational income of that

target. As Belgium has not yet introduced a tax consolidation

regime, the establishment of an acquisition vehicle in Belgium

is not necessary for that purpose (although there have been

discussions as to the possibility of introducing such a regime

in the future).

That being said, the general Belgian tax regime that applies to

holding companies remains favourable to private equity

investment for the following key reasons:

1. Dividend withholding tax

Dividends paid by a Belgian company are subject to a 15

percent or 25 percent withholding tax in Belgium, unless

otherwise provided for in a tax treaty entered into by Belgium

with the country in which the recipient shareholder resides.

For example, Belgium signed a tax treaty with the United

States on November 27, 2006, that provides for 0 percent

withholding tax in certain circumstances. Zero percent

dividend withholding tax is also provided for in the tax treaty

signed with Hong Kong on December 10, 2003, and in

Belgium’s treaties with San Marino and Singapore.

In addition, as a matter of domestic law, Belgium now

exempts from withholding tax dividends distributed by a

Belgian company to a qualifying parent company resident in

the European Union, or in any other country with which

Belgium has signed a tax treaty.2 For this purpose, the parent

company must hold at least 15 percent (to be reduced to 10

percent as of January 1, 2009) of the capital of the Belgian

company for an uninterrupted period of at least one year. It is

also required that the parent company, if it is a resident of an

E.U. Member State other than Belgium, be in a form listed in

the E.C. Parent-Subsidiary Tax Directive or, if the foreign

parent is resident in a non-E.U. tax treaty country, that it be in

a form analogous to one of the corporate forms listed in that

Directive. Finally, the parent company must be subject to

corporate income tax (or analogous taxation) and not benefit

from a tax regime that is out of the norm for its country of

residence.

2. Dividend participation exemption

Under Article 202 of the Belgian Income Tax Code, 95 percent

of the dividends received by a Belgian parent company are

exempt from tax in Belgium, provided that: (1) the parent

company has held or has committed to hold the shares

relating to the dividends received for at least one year; (2)

those shares are considered to be financial fixed assets (i.e.,

shares held for the purpose of creating a “lasting link”, as

defined under Belgian law); (3) the parent company holds (at

the time of the distribution of the dividends) a participation in

the subsidiary of at least 10 percent or €1,200,000; and (4)

the subsidiary has been subject to normal taxation in

accordance with Article 203 of the Income Tax Code

(basically, the subsidiary is not located in a tax haven).

3. Deduction of interest

In principle, interest paid on debt for the acquisition of shares

is deductible in Belgium. This is based on the general rule

applicable to the deduction of expenses, to the effect that

“the costs made or borne by the taxpayer during a given

taxable period for the purpose of acquiring or maintaining

professional income” are deductible. However, a few

restrictions on the deductibility of interest payments need to

be borne in mind, even if their scope is quite limited:

4

4

■ Any interest paid must be at arm’s length and fixed by

reference to the market rate, taking into account the

specific risk elements of the transaction (including the

financial situation of the debtor and the duration of the

loan);

■ Interest is not deductible if it is paid to a non-resident

lender that is not subject to income tax in its country of

residence or that is subject to a tax regime significantly

more favourable with respect to interest income than the

tax regime applicable in Belgium;

■ Interest paid or granted to an effective beneficiary that is

not subject to tax in its country of residence or that is

subject to a tax regime significantly more favourable with

respect to interest income than the tax regime applicable

in Belgium is not deductible, if the total amount of the

loans (other than bonds or analogous instruments issued

by public offering) exceeds seven times the sum of the

taxable reserves at the beginning of the taxable period

plus the paid-up capital at the end of that period (in other

words, a 7:1 debt-to-equity ratio is enforced); and

■ Interest paid to a Belgian individual who is also a director

or a shareholder of the Belgian debtor, or to a foreign

corporation acting as a director of that Belgian debtor, is

considered to be and treated for tax purposes as a

dividend, and hence as non-deductible, either if the

interest is not fixed at market rates or if (and to the extent

of the excess) the total amount of loans exceeds the sum

of the taxable reserves at the beginning of the taxable

period plus the paid-up capital at the end of that period (a

1:1 debt-to-equity ratio).

4. Interest withholding tax

Interest paid by Belgian debtors is subject to a 15 percent

withholding tax. The recipient of the interest may, however,

benefit from a reduced rate (generally as low as 5 percent), or

even be entirely exempt, under the terms of an applicable tax

treaty. For example, Belgium’s tax treaties with Germany,

Hong Kong, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Switzerland

provide for exemptions from withholding tax on interest in

certain circumstances. There are also a number of exceptions

to the 15 percent withholding tax provided for under Belgian

domestic law, the key exceptions being for:

■ Interest paid to a Belgian resident financial institution or to

a foreign credit institution established in the European

Economic Area (EEA) or in a country with which Belgium

has signed a tax treaty;

■ Interest arising from Belgian registered bonds subscribed

by non-resident investors;

■ Interest paid to a Belgian resident creditor;

■ Interest paid by certain qualifying Belgian “holding

companies” that are listed on a recognised stock

exchange (or part of a quoted group) to a foreign creditor;

and

■ Interest paid to an associated company resident in

Belgium or in another E.U. Member State.

A company is deemed to be an associated company of

another company if both are established in the European

Union and: (1) one of them holds directly or indirectly at least

25 percent of the capital of the other for an uninterrupted

one-year period; or (2) a third company established in the

European Union holds directly or indirectly at least 25 percent

of the capital of each of those two companies for an

uninterrupted one-year period.

5. Exit tax

Proceeds from liquidations and share buy-backs are

considered to be dividends in Belgium and are therefore

subject to a 10 percent withholding tax. No such withholding

tax is levied if the shares of the Belgian company being

liquidated are held by a qualifying entity located in another

E.U. Member State or in a country with which Belgium has

signed a tax treaty (as liquidation and share buy-back

proceeds are eligible for the same withholding tax exemptions

as other dividends). Traditionally, in order to avoid the 10

percent liquidation (or exit) tax (if it were to apply

notwithstanding the aforementioned exceptions), practitioners

have recommended that the shares of the Belgian company

be held by (usually) a Luxembourg entity. Other alternatives

can be thought of, but the need for these should decrease in

the future, in view of the recently introduced exception from

withholding tax for dividends (including liquidation proceeds)

paid to a resident of a country with which Belgium has signed

a tax treaty, as discussed above.

6. Capital gains tax

Capital gains realised by a legal entity on the sale of shares

are tax exempt in Belgium, provided the subsidiary is subject

to tax as set forth in Article 203 of the Income Tax Code.

There is no minimum participation threshold – as is the case

in Luxembourg (where a participation of at least €6 million or

10 percent is required) – for benefiting from this regime.

Following a recent modification of the Income Tax Code, the

exempt capital gain is the net gain realised after deduction of

the sales costs relating to the shares from which the capital

gain has arisen (for example, financial costs, bank fees,

consulting fees, etc.).

Conversely, capital losses on shares are not deductible,

unless the losses are incurred in the context of a liquidation,

and then only to the extent of any loss of paid-up capital. In

order to benefit from that exception, and bearing in mind the

existing anti-abuse provisions, a private equity investor might

consider setting up an intermediary holding company, the

paid-up capital of which would then solely be used to acquire

shares in the target company. If the value of the shares of the

target company has fallen below the price paid for their

acquisition (which, by hypothesis, is equal to the paid-up

capital of the holding company) by the time of the holding

company’s liquidation, the loss would become deductible for

the private equity investor, since it would then be a loss

incurred in the context of a liquidation. Of course, any interest

in using that approach will depend on the existence of profits

against which the loss may be deducted, which might not

always be the case in the context of private equity

transactions.

B. Belgian holding company v. PRICAF privée/privatePRIVAK

Private equity investors may establish their acquisition vehicle

in Belgium either as a holding company subject to the

standard corporate income tax (but benefiting from the

participation exemption for dividends and the tax-exempt

treatment of capital gains on shares, as described above) or

as a closed private collective investment vehicle for private

equity purposes (a PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK). Aside

from the PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK, it is also possible to

5

Belgium

5

create a closed public collective investment vehicle for private

equity purposes (a PRICAF Publique/Publieke PRIVAK), which

is governed by the Royal Decree of April 18, 1997.3 Although

the purpose of both vehicles is to invest in unquoted

companies, PRICAF Publique/Publieke PRIVAK are listed on

stock markets, whereas PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK are

not. To date, only two entities are reported by the Belgian

Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission to have taken

the form of a PRICAF Publique/Publieke PRIVAK. This paper

does not seek to describe this vehicle in any further detail, as

it does not come within the scope of the facts presented, but

focuses instead on the PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK.

The possibility of establishing a PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAKfor private equity purposes was introduced by the Belgian

legislature on April 22, 2003, in an effort to promote venture

capital investments in Belgium. To that end, Belgium has

accorded a favourable tax regime to such entities, the key

aspects of which can be summarised as follows:

■ PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK are subject to the

standard corporate income tax (at the normal rate of

33.99 percent), but their taxable base is limited to the

“abnormal and benevolent advantage” they have received

(essentially any reallocated income as a result of transfer

pricing) and any disallowed expenses (except capital

losses and depreciation on shares).4

■ The entity qualifies for tax treaty protection. In addition,

and even if no treaty applies, there is no Belgian

withholding tax on dividends, interest and royalties paid

to a PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK, unless the dividends

derive from a Belgian source (in which case, the

investment vehicle can claim a refund of such withholding

tax from the competent tax authorities).5

■ No withholding tax is levied on dividends distributed by a

PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK, provided that: (1) the

dividends arise from capital gains on shares realised by

the latter; or (2) if the beneficiary of the dividends is a

foreign company, the dividends arise from dividends paid,

in turn, by foreign companies.6 In addition, there is no

withholding tax on the proceeds distributed on the

liquidation of a PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK (nor is any

withholding tax levied in the event of a redemption of

shares).7

Despite the existence of this favourable tax regime, private

equity investors have, to date, preferred to establish a

standard form of company (which may be called a holding

company if its activities are limited to the ownership of shares)

for the purpose of making their investments, rather than

utilising a PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK. This is because the

use of a PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK is subject to some

rather substantial regulatory requirements and restrictions.

First, until recently, 80 percent of the shares of a PRICAFPrivée/Private PRIVAK had to be held by at least five and no

more than 20 investors. This requirement has now been

repealed by Royal Decree of May 23, 2007, which only

requires that the shares of a PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAKbe held by at least six investors. In addition, leaving aside any

other investment conditions that must be met to benefit from

the favourable tax treatment, PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAKmay not, in principle, hold a participation where they have

power to influence the management of the company or the

appointment of its directors.8 Finally, although they are only

subject to limited prudential control by the Belgian Banking,

Finance and Insurance Commission, PRICAF Privée/PrivatePRIVAK must be registered with the Ministry of Finance and

may not remain in existence for more than 12 years.

Therefore, even though the conditions for benefiting from the

favourable tax regime have been somewhat relaxed by the

Royal Decree of May 23, 2007 (especially for management

buy-out transactions), private equity investors are likely to

prefer using a standard holding company for their investments

rather than a PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK (especially since

the introduction of the 0 percent withholding tax on dividends

paid to a parent company residing in a tax treaty country, as

described below).9

C. Legal form of private equity fund

When private equity investors decide to establish their Belgian

acquisition vehicle as a holding company, their next choice

concerns what type of company to incorporate. The primary

legal forms are a joint stock company (SA/NV), a limited

liability company (SPRL/BVBA) or a partnership limited by

shares (SCA/CVA).

The choice of legal form can be influenced by various criteria,

including foreign tax rules such as those in the United States

motivating many U.S. controlled groups to “check-the-box”

and thereby elect to be treated as a partnership (for U.S. tax

purposes only). However, joint stock companies (SAs/NVs)

may not “check-the-box”, as they are considered per secorporations. One of the other available forms must,

therefore, be used instead.

There may be other reasons justifying the choice of one legal

form over another. Both a joint stock company (SA/NV) and a

partnership limited by shares (SCA/CVA), for example, allow

for the issuing of profit participation certificates (participationbénéficiaire/winstbewijzen), warrants, convertible bonds, and

tracking stock,10 which is not possible when using a limited

liability company (SPRL/BVBA).11 On the other hand, a

partnership limited by shares (SCA/CVA) and a limited liability

company (SPRL/BVBA) offer greater security to their

management than a joint stock company (SA/NV) offers to its

directors, who can be dismissed at any time by the

shareholders.12

D. Structuring a business entity for Belgian income taxpurposes

Only a very limited number of entities qualify as partnerships

under Belgian corporate law (i.e., a société de droitcommun/maatschap, a société momentanée/tijdelijkehandelsvennotschap and a société interne/stille venootschap).

These entities do not have legal personality and are, therefore,

transparent for tax purposes.13 In addition, some entities

considered to have legal personality from a corporate point of

view are deemed to be transparent for tax purposes, such as

European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIGs), Belgian

Economic Interest Groupings and commercial companies that

are not validly incorporated (these are known as “translucent

entities”). Such entities are, however, rather rare in practice.

By contrast, the Belgian Company Code accords legal

personality to a variety of other legal forms, such as the joint

stock company (SA/NV), the limited liability company

(SPRL/BVBA) and the partnership limited by shares

(SCA/CVA).

Belgium

6

6

It is generally best for a target company of a PEF (HBE) to be

incorporated as a company with legal personality, if only for

the purpose of obtaining beneficial capital gains or dividend

treatment.

First, capital gains realised by a Belgian legal entity, such as

PEF (if incorporated as a Belgian holding company), on the

sale of shares of another Belgian company, such as HBE, are

tax-exempt in Belgium, provided the subsidiary is subject to

tax as set forth in Article 203 of the Income Tax Code.14

Partnerships and “translucent entities” are not subject to tax,

as they are transparent for tax purposes. Thus, the sale of an

interest held by PEF in a partnership or a translucent entity

would normally not qualify for the capital gains tax exemption,

unless it could be demonstrated that the assets of the

partnership included shares that themselves qualified for a

capital gains tax exemption. But even in that case, it is not

certain that the tax authorities would allow the capital gains

tax exemption for the sale of an interest held in a partnership.

Indeed, the tax authorities have traditionally denied such a

benefit in the case of the sale of any interest in collective

investment funds (fonds commun deplacement/gemeenschappelijke beleggings fondsen), which,

like partnerships, are transparent for tax purposes. It is true

that the position of the Belgian Tax Administration has not

been upheld in this regard by the Tribunals of First Instance of

Brussels and Ghent; but in both cases, the taxpayer had

failed to prove that the underlying shares held by the

collective investment fund qualified for the capital gains

exemption.

The same applies to the Belgian dividend participation

exemption. Indeed, as indicated above, 95 percent of the

dividends received by a Belgian parent company is exempt

from tax on condition that the subsidiary has been subject to

normal taxation in accordance with Article 203 of the Income

Tax Code. Again, as partnerships are tax transparent, the

income received by a partnership is deemed to be received

by the partners directly – PEF in the present case – and

hence taxed at the level of PEF at the standard tax rate of

33.99 percent (but benefiting from the participation exemption

if the income of the partnership consists of dividends). While

this may not be a problem in itself (since, in a non-transparent

context, the income of HBE would be taxed at the level of

HBE and then distributed almost tax-free to PEF), it may

create practical difficulties (for example, how to stream or

allocate the income) and may not fit well within the policies or

goals of a pure private equity transaction (as operating

income may then be mixed with passive income from other

sources, which may not be desirable).

That being said, for the sake of completeness, it should be

noted that establishing HBE as a partnership could offer some

interesting possibilities for “debt pushdown” purposes

(Belgium does not have a tax consolidation regime, except for

VAT purposes). This is not decisive in itself, however, as other

alternatives have been devised over time to allow for the

effective utilisation of the interest paid on loans contracted by

the acquiring vehicle for the purposes of purchasing an

operating target that has legal personality as an offset against

the income of the latter in “debt-pushdown” scenarios.

This can be achieved, for example, through a capital decrease

or a dividend distribution post-acquisition, financed by a loan

entered into by the operating target. The operating target may

also sell assets to generate the cash necessary for a dividend

distribution (for example, in the context of a sale and

leaseback transaction, with the leaseback being effected on a

finance lease basis in order to keep the assets transferred on

the balance sheet of the operating target). In both cases, the

acquiring vehicle would use the dividends received to

reimburse the loans contracted for the purpose of acquiring

the operating target.

Another alternative is for the operating target to acquire

assets belonging to the acquiring company using debt

financing for that purpose. Again, the idea is to provide cash

to the acquiring company so that it can reimburse the loans it

has contracted (such loans being thereby “pushed down” as

a result). A downstream merger could also be considered, in

which the operating target would absorb the acquiring

vehicle, so that interest to be paid by the latter can directly be

offset by the profits of the former. However, it should be

stressed that this alternative is currently somewhat

controversial and carries with it a substantial risk of being

challenged on various grounds.

The above alternatives, as well as variations on them, are

used in practice. But before embarking on any

debt-pushdown strategy, a private equity investor would be

well advised to conduct an in-depth review and careful

analysis of Belgium’s panoply of anti-abuse provisions.

E. Overall preferred structure

On balance, and acknowledging that any deal is specific by

nature and requires a careful analysis, private equity investors

are likely to prefer, at least from a Belgian tax point of view,

investing through a normal holding structure in a company

with legal personality.

II. Preferred structure of a hedge fund forBelgian income tax purposes

As a general matter, there is no tax regime in Belgium that

would be specifically tailored for hedge fund activities,

pursuant to which private investors (such as HI, FI, HPEN,

etc.) could create a vehicle the purpose of which is to invest

in marketable stocks, securities and other financial

instruments (such as convertible debt, foreign currencies,

swaps, options, etc.). Indeed, the PRICAF Privée/PrivatePRIVAK (the tax regime for which is described in Section I.B.,

above) may only invest in certain types of instruments issued

by unquoted companies (for example, shares, bonds or, since

the Royal Decree of May 23, 2007, loans granted to unquoted

companies).15 Belgian law does provide a specific tax regime

for open and closed public collective investment vehicles

(respectively, SICAV/BEVEKs and SICAF/BEVAKs),16 but the

shares of such vehicles must be listed on a stock exchange.17

Interestingly, the Law of July 20, 2004 provides for two new

forms of investment vehicles, namely, the open/closed

institutional collective investment vehicle and the

open/closed private collective investment vehicle.18 The

former allows institutional investors (such as governments,

banks, insurance companies, pension funds, etc.) to create

a vehicle the purpose of which is to invest in marketable

instruments (such as shares, options, etc.). The latter

allows private investors to create a vehicle the purpose of

which is also to invest in marketable instruments. The

second vehicle could prove especially interesting in the

context of the current scenario, as it fits the key parameters

7

Belgium

7

of the scenario, i.e., private investors investing in

marketable stocks, securities and other financial

instruments through a special purpose vehicle.

Unfortunately, the entry into force of these two vehicles has

been expressly made contingent upon the issuance of a

Royal Decree, which has not yet been enacted.19

As a result, private investors (such as HI, FI, HPEN, etc.)

that wish to create a vehicle in Belgium for the purpose of

investing in marketable instruments would have to

incorporate a company, subject to the normal Belgian tax

regime (the key features of which are briefly described in

Section I.A., above), or a partnership. Admittedly, the use of

a partnership is likely to, in and of itself, create a number of

issues, if only with respect to the tax treatment of any

capital gains generated by the sale of an interest in the

partnership (see Section I., above) and, for HI or FI, with

respect to the tax qualification of the income received

through the partnership.20

Consequently, the use of a company is likely to be the

preferred route for setting up HF. This may result in some

taxation at the level of HF, if its income does not qualify as

dividends or capital gains eligible for the participation

exemption described in Section I.A. above (which would be

the case if the company derives interest, for example). The

standard tax rate in Belgium is equal to 33.99 percent, but

the total tax burden will be reduced by the

newly-introduced notional interest deduction.

Pursuant to this measure, a Belgian resident company is

entitled to deduct from its profits a percentage of its

adjusted net assets (see below), specifically linked to the

rate of 10-year Belgian Government bonds (which is

currently 3.781 percent for the 2008 taxable year). In other

words, a Belgian corporate taxpayer may automatically

deduct 3.781 percent of its adjusted net assets from its

annual profits. The precise percentage will be revised

annually, but in principle, it may not vary by more than one

percentage point from one tax year to another (and, in any

case, may not exceed 6.5 percent in total). If the taxpayer

does not earn enough taxable income for the notional

interest deduction to be utilised in any one year, the

remaining deduction may be carried forward for up to seven

years.

The adjusted net equity for these purposes is equal to the

net equity of the company as it appears on its books (i.e.,

capital, share premium, re-evaluation gains, reserves,

carried-forward profits, and subsidies) less a number of

technical deductions, specifically:

■ Any re-evaluation gains;

■ Subsidies;

■ Tax credits for research and development;

■ The net tax value of the company’s own shares held in its

books;

■ The net tax value of shares issued by investment

companies (in certain circumstances);

■ The net tax value of the shares held in other companies

as a financial fixed asset;

■ The net equity of any foreign permanent establishment

(PE) that is exempt from tax in Belgium pursuant to an

applicable tax treaty;

■ Real estate located abroad that is exempt from tax in

Belgium pursuant to an applicable tax treaty; and

■ Certain miscellaneous items for anti-abuse purposes (i.e.,

the book value of those items that, by their nature, are

not designed to generate taxable income; the net book

value of assets the costs of which unreasonably exceed

business needs; and the book value of real estate used

by managers).

In sum, HF’s tax burden will vary depending on its investment

policy and the assets derived from those investments.

III. Belgian taxation of income derived from acarried interest

There are various alternatives available under Belgian law

allowing the manager, i.e., Savvy, an interest in the profits

of the company it manages, i.e., PEF. Of course, one of the

alternatives is to grant Savvy a bonus equal to 20 percent

of the profits of PEF. However, any such bonus will be

considered normal remuneration subject to progressive

income tax rates of up to 50 percent (plus provincial and

communal surcharges) and social security contributions.

Indeed, pursuant to Articles 30.2° and 32 of the Income Tax

Code, any and all sums or benefits-in-kind paid or granted

to an individual acting as a manager of a company21 are

considered management remuneration, and hence taxable

at progressive rates.

According to the Official Administrative Commentary on the

Income Tax Code, the intent of the legislator was to include

any and all payments that constitute, in the hands of the

beneficiary, a return for the performance of management

functions. The debtor, the qualification and the method of

calculation or payment are not relevant in determining that

income is to be deemed to constitute management

remuneration.22 For that reason, management participation

in the profits of a company has usually taken one of the

forms briefly described below.23

A. Stock options/warrants24

Following the entry into effect of the Law of March 26,

1999, stock options granted for no consideration are

taxable in Belgium on the date on which the options are

deemed to have been granted to the beneficiary.25 Under

Belgian law, an option is deemed granted 60 days after the

offer, provided the beneficiary accepts the offer in writing

within that 60-day period.26 Otherwise, the option is

deemed to have been rejected by the beneficiary for

Belgian tax purposes. If the option is nevertheless accepted

by the beneficiary after the 60-day period, the option will no

longer qualify as an option for the purposes of the Law of

March 26, 1999 and taxation will take place on the exercise

of the option, based on the difference between the fair

market value of the underlying shares and the exercise

price of the option.27 This provides a certain flexibility to

management, which can decide to be taxed at the moment

of grant or at the moment of exercise simply by accepting

the option before or after the 60-day deadline.

Under the Law of March 26, 1999, the taxable income

relating to the grant of the option varies, depending on

whether the option is quoted or not.28 If the option is not

quoted (which is the most likely scenario in the context of a

private equity transaction), the taxable income is calculated

Belgium

8

8

by reference to the value of the underlying shares. Again,

there is a split decision-making tree. If the underlying

shares are quoted, their value is equal to, at the choice of

the grantor, the average closing price of the shares during

the 30-day period before the offer or the closing price of the

shares on the day before the offer. If the underlying shares

are not quoted, their value is determined by the grantor and

must be approved by the Statutory Auditor of the company

issuing the underlying shares (with some limitations set by

law).

The taxable income will then be equal to 15 percent of the

value of the underlying shares as determined using the

rules described above, to be increased by 1 percent per

year (or part thereof) in excess of five years if the exercise

period exceeds five years from the offer date.29 Those

percentages will be reduced, respectively, to 7.5 percent

(increased by 0.5 percent for each year, or part thereof,

exceeding five years following the offer) if the following

conditions are fulfilled:

■ The exercise price must be definitely fixed at the moment

of the offer;

■ The option may not be exercised before the end of the

third year following the year in which the offer occurs nor

after the end of the 10th year following the year of the

offer;

■ The option may not be transferable, except in the case of

death;

■ The risk of a reduction in value of the underlying shares

may not be covered, directly or indirectly, by the grantor

or by any other person with which the grantor has a

relationship of interdependence; and

■ The option must relate to shares in the company for

which the beneficiary exercises his employment or in a

company that has a direct or indirect participation in that

company.30

If the beneficiary is required to pay a price for the option,

the amount paid may be deducted from the taxable

income. There will be an additional element of taxation

should the exercise price be lower than the value of the

underlying shares at the moment of the offer (i.e., if the

exercise price is “in-the-money”). In that case, the

difference between the exercise price and the value of the

shares must be added to the taxable amount. The taxable

income so determined will then be subject to taxation at the

normal progressive tax rate.

Interestingly, the grant of stock options is not considered a

benefit-in-kind from a social security point of view, and

hence does not trigger any social security contribution,

provided the exercise price of the option is not less than the

value of the underlying shares at the moment of the offer

(and there is no “certain” advantage).31

The exercise of stock options does not trigger any tax for

the beneficiary (provided the option is accepted within the

60-day period following the offer, as indicated above).

Dividends received by managers (in the present case,

Savvy, who will receive a 20 percent share of the profits

through dividend distributions upon exercise of the option)

will be subject to a 15 or 25 percent dividend withholding

tax in Belgium. No other tax should be levied thereon in

Belgium.

That being said, if the shares acquired upon the exercise of

the stock option are shares in a foreign company, the

management may be subject to withholding tax abroad, in

addition to the Belgian withholding tax. (It should be noted

that foreign dividend withholding taxes will normally not be

creditable against Belgian withholding tax; they are

deductible, but only for the purposes of computing the net

amount of the 15 percent or 25 percent Belgian withholding

tax that is to be paid). Admittedly, this must be reviewed in

light of the applicable tax treaty (for example, some

taxpayers have argued, with success, that Belgium is

required to accord a foreign tax credit based on the terms

of the relevant tax treaty).32 In order to avoid potential

taxation abroad (or having to argue a case for tax credits

based on the text of an applicable tax treaty), Belgian

resident managers are instead likely to request that they

obtain shares in a Belgian company upon the exercise of

their stock options.

Capital gains realised on the sale of the shares obtained

upon exercise of the stock option should be exempt from

tax in the hands of Belgian resident individuals, such as

Savvy, provided the gains are deemed to result from the

normal management of the managers’ private assets and

wealth (patrimony). Under Article 90(1) of the Income Tax

Code, an individual is taxed on the profits arising from any

services, operations or speculative activities at the rate of

33 percent (plus local tax), unless such services, operations

or speculation fall within the normal management of the

individual’s private wealth. Whether the acquisition and

subsequent sale of shares would qualify as speculation,

triggering taxation at the rate of 33 percent (plus local tax)

is a matter of facts and circumstances, primarily depending

on the level of risk undertaken. This, however, is assessed

based on factual elements such as the managers’

knowledge of the activities of the company the shares of

which are being acquired, how the acquisition is being

financed, the financial situation of the individual in question,

and various other criteria. Interestingly, the Tribunal of First

Instance of Brussels has refused to tax a manager of an

unquoted company who had bought shares therein, using

financing granted by a financial institution, and then sold

them a few years later to the acquirer of the majority stake

in the company in question. The Court considered that this

operation remained within the scope of normal

management by that manager of his private assets.33

B. Shares

If shares are acquired at their market value, there is no

taxable benefit-in-kind for the acquirer. By contrast, if

shares are acquired for a discounted price, the discount will

be viewed as a benefit-in-kind taxable in the hands of the

beneficiary.34 Unfortunately, there are no guidelines under

Belgian tax law as to how such a benefit-in kind should be

calculated. However, the tax authorities accept that if the

underlying shares are quoted on a stock market, the value

of the benefit-in-kind may be limited to the difference

between 100/120ths (or 83.33 percent) of the market value

of the shares acquired and the price paid for them,

provided the shares cannot be transferred for a period of

two years after their acquisition.35 In practice, a similar

discount is generally considered acceptable for unquoted

shares.36

9

Belgium

9

An even higher discount could be claimed, depending on

the restrictions built into the shares so acquired (such as

the requirement not to transfer them for a certain period of

time, their vesting conditions, any restrictions as to voting

or dividend rights, good or bad “leaver” provisions or

tag-along or drag-along rights).37 Indeed, a wide range of

rights and restrictions can be attached to the shares

granted to a manager of the funds such as Savvy.38 For

example, Savvy’s rights to obtain dividends can be

subordinated to the payment of a dividend equal to, for

example, 15 percent per annum to the other investors

(taking into consideration a “hurdle rate”). The transfer of

the shares could also be prohibited for a certain period of

time, combined with a forfeiture period during which the

shares granted will be forfeited on the occurrence of certain

events such as the termination of the management

agreement/employment. In this respect, it might be noted

that independent studies have valued illiquidity discounts at

20 to 35 percent of the value of the underlying shares of

stock.39 Managers may also subscribe to a special category

of shares, pursuant to which they would obtain additional

shares in the target company if a given hurdle rate is

reached (an “equity ratchet”). This allows management to

increase its participation if the company performs well. But

it may also provide for the opposite effect and trigger a

reduction in the management’s participation if the company

performs poorly (a “reverse equity ratchet”).40 Those

restrictions or preferred rights, depending on how they are

structured, could not only affect the value of the

benefit-in-kind, but also, in our view, influence the timing of

taxation, i.e., at grant or upon vesting.

The tax treatment of dividends and capital gains received or

realised by Savvy in connection with the shares obtained,

whether for a discounted price or not, is the same as that

described above in connection with the shares obtained

upon the exercise of a stock option.

C. Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) and Profit Units(Participation Bénéficiaire/Winstbewijzen)

The acquisition for no consideration of RSUs and profit

units is not regulated under Belgian law (as opposed to the

granting, for no consideration, of stock options and

warrants). It would of course be considered a taxable

benefit-in kind in the hands of Savvy, but whether taxation

would take place at grant or upon vesting (if restrictions are

built in to the instrument granted) and the valuation of the

taxable benefit-in-kind depends on the terms and

conditions of the relevant profit unit or RSU, and is likely to

remain rather uncertain in the absence of a specific ruling

or more general pronouncements by the Belgian tax

authorities.

The jurisprudence relating to unregulated stock options

(i.e., stock options offered before the entry into force of the

Law of March 26, 1999) could, in the authors’ view, offer

some guidance as to the tax treatment of profit units and

RSUs.41 Unfortunately, this jurisprudence is not as clear as

might have been wished. Indeed, there is a decision of the

Brussels Court of Appeal, dated May 21, 2003, that

stipulates that the tax treatment of convertible profit units

should be the same as the tax treatment of non-regulated

stock options. It refers, in turn, to a Supreme Court case of

January 16, 2003, stipulating that non-regulated stock

options are subject to tax at grant.42 There is also a

Supreme Court case dated February 4, 2005, however, in

which the Court follows the reasoning of the Antwerp Court

of Appeals developed in a decision of February 19, 2002, to

the effect that if the stock options are forfeited upon

termination of the employee, their grant was “continuously

uncertain” until they had been exercised and, hence, the

moment of taxation should only be on exercise.43 Since

then, however, the Court of Appeals of Antwerp has issued

four judgments, all dated September 20, 2005, in which it

abandons this position and considers non-regulated stock

options to be taxable at grant, independent of the fact that

they are forfeited if termination of employment takes place

before their exercise.44 And this reasoning has, in the

meantime, been followed by the Court of Appeals of

Brussels in its judgment of December 13, 2006.45

Again, the proper tax treatment of the RSUs and profit units

will depend on the terms and conditions thereof, and

whether their vesting is made conditional upon certain

events, such as the termination of the management

agreement of Savvy, as well as how such conditions are

structured (condition precedent v. condition subsequent).

Some authors consider that if the restrictions built into the

granting of profit units are such that any valuation thereof is

not possible, no tax or social security contribution should

be levied on the granting thereof, but in that case, the risk

is that the dividends distributed subsequently in connection

with those profit units could be deemed to be remuneration

subject to the progressive tax rate (and not to the 15/25

percent final dividend withholding tax).46

1 Some European countries, such as Denmark, France and Italy,even provide for a worldwide tax consolidation system, subject tocertain conditions.

2 In the latter case, the tax treaty in question must provide for anadequate exchange of information procedure. Article 106 §§5 & 6of the Royal Decree implementing the Belgian Income Tax Code1992, as amended (BITC or Income Tax Code). See Ch. Chéruy,“Belgium extends dividend withholding tax exemption”, 2007Worldwide Tax Daily 11-3 (January 17, 2007).

3 Moniteur Belge of June 24, 1997. This Royal Decree also makes itpossible to create a transparent closed public collective investmentvehicle (a Prifonds). To date, no entity is reported by the BelgianBanking, Finance and Insurance Commission to have taken thatform.

4 PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK are also excluded from the dividendparticipation exemption regime and the foreign tax credit for taxpaid on interest and royalties pursuant to Article 185bis §2 of theIncome Tax Code (which might be in violation of certain taxtreaties). The impact of these restrictions is de minimis, however,given the limited tax base.

5 Royal Decree implementing the BITC, Articles 116, 117 §9, 118§1, 6° & 119

6 Royal Decree implementing the BITC, Article 106 §9

7 BITC, Article 21.2°

8 There are some exceptions, however, such as: (1) if theparticipation is not held for more than two years or if the influencedoes not arise from the direct or indirect holding of more than 50percent of the shares with voting rights of the company in question;or (2) if the participation arises from a management buy-outtransaction (Royal Decree of May 23, 2007, Article 14, Moniteur

Belge of June 12, 2007).

9 The use of a PRICAF Privée/Private PRIVAK might becomeinteresting if the investment made by that vehicle in other entitiesdid not qualify for the dividend participation exemption, (e.g., if the€1.2 million or 10 percent participation threshold was not reached).But even in that case, the complexity of the regime and theregulatory restrictions might outweigh its benefits.

Belgium

10

10

10 W. Heyvaert & B. Springael, “Het gebruik van de Belgische

holdingvennootschap als persoonlijke houdstermaatschappij door

Belgische ingezetenen en voor “private equity” investeringen door

buiten België gevestigde investeerders”, Fiscale Studies, 2004, atp. 26.

11 Belgian Company Code, Article 232

12 Belgian Company Code, Article 518 §3, which is a matter of publicorder according to the Belgian Supreme Court (Judgment ofJanuary 22, 1981, Pas., 1981, at p. 543).

13 BITC, Article 29

14 BITC, Article 192

15 Article 119 of the Law of July 20, 2004

16 Open and closed public collective investment vehicles that aretransparent are designated, respectively, by the terms open andclosed collective investment funds (fonds commun de placement à

nombre variable de parts/gemeenschappelijk beleggingsfonds met

een veranderlijk aantal rechten van deelneming and fonds commun

de placement à nombre fixe de parts/gemeenschappelijk

beleggingsfonds met een vast aantal rechten van deelneming).

17 Articles 10 & 17 of the Law of July 20, 2004, Moniteur Belge ofMarch 9, 2005. (See Article 185bis of the Income Tax Code for thespecial tax regime applicable to open and closed public collectiveinvestment vehicles.)

18 Articles 97 et seq. & 113 et seq. of the Law of July 20, 2004. Seenote 17, above

19 Article 240 the Law of July 20, 2004

20 Article 29 of the Income Tax Code provides a tax “fiction” to theeffect that the profits derived by a partnership are deemed to beprofits of the partners for tax purposes and may not be otherwisequalified (e.g., as dividends or real property income). If thepartnership does not realise benefits or profits, the Belgian TaxAdministration considers that the income collected by thepartnership retains its initial characteristics and qualification in thehands of the partners. This tax “fiction” could have a substantialimpact on the Belgian tax treatment of the income derived byindividuals in their capacity as partners of the partnership.Unfortunately, the interpretation of this tax “fiction” is somewhatcontroversial among legal commentators, and this paper does notattempt to describe the particulars of the controversy. See generallyPh. Hinnekens, “Le régime fiscal international des sociétés de

personnes en matière d’impôt sur le revenu”, (1995) J.D.F. at p. 209et seq.; M. Van Keirsbilck, “Internationale samenwerkingsbverband

tussen fiscaal transparente maatschap”, (January 2001), T.F.R. at p.193 et seq.

21 For tax purposes, an individual is considered to act as the managerof a company if: (1) he exercises a mandate of Director(bestuurder/administrateur or zaakvoerder/gérant) or liquidator or asimilar function; or (2) he carries out a management functioninvolving the daily management or the commercial, technical orfinancial management outside the scope of an employmentagreement. It is assumed for purposes of this paper that Savvy willexercise a mandate of Director of PEF, as it will make theinvestment decisions.

22 Tiberghien, Manuel de droit fiscal (2006), at p. 126

23 Only the key forms of management participation traditionally usedin practice have been (briefly) described. Other forms ofmanagement profit participation techniques can be devised,depending on the specifics of the deal in question. For example,management’s participation in the future profits of the company cantake the form of an earn-out clause providing for deferredcompensation depending on the results of the acquired company.Such clauses are traditionally used to incentivise the vendor(s) toremain with the target company for at least a certain number ofyears (especially in deals where the management is key to theoperation of the acquired company), and the deferredcompensation arising thereunder could qualify as an exempt capitalgain on shares if properly structured. No attempt has been made toprovide further details, as Savvy is not the vendor in the presentfact pattern, and would therefore not, in any event, be eligible forsuch a capital gains tax exemption.

24 Warrants differ from stock options, as they include the right of theholder to subscribe to newly-issued shares. Although both aresubject to the same tax regime under the Law of March 26, 1999,warrants are more frequently used than options since they offergreater protection (as they are embedded in the Articles of

Association) whereas stock options are mere contractualcommitments (See H. Lamon, “ Financial Buy-Outs: Structuring theManagers’ Participations”, May/June 2005 Derivatives & Financial

Instruments 123). Warrants may only be issued by joint stockcompanies (SA/NV) and partnerships limited by shares (SCA/CVA).

