Invitation:

The Sociology ofZygmunt Bauman

'"We know what we are', said Ophelia, 'but we know not whatwe may be'. The gentle and naíve Ophelia was wrong: we donot know, in fact, what we are, unless wc are fully aware of whatwe may be"- Zygmunt Bauman, 'Culture, Valúes and Science of Society'

The Stranger and Outsider in Our MidstGeorg Simmel described the stranger as someone who 'arrives today and staystomorrow' (Simmel 1950). The stranger is ''freer, practically and theoretical-ly" than the locáis, and "he surveys conditions with less prejudice; his criteriafor them are more general and more objective ideáis; he is not tied down in hisaction by habit, piety, and precedent" (Simmel 1950:404-405). Thus, to Sim-mel it was a defining characteristic of the stranger that he was a synthesis ofnearness and distance, involvement and passivity, proximity and detachment.Alfred Schütz (1944), described the stranger as someone who gradually ap-proached a group in order to obtain acceptance by it and final assimilation intoit. The stranger, for Schütz, cannot 'think as usual' and deploy the commonlyapplied schemes, recipes and typifications for understanding social ufe andstandardised situations, and he therefore has to navigate uneasily but freely be-tween his own understanding and that of the cultural group he approaches. Be-cause the stranger 'questions the unquestionable', he contributes new perspec-tives to what the others regard as self-evident and the order of the day - some-thing which the in-group may greet either positively or negatively dependingon their disposition.

Zygmunt Bauman is a stranger. He has brought a breath of fresh air into thestuffy atmosphere of the new culture into which he arrived, but he also broughtthe stench of burned bridges, scorched earth, faded hopes and unpleasantmemories from the culture he had to leave behind. Bauman is a stranger andwho strides across the cultural, scientific and ideological boundaries that arenormally in place in order to keep things apart and which "conceals border-lines deemed crucial to ... orderly and/or meaningful life" (Bauman 1997a:17). As a stranger Bauman thus reinterprets the world by making the familiarunfamiliar and by defamiliarising and denaturalising the world that is taken forgranted and at face valué by its native inhabitants.

In this way, the stranger is a metaphor for sociology as much as a label thatcan be applied to a given sociologist. Modernity became the eradle of sociolo-gy and strangeness alike. Throughout this period strangeness became a wide-spread human experience due to increased geographical mobility, detradition-

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alisation and social and cultural uprooting. Sociology not only undertook thestudy of this new sense oí strangeness, but also self-consciously positioned it-self as parí of ílie sclfsame phenomenon, as a stranger among strangers. Tiiis isone of the main reasons why sociology, according lo Bauínan, attracts so manydiverse interpretations and emotions: "In most countries, sociology is alwaysan object of intense, and slightly morbid, fascination. Whether it is praised orcastigated and condemned, it is always considered very much like, in simplersocieties, blacksmiths were: people who were sort of alchemists, who sitastride the normal barricades which ought to be used to keep things apart"(Bauman 1992a:209).

In sociology, the stranger among strangers, Bauman himself has remainedthe archetypal 'marginal man' to quote Everett Stonequist's (1961) develop-ment of Robert E. Park's classic understanding. The marginal man, accordingto Stonequist and Park, is someone who will always remain on the margins,walking carefully on the perimeter while looking into his own discipline aswell as outside into the real world. He is "poised in psychological uncertainty"between the different worlds of his origin and his present situation and "re-flecting in his soul the discords and harmonies, repulsions and attractions ofthese worlds" (Stonequist 1961:8). Stonequist illustrated this duality, ambigu-ity, contradictory feeling and subsequent marginality by specifíc reference tothe Jewish experience. As Milton Goldberg (1941:52) also stated of the mar-ginal man: "When an individual shaped and moulded by one culture is broughtby migration, education, marriage, or other influence into permanent contactwith a culture of different contení, or when an individual from birth is initiatedinto two or more historie traditions, languages, political loyalties, moral codesor religions, then he is likely to find himself on the margin of'each culture, buta member of neither".

This ambivalent status characterises Bauman's own personal and profes-sional situation. There is a mixture of enforced exile in England, and his re-sulting never at-homeness anywhere, with the warm welcome he always re-ceives wherever he attends high-profile internatíonal conferences or smallerpresentations in places cióse to his heart. Contrary to Goldberg's understand-ing, in which the marginal man appears insecure^and excessively self-con-scious, Bauman's personality and writings rather radiate humility, generosityand sensitivity towards the plight of others. There is no excessive self-con-sciousness or artificial self-presentation, but a modest aspiration - practisedwith feverish energy and ceaseless conviction - to come to terms with the hu-man condition and its often inhuman consequences.

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On Thinking arBauman is a strangclationship to the de"Bauman's Jewish 1under communist j2002:376). Thus, fi.European backgroufor decades dominAmerican thinkers.throughout the Colimate of the day, me;was a strange acade

Secondly, BaumaJewish experience, Ithe Jew as the arel"Bauman remained vconnection to his oíJewish experience ithe maxims that hequotes philosopher Iphilosophical problíSecond, critic Geor¿Finally, playwrightJew is that I am everadd the insight of Rtionality ... the bestpecially the Jewish <freedom coupled wiof loyalty, futility ailearned to embrace t

Bauman illustratesource of creativity:from the experienceseen either as a misf<son for despondenc(Kolakowski 1990:ídeep-seated ambival

lot only undertook ¡he-.sciously positioned it-r.ong strangers. This isaman, attracts so many:s. sociology is always\'hether it is praised ormuch like, in simpler

f alchemists, who sitto keep things apart"

himself has remaineduist's (1961) develop-jginal man, according;main on the margins,his ov/n discipline ashological uncertainty"*ent situation and "re-ons and attractions ofi this duality, ambigu-.' specific reference todso stated of the mar-one culture is broughtno permanent contactfrom birth is initiatedloyalties, moral codesin of each culture, but

personal and profes-England, and his re-

slcome he always re-inferences or smalleroldberg's understand-excessively self-con-; humility, generosityo excessive self-con-ispiration - practisedto terms with the hu-

On Thinking and Writing in ExileBauman is a stranger both in terms of his own biography and in terms of his re-lationship to the dominant forms of sociology. As Steven Seidman observed:"Bauman's Jewish birthright and his coming of age as an intellectual in Polandunder communist rule were crucial in shaping his social ideas" (Seidman2002:376). Thus, firstly, Bauman carne to the West from Poland. This EasternEuropean background automatically placed him at the outskirts of a disciplinefor decades dominated institutionally by great Germán, French, British orAmerican thinkers. Coming from the periphery of Western sociology, andthroughout the Cold War belonging to the 'enemy camp' in the political cli-mate of the day, meant that upon arrival in England in the early 1970s Baumanwas a strange academic quantity.

Secondly, Bauman is also Jewish. Although he has never fully embraced theJewish experience, mere is little doubt that he is indeed shaped by the image ofthe Jew as the archetypal stranger who arrived yesterday and settles today.Bauman remained what Samuel Heilman (1980) termed 'native-as-stranger' inconnection to his own Jewish background. Put simply, he associates with theJewish experience more than with the Jewish community. This is clear fromthe maxims that he has taken from three modern Jewish writers. First, hequotes philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein saying that 'the only place where realphilosophical problems can be tackled and resolved is the railway station'.Second, critic George Steiner remarked that 'my homeland is my typewriter'.Finally, playwright Frederic Raphael noted that 'the meaning of my being aJew is that I am everywhere out of place' (Bauman 1992a:226). One could alsoadd the insight of Romanian poet Emil Cioran who stated that 'I have no na-tionality ... the best possible status for an intellectual'. Exile, and perhaps es-pecially the Jewish experience of living and being in exile, means intellectualfreedom coupled with uncertainty, motility, instability, lack of belonging andof loyalty, futility and a multitude of different impressions, and Bauman haslearned to embrace these experiences throughout his own exile.

Bauman ¿Ilústrales Kolakowski's contention that exile can be and often is asource of creativity: "Creativity aróse from insecurity, from an exile of a sort,from the experience of homelessness". He went on to say that exile "can beseen either as a misfortune or as a challenge; it can become no more than a rea-son for despondency and sorrow or a source of painful encouragement"(Kolakowski 1990:58). In the case of Bauman, exile meant a fusión of thedeep-seated ambivalences of these different experiences into a combination of

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challenge and creativity. Despite his involuntary exile, Bauman has not forgot-ten his Polish background and, as Peter Beilharz noted, still watch Polish TVby satellite and occasionaliy participates in Polish cultural life. Indeed, shortlyafter he had to flee the anti-Semitism of state socialist Poland in 1968 he not-ed in embittered fashion about the Jewish exiles that they "will leave the coun-try bearing in their hearts attachment to Polish culture, Polish landscape, and asense of resentment against the rulers of Poland for denying the Jews - as Jews- the right to be recognised as fully fledged citizens of their country" (Bauman1969:8).

Bauman has turned his long-term exile into a context for academic develop-ment, and he has integrated its experiences into important insights of his work.Thus, he observed when contemplating the specifíc Jewish-Polish experienceof being an exile, that "to be in exile means to be out of place ... In exile, un-certainty meets freedom" (Bauman 1996:321). Uncertainty coupled with free-dom may seem unpleasant but is not entirely unrewarding. He went on to ob-serve of the destiny of so many of these specifíc exiles: "For the great majori-ty of diasporic Jews, comfortably settled now in the middle classes of their re-spective countries - local, yet not militantly parochial - assimilation means nomore than keeping up with the Joneses. Thou shalt not step out ofline with íhyneighbour is assimilation's solé commandment" (Bauman 1996:321). Bau-man, however, has never merely aspired to 'keep up with the Joneses'.

This tendency has placed Bauman in opposition to what is taken for grant-ed. He refrains from showing loyalty to any particularistic, nationalistic, polit-ical, scientifically sectarian or ideological doctrines. His loyalty is reserved foruniversalistic, moral and humanistic valúes that may be and indeed have beentermed 'socialist' but which seem much more encompassing than that:

These principies [of justice and self-assertion or autonomy] stay with me all the time -if you cali them socialist, fine; but I don't think they are particularly socialist, anyway.They are much wider than that. I really believe that communism was just the stupidlycondensed and concentrated, naive effort to push it through; but the valúes were neverinvented by the communists. The valúes were there, much wider; they were Western,Enlightenment valúes. I can't imagine a society which would dispose of these two valú-es, ever ... Once the ideas of justice and self-assertion were invented, it is impossible toforget them. They will haunt and pester us to the end of the world (Bauman 1992a:225).