25 Article 42 of the Law of March 26, 1999, Moniteur Belge of April 1,1999

26 Id.

27 Response to the Parliamentary Question No. 228 of January 20,2004; Circ. No. 2005/0652 of May 25, 2005

28 Article 43 §§ 1, 2, 3 & 4 of the Law of March 26, 1999, see note25, above

29 Id., Article 43 §5

30 Id., Article 43 §6. Options on shares issued in accordance with aspecific procedure provided for in Article 609 of the CompanyCode will not be subject to tax. Id., Article 49. This procedure mayonly be used for those members of the workforce who qualify asemployees, and it is subject to stringent conditions (such as arequirement that the company has distributed at least twodividends during the three previous fiscal years). It is therefore notrelevant for a private equity transaction in which the managementtakes a participation, whether directly or indirectly, in the targetcompany.

31 Article 19 (18) of the Royal Decree of November 28, 1969,Moniteur Belge of December 5, 1969

32 Court of Appeal of Liège of March 10, 2006, (2006) T.F.R. at p. 670(pursuant to which a foreign tax credit should be available fordividends received from the United States based on the provisionsof the Belgium-United States tax treaty).

33 J. Pattyn, “Aankoop aandelen vennootschap door bedrijfsleider:

geen diverse inkomsten bij veredere verkoop”, 11 Fiscale Actualiteit

(March 2006) at p. 5

34 Belgian Commentary to the BITC, No. 36/14

35 Belgian Commentary to the BITC, No. 36/16. Shares can also beobtained under a favourable regime pursuant to the proceduresprovided for in Article 609 of the Company Code or in the Law ofMay 22, 2001, Moniteur Belge of June 9, 2007, but the benefit ofthose procedures is limited to employees and does not extend toself-employed persons such as managers (see note 21, above).

36 H. Lamon, note 24, above, at p. 120. If the shares are not quoted,the Administrative Commentary provides that the benefit-in-kind isequal to the difference between the book value (by reference to thenet equity) and the price paid for the shares. The reference to thebook value seems contrary, however, to the language of theBelgian Income Tax Code, which refers to the “real value” of theshares. It is therefore safer, in the view of the authors, for ataxpayer to use the market value of the shares as a reference (ifsuch market value is higher than the book value), especially as areference to book value could be challenged as contrary to Belgiantax law, which is of public order.

37 Id., p. 118

38 Taking into account the limits set by law such as, for example, theprohibition of “leonine” clauses, the requirement to set up a legalreserves, the net asset threshold below which dividends may notbe distributed, the prohibition of super voting stock, the limitationon the issuance of non-voting shares, the rules relating to theprotection of capital, etc.

39 A. Damodaran, “Valuing Private Firms”,http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/

40 H. Lamon, supra note 24, at p. 123; V. Simonart & T. Tilquin, “LeRatchet”, (2004) Mélanges John Kirkpatrick at p. 875 et seq.

41 E. De Plaen, “L’actionnariat salarié”, (January 2007) R.G.F. at p. 6

42 Court of Appeal of Brussels of May 21, 2003, (2003) Courr. Fisc. atp. 533

43 Belgian Supreme Court of February 4, 2005, (2005) T.F.R. at p. 540

44 To which the decision of the Court of Appeal of Brussels ofDecember 13, 2006 refers (see note 45, below).

45 Court of Appeal of Brussels of December 13, 2006,www.fisconet.fgov.be

46 C. Chevalier, Vennootschapsbelasting (2007) at p. 293; P. DeKoster & I. Vanderreken, Financiële participatie voor werknemers:

Resultaats, deling, opties en aandeelhouderschap (2001) at p. 9& 10

11

Belgium

11

Host CountryCANADA

Jocelyn Blanchet, MAcc, CADeloitte & Touche LLP, Toronto

Jocelyn Blanchet is a partner in the Mergers &

Acquisitions Tax Group at Deloitte & Touche LLP and

has worked extensively with Canada’s largest and most

successful private equity funds. Jocelyn has significant

experience in the design and structuring of investment

funds, developing tax-efficient structures for investors in

private equity and venture capital, and for their

management teams. He has authored numerous articles

and contributed to several publications and has also

lectured for the Canadian Institute of Chartered

Accountants, teaching investment dealers about tax

concepts relevant to their business.

I. Basic Canadian tax planning for a privateequity fund

A. Investment in a Canadian business entity

The discussion that follows describes the preferred structure

for Canadian income tax purposes of an investment by PEF in

HBE (a Canadian business entity) with respect to each

investor.

1. Preferred structure for a Canadian individual

The preferred structure for an investment by HI would be for

HBE to be formed as a corporation resident in Canada, and

for PEF to be formed as a partnership. In this fashion, the

income earned by HBE would be subject to federal and

provincial income tax at rates ranging from 32.02 percent to

38.16 percent (depending on the provinces in which HBE

conducts business), which is lower than the top marginal

rates of income tax applicable to business income allocated

by partnerships to individuals (which range from 39.00

percent to 48.25 percent depending on the province of

residence). If HBE were to distribute all of its after-tax income

to PEF by way of dividend, the total tax paid by HBE and HI

would be greater in this structure (compared to a situation

where HBE is formed as a partnership), but by a modest

amount, a difference that is expected to decline gradually until

2010,1 at which time individuals are expected to be largely

indifferent between earning income directly or through a

corporation. Historically, the amount of extra tax payable on

income earned by a corporation and distributed to

shareholders that are individuals was much greater and

alternative structures that resulted in the payment of less

corporate income tax were preferable. However, amendments

to the dividend tax credit applicable to dividends received by

individuals from Canadian corporations enacted on February

21, 2007 result in more parity between these alternatives.

PEF should be formed as a partnership so that HI is allocated

his share of income earned by PEF, including gains realised

on the disposition of PEF’s investments (such as HBE). In

such a structure, PEF’s income retains its character for

income tax purposes when allocated to HI,2 so that HI may be

entitled to claim the capital gains exemption with respect to

qualifying gains realised by PEF. As an individual, HI is entitled

to a lifetime cumulative deduction3 from taxable income with

respect to capital gains realised on the disposition of qualified

small business corporation shares so that $500,0004 of

qualifying gains are not subject to income tax. Qualified small

business corporation shares are shares of certain

Canadian-controlled private corporations (essentially,

corporations engaged in active businesses where

substantially all of the operations are conducted in Canada)

that have been held for at least 24 months.5 If PEF were to be

formed as a corporation, it would not be entitled to this

deduction, nor could qualifying gains be allocated to HI.

PEF could be formed under the laws of Canada or of another

country; Canadian tax law does not differentiate between

partnerships formed under Canadian law and those formed

under foreign law. Furthermore, HI should be indifferent, from

a Canadian income tax perspective, as to whether PEF

conducts its operations through an office in Canada or

abroad. HI would be allocated his share of the income of PEF

and would be taxable on such amounts in Canada,

irrespective of the location of PEF’s management office.

However, as discussed in more detail below, a foreign

partnership would be subject to withholding tax with respect

to HBE’s dividends and thus an HI would ordinarily invest

through a Canadian partnership.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for an investment by FI would be

largely the same as that for HI with respect to an investment

in HBE; HBE should be established as a Canadian

corporation and PEF should be established as a partnership.

Provided that PEF is not considered to be carrying on

business in Canada, investors in PEF that are not resident in

Canada would generally not be subject to Canadian income

tax on income earned by PEF and allocated to the investors

(although there are certain exceptions; see below).

The position is generally adopted that a private equity fund

makes investments in capital property and does not carry on

business in Canada under general principles. However, the

Act expands the meaning of the term “carrying on business”

to include situations where a non-resident of Canada “offers

anything for sale in Canada”, which could potentially

encompass the sale of shares of private corporations.6 Even

though most income tax treaties would establish a much

12

12

higher threshold before a non-resident could be subject to

Canadian income tax, a private equity fund is usually

designed to benefit from the “safe harbour” of section 115.2

of the Act, which ensures that a non-resident of Canada is not

considered to be carrying on business in Canada solely

because of the provision of certain services by a Canadian

service provider irrespective of whether the investor is resident

in a treaty partner country. Accordingly, PEF’s management

office may be located in Canada provided that the services

rendered to PEF are limited to certain delineated services

(which include providing investment management and

administration services relating to qualified securities, which

includes most types of shares and indebtedness), provided by

certain providers (which includes Canadian corporations but

excludes individuals).

FI may consider investing through another entity in certain

circumstances. Under domestic Canadian law, non-residents

of Canada are liable to pay income tax with respect to gains

on the disposition of “taxable Canadian property”. Taxable

Canadian property includes, among other things, shares of

private corporations resident in Canada and shares of public

corporations resident in Canada where the taxpayer owned

25 percent or more of the issued shares of any class of

shares of the corporation within the 60-month period

immediately preceding the disposition.7 Many of the bilateral

income tax treaties to which Canada is a party include

provisions that eliminate this tax where the investor is a

resident of the other country.8 Accordingly, if FI is not a

resident of a country with which Canada has concluded an

income tax treaty that would eliminate this tax, and FI is not

entitled to a full foreign tax credit for any Canadian income tax

paid, then FI may consider investing in PEF indirectly through

an entity that is resident in a treaty country.

It is important to note that the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)

does not currently view a U.S. limited liability corporation that

is treated as a partnership or that is disregarded for U.S.

income tax purposes (a popular investment vehicle for many

U.S.-resident individuals) as being a resident of the United

States for purposes of the Treaty9 and such vehicles may not

be a suitable vehicle through which FI would invest in PEF.

If PEF were to have both resident and non-resident investors,

a separate partnership should be established for the

non-resident investors. A partnership that has even a single

member that is a non-resident of Canada (i.e., FI) is not

considered to be a “Canadian partnership”10 and is treated as

a non-resident of Canada for many purposes. For example, all

interest and dividends paid to such a partnership by HBE

would be subject to domestic withholding tax even if a

majority of the members of PEF are resident in Canada and

not otherwise subject to such a tax.

3. Preferred structure for a Canadian pension fund

The preferred structure for HPEN would be for both PEF and

HBE to be formed as partnerships. HPEN would not be

taxable on any income allocated by PEF, including business

income generated by HBE’s commercial activity, and there

would be no entity level tax (as a partnership is not a taxable

entity).

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

If HBE were formed as a partnership, FPEN would be subject

to Canadian income tax with respect to business income

allocated to it by HBE. The amount of tax payable would

depend on HBE’s legal form; if FPEN were considered a trust

(as determined under Canadian legal principles); it would be

subject to income tax at the rate applicable to individuals,

which typically exceeds the rate of tax applicable to income

earned by corporations. If FPEN were considered a

corporation, FPEN could be largely indifferent from a

Canadian tax perspective as to whether HBE is formed as a

corporation or as a partnership (since either HBE or FPEN

would be subject to corporate income tax at the same

effective tax rate in Canada).11 However, if any of the other

members of a PEF or HBE partnership were resident in

Canada, the participation by FPEN in the same partnership

would “taint” the partnership for withholding tax purposes (as

discussed in Section I.A.2., above). Accordingly, the preferred

structure for FPEN is likely for HBE to be formed as a

corporation and for PEF to be a partnership for non-resident

investing, including the FPEN.

The considerations described above in connection with an

investment by FI (i.e., the use of separate partnerships, and

the situs of PEF’s management office) would similarly apply to

FPEN.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV is the same as for FPEN

with respect to an investment in HBE.

B. Investment in a foreign business entity

The discussion that follows describes the preferred structure

for Canadian income tax purposes of an investment by PEF in

FBE (a non-Canadian business entity) with respect to each

investor.

1. Preferred structure for a Canadian individual

Since HI is likely subject to income tax at a rate of 39 percent

or higher, and few countries would impose a higher tax rate

on income allocated to HI, the preferred structure for HI is

probably for FBE to be structured as a corporation not

resident in Canada, and for PEF to be a partnership. In this

fashion, income earned by FBE should not be subject to

Canadian income tax.

If it is anticipated that FBE would pay significant dividends

during PEF’s holding period, PEF could consider making the

investment in FBE indirectly through a Canadian corporation

(“Holdco”). If FBE is a foreign affiliate of Holdco (which

generally requires, among other conditions, that Holdco own

greater than 10 percent of the issued and outstanding shares

of FBE)12 and is resident in a country with which Canada has

concluded an income tax treaty, dividends paid by FBE to

Holdco out of its earnings could be non-taxable to Holdco for

Canadian income tax purposes. Holdco could distribute such

amounts to HI (through PEF) by declaring dividends, which

would be subject to income tax at rates as low as 17.23

percent to 30.63 percent. Dividends paid by FBE to HI

through PEF without the use of a Canadian holding company

would be subject to income tax at full rates (of between 39.00

percent and 48.25 percent, as noted above).

Provided Holdco is a Canadian-controlled private

corporation, the realisation of capital gains by Holdco on

the disposition of the shares of FBE should not result in

significantly more income tax payable to HI than if PEF had

realised the gain directly. That is, the total corporate and

personal income tax payable with respect to such gains

(i.e., the corporate tax payable on the capital gain, and the

13

Canada

13

individual level tax payable by HI on dividends declared by

Holdco) should approximate the amount of tax that HI

would have paid had he realised the capital gain directly.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for FI with respect to an investment in

FBE is for PEF to be established as a partnership. In such a

structure, whether FBE is established as a corporation or as a

partnership should not affect FI from a Canadian income tax

perspective (subject to the comments above with respect to

the location of PEF’s management office).

3. Preferred structure for a Canadian pension fund

The preferred structure for HPEN would be for PEF to be

established as a partnership. The ideal structure for FBE

would then largely be driven by the tax regime in which FBE

is resident and where it is liable to pay income taxes; HPEN

should not be subject to Canadian income tax whatever

FBE’s legal form.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund and aforeign government

The preferred structure for FPEN and FGOV with respect to

an investment in FBE, from a Canadian income tax

perspective, would be the same as for FI (with PEF formed

as a partnership).

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

The structure that has the broadest appeal to all classes of

investors is for PEF to be formed as a partnership and for

HBE and for FBE to be formed as corporations. This

structure is generally optimal for all investors except HPEN

(which would, as a result of this structure, be liable for a

greater amount of income tax than it would were HBE to be

formed as a partnership). If any non-residents of Canada

were to invest in PEF (such as FI, FPEN, or FGOV), a

separate partnership should be formed for such investors

so that PEF is not “tainted” for Canadian withholding tax

purposes. Furthermore, the exact structure of the

partnership established for these investors could differ

slightly from that of the partnership established for HI and

HPEN in order to ensure that the “safe harbour” benefits

discussed earlier are available to these investors

(particularly if these investors are not resident in a country

with which Canada has concluded an income tax treaty).

Historically, pension funds (HPEN) have been the most

significant participant in private equity investments made in

Canada,13 and their preferences can have a significant

influence on the structure of private equity funds and the

businesses in which they invest. Where a majority of the

investors in PEF are tax-exempt for Canadian income tax

purposes, an investment in HBE would ideally be formed as

a partnership, even if this structure is less-than-optimal for

other investors in PEF.

By adding other vehicles, an alternative (albeit slightly more

complex) structure could be used to improve the structure for

a greater number of investors. For example, HBE could be

formed as a partnership, and FI would invest in PEF through a

Canadian corporation, effectively achieving the preferred

structure with respect to HBE and FBE with respect to its

proportionate investment in PEF. If desirable, the partnership

formed for non-resident investors in Canada could invest in

HBE through a Canadian corporation “underneath” the

partnership (while still making investments in FBE directly), so

that the income derived by HBE as a partnership and

allocated to its partners is nevertheless subject to Canadian

income tax at corporate tax rates.

II. Basic Canadian tax planning for a hedgefund

One of the principal differences between PEF and HF is that

HF is less likely to conduct its activities in a fashion that would

give rise to capital gains. For example, gains realised in

connection with securities sold short and with derivatives

(including futures, forwards, swaps, and related instruments)

are likely to be viewed as being on income account for

Canadian income tax purposes.14 If HF were to conduct its

activities in a fashion similar to PEF (for example, by

purchasing common shares for longer periods of time), the

preferred structure for HF could be similar to that for PEF

described above, except that additional consideration might

have to be given to withholding tax considerations since the

receipt of interest and dividends may be more prevalent with

such portfolios. Accordingly, the discussion that follows

considers the appropriate structure for HF on the assumption

that HF’s activities are to be treated on income account for

Canadian income tax purposes.

A. Investment in assets generating Canadian-sourceincome

The discussion that follows describes the preferred structure

for Canadian income tax purposes of an investment in assets

that generate Canadian-source income by HF with respect to

each investor.

1. Preferred structure for a Canadian individual

With the recent amendments made to the Act (as described

in more detail above), it is intended that HI should ultimately

be largely indifferent between earning income from such

assets directly or through a corporation, whether the activities

are considered to generate business income or income from

property (provided the corporation is a Canadian-controlled

private corporation for Canadian income tax purposes).

Accordingly, HF could likely be structured as either a private

corporation or a partnership. However, there may be slight

advantages to structuring HF as a partnership, including: (i)

the fact that the rate of tax ultimately borne by HI would be

slightly higher until the integration mechanism has been fully

enacted; and (ii) the fact that HI should obtain a “deduction”

for dividend compensatory payments made with respect to

borrowed Canadian securities whereas such a deduction is

prohibited for a corporation unless the corporation is a

registered securities dealer.15

Since the activities of HF may not give rise to capital gains

under first principles, consideration should be given to the

making of an election pursuant to subsection 39(4) of the Act.

This election would be made by HF (if HF is formed as a

corporation), or by HI (where HF is a partnership)16 and deems

every Canadian security17 held by the taxpayer to be a capital

property, and every disposition of such Canadian securities to

be a disposition of a capital property, thereby giving rise to

capital gains and losses even if such gains and losses would

otherwise be considered to be on income account, absent

the making of the election. In short, the making of such an

election could “convert” income gains generated by HF to

capital gains, which are taxed more favourably. The election

does not apply to dispositions made by a trader or dealer in

Canada

14

14

securities, or a taxpayer whose principal business is the

purchasing of debt obligations.18 Accordingly, HF could be

precluded from making the election if it is a corporation

(depending on its activities). A separate evaluation would be

required in the event that the election is made by HI.

However, because the election can be made by a mutual fund

trust irrespective of its level of activity (and whether or not it

could be considered a trader or dealer in securities), a mutual

fund trust is an alternative and attractive structure for HF.

Such structures are not common because numerous

conditions must be met in order for a trust to be considered a

mutual fund trust for Canadian income tax purposes,

including the requirement that the trust must have at least 150

unit holders and that either the issued units must be

redeemable at the demand of the holder or the trust must

comply with certain investment restrictions.19

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for FI would likely be for HF to be

structured as a partnership or as a corporation resident in a

foreign country that is subject to a low rate of tax (and

ideally benefits from a tax treaty with Canada). If HF were

structured as a corporation resident in Canada, HF would

be subject to corporate income tax with respect to its

profits and dividend distributions to FI would be subject to

a further withholding tax. If HF were to be formed as a

partnership, a separate partnership should be established

for investors that are not resident in Canada (for the

reasons described in Section I.A.2., above).

Whether HF is a partnership or a foreign corporation, it

should be formed to respect the conditions of 115.2 of the

Act (as described in Section I.A.2., above), so that neither

HF nor FI is subject to Canadian income tax with respect to

the profits generated by HF.

FI may prefer HF to be formed as a partnership, particularly

if FI is resident in a country with which Canada has

concluded an income tax treaty, in order to reduce

Canadian withholding tax. Although many debt instruments

issued by Canadian-resident persons are designed to

benefit from domestic withholding tax exemptions,

dividends paid to HF would be subject to a 25 percent

withholding tax, which could be reduced through the

application of an income tax treaty. As a partnership, HF

would likely not benefit from any tax treaties, but the CRA

has indicated that, in applying Canadian withholding tax,

one should look through partnerships and determine the

appropriate amount of withholding tax based on the

residence of the partners.20

For similar reasons, the formation of HF as a mutual fund

trust may not be optimal for FI. Income allocated to

non-residents of Canada by a mutual fund trust would be

subject to withholding tax (except for allocations of capital

gains not arising from the disposition of taxable Canadian

property), whereas interest earned by HF as a partnership

and allocated to FI could benefit from domestic exemptions

from withholding tax.

3. Preferred structure for a Canadian pension fund

The preferred structure for HPEN would be for HF to be

formed as a partnership. HPEN would not be taxable on any

income allocated by HF.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund and aforeign government

The preferred structure for FPEN and FGOV from a Canadian

tax perspective would likely be for HF to be formed as a

partnership (with a separate partnership established for

investors not resident in Canada as discussed in Section

I.A.2., above). The Act contains additional exemptions from

withholding tax on interest for non-resident pension funds

(that would serve to eliminate withholding tax with respect to

obligations that do not benefit from other domestic

exemptions) that would not apply if HF were formed as a

corporation.21 Furthermore, certain treaties provide further

exemptions from which FPEN or FGOV could benefit. For

example, the treaty exempts foreign pension entities from

Canadian withholding tax on interest and dividends, and

exempts certain foreign governmental entities from

withholding tax on interest.22

B. Investment in assets generating foreign-sourceincome

The discussion that follows describes the preferred structure

for Canadian income tax purposes of an investment in assets

that generate foreign-source income by HF with respect to

each investor.

1. Preferred structure for a Canadian individual

The preferred structure for HI with respect to HF making

investments in assets that generate foreign-source income is

likely the same as for assets that generate Canadian-source

income (as described above), with HF being formed as either

a Canadian corporation or as a partnership. Both alternatives

would result in the income generated by HF being subject to

Canadian income tax on a current basis.

If HF were to be formed as a corporation in a zero-tax

jurisdiction, HF would likely be considered a foreign affiliate of

HI (if HI owned more than 10 percent of the issued shares of

any class of HF) or a foreign investment entity of HI.23 Both

regimes would likely operate to eliminate any deferral of

taxation to HI with respect to HF’s activities and would serve

to include in HI’s income either his proportionate share of HF’s

income (as computed for Canadian income tax purposes), or

a notional return based on the amount invested.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for FI would be for HF to be formed as

either a partnership or as a corporation in a zero-tax

jurisdiction. Neither structure should affect FI from a Canadian

income tax perspective (subject to the comments above with

respect to the location of HF’s management office).

3. Preferred structure for a Canadian pension fund

The preferred structure for HPEN from a Canadian income tax

perspective would be for HF to be formed as a partnership.

HPEN would not be taxable on any income allocated by HF

and could potentially benefit from income tax treaties between

Canada and the country in which the payer of the income is

resident.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund and aforeign government

The preferred structure for FPEN and FGOV from a Canadian

tax perspective would likely be the same as that for FI above.

Neither structure should affect either investor from a Canadian

income tax perspective (subject to the comments above with

respect to the location of HF’s management office).

15

Canada

15

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

The overall preferred structure from a Canadian tax

perspective for each of the investors, with respect to a

portfolio that generates both Canadian-source and

foreign-source income, is for HF to be established as a

partnership with a management office located either in

Canada (provided that the conditions of section 115.2 of

the Act are respected) or in another country. This structure

is optimal for each of the investors, other than potentially HI

who could benefit from making the investment through a

mutual fund trust (provided the numerous applicable

conditions could be achieved). If any non-residents of

Canada were to invest in HF (such as FI, FPEN, or FGOV),

a separate partnership should be formed for such investors

so that HF is not “tainted” for Canadian withholding tax

purposes.

III. Canadian income taxation of income froma carried interest

The carried interest with respect to a private equity fund is

usually paid as a distribution on a partnership interest

(where PEF is formed as a partnership), often held by the

general partner (in this case, Savvy).

A distribution made to a partner with respect to that

partner’s interest does not, in and of itself, result in any

taxable income to the partner but reduces the adjusted

cost base of the partner’s interest in the partnership.24

However, every fiscal year, the partnership must calculate

its income or loss for tax purposes and allocate such

income or loss to its members (including the general

partner) consistently with the terms of the partnership

agreement, whether or not distributions are made to the

partners. As noted above, the character of the income or

loss allocated to the partners maintains its character for

tax purposes; that is, where PEF realises capital gains and

allocates such gains to its partners, the partners are

considered to have realised capital gains. The partnership

agreement for PEF would likely provide that the recipient

of the carried interest would be allocated income for tax

purposes approximately corresponding to the amount of

distributions made to that partner (or the amount of

carried interest earned). Accordingly, provided that PEF

realises capital gains and allocates such gains to Savvy,

Savvy should be taxed on his carried interest at the rates

applicable to capital gains.

The granting of the carried interest to the general partner

on the formation of a private equity fund is generally not

treated as a taxable event. Furthermore, it is generally

believed that the value of the carried interest is low if

acquired by the general partner before the fund has

obtained commitments from investors.

1 The 2006 Federal Budget proposed to reduce gradually the federalincome tax rate applicable to corporations. This trend wascontinued with the Department of Finance’s news release2006-061, dated October 31, 2006, which announced a proposalto further reduce the corporate tax rate to 18.5 percent effectiveJanuary 1, 2011. Once these rates have been enacted, thisdifference should be minimal.

2 Paragraph 96(1)(f) of the Income Tax Act (Canada), RSC 1985, c. 1(5th Supp.), as amended (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).Unless otherwise stated, statutory references in this paper are tothe Act.

3 The deduction is provided by subsection 110.6(2.1) of the Act.

4 The 2007 Federal Budget proposed to increase the exemption to$750,000 with respect to dispositions occurring on or after March19, 2007.

5 In order to qualify for the capital gains exemption, numerousconditions must be met by the individual and the corporation,which are beyond the scope of this article. For a detaileddiscussion of the rules, see Craig K. Hermann, “The Capital GainsExemption: A Comprehensive Review”, Report of Proceedings ofFifty-Second Tax Conference, 2000 Tax Conference (Toronto:Canadian Tax Foundation, 2001), 29:1-54

6 Paragraph 253(b) of the Act

7 Definition in subsection 248(1) of the Act

8 For example, Article XIII of the Canada-United States TaxConvention (1980) (the “Treaty”) exempts residents of the UnitedStates from this tax with respect to most forms of property that aretaxable Canadian property.

9 See, for example, CRA document 9417505, dated October 25,1994. In the 2007 Federal Budget, the Department of Financesuggested that the Treaty was being renegotiated so as to extendthe benefits of the Treaty to U.S. limited liability companies.Whether this will occur, or what will be the effective date ofimplementation, is not yet known.

10 Section 102 of the Act

11 There could be a slight advantage to FPEN bearing the corporatetax liability since corporations not resident in Canada are liable topay federal tax at a rate of 10 percent in lieu of provincial incometax, a rate that is lower than the rate of income tax levied by mostprovinces.

12 Definition in subsection 95(1) of the Act

13 See Private Equity Canada Report 2006, (Toronto: ThomsonFinancial Canada and McKinsey and Company, 2007) and PrivateEquity Canada Report 2002, a research report by Macdonald &Associates Ltd. (Toronto: Goodman & Carr LLP and McKinsey andCompany, 2002)

14 The CRA’s interpretation bulletin IT-479R Transactions in securities(dated February 29, 1984) contains a good description of the CRA’sview with respect to the treatment of numerous different types oftransactions in securities.

15 An individual is generally entitled to reduce the amount of Canadiandividends included in income by the amount of compensatorydividend payments made with respect to securities lendingarrangements by virtue of clause 82(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. Subsection260(6) otherwise prohibits a deduction with respect to suchpayments unless the taxpayer is a registered securities dealer.

16 Subsection 39(4.1) of the Act ensures that an election made by amember of a partnership is effective with respect to the activities ofa partnership of which it is a member.

17 Canadian securities are defined in subsection 39(6) of the Act andinclude shares of Canadian-resident corporations, units of a mutualfund trust, and many types of common debt instruments issued byCanadian-resident persons.

18 Subsection 39(5) of the Act

19 Definition in subsection 132(6) of the Act. An evaluation of all of theconditions that must be met in order for a trust to be considered amutual fund trust is well beyond the scope of this article. For amore comprehensive summary of the conditions to be met, see P.Botz, “Mutual fund trusts and unit trusts: Selected tax and legalissues” (1994). vol 42, no. 4 Canadian Tax Journal 1037-1058

20 For example, CRA document 2004-0074241E5 dated July 19,2005, which affirms the CRA’s long-held view.

21 Paragraph 212(1)(b)(iv) of the Act enables organisations that obtaina certificate of exemption to eliminate withholding tax on interest.Such certificates may be granted to foreign pension entities,charities, and certain other tax-exempt entities, as provided insubsection 212(14) of the Act.

22 Paragraph 2 of Article XXI and paragraph 3 of Article XI,respectively

23 The foreign investment entity regime is contained in section 94.1 ofthe Act.

24 Subparagraph 53(2)(c)(v) of the Act

Canada

16

16

Host CountryDENMARK

Christian EmmeluthCopenhagen, Denmark

Christian Emmeluth obtained an L.L.B.M. from

Copenhagen University in 1977 and became a member

of the Danish Bar Association in 1980. During 1980-81,

he studied at the New York University Institute of

Comparative Law and obtained the degree of Master of

Comparative Jurisprudence. Having practised Danish law

in London for a period of four years, he is now based in

Copenhagen.

I. Introduction

For purposes of the discussion below, it is assumed that the

private equity fund (PEF) is treated as a partnership and, as

such, as a transparent entity, for Danish tax purposes.

Otherwise the PEF will be subject to taxation under the

Corporate Tax Act, which contains specific provisions for the

taxation of investment funds established under Council

Directive 85/611/EEC on the co-ordination of laws,

regulations and administrative provisions relating to

undertakings for collective investment in transferable

securities (UCITS) and other investment funds and

associations. Generally, a PEF will be treated as a partnership

if the members are jointly and severally liable for the

obligations of the partnership, the number of members is

limited, the number of members remains basically unchanged

during the term of the partnership, and any admission of new

members and/or significant changes of the articles of

association require the unanimous consent of all the

members.

II. Basic Danish tax planning for a privateequity fund

A. Investment in a Danish business entity

1. Preferred structure for a Danish individual

From the perspective of HI (who is a Danish person), the most

tax-efficient structure for Danish income tax purposes would

be to set up HBE as a limited company. HI will in this case

incorporate his own holding company through which the

investment in HBE will be made.

Capital gains realised on the disposition of the shares in HBE

will be exempt from Danish corporate income taxation

provided the shares in HBE have been owned for more than

three years at the time of sale.1 There is no requirement as to

the percentage of shares that the holding company must own

in HBE. Gains realised before the three-year ownership

requirement is met are subject to ordinary corporate income

taxation at the rate of 25 percent.

These beneficial rules do not apply if the shares in HBE are

considered to be shares in an investment company.2 An

investment company is defined as:

■ A company covered by Council Directive 85/611/EEC of

December 20, 1985 on the co-ordination of laws,

regulations and administrative provisions relating to

UCITS;

■ A company investing in securities where, upon demand

from the bearer, shares are redeemed by funds from the

company at a price that is not significantly lower than the

intrinsic value of the company. A purchase of shares by a

third party that has undertaken vis-à-vis the company an

obligation to purchase the shares at a price that is not

significantly less than the intrinsic value of the company,

is considered a redemption by the company. Goodwill,

know-how, and similar intellectual property rights are

disregarded for purposes of calculating the intrinsic value.

The requirement concerning redemption on demand will

be deemed to have been met even if the demand is met

over a certain time period rather than immediately.

Capital gains on investment shares are taxed at the corporate

rate of 25 percent, irrespective of the length of time for which

they have been owned.3

Dividends received from HBE will be tax free provided the

holding company owns more than 10 percent of HBE4 and

provided the dividends are not received from an investment

company (i.e., provided HBE is not deemed to be an

investment company). Distributions from an investment

company must be included in the taxable income of its parent

company. For the tax years 2007 and 2008, the holding

requirement is 15 percent. If the holding requirement is not

met, then only 66 percent of the dividends received form part

of the taxable income of the holding company, again provided

the dividends are not received from an investment company.

Whether PEF is established under Danish or foreign law would

not be significant for HI, provided, if PEF is a foreign

partnership, it is treated for Danish tax purposes as a

transparent entity.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

Where the investment in PEF is to be made by a foreign

individual, the preferred form for PEF would again be a

partnership which, as noted above, is transparent for Danish

tax purposes. HBE should be established as a limited

company under the laws of Denmark.

Gains realised on the disposition of shares in HBE will not be

subject to Danish income taxation. If HBE is liquidated, a

distribution made to FI in the year in which HBE is finally

17

17

dissolved will be treated as a dividend distribution subject to

withholding tax but only if:

■ FI owns more than 10 percent of the shares in HBE

through a company; and

■ The company is a resident of an E.U. or European

Economic Area (EEA) Member State or a country with

which Denmark has concluded a double taxation treaty.5

In order to avoid or mitigate withholding tax on distributions of

dividends from HBE, FI should make his investment in

Denmark through a foreign company incorporated in another

E.U. or EEA country or a country with which Denmark has

entered into a double taxation treaty providing for a reduced

rate of withholding tax on dividends. Otherwise such

distributions will be subject to withholding tax at the rate of 28

percent.6

According to circular letter No. 12 of April 28, 1993, foreign

investors holding Danish listed shares deposited with a

Danish bank may apply to benefit automatically from the

reduced rate provided for under an applicable treaty. If

permission is granted, it will not be necessary to apply for a

refund of withholding taxes.

3. Preferred structure for a Danish pension fund

Danish pension funds are subject to taxation under the

Pension Fund Tax Act.7 Tax is imposed at a rate of 15 percent

and the taxable basis is the net income of the fund and all

realised and unrealised gains and losses on the assets of the

fund. The tax year is the calendar year and taxable income is

computed annually. Investment in certain bonds and certain

real property is exempted from tax and a credit is granted for

foreign taxes paid by the pension fund. The European Court

of Justice (ECJ) found in its decision C-150/04 that the denial

of the right of residents of Denmark to deduct contributions to

foreign pension plans was a violation of E.C. law.

Consequently a bill has been submitted to the Danish

parliament that introduces major changes to the Pension

Fund Tax Act. The bill is expected to undergo significant

amendments on its way through the Danish Parliament.

Basically, the new pension fund tax will be imposed at the

level of the individual investor rather than at the level of the

pension fund itself, and will allow Danish resident individuals

establishing plans with foreign pension funds to deduct

contributions to such plans for Danish income tax purposes.

Under current law, because of the scope of a pension fund’s

taxable basis under the Pension Fund Tax Act, the way in

which an investment in PEF is structured will not have any

impact on how HPEN is taxed.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

FPEN would structure its structure its investment in the same

manner as FI (see Section II.A.2., above) in order to limit its

exposure to Danish withholding taxes.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

FGOV would not be subject to taxation in Denmark.

B. Investment in a foreign business entity

1. Preferred structure for a Danish individual

As long as the foreign company does not fall within the scope

of the Danish controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation, HI

will use the same structure as for the investment in a Danish

subsidiary as described under Section II.A.1., above.

Under the CFC legislation, a Danish parent must include in its

taxable income its proportionate share of the CFC income of

a foreign subsidiary.8 A company is considered a parent

company if it:

■ Owns the majority of the shares in the subsidiary;

■ Is a shareholder in and has the right to appoint the

majority of the members of the board of the subsidiary;

■ Is a shareholder in, and may exercise significant influence

over the running and financial affairs of, the subsidiary

under an agreement;

■ Is a shareholder in, and controls the majority of the votes

with respect to, the subsidiary under an agreement; or

■ Is able to exercise control over the subsidiary through

another company.

A parent company must include its subsidiary’s CFC income

(as defined) in its own taxable income if the subsidiary’s CFC

income is more than 50 percent of the subsidiary’s total

income and the financial assets held by the subsidiary

constitute more than 10 percent of the subsidiary’s total

assets. CFC income is mainly passive income, such as

dividends, interest, royalties, and leasing income.

HI will seek to ensure that the thresholds for the application of

the CFC regime described above are not exceeded. If this is

achieved, the shares in the foreign company will be subject to

the tax treatment applying to shares in a non-CFC company,

(i.e., gains on the disposal of such shares will be tax-exempt)

provided the foreign company does not fall within the

definition of an investment company set out at Section II.A.1.,

above.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for FI will depend on the local tax law

of FI’s home country.

3. Preferred structure for a Danish pension fund

Whether HPEN invests in foreign or domestic assets does not

affect its taxation treatment, so that the position is as

described at Section II.A.3., above.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

As in the case of FI, the preferred structure for FPEN would

depend on the local tax law of FPEN’s home country.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

Again, the preferred structure for FGOV depends on local law.

C. Overall preferred structure

From the point of view of HI and FI (where PEF is to invest in

HBE), structuring the investment through a local holding

company would be the most attractive route. Danish pension

funds are not subject to corporate income taxation but to

taxation under a special Pension Fund Tax Act that does not

distinguish between foreign and domestic investments.

III. Basic Danish tax planning for a hedge fund

A. Investment in passive assets generatingDanish-source income

1. Preferred structure for a Danish individual

As income is taxed in the hands of individuals at the rate of 59

percent, HI will most likely seek to postpone taxation until the

date the holding company is liquidated by employing the

Denmark

18

18

structure described under Section II.A.1, above. The capital

gain on shares realised on liquidation is taxed at the rate of 43

percent.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

In order to mitigate withholding taxes, the rate of which would

exceed the corporate tax rate of 25 percent, FI would

structure his investment in HF in the same way as is

described under Section II.A.2., above in relation to an

investment in HBE through PEF. As described above,

dividends may in many instances be received tax free if the

pertinent holding requirement is met. The use of a holding

company would enable dividends to be paid on free of

withholding tax to a company resident in another E.U. or EEA

Member State or in a country that is party to an applicable tax

treaty providing full relief from withholding tax.

As the withholding tax on dividends paid to individuals is 28

percent (and on royalties 30 percent), the only investment that

FI would hold directly would be an investment in interest

yielding instruments, no withholding tax being imposed on the

return on such investments.

3. Preferred structure for a Danish pension fund

The same considerations as described under Section II.A.3.,

above would apply.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The position would be as described in Section II.A.4., above.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

FGOV would not be subject to taxation in Denmark.

B. Investment in passive assets generatingforeign-source income

1. Preferred structure for a Danish individual

Again HI would seek to postpone taxation by setting up a

holding company structure as described under Section II.A.1.,

above.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for FI would depend on the local tax

law of FI’s country of residence.

3. Preferred structure for a Danish pension fund

Under current law, no distinction is made for tax purposes

between domestic and foreign source income, all taxable

income being taxed in the same manner. Thus, the position

will be as indicated at Sectioh III.A.3., above – i.e., HPEN

would structure its investment as described in Section II.A.3.,

above.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN would depend on the local

tax law of FPEN’s home country.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

FGOV would not be subject to taxation in Denmark.

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

A holding company is the most useful vehicle for postponing

and, in certain instances, reducing the taxation of passive

income, except in the case of returns on investments in

interest-bearing instruments, which should be held directly by

foreign individual investors.

IV. Danish income taxation of income from acarried interest

The “carried interest” will be deemed to be compensation for

the advice rendered by Savvy. As the “carried interest” is a 20

percent interest in the profits of PEF, unless the agreement

with Savvy stipulates a specific date of payment different from

that on which the profits are realised by PEF, the time when

the investors realise the profits on their investments will

determine the time at which Savvy must include his “fee” in

his Danish taxable income.

1 Section 9 of Act No. 1017 of October 10, 2006 on the Taxation onGains on Shares (TGA) (aktieavancebeskatningsloven)

2 TGA, section 19

3 TGA, section 9.1

4 Section 13.2 of Act No. 1745 of December 14 2006 on theTaxation of Companies (CTA) (selskabsskatteloven)

5 Section 16 A 1 of Act No. 1061 of October 24, 2006 on theAssessment of Tax (ligningsloven)

6 Section 65 of the Act No. 1086 of November 14, 2005 on theTaxation at Source (kildeskatteloven)

7 Act No. 1075 of November 5, 2005(pensionsafkastbeskatningsloven)

8 CTA, Section 32

19

Denmark

19

Host CountryFRANCE

Stéphane Gelin, Avocat associé and Johann Roc’h, AvocatCMS Bureau Francis Lefebvre, Paris

Stéphane Gelin is an attorney, Tax Partner with CMS

Bureau Francis Lefebvre, member of the CMS Alliance.

He specialises in international tax and transfer pricing.

Johann Roc’h is an attorney with the International Tax

Department of CMS Bureau Francis Lefebvre.

I. Basic French tax planning for a privateequity fund

A. Investment in a French business entity

With respect to an investment by PEF in a French business entity,

there follows a discussion, separately with respect to each of the

investors, of the preferred structure for French income tax purposes.

For the purpose of this analysis, we have assumed that HBE

would be structured as a limited liability company such as a

Société par Actions Simplifiée (SAS) or a Société àResponsabilité Limitée (SARL), HBE consequently being subject

to corporate income tax. Indeed, in France, businesses are not

often structured as partnerships for several reasons, in particular

because: (1) the partners are jointly and severally liable for the

obligations of the partnership; and (2) the significant registration

obligations triggered by the sale of partnership shares.

For the purposes of this study, we have focused on investment

vehicles that are considered to be “private equity funds”. Other

investment vehicles are available, such as the Sociétéd’Investissement à Capital Variable (SICAV), a tax exempt

investment company that generally provides the same tax

benefits as a Fonds Commun de Placement (FCP – see Section

I.A.1., below). We have also assumed that HBE and FBE mainly

carry on commercial activities, thus excluding from consideration

predominantly real estate holding entities for which specific tax

structures may be set up.

1. Preferred structure for a French individual

From the perspective of HI (who is a tax resident of France), the

usual structure for French income tax purposes would be to set

up PEF as a French FCP. The FCP is an investment fund that

consists of a co-ownership of securities without legal personality.

It is set up by a French management company approved by the

Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), the French equivalent of

the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

HI would hold the shares in PEF directly, and PEF would invest either

directly in HBE, or through a holding company that would acquire

HBE, the acquisition preferably being funded by equity (a mix of hard

equity and shareholder loan)1 and bank debt (the holding company,

together with HBE, would subsequently set up a fiscal unity for

corporate income tax purposes). Having HI invest in HBE through

an FCP would not give rise to any additional taxation as compared

to HI investing directly in HBE, the position being as follows:

■ The issuance and transfer of shares in an FCP is not

subject to registration tax.

■ A holder of FCP shares is not liable to taxation with

respect to dividends or interest received, or capital gains

realised,2 by the FCP, if the FCP does not distribute such

income or gains.

■ HI will generally3 be subject to standard taxation on

dividends or interest received, or capital gains realised, by

the FCP, if the FCP does distribute such income or gains.

■ HI will be subject to standard taxation on the disposal of

FCP shares.4

To optimise the structure from a tax standpoint, instead of an

FCP, HI could set up PEF as a French Fonds Commun dePlacement à Risques,5 (FCPR or Venture Investment Fund). Like

an FCP, an FCPR is a co-ownership of securities without

separate legal personality.6 An FCPR is set up by a French

management company approved by the AMF and by a

custodian.7 The additional advantages it has over an FCP can be

summarised as follows:

■ HI will be exempt from income tax on income or gains

received by HI through the FCPR (such income would only

be subject to social contributions at the rate of 11

percent, the contributions being withheld by the FCPR’s

management company), provided certain conditions are met.

■ HI will also be exempt from capital gain tax on the disposal

of FCPR shares if the same conditions are met (social

contributions would still apply at the rate of 11 percent).

■ HI will be entitled to a tax reduction equal to 25 percent

of the FCPR subscription, up to a maximum subscription

of €12,000 per person per year. HI may also be exempt

from French tax on distributions from the FCPR

reinvested in the FCPR and on capital gains realised

when the FCPR shares are sold or redeemed after the

initial five-year blocking period.

Under French law, an FCPR must meet several requirements:

■ Its investments must be predominantly in private equity

(the investment quota is 50 percent);8

■ Shareholder loans granted and financial investments

made by it must be limited;9

■ Its equity in listed companies must be limited.10

Also for the tax exemptions/reductions listed above to be

granted, not only must the taxpayer meet a five-year holding

period requirement, but further conditions must be met as to the

investment quota of 50 percent (which will normally be met

where HI invests in HBE through an FCPR):

■ The companies in which the FCPR invests must have

their registered head office in a Member State of the

European Union, or in another Member State of the

European Economic Area (EEA) that has signed a tax

20

20

treaty with France that contains an administrative

assistance clause for the prevention of tax fraud or evasion;

■ The companies must carry on a commercial or industrial

activity; and

■ The companies must be subject to French corporate

income tax (CIT) under ordinary conditions (or would be

subject to French CIT under the same conditions if their

activity was performed in France).

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

FI is a non-resident of France. For FI also, PEF could be set up as

a French FCPR with the following French tax consequences:

■ There would be no supplementary registration tax.

■ French-source income and gains11 distributed by the

FCPR would be subject to withholding tax to the extent

the underlying income received was subject to

withholding (for example, dividends paid to non-resident

shareholders are subject to French domestic withholding

tax at the rate of 25 percent). Such withholding could be

reduced under the provisions of a tax treaty (if any)

between France and the country of residence of FI12 (no

social contributions would be due); and

■ Capital gains on the disposal of the FCPR shares13 would not

trigger any withholding tax or any other taxation in France.

PEF could also be set up as a foreign partnership. According to

recent administrative guidelines issued by the French tax

authorities, a foreign partnership that is treated as tax transparent

in the country in which it is established, whether or not it has

separate legal personality, and whether or not its partners have

unlimited liability, must be looked through for the purposes of

applying the treaty(ies) signed by France with the country(ies) in

which its partners are resident. Such transparent treatment

applies provided the following conditions are met:

■ The partnership must have its seat of management in a

country that has signed a tax treaty with France

containing an administrative assistance clause for the

prevention of tax fraud or evasion;

■ The partners must themselves be resident in a country

that has signed a tax treaty with France containing an

administrative assistance clause for the prevention of tax

fraud or evasion;

■ The French-source income flowing through the partnership

must be treated for tax purposes as the income of the

partners as residents of their relevant county(ies), and be

effectively subject to taxation in that country (those

countries) without benefiting from any exemption; and

■ None of the partners may be a partnership.

Provided the conditions set out above are met, the

French-source income would be deemed to be attributed directly

to the partners of the foreign partnership, so that the provisions

of the tax treaty between France and the country of residence of

the partners would apply. Irrespective of any tax treaty provisions,

potential withholding tax on interest paid to FI could be avoided if

the conditions for benefiting from France’s domestic exemption

from withholding tax were met.14

Finally, the foreign partnership should not be deemed to have a

permanent establishment (PE) on the sole ground that it has

entered into an agreement with a French company with respect

to the management of its portfolio investments. No such PE

should be recognised in France provided the administrative and

commercial management of the fund is handled abroad, at the

level of its seat.15

3. Preferred structure for a French pension fund

France has no equivalent of a pension fund.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN would be the same as that for

FI with respect to an investment in HBE, provided FPEN does not

have a PE in France. Depending on the specific constraints

applying to FPEN, a corporation benefiting from an advantageous

tax regime may be interposed between HBE and PEF.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV would be the same as that for

FPEN with respect to an investment in HBE, provided FGOV

does not have a PE in France.

B. Investment in a foreign business entity

1. Preferred structure for a French individual

If FBE is resident in an E.U. Member State or another EEA

Member State that has signed a tax treaty with France containing

an administrative assistance clause for the prevention of tax fraud

or evasion, HI could invest in FBE through an FCPR, FBE being a

limited liability company.

Provided the FCPR qualifies as a fiscal FCPR, HI would benefit

from the tax exemptions described above in connection with HI

investing in HBE (see Section I.A.1., above).

Since an FCPR has no legal personality and is not subject to tax

in France, under the provisions of the applicable tax treaty,16 the

FCPR may not be regarded as a French resident for tax

purposes. On the other hand, the transparent character of an

FCPR may not be recognised by all foreign jurisdictions, so that:

(1) withholding tax could be levied on its foreign-source income;

and (2) the investors could be denied tax credits for any foreign

withholding tax so levied.

These problems could be remedied by interposing between PEF

and FBE, a foreign corporation, such as a Luxembourg SARL

that is eligible for the “SOPARFI” regime,17 which would benefit

from an advantageous local tax regime (i.e., the exemption from

tax of dividends and capital gains) and would be regarded as a

Luxembourg resident for tax treaty purposes.18 The income

received by this entity would, therefore, benefit from the

provisions of the applicable tax treaties and could be ultimately

repatriated free of taxation to the investors by way of regular

dividend distributions or the use of hybrid instruments (for

example, convertible bonds redeemed by the issuer at fair

market value, once a capital gain is derived on the sale of FBE at

the end of the investment term).19

Alternatively, HI could invest in FBE through a foreign partnership,

for example, a foreign limited partnership,20 in which case the

comments at Section I.A.2., above would apply.

Finally it should be emphasised that French individuals (residents

of France) are taxed on both their French and foreign-source

income. In this respect, attention should be paid to the tax

regime applicable to the entities constituting the chosen

structure. Specifically, Section 123 bis of the French Tax Code

provides that where a French individual (a resident of France)

holds, directly or indirectly, a participation of at least 10 percent in

an entity formed under a foreign jurisdiction that benefits from a

privileged tax regime as defined in the French tax regulations,21

any profits of the entity are to be regarded as passive income

21

France

21

directly attributable to, and accordingly taxable in the hands of,

the French individual in proportion to his participation in the entity.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

In view of the features of an FCPR and the withholding tax issues

that the use of an FCPR may give rise to in foreign jurisdictions, FI

would not gain any particular advantage from investing in FBE

through an FCPR. However, should FI make his investment through

an FCPR, the FCPR’s foreign-source income would not be

subject to any income or withholding tax in France when it was

redistributed by the FCPR to FI. If any withholding tax was levied

in the source country, FI might be entitled to a reimbursement of

such tax under the tax treaty (if any) between FI’s country of

residence and the source country (this would depend on the

source country recognising the tax transparency of the FCPR).

Preferably, FI should invest through a foreign limited partnership,

FBE being structured either as a corporation or as a partnership,

depending on the constraints on the local business and on the

specific constraints applying to FI.

As noted at Section I.A.2., above, the fund should not be

deemed to have a PE in France as long as the administrative and

commercial management of the fund remains with the seat of

management located abroad.

3. Preferred structure for a French pension fund

As noted above, France has no equivalent of a pension fund.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN would be the same as that for

FI with respect to an investment in FBE, i.e., for PEF to be set up

as a foreign partnership (see Section I.B.2., above). Depending

on the specific constraints applying to FPEN, a corporation

benefiting from an advantageous tax regime could be interposed

between FBE and FPEN.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV would be the same as that for

FPEN with respect to an investment in FBE (see Section I.B.4.,

above).

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

Considering all investors and investments in both HBE and FBE,

the preferred structure would require the setting up of a FCPR in

which: (1) HI would invest directly; (2) FI, FPEN and FGOV would

invest either directly or through a corporation or a partnership

benefiting from an advantageous tax regime, which would be

interposed between the investors and PEF. Depending on the

predominant character of the investments in HBE or FBE,

consideration could also be given to setting up a parallel structure

alongside the FCPR in which FI, FPEN and FGOV would invest

directly or indirectly, depending on their specific tax constraints.

PEF would itself invest directly in HBE and FBE, although PEF

could alternatively invest in FBE through an interposed

corporation benefiting from an advantageous tax regime (see

Section I.B.1., above).

II. Basic French tax planning for a hedge fund

A. Investment in passive assets generatingFrench-source income

There follows a discussion, separately with respect to each of the

investors, of the preferred structure for French income tax

purposes with respect to investments by HF in passive assets

generating French-source income.

1. Preferred structure for a French individual

French investment vehicles such as basic FCPs, FCIMTs22 and

SICAVs23 are strictly regulated by French law (particularly in terms

of creation and investment quotas) and do not offer full flexibility

in terms of investments.

In light of the above, France has been trying to improve and

develop the legal framework for the activities carried on by hedge

funds, such activities being commonly referred to in France by

the general term “gestion alternative”. This recently resulted in the

creation of three specific investment vehicles: the “OPCVM24 àrègles d’investissement allege” (known as an RIA), the “OPCVMde fonds alternatifs” and the “OPCVM contractuels”.25 Any other

investment vehicle not within the scope of the domestic

regulations would have to be approved by the AMF. These

investment vehicles fall under the umbrella term “Undertakings for

Collective Investment in Transferable Securities” (UCITS), their

legal framework deriving from the E.C. UCITS Directive.26

As such vehicles would benefit from the same tax treatment as a

basic FCP, the rationale guiding the tax structuring of the HEF

investment would be the same as that guiding the structuring of

the PEF investment.

In light of the above, the preferred structure for HI would be the

same as that set forth in Section I.A.1., above, for HI investing in

HBE through PEF, with HEF being set up as a basic FCP or as a

specific investment such as an RIA.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for FI would be the same as that set forth

above for FI investing in HBE through PEF (the FCPR being

replaced by a basic FCP or a specific investment such as an RIA).

3. Preferred structure for a French pension fund

As noted above, France has no equivalent of a pension fund.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN would be the same as that for

FPEN investing in HBE through PEF (see Section I.A.4., above).

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV would be the same as that for

FI investing in HBE through PEF (see Section I.A.2., above).

B. Investment in passive assets generatingforeign-source income

1. Preferred structure for a French individual

The preferred structure for HI would be the same as that

described at Section I.B.1., above for HI investing in FBE through

PEF (the FCPR being replaced by a basic FCP or a specific

investment such as an RIA).

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for FI would be the same as that for FI

investing in FBE through PEF (see Section I.B.1., above).

3. Preferred structure for a French pension fund

As noted above, France has no equivalent of a pension fund.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN would be the same as that for

HI investing in FBE through PEF (see Section I.B.4., above).

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV would be the same as that for

FI investing in FBE through PEF.

France

22

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C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

Considering all investors and investments in both passive assets

that generate French-source income and passive assets that

generate foreign-source income, the overall preferred structure,

from a French income tax perspective, would be the same that

for the investors in the PEF scenario (see Section I.C., above).

III. French income taxation of income from acarried interest

Savvy’s “carried interest” constitutes a 20 percent interest in the

profits derived by PEF. The carried interest is actually

compensation to Savvy for the advice he provides to PEF.

As discussed at Section I.A.1., above, in the case of a PEF

investment, a structure using an FCPR would be one of the most

advantageous structures from a French income tax perspective.

Should PEF be structured as an FCPR, Savvy would be a

member of the management company of the FCPR. Provided

certain requirements27 were met, carried interest distributed to the

management team28 would be taxed at the reduced rate of 16

percent (plus social contributions at the rate of 11 percent)

instead of the progressive income tax rate (maximum effective

rate of 40 percent plus 11 percent social contributions).

Other structures offer different possibilities for structuring the

carried interest that can result in the gain on the sale of the

carried interest shares being treated as a capital gain for income

tax purposes (and taxed at the reduced rate of 16 percent plus

social contributions at the rate of 11 percent). However, care

must be exercised in setting up such structures, since the French

tax authorities are increasingly focusing on carried interest

distributed to management teams. The tax authorities frequently

attempt to challenge the capital gain treatment of the carried

interest, particularly on the grounds that the carried interest is

actually compensation for services, and as such, should be taxed

as salary or non-commercial profits at the progressive income tax

rate.

1 In order to comply with the French thin capitalisation rules

2 There is no taxation on gains realised by an FCP provided noindividual, acting either directly or through interposed persons,holds more than 10 percent of the units of the FCP (Code Général

des Impôts (the French General Tax Code or FTC), Section92-D(3)). If the 10 percent threshold is exceeded, the gain realisedby the fund would be taxed at the rate of 16 percent (plus socialcontributions at the rate of 11 percent) in the hands of eachinvestor in proportion to its investment.

3 Except where the investment is lodged in a life insurance contract(in which case favourable tax treatment applies).

4 Capital gains tax would apply at the rate of 16 percent plus socialcontributions at the rate of 11 percent; FTC, Section 150-0A,however, provides that capital gains on securities and similarinstruments are taxed only if the “tax household’s” proceeds fromthe sale of such instruments exceed an annual threshold amount of€20,000 (amount for 2007, revised each year).

5 Funds may take any of a number of forms in France such as anFCP, an FCPI, or an SUIR (an FCPR designed for a sole investor).The FCPR is, however, the vehicle most commonly used to set upa fund in France for a number of reasons, in particular because ofthe tax exemptions granted to French investors in an FCPR wherecertain conditions are fulfilled.

6 See The Guide to Private Equity Fundraising, Private EquityInternational, September 2005

7 Provided the subscription and acquisition of units in the FCPR arerestricted to “qualified investors” (as defined by French law), theFCPR can benefit from a simplified procedure pursuant to which itdoes not itself need to be approved by the AMF.

8 At least 50 percent of the assets of the FCRPR must consist of:■ Quasi-equity or securities of companies (or securities giving

access to the equity of companies) that are not traded on a

financial instruments market operated by a market undertakingor an investment services provider; or

■ Shares of SARLs (limited liability companies) or comparableforeign companies.

9 The limit is 15 percent for shareholder loans granted, for the term ofthe investment made, to companies in which the FCPR holds atleast 5 percent of the equity.

10 The assets of the FCPR can comprise, but only up to a limit of 20percent of the total, equity securities (or securities giving access toequity) issued by companies with a market capitalisation of lessthan €150 million that are traded on a market of the EEA.

11 If the investors hold, as of the date of the sale of the shares of aFrench company, or have held at any time in the past five years,directly or indirectly, shares entitling them to more than 25 percentof the profits of a French company (FTC, Section 244 bis C),withholding tax would apply at the rate of 16 percent, subject tothe application of the provisions of an applicable tax treaty that mayreduce or eliminate such taxation. Recent Administrative guidelines,however, have indicated that, subject to the fulfilment of specificconditions, a favourable tax regime (partial or total exemption ofcapital gains on the sale of shares, depending on the period forwhich the participation is held by the investor, the gain being fullyexempt after an eight-year period) is available not only to Frenchresidents but also to foreign residents.

12 The tax is withheld by the management company and, wheneverpossible, limited to the reduced rate provided for by the applicabletax treaty provided adequate documentation is provided to themanagement company. It should be noted that in this case a foreignresident could, subject to the application of the provisions of anapplicable tax treaty, suffer withholding tax while a French residentwould be tax exempt. To this extent, such taxation could be regardedas discriminatory from the point of view of the foreign resident.

13 Either a disposal of shares by the FCPR when distributed to theforeign investor or a disposal of FCPR shares by the investor.

14 FTC, Section 131 quater. In particular Section 131 quater, providesthat the loan must be concluded abroad, prior to the remittance of thefunds, and that the written loan agreement must expressly provide fora fixed loan amount, the maturity date of the loan and the interest rate.

15 Ministerial Answer to the Senate, Jean Chérioux, Session datedDecember 15, 2003

16 Certain tax treaties, e.g., the France-United Sates tax treaty,expressly address the tax treatment of FCPRs. For U.S. taxpurposes, the FCPR may thus be treated as a partnership provideda proper election is filed.

17 SOPARFI stands for “Société de Participations Financières”.

18 Subject to the provisions of the applicable tax treaty, and inparticular the beneficial ownership requirements of the treatyconcerned

19 When setting-up such a structure, attention should be paid to theprovisions of the E.C. Savings Directive. A ruling should also beobtained from the Luxembourg tax authorities to confirm thetaxation regime that will apply in the case concerned.

20 U.K. limited partnerships are frequently used in this context.

21 FTC, Section 123 bis refers to a privileged tax regime as defined byFTC, Section 238A, i.e., a regime under which the tax that isimposed is less than 50 percent of the tax that would have beenimposed in France (the maximum corporate income tax rate inFrance is currently 34.43 percent).

22 FCIMT stands for “Fonds Commun d’Intervention sur les Marchés

à Terme” (the French equivalent of futures market funds).

23 Unlike an FCP, a SICAV has a separate legal personality.

24 OPCVM stands for “Organisme de Placement Collectif en Valeurs

Mobilières”.

25 Loi sur la Sécurité Financière, dated August 3, 2003 and guidelinesissued by the AMF

26 E.C. Directive 85/611/CE (UCITS I), amended by E.C. Directives2001/107/CE and 2001/108/CE (UCITS III)

27 Finance Law for 2002, Article 78, IV 2001-1275 dated December28, 2001; FTC, Section 163 quinquies B and C; Administrativeguidelines dated March 28, 2002, n° 5-I-2-02

28 All income derived upon the “carried interest” shares (dividend,capital gains) fall into the scope of the distributions eligible to thisregime.

23

France

23

Host CountryGERMANY

Dr. Rosemarie Portner, LL.MPricewaterhouseCoopers, Düsseldorf

Before Dr. Rosemarie Portner, LL.M. joined private

practice as a lawyer and tax adviser in 1993 she worked

as a civil servant for several State and Federal tax

authorities, most recently the Federal Ministry of Finance

in the Tax Counsel International’s office. Her areas of

practice comprise in particular employee benefits and

pensions with a focus on cross-border transactions, as

well as international taxation (at the time she worked as

a civil servant she was member of the German

delegation which negotiated the German/U.S. Treaty of

1989). She has published numerous articles and lectured

frequently in German and English language in her

practice areas.

I. Introduction

A. Current debate

Germany is currently in the throes of a debate as to whether

private equity investments and more precisely, venture capital,

should be promoted. The two political parties forming the

current German government agreed in their Coalition

Agreement of November 11, 2005 (Koalitionsvertrag) to

improve the framework conditions for private equity investors,

management and target companies. However, the trade

unions have attacked the draft Act for the Modernisation of

the Framework Conditions for Equity Investments (Gesetz zurModernisierung der Rahmenbedingungen für Kapitalbeteilig-ungen or MoRAKG), which the German Government

submitted on June 29, 2007. The draft Act is based on a

research study entitled “Acquisition, and Take-Over of

Companies by Financial Investors (in particular Private Equity

Companies)” (“Erwerb und Übernahme von Firmen durchFinanzinvestoren (insbesondere Private Equity-Gesellschaften)”)

prepared by the Technical University of Munich (TU München)

on behalf of the German government. The German

government sees the potential for the development of private

equity investment in Germany in terms of the ratio of the

volume of venture capital investments to the volume of gross

domestic product and refers to research carried out by PwC

that ranks Germany fifth in an international survey in terms of

investment volume attributable to venture capital. The draft

Act takes into account the amendments to individual and

corporate income tax and the trade tax contained in the

Business Tax Reform Act 2008.

The trade unions are concerned that the draft Act may afford

opportunities for the adoption of sophisticated schemes

allowing (ordinary) middle market companies to deploy tax

privileges in an unintended manner. In the trade unions’ view,

tax privileges should, therefore, be expressly confined to

venture capital companies while all other capital investment

companies should be subjected to the general tax provisions.

B. Rationale behind the Government initiative

The German Government explained the rationale behind its

initiative to promote private equity in a paper of May 9, 2007

as follows:

The draft Act has three aims: (1) to enact the Venture Capital

Act (Wagniskapitalbeteiligungsgesetz or WKBG)); (2) to

revise the existing Private Equity Act (Gesetz über

Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaften or UBGG); and (3)

to take measures to limit the risks associated with the

activity of financial investors.

Unlike venture capital companies, private equity companies

are permitted to invest in target companies, whether listed on

a stock exchange or not, that do not have to meet further

requirements with regard to their age or the volume of their

equity capital, and are also permitted to invest in any type of

company, including commercial partnerships. As private

equity funds (as the term is understood for purposes of this

article) rarely make use of this form of company, preferring

instead to use the form of a venture capital company, the

following summary of the draft Act does not address the

measures intended to revise the existing Private Equity Act.

Nor does the summary deal with part three of the draft Act,

which introduces measures designed to eliminate, or at least

minimise, the harmful effects on financial investors by

addressing, among other things, persons “acting in concert”,

transparency relating to security lending , security trading

notices and information on substantial shareholdings. These

measures are directed particularly at hedge funds, which in

Germany have been admitted for public offering to private

investors, generally as umbrella funds (and under certain

circumstances, single hedge funds) since January 1, 2004.

Such funds are covered by the Investment Act and the

Investment Tax Act.

C. Summary of the draft Venture Capital Act

To qualify as a “venture capital company” (Wagniskapital-

beteiligungsgesellschaft), a company must have a purpose

that is confined to the holding of shares in corporations.

More precisely, a venture capital company must invest at

least 70 percent of its funds in target companies that are:

(1) not listed on a stock exchange; (2) are no older than 10

years (a former version of the draft Act provided for a

maximum age of seven years); and (3) have equity capital of

not more than €20 million (a former version of the draft Act

24

24

provided for a maximum equity capital of €500,000) at the

time the shares are acquired. The shares must not be held

for more than 15 years; after an Initial Public Offering (IPO)

shares must not be held for more than three years. Further,

the shareholding of the venture capital company in the

target company is limited to 90 percent. No specific

requirements apply to the target company in terms of

company purpose (for example, new technology).

The draft Venture Capital Act contains the measures that

apply at the level of: (1) the venture capital company; (2) the

management of the venture capital company; and (3) the

target company.

1. Level of venture capital company

a. Legal form

Private equity funds (PEFs) are mostly organised in the form

of a limited liability partnership with a corporation as

general partner, the investors being limited liability partners

(GmbH & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft, KG). To avoid liability

to trade tax being triggered merely because of the

participation of the GmbH, the statutes generally provide

that a limited liability partner may manage the partnership

instead of or in addition to the GmbH. If the management

were left exclusively to the GmbH or a third party, merely

because of its legal structure, the partnership would be

deemed to be carrying on commercial business irrespective

of whether it actually administered property.

If a limited liability partnership is not deemed to be carrying

on commercial business because of its legal structure, the

activity of the partnership may be regarded as either the

administration of property (Vermögensverwaltung) or

commercial business (gewerbliche Tätigkeit). The criteria for

determining whether a partnership is to be deemed to be

administering property or carrying on commercial business

are set out in the administrative ordinance of December 16,

2003 (Einkommensteuerliche Behandlung von Venture

Capital und Private Equity Fonds; Abgrenzung der privaten

Vermögensverwaltung vom Gewerbebetrieb). A partnership

is deemed to be administering private property if its activity

is concentrated on the generation of capital yields. The

assumption that a partnership is carrying on a commercial

business, on the other hand, requires the existence of an

ongoing activity undertaken to generate profits and

participation in the market. This requirement is deemed to

be met, for example, if an office is maintained and funds

are loaned rather than capital being used. Accordingly, if

PEF finances the acquisition of the shares in the target

company out of its own funds it may qualify as

administering property if certain other conditions are met.

On the other hand, PEF will be deemed to carry on a

commercial business if it participates in a partnership that

itself carries on a commercial business (a “double layer”

partnership). From this it follows that PEF should acquire

shares in a corporation rather than a commercial

partnership, which would “taint” PEF.

b. Exemption from trade tax

To encourage investment in German target companies,

venture capital companies are to be exempted from

German trade tax irrespective of whether they administer

property or carry on a commercial business. Under existing

law, companies that carry on commercial business activities

are subject to trade tax whether they are organised as a

corporation or a partnership. However, trade tax does not

apply to partnerships that merely administer property. The

exemption from trade tax of all partnerships, whether they

administer property or carry on a commercial business,

would be an important improvement. In that respect, the

draft Venture Capital Act would follow the

recommendations of the research paper prepared by the

University of Munich, but only for venture capital companies

organised as partnerships and not for other private equity

companies or corporations.

c. Avoidance of taxation at partnership level – transparency

principle

Venture capital companies are not taxed if they are

organised as a partnership that, in accordance with

German tax principles, is not treated as a taxable subject

but as a transparent entity. Income generated by

partnerships that qualify as administering property is taxed

in the hands of their partners and according to the tax

status of the partners, i.e., as either private capital gains,

dividends or business income. On the other hand, if a

partnership carries on a commercial business, the income

attributable to its partners and taxable in their hands is

always regarded as income from trade or business. This

means, for example, that capital gains from the sale of

shares are taxable, currently at the rate of 50 percent and,

after 2008, at the rate of 60 percent. Under the draft

Venture Capital Act, a venture capital company organised

as a partnership would always be deemed to administer

property.

d. Exemption for corporations

Under existing law, capital gains from the sale of a

shareholding in a corporation are exempt from tax, except

that 5 percent of the income is deemed to be

non-deductible expenses related to tax exempt income if

the seller is a corporation. Dividends distributed by one

corporation to another are taxed in a similar manner.

Consequently, 95 percent of capital gains from the sale of

shares in a corporation and 95 percent of dividends are tax

exempt. In this respect, the draft Act provides no additional

relief.

2. Level of management

Under the existing rules, profits distributed by the target

company to the managers of a PEF (that qualifies as

administering property) after profits are distributed to the

remaining shareholders (“carried interest”) are 50 percent

tax-exempt. The draft Venture Capital Act reduces this

exemption to 40 percent. However, the 40 percent

exemption is not confined to managers of companies that

qualify as administering property, but is also available to

managers of partnerships that carry on a commercial

business.

3. Level of target company

The draft Company Tax Act 2008 (Unternehmenssteuer-

reformgesetz 2008) provides for a further tightening of

the provision governing corporations’ utilisation of

losses, in particular through the acquisition of shell

companies. Currently, a corporation can no longer use its

losses to offset profits if it loses its identity. A loss of

identity is assumed to occur if more than 50 percent of

the shares in the corporation are transferred and the

corporation continues or restarts its business with

25

Germany

25

predominantly new business assets. Generally, as of

2008, merely the direct or indirect transfer of the

requisite percentage of shares and similar transactions

will prevent losses being utilised. Because the intended

amendment of the loss utilisation rule would affect

start-up companies, the draft Venture Capital Act

excludes target companies from its scope of application.

If a venture capital company acquires shares in a target

company, losses are not forfeited but can be used over a

period of five years if the venture company holds the

shares for at least four years.

To prevent the abuse of the new rules, the draft Venture

Capital Act requires formal admission of venture capital

companies by the Federal Agency for Financial Services

Supervision (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungs-

aufsicht or BaFin) and control.

Lobbying groups (including the Liberal Party), and the

research paper of the Technical University of Munich,

argued for the extension of the tax privileges described

above, in particular the general exemption from trade tax,

to all private equity funds, including those that do not meet

the requirements for qualifying as venture capital

companies. This demand is not (currently) met in the draft

Venture Capital Act because of the estimated loss of tax

revenue. However, the tax allowance granted with respect

to capital gains from the sale of shareholdings amounting to

1 percent or more of a corporation’s capital is to be

increased from €9,060 to €20,000 for “business angels”.

Finally, it should be noted that, on May 31, 2007, the

Federal Ministry of Finance published a decree explaining

that management services would be subject to German

value added tax (VAT). This administrative decree has,

however, been revoked.

II. Basic German tax planning for a privateequity fund

A. Investment in a German business entity

With respect to an investment by PEF (which is not a

venture capital company) in a German business entity

(HBE), there follows a discussion, separately with respect to

each of the investors, of the preferred structure for German

income tax purposes. The discussion takes into account

the amendments to the Income Tax Act made by the

Business Tax Reform Act 2008. The Business Tax Reform

Act 2008 has been approved by the two chambers of

German Parliament and will become effective as of January

1, 2008.

The preferred structure and its tax implications can be

summarised as follows:

■ HBE should be organised as a corporation.

■ PEF should be organised as a partnership that

administers property instead of carrying on a commercial

business.

■ Assuming that PEF receives capital gains, dividends or

interest from the sale of shares in HBE it does not

matter whether PEF is formed under German law or

foreign law.

■ If PEF administers property and does not carry on a

commercial business, it does not matter whether PEF

has its management office in Germany or elsewhere.

■ A German individual (HI) or a foreign individual (FI) should

make investments in PEF directly and not through a

corporation.

■ If a corporation is interposed between HI/FI and PEF

(indirect investment), it no longer matters whether PEF is

organised as a partnership that administers property or

one that carries on a commercial business. Retaining

profits at the level of the interposed corporation could be

used to defer tax, particularly from 2008, when the

corporate tax rate will be reduced.

■ FI may prefer to invest in a PEF that administers property

in order to avoid any tax liability in Germany as a partner

in a commercial partnership who is deemed to have a

permanent establishment (PE) in Germany, as well as the

withholding tax on dividends that would be imposed were

PEF to be organised as a corporation or were a

corporation to be interposed. Capital gains and dividends

will generally be taxable abroad and not subject to tax in

Germany (subject in the case of dividends, to the

imposition of withholding tax) if there is an applicable tax

treaty between Germany and FI’s country of residence.

■ If the investor is a corporation, including a pension fund

that is organised as a German stock corporation, and

PEF a partnership administering property, capital gains

and dividends are 95 percent tax exempt. In applying a

fractional approach, the assets of a partnership that

administers property are attributed to the partners in

proportion to their interests in the partnership, so that a

corporate investor, including a pension fund, may also

prefer to have the PEF organised as a partnership

administering property rather than as a corporation or a

commercial partnership.

■ If the investor is a foreign corporation and there is a tax

treaty between Germany and the foreign corporate

investor’s country of residence, capital gains and

dividends will generally be taxable in the foreign country

and not in Germany (subject in the case of dividends to

the possible imposition of German withholding tax) if

PEF is organised as a partnership administering private

property or as a corporation. Such an investor may

therefore prefer PEF to be structured as a partnership

that administers private property or a corporation rather

than as a partnership carrying on a commercial

business.

■ Assuming that the investment does not constitute

governmental activity, the same rules will apply to an

investment of the government in PEF as would apply if

the investor were an individual holding a participation in a

PEF that carries on commercial business.

■ The remarks in the previous bullet will also apply if the

investor is a foreign government (FGOV).

In light of the above, the overall preferred structure for the

purpose of minimising taxation under Germany’s income

tax law and taking into account all the different kinds of

investors would be to have PEF organised as a

partnership that administers property. If PEF were so

organised, there would be only one level of tax, the nature

Germany

26

26

of that tax being determined by the individual tax status of

each investor.

1. Preferred structure for a German individual

a. Private equity fund is a partnership administering property

German individual holds a direct interest in private equity fund

In such a structure there would be only one level of tax – at

the level of HBE, which is taxed as a corporation.

HBE is currently subject to corporate income tax at the rate

of 25 percent (plus 5.5 percent solidarity surcharge) and to

trade tax, the rate of which varies depending on the

leverage rate applied by the respective municipality where

HBE has its registered seat. The combined tax burden is

40.863 percent if one assumes a municipal leverage rate of

490 percent (which applies, for example, in Munich) and

34.263 percent if one assumes a municipal leverage rate of

240 percent (which applies for, example, in Grünwald, a

small town just outside of Munich).

Under the Business Reform Tax Act, the corporate tax rate

will be reduced from 25 percent to 15 percent, so that the

rate of corporate income tax including the solidarity

surcharge will be 15.83 percent. Unlike under the current

law, from 2008 trade tax will no longer be treated as a

deductible business expense but the basic trade tax

multiplier will be reduced from 5 percent to 3.5 percent.

Thus, the total tax burden will be 32.975 percent (assuming

a municipal leverage rate of 490 percent) and 24.225

percent (assuming a municipal leverage rate of 240

percent).

If PEF disposes of its participation in the target company,

the capital gains thereon are tax exempt under the existing

law, assuming that HI’s indirect shareholding in HBE is less

than 1 percent of HBE’s equity capital, is held as private

property and is held for more than one year.

Under the Business Tax Reform Act 2008, as of January

2009, “private” capital gains will no longer be tax exempt.

Instead, a flat 25 percent rate of taxation of (plus 5.5

percent solidarity surcharge, giving an effective rate of

26.375 percent) will apply to a shareholding acquired after

December 31, 2008 if there is a shareholding of less than 1

percent held as a private asset. The flat rate taxation does

not require the asset to have been held for a particular (for

example, one year) period.

In the scenario envisaged, no trade tax is levied on PEF

because PEF administers property and does not carry on a

commercial business.

Interest would, generally, be subject to the same flat rate

taxation of 25 percent (plus solidarity surcharge). However,

under anti-abuse rules, flat rate taxation does not apply in

certain circumstances (for example, if the interest is paid in

connection with a loan agreement among related parties, if

the interest is paid by a corporation to a shareholder

holding 1 percent or more of the corporation’s capital, or if

the interest is attributable to independent services, letting

or renting, etc.) In such circumstances, interest payments

made by HBE to PEF would be taxed at the regular tax

rate, which is currently 45 percent (plus solidarity

surcharge, giving an effective rate of 47.475 percent).

If PEF is a foreign partnership that, after being evaluated by

the German revenue authorities, is deemed to administer

property and that does not have a PE abroad, the tax

consequences for HI would be the same as the

consequences of investing in a domestic PEF. Capital gains

from the disposal of a shareholding are generally taxed in

the alienator’s country of residence (in accordance with

Article 13(5) of the OECD Model Convention), in this case

Germany. The same rule generally applies to dividends. If

dividends are subject to withholding tax in the country of

source, the foreign tax paid is generally creditable against

the German tax payable on the (foreign-source) dividends.

German individual holds an indirect interest in private equity fund

The interposed corporation is currently subject to corporate

income tax and trade tax at the combined effective rate of

40.863 percent (490 percent municipal leverage rate) or

34.263 (240 percent municipal leverage rate). With effect

from 2008, these rates will fall to, respectively, 32.975

percent and 24.225 percent, as explained above.

The income received by the interposed corporation is also

subject to trade tax; the trade tax exclusion which applies

to a shareholding in a commercial business does not apply

because the PEF is structured as a partnership which

administers property and does not carry on a commercial

business.