In relation to the poles of 'involvement' and 'detachment' which Norbert Eliasidentified (1956), Bauman clearly comes much closer to the former than to thelatter. In his inaugural lecture at the University of Leeds in 1971, he expresseda wish that "our vocation, after all these unromantic years, may become again

a testfield of couragí1972:203). This aspir

Bauman's BiograZygmunt Bauman waly in Poznan, Poland.ing the Stalin regimeSeptember 1939. Initied studies at a Sovietjoin the military inste1943. By the end o f tpating in the Red Arrrpost-war Poland he b(Smith 1999:39). He ithe Warsaw Academya member of the Comna later described, hea better socialist socie

In 1953 Bauman stímissed from the arm;completed his MA in :pointed lecturer at thtyears he received his 1don School of Econonconducted research onstarted editing Polish stained the position asalso elected PresidentAssociation. During timember of the Commiwhen he handed in himissed from his positi<text of encouraging suish youth. This event vauthorities were whipplems. Exile became thgled to settle, the BauiAustralia. Despite rece

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luinan has not forgot-xt i l l \vatch Polish TV.1 lite. Indeed, :;hort!yiland in 1968 he not-"\\ill leave the coun-ilish landscape, and ai£ the Jews - as Jews•ircountry" (Bauman

^ academic develop-insights of his work.sh-Polish experienceilace ... In exile, un-;y coupled vvith free-¿:. He \vent on to ob-For the great majori-le classes of their re-^similation means nop out ofline with thyan 1996:321). Bau-the Joneses'.at is taken for grant-. nationalistic, polit-ivalty is reserved fornd indeed have beenng than that:

¡y with me all the time -uiarly socialist, anyway.sm was just the stupidlyai the vslues were neverden they were Western,spose of these two valu-ented. ii rs impossible toi¿iBaurünl992a:225).

aliich Norbert Eliase former than to theI971.faeexpressedmay recome again

a testfield of courage, consistency, and loyalty to human valúes" (Bauman1972:203). This aspiration has characterised Bauman's mission ever since.

Bauman's Biography - The BaslesZygmunt Bauman was born on November 18th 1925 into a poor Jewish fami-ly in Poznan, Poland. His formal schooling took place in the Soviet Union dur-ing the Stalin regime, after his family fled the Nazi occupation of Poland inSeptember 1939. Initially he had ambitions of becoming a physicist and start-ed studies at a Soviet university, but the outbreak of World War II made himjoin the military instead. He joined the Polish divisions of the Red Army in1943. By the end of the war he was wounded but was still capable of partici-pating in the Red Army's liberation of Berlín in May 1945. Upon his return topost-war Poland he became one of the youngest majors in the Polish army(Smith 1999:39). He met his wife and life-long companion, Janina, in 1948 atthe Warsaw Academy of Social Sciences. Zygmunt Bauman officially becamea member of the Communist Party in 1951 (Bielefeld 2002:113ff) and as Jani-na later described, he was initially a devoted believer in the ideas and ideáis ofa better socialist society.

In 1953 Bauman started an academic career as a sociologist after being dis-missed from the army during an anti-Semitic and 'de-Judaising' purge. Hecompleted his MA in social sciences at the University of Warsaw and was ap-pointed lecturer at the Faculty of Social Sciences in 1954. In the followingyears he received his PhD and made several trips to England, first to the Lon-don School of Economics and later to the University of Manchester, where heconducted research on the Englis'h labour movement. From the early 1960s hestarted editing Polish sociology journals (Bunting 2003:23) and in 1964 he ob-tained the position as Chair of General Sociology at Warsaw. In 1966 he wasalso elected President of the Executive Committee of the Polish SociologicalAssociation. During mis period he remained a loyal, yet increasingly criticalmember of the Communist Party but this carne to a swift halt in January 1968when he handed in his party membership card. Bauman was eventually dis-missed from his positien as Chair of Sociology in late March 1968, on the pre-text of encouraging student revolt against the Party and of corrupting the Pol-ish youth. This event was part of a wider anti-Semitic campaign that the Polishauthorities were whipping up, in order to divert attention from their own prob-lems. Exile became the only option. For three years during which they strug-gled to settle, the Baumans stayed in Israel and had brief spells in Canadá andAustralia. Despite receiving invitations from a number of institutions, they ar-

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rived at Leeds in England where Bauman taught at the sociology departmentuntil his retiremeni in 1990.

Today, Bauman is professor emeritus at (he universiíies of Leeds and War-saw and, amongst oíher places, honorary doctor at the University of Copen-hagen, Denmark. Eversince these early exile years, Bauman has written, trav-elled and lectured extensively and almost incessantly on issues cióse to hisheart and he is a frequently booked as an inspirational speaker at conferencesal! over the world.

What do these brief biographical details reveal about Zygmunt Bauman, thesociologist? First, they ¡Ilústrate the extent to which the biographical is mixedwith the historical. Bauman was right when in his inaugural lecture as profes-sor of sociology at the University of Leeds he remarked: "In the professionallife of a sociologist his most indínate, prívate biography is inextricably inter-tangled with the biography of his discipline; one thing the sociologist cannottranscend in his quest for objectivity is his own, intímate and subjective en-counter-with-the-world" (Bauman 1972:185).

Second, the fact that Bauman became an integral part of the Polish academ-ic power structure despite his Jewish background and his gradually evolvingscepticism towards the system also illustrates how, as perpetual stranger, he si-multaneously remained part of and an outsider to the system. This was a posi-tion that also characterised his situation in the West. His intellectual itineraryis a transformation from the intellectual as 'legislator' to the intellectual as 'in-terpreter' (Bauman 1987a). The Polish térra 'intellectual', as Stanislaw Ba-ranczak (1986) points out, actually has a double meaning and contains dif-ferent semantic connotations. First, as the term intelektualista meaning 'the in-tellectual', it refers to a member or representative of the ñarrow and elitist cir-cle of 'creative' intellectuals. Second, as the term inteligent, it connotes a per-son who works with his mind rather than with his hands. Early in life, Baumanembraced and personified the intelektualista when still in Poland and occupy-ing the position as professor of sociology at the University of Warsaw. He wasa man apparently <?/the system and also belonged to the inteligencia, the intel-ligentsia. Later, however, when he started voicing criticism against the systemand its way of treating people and abandoning its promises of a socialistutopia, he was expelled from the intellectual élite and had to make it on hisown without the security of being part of the intelektualista.

Stanislaw Baranczak described the inevitable plight of the Polish intellectu-al upon arrival and settlement in the West: "A Polish intellectual who in hisown country appears to other intellectuals as a specifíc, individual personality... after becoming an emigré finds himself reduced to the role of a typical,

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face-in-the-crowd 'iWesterners, who quthought, poetry, or iBauman has severaland being an exile. Iperíences of livingmixed and dubious tjective' and exotic stHowever, as strangeness from the 'nativtravel light, they wouthose many who maysions" (Bauman \991exiled ... in the end [country of arrival, lii1997b:160).

That is the story othe process of assimilinternational sociologed. It is as if he has almany years of succesí

The Backbone ofBauman is a 'mavericlcific school of thoughlcipline. He is unique i:that are offered by beiiBauman is actually exgards his work as a vo<ble. He is also uniqueand interpretative ironconventional categorie

Bauman is neither aeverything. He clearlyguess that my works jirecord, since in their dispicuous solely ihrougi'modernist trilogy' o f ,

: sociology dcpartment

lies of Leeds and War-: University of Copen-iiman has writlen, trav-on issues cióse to hisspeaker at conlerences

Zygmunt Bauman, the: biographical is mixediural lecture as profes--d: "In the protessional.y is inextricably inter-the sociologist cannot

,ate and subjective en-

: of the Polish academ-his gradually evolvingírpetual stranger. he si-stem. This was a posi-is intellectual itineraryi the intellectual as 'in-aal'. as Stanislaw Ba-ling and contains dif-alisía meaning 'the in-narrow and elitist cir-

>ent, it connotes a per-. Early in life. Baumanin Poland and occupy-ityofWarsavv. Hewasimeligencja, the intel-sm against the system-omises of a socialisthad to make it on hisista.f the Polish intellectu-ntellectual who in hisindividual personalitythe role of a typical,

face-in-the-crowd 'Polish exile'. He is reduced to such a role not only byWesterners, who quite naturally know nothing of his achievements in socialthought, poetry, or theatre, but also by himself" (Baranczak 1986:222-223).Bauman has severa! times commented on this specific experience of being inand being an exile. Exiles are normally regarded as an avant-garde whose ex-periences of living elsewhere man their original habitat are "notoriously amixed and dubious blessing" (Bauman 1997b:159). On the one hand, as 'ob-jective' and exotic strangers, they may encounter warm and welcoming arms.However, as strange 'outsiders', they "may well expect all sorts of unpleasant-ness from the 'natives'. Just because they already know that their fate is totravel light, they would be looked upon with suspicion, distaste and rancour bythose many who may still hope against hope to cling on to their bulky posses-sions" (Bauman 1997b:159-160). Whiie it may seem a "mixed blessing for theexiled ... in the end [it is] no small a blessing for their new neighbours in thecountry of arrival, little that they may expect it in the beginning" (Bauman1997b:160).

That is the story of Bauman's personal and sociological journey. For him,the process of assimilation to the West as well as acceptance into the centre ofinternational sociology has never, and self-consciously, been totally complet-ed. It is as if he has always wanted to retain his status as stranger even after somany years of successful exile.

The Backbone of BaumanBauman is a 'maverick' sociologist. He is not a member or founder of any spe-cific school of thought, or representative for a certain paradigm within the dis-cipline. He is unique in the sense that he does not seek shelter in the secundesthat are offered by being part of an established tradition or intellectual faction.Bauman is actually extremely wary of accepting sociology as a career and re-gards his work as a vocation for which he is personally, and morally, responsi-ble. He is also unique - a stranger - in the sense that he escapes our cognitiveand interpretative iron-cages and does not allow himself to be caught in theconventional categories we normally employ when classifying thinkers.

Bauman is neither a systematic thinker ñor the creator of grand theories ofeverything. He clearly cherishes this unsystematic tendency in his writings: "Iguess that my works justify my filing among the least systematic thinkers onrecord, since in their descriptions the merit of 'conceptual clarity' can be con-spicuous solely through its absence" (Bauman 2005). Apart perhaps from his'modernist trilogy' of Legislators and Interpreten, Modernity and the Holo-

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caust and Modernitv and Ambivalence, Bauman has not written a coherent, in-tegrated or syslematic sociological theory in trie manner of Talcott Parsons,Niklas Luhmann or Jürgen Habermas. Like Siminel he writes essavs aboutwhatever he finds stimulating, whether that is love, law and order, humanrights, religión, sexuality, strangers, criminology, marginalisation, globalisa-tion, individualisation, terrorism, morality, postmodernity, intellectuals, theHolocaust, ethics and morality, death, etc. These themes are merged into somesort of fragmented order in which, what at the surface level may seem to be ut-terly disorderly and coincidental, deeper down reveal a certain loóse structure,sensitivity and senseof purpose. Bauman attempts to make his words matter inreal life by ascribing an uncompromising critical role to the academic. Heclaims, by way of Lev Shestov, thai "the philosopher's [and sociologists']search for the ultímate sysiem, for the complete order, for the extirpation ofeverything unknown and unruly, stems from the dream of having a firm soiland solid home, and leads to closing down the obstinately infinite human po-tential. Such search for the universal cannot but degenerate into a ruthlessclamp-down on human possibilities" (Bauman 1988-1989:23).

Bauman, perhaps inevitably therefore, is not afraid ío remain open to inter-pretation and does not want to constrain or constrict the reader in his or herown interpretations of the texts he has authored. Pieter Nijhoff (1998) hasspeculated that the self-imposed inconsistency in Bauman's work mirrors theambivalence and complexity of the world he explores. As Kwang-Ki Kimstated in his Order and Agency in Modernity:

Such ambivalence has often been held against one or another modern theorist, for ex-ample, as a symptom of personal confusión or inconsistency, but it now needs to be re-cognized that modernity is complex and multi-faceted; any insightful analysis, andespecially any penetrating evaluation, should recognize and reflect this complexity. It isnot a question of personal confusión about an unambiguous phenomenon, but aquestion of personal insight into a phenomenon which is in many respects ambiguous(Kim 2003:109).