Capital gains derived by the interposed corporation from

the alienation of shares in HBE held indirectly by PEF are

tax exempt to the extent of 95 percent (see above). The

exemption also applies for trade tax purposes. Capital

gains are thus currently taxed at the effective rate of 2.043

percent (490 percent municipal leverage rate) or 1.713

percent (240 percent municipal leverage rate), and will be

taxed with effect from 2008 at the rate of 1.649 percent

(490 percent municipal leverage rate) or 1.211 percent (240

percent municipal leverage rate). Interest received is

currently taxed at the rate of 40.863 percent (490 percent

municipal leverage rate) or 34.263 percent (240 percent

municipal leverage rate) and will be taxed at the rate of 32.

975 percent (490 percent municipal leverage rate) or

24.225 percent (240 percent municipal leverage rate) after

the Business Tax Reform Act 2008 enters into effect. Thus

it can be seen that the amendments made by the Business

Tax Reform Act 2008 are beneficial to the interposed

corporation. Because of the reduced tax burden on

corporations, retaining profits in the corporation will have a

tax deferral effect.

Distributions made on or after January 1, 2009 will no

longer be subject to the “half income” regime under which

the tax rate is effectively 23.738 percent (investor’s marginal

tax rate of 45 percent plus 5.5 percent solidarity surcharge

on half of the dividends) but to a flat rate of 26.375 percent

(25 percent income tax plus 5.5 percent solidarity

surcharge on the full amount of the gross dividends). From

this it follows that, when the interposed corporation

distributes capital gains to HI, there will be an increase in

HI’s tax burden from 25.296 percent (490 percent municipal

leverage rate) or 25.044 percent (240 percent municipal

leverage rate) to 27.589 percent (490 percent municipal

leverage rate) or 27.267 percent (240 percent municipal

leverage rate), respectively.

Interest payments derived by the interposed corporation will

benefit from the amendments made by the Business Tax

Reform Act. Such payments are currently taxed at the rate

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Germany

27

of 54.901 percent (490 percent municipal leverage rate) or

49.868 percent (240 percent municipal leverage rate) and,

as of 2008, will be taxed at the rate of 50.653 percent (490

percent municipal leverage rate) or 44.211 percent (240

percent municipal leverage rate).

If the interposed corporation were to hold an interest in a

foreign PEF that is organised as a partnership that

administers property and does not have a PE abroad, the

tax consequences would be the same as described above

(i.e., where the interposed corporation holds an interest in a

domestic PEF), assuming that generally no taxes are levied

in the foreign country where the foreign PEF is resident.

b. Private equity fund is a partnership carrying on commercial

business

German individual holds a direct interest in private equity fund

Unlike a partnership that administers property, a German

commercial partnership is subject to trade tax which,

however, can be offset against the income tax payable by

HI as an investor.

Unlike those derived by a partnership that administers

property, capital gains derived by a commercial partnership

are not exempt from tax but (currently) are taxed under the

“half income” regime. Interest is fully taxable. As of 2008,

dividends will be exempted to the extent of only 40 percent

(“partial income” procedure) instead of, as currently, to the

extent of 50 percent, to take into account the reduction in

the corporate income tax rate from 25 percent (plus

solidarity surcharge) to 15 percent (plus solidarity

surcharge).

The result is that capital gains will be taxed with effect from

2008 at a rate of 30.356 percent (490 percent municipal

leverage rate) or 28.208 percent (240 percent municipal

leverage rate) (as compared with the current rate of 23.821

percent or 20.900 percent, respectively).

Interest is currently taxed at a rate of 47.643 percent (490

percent municipal leverage rate) or 41.799 percent (240

percent municipal leverage rate). As of 2008, the tax rate

increases to 50.594 percent (490 percent municipal

leverage rate) or 47.013 percent (240 percent municipal

leverage rate). The reason for the rate increase is that, as of

2008, a marginal income tax rate of 45 percent applies not

only to high net worth individuals but also entrepreneurs

(“Reichensteuer” or the “rich persons’ tax”), instead of the

regular marginal income tax rate of 42 percent.

If PEF were a foreign partnership, it would not be subject to

German trade tax. With effect from 2008, the rate of tax on

capital gains in the hands of HI would increase from 22.155

percent by 6.33 percentage points to 28.485 percent, as

only 40 percent of the capital gains would be exempt from

tax (as opposed to the current 50 percent). With effect from

2008, interest would be taxed at the rate of 47.475 percent

as compared to the current rate of 44.31 percent, an

increase of 3.165 percentage points, attributable to the

increase in the marginal tax rate applying to high net worth

individuals from 42 percent to 45 percent (see above).

German individual holds an indirect interest in private equity fund

The tax consequences would be the same as those where

an indirect investment is made in a PEF that administers

property, because the interposed corporation is subject to

corporate income tax and trade tax (see Section II.A.1.a.,

above).

c. Private equity fund is a corporation

German individual holds a direct interest in private equity fund

Where PEF is organised as a corporation, capital gains that

it derives from the alienation of shares in HBE are tax

exempt to the extent of 95 percent (see Section II.A.1.a.,

above). The exemption also applies for trade tax purposes.

The total tax burden, depending on where the company has

its registered seat, is currently 40.863 percent (490 percent

municipal leverage rate) or 34.263 percent (240 percent

municipal leverage rate) and will be 32.975 percent (490

percent municipal leverage rate) or 24.225 percent (240

percent municipal leverage rate) respectively, when the

Business Tax Reform Act 2008 enters into effect. Capital

gains are thus currently taxed at the rate of 2.043 percent

(490 percent municipal leverage rate) or 1.713 percent (240

percent municipal leverage rate) and, with effect from 2008,

will be taxed at the rate of 1.649 percent (490 percent

municipal leverage rate) or 1.211 percent (240 percent

municipal leverage rate) respectively.

Interest is currently taxed at the rate of 40.863 percent (490

percent municipal leverage rate) or 34.263 percent (240

percent municipal leverage rate) and, with effect from 2008,

will be taxed at the rate of 32.975 percent (490 percent

municipal leverage rate) or 24.225 percent (240 percent

municipal leverage rate) respectively.

Because of the reduced tax burden on corporations,

retaining profits in the corporation will have a tax deferral

effect.

Distributions made on or after January 1, 2009 will no

longer be taxed using the “half income” procedure, but will

be taxed at the flat rate of 26.375 percent (25 percent

income tax plus 5.5 percent solidarity surcharge on the full

amount of the gross dividends). From this it follows that,

when the corporation (PEF) distributes capital gains to HI,

there will be an increase in HI’s tax burden from 25.296

percent (490 percent municipal leverage rate) or 25.044

percent (240 percent municipal leverage rate) to 27.589

percent (490 percent municipal leverage rate) or 27.267

percent (240 percent municipal leverage rate), respectively,

as explained above.

In certain circumstances (i.e., where there is a low level of

taxation in the corporation’s country of residence and it has

“income with a capital investment character” – “Einkünfte

mit Kapitalanlagecharackter”), German sub-part F-type

legislation (Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung nach AStG) may

apply to interest payments derived by PEF, if PEF is a

corporation not resident in the European Union or the

European Economic Area; this legislation does not,

however, apply to dividends.

German individual holds an indirect interest in private equity fund

An interposed corporation would benefit from the reduction

of the trade tax with effect from 2008 with respect to

distributions made to it by a PEF organised as a

corporation, as generally it would not meet the requirement

for such dividends to be exempt from trade tax (i.e., holding

a participation of at least 10 percent in PEF). Dividends are

currently taxed at the rate of 40.303 percent (490 percent

Germany

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municipal leverage rate) or 33.376 percent (240 percent

municipal leverage rate) and, with effect from 2008, will be

taxed at the rate of 40.007 percent (490 percent municipal

leverage rate) or 33.215 percent (240 percent municipal

leverage rate) respectively. However, as capital gains would

constitute the main part of the corporation’s income, the

benefit from the decrease in the rate of trade tax would be

minor.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

a. Private equity fund is a partnership administering property

Foreign individual holds a direct interest in private equity fund

Assuming that FI’s indirect shareholding is less than 1

percent of HBE’s equity capital, neither capital gains arising

from the sale of shares by PEF nor interest paid by HBE to

PEF are subject to German tax, irrespective of the

existence of an applicable tax treaty, because there is no

provision allowing such income to be taxed within the

framework of limited tax liability.

The introduction of the flat rate taxation of capital gains as

provided for in the Business Tax Reform Act 2008 should

not have a negative impact on foreign investors. In addition,

the reduction of the corporate income tax rate from 25

percent (plus solidarity surcharge) to 15 percent (plus

solidarity surcharge) should make investment more

attractive to foreign investors after the Business Tax Reform

2008 takes effect.

Foreign individual holds an indirect interest in private equity fund

FI should be able to benefit from the lower tax burden to

which the interposed corporation is subject. The

disadvantages resulting from the abolition of the “half

income” regime and the introduction of flat rate taxation

should generally not affect FI, who will be taxed on

dividends and interest in his country of residence if there is

an applicable tax treaty between Germany and that country,

unless FI’s shareholding in the interposed corporation were

to be attributable to a German PE of FI.

However, dividends distributed by the interposed German

corporation would be subject to German withholding tax,

currently at the rate of 20 percent (plus 5.5 percent

solidarity surcharge) and, with effect from 2008, at the rate

of 25 percent (plus solidarity surcharge). Where there is an

applicable tax treaty between Germany and FI’s country of

residence, the withholding tax rate will generally be reduced

to 15 percent (including solidarity surcharge) and the

withholding tax will generally be creditable against FI’s tax

liability in his country of residence.

b. Private equity fund is a partnership carrying on commercial

business

Foreign individual holds a direct interest in private equity fund

FI would be subject to German tax irrespective of the

existence of an applicable tax treaty between Germany and

FI’s country of residence, because FI would be deemed to

have a German PE. In these circumstances the tax

consequences would be the same as those for HI (see

Section II.A.1.b., above).

Foreign individual holds an indirect interest in private equity fund

The tax consequences would be the same as those where

an indirect investment is made in a PEF that administers

property, because the interposed corporation is subject to

corporate income tax and trade tax (see Section II.A.2.a.,

above).

c. Private equity fund is a corporation

Foreign individual holds a direct interest in private equity fund

FI should be able to benefit from the lower tax burden to

which a PEF organised as a corporation is subject. The

disadvantages resulting from the abolition of the “half

income” regime and the introduction of flat rate taxation

should not affect FI, who will be taxed on dividends and

interest in his country of residence if there is an applicable

tax treaty between Germany and that country.

However, dividends distributed by a PEF organised as a

corporation would be subject to German withholding tax,

currently at the rate of 20 percent (plus 5.5 percent

solidarity surcharge) and, with effect from 2008, at the rate

of 25 percent (plus solidarity surcharge). Where there is an

applicable tax treaty between Germany and FI’s country of

residence, the withholding tax rate will generally be reduced

to 15 percent (including solidarity surcharge) and the

withholding tax will generally be creditable against FI’s tax

liability in his country of residence.

Interest payments derived by a PEF organised as a

corporation would benefit from the amendments made by

the Business Tax Reform Act 2008. Currently, such

payments are taxed at the rate of 54.901 percent (490

percent municipal leverage rate) or 49.868 percent (240

percent municipal leverage rate). As of 2008, they will be

taxed at the rate of 50.653 percent (490 percent municipal

leverage rate) or 44.211 percent (240 percent municipal

leverage rate).

3. Preferred structure for a German pension fund

German pension funds are generally organised as stock

corporations. If HPEN is organised as a German stock

corporation and PEF as a partnership administering

property, capital gains and dividends will be 95 percent tax

exempt. In applying a fractional approach, the assets of a

partnership that administers property are attributed to the

partners in proportion to their interests in the partnership,

so that HPEN may prefer to have the PEF organised as a

partnership administering property rather than as a

corporation or a commercial partnership.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The tax consequences would be the same as those where

the investment is made by FI (see Section II.A.2.a., above).

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

A distinction is made between the circumstances in which

FGOV is carrying on governmental activities and those in

which it is participating in the market in the same way a

private company would. Assuming that the investment does

not constitute governmental activity, the same rules will

apply to an investment of FGOV in PEF as would apply if

the investor were a foreign individual holding a participation

in a PEF that carries on commercial business.

B. Investment in a foreign business entity

Assuming FBE is organised as a corporation, the tax

consequences would be the same as those described at

Section II.A., above. Capital gains from the sale of shares in

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29

a corporation are taxed in the same manner, irrespective of

whether the corporation is a domestic or a foreign

corporation, provided there is an applicable tax treaty

between Germany and the foreign country concerned. The

same holds true in relation to the taxation of dividends. The

foreign withholding tax would be creditable against the

German tax liability. Interest would also be taxable in

Germany as the investor’s country of residence. The tax

consequences would therefore differ, depending on

whether PEF was taxed as a German property

administering partnership or as a commercial partnership or

was organised as a corporation.

If FBE were to be organised as a partnership, the German

investor or, respectively an interposed corporation, would

be deemed to generate foreign-source business income

that would generally be taxable abroad and exempt in

Germany as the investor’s country of residence.

C. Overall preferred structure

In light of the above discussion, the overall preferred

structure for the purpose of minimising taxation under

Germany’s income tax law, taking into account the various

investors and PEF’s investments in both HBE and FBE,

would be to have PEF organised as partnership that

administers property. If PEF were so organised, there would

be only one level of tax, the nature of that tax being

determined by the individual tax status of each investor.

III. Basic German tax planning for a hedgefund

The rules for the taxation of income derived through hedge

funds are set out in the Investment Act and apply to

domestic and foreign funds alike.

There are three distinct levels relevant to the taxation of the

holder of a unit in a fund: (1) the capital investment

corporation (Kapitalanlagegesellschaft); (2) the special fund

(Sondervermögen); and (3) the unit holder

(Anteilscheininhaber).

A special fund qualifies as corporation but is exempted

from corporate tax, so that capital gains and dividends

derived by the special fund are taxed in accordance with

the rules that would apply had the unit holder invested

directly and derived the income himself (transparency

principle). The same rules apply where the investor returns

or sells the units he holds, so that in these circumstances

the investor will be taxed on an “intermediate gain”

(Zwischengewinn), which has the effect of taxing interest

that the fund received during the fiscal year concerned.

The investor is taxed on distributions and on distributable

income that is deemed to have been received at the end of

the fiscal year in which the income was generated; the

latter, however, currently does not include capital gains

from the sale of shares. Similarly, capital gains are exempt

from tax if actually distributed to the unit holder. However,

unit holders who hold their investment as a business asset

(i.e., single entrepreneurs, partnerships or corporations) are

excluded from the exemption for capital gains. Such unit

holders are taxable on capital gains in accordance with the

generally applicable rules, (i.e., they are taxable on half

(after the entry into effect of the Business Tax Reform Act

2008, 60 percent) of the capital gains, or in the case of

corporations, they are entitled to an exemption to the

extent of 95 percent of the capital gains). The receipt of

taxable income triggers trade tax.

Where a fund derives foreign-source income, such income

is tax exempt at the level of the fund if it would have been

exempted from German tax under an applicable tax treaty

had the unit holder derived the respective income directly.

Foreign taxes paid by the fund can be credited by the unit

holder against his income tax payable, except to the extent

that the income concerned is exempt from German tax;

thus, foreign withholding tax on foreign-source dividends

only 50 percent of which are taxable is only creditable at

the rate of 50 percent.

The income constitutes either business income or

investment income in the hands of the unit holder. Where

the fund is a foreign fund organised as a corporation, the

income would be taxed as either dividends or capital gains.

To summarise, although the fundamental rules governing

the taxation of hedge funds are similar to those governing

the taxation of a PEF organised as a partnership

administering property, there are some disadvantageous

differences, for example, in relation to the deductibility of

expenses.

IV. German income taxation of income from acarried interest

With regard to income from a carried interest that exceeds

the profit share attributable to Savvy’s interest in PEF, Savvy

cannot benefit from the (current) exemption of capital gains

from the sale of private assets (as of 2009, flat rate

taxation) or the (current) “half income” procedure (as of

2009, “partial income” procedure) or the 95 percent

exemption applying to dividends. Currently, 50 percent of

income from a carried interest is taxed at the ordinary rate;

the 50 percent exemption will be reduced to 40 percent as

of 2008, but the exemption will apply (under the draft

Venture Capital Companies Act) irrespective of whether

Savvy manages a PEF that is organised as a partnership

that administers property or as a partnership that carries on

a commercial business. This rule would not apply to income

from services Savvy renders to a hedge fund (i.e., as

counsel). Consequently such income would be fully taxable

at the ordinary rate.

Germany

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30

Host CountryITALY

Carlo GalliMaisto e Associati, Milan and London

Carlo Galli is a partner with Maisto e Associati and has

been practising Italian tax law in the Milan and London

offices of the firm since 1995, after having worked for

two years as a research associate at the IBFD in

Amsterdam.

I. Introduction

This paper will discuss possible structures involving the

establishment of domestic and “foreign” investment vehicles.

In relation to a “foreign” investment vehicle, it is important to

be aware of who makes the necessary investment decisions

and where those decisions are made, as these factors can

have a significant impact on where the vehicle is regarded as

a resident for tax purposes. In the scenario under

consideration, it is assumed that Savvy is an Italian person

and that Savvy makes the investment decisions for PEF. For

performing this function, Savvy is remunerated by way of a 20

percent carried interest.

Where Italy is the host country and PEF is structured as a foreign

investment vehicle, the question arises whether the residence of

PEF for tax purposes would be deemed to be in its jurisdiction of

establishment or in Italy, where the effective place of

management of PEF would be located. In this connection, it

should be noted that, under Italian tax law, a foreign entity (such

as a private equity fund established under foreign law) that

controls an Italian entity (such as HBE) will be deemed to be a

resident of Italy for tax purposes, unless proof to the contrary is

provided, if it is either: (i) controlled, directly or indirectly, by an

Italian resident person; or (ii) managed by a management body,

the majority of which consists of Italian resident persons.

Applying this rule to the scenario under consideration, if PEF is

established under foreign law and actually managed and

controlled by Savvy and if PEF holds the majority of the voting

rights in HBE, PEF may be regarded as a resident of Italy for tax

purposes unless proof to the contrary is provided. Such proof

could take the form of documentation showing that PEF is

actually managed and controlled outside Italy, but this would not

be the case if Savvy were to make the investment decisions.

Traditionally, in cases where the investment knowledge was (at

least partially) derived from individuals operating in Italy, their

contribution would be provided in the form of an advisory

function carried out for the benefit of the body that had the actual

power to make the investment decisions (typically the governing

body of the management company). The governing body would

normally convene outside Italy to make necessary investment

decisions. However, it should be noted that such arrangements

have sometimes been misused to conceal the reality that what is

labelled an advisory function is, as a matter of fact, a

decision-making function. The Italian tax authorities are aware of

such practices and are increasingly challenging the foreign

residency status of vehicles used to invest into Italy.

Notwithstanding the above discussion, unless otherwise

specified, it should be assumed for purposes of this paper that,

where a foreign investment vehicle is referred to, the relevant

investment decisions are actually and predominantly made

outside Italy.

II. Basic Italian tax planning for a privateequity fund

A. Investment in an Italian business entity

1. Preferred structure for an Italian individual

From the perspective of HI, the main alternatives would be to

invest in HBE through a domestic or foreign entity or through a

domestic or foreign collective investment undertaking.

If the investment is made through an entity (including a

partnership), the tax consequences for HI will normally be the

same whether the entity is domestic or foreign (provided it is not

established in a tax haven jurisdiction). It would be unusual for

PEF to be structured as a domestic partnership since domestic

partnerships are treated for tax purposes on a look-through

basis. Foreign partnerships, on the other hand, are invariably

regarded as “opaque” entities, and thus treated for tax purposes

in the same way as foreign companies with legal personality.

If PEF is structured as an Italian company (or as a foreign

partnership or company), HI will be subject to the following tax

regime:

■ If HI’s investment interest does not represent more than

20 percent of the voting rights or 25 percent of the capital

of the investment vehicle, both dividends and capital

gains derived by HI would be subject to a 12.5 percent

substitute tax (the rate of the substitute tax may be

increased to 20 percent under the reforms that are to be

introduced by the current Government).

■ If HI’s investment interest exceeds the above percentage

thresholds, dividends and capital gains derived by HI

would be included in HI’s taxable income subject to

individual income tax at progressive rates (of, currently, up

to 43 percent), but only to the extent of 40 percent of the

respective amount of such dividends and gains, resulting

in a maximum effective rate of 17.2 percent (again, the

projected reform of the taxation of the investment income

of individuals might harmonise the taxation of dividends

and gains at a flat rate of 20 percent).

As noted earlier, the above regime applies regardless of whether

the entity is established in Italy or abroad (provided it is not

established in a tax haven). Hence, any additional layer of

taxation (for example, at the level of PEF on gains and

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31

distributions derived by the PEF with respect to its investment in

HBE) would constitute tax leakage from the perspective of HI. If

PEF is structured as an Italian company, any gains realised on the

disposal of its shares in HBE, assuming that the shares qualify for

the participation exemption, will be subject to corporation tax (at

the rate of 33 percent) on 16 percent of the amount of the gains,

resulting in an effective rate of 5.28 percent. Dividends distributed

by HBE to PEF will be subject to corporation tax (at the rate of 33

percent) on 5 percent of the amount of the dividends, resulting in

an effective rate of 1.65 percent. Distributions made by PEF to HI

will not be subject to withholding tax, dividends and gains at the

level of HI being subject to the tax regime described above. For

this reason, having PEF organised as an Italian company might

create tax leakage for HI.

For the same reason, it might be advisable to have PEF

organised as a foreign entity established (and resident for tax

purposes) in an E.U. jurisdiction that has concluded a tax

treaty with Italy. In principle, this would have the effect that

dividends and gains derived with respect to PEF’s investment

in HBE would be exempt from Italian tax, and that PEF would

benefit in its country of residence from a participation

exemption regime. For this reason, Luxembourg is often the

jurisdiction of choice for establishing a PEF the purpose of

which includes investing in Italian target companies, although

in these circumstances due care needs to be exercised with

regard to the potential withholding tax on distributions made

by PEF to its investors (for example, HI).

Having PEF structured as a company or partnership in a tax

haven jurisdiction would be detrimental for HI if his share of

the (direct) participation in PEF was in excess of 20 percent,

since: (1) the controlled foreign company (CFC) rules would

apply; and (2) the exemptions referred to above would not be

applicable, with the consequence that distributions made by,

and gains on the disposal of the shares of, the PEF would be

fully subject to individual income tax at progressive rates (of

up to 43 percent) in the hands of HI.1

The tax regime described above applies provided the foreign

PEF is regarded as a foreign “entity” and not as a foreign

collective investment undertaking (such as a mutual fund).

The distinction is significant because, if the investment is

regarded as parts of a collective investment undertaking, and

if, as is assumed, the vehicle does not fall within the scope of

the EC “UCITS” Directive:2

■ Income derived from distributions and the portion of the

gain arising from the sale or redemption of the units

corresponding to an increase in the net asset value of the

fund, would be fully subject to personal income tax in the

hands of the investor at progressive rates (of, currently,

up to 43 percent); and

■ To the extent they are not covered by the previous bullet,

capital gains would be subject to a 12.5 percent

substitute tax.

For tax purposes, no specific characterisation rules apply in this

context. In the case of Italian vehicles, the position is

straightforward, as the tax characterisation follows the legal

system, which clearly identifies what types of vehicles are to be

treated as collective investment vehicles for legal and regulatory

purposes. The position is more complicated in the case of certain

foreign established vehicles. Foreign vehicles legally set up as

collective investment undertakings and subject to regulatory

control in their jurisdiction of establishment will be treated as

collective investment undertakings for Italian tax purposes and

the relevant income and gains taxed accordingly. On the other

hand, foreign holding companies will be treated as entities. The

characterisation is not so straightforward in the case of a foreign

vehicle that combines the features of an entity (such as a

company or partnership) with those of a collective investment

undertaking (for example, the investors having very limited

powers as compared to shareholders in a company or the

existence of some degree of regulatory control) – for example, a

foreign partnership acting as an investment fund or a

Luxembourg SICAR. In such cases, as a matter of practice,

reference is made to the regime that would apply for regulatory

purposes to the placement of the investment units of such

vehicles on the Italian market. If, based on a regulatory analysis,

the marketing of the units (or shares, or partnership interest, etc.)

would be subject to the regime applicable to the marketing of the

units of a collective investment vehicle, the units would also be

regarded as units in a collective investment vehicle for tax

purposes. If, conversely, the marketing of the units would be

subject to the regime applicable to the marketing of shares of

companies, the same characterisation would be followed for tax

purposes.

Another alternative that might be considered would be to have

PEF established as an Italian (regulated) closed-ended

investment fund3 (a “Closed-Ended Fund”). Such a fund would

be subject to regulatory control and would be managed by a

qualified management company (società di gestione delrisparmio) that would also be subject to regulatory control. Such

features and the associated costs have traditionally dissuaded

sponsors from arranging a private equity fund using a

Closed-Ended Fund, although resistance to such arrangements

has progressively been disappearing and this form of collective

investment undertaking is being increasingly used for private

equity initiatives managed by Italians.

A Closed-Ended Fund organised in the way envisaged would be

subject to a 12.5 percent substitute tax on the yearly

appreciation in its net asset value (i.e., on distributions and gains

on investments, including its investment in HBE).4 Distributions

made by the fund to HI would not be subject to tax in the hands

of the investor. Moreover, capital gains on the disposal of the

units in the fund would not be subject to tax to the extent they

represent appreciation in the fund that has already been

subjected to a 12.5 percent substitute tax imposed at the level of

the fund. Any excess gain would be subject to a 12.5 percent

substitute tax.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

As the Italian tax system does not “look through” PEF (unless

PEF is organised as a domestic partnership, which would not be

tax-efficient), the choice of structure for an investment of FI to

invest in HBE must be optimised at the level of PEF.

Because of the tax leakage discussed at Section II.A.1., above,

using an Italian company as PEF would not be the most efficient

structure for FI. Moreover, if FI were to invest directly in PEF

where PEF was an Italian company, distributions made by PEF to

FI would be subject to withholding tax. Such withholding tax

might be reduced, but would never be entirely eliminated, under

an applicable tax treaty.

An alternative that might be considered would be to structure

PEF as a Closed-Ended Fund (see Section II.A.1., above). In

this case, if FI was resident for tax purposes in a “white-listed”

jurisdiction (which includes all Italy’s treaty partners, with the

exception of Switzerland), FI would be entitled to a (tax-free)

Italy

32

32

payment by the management company equal to 15 percent of

the amount of the distribution made by PEF to FI, the

payment to compensate for the 12.5 percent substitute tax

imposed at the level of the fund.

3. Preferred structure for an Italian pension fund

Italian pension funds are subject to an 11 percent substitute

tax on their income and gains, without any specific relief being

provided for either dividends or capital gains. The best

structure for an investment of HPEN would, therefore, be one

that eliminates any tax leakage between HBE and HPEN. It

should be noted, however, that a pension fund may be

subject to strict limitations as to the types of investment it can

make, so that in these circumstances there may be limited

scope for planning.

If PEF is organised as a Closed-Ended Fund, HPEN will be

entitled to a tax credit equal to 15 percent of the amount of

distributions made to it by PEF (and of the portion of a gain

realised upon the disposal of its investment in the

Closed-Ended Fund corresponding to the appreciation in the

net asset value of the fund, which will already have been

subject to the 12.5 percent tax at the level of the fund), which

is meant to compensate for the 12.5 percent tax imposed at

the level of the fund.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

There are no special provisions applying to a foreign pension

fund investing (indirectly) in an Italian business entity. The best

structure for FPEN would, therefore, be the same as that for

FI described in Section II.A.2., above. If the investment is

made through a Closed-Ended Fund, FPEN will be eligible for

the 15 percent refund, even if FPEN is not regarded as a

“resident” for local tax purposes of the state where it is

established (because, for example, it is not subject to tax

therein), because it would most likely be regarded as an

eligible foreign collective investment undertaking.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

There are no special provisions applying to a foreign

government investing (indirectly) in an Italian business entity.

Hence, the best structure for FGOV would be the same as

that for FI described in Section II.A.2., above. It should,

however be noted that, if the investment is made through a

Closed-Ended Fund, FGOV will be eligible for the 15 percent

refund only if it regarded as a “resident” for local tax purposes

of the state of which it is a government.

B. Investment in a foreign business entity

1. Preferred structure for an Italian individual

From a tax perspective, it makes no difference whether FBE is

organised in the form of a partnership or a corporation. The

same structuring considerations as were discussed in Section

II.A.1., above, in connection with an investment of HI in HBE,

would also be applicable in the case of an investment in FBE.

If, however, FBE (or any intermediate holding company) is

established in a tax haven, under the CFC rules HI may be

taxed on his proportionate share of FBE’s income if his

entitlement to the profits of FBE is equal to at least 20

percent.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The same considerations apply as those discussed in relation

to an investment of FI in HBE (see Section II.A.2., above). It

would not be advisable to have PEF organised as an Italian

company (or partnership) because, in addition to tax leakage,

there could be a detrimental effect in the shape of the

application of the CFC legislation if FBE (or any intermediate

holding company) is established in a tax haven. If PEF is a

foreign entity with no presence in Italy, it does not matter how

PEF is organised for Italian tax purposes.

If PEF is organised as a Closed-Ended Fund, it will not be

entitled to a foreign tax credit; the 12.5 percent substitute tax

will be imposed on PEF’s foreign income (i.e., distributions

made by FBE and gains on the disposal of the FBE’s shares)

net of foreign taxes.

3. Preferred structure for an Italian pension fund

The same considerations apply as those discussed in relation

to an investment of HPEN in HBE (see Section II.A.3., above).

If PEF is a foreign entity with no presence in Italy, it does not

matter how PEF is organised for Italian tax purposes, except

that HPEN will not be entitled to any foreign tax credit for

foreign taxes imposed on distributions made by PEF.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The same considerations apply as those discussed in relation

to an investment of FI (see Section II.B.2., above). If PEF is a

foreign entity with no presence in Italy, it does not matter how

PEF is organised for Italian tax purposes.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The same considerations apply as those discussed in relation

to an investment of FI (see Section II.B.2., above). If PEF is a

foreign entity with no presence in Italy, it does not matter how

PEF is organised for Italian tax purposes.

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

From an Italian tax perspective, the most efficient structure for

all the categories of investors under consideration would be to

have HBE established as a corporation. It would not matter in

which form FBE was established. The use of an Italian

company or partnership to act as PEF would not normally be

advisable. A Closed-Ended Fund might be considered as an

alternative, as such a fund would (in most cases) constitute a

tax-exempt vehicle for eligible foreign investors, but would not

entail additional benefits or burdens for HI or HPEN.

III. Basic Italian tax planning for a hedge fund

A. Investment in passive assets generating Italian-sourceincome

1. Preferred structure for an Italian individual

From the perspective of HI, the most tax efficient structure

would be to have HF set up as a foreign entity (established in

a white-listed jurisdiction) the organisation and operation of

which does not result in it being characterised as a collective

investment undertaking for Italian regulatory (and hence tax)

purposes. If such a structure is employed, HF is more likely to

be eligible for domestic and treaty-based reliefs from taxation

at source on its Italian-source income. Income and gains

derived by HI from such an investment will be subject to

substitute taxes levied at a rate of 12.5 percent (assuming

that the interest held by HI does not exceed 20 percent of the

voting rights or 25 percent of the capital of HF).

Consideration may also be given to having HF set up as a

Closed-Ended Fund. The tax regime would be the same as that

described in relation to PEF in Section II.A.1., above. Specifically,

33

Italy

33

Italian-source passive investment income received by the fund

would, with few exceptions, not be subject to tax at source

(being subject only to the 12.5 percent substitute tax at the level

of the fund).

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

It would not be advisable to have HF organised as an Italian

company or partnership. The most tax efficient structure would

therefore be to have HF set up as a foreign entity (established in a

white-listed jurisdiction in order to benefit from a range of

exemption regimes provided under Italian law for Italian-source

income).

Having HF set up as a Closed-Ended Fund alternative, on the

other hand, would (in most cases) produce exempt income for FI

(taking into account the 15 percent refund for eligible foreign

investors).

3. Preferred structure for an Italian pension fund

The preferred structure(s) would be the same as that (those)

described in relation to an investment of HI (i.e., a foreign HF

established in a white listed jurisdiction or an Italian

Closed-Ended Fund), except that income and gains derived by

HPEN from its investment in a foreign entity would be subject to

the 11 percent substitute tax at the level of HPEN (without any

foreign tax credit but imposed on the income net of any foreign

taxes) regardless of the size of HPEN’s participation.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The same considerations apply as those discussed in Section

III.A.2., above in relation to an investment of FI.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The same considerations apply as those discussed in Section

III.A.2., above in relation to an investment of FI.

B. Investment in passive assets generatingforeign-source income

1. Preferred structure for an Italian individual

From the perspective of HI, the most tax efficient structure would

be to have HF set up as a foreign entity (not established in a tax

haven) the organisation and operation of which does not result in

it being characterised as a collective investment undertaking for

Italian regulatory (and hence tax) purposes. Income and gains

derived by HI from such an investment will be subject to

substitute taxes levied at a rate of 12.5 percent (assuming that

the interest held by HI does not exceed 20 percent of the voting

rights or 25 percent of the capital of HF).

Consideration may also be given to having HF set up as a

Closed-Ended Fund. The tax regime would be the same as that

described at Section II.A.1., above in relation to a PEF (and at

Section III.A.1., above in relation to HF, where the passive assets

generate Italian-source income), although it must be borne in

mind that a Closed-Ended Fund would not be eligible for a credit

for foreign taxes.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

It would not be advisable to have HF organised as an Italian

company or partnership. The most tax efficient structure would

therefore be to have HF set up as a foreign entity with no Italian

presence.

3. Preferred structure for an Italian pension fund

The preferred structure(s) would be the same as that (those)

described in relation to an investment of HI (i.e., a foreign HF not

established in a tax haven), except that income and gains derived

by HPEN from its investment in a foreign entity would be subject

to the 11 percent substitute tax at the level of HPEN (without any

foreign tax credit but imposed on the income net of any foreign

taxes) regardless of the size of HPEN’s participation.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN would be the same as that

discussed in Section III.B.2., above for an investment of FI.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV would be the same as that

discussed in Section III.B.2., above for an investment of FI.

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

Where Italian-source passive investment income is generated,

the most efficient structure for all the categories of investors

considered would be to set up HF as a foreign company

established in a white-listed jurisdiction. The use of an Italian

company or partnership to act as HF would not normally be

advisable. As an alternative, consideration might also be given to

setting up a Closed-Ended Fund, as such a fund would (in most

cases) constitute an exempt vehicle for eligible foreign investors,

but would not result in additional benefits or burdens for HI or

HPEN.

IV. Italian income taxation of income from acarried interest

Savvy’s “carried interest” comprises a 20 percent interest in

the profits derived by PEF. IF PEF is organised as a foreign

company, the most efficient structure would be to have PEF

issue a special category of shares embodying the carried

interest rights with a very low face value entitling the holder to

no more than 20 percent of the voting rights and 25 percent

of the capital of PEF (as would normally be the case with

shares to be held by managers and advisors). Savvy would

buy the shares at their fair market value. Because of the

uncertainty attaching to the realisation of the carried interest,

the fair market value would be reasonably close to the face

value of the shares (which is assumed to be very low).

Assuming that PEF is not established in a tax haven, income

and gains on such shares would be subject to a 12.5 percent

substitute tax in the hands of Savvy.

If PEF is organised as a Closed-Ended Fund, the same structure

may be achieved by having the carried interest embodied in a

special category of units (rather than shares). The same tax

regime (i.e., 12.5 percent substitute tax) would apply.

1 While the threshold for the application of the CFC rules is a director indirect entitlement to the profits of the foreign entity of not lessthan 20 percent, the detrimental effect on distributions and capitalgains would be triggered by a participation representing more than20 percent of the voting rights or 25 percent of the capital of theforeign entity. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted thatthe above limitation does not apply in the case of listed shares.

2 Council Directive 85/611/EEC of December 20, 1985 on theco-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisionsrelating to undertakings for collective investment in transferablesecurities (UCITS), as subsequently amended and supplemented

3 Regulated under Law 344 of August 14,1993

4 The substitute tax is levied at the rate of 27 percent on income andgains from participations in unlisted entities representing an interestof more than 50 percent of the capital of the company concerned.This regime, which is intended to prevent the abusive use ofClosed-Ended Funds applies only to funds with fewer than 100investors, but not to such funds the majority of whose investorscomprise qualified investors (i.e., institutional investors) other thanindividuals.

Italy

34

34

Host CountryTHE NETHERLANDS

Carola van den Bruinhorst and Dennis LangkemperLoyens & Loeff N.V., Amsterdam

Carola van den Bruinhorst is a Partner and has been

practising Dutch tax law since 1990 with Loyens & Loeff

in their offices in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and New York.

I. Basic Netherlands tax planning for a privateequity fund

For purposes of the discussion of the various preferred structures

that follows, it is assumed that PEF is established in the

Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the most common legal forms

available for structuring PEF would be a limited liability company

(besloten vennootschap or BV), a co-operative association

(coöperatie or Co-op) and a limited partnership (commanditairevennootschap or CV). A BV and a Co-op are legal entities and as

such subject to Dutch corporate income tax. A CV can either be

transparent for Dutch tax purposes (a “closed CV”) or be treated

as an entity subject to corporate income tax (an “open CV”).1 A

CV is considered tax transparent if the admission or replacement

of a limited partner requires the prior consent of all partners (both

limited and general). If this requirement is not met, a CV will

automatically be considered an entity subject to corporate

income tax (i.e., an open CV).

For Dutch tax purposes, PEF is considered to carry on an

enterprise.2 If PEF were to be structured as a (tax transparent)

closed CV, this would mean that a foreign corporate investor

investing in PEF would be deemed to be engaged in the conduct

of a business through a permanent establishment (PE) in the

Netherlands. Consequently, such a foreign investor would – in

principle – be subject to Dutch corporate income tax. The equity

investments held by PEF (in HBE or FBE) would be considered to

belong to the business assets of the PE of the foreign investor

(allocated in proportion to the percentage interest held by the

investor in PEF).

As HBE would not usually be structured in the Netherlands as a

partnership, and as foreign partnerships are often treated as

corporations for Dutch tax purposes, it is assumed for purposes

of this paper that both HBE and FBE are structured as limited

liability companies (with a capital divided into shares).

A. Investment in a Netherlands business entity

If PEF were structured as a BV, a Co-op or an open CV,

dividends and capital gains derived from HBE would be exempt

from corporate income tax if the participation exemption applied.3

As a general rule, the participation exemption will apply if PEF

has a participation of 5 percent or more in the aggregate issued

nominal share capital of HBE, and HBE is not considered a

“low-taxed investment participation”. HBE is not considered a

low-taxed investment participation if:

■ No more than 50 percent of the assets of HBE consist of

passive portfolio investments; or

■ HBE is subject to tax to an effective rate of at least 10

perc7ent levied on its profits calculated in accordance

with Netherlands standards.

As HBE is a resident of the Netherlands, it will be subject to

Dutch corporate income tax. From this it follows that the

requirement in the second bullet above will be met. Therefore, the

participation exemption would apply with respect to dividends

and capital gains from HBE, provided PEF owns at least 5

percent in the share capital of HBE.

Provided PEF’s actual place of management is within the

Netherlands, all the conclusions drawn in this paper will apply

equally if PEF is formed under foreign law. If PEF has its

management office outside the Netherlands, it is likely that PEF

will also be considered to have its residence outside the

Netherlands. If so, PEF may be subject to Dutch corporate

income tax (25.5 percent) on a capital gain realised on the

alienation of HBE if: (1) PEF owns an interest of at least 5 percent

in HBE; (2) the participation in HBE cannot be allocated to the

assets of an enterprise carried on by PEF; and (3) PEF is not

entitled to relief under a tax treaty concluded between its country

of residence and the Netherlands. Taking into account the basic

assumption that PEF is considered to be carrying on an

enterprise for Dutch tax purposes, the second requirement would

not be met and would prevent PEF from being subject to

corporate income tax in the Netherlands.

1. Preferred structure for a Dutch individual

The Netherlands Income Tax Act 2001 distinguishes three different

components of income. These components of income are allocated

to separate “Boxes” to which special tax rates apply. Income

allocated to Box I (such as employment income and income from a

trade or business) is taxed at progressive rates of up to 52 percent.

Income from a “substantial interest” (an equity participation of 5

percent or more)4 is allocated to Box II and is taxed at a rate of 25

percent. Income from “savings and investments” (such as less than

5 percent shareholdings, bonds, etc.) is allocated to Box III. The

taxable benefit in Box III is calculated as a deemed 4 percent yield

on the fair market value of the assets that are allocated to Box III.

This 4 percent yield is subject to an income tax rate of 30 percent (as

such, the annual income tax due would equal 1.2 percent of the fair

market value of the assets).

From the perspective of HI (a Netherlands resident individual), the

most tax efficient structure would be to establish PEF as a BV, a

Co-op or an open CV, provided HI owned an interest of less than 5

percent in PEF.5 HI would then be taxed annually on his participation

in PEF at a rate of 1.2 percent on the fair market value of his interest

in PEF. Any income (dividends and capital gains) actually received by

HI from PEF would not be subject to any further taxation.

If HI owned a substantial interest in PEF, any income received

from PEF (dividends and capital gains) would be subject to the

Box II tax rate of 25 percent. As the 25 percent Box II taxation

35

35

would only become due when the benefits were actually received

by HI, the Box II taxation could be deferred if HI were to hold its

participation through an intermediate holding BV.

Fifteen percent Dutch dividend tax is due on profit distributions

made to HI by PEF, where PEF is structured as a BV or an open

CV. This dividend tax can be fully credited against HI’s Dutch

income tax liability, regardless of whether income from the

participation in PEF is allocable to Box II or Box III. If PEF were

structured as a Co-op, no dividend tax would be due as, under

the Netherlands Dividend Tax Act 1965, a Co-op is not required

to withhold dividend tax when it makes a distribution of profits.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

If FI owns an interest of less than 5 percent in PEF, the preferred

structure for HI described in Section I.A.1., above, will also be

suitable for FI, provided, if PEF is a BV or an open CV, FI is able

to credit any Dutch dividend tax withheld by PEF against its

income tax liability in his country of residence. However, if the

Dutch dividend withholding tax would represent an additional tax

burden for FI, PEF should be structured as a Co-op. If on the

basis of the tax laws in FI’s country of residence an investment in

a transparent structure is more suitable (in order to have the

income from PEF treated as capital gains income), an open CV

would most probably be preferred as, unlike a BV or a Co-op, a

CV is often considered transparent from the perspective of

foreign tax law.

If FI holds a substantial interest in PEF, FI will be subject to Dutch

income tax at a rate of 25 percent (Box II) on income (dividends

and capital gains) from PEF. This tax burden may, however, be

reduced to 15 percent (in the case of dividends) or fully

eliminated (in the case of capital gains) if FI is entitled to benefits

under a tax treaty concluded between his country of residence

and the Netherlands. In this situation it will make no difference

whether PEF is structured as a Co-op or as a BV.

If Netherlands Box II taxation will be an actual burden,

consideration could be given to having FI invest in PEF through a

foreign limited partnership (FLP) that is non-transparent for Dutch

tax purposes,6 and to PEF being structured as a closed CV (of

which the FLP is the sole limited partner). In this structure, the FLP

would be subject to corporate income tax in the Netherlands, but

would be able to apply the participation exemption in relation to the

benefits derived from HBE, provided its owned an interest of at

least 5 percent (on a look through basis) in HBE.

3. Preferred structure for a Dutch pension fund

As HPEN is exempt from Dutch corporate income tax, the legal

structure of PEF generally has no relevance. However, if PEF is

structured as a BV or an open CV, it will have to withhold Dutch

dividend tax on profit distributions to HPEN. HPEN will be able to

obtain a full refund of this dividend tax,7 but as some time may

lapse until the refund is actually received this could result in a

cash-flow disadvantage.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

If FPEN is considered a qualifying foreign tax-exempt pension

fund for Dutch tax purposes, the preferred structure for PEF

would be a closed CV or a Co-op. It is true that, if it holds a

participation in a closed CV, FPEN will be subject to tax in the

Netherlands, but it will be entitled – upon request – to the same

exemption8 from Dutch corporate income tax that applies to

HPEN. If PEF is structured as a Co-op, no Dutch tax liability

arises if FPEN owns an interest of less than 5 percent in PEF. If

FPEN’s participation exceeds 5 percent, FPEN will, in principle,

be subject to Dutch corporate income tax, but will nevertheless

be able to benefit from the above-mentioned exemption for

pension funds.

If FPEN is a resident of the United States or an E.U. Member

State, PEF could also be structured as a BV or an open CV. This

is because an exemption from dividend tax applies to dividends

distributed by such an entity to a foreign pension fund that is

resident in the United States, and a full refund of dividend tax can

be obtained by a foreign pension fund resident in an E.U.

Member State.9

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

If FGOV is resident in an E.U. Member State, it will generally be

able to obtain a refund of dividend tax on dividends distributed by

PEF, if PEF is structured as a BV or an open CV.10

If PEF is structured as a closed CV, FGOV will in principle be

subject to Dutch corporate income tax. There is no provision in

Dutch law that would protect FGOV from such taxation. Dutch tax

liability could also arise if FGOV were to own 5 percent or more in

PEF structured as a BV, a Co-op or an open CV. In such a situation

it would remain to be seen if, and to what extent, FGOV would be

able to obtain relief from Dutch taxation under a tax treaty

concluded between its country of residence and the Netherlands.

FGOV can, however, avoid Dutch taxation, if the preferred structure

for FI is used (i.e., FGOV invests in a closed CV through an FLP).

B. Investment in a foreign business entity

1. Introduction

If PEF is structured as a BV, a Co-op or an open CV and makes

an investment in FBE, income from FBE (dividends and capital

gains) will only be exempt from Dutch corporate income tax in

the hands of PEF if the participation exemption applies. The

exemption will apply if PEF has a participation of 5 percent or

more in the nominal paid-up capital of FBE, and FBE is not

considered a “low-taxed investment participation”. As discussed

in Section I.A., above, FBE is not considered a low-taxed

investment participation if:

■ No more than 50 percent of the assets of FBE consist of

passive portfolio investments; or

■ FBE is subject to tax at an effective rate of at least 10

percent levied on its profits calculated in accordance with

Netherlands standards.

Unlike in the situation applying to HBE, it will not always be

certain that the requirement in the second bullet will be met with

respect to FBE. Therefore, in order to ensure that FBE is not a

low-taxed investment participation, FBE should meet the

requirement in the first bullet.

Whether more than 50 percent of the assets of FBE consist of

passive portfolio investments is to be determined on an indirect

basis – i.e., if FBE owns shareholdings of 5 percent or more in

subsidiaries, the assets of the subsidiaries will be “fictitiously”

attributed on a pro rata basis to the balance sheet of FBE. On the

basis of this “attributed balance sheet”, it will be determined

whether 50 percent or more of FBE’s assets consist of passive

portfolio investments.11 Passive portfolio investments are

investments that are not held in line with the business carried on

by FBE (this could, for instance, be more than 5 percent holdings

of stock, bonds or group receivables). For purposes of

determining the 50 percent threshold, the fair market value of the

assets is decisive.

For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that FBE does not

fail the 50 percent passive portfolio investments test.12 Therefore,

if PEF is structured as a BV, a Co-op or an open CV, benefits

The Netherlands

36

36

derived from FBE will be exempt from Dutch corporate income

tax, provided PEF owns at least 5 percent of the nominal paid-up

capital of FBE.

2. Preferred structures for a Dutch and foreign individual,a Dutch and foreign pension fund, and a foreigngovernment

In the Netherlands, if PEF is structured as a tax transparent

partnership (a closed CV), HI, FI, FPEN and FGOV will be

deemed to receive income from a Dutch enterprise, and as such

will be subject to Dutch (corporate) income tax.13 Consequently,

as the income distributed by PEF will be deemed to be

Dutch-source income, it will not matter to the investors envisaged

in this paper whether the income originates from HBE or FBE.

Further, as it is not possible in the Netherlands to have

corporations treated as tax transparent entities, it will make no

difference to HI, FI, HPEN, FPEN or FGOV whether PEF, whether

structured as a BV, a Co-op or an open CV, invests in HBE or

FBE. To summarise, all conclusions reached in Section I.A.,

above with respect to an investment by PEF in HBE will in

principle also apply for HI, FI, HPEN, FPEN and FGOV with

respect to an investment by PEF in FBE.

If local withholding taxes are levied on capital gains (or dividends)

in FBE’s country of residence, it should be determined whether

PEF will obtain relief with respect to such taxes under a tax treaty

concluded between FBE’s country of residence and the

Netherlands. Such relief may not be available if PEF is structured

as a closed CV, as PEF would then not be considered a resident

of the Netherlands for tax treaty purposes. In such a situation,

consideration could be given to interposing an intermediate

holding BV between PEF and HBE.

C. Overall preferred structure

In light of the conclusions reached above, and to suit each of the

investors taken into consideration, the overall preferred structure

for PEF in the Netherlands would be a parallel structure

consisting of a closed CV and a Co-op. In order to avoid Dutch

(corporate) income tax liability, the investors in the closed CV (FI,

FPEN and FGOV) should hold their participation through an FLP

that is non-transparent for Dutch tax purposes (see the

discussion at Section I.A.2., above). The FLP would be subject to

corporate income tax in the Netherlands, but, provided the FLP

owned (on a look through basis) an interest of 5 percent or more

in HBE/FBE, the income (capital gains and dividends) derived

from HBE/FBE would be exempt under the participation

exemption (see Structure 1, above).14

If FI is also able to invest tax-neutrally in a Co-op,15 consideration

could also be given to not interposing an FLP between the

investors and the closed CV. FGOV and FPEN would then invest

directly in the closed CV, and would be subject to Dutch

corporate income tax on income derived from PEF (capital gains

and dividends from HBE/FBE). FPEN, would however, be eligible

for the subjective exemption for pension funds (see Section

I.A.4., above). In order to ensure that the income received by

FGOV is also exempted (by virtue of application of the

participation exemption), a Co-op should be interposed between

PEF and HBE/FBE (see Structure 2, above).16

The above structures provide for tax neutrality at the level of

PEF and the tax-free repatriation of profits to HI, FI, HPEN,

FPEN and FGOV.

II. Basic Netherlands tax planning for a hedgefund

As HF will invest in a great variety of assets, such as marketable

stocks, securities and other financial instruments, HF, unlike PEF,

will not primarily own 5 percent or more equity participations. A

regular corporate structure (BV or Co-op) or having HF structured

as an open CV, would therefore not be preferred, as most of HF’s

income derived from its investments would probably not be

eligible for the participation exemption. Nevertheless, to the

extent HF has taxable income, it could consider being financed

by its investors with substantial borrowings in order to claim an

interest deduction that would reduce HF’s taxable income.

Provided none of HF’s investors is considered a related entity of

HF for Dutch tax purposes17 and the loans do not have to be

reclassified as equity,18 the Dutch thin capitalisation rules and/or

other anti-abuse provisions would not, in principle, restrict the

deduction of interest. However, a discussion of structures in

which HF is debt-financed by its investors is beyond the scope of

this paper. It is, therefore, assumed that HF is primarily financed

with capital contributions from its investors.

Given the more “passive” character of HF’s investments, the

question could be raised whether HF is to be deemed to be

carrying on an enterprise for purposes of Dutch tax law. This is a

question of fact that would depend on, among other things, the

extent of the involvement of the HF managers with HF’s

investment portfolio and the level of risk that is incurred. If it is

assumed that HF is not considered to carry on an enterprise for

purposes of Dutch tax law, HF could be structured as a closed

CV. If so, FI, FPEN and FGOV would not be subject to (corporate)

income tax in the Netherlands on income from their investments

in HF. For HI, it would mean that he would not be deemed to

derive income from a trade or business (Box I); instead income

from his investment in HF would be allocated to the favourable

Box III tax regime. Nevertheless, a closed CV may not be the

preferred structure for HF as, in order to ensure the tax transparency

of the CV, prior consent is required from all the partners for the

admission or replacement of a limited partner. As hedge funds

typically are open ended, in practice, the prior consent

requirement would definitely represent an awkward obstacle.

37

The Netherlands

37

In July 2007, the Netherlands legislator adopted a new tax regime

(the Exempt Fund Regime) for investment funds such as HFs.19

The Exempt Fund Regime provides for a full exemption from

Dutch corporate income tax, as well as an exemption from Dutch

dividend withholding tax on profit distributions. If HF invests solely

in financial instruments such as shares, bonds, options and

similar securities,20 it will be eligible for the Exempt Fund Regime.

One of the conditions that must be met for HF to apply the Exempt

Fund Regime is that HF should take the legal form of either: (1) a

public limited liability company (naamloze vennootschap or NV); or

(2) a mutual fund (fonds voor gemene rekening or FGR).

The preferred structure for all the investors envisaged in this

paper (HI, FI, HPEN, FPEN and FGOV) would be to have HF take

the form of an NV or an FGR subject to the Exempt Fund

Regime, because: (1) there would be no taxation at the level of

HF; (2) no Dutch dividend tax would be due on profit distributions

made by HF; and (3) investors would not be subject to Dutch

(corporate) income tax.21

If HF is subject to the Exempt Fund Regime, all its income is

exempt from taxation regardless of whether it is Dutch source or

foreign source. However, as a result of the tax exemption, HF will

not be considered a Dutch resident for tax treaty purposes and

will therefore have no access to the Netherlands’ tax treaties. As

such, HF will not be entitled to a refund or exemption of withholding

taxes on income received from foreign-source investments.

Further, HF will not be entitled to a refund of Dutch dividend tax

withheld on dividend distributions made by Dutch investments.22

III. Dutch income taxation of income from acarried interest

As discussed in Section I.A.1., above, the ITA distinguishes separate

components of income, each component of income being

allocated to a separate “Box” (for which a special tax rate applies).

If it is assumed that the carried interest entitlement of Savvy

should simply be regarded as compensation for the activities

performed by Savvy for PEF, the carried interest will be

considered employment income and as such be allocated to Box

I (progressive rates of up to 52 percent). The basic assumption in

the Netherlands is therefore that a distinction should be made

between: (1) Savvy performing activities for PEF for which he

receives a salary; and (2) Savvy making an at risk investment in

PEF on the basis of which his carried interest entitlement will be

paid out. Savvy’s salary will obviously be taxed in Box I. The

carried interest entitlement should be allocated to Box II or Box III

(depending on whether Savvy holds a substantial interest in PEF).

The most common structure would be for Savvy to hold his

carried interest entitlement through equity instruments in PEF

(either shares in a BV, or a membership interest in a Co-op, or a

limited partnership interest in an open CV). If PEF takes the form

of a closed CV, Savvy should preferably hold his carried interest

through a holding BV (the latter being a limited partner of the CV).

In each of these scenarios, the respective equity instruments are

likely to constitute a Box II investment for Savvy,23 meaning that

distributed carried interest will be taxed at a rate of 25 percent at

the moment it is actually received by Savvy. Any Dutch dividend

tax due on the distribution of the carried interest may be fully

credited against the income tax due.

Ideally Savvy would want to create a structure where his carried

interest entitlement would be subject to the favourable tax regime

of Box III (savings and investments). As previously discussed,

Savvy would then be taxed annually at the rate of 30 percent on

a deemed 4 percent yield on the fair market value of his carried

interest entitlement (effectively equivalent to a net wealth tax of

1.2 percent). Structuring Savvy’s carried interest as a Box III

investment would be possible if PEF took the legal form of a BV,

and Savvy granted a profit sharing loan (PSL) to the BV. The

principal of the PSL would equal the capital contribution that

Savvy otherwise would have made on its carried interest

entitlement had it been structured using equity instruments. Any

carried interest to be distributed to Savvy by PEF would be paid

out to him in the form of interest on the PSL. In this situation,

Savvy would be taxed annually on 1.2 percent of the fair market

value of the PSL, while the interest received on the PSL would

not be subject to any further taxation.

The Dutch tax authorities take the position that the proceeds

derived from carried interest schemes should mostly be treated

as employment income (Box I), irrespective of whether the carried

interest is structured as a Box II or a Box III investment. As some

Dutch private equity managers have structured their carried

interest entitlement as a Box II or Box III investment, the position

taken by the Dutch tax authorities may lead to disputes that may

eventually be taken to tax court. So far, however, no cases have

been taken to court.24

1 This only applies to the share attributable to the limited partners. ACV is always tax transparent for its general partner(s).

2 This has been confirmed in a decision of the Netherlands SupremeCourt (October 25, 2000, BNB 2000/388).

3 Pursuant to Corporate Income Tax Act 1969 (CITA), Article 13

4 A shareholder holds a “substantial interest” in a BV if he owns 5percent or more of the paid up capital of the BV or 5 percent ormore of the paid up capital of a separate class of shares of the BV.A participant in a Co-op holds a substantial interest if he owns atleast 5 percent of the voting rights or is entitled to at least 5 percentof the Co-op’s profits. A limited partner in an open CV holds asubstantial interest if he is entitled to at least 5 percent of the CV’sequity belonging to the limited partners. It should be noted that the5 percent threshold for purposes of determining whether asubstantial interest is present differs from the 5 percent thresholdapplying for purposes of the participation exemption in the CITA (5percent or more in the aggregate of issued nominal share capital).

5 If PEF were structured as a tax transparent partnership (CV), theincome received by HI from PEF would be likely to be allocated toBox I as it would be considered income from a trade or businessand as such would be subject to progressive rates of up to 52percent. No exemption could be obtained for this income (incontrast to the position of limited partners subject to corporateincome tax, which, if all the relevant conditions are met, maybenefit from the participation exemption).

6 FLP could, for instance, be structured as limited partnershipincorporated under the laws of Delaware and managed by ageneral partner resident in a tax haven jurisdiction (e.g., Guernsey).In order to have FLP classified as non-transparent for Dutch taxpurposes, it must be evident that on the admission or replacementof a limited partner no prior consent is required from all partners.

7 Dividend Tax Act 1965 (DTA), Article 10, paragraph 1

8 CITA, Article 5, paragraph 1-b, in conjunction with Resolution ofJanuary 26, 2000, nr. DB99/3511M

9 For U.S. pension funds this exemption follows from Netherlands –United States tax treaty, Article 35 and for E.U. pension funds therefund entitlement originates from Dutch domestic law (DTA, Article10, paragraph 4).

10 DTA, Article 10, paragraph 4

11 In this respect, it should be noted that this test must be applied ona continuous basis, and that the asset test must be executedthroughout the chain of ownership below FBE; i.e., if a subsidiary ofFBE itself owns participations of 5 percent or more, the assets ofthese participations will also be included on the “attributed balancesheet” of FBE.

12 Taking into account the investment focus that generally applies toPEFs, in practice, their portfolio companies should always pass thepassive portfolio investments test.

13 See the discussion at Section I

The Netherlands

38

38

14 A variation on Structure 1 would be to establish PEF as a closedCV, with the FLP and the Co-op as its limited partners. Thisstructure offers more simplicity (as PEF consists of only one entity),but may not be preferred if a substantial number of US residentswho are subject to ERISA are to invest in PEF.

15 If FI owns less than 5 percent in Co-op, no Dutch tax liability will arise.

16 FGOV may not own (on a look-through basis) an interest of 5percent or more in the interposed Co-op. However, unlike in thecase of a participation in any other corporate entity, the 5 percentthreshold test does not apply to participations in a Co-op. Thus,provided all other requirements are met (i.e., no low-taxedinvestment participation), any interest in a Co-op would qualify forthe participation exemption.

17 In general terms and in the context of the case at hand, an investorwould be a related entity of HF if the investor held an interest of at leastone-third in HF, or if a third party held an interest of at least one-third inHF and also held an interest of at least one-third in the investor.

18 Loans that are not considered “sham loans” or “bottomless pitloans” (the definition of such loans can be found in a SupremeCourt decision of January 27, 1988, BNB 1988/217) and have aterm of less than 50 years, should, in principle, not be reclassifiedas equity.

19 In the legislative history it has been confirmed that hedge funds inprincipal are eligible for the Exempt Fund Regime. The legislatornevertheless has explicitly excluded investment funds that carry onan enterprise from the Exempt Fund Regime. PEF would, therefore,certainly not qualify for this regime. This conclusion is reinforced bythe fact that the Exempt Fund Regime may only be invoked byinvestment funds that are open ended. Unlike HF, PEF wouldgenerally not meet this requirement.

20 The Exempt Fund Regime is not available for: (1) (direct)investments in Dutch real estate and (mortgage) loans; or (2)investments in rights, other than through securities, to profits of abusiness conducted in the Netherlands.

21 This would also be true if a foreign investor were to own an interestof 5 percent or more in HF.

22 The Netherlands does not levy a withholding tax on interestpayments and capital gains.

23 If PEF is structured as a BV, a person owning 5 percent or more ofa separate class of shares of PEF will be considered to hold asubstantial interest and thus be taxed on income arising from thisshareholding in Box II. In practice it is very difficult to create a sharestructure for carried interest where the carried interest shares donot constitute a separate class, as different profit rights attach tosuch shares as compared to the shares owned by the investors (forinstance, catch-up rights). As a result, the PEF managers will own100 percent of a separate class of shares. This means that anumber (if not all) of them will own 5 percent or more of theseshares. Opinions vary as to whether this “separate class” analysisshould also be followed with respect to a membership right in aCo-op or a limited partnership interest in an open CV.Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide unequivocal guidance onthis issue. It should, however, be noted that if catch-up paymentsare not paid out as part of the carried interest (but as a bonus or asa part of the management fee), it might be possible to avoid thePEF managers having a substantial interest; i.e., the 80:20 divisionof excess profits could then be paid out on the same class ofshares held by the investors and the PEF managers. The PEFmanagers would then jointly hold 20 percent of one class. On anindividual basis, the managers may then hold less than 5 percent.The disadvantage is that the catch-up payments will be taxed at ahigher rate (paid as bonus: Box I (52 percent), paid as part of themanagement fee: corporate income tax (25.5 percent) at the levelof the management company and Box II (25 percent) in the handsof the PEF managers).

24 If the tax court were to decide in favour of the Dutch tax authorities,the question of when the carried interest becomes taxable in Box Iwould also have to be answered. The tax authorities argue thateach payment of carried interest is taxed at the moment it isactually received. However, there are strong arguments forsuggesting that the carried interest should be taxed at the momentthe entitlement thereto is (unconditionally) obtained. In suchcircumstances, a valuation of the carried interest rights would haveto be made. The taxable amount (in Box I) would then be thedifference between the value of the carried interest rights and theamount invested therein. Any actual payments to be received in thefuture would then not be taxable.

39

The Netherlands / Spain

Host CountrySPAIN

Javier Martín Martín and Montserrat Turrado AlonsoErnst & Young, Madrid

Javier Martín is a tax adviser with the Madrid law firm

Ernst & Young Abogados. He is a licenciate in Law and a

graduate in Business Administration (Universidad

Pontificia de Comillas). He received a Diploma in

Taxation from the Centre of Tax and Economic Studies.

In 1982, he was admitted to the Madrid Bar. Before

joining Ernst & Young, Mr. Martín was an auditor, then a

tax adviser, with Arthur Young (now Ernst & Young) and

then a tax adviser with Estudio Legal. He is the author of

the Spanish chapter of the book Value Added Taxation in

Europe, published by the International Bureau of Fiscal

Documentation.

Montserrat Turrado Alonso has more than fourteen years

of professional experience, including two years working

in the banking industry and 12 years providing tax

advisory services. Working in the Madrid office, she has

a broad experience in providing tax advisory services to

banking institutions (commercial and private banking),

broker and dealer firms, investment funds and asset

management firms, as well as co-ordinating specialised

teams (transfer pricing, indirect taxation, etc.)

39

I. Background

In Spain, both venture capital funds and venture capital

companies may be used for investing in start-up companies or

companies with financial or management difficulties, with a view

to selling them after a significant return is achieved.

From a tax perspective, these entities are efficient vehicles for

making such temporary investments. However, it is important to

note that, from a regulatory perspective, because these entities

are controlled and supervised by the Spanish Stock Exchange

Commission (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores or

CNMV),1 they are subject to a number of investment and equity

ratio requirements. Because of these regulatory/control

constraints, many investors have opted historically to carry on

such investment activities using “traditional” companies that are

subject to the general corporate regime, even though this

involves a higher tax burden (i.e., corporate income tax at a rate

of 32.5 percent).2 It is principally for this reason that most venture

capital vehicles have traditionally been owned by Spanish

government bodies.

However, the climate has recently begun to change and venture

capital vehicles are increasingly used by all sorts of investors. This

can be attributed to a number of factors: the higher degree of

flexibility provided by the new legal framework for such vehicles

introduced by Law 25/2005, the new economic/investment

opportunities in the Spanish market and the growing skills and

experience of Spanish investors in this area, as well as the

increasing desire to seek out suitable new vehicles/procedures

on the part of those with funds available to allocate to sectors

where they feel profitable opportunities exist, in particular in

relation to many small and medium-sized companies.

Spanish venture capital entities are now governed by Law

25/2005 of November 24, 2005, which constitutes the regulatory

framework applicable both to the venture capital entities (VCEs)

themselves, whether in the form of venture capital companies

(VCCs) or venture capital funds (VCFs), and to their management

companies, which carry out their management, representation

and administration functions. This new VCE law, which repeals

the previous Law 1/1999 of January 5, 1999, is designed to

provide VCEs with a more flexible and modern legal framework in

order to boost the development of the venture capital sector, in

recognition of the vital role this sector plays in the financing of

companies involved in innovative business projects.

Specifically, the amendments to the VCE regime introduced by

Law 25/2005 focus on such essential issues as: (1) speeding up

administrative procedures; (2) providing flexibility in the context of

the investment rules; and (3) introducing mechanisms generally

accepted in the venture capital sector in most advanced

countries.

An alternative to VCEs is provided by hedge funds (HFs) , for

which Spain has for the first time only recently introduced a legal

framework. Like VCEs, HFs are controlled by the CNMV and,

while HFs are exempted from some of the investment

requirements applying to other collective investment schemes,

such as investment funds or Sociedad de Inversión de CapitalVariable (SICAVs), they must still meet certain asset and equity

ratio requirements.

The incorporation of HFs into the Spanish system is in response

to the enormous demand for products enjoying greater flexibility

as to the types of underlying assets in which they are allowed to

invest than the traditional collective investment schemes.

Specifically, HFs are allowed to invest in assets carrying a greater

level of risk as well as being more highly leveraged for investment

purposes, although it must be acknowledged that such vehicles

are not permitted the degree of flexibility enjoyed by HFs

incorporated or located in offshore jurisdictions.

Until the new Spanish HFs were available, Spanish investors

wishing to make HF investments had to invest abroad in one of

the offshore jurisdictions where such products are available.

However, because most offshore HFs are incorporated in

jurisdictions that are regarded as tax havens for Spanish tax

purposes, Spanish demand for them has been limited.

While the new Spanish HFs offer Spanish investors fresh

opportunities and widen the range of available investment

products, it is still too soon to evaluate their success and to know

whether they will be able to compete with HFs located abroad.

Because of the importance and relative novelty of HFs and the

new rules applying to VCEs, this paper considers in some depth

the procedures for setting up such vehicles and their tax

treatment.

II. Spanish venture capital vehicles

A. Setting up a Spanish venture capital vehicle

Venture capital entities are defined in Law 25/2005 basically as

entities the main activity of which consists of acquiring

participations in non-financial entities that do not qualify as real

estate companies and that are not listed on a regulated stock

exchange. Under Law 25/2005, VCEs may be incorporated as

either venture capital funds or venture capital companies.

In determining whether a VCE may be regarded as governed by

Law 25/2005, the following must be taken into consideration.

Law 25/2005 applies to a VCE, whether as a VCF or a VCC, that

complies with Title I of the Law, which deals with “Conditions

relating to the carrying on of VCE activity”, “Investment regime”

and “Reporting and audit obligations”.

Prior to commencing operations, a VCE must:

First, obtain prior administrative authorisation from the CNMV.

To obtain the relevant authorisation from the CNMV, a VCE must

meet the criteria set forth in Law 25/2005, which, broadly

speaking, are as follows:

■ Limit its activities to those within the corporate purpose

specified in the Law;

■ Have assets with a minimum value of €1,650,000, which

must be contributed in cash; and

■ Appoint a management company to carry out the

management, representation and administration functions

of the VCE.

To obtain the required authorisation, the VCE’s management

company must also prepare and submit to the CNMV the

following documents:

■ A report on the VCE’s project of incorporation;

■ A prospectus covering the internal regulation of the VCE

and the main financial and legal aspects; and

■ Any other document or information the CNMV may

require in order to verify that the requirements set forth in

Law 25/2005 are met.

Secondly, be incorporated as a VCE.

In this context, it should be noted that under current legislation,

the public deed of incorporation and further registration with the

Mercantile Registry have become discretionary.

Spain

40

40

Thirdly, be registered with the relevant CNMV Official Register.

The principal investment criteria are as follows:

■ A VCE is only allowed to invest in non-listed, non-financial

companies.

Exceptionally, a VCE is allowed to participate in a

non-financial company that is traded on the stock market,

provided the company is excluded from trading in the 12

months following the acquisition of the participation. This

represents a major advance for the venture capital market in

Spain, as it affords access to a new type of investment, albeit

one to which foreign competitors already had access.

■ Investment in stocks issued by companies more than 50

percent of whose assets consist of real estate will qualify

as acceptable investment activity provided that at least

85 percent, by accounting value, of the total real estate of

the company in whose stock the investment is made is

connected with the development of an economic activity.

■ A VCE is allowed to invest up to 20 percent of its assets

in other Spanish or foreign VCEs provided that the

investments of the latter in other VCEs are not higher

than 10 percent. (At least 60 percent of the VCEs’ assets

must consist of shares or similar shareholding rights in

other companies. The 20 percent limit applies to this 60

percent compulsory investment.)

B. Taxation of venture capital vehicles

Spanish venture capital vehicles benefit from a special, favourable

tax regime. One feature of this regime is an exemption from tax of

99 percent of the income and gains derived by Spanish VCEs

from the transfer of shares and participations in the capital of

companies (targets) in which they invest, provided the transfer

occurs more than one year but less than 15 years (in certain

circumstances 20 years) after the date of acquisition. 1 percent of

such income and gains, as well as other non-exempt income, is

subject to taxation at the general rate (30 percent from 2008

onwards).

This special treatment described above is subject to the following

limitations:

■ Real estate companies: where 50 percent or more of the

assets of the company whose shares are transferred

consist of real estate assets, the exemption is only

available if at least 85 percent of the real estate assets are

used in an economic activity, not including a financial

activity.

■ Related parties and tax havens: for the exemption to be

available, the purchaser must not be considered a related

party (subject to some exceptions) nor be resident in a

territory qualifying as a tax haven.3

■ Related parties: the exemption is not available if the

participation transferred was acquired from a related

party.

Relief from the domestic double taxation of dividends received

from Spanish companies is provided to Spanish VCEs by way of

a tax credit and relief from the cross-border double taxation of

foreign-source income and gains by way of an exemption,

irrespective of the percentage interest held in the paying

company and the length of the period for which the interest has

been held.

The taxation treatment of the income (dividends) and gains

received by the investors in a Spanish VCE varies depending

on the nature of the investor:

1. Dividends

A Spanish resident entity or a non-resident entity with a PE in

Spain may claim relief from Spanish double taxation by way of a

full deduction for dividends received from a Spanish VCE,

irrespective of the percentage interest it holds in the VCE and the

length of the period for which the interest has been held.

Dividends received by a Spanish resident individual are tax

exempt to the extent they do not exceed €1,500, any dividends

in excess of this amount being taxed at a fixed tax rate of 18

percent.

Dividends received from a Spanish VCE by a non-resident

without a PE in Spain are not regarded as Spanish-source

income and, therefore, are not subject to Spanish taxation.

However, this treatment does not apply if the income of the VCE

is derived from a jurisdiction qualifying as a tax haven (see

above).

2. Gains

A Spanish resident entity or a non-resident entity with a PE in

Spain may deduct in full from any gain arising to it on the transfer

of units of or shares in a Spanish VCE, the non-distributed

earnings to which the gain is attributable, irrespective of the

percentage interest it holds in the VCE and the length of the

period for which the interest has been held. In other words, gains

arising on the transfer of units/shares up to the amount of the

non-distributed earnings of the VCE are tax-exempt.

Gains derived from the transfer of shares in or units of a Spanish

VCE by a non-resident without a PE in Spain are not regarded as

having a Spanish source and, therefore, are not subject to

Spanish taxation. However, this treatment does not apply if the

income of the VCE is derived from a jurisdiction qualifying as a

tax haven (see above).

Spanish investors in a non-Spanish VCE are not entitled to the

tax treatment described above. Instead they are subject to the

general taxation rules, which essentially has the following

implications:

■ Individual investors: dividends (in excess of €1,500) and

gains from the VCE are taxed at the rate of 18 percent.

■ Corporate investors: dividends and gains from the VCE

are taxed at the rate of 32.5 percent (30 percent from

2008 onwards).

■ As an exception to the above rules, where the VCE does

not have separate legal personality, the Spanish investors

(both individual and corporate) are taxed annually on the

worldwide income and gains derived by the VCE in

proportion to the interest they hold in the VCE, as if the

income/gains were derived by them directly.

It is open to debate and a matter for further analysis whether

there is discrimination where a Spanish investor holds an interest

in a foreign VCE located in another European country and the

foreign VCE operates in a manner similar to that in which a

Spanish VCE operates. Should the European Court of Justice

(ECJ) find discrimination to exist in this context, Spanish investors

may find themselves free choose among all European VCEs

without being influenced by tax considerations, rather than being

obliged to invest in Spanish VCEs because of the tax advantages

involved.

41

Spain

41

C. Conclusions

The following conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis:

■ A private equity fund (PEF) will qualify as a VCE regulated

by Law 25/2005, of November 24, 2005, provided it

obtains prior administrative authorisation from the CNMV

and is registered with the relevant CNMV Official Register.

■ The tax advantages available to a VCE (i.e., 99 percent

tax relief with respect to income/gains derived on

disinvestment in the target(s)) would automatically be

available to a PEF, provided it met the regulatory

requirements referred to in the previous bullet and

provided the stock held by the PEF meets the temporary

investment and other criteria.

■ The tax advantages available to VCE investors (i.e., tax

relief with respect to the dividends received from and

gains arising from the transfer of units/shares in the VCE)

would automatically be available to PEF investors.

III. Spanish hedge funds

A. Setting up a Spanish hedge fund

Like other collective investment schemes (CISs), hedge funds or

hedge companies are open-ended investment vehicles or UCITS.

The new Spanish hedge fund rules establish a special status for

hedge fund/hedge company type products that are known as

“Institucion\r the sake of convenience, both forms will be referredto as hedge funds (HFs) throughout this paper. The main featuresof an HF are as follows:

■ The sole object of an HF is the collective investment in

transferable securities and/or other liquid financial assets

of capital raised from the public, on the principle of risk

spreading.

■ The units/shares of an HF are, at the request of the unit

holders/shareholders, re-purchased or redeemed, directly

or indirectly, out of the HF’s assets. In this regard, an HF

must take the actions necessary to ensure that the stock

exchange value of its units/shares does not significantly

diverge from its net asset value.

■ An HF may be constituted in accordance with EC

Directive 85/611/EEC and its implementation into national

law, which, in Spain, was accomplished via Law

35/2003, of November 4, 2003 and Royal Decree

1309/2005 of November 4, 2005. Specifically, an HF may

be incorporated either under the law of contract (as a

common fund or FIM, managed by a management

company) or under statute (as an investment company,

known as a SICAV).

The special regulatory framework governing HFs has now been

established by the enactment of two pieces of secondary

legislation: (1) a Ministerial Order from the Ministry of Economy

and Finance, dated April 25, 2006; and (2) a Circular approved

by the CNMV on May 3, 2006, which came into force on May 17,

2006.

■ An HF is free to invest in any kind of financial assets and

is not constrained by the investment concentration limits

imposed by law on other CISs. The allowable level of

borrowing against assets is also higher than in the case

of other CISs.

■ An HF may be marketed only to “qualified investors”, as

defined in the relevant provisions. Broadly speaking,

qualified investors are legal entities that are authorised or

regulated to operate in the financial markets (for example,

credit institutions and investment service firms), national

and regional governments, high net worth companies

and certain Spanish individuals (who have some

connection with the securities market).

■ The minimum number of unit holders/shareholders of an

HF is 25 (other CISs must have at least 100 unit

holders/shareholders). This quota must be met within one

year from the date on which the HF is officially registered

with the CNMV.

■ The minimum subscribed capital of an HF is €50,000.

■ To commence business an HF must obtain prior official

authorisation from the CNMV. To obtain the relevant

authorisation, the HF must meet the requirements set

forth in the applicable regulations, which, broadly

speaking, are as follows:

■ The minimum capital is €3,000,000 in the case of an HF

established as a fund and €2,400,000 in the case of an

HF incorporated as a company.