Besides the fact that modernity is ambivalent in itself, there are also other rea-sons why such ambivalences and inconsistencies can be detected in Bauman'swork. He willingly pursues the fragment, the non-linearity of argument, ad-mits his ambivalence and lack of access to any ultimate or incontrovertibletruth. He does not claim to hold superior wisdom or insight because of his sta-tus as sociologist, although he believes that the sociologist holds an obligationto "help an ordinary person like you and me to see through our experience, andto show how the apparently familiar aspects of life can be interpreted in a nov-

el way and seen inthis description thaiSociology - and thethat seeks to 'defanning the apparent in

Another reason fNijhoff noted, "ofteintertwines scientifiquestions that are udifferent genres, BÍwork, but he does slook deeper than h<conventional scientindividual who hasThus, Bauman rece

I believe that th<pose the specifisponsibility; it ssequences for tie's vocation ou,denies its relatiiaround, showindition told whiltral, and doingwhoever takesassume or rejecly (Bauman 20i

Consequently, Baiand ethical respon;the moral depths o:the early writingsdefence of a moral- as human suenoinhuman delusion;manity in life, thatthe difference be2001:335).

Thus, without s:

ity, it can neverthe

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,Tillen a cohercnt, in-r oí Talcoll Parsons,writcs cssays about

w and ordcr, humannalisation. globalisa-ity, intellectuals, theiré mcrgcd inlo some.-I may seem to be ut-•rtain loóse structure,e his \vords matter into the academic. Hes [and sociologists']or the extirpation ofof having a firm soily infinite human po-erate into a ruthless};23).:emain open to inter-• reader in his or her: Nijhoff 0998) hasji's work mirrors the

As K\vang-Ki Kim

• modero theorist. for ex-rnit it nov> needs to be re-

insiehnul analysis. andflect thi? complexity. It isous phesomenon. but ananv resrects ambiguous

•re are siso other rea-ietecte-d in Bauman'sity of srsument. ad-; or ircomrcvertibleht beca.se of his sta--i hol¿5 jn ocligafioni our ecerseace. andInterTTítzC -j~ a nov-

el way and seen in a different light" (Bauman 1990a:18). It is obvious fromthis description that Bauman places himself alongside the 'ordinary person'.Sociology - and the sociologist is engaged in a conversador, with lay peoplethat seeks to 'defamiliarise the familiar' and disclose the illusions underpin-ning the apparent inevitability and stubborn facticity of the world.

Another reason for the ambivalences of his work is that Bauman, as PeterNijhoff noted, "often combines the criteria of what is just, pleasing or true - heintertwines scientific and moral considerations and lavishes literary means onquestions that are usually treated analytically" (Nijhoff 1998:87). By mixingdifferent genres, Bauman transgresses the traditional boundaries of scientificwork, but he does so in a way that encourages the reader to reach farther andlook deeper than he would have been able to do armed merely with dull orconventional scientific 'facts'. He confronts the reader personally as a moralindividual who has a responsibility for his own Ufe as well as that of others.Thus, Bauman recently stated that

I believe that the propulsión to sociologize, to tell stories the sociological way - to com-pose the specifically sociological stories - is born from responsibility and driven by re-sponsibility; it signáis the assumption of responsibility for human choices and their con-sequences for the shape of humanity. I believe that to be a sociologist means to make on-e's vocation out of that responsibility. Sociology that shakes off such responsibility ordenies its relation to its own labour is not, of course, inconceivable (there is plenty of itaround, showing no symptom of decay) - but it is an oxymoron. No story of human con-dition told while that condition is in-the making (as it always is) is not ñor can be neu-tral, and doing sociology means, whether by design or by default, taking sides. Andwhoever takes sides bears responsibility for the consequences. The solé problem is toassume or reject one's responsibility for that responsibility - and then to act according-ly (Bauman 2005).

Consequently, Bauman mixes scientific considerations with moral concernsand ethical responsibility. This has meant that he has always delved deep intothe moral depths of his discipline, and his critique of positivist sociology, fromthe early writings to the latest books, illustrates that Bauman is serious in hisdefence of a morally committed sociology. Bauman warns that "Wertfreiheit is- as human silences is concerned - not just a pipe-dream, but also an utterlyinhuman delusion; that sociologizing makes sense only in as far as it helps hu-manity in life, that in the ultímate account it is the human choices that make allthe difference between Uves human and inhuman" (Bauman in Beilharz2001:335).

Thus, without stretching the analogy of the stranger beyond reasonable util-ity, it can nevertheless be said that Bauman, as the stranger, has, therefore, not

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distanced himself from the interna! concerns of the discipline of sociology orretreated into self-imposed or self-satisfied intellectual isolation. As Simmelobserved. to be a stranger does neither mean non-participation ñor self-con-straining isolation. It rather means a positive and definite kind of participation,theoretical or practica!, which "does not mean that the mind is a passive tabu-la rasa on which things inscribe their qualities, but rather signifies the full ac-tivity of a mind working according to its own laws, under conditions that ex-clude accidental distortions and emphases whose individual and subjectivedifferences would produce quite different pictures of the same object" (Sim-mel 1950:404). Moreover, apart from 'a mind working according to its ownlaws', the status as stranger involves a positive freedom from common sense,from the often stagnant logic of the insiders. It is this that allows Bauman todevelop a distinctive view of the social world as well as of the academic disci-pline of which he is a part.

The pragmatist philosopher William James once stated that 'any author iseasy if you catch the centre of his visión'. Although the vastness and complex-ity of Bauman's work makes attempts at catching and clarifying the 'centre ofhis visión' somewhat problematic, he offers some clues. Bauman remarked inan interview that there "were actually two things with which I was concernedthroughout my writings, throughout my academic career. One was the workingclass, standing for the downtrodden or the underdog, for suffering in general.For a long time there was a sign of identity between the two: the working classas the embodiment of suffering. That was one topic, and the other was culture... To understand how the visibility, tangibility and power of reality - and theconviction concerning the belief in reality - are being constructed: that is whyI became interested in culture" (Bauman 1992a:206). 'Suffering and culturehave indeed been some of the recurrent themes in Bauman's work. Moreover,not only the theme in themselves but also the Way he has confronted them isimportan! in understanding the 'centre' of Bauman. Dennis Smith has ob-served: "The driving forcé behind Zygmunt Bauman's work as a sociologisthas been two things: first, a sense of intellectual and moral outrage about theextent to which societies are run on the basis of untruth and self-deception;and, second, a deep dissatisfaction with the evil and suffering this makes pos-sible" (Smith 1998:40). So Bauman not only looks and analyses but he does soin a special way. He looks at both conditions and consequences. He equallydescribes, analyses, diagnoses, and evalúales. However, he never proposeshow or what people should do - this dimensión is left entirely to people them-selves as autonomous and potentially active human beings.

Thus, morality is one of the most frequently discussed and occurring con-

cepts in the sociologytified as a 'moral soMatthias Junge (200,versión of morality tiprivileged as being th<approach was identifwhich he instead pro]man's understandingRobert Musil in his dThe Man Without Que

For him morality \e infinite fullnes:

for constant intensmost people do, incut-and-dried and <without believing i;rality is somethingcause life does nothing that could nevBut morality mus1969/1995:430).

This 'morality as ima¡infinity of possibilitie;of one single incontro-"phrases like 'the saneciology seminar as theic office" (Bauman 19gy if it is to serve a re;

The moral imaginatstated in Alone Again:tinuous uncertainty, arto withstand pressurestional and in principietheir never quenched cing suspicion that theyBauman has dramatic;one's life for another 1(Bauman 1992b:210).

This approach to me

22

soplillo of sociology oral isolation. As Simmelticipation ñor self-con-

itc kind of participation,niind is a passive tabu-

her signifies the full ac-nder condilions that ex-lividual and subjectivethe sanie object" (Sim-ic according to iís ownm troni oommon sense,that allows Bauman to

s of the academia disci-

ited that 'any author isvastness and complex-

:larifying the 'centre ofs. Bauman remarked inwhich 1 was concernedr. One was the workingor suftering in general.t\vo: the working classd the other was culturever of reality - and theonstructed: that is why•Suffering and culture

nan's \vork. Moreover,ia> confronted them isDennis Smith has ob-work as a sociologistoral ourrage about theth and self-deception;fering mis. makes pos-

he does sos. He equally

er. he never proposesitirely x> people them-O"v.

id anc vX-curring con-

cepts in the sociology of Bauman (see Crone 2005) and his work can be iden-tified as a "moral sociology'. His so-called 'poisoned gift of morality', asMatthias Junge (2001) apíly described it. consists in offering an alternativeversión of morality than the one the West has traditionally conceived of andprivileged as being the dominant, true and most valid. This traditional Westernapproach was identified by Bauman as a 'morality of conformity', againstwhich he instead proposes a 'morality of choice' (see Bauman 1998c). Bau-man's understanding of morality is perhaps best captured by the words ofRobert Musil in his description of the moral hero, Ulrich, towards the end ofThe Man Wilhout Qualities:

For hira morality was neither conformism ñor the sum of acquired knowledge; it wasthe infinite fullness of life's potentialities. He believed that morality held the capacityfor constant intensification. He believed in stages of moral experience, not merely, asmost people do, in stages of moral apprehension - as though morality were somethingcut-and-dried and only man were not yet puré enough for it. He believed in moralitywithout believing in any particular code of moráis. What is generally understood by mo-raiity is something like a system of pólice regulations for keeping order in life; and be-cause life does not answer to these, they come to look as if they were by nature somet-hing that could never quite be lived up to and henee, in a rather sordid way, like an ideal.But morality must not be reduced to mis level. Morality is imagination (Musil1969/1995:430).

This 'morality as imagination' means a morality attuned to human life, to theinfmity of possibilities and paths available, not to the totalising understandingof one single incontrovertible moral truth or norm. Bauman is well aware that"phrases like 'the sanctity of human life' or 'moral duty' sound as alien in a so-ciology seminar as they do in the smoke-free, sanitized rooms of a bureaucrat-ic office" (Bauman 1989:29), yet he still insists on bringing them into sociolo-gy if it is to serve a real mission in the lives of people and society.

The moral imagination also means a never-ending search for moral life. Hestated in Alone Again: Ethics After Certainty that "moral life is a life of con-tinuous uncertainty, and it takes a lot of strength and resilience and an abilityto withstand pressures to be a moral person. Moral responsibility is uncondi-tional and in principie infinite - and thus one can recognize a moral person bytheir never quenched dissatisfaction with their moral performance; the gnaw-ing suspicion that they were not moral enough" (Bauman 1994:45). ElsewhereBauman has dramatically claimed that it is only by being willing to sacrificeone's life for another human being, that one can ultimately claim to be moral(Bauman 1992b:210).