■ The HF must appoint a management company to carry

out management, representation and administration

functions with regard to the HF.

■ The HF (or its management company) must prepare and

submit to the CNMV the following documents to obtain

the authorisation referred to above: (1) a prospectus

setting out the internal regulation of the HF and its main

financial and legal aspects; (2) any other document or

information that the CNMV may need to verify that the

requirements set forth in the applicable regulations are

met.

■ The HF must be incorporated as an HF. It should be

noted that, pursuant to current legislation, the public

deed of incorporation and further registration with the

Mercantile Registry are discretionary in the case of an HF

that takes the form of a fund. Conversely, when the HF

takes the form of an investment company, the public

deed of incorporation and further registration with the

Mercantile Registry are compulsory.

■ The HF must be registered with the relevant CNMV

Official Register.

■ The main investment requirements applying to the HF

are: (1) the HF is allowed to invest in all categories of

financial assets, although the investment strategy must

meet the basic liquidity, diversification and transparency

requirements laid down by the law for collective

investment generally; (2) the HF is subject to a maximum

leverage limitation of five times net asset value; and (3)

there are no restrictions as to the proportion of the HF´s

assets that may be pledged.

B. Taxation of Spanish hedge funds

Spanish HFs (and any other Spanish CISs that meet the

requirements set out above) are subject to corporate income tax

at the reduced rate of only 1 percent.

Under Spanish tax law, Spanish HFs are not eligible for any tax

credit (either foreign or domestic). However, foreign tax credits

would probably be available to CISs in general and to HFs in

particular where there is a tax treaty between Spain and the

source country providing for a mechanism for the avoidance of

Spain

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42

double taxation. In this regard, it should be noted that HFs (and

all Spanish CISs generally) are corporate income taxpayers, and

as such, entitled to treaty protection. If double taxation relief were

available under an applicable treaty, an HF would presumably

apply for it, although, in most cases, the low level of Spanish

taxation (i.e., 1 percent) would function as an upper threshold.

Generally, gains are taxed in the hands of the unit

holders/shareholders on the reimbursement or transfer of

units/shares of a Spanish HF. In other words, the gains/losses

accrued at the HF level are not taxed at the unit

holder/shareholder level until the date on which they crystallise as

a result of the corresponding transfer or redemption of

units/shares. This rule applies even if the HF is incorporated as a

fund and thus lacks legal personality or legal presence (as

opposed to an investment company, which has legal personality

per se).

Spanish investors in receipt of dividends from a Spanish HF are

subject to tax on the date of accrual or the date of payment,

whichever is earlier.

The taxation regime applying to investors in a Spanish HF may

be summarised as follows:

■ Spanish individual investors: gains are taxed at the rate of

18 percent, being subject to withholding at the rate of 18

percent.4 The law provides a special, tax deferral

mechanism for switches between qualifying funds.

Specifically, the deferral is available with respect to gains

arising from the transfer of units/shares of registered

funds and certain investment companies (SICAVs),

provided the amount obtained on the

transfer/reimbursement (transfer price) is re-invested in

another fund/SICAV. Thus, the gain arising does not

trigger capital gains tax, the “old” acquisition value and

“old” acquisition date being “inherited” by the new

units/shares acquired when the re-investment takes

place. Dividends received are taxed at a fixed tax rate of

18 percent. The tax law specifically provides that

dividends payable by an HF (and, in general, by any CIS)

do not qualify for the annual €1,500 tax exemption

granted for other dividend payments. Dividends are

subject to withholding tax at the rate of 18 percent.

■ Spanish corporate investors: dividends and gain are

taxed at the rate of 32.5 percent (30 percent from 2008

onwards).

■ Non-Spanish investors (whether individuals or entities):

gains derived from the transfer or redemption of

units/shares of a Spanish HF are exempt from Spanish

tax. Dividends, however, are subject to withholding tax at

the general rate of 18 percent or at the reduced rate

provided for by an applicable tax treaty.

The tax treatment provided by Spanish tax law5 for Spanish HFs

applies to both Spanish and other European UCITS (i.e., UCITS

established in accordance with EC Directive 85/611/EEC – see

above) that are duly registered for distribution purposes with the

CNMV.6 On the other hand Spanish tax law is silent on the

subject of other funds that do not qualify as UCITS, so that both

European non-UCITs and non-European funds are governed by

the general tax provisions applying to any investment vehicle. In

this regard, assuming that such vehicles (funds, trusts,

partnerships) do not have separate legal personality and are not

directly taxed, their Spanish investors will be taxed on the

world-wide income/gains derived by the vehicles annually in

proportion to the interest they hold, as if the income/gains were

derived by them directly. This regime is known as the “régimende atribución de rentas” (transparency regime).

More specifically, a special provision applies to income and gains

arising from funds incorporated in tax haven jurisdictions. This

provision attributes an annual taxable deemed gain of 15 percent

(unless otherwise credited) to the fund’s units/shares, the

deemed gain being subject to annual taxation at the investor’s

marginal tax rate (rates of up to 43 percent, in the case of

individuals, and a fixed rate of 32.5 percent (30 percent from

2008 onwards), in the case of entities).

Thus, for Spanish purposes, a UCITS is considerably more tax

advantageous to investors than a non-UCITS fund (whether

European or not) because, in the case of a UCITS, the investors

are taxed only when the fund income/gains are realised (i.e., on

the payment of a dividend or the reimbursement of units) while, in

the case of a non-UCITS fund, the investors are taxed as though

they are investing directly in the underlying assets held by the

fund, even if the fund has not distributed its earnings among its

unit holders.

From a withholding tax perspective, it should be borne in mind

that the entity obliged to withhold tax (at the rate of 18 percent)

on the gains arising from the transfer of units/shares of an HF,7

whether Spanish or non-Spanish, is:

■ Generally, the Spanish management entity.

■ In the case of gains from a foreign HF distributed in

Spain, the Spanish distributor.

■ In the case of a foreign management entity rendering

services in Spain under the free provision of services

principle (with a “European passport”), the Spanish tax

representative that must be appointed by such an entity.

■ In other cases, the investors themselves, by way of a

self-withholding mechanism.

From a regulatory perspective, it should be noted that it is almost

impossible for non-UCITS funds (whether from a European

country or elsewhere) to obtain registration with the CNMV

(although feasible in theory, in practice, this is very difficult in

practice because of the restrictions imposed on the CNMV),

which may have adverse tax (i.e., the transparency regime would

apply to the Spanish investors in such a fund) and distribution

consequences (i.e., the fund would not be able to carry on

solicited/active selling operations in Spain). That being said, as a

result of the recognition of domestic HFs, it is probable that

foreign HFs will now be able to be registered with the CNMV,

provided they can prove that they are equivalent to Spanish HFs,

i.e., if they comply with similar leverage thresholds, minimum

subscription requirements, etc. However, it remains unlikely that

an HF domiciled in an offshore jurisdiction such as the Cayman

Islands would be allowed by the regulatory bodies to carry on

distribution/marketing activities in Spain.

Spanish investors may still have the opportunity to invest in a

non-Spanish unregistered HF through a Spanish “fund of hedge

funds” (i.e., a fund that mainly invests its assets in other HFs) or

by directly asking the fund or its manager to buy units/shares

(using a procedure known as an “unsolicited sale”).

C. Conclusion

The main points of the analysis above may be summarised as

follows:

■ In order to become a “qualified” HF, that is an HF as

described above, an HF must obtain prior administrative

43

Spain

43

authorisation from the CNMV and be registered with the

relevant Official Register of the CNMV.

■ Beneficial tax treatment (i.e., 1 percent corporate income

tax) is automatically available to an HF, provided it meets

the regulatory requirements referred to in the previous

bullet and provided the stock held by the HF meets the

investment and other criteria.

■ Beneficial tax treatment is automatically available to an

HF’s investors (i.e., deferral of taxable gains on transfers if

proceeds are reinvested).

The use of an HF, which enjoys more investment flexibility and a

greater leverage threshold than a traditional Spanish CIS, is now

a viable alternative for investing in a wide range of transferable

securities. However, it should be noted that Spanish HFs are still

subject to certain risk-spreading, liquidity and other requirements

and constraints established by their regulating body, the CNMV.

This tends to result in their adopting somewhat “conservative”

investment policies and to prevent them from taking as much risk

as HFs located offshore.

IV. Other Spanish and non-Spanish investmentvehicles

A VCE or an HF that did not meet the regulatory requirements

discussed above would constitute a “traditional” investment

vehicle, and as such would be able to invest freely in whatever

assets it might consider appropriate in the course of its business.

Such an entity would not, however, enjoy the special tax

treatment available to a VCE or an HF and would be taxed as

follows:

■ Vehicle itself: worldwide net income would be taxed at

the rate of 32.5 percent (30 percent from 2008 onwards).

■ Individual investors: dividends (in excess of €1,500) and

gains would be taxed at the rate of 18 percent.

■ Corporate investors: dividends and gains would be taxed

at the rate of 32.5 percent (30 percent from 2008

onwards), although the taxation of dividends could be

reduced or eliminated by way of a tax credit.

Because no exchange control or other restrictions apply, it would

also be possible to invest in the contemplated targets (i.e.,

start-up companies and companies in difficulty) through a

non-Spanish vehicle that might or might not be similar to a

Spanish VCE or HF. However, it should be noted that such a

vehicle would not enjoy the favorable tax treatment enjoyed by a

VCE or an HF and it investors would be taxed as follows:

■ Individual investors: dividends and gains would be taxed

at the rate of 18 percent.

■ Corporate investors: dividends and gains would be taxed

at the rate of 32.5 percent (30 percent from 2008

onwards).

In the case of both Spanish and non-Spanish vehicles, where the

vehicle concerned does not have legal personality, its Spanish

investors (whether individuals or entities) will be taxed annually on

the world-wide income and gains derived by the vehicle, as if the

income and gains were derived directly by them in proportion to

the interest they hold in the vehicle.

A summary in tabular form of the consequences of using the

various kinds of investment vehicle is provided at the end of this

paper.

V. Basic Spanish tax planning for a privateequity fund

A. Investment in a Spanish business entity

Where PEF wishes to invest in a Spanish target (HBE), purely

from a tax standpoint, and assuming that PEF is a VCE subject

to a reduced corporate tax burden, HBE would ideally be set up

in any legal form qualifying as a transparent entity for tax

purposes and thus subject to look-through treatment. If this

structure were employed, the transparent vehicle’s income and

gains would not be directly taxed but instead would be allocated

to its unit holders/shareholders. Thus, the dividends and gains

derived by the HBE would not be taxed at the level of the HBE

and would be tax-exempt or taxed at a very low rate at the level

of the VCE.

It should, however, be stressed that most targets conduct

business in a form that provides limited liability (i.e., as

Sociedades Anónimas (SAs) or Sociedades de ResponsabilidadLimitada (SLs), in order to avoid further claims against unit

holders/shareholders. It is, therefore, unusual for a Spanish target

to adopt a legal form, such as a partnership or a SociedadColectiva, that is subject to the tax look-through regime and thus

taxable at the level of its unit holders/shareholders.

In light of the above, it will be assumed for purposes of this

discussion that the Spanish target would carry on business in the

form of an SA or SL and thus, automatically be subject to the

general corporate tax regime. As noted above, this would mean,

in essence, that its net income would be subject to corporate

income tax at the rate of 32.5 percent (30 percent from 2008

onwards).

PEF itself could be incorporated either as a VCF or as a VCC,

both vehicles being subject to the same tax regime (i.e., 99

percent tax relief with respect to gains arising from an interest

held for a period of between 2 and 15 years and a full tax credit

with respect to domestic dividends received) and to similar legal

requirements. Any other income derived by PEF would be

subject to the general corporate income tax rate of 32.5 percent

(30 percent from 2008 onwards).

For PEF to be able to enjoy favourable VCE tax status, it would

have to be incorporated in Spain under Spanish law as either a

qualifying VCF or a qualifying VCC, i.e., as a VCE subject to the

control and supervision of the CNMV that meets the

requirements laid down for such entities.

The tax advantages provided in Spanish law for unit

holders/shareholders of a Spanish VCE would make it advisable

for the investors to invest directly in PEF. The advantages

concerned may be summarised as follows:

■ Dividends received by Spanish individual investors would

be tax exempt up to an annual amount of €1,500, while

dividends received by Spanish corporate investors would

qualify for a full tax credit eliminating any tax liability with

respect to such dividends. Dividends received by

non-resident investors not engaged in a business in

Spain (i.e., without a Spanish PE) would not be taxed in

Spain.

■ Gains derived by Spanish individual investors would be

taxed at a fixed rate of 18 percent, while gains derived by

Spanish corporate investors would qualify for a full tax

credit eliminating any tax liability with respect to such

gains.8 Likewise, gains received by non-resident investors

Spain

44

44

not engaged in a business in Spain through a PE would

not be taxed in Spain.

B. Investment in a foreign business entity

In general terms, the tax status provided for in Spanish tax law for

a VCE applies on a world-wide basis, i.e., the tax relief with

respect to a VCE’s income and gains is available whatever the

source of the income and gains, unless the source country

qualifies as a tax haven jurisdiction.

Thus, dividends and gains derived from a foreign business entity

(FBE) would be 99 percent tax relieved provided: (1) FBE is

located in a non-tax haven jurisdiction; (ii) FBE’s profits are

subject to a corporate income that is similar to Spanish corporate

income tax; and (3) the profits giving rise to dividends and gains

received by the VCE arise from a business activity9 mainly carried

out abroad (i.e., outside Spain) by the foreign (underlying) entity.

It is important to note, however, that any foreign withholding tax

paid on the income and gains would be a final (i.e.,

non-refundable) tax burden.

Notwithstanding the above, it should also be noted that where

FBE does not have legal personality per se and is not taxed

directly, the transparency regime would apply and all FBE’s

income and gains would be attributable to the VCE as if the VCE

had derived them directly. As special VCE tax status, as provided

for in Spanish tax law, only concerns the dividends and gains

referred to above (i.e., gains arising from the transfer of units or

shares), any other income derived by or attributed to the VCE (for

example, income from a manufacturing business allocated to the

VCE under the transparency regime) would fall within the general

tax regime and be taxed at the rate of 32.5 percent (30 percent

from 2008 onwards). A Spanish VCE should, therefore, avoid

investing in an FBE that does not have legal personality.

From the perspective of VCE’s investor, the position will be the

same whether the VCE invests in HBE or FBE.

C. Overall preferred structure

As discussed in Section V.A., above, the preferred structure

would be achieved by setting up a qualifying VCE (i.e., either

a VCF or a VCC that meets the legal and regulatory

requirements applying to its incorporation and investments).

A qualifying VCE may invest in any (non-listed) business target

located either in Spain or abroad. If the target is located

abroad: (1) the jurisdiction in which the target is incorporated

should not be a jurisdiction qualifying as a tax haven for

Spanish tax purposes; and (2) the target should carry on a

business activity abroad. Otherwise, the dividends and gains

arising from the FBE will not qualify for the favourable tax

treatment provided for certain types of income derived by a

Spanish VCE.

When choosing between local and foreign investments, the

impact of any foreign withholding tax payable should be taken

into account, as such tax may represent a final (i.e.,

non-refundable) tax burden.

A Spanish VCE may make certain kinds of investment via an

intermediary vehicle, although it should be borne in mind that

the intermediary, like other VCE investments, should meet the

risk-spreading and other investment requirements established

for Spanish VCEs by the Spanish regulatory body.

From an indirect tax perspective, it may be noted that:

■ Neither the incorporation nor any subsequent increase in

the share capital of a VCE is subject to capital tax (unlike

similar transactions carried out by other Spanish entities,

which are subject to capital tax at the rate of 1 percent).

■ As the holding and management of the underlying assets

qualify as exempt activities for value added tax (VAT)

purposes, no VAT would be charged on the activities

carried out by a VCE or its management company. This

means, however, that the VCE would not be entitled to

recover or deduct any input VAT incurred in the course of

its business (for example, with respect to advisory

services or external audit services).

VI. Basic Spanish tax planning for a hedge fund

The benefits of a favourable tax regime are also available

where the chosen investment vehicle is an HF rather than a

VCE.

A Spanish HF that meets the requirements laid down by the

CNMV (the relevant regulatory body) is subject to corporate

income tax at the reduced rate of 1 percent, but is not entitled

to any tax credit. All the HF’s “passive income” (dividends,

interest, capital gains, etc.), is taxed at this reduced rate

regardless of its source, although when a foreign investment

is contemplated, it is important to remember that foreign

withholding tax paid would be a final (non-refundable) tax

burden.

From the point of view of the investors, the salient tax

considerations would be as follows:

A. Spanish individual investors

■ Gains would be taxed at the rate of 18 percent, being

subject to withholding tax at the rate of 18 percent.10

■ The special tax deferral mechanism for switches between

qualifying fund would apply, so that gains arising from the

transfer of units/shares of qualifying HFs would not be

taxed, provided the proceeds obtained from the

transfer/reimbursement (transfer price) were re-invested in

another fund/SICAV.

■ Dividends received would be taxed at a fixed tax rate of

18 percent.

B. Spanish corporate investors

Dividends and gains would be taxed at the rate of 32.5

percent (30 percent from 2008 onwards).

C. Non-Spanish investors (whether individual orcorporate)

Gains derived on the transfer or redemption of units/shares of

the Spanish HF would be exempt from Spanish tax. Dividends

would, however, be subject to withholding tax, either at the

general rate of 18 percent or at a reduced rate provided for in

an applicable tax treaty.

From an indirect tax perspective, it may be noted that:

■ Neither the incorporation nor any subsequent increase in

the share capital of an HF is subject to capital tax.

■ As the holding and management of the underlying assets

qualify as exempt activities for VAT purposes, no VAT

would be charged on the activities carried out by an HF.

This means, however, that the HF would not be entitled

45

Spain

45

to recover or deduct any input VAT incurred in the course of

its business.

VII. Spanish income taxation of income from acarried interest

Fees received by Savvy as compensation for his activities in

relation to the investment decisions of PEF (whether

calculated as a fixed amount or as a percentage of the

profits obtained by PEF) would be taxed at the progressive

tax rates under the Personal Income Tax Law, 43 percent

being the maximum rate. For the purpose of determining

Savvy’s net profit attributable to such activities, certain

expenses incurred in the course of those activities would be

deductible.

1 These vehicles were initially under the supervision of the SpanishCentral Bank.

2 For 2008 onwards, the corporate income tax rate has been set at30 percent. For 2007 only, following the repeal of the “traditional”rate of 35 percent, a transitional 32.5 percent rate applies.

3 Royal Decree 1080/1991, of July 5, 1991 specifies the 48jurisdictions that qualify as tax haven jurisdictions for Spanish taxpurposes.

4 There are some exceptions to the withholding tax rule, which apply,inter alia, to gains arising from exchange traded funds (ETFs) orgains arising from the transfer of CIS units/shares where theconsideration is in the form of new CIS units/shares.

5 For both personal and corporate income tax purposes

6 Whether these rules might apply to UCITS not registered with theCNMV needs to be examined further, although such applicationmight contravene the freedom of establishment principle in thecase of UCITS within the European Union.

7 There are special withholding tax rules that apply with respect togains from SICAV shares.

8 Provided the gains arise from the undistributed profits derived bythe VCE during the holding period.

9 As opposed to a mere holding activity that gives rise to passiveincome (i.e., interest and dividends).

10 There are some exceptions to this withholding tax rule, whichapply, inter alia, to gains arising from ETFs and gains arising fromthe transfer of CIS units/shares whose sale price is reimbursed innew CIS shares/units.

Spain

46

VCC (qualified) HF (qualified) Other Spanish vehicle Other non-Spanish vehicle

Controlled byregulatory body?

Yes (CNMV) Yes (CNMV) No N/A

Target Non listed equity Transferable securities Any Any

Legal form • Fund (no legal personality)

• Company (legal personality)

• Fund (no legal personality)

• Company (legal personality)

• Fund (no legal personality)

• Company (legal personality)

• Fund (no legal personality)

• Company (legal personality)

Investment/equityrequirements

Yes Yes No No

Taxation ofvehicle

• 99% of gain derived is taxexempt, depending onholding period.

• Dividends are generally taxexempt.

• Other income is subject totax at general rate (32.5%/30%).

1% CIT • 32.5% (2007).

• 30% (2008 onwards)

N/A

Taxation over theinvestors

• Spanish individualinvestors: dividends (over€1,500 per year) and gainsare taxed at 18%.

• Spanish individualinvestors: dividends andgains are taxed at 18%.

• Spanish individualinvestors: dividends (over€1,500 per year) and gainsare taxed at 18%.

• Spanish individualinvestors: dividends (over€1,500 per year) and gainsare taxed at 18%.

Taxation ofinvestors

• Corporate investors:dividends and gains areexempt from CIT.

• Non-Spanish investors:dividends and gains are notbe subject to Spanish WHT.

• Corporate investors:dividends and gains aretaxed at 32.5% (30% from2008 onwards).

• Non-Spanish investors:dividends are subject to18% WHT or reducedtreaty rate. No WHT ongains

• Corporate investors:dividends and gains aretaxed at 32.5% (30% from2008 onwards).

• Where vehicle does nothave legal personality,Spanish investors (whetherindividuals or entities) aretaxed annually onworld-wide income/gainsderived by vehicle, as ifdirectly derived by theinvestors, in proportion tointerest held.

• Non-Spanish investors:dividends and gains subjectto 18% WHT or reducedtreaty rate.

• Corporate investors:dividends and gains aretaxed at 32.5% (30% from2008 onwards).

• Where vehicle does nothave legal personality,tSpanish investors (whetherindividuals or entities) aretaxed annually onworld-wide income/gainsderived by vehicle, as ifdirectly derived by theinvestors, in proportion tointerest held.

46

Host CountrySWITZERLAND

Walter H. BossBLUM Attorneys at Law, Zürich

Walter H. Boss was born in Bern in 1952. He is a

graduate of the University of Bern and also graduated

from New York University School of Law with a Master

of Laws (Tax) Degree. Mr. Boss was admitted to the bar

in 1980. Until 1984 he served in the Federal Tax

Administration (International Tax Law Division) as legal

counsel; he was also a delegate at the OECD Committee

on Fiscal Affairs. He then was an international tax

attorney with major firms in Lugano and Zürich. In 1988,

he became a partner at Ernst & Young’s International

Services Office in New York. After having joined a major

law firm in Zürich he is now with the law firm von Meiss

Blum & Partners, Zürich, where he heads the tax

department. His areas of concentration are national and

international tax law, mergers and acquisitions and

corporate restructurings. He practices in German,

English, French and Italian and has published extensively

both in Switzerland and in the United States. He is a

member of the Swiss and Zürich Bar Associations, the

American Bar Association, the International Bar

Association and the International Fiscal Association. He

also served as Chairman of the Tax Chapter Board of the

Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce and is a

member of the Chapter Doing Business in Switzerland.

I. Introduction

The Swiss Federal Act on Collective Capital Investments (CCIA),

which replaced the former regulations on investment funds,

came into force on January 1, 2007. The CCIA, which contains a

comprehensive set of rules, follows the “same business, same

rules” principle and provides, generally speaking, that all forms of

collective invest-ment schemes are governed by the CCIA and

are supervised by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (FBC).

The previous law on investment funds allowed only open-ended

investment funds based on collective investment agreements

concluded by the fund management and the custodian bank

with the investors. These investment funds were subject to the

supervision of the FBC and were entitled to use the term “fund”

in their name and to solicit fund investors publicly. Other types of

collective capital investment funds existed but were not subject

to the previous law on investment funds. Contempo-rary types of

collective investment schemes such as Sociétésd’Investissement à Capital Variable (SICAVs) and limited

partnerships did not exist.

The CCIA specifies three criteria that are decisive for determining

whether a scheme constitutes a Swiss collective investment

scheme: (i) an investment in the scheme must qualify as a capital

investment; (ii) the capital investment must be made by a number

of investors; and (iii) the capital invest-ment must be made in a

collective manner.

The CCIA distinguishes between open-ended and closed-ended

collective capital invest-ments,1 the distinction depending on

whether the investor has the right to have his shares repaid at

their net asset value. In the case of an open-ended collective

capital investment, the investor has the right to have his shares

repaid at their net asset value.2

Open-ended collective capital investments comprise: (i)

investment funds set up as con-tractual schemes,3 which were

also permitted under the previous law; and (ii) investment

companies with a variable capital (i.e., SICAVs),4 which are a new

investment vehicle.

Closed-ended collective capital investments comprise: (i) limited

partnerships for collective capital investments (LPs),5 which are a

newly created form of partnership; and (ii) investment com-panies

with fixed capital (Sociétés d’Investissement à Capital Fixe orSICAFs).6

Investment companies in the form of stock companies, whose

shares are either traded on a Swiss stock exchange or held

exclusively by qualified investors, are outside the scope of the

CCIA.7 Furthermore, neither operating companies, holding

companies nor investment clubs whose members are able to

manage their interests independently are sub-ject to the CCIA.8

As a matter of principle, the CCIA does not apply to in-house

funds (pooled assets) available to both banks and securities

dealers for the collective in-vestment and management of their

clients’ portfolios.9

The CCIA distinguishes two categories of investors – qualified

investors and other investors.10 Qualified investors com-prise

institutional investors, including banks, insurance companies and

pension funds, as well as high-net-worth individuals holding,

directly or indirectly, financial assets of at least CHF 2 million and

investors who have entered into a written discre-tionary asset

management agreement with a qualified asset manager.11 The

FBC is authorised to relieve from certain requirements a collective

investment whose circle of investors is comprised exclusively of

qualified investors.12

The SICAV and the LP are newly created, tax-transparent legal

forms for collective investment.13 Because of the

tax-transparency of these vehicles, their capital gains and

dividend or interest income are taxed at the level of the partners

based on a proportionate attribution, but not at the level of the

SICAF or the LP. Unless specific exceptions apply, dividend and

interest income is subject to withholding tax. The general

partner’s share in capital gains, i.e., the “carried interest”, is

subject to income tax in his hands. The subscription of an

interest in a SICAV or an LP is exempt from issuance stamp tax14

and both SICAVs and LPs are exempt from transfer stamp tax on

the trading of taxable securities.15 On the other hand, the trading

47

47

of shares in a SICAV or an LP by a Swiss investor who qualifies

as a securities dealer is subject to transfer stamp tax, since

shares in a SICAV or an LP are considered to be taxable

securities.16 Conversely, a SICAF is treated as a separate legal

entity for tax purposes.17

The LP resembles an Anglo-Saxon limited partnership. It has

been designed for investments in risk capital and is, therefore,

primarily intended for private equity investments and hedge fund

investments. Nevertheless, it may also be used for collective

investments in construction and real estate projects or alternative

investments. The LP is available to qualified investors only.

An LP is subject to some of the rules of the Swiss Code of

Obligations, which governs (common) limited partnerships. The

most noteworthy divergence from these rules lies in the fact that

the general partner of an LP must be a legal entity, whereas the

general partner of a common limited partnership must always be

an individual. Pursuant to the CCIA, the partner subject to

unlimited liability must be a stock corporation with a paid-in share

capital of at least CHF 100,000 that has its registered office in

Switzerland.18 The general partner is responsible for the

management of the LP.

Another way in which the CCIA departs from the Swiss Code of

Obligations is that the non-competition clause has been

rescinded for the limited partners19 and eased for the general

partner of an LP. The latter may engage in other activities, as long

as they are disclosed and do not run contrary to the interests of

the LP.20 However, the general partner is not allowed to act as a

general partner in more than one LP.21 The limited partners on the

other hand have no right of co-determination with regard to

investment decisions; hence, they are excluded from the

management of the LP. They are, however, entitled to inspect the

books and accounts of the LP at any time and to receive

quarterly reports.22

II. Basic Swiss tax planning for a private equityfund

As envisaged in the fact pattern for this discussion, a small circle

of investors comprised of a Swiss wealthy individual (HI), a foreign

wealthy individual (FI), a Swiss pension fund that is a tax-exempt

entity under Switzerland’s income tax law (HPEN), a foreign

pension fund (FPEN), and a foreign government (FGOV) intend to

set up a private equity fund (PEF). PEF will be making

investments both in business entities formed and operating in

Switzerland (HBE) and in business entities formed and operating

abroad (FBE).

Given the narrowly limited circle of investors and the

circumstances described in the fact pattern, it is assumed that

the investors intend to set up a closed-ended collective capital

investment vehicle. As discussed above, closed-ended collective

capital investment vehicles under the CCIA comprise LPs and

SICAFs.

A. Investment in a Swiss business entity

1. Preferred structure for a Swiss individual

a. Investment in a Swiss private equity fund

Assuming that it is the intention of the investors to set up a

closed-ended collec-tive capital investment vehicle under Swiss

law and that HI is a qualified investor under the CCIA, (i.e., a

high-net-worth individual holding directly or indirectly financial

assets of at least CHF 2 million), the most tax efficient Swiss

closed-ended collective investment vehicle for HI would appear

to be an LP under the CCIA. Because an LP is treated as a

tax-transparent entity, the double taxation of income derived from

HBE (first at the level of the LP and subsequently in the hands of

HI) can be avoided.

As a SICAF is treated as a separate legal entity for tax purposes,

if PEF were a SICAF, income derived from HBE would be taxed

both at the level of the SICAF and at the level of HI. As a

consequence, a SICAF would appear to be a less attractive

collective investment vehicle for these purposes.

Assuming that HI holds his interest as a limited partner in the LP

as part of his private assets (as opposed to business assets), the

tax consequences for HI with regard to his investment in the LP

are as follows:

■ Both distributed and retained earnings are subject to

personal income tax;

■ Both distributed and retained capital gains are tax free,

provided the LP is in a position to distribute the capital

gains separately from other types of income;

■ The sale of HI’s share in the LP will be tax free; and

■ HI’s share in the LP is subject to net wealth tax.

Assuming that HI holds his share in the LP as business assets or

that HI qualifies as a securities dealer, the tax consequences for

HI with regard to his investment in the LP are as follows:

■ Both distributed and retained earnings are subject to

income tax;

■ Both distributed and retained capital gains are subject to

income tax;

■ The sale of HI’s share in the LP will give rise to a capital

gain subject to income tax or a tax-deductible capital

loss; and

■ HI’s share in the LP is subject to (cantonal and

communal) capital tax.

b. Investment in a foreign private equity fund

Whether it is more tax efficient for HI to invest in a foreign PEF

than a Swiss PEF will depend on the tax laws of the foreign

country in which PEF is located and on whether there is a

favourable tax treaty between Switzerland and that country.

Assuming that HI holds his share in the foreign PEF as private

assets, under the tax laws of Switzerland, the tax consequences

for HI are as follows:

■ Distributed earnings are subject to personal income tax;

■ Distributed capital gains are tax free;

■ The sale of HI’s share in the foreign PEF will be tax free;

and

■ HI’s share in the foreign PEF is subject to net wealth tax.

Assuming that HI holds his share in the foreign PEF as business

assets or qualifies as a securities dealer, the Swiss tax

consequences for HI are as follows:

■ Distributed earnings are subject to income tax;

■ Distributed capital gains are subject to income tax;

■ The sale of HI’s share in the foreign PEF will give rise to a

capital gain subject to income tax or a tax-deductible

capital loss; and

■ HI’s share in the foreign PEF is subject to capital tax.

48

Switzerland

48

c. Tax efficient structure for the Swiss business entity

Given the circumstances envisaged in the fact pattern, the most

tax efficient structure for HBE is a partnership. As a partnership is

treated as a tax-transparent entity, double taxation (i.e., at the

level of HBE and at the level of PEF) may be avoided.

As a Swiss corporation is treated as a separate legal entity for tax

purposes, if HBE were to be set up as a Swiss cor-poration, its

income would be taxed both at the level of HBE and at the level

of PEF respectively the partners of PEF.

However because, as noted above, a Swiss partnership must

have at least one individual partner with unlimited liability, very few

Swiss business entities are set up as partnerships. The

overwhelming majority of business investments in Switzerland are

made either through a stock corpo-ration (AG) or a limited liability

company (GmbH).

d. Location of the private equity fund’s management office

Assuming that the PEF is set up as an LP in accordance with the

CCIA, the general partner that is responsible for the management

of the LP must be a stock corporation organised under the laws

of Switzerland with its registered office in Switzerland. The

general partner of a Swiss LP is required to obtain a licence from

the FBC as an asset manager. However, the general manager

may delegate the asset management fully or partially to a third

party asset manager.

If a foreign PEF has its management office in Switzerland, it runs

the risk of becoming subject to Swiss corporate income tax on its

worldwide income, absent special exemptions or specific treaty

provisions, by virtue of having its effective place of management

in Switzerland.

A legal entity is subject to tax as a cor-poration resident in

Switzerland if either its place of registration or its effective

management is in Switzerland.23 A legal entity that meets either of

these criteria is subject to unlimited Swiss tax liability, i.e., it is

taxed on its worldwide income, absent special exemp-tions or

specific treaty provisions. The meaning of the term “place of

effective management” has been inter-preted by the Federal

Supreme Court in its jurisprudence relating to the delimitation of

tax sover-eignty among the various cantons. In a number of

decisions, the Federal Supreme Court has located the place of

effective management where a corpo-ration has the centre of its

economic and factual existence,24 where the management (which

generally takes place at the seat of the corporation), is effectively

administered,25 and where those actions are taken that in their

entirety serve the pursuit of the corporation’s statutory purpose.26

This old jurisprudence has been con-firmed by later decisions.27

The relevant activity is the administration of the day-to-day

business, not the activity of the corporations highest organs, to

the extent that their province is merely the oversight of the

effec-tive management of the company and the making of

fundamental decisions. As a general rule, those persons

authorised by the board of directors to direct the business and

other members of higher manage-ment are considered to be

indicative of where the effective place of management is located.

For withholding tax purposes, a legal entity is considered a Swiss

resident if (among other criteria) its statutory seat is outside

Switzerland but it is effectively managed in Switzerland and has a

business activity in Switzer-land. Thus, characterisation as a

Swiss legal entity under the Federal Withholding Tax Act requires

the existence not only of a place of effective management but

also a business activity in Switzerland. Pursuant to the practice

developed by the Federal Tax Administration, a business activity

within Switzerland may be under-stood as manufacturing, trade

or the rendering of services in Switzerland. Under the Federal

Withholding Tax Act, any distribution paid out with respect to the

shares of a Swiss resident corporation will be subject to Swiss

federal withholding tax, the current rate of which is 35 percent.

As the federal withholding tax is imposed on the net amount of

the distribution, the effective rate of withholding tax on the

grossed up amount of the distribution is 53.8 percent.

To avoid the risk of being subject to unlimited Swiss corporate

taxation, the management office of the foreign PEF should,

therefore, be located outside Switzerland.

e. Direct or indirect investment in the private equity fund

Assuming that the PEF is set up as an LP in accordance with

the CCIA, it would not be tax efficient for HI to hold his share

in the LP through a special entity. As an LP under the CCIA is

treated as a tax-transparent entity for tax purposes, the most

tax efficient structure in the circumstances would be for HI to

invest directly in the LP.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

a. Investment in a Swiss private equity fund

Although, as noted above, an LP formed under the CCIA is

treated as a transparent entity for corporate income tax

purposes, it is not considered tax transparent for Swiss federal

withholding tax purposes. An LP’s distributed and re-tained

earnings, dividend and interest income, as well as annuities, are

subject to withholding tax, but not its capital gains, provided the

LP is in a position to distribute the capital gains separately from

the other types of income.28

As a SICAF is treated as a separate legal entity for tax purposes,

any distri-butions it makes to its shareholders, even those derived

from capital gains, are sub-ject to withholding tax.

Consequently, the most tax efficient structure for an investment of

FI in a Swiss PEF would appear to be to have PEF set up in the

form of an LP, assuming that FI is a qualified investor under the

CCIA. FI’s share of the distributed and retained earnings, dividend

and inter-est income, as well as annuities, of the LP would be

subject to withholding tax. Whether FI would be able to reclaim

the tax withheld, either fully or partially, would depend on whether

there was a tax treaty between Switzerland and the country of

residence of FI. FI’s share of the distributed and retained capital

gains realised by the LP would be tax-free.

b. Investment in a foreign private equity fund

Whether it is more efficient for FI to invest in a foreign PEF than a

Swiss PEF will depend on the tax laws of the country of

resi-dence of the foreign PEF and those of the country of

residence of FI as well as on whether there is a favourable tax

treaty between the country of residence of the foreign PEF and

the country of residence of FI.

c. Tax efficient structure for the Swiss business entity

Given the circumstances envisaged in the fact pattern, the most

tax efficient structure for HBE is a partnership. As a partnership is

treated as a tax-transparent entity, double taxation (i.e., at the

level of HBE and at the level of PEF respectively the partners of

PEF) may be avoided.

However, because, as noted above, a Swiss partnership must

have at least one individual partner with unlimited liability, very few

Swiss business entities are set up as partnerships. The

overwhelming majority of business investments in Switzerland are

made either through a stock corpo-ration (AG) or a limited liability

company (GmbH).

49

Switzerland

49

d. Location of the private equity fund’s management office

For a discussion of where PEF’s management office should be

located, see Section II.A.1.d., above.

e. Direct or indirect investment in the private equity fund

Assuming that FI is a resident of a country that has not

concluded a tax treaty with Switzerland, it may be tax efficient for

FI to hold his share in an LP set up in accordance with the CCIA

through a foreign entity incorporated in a country that has a

favourable tax treaty with Switzerland.

3. Preferred structure for a Swiss pension fund

a. Investment in a Swiss private equity fund

The most tax efficient Swiss closed-ended collective investment

vehicle for HPEN to make an investment in would appear to be

an LP under the CCIA. Because an LP is treated as a

tax-transparent entity and HPEN is a tax-exempt entity under

Swiss tax law, HPEN’s share in the income of the LP derived from

HBE would be tax free.

A SICAF is treated as a separate legal entity for tax purposes

and, therefore, would appear to be a less tax-efficient vehicle for

HPEN to invest in, since income derived from HBE would be

taxed at the level of the SICAF.

b. Investment in a foreign private equity fund

The only structure involving a foreign PEF that could be as tax

efficient as having HPEN invest in an LP under the CCIA, would

appear to be to have HPEN invest in a foreign PEF located

offshore, assuming that no income tax was levied at the level of

PEF and no withholding tax was levied on distributions to HPEN.

c. Tax efficient structure for the Swiss business entity

Given the circumstances envisaged in the fact pattern, the most

tax efficient structure for HBE is a partnership. As a partnership is

treated as a tax-transparent entity, taxation at the level of HBE

may be avoided.

As a Swiss corporation is treated as a separate legal entity for tax

purposes, if HBE were set up as a Swiss cor-poration, its income

would be taxed at the level of HBE and at the level of PEF.