This approach to morality contains the space in which ambivalence is so im-

23

portátil for Bauman. Even though modernity sought lo crush ambivalence (thekind of ambivalence that is represented by the stranger) in the ñame of 'perfectorder', for Bauman ambivalence is the nub of the human condition and the cir-cumstance in which moral choices have to be inade and carried out. In Bau-man's work then, ambivalence embodies and connotes positive aspects of cul-tural life such as diversity, liberty, variety, choice and non-conformity, and heis a stern defender of ambivalence against the oppressive and relentless socialforces of order, structure, system and streamlining (see Junge 2002; Diken2005).

Bauman's sociological and moral mission is always, categorically and un-conditionally, to side with the weakest members of society and to show us, thebetter off part of the planet, that our moral obligation must be equally uncon-ditional and unwavering if human suffering is to be avoided or overeóme. It isin this context of a concern with suffering that social and spatial stratificationare important (see Abrahamson 2004); economic poverty and the inability touphold a decent life spur Bauman's sociological and moral indignation. Heeven calis poverty the 'meta-humiliation' that in turn serves as a 'trampoline'for other humiliations and indignities in life (Bauman & Tester 2001:154). Allof his books are drenched in solidarity with - and sympathy for - peoplecaught and suspended in the webs of power, oppression, persecution, povertyand potential extermination. He thus claims that in the last instance we canjudge "society by the care it takes of its weakest members" (Bauman 1990b:23).

Given that Bauman addresses questions of morality, ambivalence and suf-fering within a sociological context - and given that he refuses to see them asabstractions - it is inevitable that his attention focuses on power. Kilminsterand Varcoe have claimed of Bauman that, "his treatment of power is possiblyhis single most accomplished sociological analysis" (Kilminster & Varcoe1996:218). Power, in his universe, is a multi-facetted phenomenon includingdirect physical coerción, torture, starvation and execution, surveillance, con-trol of the predictability of outcomes, repression and the mastery over the lifechances of other people. Bauman's sociological imagination wishes to "under-stand how the visibility, tangibility of power, of reality - and the convictionconcerning, the belief in, reality - are being constructed" (Bauman 1992a:206). This is not a merely descriptive task, and he consequently seeks to assistin relieving people from repression, from the determinations of the powerfulor false consciousness. Bauman's work seeks to show to the oppressed andpowerless that the world can be different from what it currently is despite itsawesome and powerful structures, order and systemic appearance. Repression

and inequality of life chaeither in the form of physi1982, 1998a) or with whaconsumerist postmodern tman is, as a consequenaevitability, totality and inquence of human unfreedture the essence of his ow

I have seen morally ¡nslogic of the reality theithemselves to re-definehuman meaning, to derpotential. I was with thof the same stubborn re.again from below the tiyoung and vigorous, iichallenge the ungratifywhich the meaning andtermined, merge continry and mischievously ehuman world (so I leanwas, I think, congenialform emerged. It was bihe ends people read inbetween anticipations ;1972:186-187).

Bauman's sociology seelcrepancy' in order to alieHe does not tell his readethey themselves discoveíthis is perhaps also becauswers or the solutions.

Despite his indefatigaldanger that the disciplineas people actually experiicommentary, an after thetude of events in humanthe time at my disposal s(the older you are the betttthey will never be big en<

24

orush ambivalence (thein the ñame oí 'periect

n condition and the cir-id carried out. In Bau-positive aspeéis of cul-lon-conformity. and heve and relentless socialee Junge 2002: Diken

. categorieally and un-ety and to show us. theriust be equally uncon-ided or overeóme. It isid spatial stratificationrty and the inability tomoral indignation. He.-rves as a 'trampoline':Tester 2001:154). Allvrnpathy for - peoplei, persecution. poverry; last instance we caniers" (Bauman 1990b:

ambivalence and suf-refuses to see them ason power. Kilminstert of power is possiblyKilminster & Yarcoehenomenon includingon, surveillance. con-• mastery over the ufedon wishes to "uoder-- and the convicúoned" (Bauman 1992a;}uentlv seeks to assis.tions of the powürfulto the oppressed ao¿urrently is despitr itípearance. Repre

and inequality of life chances have always been part of the human conditioneither in the form of physical regimentation or mental indoctrination (Bauman1982, 1998a) or with what he succinctly termed the 'velvet repression' of theconsumerist postmodern era (Bauman in Cantell & Pedersen 1992:142). Bau-man is, as a consequence, a keen observer and stern critic of necessity, in-evitability, totality and invariability that is either the condition or the conse-quence of human unfreedom, suffering and defeat. He thus attempted to cap-ture the essence of his own work in the following way: .

I have seen morally inspired, noble and lofty ideáis smashed to pieces by the mercilesslogic of the reality their bearers failed to assess. I was with those who took ... uponthemselves to re-define the world they lived in, to fill the world with a new, better, morehuman meaning, to deny its repulsive reality in the ñame of the untrammelled humanpotential. I was with them still when they saw their ambition shattered against the wallof the same stubborn reality they refused to admit, and the same moral squalor sproutingagain from below the thin film of ideáis. And then, fortunately, I saw the same, alwaysyoung and vigorous, indomitable spirit of exploration and perfection rising again tochallenge the ungratifying reality. There seemed, indeed, to be no end to the drama inwhich the meaning and the reality, the subjective and the objective, the free and the de-termined, merge continuously to mould our present into our future. Such - contradicto-ry and mischievously elusive to all clear-cut unilateral descriptions - is the shape of thehuman world (so I learned), my metier - sociology - is about. And the lesson I learnedwas, I think, congenial to the collective experience from which sociology in its modernform emerged. It was born of the painful realization of the vexing discrepancy betweenthe ends people read into their actions and the consequences these actions bring about;between anticipations and results; ideáis and reality; the 'ought' and the 'is' (Bauman1972:186-187).

Bauman's sociology seeks to describe, bridge and remedy this 'vexing dis-crepancy' in order to allow people themselves to overeóme and transcend it.He does not tell his readers how to do it, when or where, but rather insists thatthey themselves discover the path that may take them there. This reason forthis is perhaps also because Bauman himself does not pretend to know the an-swers or the solutions.

Despite his indefatigable belief in sociology, Bauman is well aware of thedanger that the discipline may not necessarily always capture the social worldas people actually experience it. Sociological knowledge will always remain acommentary, an after the fact and indeed selective interpretation, of the multi-tude of events in human life. This difficulty made Bauman ponder: "Perhapsthe time at my disposal seems too short not because of my oíd age, but becausethe older you are the better you know that however big the thoughts may seem,they will never be big enough to embrace, let alone keep hold of, the bountiful

25

prodigaJity of human expenence" (Bauman 2003a:2). The human world, in-habited by creative and also 'destructively creative' human beings, capable ofcompassionate and self-effacing - as vvell as inhuman and selfish deeds - isacomplex realm that requires the skills of sociology in order to be understood.and Bauman's work takes us a long way in that direction.

Sources of Sociological ImaginationAs Matthias Junge and Tilomas Kron rightly observed when trying to capturethe theoretical lineage of Zygmunt Bauman: "When one attempts to sum-marise possible predecessors of and affinities with the work of Zygmunt Bau-man, then ever more persistent references show up which have influenced hisposition and understanding of social, historical and ideational processes"(Junge & Kron 2002:8). True, such an attempt is similar to opening up a Pan-dora's Box from which a swarm of ñames, traditions and possible interpreta-tions suddenly starts appearing, making a coherent or agreed upon reception ofthe nature of his work almost impossible. There is a multitude of sources of in-spiration, affinities, fads, references, predecessors, contemporaries and intel-lectual kinships, spiritual and sociological soul mates in Bauman's writings.Mixing, combining, uniting, utilising, bending, joining, modifying, support-ing, critiquing, forging and transforming these constant presences makes upmuch of the sociological skeleton that he has gradually constructed and devel-oped. He once noted on his particular, and to some peculiar, way of workingwith the ideas and theories of others:

I am inherently, and probably incurably eclectic; that is, I am not v'ery much interestedin loyalty to any particular school or style. I am looking everywhere for things whichseem to be relevant to what I am working on. And, once I have found them I am not verymuch bothered with the question of whether I transgressed some sacred boundary, orwent into an área which I shouldn't, because I belong to a different school... During myintellectual career - if you want to put it this way - I flirted in this manner with a num-ber of new fads which I thought might contain something relevant (Bauman 1992a:211).

This kind of eclecticism made Pieter Nijhoff propose that "Bauman is notbothered too much by the boundaries between politics, social science and cul-tural history; social-psychological analysis and existential reflections inter-mingle; he switches back and forth between literary and logical expositions;he changes the lenses from hermeneutical to systematical, analytical and back;fmally, his moral philosophy searches for indeterminacy beyond all defini-tions. All these combinations match his conception of sociology" (Nijhoff

26

1998:95). In a similarstrategy is to ingest wlmany ñames have beenliterary predecessors adetermining these, eithcommitting a 'strong(1997) by way of literafluence (1973), Bloompoem, but another poensame way Bauman's w<other pieces of work th;

Bauman's early acachim like a shadow. InHochfeld and Stanisla\. Where the forme

work has been charact179ff). Despite theirdifcio-political importancetached work, for its owrclearly fond of the anti-"I am so grateful to Ossvery beginning of my sithat sociology is (or shchistory behind and nevéwanted sociology to macial life. Hochfeld wantecial suffering to reveal ition more likely. From Cof standing up against trtions of the actual, the rewhich Bauman has nevé;

The fact that a man isñor from obedience arequires him to be dis<red to do so, or if he inctfulofhisduty ...Th<sional obligation. His sthe synod, ñor the corrinNowak!963:10).

i

The human world, in-nian beings, capable of.ind selfish deeds - is acu'der to be understood,

when trying to captureone attempts to sum-

\ \orkofZygmuntBau-ich have influenced his

ideational processes"ar to opening up a Pan-md possible interpreta-;reed upon reception ofItitude of sources of in-itemporaries and intel-in Bauman's writings.g. modifying, support-nt presences makes upconstructed and devel-culiar, way of working

jn not very much interested\e for things whichve found ihem I am not veni some sacred boundary. orñerent school... During my. ín this manner with a num-.evant (Bauman 1992a:211).

e that "Bauman is notsocial science and cul-;ntial reflections inter-nd logical expositions:al. analytical and back:acy beyond all defini-?f sociology" (Nijhoff

1998:95). In a similar vein, Peter Beilharz stated that "Bauman's workingstrategy is to ingest whatever intere.sts" (Beilharz 2001:3). As a consequence,many ñames have been mentioned as Bauman's sociológica!, phiiosophical orliterary predecessors and sources of inspiration throughout the years. Whendetermining these, either by including or excluding them, one is in danger ofcommitting a 'strong misreading' or 'poetic misprision', as Marek Kwiek(1997) by way of literary critic Harold Bloom remarked. In The Anxiety ofln-fluence (1973), Bloom had stated that "the meaning of a poem can only be apoem, but another poem - a poem not itself' (Bloom in Kwiek 1997:3). In thesame way Bauman's work may poetically be understood through the prism ofother pieces of work that either latently or manifestly colour his perspective.

Bauman's early academic training in Poland has without doubt followedhim like a shadow. In particular the influence of his two teachers, JuliánHochfeld and Stanislaw Ossowski, shaped Bauman's own unique develop-ment. Where the former represented a so-called 'open Marxism', the latter'swork has been characterised as a 'humanistic sociology' (Sztompka 1984:179ff). Despite their differences, both were "convinced of the tremendous so-cio-political importance of their purely academic work. Theirs was never de-tached work, for its own sake" (Bauman 1992a:208). Moreover, Bauman wasclearly fond of the anti-positivistic strand of sociology that they represented:"I am so grateful to Ossowski and Hochfeld for having vaccinated me, at thevery beginning of my sociological life and once and for all, against the ideathat sociology is (or should become) a kind of physics which leaves its ownhistory behind and never looks back" (Bauman & Tester 2001:35). They bothwanted sociology to make a difference and to have a bearing on practical so-cial life. Hochfeld wanted the sociologist to see behind the smokescreen of so-cial suffering to reveal its underlying causes and in order to make its allevia-tion more likely. From Ossowski, Bauman learned the importance of critique,of standing up against the status quo and of confronting the official presenta-tions of the actual, the real or the necessary. Ossowski outlined a position fromwhich Bauman has never departed:

The fact that a man is a scholar does not free him from the discipline of his profession,ñor from obedience as a citizen. But in certain circumstances professional disciplinerequires him to be disobedient ... If he is obedient, if he changes his views when orde-red to do so, or if he in his thinking is not in agreement with his words, then he is negle-ctful of his duty ... The scientist is a man for whom disobedience of thought is a profes-sional obligation. His social function is to question. In this respect he must obey neitherthe synod, ñor the committee, ñor the cabinet minister, ñor Caesar, ñor God (OssowskiinNowak 1963:10).

27

The valué of disobedience, of refusing to obey, of saying 'no' and of non-con-formity was a lesson Bauman learned early on and later embraced as the sineqi'.a non of academic as well as of human existence.

These lessons taught by Hochfeld and Ossowski constitute Bauman's spe-cial sociológica! sensibility or 'sixth sense', as he himself has termed it. Thissixth sense entails the "realisation that there is more to what you see and hearthan meets the eye, that the most important part is hidden from view, and thatthere is a huge and dense tissue of inter-human connections below the visibletip of the iceberg" (Bauman in Blackshaw 2002:1). But there is no doubt thatthe younger Marx can be and should be mentioned as well, despite Bauman'sperpetual battle with and revisión of Marxism. These influences were filteredthrough Gramsci and his insistence on the possibility of a world different fromwhat it currently is, Hannah Arendt and her notion of democratic participationand republicanism, Robert Musil and the anti-naturalistic attitude, Albert Ca-mus and the commitment to human dignity and moral refusal, as well as thecritica! and dialectical social theory of the early Frankfurt School (see Beilharz1998, 2000, 2001; Tester 2002, 2004; Jacobsen 2003, 2004a). Moreover, therecurring theme of ambivalence was clearly inspired by Mary Douglas, whoseanthropological perspective he sociologised: "To Douglas I owe my under-standing of the social production and the effects of ambivalence" (Bauman &Tester 2001:35; Beilharz 2001:335). He also specifically mentions the inspira-tion found in the work of Michel Crozier on the bureaucratic phenomenon andthe idea that domination is based on the control of uncertainty, and ClaudeLévi-Strauss' insistence that culture is the result of endless structuration in-stead of constituting an immutable structure in itself. Common to most ofthese sources of inspiration is their defence of possibility and insistence on anegation of the apparently inevitable reality.

They are all there, along with Max Weber, whom Peter Beilharz found par-ticularly important when he stated that "much of Bauman's work reads some-thing like a dialogue with the ghost of Weber" (Beilharz 2000:172). In an in-terview with Beilharz, Bauman, however, specifically revealed his admirationfor Simmel who taught him a great deal about how to understand and appreci-ate the complexity of the social world. On this, Bauman stated: "Simmel tookaway ... the youthful hope/cheek that once the 'surface' incongruities and con-tradictions are out of the way, FU find 'down there' the clockwork running ex-actly to the second; he also taught me that for the pencil of every tendencythere is an eraser of another, and that the wish to dismantle that ambivalence inorder to see better how society works is like wishing to take the walls apart tosee better what supports the ceiling" (Bauman in Beilharz 2001:334-335).

28

One of the ñames thetioned as one of Baur(1959) and his classicalof sociológica! as an inimportant to Bauman's iin sociology, Thinking íthe sociological imaginwork: "This is exactly \t it will ask ques

tertwine with the historMay 2001:7). Like Miljective structures confrcested in the deeply subjtions or the inner psychon the collective experiefollow from the mercileman 1998b, 2001a) andmoral solidanty (Baumaested in isolated 'privatissues' that often take1959:11).

This how Bauman hashis socialist sympathies.excessive individualisatist', when he turned ag;needs into individual coiinterested in shedding li;ly powerful social and ctrating the dialectic relatsus coerción, choice ver:versus community, mor;autonomy versus confoThis is Bauman's speciaus how to transcend thes<extreme (see Jacobsen 2

As Peter Beilharz rensubjects, but does so thr<as the largest most comfever, a perspective that

ig 'no' and ot'non-con-•r embraced as the sine

nstitute Baunun's spe-self has termed it. Thiswhat you see and hear

¡en from view. and thattions below the visiblet there is no doubt thatvell. despite Bauman's,ifluences were filtered' a world differeut fromjmocratic parñcipationtic attitude, Albert Ca-refus-al, as well as thert School (see Beüharz2004a). Moreover, theMary Douglas. whoseglas I owe my under-ñvalence" (Bauman &j mentions the inspira-ratic phenomenon andiceruúnty, and Claudedless structuranon in-Common to most of

ty and insisterce on a

er Beilharz fcxnsi par-an's work rea¿> some-z 2000:172). kan in-;vealed his aásrationiderstand and ¿rpreci-stated: "Simrjd took

mconirruines s^. con-lockwork rumrrg ex-cil of every Escencyle that ambivaeace in:ake the walls- srart to

One of the ñames that is only seldom, and indeed surprisingly rarely, men-tioned as one of Bauman's intellectual confreres is Charles Wright Mills(1959) and his classical notion of the 'sociológica! imagination'. Mills's ideaof sociological as an imagination rather than a discipline has been extremelyimportant to Bauman's own practice (Bryant 1972:114). Bauman's 'text book'in sociology, Thinking Sociologically is permeated with suggestions as to howthe sociological imagination must be an indispensable quality in sociologicalwork: "This is exactly what sociological thinking can do.for us. As a mode ofthought it will ask questions such as: 'How do our individual biographies in-tertwine with the history we share with other human beings?'" (Bauman andMay 2001:7). Like Mills, Bauman is concerned with understanding how ob-jective structures confront and shape individual Uves. As such, he is not inter-ested in the deeply subjective and idiosyncratic individual feelings and emo-tions or the inner psychological frames of mind of people. Bauman's focus ison the collective experiences of despair, suffering, deprivation and misery thatfollow from the merciless forces of individualisation and globalisation (Bau-man 1998b, 2001a) and the subsequent undermining of human community andmoral solidarity (Bauman 2001b). In Mills's terminology, Bauman is not inter-ested in isolated 'prívate troubles' but in the widespread and serious 'publicissues' that often take the shape of 'indifference' or 'uneasiness' (Mills1959:11).

This how Bauman has never entirely shed his Marxistroots and has retainedhis socialist sympathies. He has always stressed the negative consequences ofexcessive individualisation, as in the essay 'The Importance of Being Marx-ist', when he turned against the "continuing tendency to transíate collectiveneeds into individual consumption" (Bauman 1987b:9). Therefore, Bauman isinterested in shedding light on the often invisible and intangible yet immense-ly powerful social and cultural pressures that shape human life, and in illus-trating the dialectic relationship that exists between the poles of freedom ver-sus coerción, cholee versus determinism, anxiety versus security, individualityversus community, morality versus ethics, responsibility versus indifference,autonomy versus conformity/heteronomy, equality versus dependency, etc.This is Bauman's special sociological dialectic whereby he attempts to showus how to transcend these diametrically opposite poles without ending at eitherextreme (see Jacobsen 2004a:210-212).

As Peter Beilharz remarked, "sociology in Bauman's work connects us assubjects, but does so through the pursuit of the smallest personal detall as wellas the largest most compelling social issues" (Beilharz 2001:15). His is, how-ever, a perspective that without neglecting the micro features and impacts of

29

social transíbrmation still retains its primary focus on the macro dynamics thatrclentlessly forcé history on its way unless they can be brought back under hu-man control. We need, in Mills's terminology, to turn 'drift', the apparentlydisorderly and directionless, yet often deliberately guided and controlled,movement of the world, into 'thrust', the intentional and wilful aspiration topick up the reins and make a difference. Bauman does not claim that this iseasily done but he is convinced that it can and musí be done.

Mills identified three tasks to be performed and three questíons to be askedin order to uphold this prcmise of the sociological imagination: (1) What is thestructure of this particular society as a whole?, (2) Where does this societystand in human history?, and (3) What varieties of men and women now pre-vail in this society and this períod? In his work, Bauman addresses all thesequestions by analysing the structure of contemporary society and its impact ona multitude of different aspects of life. Moreover, he has analysed in detailhow modernity developed from premodernity and how postmodernity orliquid modernity are developments stemming from and embedded within aprior period of solid modernity - without, however, stressing any historical ne-cessity or teleology in such a development. Finally, Bauman has also taken akeen interest in describing the varieties of people inhabiting contemporary so-ciety, as well as historically preceding societies, by proposing his well-knownand colourful metaphors of the 'vagabond', 'tourist', 'pilgrim', 'pariah', 'par-venú', 'nomad', 'stranger', and 'fláneur' (see Bauman 1993, 1995). By usingsuch illustrative metaphors, Bauman shows that what he is interested in is notthe individual plight of identifiable people as such but the collective destinythat has befallen certain groups of people in society - the downtrodden, mar-ginalised, ostracised, deprived and apparently dispensable 'human waste' anduseless 'outcasts' (Bauman 2003b). As Pieter Nijhoff (1998:97) noted, by"transforming social constructs ('modernity', 'society', 'sociology') into per-sonages with hands and feet", Bauman is able to 'anthropomorphise' the rei-fied collective representations and makes them more human and more lifelike.