However, because, as noted above, a Swiss partnership must

have at least one individual partner with unlimited liability, very few

Swiss business entities are set up as partnerships. The

overwhelming majority of business investments in Switzerland are

made either through a stock corpo-ration (AG) or a limited liability

company (GmbH).

d. Location of the private equity fund’s management office

For a discussion of where PEF’s management office should be

located, see Section II.A.1.d., above.

e. Direct or indirect investment in the private equity fund

Assuming that PEF is set up as an LP in accordance with the

CCIA, it would not be tax efficient for HPEN to hold its share in

the LP through a special entity. As an LP under the CCIA is

treated as a tax-trans-parent entity for tax purposes, the most tax

efficient structure in the circumstances would be for HPEN to

invest directly in the LP.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

a. Investment in a Swiss private equity fund

As noted above, an LP under the CCIA is, in principle, not

regarded as a tax-transparent entity for Swiss federal withholding

tax purposes. Both distributed and retained earnings, dividend

and interest income, as well as annuities, are subject to

withholding tax at the statutory rate of 35 percent. By way of

exception to the normal with-holding tax rules, an LP is treated

as a tax-transparent entity with respect to its capital gains.

Conse-quently, capital gains derived by an LP are tax free,

provided the LP is in a position to dis-tribute the capital gains

separately from its other types of income.

As a SICAF is treated as a separate legal entity for tax purposes,

any distri-butions it makes to its shareholders, even those derived

from capital gains, are subject to withholding tax.

The most tax efficient structure for an investment of FPEN in a

Swiss PEF would appear to be for PEF to be set up as an LP.

FPEN’s share of the distributed and retained earnings,

dividend and interest income, as well as annuities, of the LP

would be subject to withholding tax. Whether FPEN would be

able to reclaim the tax withheld, either fully or partially, would

depend on the terms of any tax treaty between Switzerland

and FPEN’s country of residence. FPEN’s share of both the

distributed and the retained capital gains realised by the LP

would be free of withholding tax.

b. Investment in a foreign private equity fund

Whether it is more tax efficient for FPEN to invest in a foreign

PEF than a Swiss PEF will depend on the tax laws of the

country of residence of the foreign PEF and those of the

country of residence of FPEN as well as on whether there is a

favourable tax treaty between the country of residence of the

foreign PEF and the country of residence of FPEN.

c. Tax efficient structure for the Swiss business entity

Given the circumstances envisaged in the fact pattern, the

most tax efficient structure for HBE is a partnership. As a

partnership is treated as a tax-transparent entity, double

taxation (i.e., at the level of HBE and at the level of PEF

respectively the partners of PEF) may be avoided.

As a Swiss corporation is treated as a separate legal entity for

tax purposes, if HBE were set up as a Swiss cor-poration, its

income would be taxed at the level of HBE and at the level of

PEF.

However, because, as noted above, a Swiss partnership must

have at least one individual partner with unlimited liability, very

few Swiss business entities are set up as partnerships. The

overwhelming majority of business investments in Switzerland

are made either through a stock corpo-ration (AG) or a limited

liability company (GmbH).

d. Location of the private equity fund’s management office

For a discussion of where PEF’s management office should

be located, see Section II.A.1.d., above.

e. Direct or indirect investment in the private equity fund

If FPEN is a resident of a country that has not concluded a tax

treaty with Switzerland, it may be tax efficient for FPEN to

hold its share in an LP under the CCIA through a foreign entity

incorpo-rated in a country that has concluded a favourable

tax treaty with Swit-zerland, provided there is no treaty abuse.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

a. Investment in a Swiss private equity fund

The most tax efficient structure for an investment of FGOV in

a Swiss PEF would appear to be for PEF to be set up as an

LP. FGOV’s share of the distributed and retained earnings,

dividend and interest income, as well as annuities, of the LP

would be subject to withholding tax. Whether FGOV would be

able to reclaim the tax withheld, either fully or partially, would

depend on the terms of any tax treaty between Switzerland

50

Switzerland

50

and the country of which FGOV is a government. FGOV’s

share of both the distributed and the retained capital gains

realised by the LP would be free of withholding tax.

b. Investment in a foreign private equity fund

Whether it is more tax efficient for FGOV to invest in a

foreign PEF than a Swiss PEF will depend on the tax laws

of the country of residence of the foreign PEF and those of

the country of which FGOV is a government, as well as on

whether there is a favourable tax treaty between the

country of residence of the foreign PEF and the country of

which FGOV is a government.

c. Tax efficient structure for the Swiss business entity

Given the circumstances envisaged in the fact pattern, the

most tax efficient structure for HBE is a partnership. As a

partnership is treated as a tax-transparent entity, double

taxation (i.e., at the level of HBE and at the level of PEF

respectively the partners of PEF) may be avoided.

As a Swiss corporation is treated as a separate legal entity

for tax purposes, if HBE were set up as a Swiss

cor-poration, its income would be taxed at the level of HBE

and at the level of PEF.

However, because, as noted above, a Swiss partnership

must have at least one individual partner with unlimited

liability, very few Swiss business entities are set up as

partnerships. The overwhelming majority of business

investments in Switzerland are made either through a stock

corpo-ration (AG) or a limited liability company (GmbH).

d. Location of the private equity fund’s management office

For a discussion of where PEF’s management office should

be located, see Section II.A.1.d., above.

e. Direct or indirect investment in the private equity fund

If FGOV is a government of a country that has not

concluded a tax treaty with Switzerland, it may be tax

efficient for FGOV to hold its share in an LP under the CCIA

through a foreign entity incorpo-rated in a country that has

concluded a favourable tax treaty with Swit-zerland,

provided there is no treaty abuse.

B. Investment in a foreign business entity

Assuming that it is the intention of the investors to set up a

closed-ended collec-tive capital investment vehicle under

Swiss law, the most tax efficient such vehicle for all the

investors envisaged would appear to be an LP under the

CCIA. As an LP is treated as a tax-transparent entity, the

double taxation of income derived from the FBE (i.e., both

at the level of the LP and at the level of the investors) can

be avoided.

As a SICAF is treated as a separate legal entity for tax

purposes, if PEF were a SICAF, income derived from FBE

would be taxed both at the level of the SICAF and at the

level of the investors. As a consequence, a SICAF would

appear to be a less attractive collective investment vehicle

for these purposes.

C. Overall preferred structure

The overall preferred structure for investors wishing to set

up a closed-ended collec-tive capital investment vehicle

under Swiss law would appear to be for the investors to

use an LP under the CCIA. As an LP is treated as a

tax-transparent entity, double taxation of income derived

from HBE or FBE (i.e., both at the level of the LP and the

investors) can be avoided.

It is possible that setting up a foreign PEF located offshore

could be more tax efficient than setting up an LP under the

CCIA if no income tax was levied at the level of the PEF and

no withholding tax was imposed on dis-tributions made to

the investors.

III. Basic Swiss tax planning for a hedge fund

The LP under the CCIA has been designed for investments

in risk capital and is, therefore, mainly used for private

equity investments and hedge fund (HF) investments.

The most tax efficient structure for a Swiss HF is, therefore,

an LP under the CCIA and the considerations outlined above

with regard to a Swiss PEF would consequently also apply to

an investment in a Swiss HF.

Again, setting up a foreign HF located offshore could be more

tax efficient than setting up an LP under the CCIA, provided

no income tax was levied at the level of the HF and no

withholding tax was im-posed on distributions to investors.

IV. Swiss income taxation of income from acarried interest

The general partner’s share in capital gains (i.e., the “carried

interest”) is subject to Swiss income tax in the hands of the

general partner at the regular tax rates. This ordinary taxation

of income derived from a carried interest is re-garded as a

major drawback to setting up a PEF or an HF in Switzerland.

1 CCIA, Article 7, paragraph 2

2 CCIA, Article 8, paragraph 2

3 CCIA, Articles 25 et seq.

4 CCIA, Articles 36 et seq.

5 CCIA, Articles 98 et seq.

6 CCIA, Articles 110 et seq.

7 CCIA, Article 2, paragraph 3

8 CCIA, Article 2, paragraph 2

9 CCIA, Article 4, paragraph 1

10 CCIA, Article 10

11 CCIA, Article 10, paragraph 3; Ordinance on Collective CapitalInvestments of November 22, 2006, Article 6

12 CCIA, Article 10, paragraph 5

13 Federal Direct Tax Act of December 14, 1990 (as amended) (FDTA),Article 10, paragraph 2; Federal Tax Harmonization Act ofDecember 14, 1990 (as amended) (FTHA), Article 7, paragraph 3

14 Federal Stamp Tax Act of June 27, 1973 (as amended) (FSTA),Article 6, paragraph 1, lit. i

15 FSTA, Article 17a, paragraph 1, lit. b

16 FSTA, Article 13, paragraph 2, lit. a, cipher 1

17 FDTA, Article 49, paragraph 2; FTHA, Article 20, paragraph 1

18 CCIA, Article 98, paragraph 2

19 CCIA, Article 104, paragraph 1

20 CCIA, Article 104, paragraph 2

21 CCIA, Article 98, paragraph 2

22 CCIA, Article 106

23 FDTA, Article 50

24 BGE 54 I 308

25 BGE 50 I 103

26 BGE 50 I 104

27 StE 1999 A 24.22, Nr. 3

28 Federal Withholding Tax Act of October 13, 1965 (as amended)(FWHT), Article 4, paragraph 1, lit. c and Article 5, paragraph 1,lit. b

51

Switzerland

51

Host CountryUNITED KINGDOM

Nicola Purcell and Amy ManchiaMcDermott Will & Emery U.K. LLP, London

Nicola Purcell is a partner in McDermott, Will & Emery’s

London tax group. She regularly advises on a broad

range of domestic and cross-border commercial tax

issues, including corporate reorganisations, corporate

and structured finance projects, transfer pricing and thin

capitalisation issues. In addition, Nicola also advises on

U.K. value added tax, particularly in the context of

e-commerce.

I. Introduction

The reader is asked to note that a discussion of any potential

stamp duty, stamp duty reserve tax, stamp duty land tax or

value added tax issues arising from the proposed PEF/HF

investments is beyond the scope of this response.

Given HI is “a Host Country wealthy individual”, we have

assumed for the purpose of this paper, that HI is a U.K. higher

rate income tax payer subject to a 32.5 percent rate of tax on

dividend income and a 40 percent rate of tax on other

income.

We have also assumed that neither the PEF nor the HF would

be investing in real estate through a special purpose vehicle,

for example, a real estate investment trust (REITs).

II. Basic U.K. tax planning for a private equityfund

We have been asked to consider the PEF structure on the

assumption that the PEF will fund its investments only with

contributed capital and not with any borrowings. We

understand this to mean that PEF will not borrow funds from

third parties nor from investors in the fund in order to acquire

investments. We also assume that any intermediate

acquisition vehicle interposed between PEF and the foreign or

home country business entity investment would not borrow

funds from PEF or any other party to make these investments.

It should be noted, however, that in the U.K. market, a private

equity fund will ordinarily fund its investments with a high level

of debt to capital. This generates interest deductions at the

level of the portfolio companies or special purpose corporate

acquisition vehicles thus sheltering PEF profits from local

taxation.

Where a private equity fund finances its investments with

debt, issues arising include the United Kingdom’s transfer

pricing legislation,1 which requires that such debt is entered

into on arm’s length terms. Also, withholding tax planning

strategies (involving debt/hybrid instruments and acquisition

structures in foreign jurisdictions) may be relevant.

However, given the factual assumption we have been asked

to make that the PEF does not fund any of its investments

with borrowings, we have not discussed the issues described

above.

For the purposes of this paper, we assume that the PEF will

participate 100 percent in the foreign and home country

business enterprise.

A. Investment in a U.K. business entity

1. Preferred structure for a U.K. individual

The preferred structure for HI would require that PEF is

constituted by a fiscally transparent partnership,

non-corporate entity with limited liability. This is to ensure that

there is no taxation at the fund level on returns from

underlying investments and hence no tax leakage which

would impact on HI’s overall return on the PEF investment.

Furthermore, HI’s liability will be limited to the capital

contributed to the fund.

For U.K. private equity houses, these objectives are typically

achieved via constitution of the fund by a U.K. established

limited partnership formed under the Limited Partnerships Act

1907 (“LPA”), (“LP”).2

An LP is a tax transparent entity for U.K. tax purposes and

governed by a relatively light regulatory regime which has

made the LP the vehicle of choice for certain types of funds,

especially private equity funds.3

An LP must include one or more general partners, who have

the responsibility for managing the business of the

partnership. The general partners have unlimited liability for

the debts of the partnership.4 The general partner will typically

be a corporate partner which itself has unlimited liability. The

remaining partners are limited partners, who elect not to take

a positive role in the operation of the partnership in exchange

for limited liability. The investors, HI in this scenario, will be

limited partners.

The LP would invest directly in a portfolio U.K. incorporated

company, HBE.

Accordingly, given the fiscal transparency of an LP, profits,

gains and losses arising from the operations of PEF would be

treated as arising directly to the investors of PEF according to

their allocation rights pursuant to the partnership agreement.

HI, being a U.K. tax resident individual, would be subject to

U.K. tax on the returns from the investment in HBE.

The taxation of HI on such returns from the PEF investment

will depend on whether the PEF is carrying on a trade or an

investment business (see below).5

52

52

Provided that PEF is carrying on an investment business, not

trading, the return received by HI on the sale of HBE should

be treated as a capital return and chargeable to capital gains

tax. Similarly, a sale of his interest in PEF should be treated as

a capital transaction.

HI would be subject to income tax in respect of income profits

such as interest and other income distributions (e.g.,

dividends) arising from the PEF’s investment in HBE (although

interest income may not be likely given the factual

assumptions relevant to Section II. mentioned above).

Income (except dividend income) and capital gains tax is

chargeable at a prevailing rate of 40 percent. Dividend income

is taxable at 32.5 percent. However, dividend income carries a

tax credit of 10 percent and is, therefore, taxed at an effective

rate of 25 percent. Reliefs may be applicable for capital gains

tax purposes and, as a result, the effective tax rate of tax on

capital gains can be as low as 10 percent (provided the

statutory conditions for business asset taper relief are

satisfied).6 Generally, it is preferable for an individual to

achieve capital gains rather than income treatment.

To complete the picture, as HBE is a U.K. corporation,

income and capital profits arising to HBE would be subject to

U.K. corporation tax at 30 percent (reducing to 28 percent

which effect from April 1, 2008). Lower rates are applicable to

companies/groups with chargeable profits for the accounting

period in question of £1,500,000 or less.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for FI is the same as stated at Section

II.A.1. above for HI.

No U.K. tax is payable at the PEF level. PEF profits would be

treated as arising directly to FI for U.K. tax purposes.

FI is not U.K. tax resident and as such, assuming PEF is not

trading in the United Kingdom and the income does not

comprise interest, should not be liable to U.K. income or

capital gains tax.

FI should consider making a claim under the relevant double

tax treaty or FI’s domestic tax legislation for double tax credit

for U.K. withholding taxes suffered.

FI would, however, be within the charge to U.K. income tax

on any profits of a trade exercised by or on behalf of FI within

the United Kingdom. If the partnership were trading, FI would

be subject to U.K. income tax on FI’s share of the PEF profits.

However, as noted above, provided and on the basis that the

PEF is an investment, not a trading partnership, FI should not

be within this charge to U.K. tax. See footnote 5 regarding the

status of the PEF as an investment LP.

3. Preferred structure for a U.K. pension fund

The preferred structure for HPEN is as set out at Section

II.A.1. above for HI.

Provided that the PEF is not trading and HPEN is an HMRC

registered pension scheme,7 then HPEN should be exempt

from tax on income and capital gains arising on its investment

in PEF. Given that PEF is fiscally transparent, HPEN will be

treated as directly carrying on the operations of PEF in

partnership with the other partners. As discussed at footnote

5, in the context of the operations of a private equity

partnership, the partnership is likely to be considered to be

carrying on an investment not a trading operation.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN is as set out at Section

II.A.1. above for HI.

FPEN would be subject to U.K. tax in the same manner and

to same extent as FI.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV is as set out at Section

II.A.1. above for HI.

In any event, where FGOV invests directly, it should not be

subject to any U.K. tax on the basis of sovereign immunity.8

B. Investment in foreign business entity

1. Preferred structure for a U.K. individual

The preferred structure would be the same as for HI investing

in HBE (as set out at Section II.A.1. above). That is, PEF

should be constituted as a U.K. LP investing in shares of the

FBE company. There need be no intermediate acquisition

vehicle subject to what we say below.

Foreign dividend income paid by FBE is treated, once

distributed, as accruing due to HI, not PEF, and would be

subject to U.K. income tax at 40 percent. Capital gains

realised on the sale of HI’s interest in PEF or, assuming PEF is

not trading, FBE should be subject to capital gains tax but

may benefit from more favourable reliefs (e.g., business asset

taper relief) if the relevant statutory conditions are satisfied.

HI should consider a claim for double tax relief for local taxes,

if any, borne on realisation of the investment in FBE and for

any local dividend withholding tax under the terms of the

relevant double tax treaty or, failing which, under U.K.

domestic legislation.

If FBE’s jurisdiction treats the PEF as a taxable entity and not

fiscally transparent, local taxes mentioned in the previous

paragraph would be treated as taxes borne by the PEF not

the individual investor. In this case, PEF would not be eligible

for treaty relief or unilateral relief under U.K. domestic

legislation in respect of those local taxes; the U.K. tax

authority, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), would consider

these to be the tax liabilities of the investors in the PEF. This

leads to effective double taxation of HI.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure would be for PEF to set up as a

foreign partnership or corporation with no presence in the

United Kingdom. Care should be taken to ensure that any

foreign company in the structure is not centrally managed and

controlled from the United Kingdom9 to avoid the company

becoming U.K. tax resident. For the purposes of U.K. tax on

income, it would not matter how FBE is set up in these

circumstances.

Provided that PEF is an investment, not a trading, partnership

or corporation, FI should not be within the charge to U.K. tax

by reference to profits of a trade exercised within the United

Kingdom (see discussion at Section II.A.2. above).

Furthermore, even where management functions are carried

on in the United Kingdom, any foreign PEF corporation would

not be within the charge to U.K. corporation tax provided any

such U.K. established investment management function is

carried out on behalf of the corporation as described at

Section III.A.1. below.

On this basis, FI should not be subject to U.K. tax.

53

United Kingdom

53

3. Preferred structure for a U.K. pension fund

The preferred structure for HPEN is as set out at Section

II.A.1. above for HI.

Provided that the PEF is not trading, then HPEN should not

be subject to U.K. tax on its investment in PEF and assuming

HPEN is an HMRC registered pension scheme, HPEN should

be exempt from tax on income and capital gains arising on its

investment in PEF (see discussion at Section II.A.3. above).

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure would the same as for FI (see Section

II.B.2. above).

On this basis, FPEN should not be subject to U.K. tax.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV is as set out at Section

II.B.2. above for HI.

In any event, regardless of the structure, FGOV should not

itself be subject to U.K. tax on the basis of sovereign

immunity.10

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

The overall preferred structure for cases where the

circumstances involve either (i) a U.K. established or U.K. tax

resident investor; or (ii) a U.K. source/situated investment is

as follows.

PEF should be constituted as an entity that is treated as tax

transparent for U.K. tax purposes and for tax purposes in the

jurisdiction of FBE/HBE (although the choice of which FBE or

HBE the PEF will invest in is unlikely to be decided on the

basis of tax considerations alone). A U.K. LP is frequently

used in these circumstances to ensure that tax charges on

returns realised from underlying investments of the fund only

arise at the level of the investors.

Where neither the investor nor the investment is established

or situated in the United Kingdom, no U.K. established

corporate or non-corporate entities should be used in the

structure to avoid subjecting the investor or any entity used in

the structure to U.K. tax. Foreign incorporated corporate

entities used in the structure should be managed and

controlled entirely outside of the United Kingdom to ensure

that the entity does not become U.K. tax resident (save to the

extent the U.K. Investment Manager Exemption applies).

III. Basic U.K. tax planning for a hedge fund

Given the various investment restrictions imposed on

Authorised Unit Trusts and Open-ended Investment

Companies by the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) (in

particular they cannot short sell or be leveraged), fund

mangers wishing to offer investors a hedge fund investment

do not, in practice, establish themselves as a U.K.-regulated

vehicle.

Furthermore, a hedge fund will typically be considered to be

carrying on a trade rather than an investment business for

U.K. tax purposes (see above at footnote 5; on the basis that

the HF is taking short positions on the underlying assets

acquired). As a result, unauthorised unit trusts, investment

trusts and LPs are not tax efficient vehicles for hedge fund

investors, given the tax implications of these vehicles carrying

on a trade in the United Kingdom (discussed further below).

Unauthorised unit trusts and investment trusts are also likely

to give rise to some tax leakage at the fund level.

On this basis, the preferred structure, discussed below, would

be the same for all classes of investor and would be the same

whether or not the HF invests in assets generating host

country source income (“HCI”) or assets generating foreign

country source income (“FCI”).

A. Investment in assets generating host country sourceincome

1. Preferred structure for a U.K. individual

The preferred structure for HI would be to make investments

via an offshore company, e.g., incorporated in the Cayman

Islands (for the reasons set out above). There should be no

liability to U.K. tax imposed on the offshore company on the

basis that it is a foreign incorporated company which is

centrally managed and controlled outside of the United

Kingdom. The Cayman Islands is typically the jurisdiction

chosen for incorporation of hedge fund vehicles as a Cayman

Islands company, we understand, is tax neutral; there should

be no (or negligible) Cayman Islands’ taxation on the profits of

the HF.

Furthermore, use of a corporate vehicle rather than a tax

transparent partnership vehicle, will defer tax charges on the

investor until such time as profits from underlying investments

are distributed by the HF or the HF shares are disposed of by

the investor; returns on underlying investments (and

accompanying tax charges) would not accrue directly to the

investor.

It is important to ensure that any investment manager acting

on behalf of the HF and operating out of the United Kingdom

does not constitute a U.K. permanent establishment of HF. A

non-resident company is within the charge to corporation tax

if it is carrying on a trade in the United Kingdom through a

U.K. permanent establishment. Profits of the non-resident

company attributable to the activities of the U.K. permanent

establishment are so chargeable. However, provided either

that (i) the investment manager is an independent agent

acting in the ordinary course of his business of providing

investment management services,11 or (ii) the arrangements

between the investment manager and the HF satisfy the

conditions of the U.K. Investment Manager Exemption, then

the investment manager should not constitute the U.K.

permanent establishment of the HF and HF should not be

exposed to this charge to U.K. corporation tax.12

All returns for HI on the investment in the HF are taxed as

income subject to 40 percent income tax rate. Hedge funds

typically do not distribute income to investors; the investor

return is received on redemption of the investment in HF.

However, capital returns on realisation of the HF investment

are also taxed as income on the basis of the application of

anti-avoidance provisions applying to offshore funds that

accumulate distributable income rather than distribute that

income to investors. The anti-avoidance legislation seeks to

ensure that investors do not roll-up income offshore tax-free

and then realise their investments on redemption as capital

gain in order to gain the more favourable reliefs/effective U.K.

tax rates on capital gains.13

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure would be for HF to set up as a foreign

partnership or corporation with no presence in the United

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Kingdom. Care should be taken to ensure that any foreign

company in the structure is not centrally managed and

controlled from the United Kingdom to avoid the company

becoming U.K. tax resident. For the purposes of U.K. tax on

income, it would not matter how FBE is set up.

If the investment management function is to be carried out

from the United Kingdom, then provided that manager is an

independent agent or otherwise complies with the terms of

the U.K. Investment Manager Exemption (as referred to above

at Section III.A.1.), the investment manager would not

constitute a U.K. permanent establishment of the HF so as to

ensure that the HF does not become subject to U.K. taxation

on its investment returns.

On this basis, FI should not be subject to U.K. tax.

3. Preferred structure for a U.K. pension fund

The preferred structure for HPEN would be the same as for HI

described above at Section III.A.1.

Provided that HPEN’s acquisition of the shares of HF are for

investment purposes (so, applying the badges of trade

discussed at footnote 5 above, HF shares are to be held long

term for capital appreciation and not to be disposed of in the

short term for profit), HPEN will be considered to be making

an investment. If HPEN is an HMRC registered pension

scheme it is tax exempt on its income and gains realised from

investments.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN would be the same as for FI

described above at Section III.A.2.

On this basis, FPEN should not be subject to U.K. tax.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV would be the same as for FI

described above at Section III.A.2.

In any event, regardless of the structure, FGOV should not be

subject to U.K. tax on the basis of sovereign immunity.14

B. Investment in assets generating foreign countrysource income

The position is as set out above at Section III.A. in respect of

investment by HF in HCI.

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

The preferred overall structure is that set out at Section III.A.1.

for the reasons described there.

IV. U.K. income taxation of income from acarried interest

A. Private equity

In the context of a private equity fund, “carried interest” is

essentially a subordinated limited partnership interest in

respect of which a share of any remaining profits of the LP will

be paid to the carried interest limited partners (the founders,

sponsors and managers of the fund) after payment of a) the

management fee/profit shares of the general partner or

manager, b) the return of investors’ contributions (structured

as capital and debt), and, c) payment of the investors’ agreed

rate of return on contributions. The remaining profits are split

between carried interest partners and investors. Typically,

carried interest partners will receive a “catch-up” allocation

before the remaining profits are split between the carried

interest partners and the investors. This carried interest of the

carried interest partners is generally bought for a nominal

amount.

The taxation of carried interest is governed by a non-statutory

memorandum of understanding published by the BVCA on

July 25, 2003 and agreed with HMRC (the MOU). The MOU

applies to an investment partnership (which does not carry on

a trade) whose sole or main purpose is to invest in unquoted

shares or securities. Provided the conditions in the MOU are

satisfied15 the carried interest partner will be taxed on all the

returns on its carried interest as capital and not to any extent

as compensation income for any employment of the partner

on behalf of the fund.

Provided further additional relevant statutory conditions are

satisfied, Savvy will generally benefit from a lower overall tax

rate on the carried interest than he would if the carried interest

returns were taxed as income/employment compensation;

given the more favourable tax reliefs on capital returns as

compared to income profits. In certain circumstances, an

effective 10 percent tax rate can be achieved as compared to

40 percent income tax rate on employment compensation.

The taxation of carried interest is currently the subject of

HMRC review and may be reformed. The U.K. Government

has stated that possible proposals for reform include the

increase in the overall effective tax rate from 10 percent to 20

percent. Given the possible reform, there is evidence that

some fund management groups may be moving towards LLP

structures such as those used in the hedge fund industry and

described below.

B. Hedge fund

In the context of the U.K. established investment manager of

a hedge fund constituted by an offshore company, it is

common for the investment management function to be

carried out via a U.K. limited liability partnership (“LLP”). The

LLP contracts directly with the fund in relation to its provision

of investment management services.

Typically, the investment management fee is structured as a

management fee equal to 2 percent of the net asset value of

the fund and a performance fee of 20 percent of the annual

profits of the fund.

The investment managers who on a traditional private equity

structure would have been entitled to carried interest become

partners (referred to as “members”) in the LLP taking their

share of the management fee and performance fee by way of

a share in LLP profits instead of as employment income; the

partners are considered to be self-employed and not

employees. Accordingly, members are subject to capital gains

tax or income tax on their share of the income or capital gains

of the partnership. This also avoids the cost of employers’

national insurance contributions (NICs) which would be

payable by the LLP in addition to any employment

compensation if the partners were treated as employees of

the LLP.

In the context of hedge fund management, an LLP is used as

the fund management vehicle rather than an LP for general

corporate purposes rather than for tax reasons. Although both

entities are partnerships which offer members/partners limited

liability, the Limited Liability Partnership Act which governs the

constitution of LLPs is more comprehensive than the LPA

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55

and, accordingly, meets the commercial demands placed on

LLPs involved in fund management better than the LP.

1 Schedule 28AA, Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (“TA”)

2 Other U.K. investment vehicles such as FSA regulated authorisedunit trusts and open-ended investment companies would not beappropriate because these are heavily regulated and are prohibitedfrom borrowing to purchase investments. U.K. investment trustsmust, inter alia, be listed on the Official List of the London StockExchange in order to obtain tax exemptions for capital gains andwould not therefore be appropriate given the nature of the privateequity industry. Other vehicles include U.K. unauthorised trusts butsuch entities are not ideal when dealing with counterpartiesestablished in civil law jurisdictions where trusts are an unfamiliarconcept. Furthermore, there are potential trust law issues withunauthorised unit trusts.

3 The limited liability partnership (“LLP”) is another U.K. partnershipwhich confers limited liability on its members and is treated asfiscally transparent for U.K. tax purposes. However, in the contextof private equity an LLP would not be a viable vehicle by which toconstitute a fund. This is because, as explained in this paper, apartnership carrying on private equity investment is likely to beconsidered an investment partnership, not a trading partnership.An investment LLP is subject to tax anti-avoidance legislationwhich provides that interest relief is denied in respect of loans toindividuals to purchase an interest in an investment LLP.Accordingly, we would recommend that the PEF in this scenario isconstituted via an LP to maintain maximum flexibility.

4 Sections 3 and 4(2) LPA

5 Whether or not a partnership is trading or carrying on investmentbusiness is determined according to U.K. case law which can besummarised as follows. The issue is decided by establishing thetaxpayer’s motive in conducting the relevant operations/activity(here, the acquisition of the investment in the PEF vehicle). Thetaxpayer’s motive must be objectively determined according to therelevant factual criteria, or indicia, as identified by the case law,know as the “badges of trade” (Marson v. Morton 1986 STC 463).In the context of an investor in a private equity fund the motive ofthe partnership as a whole in entering into the partnership businessis relevant. The following facts are commonly considered decisivein a private equity context: the making of investments with a view tolong term capital appreciation (investment) rather than short termturn-over of investments (trade), frequency of purchase and sale ofassets (the more frequent the more likely a trade exists, if only aone-off transaction is entered into this is more likely to be aninvestment activity).A statement of the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) pub-lished in 1987 and approved by HMRC confirms that a fund that isset up through the medium of a limited partnership to purchaseshares with the intention of holding these as investments, would betreated for tax purposes as an investment partnership, not a tradingpartnership (provided the partnership was not also carrying on anyother trading activity). The fact that the general partner of the LPprovides management assistance to the companies in which in-vestments are held by the partnership would not, of itself, affect thematter and will be irrelevant; this is noteworthy because, ordinarily,the “badges of trade” provide that the management of an asset toenhance the asset value or returns from that asset usually suggestsa trading, not investment, activity. See paragraphs 1.4 and 1.5 ofthe BVCA statement.

6 Business asset taper relief (BATR) limits the proportion of a capitalgain which is chargeable to tax thereby reducing the effective taxrate on that gain. BATR is available on investments in shares of anunquoted trading company (see 2A, and Schedule A1, TCGA). Thecontinuing availability of BATR on its existing terms is understoodto be currently under review by HM Treasury as part of a broaderreview of the private equity sector.

7 Sections 186 and 187 Finance Act 2004. The tax treatment ofunregistered/unapproved pension schemes is unfavourable

compared to registered schemes; as a result very few have beenestablished. A detailed discussion of unregistered schemes isbeyond the scope of this paper.

8 “Sovereign immunity” is a principle of international law whereby onesovereign state does not seek to apply its domestic laws to anothersovereign state. Under this principle, the current practice of HMRCis to exempt from direct taxes all income and gains which arebeneficially owned by the head of state and the government of aforeign sovereign state. It should be noted that, as a matter ofinternational law, the United Kingdom does not recognise certainterritories as being foreign sovereign states (e.g., Taiwan), and insuch cases, the practice described above may not necessarilyapply.

9 Central management and control is defined by U.K. case law (De

Beers Consolidated Mines v. Howe (5 TC 198) and Bullock v. Unit

Construction Company (1959) 38 TC 712). The centralmanagement and control of the company is directed at the highestlevel of control of the business of a company and is to bedistinguished from the place where the main operations of thecompany are carried out. It is often determined by reference to theplace where the board of directors meets, if the board is themedium through which the central management and control of thecompany is in fact carried on. Central management and control isnot synonymous with control at shareholder level.

10 See footnote 8 above

11 Section 148(3) Finance Act 2003

12 The U.K. Investment Manager Exemption is specifically geared toproviding exemption in respect of investment managers servicesrelating to investments in, inter alia, shares, stock, futures contractsand certain securities. The exemption is particularly relevant in thecontext of the offshore funds industry. The statutory conditions forexemption are set out at section 152 and Schedule 26, Finance Act2003.Further guidance is provided in the form of a published statementof practice of HMRC (SP1/01 as revised on July 20, 2007) whichprovides guidance on HMRC’s interpretation of these conditions.The statement is intended to provide the funds industry with morecertainty that reliance can be placed on the investment managersexemption when establishing, marketing and operating funds.

13 Other tax anti-avoidance legislation is technically relevant to U.K.tax-resident individuals investing in offshore hedge funds, e.g.,section 13 TCGA (attribution of gains of non-resident company toparticipators) and sections 721, 728 and 732 Income Tax Act 2007(transfer of assets abroad).Section 13 should not apply provided that the HF would not be a“close” company were it incorporated in the United Kingdom(broadly, this would require that HF is widely held and not held byan irreducible number of unconnected investors numbering five orfewer).

Sections 721, 728 and 732 will not apply if the investor can showthat the purpose of its investment in HF was not to avoid U.K. taxa-tion or that the investment was undertaken for bona fide commer-cial reasons. Historically, HMRC has chosen not to invoke theseprovisions given that hedge fund investments are usually made forbona fide commercial reasons. However, this exclusion was re-cently redrafted to restrict its application so it remains to be seenwhether HMRC continues its former practice. If these provisionsapply, the income of the HF can be attributed to the individual as itarises and will be subject to U.K. tax accordingly.

14 See footnote 8 above

15 The conditions require, for example, inter alia, that the carriedinterest is acquired by the partner before the fund starts investingor before the value of the fund’s investments have increased invalue since the date of acquisition of those investments (paragraph3.1 of the MOU). Furthermore, the carried interest partner mustotherwise receive arm’s length compensation for his employmentduties as fund manager.

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Host CountryUNITED STATES

Herman B. BoumaBuchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Washington, D.C.

Herman B. Bouma is Counsel with the Washington, D.C.

office of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC. Mr. Bouma

has over 25 years of experience in U.S. taxation of

income earned in international operations, assisting

major U.S. companies and financial institutions with tax

planning and analysis and advising on such matters as

the structuring of billion-dollar international financial

transactions, the creditability of foreign taxes, Subpart F

issues, transfer pricing, and foreign acquisitions,

reorganisations and restructurings. Mr. Bouma was

counsel to the taxpayer in Exxon Corporation v. Comr.,

113 T.C. 338 (1999) (creditability of the U.K. Petroleum

Revenue Tax under §§901/903), and in The Coca-Cola

Company v. Comr., 106 T.C. 1 (1996) (computation of

combined taxable income for a possession product

under §936).

Mr. Bouma began his legal career as an attorney-advisor

in the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, Legislation and

Regulations Division (International Branch) in

Washington, D.C. He was the principal author of the

final foreign tax credit regulations under §§901/903, and

participated in income tax treaty negotiations with

Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands Antilles. Mr.

Bouma is a graduate of Calvin College and the

University of Texas at Austin School of Law.

I. Introduction

The amount of assets under management by private equity

funds and hedge funds has expanded exponentially over the

past two decades. According to a report recently released by

the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, it is estimated that

private equity funds manage approximately $1 trillion of assets

globally and hedge funds manage approximately $1.46 trillion

of assets globally.1 Some of the better known private equity

funds are the Blackstone Group, Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts,

the Carlyle Group, and Lone Star. The principal advantage of

private equity funds and hedge funds is that they are generally

free of securities regulation, including, in the United States,

the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, and thus

have substantially lower compliance costs and can operate

more freely and flexibly.2 In addition, because the ownership

interests are not publicly traded, managers can focus more on

the long term and less on each quarter’s earnings results.

Even foreign governments have not been able to resist the

allure of such funds. Recently it was announced that China

would be making a $3 billion investment in the New

York-based Blackstone Group.3 (It might also be noted, in the

words of one commentator, that “with some 9,000 funds now

managing more than $1.4 trillion in assets, hedge fund money

is creating new wealth for law firms”.)4

However, private equity funds are not without their detractors.

On March 16, 2007, union leaders urged the Group of Eight

countries to begin formulating a co-ordinated response to

“the growing influence” of private equity funds.5 According to

John Evans, General Secretary of the Trade Union Advisory

Committee to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD), which represents 66 million

workers that belong to 56 affiliated organisations across the

30-member OECD, and John Monks, the General Secretary

of the European Trade Union Confederation, private equity

funds pose a major threat to jobs, employee rights, company

pension plans, the normal functioning of capital markets, tax

revenues (because the funds are often based in offshore

low-tax jurisdictions), and the economy as a whole.6

According to Damon Silvers, Associate General Counsel for

the AFL-CIO, American unions “suspect private equity funds

of constructing new cash flow operations to shift income, and

tax liabilities, to low-tax jurisdictions” and are “calling for new

discussions on how private equity funds are using tax havens

and other offshore financial centres to avoid corporate

taxation liabilities”.7

However, others are equally strong in their defence of private

equity funds. In a speech on February 22, 2007, E.U. Internal

Market Commissioner Charlie McCreevy lauded the “proactive

oversight” by private equity funds and stated that “workers as

well as investors benefit from more active management

because more competitive companies expand faster, create

more jobs, and earn higher returns on investment”.8 He also

noted that “all taxpayers benefit from higher corporate tax

revenue from the profits of private equity portfolios”.9 It has

also been noted that private equity funds often help ventures

that are not able to obtain financing through more

conventional means and it is typical “for private equity firms to

invest in young companies that have great potential, but are in

need of capital and management expertise to help them

grow”.10 At a hearing before the U.S. House Financial Services

Committee on May 16, 2007, Douglas Lowenstein, President

of the Private Equity Council, cited the following benefits that

flow from private equity funds: (1) without the pressures from

outside public shareholders looking for short-term gains,

private equity funds can focus on what is required to improve

the medium- to long-term performance of a company and

institute a nimbler operating style that fosters greater

innovation, improved productivity, and competitiveness; (2)

according to a study done by the international management

consulting firm A.T. Kearney, private equity firms generate

employment, on average, at a much faster pace than

comparable, traditionally-financed firms; and (3) because

public and private pension funds, university endowments, and

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foundations have realised returns from private equity funds

that far exceed those available from the stock market, the

beneficiaries of private equity funds “include tens of millions of

Americans whose retirements are made more secure by the

very strong returns earned by public, private and union

pension funds that invest in private equity ventures; they

include the thousands of young people who obtain financial

aid or scholarships to public and private colleges because of

the high returns earned by university endowments investing in

private equity; and they include those of us who may one day

benefit from research to cure or treat a disease funded by a

foundation generating above average returns from private

equity”.11

Of late, private equity funds have drawn increasing attention in

the mainstream media and in the U.S. Congress because of

the “healthy” compensation received by some fund managers.