Bauman advócales sociology that is rélevant and sensitive to the problemsfaced by human beings in the world. Despite stating several times throughouthis books that he works from the perspective of a-sociological hermeneutics'(Blackshaw 2002:2), Bauman is not a fetishist of methodology or researchmethods. On the contrary, Bauman upholds a very pragmatic and problem-ori-ented perspective on methods and methodology. This is clear from the essay'Modern Times, Modern Marxism': "As far as research methods are con-cerned, their merits and shortcomings can be reasonably judged solely in thelight of the volume and competence of the information they lead to. The

30

choice of cognitive metíof problems one think1967b:406). Thus, Baungist. He struggles with ttheir everyday lives, andimpact, to change things

Sociology cannot corríthem in a more complepose of human bettenrciology can provide m<sent enables a hold upeof shaping the future ()

This is the job sociologycal circumstances or inhthat confronts the status q

It is a job that is nevé:turning point in the histortellectual endeavour whicsubjective and objective, ;form. It must strive to re-ihumanity and efficiencyand whose divorce the lemust restore to reason itsonly itineraries, but destiidoes not describe destina!our current points of depafollow the path we are pisame and is expressed as '

Sociology is needed morperts, the job of restorirjective experience, has bthan ever to be performespokesmen and practitioiIf all experts deal with presolution, sociology is oit struggles to resolve2000:211; original emphi

: macro dynamics thatrought back under hu-'drilV. !hc apparentlylided and controlled,id will'ul aspiration tonot claim that this isone.questions to be askedunión: (1) What is the'.ere does this societyand women now pre-in addresses all theseiety and its iinpact onas analysed in detail\ postmodernity or. embedded within aing any historical ne-man has also taken ang contemporary so-ising his well-knowngrim'. 'pariah', 'par-Í93. 1995). By usingis interested in is notie collective destiny4 downtrodden, mar-." 'human waste' and1998:97) noted, by

Ñociology') into per-x>morphise' the rei-in and more lifelike.ave to the problems-al times throughout

,. -gical hermeneutics'\iology or researchac and problem-ori--iear from the essay-. roethods are con-u\ked solely in thetbev lead to. The

choice of cognitive methods always is, or should be, secondary to the choiceof problems one thinks importan! enough to be investigated" (Bauman1967b:406). Thus, Bauman is first and ibremost a problem-orientcd sociolo-gist. He struggles with the same problems that ordinary human beings do intheir everyday lives, and he does so in order to make a difference, to have animpact, to change things to the better:

Sociology cannot correct the shortcomings of the world, but it can help us to understandthem in a more complete manner and in so doing. enable us to act upon them for the pur-pose of human betterment. In this time of globalization we need the knowledge that so-ciology can provide more than ever before. After all, to understand ourselves in the pre-sent enables a hold upon curren! conditions and relations without which there is no hopeof shaping the future (Bauman & May 2001:116).

This is the job sociology should perform, especially when unfortunate histori-cal circumstances or inhuman structural tendencies require critical thinkingthat confronts the status quo.

It is a job that is never accomplished and is never trivial: "In this criticalturning point in the history of civilization, sociology, the one área of human in-tellectual endeavour which can bridge the gap between cultural and natural,subjective and objective, art and science, has a crucially important role to per-form. It must strive to re-marry masses and reason, human Ufe and rationality,humanity and efficiency - the couples whom modern civilization separatedand whose divorce the learned priests of this civilization have sanctified. Itmust restore to reason its denied right and its lost willingness to discuss notonly itineraries, but destinations as well" (Bauman 1972:202). But Baumandoes not describe destinations or itineraries in his work; instead he analyzesour current points of departure and where we will in all likelihood end if wefollow the path we are presently on. His sociological vocation remains thesame and is expressed as 'enlightenment aimed at human understanding':

Sociology is needed more today than ever before. The job in which sociologists are ex-perts, the job of restoring to view the lost link between objective affiliation and sub-jective experience, has become more vital and indispensable than ever, while less likelythan ever to be performed without their professional help, since its performance by thespokesmen and practitioners of other fields of expertise has become utterly improbable.If all experts deal with practica! problems and all expert knowledge is focused on theirresolution, sociology is one branch of expert knowledge for which the practical problemit struggles to resolve is enlightenment aimed at human understanding^ (Bauman2000:211; original emphasis).

31

Such an enlightened sociology aimed at human understanding must be value-oriented and morally committed, and Bauman is sure that, "there is no choicebetween 'engaged' and 'neutral' ways of doing sociology. A non-committal so-ciology is an impossibility" (Bauman 2000:216). Thus, Bauman's ambition isto debunk common sense and to denaturalise the taken for granted world thatcaptures the free play of imagination and underpins the status quo. He hasalways been well aware of the reception such an iconoclastic position wouldencounter among colleagues, decision-makers, power-holders and conserva-tive forces in society:

Such an iconoclastic attitude cannot but arouse a most ferocious resistance. If accepted,it will surely put in doubt the virtue of commonsense, frequently identified with wis-dorn, and detract from the strength and attractiveness of commonsensical beliefs. It will'denaturalize' what commonsensically passes for nature, make the inevitable a matter ofchoice, transform the super-human necessity into an object of moral responsibility, andforcé men into questioning what has unreflectively, and often conveniently, been accep-ted as brute, immutable facts. It will tear to shreds the comfortingly tight protective shi-eld which leaves so little within the reach of human decisión and responsibility. It maywell render unbearable the same human condition which commonsense tries hard - andsuccessfully - to make tolerable ... The death knell to the allegedly invulnerable routí-ne-commonsense compact sounds when the habitual split is suddenly seen in the light ofanother possibility. Then, and only then, does the natural begin to be perceived as artifi-

• cial, the habitual as enforced, the normal as unbearable (Bauman 1976b:75-76,93).

Bauman's iconoclastic sociology seeks to sound the death knell to the in-evitable, the natural, the habitual and the 'normal', so that men and womenmay participate in the critical transcendence and disclosure of the artifícialityof a stubborn reality.

Here we once again see the exemplification of Bauman being a stranger insociology, as the whippersnapper and naughty boy in H. C. Andersen's fairy-tale revealing to the anaesthetised yet astonished crowd that the emperoris ac-tually naked. Iconoclasm is part and parcel of the stranger status and as RobertMerton remarked in the description of the 'Outsider Doctrine', "it is throughthe iconoclasm that comes with changing group affiliations that we can de-stroy the Idol of the Cave, abandon delusory doctrines of our own group, andenlarge our prospects for reaching the truth" (Merton 1972:31). Or as Baumansaid of the professional responsibility of the sociologist: "If the professionalthinker has an immediate obligation at all, it is to keep a cool head in the faceof the idols prevailing at the time, and if necessary to swim against the stream"'(Bauman 1972:203).

The Utopian of HopWith his faith in humaniiBauman can be identifiethat Bauman's ethical pemore utopian blueprint oíing-beside' or 'being-wralso his poütical visión,taking priority over probéage of man' is also colouithe human being, in ]1976b:112). Withoutsuclstead of life as destiny.

Bauman's utopianismJeffrey C. Alexander (20(man submission. Instead,man variety and always 1nation. Consequently theand the future cannot be {Jacobsen 2004b). Baumasimilar to Ernst Bloch's'upright carriage', 'Novipointing anead' and the sto the domain where 'thealso seek its thought', solinking the vita contemplto the utopian possibilitistriving. Bauman also adiinition of human being as'something which still mfore, there is a peculiar uttics, culture, humanity a:work.

Bauman's utopianism ipredicting events, like sominology, Bauman is andoes neither wants to ñorin prívate communicatioiare what stock exchange;

32

ng must be value-'there is no choiccnon-committal so-nian's ambition is:ranted world that;atus quo. He hasic position wouldcrs and conserva-

:sistance. If accepted,> identified with wis-ínsical beliefs. It willinevitable a matterof

ral íesponsibility, andeniently. been accep-y tight protective shi-responsibility. It may-ense tries hard - andA invulnerable routi-:\\n in the light ofv perceived as artifi-476b:75-76, 93).

knell to the in-men and womenn the artificiality

íing a stranger inVndersen's fairy-ie emperor is ac-:us and as Roberte", "it is throughthat we can de-own group, and>. Or as Baumanthe professionalhead in the faceiinst the stream"

The Utopian of HopeWith his faith in humanity and his commitment to the pursuit of possibiliües,Bauman can be identified as a 'utopian of hope'. Stefan Morawski claimedthat Bauman's ethical position can be described as utopian: "Can there be amore utopian blueprint of humankind than 'being-for' taking priority over 'be-ing-beside' or 'being-with'?" (Morawski 1998:35). Not only his moral, butalso his political visión, may seem utopian with its insistence on possibilitytaking priority overprobability (Bauman 1976a, 1976b). His fundamental 'im-age of man' is also coloured by this utopian tendency and before anything else,the human being, in Bauman's sociology, is 'he-who-hopes' (Bauman1976b: 112). Without such hope, humanity is doomed to Uve out life as fate in-stead of life as destiny.

Bauman's utopianism is opposed to the so-called 'totalising utopias' whichJeffrey C. Alexander (2001) suggests strive for conformity, uniformity and hu-man submission. Instead, Bauman's utopias defend plurality, diversity and hu-man variety and always leave room for difference, dissidence and insubordi-nation. Consequently they are also 'infinite' in that they insist that human lifeand the future cannot be put into frozen formulae and cannot be predicted (seeJacobsen 2004b). Bauman's utopia is tacit, infinite, active and open in a veinsimilar to Ernst Bloch's (1986) idiosyncratic utopian Marxist insistence on'upright carriage', 'Novum', 'daydreams', 'explosive possibility', 'intentionpointing anead' and the striving towards a future horizon that opens up a pathto the domain where 'thought must not only seek its reality, but reality mustalso seek its thought', so does Bauman's work in its continuous insistence onlinking the vita contemplative with the vita activa, thought with action, pointto the utopian possibilities inherent in human existence and its intentionalstriving. Bauman also admits how he was "deeply impressed by [Bloch's] def-inition of human being as 'intention pointing ahead', and of 'human nature' as'something which still must be found'" (Bauman & Tester 2001:49). There-fore, there is a peculiar utopian element in his understanding of morality, poli-tics, culture, humanity as well as many other topics he touches upon in hiswork.

Bauman's utopianism is not preoccupied with predetermining the future orpredicting events, like so many classical or modernist utopias. In his own ter-minology, Bauman is an 'interpreter' not a 'legislator' (Bauman 1987a). Hedoes neither wants to ñor believes in predicting or determining the future, andin prívate communication with Tim May he revealed: "In my view 'futures'are what stock exchanges are to gamble on, not the sociologist to determine"

33

..tí

(Bauman in May 1998:127). He is not interested in narrowing down the op-tions open lo pecple, Ihepossibilities and potentials that they may wish to re-alise whenever time seems ripe. May observed that: "What Zygmimt Baumanseems to be doing is taking contemporary trends and then extrapolating in or-der that we might glimpse the consequences of the direction in which wemight be heading" (May 1998:127). The word to notice here is the 'might' in-stead of 'must' or 'will' - Bauman is not a social forecaster, sociologicalsoothsayer or futurologist who claims to hold any privileged position regard-ing looking into the unknown. His books seek to show people how things are,good and bad, how they can be and how they will be if we do not change ourways.

Thus, Bauman can be regarded as a utopian of hope, who through his socio-logical practice with its morally committed core wishes to actívate people andshow them the possibilities and alternatives available to them. In an interviewwith Madeleine Bunting, Bauman pondered: "Why do I write books? Why doI think? Why should I be passionate? Because things could be different, theycouid be made better. My role is to alert people to dangers, to do something"(Bauman in Bunting 2003:20).

In the subsequent three parís of this book - respectively dealing with the1960s, 1970s and 1980s - our questions in the conversations based on emailcorrespondence with Zygmunt Bauman are highlighted in italics and his re-sponses to those questions are reproduced in normal fonts. The conversationsincluded in each of the three parts represent the only time to date that Baumanhas reflected substantially on this early part of his work. The second parí ofeach section consists of a chronologically annotated bibliography with com-prised reviews and comments that are intended to provide the reader with aninsight into the main themes and concerns of these pieces so that future read-ers might be able to find a point of departure that they fínd congenial and ap-propriate in their own work on Bauman or the topics he has analysed. The in-cluded annotations are not merely of biographical interest for people with aspecific interest in the life and intellectual development of Zygmunt Baumanbut also of historícal interest because many of the texts touch upon events andepisodes during decades marked by rapid social, economic and political trans-formation in the West as well as in the East. In this respect Bauman, due to hisown personal triáis and tribulations described above, deals with both sides ofthe European divide not to mention its collapse towards the end of the 1980s.In many ways his work represent the essence of European history, West andEast, throughout the latter part of the 20th century.

The Ena Socií

34

owing down the op-:hey may vvish to re-at Zygmunt Bauman. extrapolating in or-ection in which weare is the 'might' in-xaster, sociologicalged position regard-;iple how things are,e do not change our

0 through his socio-activate people and

lem. In an interviewrite books? Why doId be different, theys, to do something"

ly dealing with theons based on email1 italics and his re-. The conversations0 date that BaumanThe second part ofography with com-the reader with an

so that future read-1 congenial and ap-is analysed. The in-t for people with a' Zygmunt Baumanch upon events andand political trans-Bauman, due to hiswith both sides of; end of the 1980s.i history, West and

Part I:

The End of the Beginning ofa Sociological Imagination

1960s Conversation

We would like to begin with a simple question. This book focases on yoiir ear-ly English language work, for the most part the essays that were publishedwhile yon were still based in Poland. Quite simply, why was so much Polishsociology published in English (for example the Polish Sociological Bulletinwas an English language publicación) ?

Every sociologist who thinks and writes in a 'non-global' language has beenconfronted with the question of publishing in English. It has been a question ofto-be-or-not-to-be in a profession that has been global since its inception. Ñoris it any wonder that, in most non-English speaking countries, local sociolo-gists lean over backwards to put together a periodical that makes their worksavailable, and hopefully known, to the speakers of the global-language. In ad-dition to the 'Catch 22' quandary in which all aspiring authors are everywherecast (you won't find a publisher unless you have made yourself a ñame, butyou will not make a ñame unless you find a publisher), a foreign-languagewriter can hardly count on English publishers, because they are reluctant to in-vest money in translating the works of unknowns who are also blighted withunpronounceable ñames. I could tell a lot of stories about this. I have triedhard but mostly unsuccessfully to convince quite a few publishers to take arisk with some of the remarkable oeuvres of my Polish colleagues.

But I doubt whether Polish sociologists are any more keen or success-fül than others in getting their work published in English. The most profoundand precious, and particularly the most original, works of the greatest Polish so-ciologists, including my masters, are still waiting in vain to be made availableto a global readership - a situation more harmful to the latter than to the fírst, bythe way, since Poland is a large country with its own wide, avid, critical andgrateful readership, and almost all Polish sociologists are fluent in English.

As to myself, the list of my Polish-language publications of the periodcovered by your bibliography is not just longer, but it íncludes the positionswhich were central to my preoccupations of the time and which, retrospective-ly, also appear to be the turning-points of my intellectual itinerary (works likeOn the Need ofa Sociology ofthe Party, Essay on Bureaucracy, On the Pro-fession of Sociologist, or Visions of Human Worlds). Those positions derivedtheir inspiration and whatever meaning and significance they had from triáisand tribulations that were interna! and specific to Poland. They were too

37

deeply and t ightly enmeshed in Poland's own (and at that time still mosíly sub-terranean) struggles, lo be of any interest, or indeed to be comprehensible. tonative English readers.

Yon say that, umongst others especially two Polish-language publications, Onthe Profession of Socioiogist and Visions of Human Worlds, were essential tothe emergence of your position. Couldyou say something about what they ar-gued? What does the profession of sociologist require, and what are the 'vi-sions' of the human world to which you referred?

A word of warning is in order: Contrary to a common opinión which socialscientists tend to endorse, much of our thinking, and perhaps the most seminalpart of it, is not 'targeted', not a 'purposeful activity'. From my own experi-ence, at least, I am rather inclined to endorse Adorno's resigned conclusiónthat we think just because we can't not. The 'objective' of mental efforts usu-ally comes as an afterthought, a codicil that is added later. I would be cavalierwith the truth were I to say that I undertook the works you've mentioned withthe intention of elaborating a position. The 'in order to' at the time I wrotethem up was not the same 'in order to' as the one which later ruminations, andyour question, have retrospectively imputed.

Trying hard to recall the 'motivational causes' thatprompted and guided mysearch, or rather to fill blank spots in memory while calling imagination tohelp, I believe I need to start from remembering the situational setting. After afew years of exile sociology was let back into the post-Stalinistera through theback door. No identity card was issued, no clear status accorded, let alone as-sured. Sociology lived ir, a sort of 'suspended animation' that could be termi-nated at any moment on any pretext, or without one. It was without doubt anunpleasant situation to be in, and yet with the benefit of hindsight I suspectthat such a state of guilt without a charge, of under-definition unconstrained byany canon, unhampered by a 'paradigm', was in a way a blessing, even if in avery unprepossessing disguise. It spurred critical self-scrutiny that drew intofocus the 'self-evidences', and so offered a closer look at a host of unspokenassumptions which under more enjoyable circumstances gladly would havebeen left in the shade and in silence. We went on asking ourselves about thefundamentáis about which our 'Western' colleagues did not much worry (notin the fifties lived under the protective wings of Parsonian self-confidence!)and were genuinely puzzled when challenged to make explicit and analyse."

In Poland, I was just one among many aspiring sociologists who had first tofind the address at which the new home was located and to sean its interior to

38

make it fit for decent,spired by (indeed, wei

The first piece repomation about whatevelive in company. and vtion under which choiwords, sociology colkliving 'in society'. Th'essentially contested'for taking sides moretention was the main lsociological professioiber's Beruf. When wothat I was trying to res(or the 'socialist campof the political regimeun-manageable. It didon that occasion. I jusíence was but an extre:that in the plight of socthen that it was preciseto perceive a universal

To start with, Polishwhich other, non- or leabout, underhand andleave too many foot- íwhat they wished soc:they would tolérate) wobedient more docilevinced immune to doiwished the 'really existheory, in the uncondittionality' their un-shaamend and enhance 'irguiding human behavihavioural choices wer<tended effects would bevant or effectively míin its 'behavioural scie

time still mostly sub-K- comprehensible, to

iage publications, On'Ids, were essential lo> abouí whaí they ar-ma what are the 'vi-

opinion which socialaps the most seminalrom my own experi-resigned conclusiónf mental efforls usu-. I would be cavalieru've mentioned withat the time I wrote

iter ruminations, and

ipted and guided mylling imagination toional setting. After ainist era through the:orded, let alone as-that could be termi-as without doubt anhindsight I suspectm unconstrained bylessing, even if in aitiny that drew intoa host of unspokengladly would haveDurselves about the)t much worry (notn self-confidence!)icit and analyse.sts who had first tosean its interior to

make it fit for decent, sensible living. The two pieces you ask about were in-spired by (indeed, were a logical consequence of) that preoccupation.

The first piece reponed the search for location. Sociology collects the intbr-mation about whaíever follows from the fact that humans are not loners butlive in company and wil ly-ni l ly influence each other's choices and the condi-tion under which choices are made, as well as their plausible range. In otherwords, sociology collects the information about the difference that is made byliving 'in society'. That much was commonly agreed. The rest, though, was'essentially contested' and called for taking sides. Some of the contests calledfor taking sides more imperatively and urgently than others. One such con-tention was the main theme of the essay that was dcdicated to unpacking thesociological profession, a somewhat updated and domesticated versión of We-ber's Beruf. When working on it, I thought, mistakenly as it later transpired,that I was trying to resolve a thoroughly local and hopefully temporary, Polish(or the 'socialist camp's') dilemma, which aróse from the authoritarian natureof the political regime and from its bid to manage everything and eliminate theun-manageable. It did not occur to me that a life-long position would emergeon that occasion. I just did not realize at the time that the local Polish experi-ence was but an extreme and particularly festering specimen of a contentionthat in the plight of sociology was neither incidental ñor local. I did not realisethen that it was precisely the extremity of the Polish case that made it possibleto perceive a universal dilemma more ctearly than elsewhere.

To start with, Polish state authorities were quite outspoken about matters inwhich other, non- or less-authoritarian, powers preferred to move in a round-about, underhand and a rather inconspicuous fashion, while careful not toleave too many foot- and finger-prints. The Polish rulers left little doubt thatwhat they wished sociologists to do (and the only sociological undertakingthey would tolérate) was to help them make the obstreperous obedient and theobedient more docile yet, to convince the unconvinced and make the con-vinced immune to doubts. In short (to resort to Weber's terms again) theywished the 'really existing' Herrschaft to rebound, just as its ideal type did intheory, in the unconditional Disziplin of the subjects. Having made 'valué ra-tionality' their un-shared prerogative, they intended to use sociologists toamend and enhance 'instrumental rationality'. They wished to know the rulesguiding human behaviour, in order to manipúlate the setting in which the be-havioural choices were made - so that only such choices as agreed with in-tended effects would be taken, while other choices either would be made irrel-evant or effectively marginalised. They most gladly accommodated sociologyin its 'behavioural science' versión, a versión made to the measure of panopti-

39

cal power and the Tordist factory', and at the time the dominant and still gath-ering tendency in Western, and particularly American, sociology.

I du not pretend that I understood all that when the essay on the professionof sociologist, focused as it was on the apparently local and hopefully transientworry, gestated. But what I did articúlate and clarify for myself in the course ofwriting helped me later in grasping the nature of the contradictory pressuresunder which all sociological work, under any kind of regime, is conducted -and the fundamental choices no sociologist, wherever placed, can avoid. I be-lieve now that it was then that the visión of sociology as an essentially criticalactivity took shape in my mind (a model that was more fully articulated onlyten years later in the extended essay Towards a Critical Sociology that waswritten in parallel with Socialism: The Active Utopia).

That was the only lasting benefít and saving grace of the effort invested inthe writing. Otherwise, the essay was fatally misconceived. It reads now most-ly as a testimony of the shameful naivety of its author. The essay was an invi-tation to the rulers to join in a discussion, and an attempt to explain that theywould benefít from openíng themselves to argument. Something along the lineof 'what good government needs, is a watchful and imaginative opposition',couched in terms that the rulers would (so I hoped...) understand and find ac-ceptable. The idea, of course, was stillborn, only I was not aware of that at thetime. I believed that the inanities of the country's rulers and the ineptitudes ofthe 'system' they called into life were more like 'unanticipated consequences'than delibérate moves, and aróse from errors of judgment, not from design. Ithought that the rulers might be talked to and persuaded to listen, engage in adebate, argued with, and in the end - who knows? - con verted to a different,better model of the state and a strategy of running it. A hiccup of the 'enlight-ened despot' dream, I suppose. Well, the rulers made no mistake. They just be-haved trae to form. It was I who was mistaken, grossly and totally. In the qua-si-totalitarian quasi-Soviet regime, sociology as I saw it could only be an alienbody and treated as the enemy's fifth column. And the rulers understood it be-fore I did. It took me a few more years to catch up with their wisdom.