In 2006 Stephen A. Schwarzman, a manager at the

Blackstone Group, received almost double the combined

compensation for the CEOs of Wall Street’s five biggest

investment banks.12 According to one commentator, private

equity funds might not be subject to such intensive scrutiny

now had Mr. Schwarzman not thrown an elaborate birthday

party for himself in February 2007: “Schwarzman may have

tempted fate with a lavish, much-publicised birthday party for

himself in February, which put the world on notice just how

much money private equity firms were making. Rod Stewart,

who charges $1 million for a private gig, entertained at

Schwarzman’s 60th birthday party.”13

Whether because of Mr. Schwarzman’s birthday party or not,

it is true that the U.S. Congress is now focusing much more

attention on private equity funds (and hedge funds). On June

14, 2007, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), Chairman of the

Senate Finance Committee, and Senator Charles Grassley

(R-Iowa), Ranking Member of the Senate Finance Committee,

introduced legislation (S. 1624) to treat publicly-traded

partnerships as corporations if they make their money by

providing financial services.14 On June 22, 2007,

Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), Chairman of the Ways

and Means Committee, Representative Barney Frank (D-NY),

Chairman of the Financial Services Committee, and

Representative Sander Levin (D-Mich.) introduced legislation

(H.R. 2834) to treat as ordinary income (rather than capital

gain) income derived from a carried interest. (The taxation of

income from a carried interest is discussed in more detail in

Section IV. below.) H.R. 2834 would also tax publicly-traded

partnerships as corporations if more than 10 percent of their

income is derived from carried interests. On July 13, 2007,

Representative Levin stated that new information received

with respect to the Blackstone Group’s initial public offering

shows that private equity funds “are taking tax avoidance

efforts even further than lawmakers’ examination of carried

interests had indicated”.15 On July 17, 2007, Senate Majority

Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) stated that he supported the

Senate Finance Committee’s ongoing examination of the

taxation of private equity firms, saying it is “something we

need to take a look at”.16

On June 20, 2007, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson

stated that the U.S. Department of the Treasury “has been

considering new rules affecting the taxation of private equity

firms for weeks”.17 However, at this point the Treasury

Department appears less than enthusiastic about the changes

being considered by Congress. On June 27, 2007, Secretary

Paulson voiced opposition to S. 1624, which would treat

certain publicly-traded partnerships as corporations.18

Moreover, on July 11, 2007, at a Senate Finance Committee

hearing on the taxation of income derived from a carried

interest, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Eric

Solomon stated that the Bush Administration opposes any

changes to the taxation of such income. Assistant Secretary

Solomon said that making a significant change “could undo

the work the federal government has done to support

entrepreneurship”.19 At this point, therefore, one might say the

U.S. taxation of private equity funds and hedge funds has an

unsettled future.

II. Basic U.S. tax planning for a private equityfund

A. Investment in a U.S. business entity

With respect to an investment by PEF in HBE (which is a U.S.

business entity), there follows a discussion, separately with

respect to each of the investors, of the preferred structure for

U.S. income tax purposes (under existing law, of course).

1. Preferred structure for a U.S. individual

From the perspective of HI (who is a U.S. person), the most

tax-efficient structure for U.S. income tax purposes would be

to set up HBE as a partnership and PEF as a partnership

(with HI as a direct partner in PEF). With such a structure,

there would be only one level of tax on the income derived by

HBE (avoiding tax on distributions (if any) from HBE that are

attributable to income derived by HBE) and the tax rate

imposed on the income derived by HBE would be no higher

than the tax rate that would apply if HBE were a

corporation.20 HI would file a U.S. income tax return reporting

his/her (“his”) distributive share of the income derived by HBE

and also his share of any gain realised by PEF on the sale of

its interest in HBE. An additional advantage of this structure is

that, as HBE’s income is taxed to its partners (which, in the

case of PEF, would mean taxed to PEF’s partners), PEF’s

basis in HBE would be adjusted upward, thus reducing the

amount of capital gain on a subsequent sale of PEF’s interest

in HBE.

A U.S. Limited Liability Company could be used for HBE in

order to ensure that limited liability is provided to its owners.

(Hereinafter, any reference to a business entity will be to an

entity that provides limited liability to its owners.) Because a

U.S. Limited Liability Company is not a per se corporation,21

HBE could be treated as a partnership for U.S. income tax

purposes. Moreover, its default classification would be that of

a partnership22 and thus no election would be necessary

(unless its classification were being changed).23

Whether PEF was formed under U.S. law or foreign law would

not be significant for HI nor would it matter whether PEF

conducted its operations through an office in the United

States. This is because, as a U.S. person, HI would be taxed

on his distributive share of PEF’s total income, whether or not

PEF was a U.S. entity and whether or not it was engaged in a

U.S. trade or business.

If PEF were a foreign entity, its default classification would be

a corporation since all owners would have limited liability.24 In

that case, it would be necessary for PEF to file an election to

be treated as a partnership.

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2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for HI would also work well for FI

except for two concerns. The first relates to the fact that FI

would be considered to be engaged in a trade or business in

the United States (considered to be “ETB”) by virtue of his

indirect partnership interest in HBE. As a result, FI might be

exposed to taxation on other U.S.-source income derived by

him independently of his investment in PEF.25 This could be

dealt with by having HBE function as a corporation for U.S.

income tax purposes. Although this would eliminate the

possibility of PEF receiving a step-up in basis for its interest in

HBE as a result of income earned by HBE, this would not be

a concern for FI (from the U.S. income tax perspective)

assuming FI would not be subject to U.S. income tax on

income earned by PEF. This leads to the second, more

serious, concern – whether PEF might be considered ETB,

assuming it has a physical presence in the United States. If

PEF was ETB, then FI would be considered ETB and he

would be taxed on his proportionate share of all the income

earned by PEF (assuming all such income was effectively

connected with PEF’s U.S. trade or business). Such income

would include gain realised by PEF on the sale of its interest

in HBE. If PEF was ETB, FI might also be subject to U.S.

income taxation on gain realised on the disposition of his

interest in PEF. It is the position of the U.S. Internal Revenue

Service (IRS) that if a partnership is ETB, then gain realised by

a foreign partner on the disposition of his partnership interest

is income effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S.

trade or business (“effectively-connected income” or “ECI”).26

The conventional wisdom on Wall Street appears to be that,

even if PEF had a presence in the United States, it would not

be considered ETB because: (1) it would not be ETB under

the general rules for determining if a person is ETB; and (2)

even if it were to be ETB under the general rules, it would be

protected by the “trading” safe harbour in §864(b)(2)(A)(ii), a

special rule that provides that a foreign person is not

considered ETB simply by virtue of being in the United States

trading in stocks and securities for its own account. However,

there is an issue as to whether PEF would not be ETB under

the general rules (assuming it had a presence in the United

States) and also whether PEF would be covered by the

special trading safe harbour if it would otherwise be ETB.

Because of the substantial activities of PEF in finding

companies to invest in and in assisting the management of

those companies in getting the companies to a very

favourable profit position, it could be argued that PEF would

be ETB under the general rules and would not be covered by

the trading safe harbour because it is doing more than just

“trading”. This issue is similar to the issue of whether a foreign

person would be ETB and not covered by the trading safe

harbour if he is conducting a loan origination business in the

United States (involving solicitation and negotiation), as

opposed to trading in loans acquired on a secondary market.

In a speech on February 22, 2007, E.U. Internal Market

Commissioner Charlie McCreevy stated, “There is no room in

the modern world for hush-puppy fund managers watching

passively as complacent management teams erode

shareholder value and get bowled over by the competition”

and stated that “private equity firms’ ‘proactive oversight’ of

company management helps companies meet the challenges

of globalisation”.27 As stated earlier, a commentator has also

noted the importance of management expertise provided by

private equity firms, stating that it is typical “for private equity

firms to invest in young companies that have great potential,

but are in need of capital and management expertise to help

them grow”.28 Finally, in his testimony before the House

Financial Services Committee on May 16, 2007, Douglas

Lowenstein, President of the Private Equity Council, stated

that the best private equity firms “must bring to the table

much more than capital”; they offer “the management focus

and resources needed to achieve a new mission”, they

“deliver deep expertise in the sector in which the investment

is being made”, and “with infusions of capital, talent and

strategy, private equity firms improve the productivity,

performance and financial strength of the companies in which

they invest”.29 Thus, there are indications that private equity

funds may be doing more than just “trading” in stocks and

securities.

If PEF is a partnership with no presence in the United States,

then PEF would avoid the ETB issue.30 To be on the safe side,

it would be best to set up PEF as a foreign partnership. This

would reduce the reporting burden (for U.S. income tax

purposes) and would also reduce the possibility that a foreign

corporation in which PEF invests might be considered a

controlled foreign corporation (CFC).31

Another option would be to set up PEF as a foreign

corporation in a zero-tax jurisdiction (with no presence in the

United States). However, having PEF set up as a partnership

would be more tax-efficient for FI if FI is a resident of a foreign

country with which the United States has an income tax treaty

and FI would be entitled under the treaty to a reduced rate of

withholding tax on dividends received from HBE. (This

assumes that FI would qualify for the reduced withholding

under the regulations issued under §894(c).)32 It is unlikely that

PEF would qualify for any reduced withholding if it were a

corporation set up in a zero-tax country, and thus setting up

PEF as a partnership has the advantage of possibly allowing

FI to take advantage of a reduced treaty rate.33 Thus, the

preferred structure for FI is to have HBE set up as a

corporation and PEF set up as a foreign partnership with no

presence in the United States.

3. Preferred structure for a U.S. pension fund

If the preferred structure set forth above for HI were followed

for HPEN, then HPEN would have unrelated business taxable

income (UBTI) subject to U.S. income taxation.34 This is

because HPEN would be considered engaged in the business

in which HBE is engaged because HPEN would have an

indirect partnership interest in HBE. Having this UBTI would

not in itself be a negative since the tax burden on HPEN’s

share of the income derived by HBE would be the same

whether HBE was a partnership and HPEN had UBTI or HBE

was a corporation and HPEN received tax-exempt dividends.

However, HPEN may simply wish to avoid having to report

UBTI, in which case HBE could be set up as a corporation.

With respect to PEF, if PEF were set up as a partnership, its

income would not be UBTI to HPEN as long as PEF was only

receiving interest, dividends, and capital gains. This would be

true even if PEF were considered to be engaged in a trade or

business.35 Thus, assuming HPEN wishes to avoid having to

report UBTI, it would be best to follow a structure similar to

that for FI, i.e., with HBE set up as a corporation and PEF as

a partnership.36 Whether PEF is a U.S. or foreign partnership

or has or does not have a presence in the United States

would not have an impact on HPEN.

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4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

If FPEN is considered a tax-exempt organisation for U.S.

income tax purposes, then the preferred structure set forth

above for HPEN would also be the preferred structure for

FPEN. If FPEN is not considered tax-exempt and is treated

as a foreign corporation, the preferred structure for HI (i.e.,

with HBE and PEF both set up as partnerships) would

result in FPEN being ETB, which would give rise to

exposure under the branch profits tax37 and also possible

exposure to taxation of U.S.-source income derived outside

of FPEN’s investment in PEF. Thus, if FPEN is treated as a

foreign corporation for U.S. income tax purposes, it would

be better for it to have the preferred structure for FI (i.e.,

with HBE set up as a corporation and PEF as a foreign

partnership with no presence in the United States). The

same would be true if FPEN were to be treated as a taxable

foreign trust for U.S. income tax purposes. By setting up

HBE as a corporation, the foreign corporation or foreign

trust would not be ETB even though PEF is set up as a

partnership and by setting up PEF as a foreign partnership

with no U.S. presence, FPEN’s distributive share of capital

gains would be exempt from U.S. income tax and its share

of any dividends received from HBE might qualify for treaty

relief.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

As a foreign government, FGOV is a tax-exempt entity

except with respect to income derived from the conduct of

a “commercial activity” or from a “controlled commercial

entity” or from the disposition of an interest in a controlled

commercial entity.38 In order for an entity to be a controlled

commercial entity, it must be at least 50 percent controlled

by the foreign government and thus it is assumed here that

neither HBE nor PEF would be controlled commercial

entities of FGOV. If both HBE and PEF were partnerships,

FGOV would be considered engaged in a commercial

activity and subject to U.S. income tax on its share of

HBE’s income. Assuming FGOV would not want to file a

return reporting such income, this could be avoided by

having HBE treated as a corporation. If PEF is set up as a

partnership and is not considered engaged in a commercial

activity, then dividends and capital gains that flow through

to FGOV would not be subject to U.S. tax. If PEF is set up

as a partnership but is considered engaged in a commercial

activity, then, if it has a presence in the United States to

which its income is attributable, FGOV would be subject to

U.S. income tax on its share of the ECI (including dividends

and capital gains). If PEF does not have a presence in the

United States, then FGOV would not be subject to tax on

its share of capital gains, but dividends received by FGOV

through the partnership might still be subject to U.S.

income tax (on a gross basis) because they are derived as

part of a commercial activity. An interesting question would

then arise as to whether the tax could be reduced under an

income tax treaty to which FGOV is a party. Would FGOV

be considered a resident of FGOV? In theory, a treaty

reduction should apply but, depending on the particular

language of the treaty, it might be hard to arrive at that

result based on a technical reading of the treaty.

In summary, the preferred structure for FGOV would be the

same as that for FI, i.e., with HBE set up as a corporation

and PEF as a foreign partnership with no U.S. presence.

B. Investment in a foreign business entity

1. Preferred structure for a U.S. individual

If FBE is operating in a high-tax country (i.e., is subject to an

effective foreign income tax rate equal to or higher than 35

percent), then the preferred structure for HI with respect to

the investment in HBE (i.e., with HBE and PEF both set up as

partnerships) would also be the preferred structure for HI with

respect to the investment in FBE. This is because HI would

receive foreign tax credits for the foreign income taxes paid by

FBE and thus, generally speaking, there would be no residual

U.S. income tax on HI’s distributive share of FBE’s income. HI

would also benefit from the upward adjustment to PEF’s basis

in FBE.

If FBE is operating in a low-tax country (i.e., is subject to an

effective foreign income tax rate lower than 35 percent), then

it likely would be preferable for FBE to be set up as a foreign

corporation in order to obtain deferral of U.S. tax with respect

to FBE’s income. PEF could be set up either as a partnership

or a foreign corporation in a zero-tax jurisdiction. If PEF is to

be set up as a partnership, it should be set up as a foreign

partnership in order to reduce the chances that FBE would be

a CFC and thus possibly yield Subpart F income for HI. If PEF

is set up as a partnership, HI would be immediately taxed on

his distributive share of capital gain realised by PEF on the

sale of its interest in FBE.

If PEF is set up as a foreign corporation in a zero-tax

jurisdiction, then PEF may or may not be a CFC, depending

on its other owners. If it is not a CFC, it is possible it is a

Passive Foreign Investment Company (PFIC), depending on

the type of income it derives. If all of its ownership interests in

corporations are substantial (i.e., over 25 percent), then it

likely would not be a PFIC.39 If it is a PFIC, then, under the

default PFIC regime, HI would have to pay an interest charge

to the United States with respect to the benefit he has derived

from deferring U.S. income tax on the income of PEF (for

example, dividends and capital gains).40

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

Since the United States would not tax income realised by FI

as long as there was no connection to the United States, the

preferred structure for FI would be for PEF to be set up as a

foreign partnership or foreign corporation, each with no

presence in the United States, and it would not matter how

FBE was set up. (This assumes that FBE has operations only

in its country of formation.) It must be emphasised that this

preferred structure is only for U.S. income tax purposes. The

way in which FBE and PEF are set up could be highly relevant

for foreign income tax purposes.

3. Preferred structure for a U.S. pension fund

Since FBE might be operating in a low-tax jurisdiction, HPEN

would definitely prefer that FBE be set up as a corporation so

that FBE’s income would not be UBTI to HPEN, assuming

PEF is set up as a partnership. If FBE is set up as a foreign

corporation and PEF as a partnership, dividends received by

HPEN through the partnership would be tax-exempt for U.S.

income tax purposes. Moreover, HPEN’s share of capital gain

realised by PEF on the sale of its interest in FBE would also

be tax-exempt. Thus, the preferred structure for HPEN would

be the same as that for HPEN with respect to an investment

in HBE, i.e., with FBE set up as a corporation and PEF as a

partnership.41

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4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN would be the same as that

for FI with respect to an investment in FBE, i.e., with FBE set

up as either a partnership or corporation and PEF set up as

either a foreign partnership or a foreign corporation, with no

presence in the United States.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV would be the same as that

for FI with respect to an investment in FBE.

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

Considering all investors and investments in both HBE and

FBE, the overall preferred structure, assuming no new entities

are introduced, would be to set up HBE and FBE as

corporations and PEF as a foreign partnership with no

presence in the United States.42 This would produce the best

results (from the U.S. income tax perspective) for all investors

except HI. An alternative structure that would improve the

situation for HI but not unduly hurt the situation of the other

investors would be the same as the preceding except that

HBE would be set up as a partnership and HPEN and the

foreign investors would invest in PEF through a “foreign

blocker corporation”. The foreign blocker corporation would

be a foreign corporation that is organised in a zero-tax

jurisdiction and has no presence in the United States. This

structure would allow HI to benefit from a basis step-up for

income earned by HBE but would not result in HPEN and the

foreign investors having UBTI or ECI. However, the foreign

blocker corporation would have ECI (as a result of its indirect

interest in HBE) and thus would need to file a U.S. income tax

return.43 Moreover, the foreign blocker corporation’s share of

an actual distribution from HBE (to the extent it constitutes a

“dividend equivalent amount”) would be subject to the 30

percent branch profits tax under §884 (which likely would not

be subject to reduction under an income tax treaty). However,

this last point would not be significant if HBE is not expected

to make any distributions. A potential defect with this

structure is that, when PEF sells its interest in HBE, the

foreign blocker corporation’s share of the gain might be taxed

as ECI because it is from the sale of an interest in a

partnership that is itself ETB. However, a reasonable

argument could be made that the gain on the sale of the

partnership interest is not ECI because PEF is not ETB.44

It should be noted that the preceding has assumed, pursuant

to the facts of the hypothetical, that PEF will not incur any

borrowings. As will be seen below, if the fund is to incur

borrowings, this would affect the analysis with respect to

HPEN and FPEN because of the special rules for “unrelated

debt-financed income” in §514.45

III. Basic U.S. tax planning for a hedge fund

A. Investment in passive assets generating U.S.-sourceincome

There follows a discussion, separately with respect to each of

the investors, of the preferred structure for U.S. income tax

purposes with respect to investments by HF in passive assets

generating U.S.-source income.

1. Preferred structure for a U.S. individual

If HF were set up as a foreign corporation in a zero-tax

jurisdiction, its U.S.-source income from passive investments

would typically be subject to a 30 percent U.S. withholding

tax and HI would then be subject to tax (generally at a 35

percent rate) on dividends received from HF (unless the

special rate in s 1(h)(11) for dividends from “qualified foreign

corporations” applied). Moreover, HF would likely be a PFIC

(in which case the special rate of 15 percent in §1(h)(11)

would clearly not apply)46 and, under the default PFIC regime,

HI would be subject to an interest charge with respect to the

deferral of U.S. tax on HF’s income.47

However, if HF were set up as a partnership, there would be

only one level of tax on the U.S.-source income derived by HF

(which tax would be imposed on HI) and tax would be

avoided on distributions from HF. Thus, from the perspective

of HI, the most tax-efficient structure for U.S. income tax

purposes would be to set up HF as a partnership (and HI as a

direct partner in HF). The partnership could be either a U.S. or

foreign partnership and the partnership could have a

presence in the United States. HI would file a U.S. income tax

return reporting his distributive share of the income derived by

HF.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

The preferred structure for HI would also work well for FI. FI

would likely be subject to a 30 percent U.S. withholding tax

on his share of the income received by HF or possibly a lower

rate if FI is a resident of a country with which the United

States has an income tax treaty.48 In theory, FI might be better

off if HF were considered ETB since this would mean FI could

pay U.S. income tax on a net basis rather than a gross basis.

However, FI’s income tax rate would likely be 35 percent and

thus FI might not be better off even if he could pay on a net

basis. (Being ETB might also expose FI to taxation on other

U.S.-source income derived by him independently of his

investment in HF.) In any event, given the trading safe harbour

in §864(b)(2), it is unlikely that HF would be considered ETB

(even if it had a presence in the United States).49 Thus, the

preferred structure for FI would be the same as that for HI,

but with U.S. tax applied on a gross basis (through

withholding) rather than on a net basis as in the case of HI.

3. Preferred structure for a U.S. pension fund

Since HPEN is a tax-exempt pension fund, it would likely be

exempt from tax on most, if not all, of the income derived by

HF if HPEN derived that income directly. Thus, if HF incurred

no debt, the preferred structure set forth above for HI would

also be the preferred structure for HPEN since HF would be a

partnership and thus the income derived by HF would “flow

through” to HPEN. However, according to the facts of the

hypothetical, HF will in fact incur debt; pursuant to §514, this

will “taint” the income that would otherwise be tax-exempt to

HPEN. In order to avoid this problem, HF could be organised

as a foreign corporation in a zero-tax jurisdiction. Alternatively,

a foreign blocker corporation could be interposed between

HF (organised as a partnership) and HPEN. However, both

structures would produce exposure to the U.S. 30 percent

withholding tax since the income would be earned by a

foreign corporation that in all probability would not qualify for

any treaty relief. If instead HF were organised as a U.S.

corporation or a U.S. blocker corporation were used, then the

U.S.-source income would be taxed on a net basis, taking

into account the interest deductions, but generally would be

taxed at the 35 percent corporate rate. This may or may not

be advantageous. Moreover, all income realised by HF (if HF

were organised as a U.S. corporation) or by the U.S. blocker

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corporation (if HF were organised as a partnership but a U.S.

blocker corporation was used) would be so taxed, including

foreign-source passive income derived by HF. Thus,

depending on the circumstances, it may be preferable to use

a foreign blocker corporation (with HF organised as a

partnership) and it is assumed that such is the case here.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

If FPEN is considered a tax-exempt organisation for U.S. income

tax purposes, then the preferred structure set forth above for

HPEN would also be the preferred structure for FPEN.

If FPEN is not considered tax-exempt and is treated as a foreign

corporation or a foreign trust, the preferred structure set forth

above for FI (which is the same as the preferred structure for HI)

would also be the preferred structure for FPEN.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

Since FGOV is a tax-exempt entity except to the extent it is

engaged in a commercial activity (or deriving income from a

controlled commercial entity), the preferred structure for it

would be the same as that for HI, i.e., with HF set up as a

partnership, since HF would likely not be considered engaged

in a commercial activity and thus FGOV’s share of its income

should be tax-exempt.

B. Investment in passive assets generatingforeign-source income

1. Preferred structure for a U.S. individual

In the case of investments by HF in passive assets generating

foreign-source income, the preferred structure for HI would likely

be the same as that set forth above with respect to investments

by HF in passive assets generating U.S.-source income, i.e., with

HF set up as a partnership, either U.S. or foreign and either with

or without a U.S. presence. Such a structure would potentially

allow HI to benefit from an income tax treaty between the United

States and the country to which the income is sourced.

Another possibility is to set up HF as a foreign corporation in a

zero-tax jurisdiction. However, it likely would be treated as a PFIC

(if not a CFC), and, under the default PFIC regime, HI would be

subject to an interest charge with respect to the deferral of U.S.

tax. Assuming there is nothing to be gained by deferring the U.S.

tax but then being subject to the interest charge, setting up HF

as a partnership should work just as well.

2. Preferred structure for a foreign individual

With respect to the preferred structure for FI, HF could be set

up as a partnership or a foreign corporation in a zero-tax

jurisdiction, with or without a presence in the United States. In

either case, there would be no U.S. income tax on FI’s

distributive share of the foreign-source income because it is

foreign-source income and not ECI. (This assumes that HF

would not be considered ETB even if it had a presence in the

United States.)

3. Preferred structure for a U.S. pension fund

The preferred structure for HPEN would be the same as that

with respect to investments in passive assets that generate

U.S.-source income, i.e., to have HF set up as a partnership

and then have a foreign blocker corporation set up between

HF and HPEN.

4. Preferred structure for a foreign pension fund

The preferred structure for FPEN would be the same as that

set forth above for FI, i.e., to have HF set up as a partnership

or as a foreign corporation in a zero-tax jurisdiction, with or

without a presence in the United States.

5. Preferred structure for a foreign government

The preferred structure for FGOV would be the same as that

set forth above for FI.

C. Conclusion as to the overall preferred structure

Considering all investors and investments in both passive

assets that generate U.S.-source income and passive assets

that generate foreign-source income, the overall preferred

structure, from the U.S. income tax perspective, would be to

set up HF as a partnership, either U.S. or foreign, with or

without a presence in the United States, and then have the

investors invest directly in HF, except for HPEN (and FPEN if it

is tax-exempt for U.S. income tax purposes), which would

invest in HF through a foreign blocker corporation.50

IV. U.S. income taxation of income from acarried interest

Savvy’s “carried interest” constitutes a 20 percent interest in

profits derived by PEF. The carried interest is actually

compensation to Savvy for the advice he provides to PEF but

is structured the way it is in order to produce capital gain for

Savvy (taxable at a 15 percent rate) rather than ordinary

income (taxable at a 35 percent rate). Under current law, there

is an argument that the carried interest actually does yield

capital gain, notwithstanding it is actually compensation for

services. In Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343, the IRS ruled

that the receipt of a partnership profits interest in exchange

for services rendered to the partnership is not a taxable event,

provided certain conditions are met.51

As discussed in the Introduction, fees received by fund

advisors are receiving more and more attention, both from the

U.S. Congress and the Bush Administration. In a report in The

Daily Tax Report for April 30, 2007, Associate Professor Victor

Fleischer of the University of Colorado Law School described

the carried interest issue as follows: “The private equity fund

managers are managing the fund and putting up only small

amounts of capital themselves and yet the returns from their

labour income are treated as capital gains. So that’s an

anomaly in the tax system. When you perform services you

normally get taxed at ordinary income rates, and so we have

some of the very richest labourers in our country being taxed

at a low tax rate.”52

On June 22, 2007, Representative Charles Rangel, Chairman

of the Ways and Means Committee, Representative Barney

Frank, Chairman of the Financial Services Committee, and

Representative Sander Levin introduced H.R. 2834 which

would treat income derived from a carried interest as ordinary

income, rather than capital gain. Leaders of the Senate

Finance Committee, however, are taking a more cautious

approach. Ranking Member Senator Charles Grassley has

stated, “If it’s earned income, it ought to be taxed at 35

percent instead of 15 percent. If it’s capital gains, then we’ll

just leave it the way it is right now.”53 Chairman Max Baucus

has stated, “I’ve got no legislation. I may, but I’m not close to

having legislation.”54 According to a report in Tax Notes Today,

Baucus stated “he was in ‘no great rush’ to address the

taxation of hedge funds through legislation but preferred

instead to study the issue thoroughly and speak to a variety of

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people on the topic before acting. ‘This is a very complicated

question.’ he added”.55

On July 11, 2007, at a Senate Finance Committee hearing on

the taxation of income derived from a carried interest,

Assistant Secretary Eric Solomon asserted the Bush

Administration’s opposition to any changes to the taxation of

such income, contending that a significant change “could

undo the work the federal government has done to support

entrepreneurship”56

Thus, current law appears to support the treatment of income

from a carried interest as capital gain, but (notwithstanding

the Bush Administration’s opposition) change may be on the

horizon.

1 Joint Committee on Taxation, Present Law and Analysis Relating toTax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests, JCX-41-07, July 10,2007, pp. 32 and 34

2 With respect to the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation onpublicly-traded corporations, see Thomas and Brill, “Public ‘Private’Equity: The Tax Puzzle”, June 22, 2007,http://www.american.com/archive/2007/june-0607/public-private-equity-the-tax-puzzle/

3 “China to Invest $3 Billion in Blackstone”, The Washington Times,p. C10 (May 21, 2007); “Fund Takes It Slowly, Chinese Seek toAvoid Backlash”, The Washington Times, p. C8 (May 22, 2007). Asnoted in the articles, China will acquire no more than a 10 percentinterest in the Blackstone Group.

4 Rosen, “Partners in Profit: The Lawyer-Hedge Fund Nexus”,International Herald Tribune, p. 15 (April 20, 2007)

5 Speer, “Unions Urge G-8 Nations to Study Tax Impact of PrivateEquity Funds”, 52 Daily Tax Report I-3 (March 19, 2007)

6 Id. At a hearing held by a U.K. parliamentary committee on June20, 2007, representatives of U.K. trade unions described privateequity funds as “raiders” and “asset strippers”, which have anadverse impact on employment. Goulder, “Private Equity BossesGrilled at U.K. Tax Inquiry”, 2007 WTD 121-1 (June 22, 2007)

7 Speer, “Unions Urge G-8 Nations to Study Tax Impact of PrivateEquity Funds”, 52 Daily Tax Report I-3 (March 19, 2007). Someforeign governments are cracking down on the taxation of funds.For example, South Korea has asserted a tax deficiency of morethan $200 million against five foreign investment funds, includingthe Carlyle Group and Lone Star. See Lim, “South Korea SlapsForeign Funds with $200 Million in Tax Invoices”, 190 Daily TaxReport, p. G-3 (October 3, 2005); Lim, “Finance Ministry IncreasesTax Pressure on U.S. Investment Fund, Rejects Appeals”, 131 DailyTax Report, p. I-2 (July 10, 2007). In addition, Russia has begun “acriminal investigation into alleged tax underpayments by OOOKameya, a company allegedly associated with Russia’s largestforeign portfolio investment fund, Hermitage Capital Management….” Nadal, “Russian Authorities Accuse Foreign Fund Manager ofUnderpaying Taxes”, 2007 WTD 122-2 (June 25, 2007)

8 Gnaedinger, “Private Equity Fund Growth and Policy Implications”,2007 TNT 53-5 (March 19, 2007)

9 Id.

10 Toomey, “Defending Private Equity”, The Washington Times, p. A21(June 22, 2007)

11 “Douglas Lowenstein, Private Equity Council President, PreparedRemarks before House Financial Services Committee May 16,2007, Hearing on Private Equity’s Effects on Workers, Firms”, 121Daily Tax Report (June 25, 2007)

12 “Schwarzman Earns $400 Million, Blackstone Boss Got NearlyDouble of 5 Wall Street Peers in ‘06”, The Washington Times, p.C8 (June 12, 2007)

13 Sheppard, “Blackstone Tells Two Different Stories”, 2007 TNT118-5 (June 19, 2007)

14 Most private equity funds and hedge funds are not publicly traded;the funds in the hypothetical are, by implication, not publicly tradedbecause they are generally not subject to securities regulation.

15 Glenn, “Levin Reacts to new Details on Blackstone’s IPO”, 2007TNT 136-2 (July 16, 2007)

16 Shreve, “Reid Supports Examination of Private Equity Taxation”,2007 TNT 138-2 (July 18, 2007)

17 Ferguson, “Treasury Studying Changes to Taxation of Private EquityPartnerships, Paulson Says”, 119 Daily Tax Report p. G-2 (June 21,2007)

18 Ferguson, “Paulson Objects to Senate Bill on Private Equity Firms,Defends Current Tax Rules”, 124 Daily Tax Report p. G-9 (June 28,2007)

19 Ferguson, “Grassley Defends Private Equity Legislation AsLoophole Closer, Not Revenue Raisers”, 133 Daily Tax Report p.G-7 (July 12, 2007)

20 Currently, the highest individual tax rate is 35 percent and thehighest corporate tax rate (after a “bubble” reaching 39 percent) is35 percent. See §§1 and 11(b). All “§” references are to the InternalRevenue Code of 1986, as amended (“the Code”), and all “Regs.§” references are to regulations issued thereunder by theDepartment of the Treasury (and set forth in 26 CFR).

21 A corporation is a per se corporation if it is described in Regs.§301.7701-2(b) other than (b)(2).

22 Regs. §301.7701-3(b)(1)

23 If the classification of HBE were being changed from a corporationto a partnership, that would be considered a liquidation of thecorporation under §331 and could give rise to a tax cost to HBEunder §336 (recognition of gain or loss on assets distributed incomplete liquidation).

24 Regs. §301.7701-3(b)(2)(i)

25 See §864(c)(3)

26 See Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107. For criticism of thisposition, see Blanchard, “Rev. Rul. 91-32: Extrastatutory Attributionof Partnership Activities to Partners”, 1776 Tax Notes 1331(September 8, 1997)

27 Gnaedinger, “Private Equity Fund Growth and Policy Implications”,2007 TNT 53-5 (March 19, 2007)

28 Toomey, “Defending Private Equity”, The Washington Times, p. A21(June 22, 2007)

29 “Douglas Lowenstein, Private Equity Council President, PreparedRemarks before House Financial Services Committee May 16,2007, Hearing on Private Equity’s Effects on Workers, Firms”, 121Daily Tax Report (June 25, 2007)

30 This, of course, assumes that PEF could actually avoid a presence inthe United States, notwithstanding its activities with respect to HBE.

31 A U.S. partnership is considered a U.S. person and thus, if PEF is aU.S. partnership, the full amount of PEF’s ownership interest in aforeign corporation is taken into account in determining if theforeign corporation is a CFC. If PEF is a foreign partnership, a“look-through” rule applies and only ownership interests in theforeign corporation that are attributable to partners in PEF that areU.S. persons are taken into account. See §958(a). For a discussionof the pros and cons of using a U.S. or foreign partnership, seeKlein, “Master-Feeder Funds: Domestic or Foreign Master?” 35 TaxMgmt. Int’l J. 522 (October 13, 2006)

32 See Regs. §1.894-1

33 It should be noted that the first meeting of the OECD’s InformalConsultative Group on Taxation of Collective Investment Vehicleswas held in May 2007. A principal focus of the group will be theapplication of income tax treaties with respect to income realisedby such vehicles.

34 See §512

35 See §512(b)(1) and (5)

36 If PEF were set up as a corporation, e.g., as a foreign corporationin a zero-tax jurisdiction, another layer of tax might be incurred,particularly with respect to dividends from HBE. Dividends paid byHBE to PEF as a foreign corporation would likely be subject to U.S.withholding tax but dividends paid by HBE to HPEN through apartnership (PEF) would be tax-exempt.

37 See §884

38 §892

39 See §1297(c)

40 See §1291

41 Alternative structures that would also be satisfactory are to have:(1) FBE set up as a partnership and PEF as a foreign corporation ina zero-tax jurisdiction; and (2) FBE set up as a foreign corporationand PEF as a foreign corporation in a zero-tax jurisdiction.

42 If one is comfortable with the position that PEF would be coveredby the trading safe harbour in §864(b)(2)(A)(ii), then PEF could havea presence in the United States.

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43 The foreign blocker corporation’s share of HBE’s income wouldalso be subject to withholding under §1446 but a credit could beobtained for the tax withheld.

44 As mentioned earlier, it is the position of the IRS that the gain wouldbe ECI. However, there is a reasonable argument to the contrary.See Blanchard, “Rev. Rul. 91-32: Extrastatutory Attribution ofPartnership Activities to Partners”, 1776 Tax Notes 1331(September 8, 1997).

45 For an in-depth discussion of U.S. income tax issues involvingprivate equity funds, see Needham and Adams, 735 T.M., PrivateEquity Funds.

46 See §1(h)(11)(C)(iii)

47 If HF were a CFC, then HI would likely be currently taxed on hisshare of all of HF’s income. Obviously, setting up HF as a U.S.corporation would also be detrimental since HF would generally besubject to U.S. corporate income tax at a 35 percent rate and HIwould then be subject to U.S. tax on dividends received, althoughat the special lower rate for dividends from a U.S. corporation. See§1(h)(11)(B)(i)(I)

48 See §1441

49 Whether or not it is ETB would depend upon exactly what it isdoing in the United States. However, given the facts of thehypothetical, it is likely that HF would not be considered ETB. Thisat least appears to be the conventional wisdom on Wall Street. SeeNeedham and Brause, 736 T.M., Hedge Funds, §VII.D.1. However,Regs. §1.864-2(c)(2)(ii) states somewhat enigmatically that thetrading safe harbour does not apply with respect to “a partnership(other than a partnership in which, at any time during the last half ofits taxable year, more than 50 percent of either the capital interestor the profits interest is owned, directly or indirectly, by five or fewerpartners who are individuals) the principal business of which istrading in stocks or securities for its own account, if the principaloffice of such partnership is in the United States at any time duringthe taxable year”.

50 For an in-depth discussion of U.S. income tax issues involvinghedge funds, see Needham and Brause, 736 T.M., Hedge Funds.

51 The IRS also ruled in Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191, thatthe determination of whether an interest constitutes a profitsinterest is made at the time the interest is granted, even if theinterest is “substantially nonvested” within the meaning of §83 andthe receipt of the interest will not be a taxable event when theinterest does become substantially vested.In 2005, proposed regulations were issued (Prop. Regs.§1.721-1(b)(1), Prop. Regs. §1.83-3(e), and Prop. Regs.§1.704-1(b)(4)(xii)) along with Notice 2005-43 (2005-1 C.B. 1221)that would repeal Rev. Proc. 93-27 (and also Rev. Proc. 2001-43)and provide that the receipt of a profits interest would be governedby §83, generally resulting in immediate income recognition basedon the fair market value of the interest. However, a safe harbour inthe proposed regulations would provide that the fair market valueof a compensatory partnership interest may be treated as beingequal to the liquidation value of that interest. Because the liquida-tion value of a profits interest is zero, under this safe harbour a car-ried interest could continue to be excluded from gross income atthe time of grant.

52 Joyce, “Treasury Scrutinizing Hedge Fund Treatment; Seen asPossible Source for Raising Revenue”, 82 Daily Tax Report GG-1(April 30, 2007)

53 Rothman, “Finance Committee Not Close to Drafting PrivateInvestment, Hedge Fund Legislation”, 88 Daily Tax Report G-2(May 8, 2007)

54 Elmore, “Baucus Sees No Rush to Act on Hedge Fund Legislation”,2007 TNT 89-1 (May 8, 2007)

55 Id.

56 Ferguson, “Grassley Defends Private Equity Legislation AsLoophole Closer, Not Revenue Raisers”, 133 Daily Tax Report p.G-7 (July 12, 2007)

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