The core of the Visions book - a sort of an inventory of the house contents -was provided by three extended studies: oí Talcott Parsons, C. Wright Millsand Antonio Gramsci. In the first study, I attempted to reconstruct the visión ofsociety as seen from the managers' offices and a model of sociology made tothe measure of managerial reason and management tasks (Parsons' work was amost conspicuous and authoritative exemplification of both). In the second,following Mills's suggestions and example, I tried to develop an alternativeprogramme, as well as a strategy of resistance to the advances of the 'adminis-

tered society'. I guessand Muís, preparad a 1Critical Sociology bocresented most spectacsociology bent on enh;third study, a distancecourse of the time (likquired and the broad ocontinuous and infiniicountervailing social ptween themselves thesights from which thewards emerged. Or at 1

All in all, I'd descrilators'. They were extclumsy and awkward.thought where their cispeak, worked themselportance. In this lie the

You have said befare ílparí in rebuilding Polithe humiliation of povlowed to play such a re

Allowed it was not, butsuch a role, though not;ciology (which was renumbness during the Stthan in other countriesdependent standpointsdependent thought waseven fewer and fartherry that was officially shinsistently marginalisecit had to stand up againers spawned in profusicof sociology exemplifntious part of Polish inte"

40

,minnnl and s l i l l gath->ciology.,say on tlic proíessionnd'hopcTully tnmsientnyscll'in UK- course ofjntradictovy prcssuresegime. is conducted -laced. can avoid. I be-- an essentuül) critical• fully artK-ub.ted onlv•al S.vú'.Vv-v ihat was

f the otYor. mvested m<ed. U rea¿> now nost-The essjv vvas an mvi~ipt to expían áiat they>mething ¿oni me lineíiaginative orcvsiñon'.mdersranc ¿no ñnd ac-not a ware >x tbir & tnes and the ráscenos oficipated cccsecuecces\ent. ncc fr.xT, -js¿gn. I;d to lisien — i f m a

•onvertec rr ¿ oirseniv hicvur ce=K -=¿¿1:-

K k ±e qas-:;- it -^ ^

be-

anit

h thar «rs' of ae

of hsr-

tered society'. I guess that between themselves those two studies, of Parsonsand Mills, prepared a framework for the opposition, explored in the Towards aCritica! Sociology book, between the 'science of unfreedom' of the kind rep-resentad most spectacularly by what 1 dubbed 'Durksonian' sociology, and asociology bent on enhancing the range of freedom. Finally, in the course of thethird study, a distance from the concepts most common in the sociological dis-course of the time (like system, totality, structure, determination etc.) was ac-quired and the broad outlines were drawn of the concept of 'social reality' as acontinuous and infinite, open-ended interplay between human pursuits andcountervailing social pressures experienced as 'constraints'. I suppose that be-tween themselves the studies of Mills and of Gramsci offered me basic in-sights from which the programme of 'sociological hermeneutics' soon after-wards emerged. Or at least so it seems to me after these years.

All in all, I'd describe the two works you've mentioned as 'vanishing medi-ators'. They were extremely helpful, indeed indispensable, even if coarse,clumsy and awkward. Their role was to ease me (or push me?) into a realm ofthought where their continued services were no longer needed. They, so tospeak, worked themselves out of a job, and by doing that they proved their im-portance. In this lie their solé, though formidable, merit.

You have said befare that you took up sociology because yon wanted to play aparí in rebuilding Poland in terms ofjustice, equality and an overcoming ofthe humiliation of poverty (see Bauman & Tester 2001). Was sociology al-lowed to play such a role in Poland in the 1950s and 1960s?

Allowed it was not, but it struggled to gain such a role and in the end it did playsuch a role, though not at all how I na'ively and gullibly expected it to. Polish so-ciology (which was resurrected and recovering its public voice after a briefnumbness during the Stalinist period, which was considerably shorter in Polandthan in other countries under Soviet influence) offered one of the very few in-dependen! standpoints and narratives that was available in a country where in-dependent thought was fast becoming a rarity, and its chances of being heardeven fewer and farther between. Sociology whispered an alternative to the sto-ry that was officially shouted, and so it became an element, however slight andinsistently marginalised, of plurality in a forcefully 'homogenised' society. Andit had to stand up against the new injustices and inequalities that the new pow-ers spawned in profusión in the course of extirpating the oíd ones. The laboursof sociology exemplified the resolution of the most thoughtful and conscien-tious part of Polish intellectuals to cooperate with the new powers in their good

41

deeds, in lifting the country from its centuries-long backwardness, while at thesame time watching carefully and vigilantly the hands of the power-holders.

//; the English-language materia! that was published before 1968, it looks as ifit took some timeforyour own raice to emerge. Some oftlie very earlicst Eng-lish-language pieces seem to be alinost managerial thanks to their emphasison statistics, graphs and so on. The present-day reader has to look very hardto find any critical dimensión. It took a while for these essays to reflect ¡heconcerns ofa more obviously crítica! sociology. Do these pieces accurately re-flect your thernes and concerns, and the changes that they underwent?

'Managerial vein'... Stanislaw Ossowski and Julián Hochfeld, the two teach-ers to whom I owe most of what I learned at Warsaw University, were deeplysuspicious of the cognitive valué, and even more of the cultural impact, of theprevalent managerially oriented model of a thoroughly quantified and statis-tics-obsessed sociology. I guess that suspicion is an irremovable and indeliblepart of their bequest, to which as much as I could I tried to remain faithfulfrom the start, and nave carried on trying throughout my own work. At thesame time, though, Ossowski and Hochfeld were only too aware that selling tothe communist managers the kind of sociology that they preferred - a criticaland 'humanist' kind of sociology - would be a tall order, if not a lost cause andwaste of time. If any argument stood a chance of reaching the Polish rulers'ears, it could only be a plea that emphasised the services that the sort of soci-ology imported from the U.S.A. promised to render to the managers. Sociolo-gy could only be 'sold' to the powers-that-be as a handmaiden of management,as a heads-counting enterprise and a briefing for those who sought conformityto their orders and were bent on making society obedient and pliant.

Such a setting was conducive tp schizophrenic responses. Ossowski'sthoughtful yet tormented book on the peculiarities of social sciences was avivid testimony of that. In other words, the two accents which you rightlyspotted were not successive, but simultaneous. They coexisted, since they hadto coexist, in an uneasy alliance rent with mutual suspicions.

Your critical sociology was part of the intellectual ferment that was going onunder the dull surface of Gomulka 's 'little stabilisation'. Reading histories ofthis period creates the impression that sociology was a key player in a verybroad oppositional culture that included intellectuals, journalists, filmntakers,and novelists. Could you say something about the circles in which your criticalsociology circulated and participated?

42

The milieu you are askdegrees of opposition, ;go in manifesting theiibest serve the purpose.member a little play 77,Mroz'ek, in which a 1-beckoned to two haplesmeekly followed sucaorder, all the time furiotive virtues of their res{but sober admission thastrategic querelle.

But you are right in ptogether and complemeithe fíre of independent tto reconcile their progratre' which all the scatteisations') of opposition 'the situation because thethe issues that were curnof people with the highearound a few persons oíthe poet Antoni Stonirrdomitable 'professionalalways ready for the fraj

In all though the 'resisplex, to be given justice iabout it, but the multi-vo

During the period roughyouth and education. Wl

Alongside other thingshands of power meant fiters had changed or we¡more solidary) in the resman', feeling at one wittrustworthy and trustful,from humiliating docilit;

. ardness. \vhilo at the

.he power-holders.

>re 1968. ¡i Uvksasif•lie veiy tw/iV>' tr¡$-iks w their cn-.-'husishas lo look v t-ry i uníessays te /r/.cvr ¡hepieces accur¿:i".y /v-v iindenveiu.

:hfeld, the t\\ tíach-uversity. \verc ¿eeply:ultural impa-"- ot thequantified are sraüs-novable and -.-¿dibleied to remair. ruidmilny own \vork A* the0 aware that >e!:nc to• preferred - i cr.dcalif not a lost ri-sí andúng the Polis riiers"s that the sor: o: sle managers.aiden of ma.•no sought cccrrnsty¡t and pliant.esponses. Os 5 >¿ >social scierci- vsí ants which y«- r^nyixisted, sinc; re-. *j¿¿ions.

tent ihat veja Jc/Zf -^'. Reading hiz:*-^ 1 key playe~ ^ -" ^^^turnalisíf.. jn; in which \o

The müieu you are asking about was far from unified. There were all possibledegrees of opposition. and people differed as lo how far they were prepared togo in manifesting their resistance, as well as in what kind of conduct wouldbest serve the purpose. Not that the differences mattered much in the end. I re-member a little play The Hand, by the outstanding Polish dramatist SlawomirMroz'ek, in which a huge hand stretched from the wings of the stage andbeckoned to two hapless little men to take off their clothes, bit by bit. One manmeekly followed successive orders, the other loudly protested against eachorder, all the time fuñously quarrelling between themselves about the respec-tive virtues of their responses. Both men ended up naked. I remember our sadbut sober admission that the play flawlessly assessed the practica! valué of ourstrategic querelle.

But you are right in principie. The various acts of resistance somehow addedtogether and complemented each other in keeping the spirit of dissent alive andthe fire of independen! thought smouldering, even if the actors found it difficultto reconcile their programmes and their tactics. All the same, there was no 'cen-tre' which all the scattered and diffuse, and often ephemeral, circles ('conden-sations') of opposition would have recognised as such. This was all the morethe situation because the dividing lines were constantly redrawn, depending onthe issues that were currently on the agenda. However in the I960s a 'hard core'of people with the highest and a seldom questioned moral authority crystallisedaround a few persons of outstanding courage and determination - writers likethe poet Antoni Slonimski, academics like Leszek Kolakowski, or just in-domitable 'professional revolutionaries' like Jan Józef Lipski, a man who wasalways ready for the fray and always in the frontline of the battle.

In all though the 'resistance movement' was too diverse, too protean and com-plex, to be given justice in a short conversation like ours. Much has been writtenabout it, but the multi-volume monograph that it deserves remains to be written.

During the period roughly 1963-1968 your work often focused on questions ofyouth and education. Why?

Alongside other things and perhaps more than anything else, watching4hehands of power meant finding out whether and how life-attitudes and charac-ters had changed or were changing (to the better, of course - more ethical,more solidary) in the result of the 'socialist transformations'. After all, a 'newman', feeling at one wrth the community of citizens, friendly and confident,trustworthy and trustful, free from fears, from suspicion towards others andfrom humiliating docility, was allegedly the ultimate purpose of those trans-

43

formations and the test of their success or failure. And where was the answerto be found, if not in the younger generation. born and giown in the new post-iransformation social setting?

Looking back, I suspect that the outcome of our research into the altitudesof Polish youth marked, perhaps not the fírst, but certainly the most profound,of my disenchantments. What I found was not what I and other 'believers' likeme had hoped to fínd. What I found was a mixture of downright conservativeand parochial, petty bourgeois life ideáis, with alarming symptoms of anemerging cult of shrewdness, craftiness and 'getting by'. There was little traceof socialist valúes. The new social setting was not working. Most certainly, itdid not turn out to be the school of humanity whose prospect attracted somany, myself including, to the idea of socialism. The task was now to fínd outwhat stopped it from becoming such a school.

After your exile, you must have been subjected to a number of pressures fromthe West to become a 'dissident' who would blow the whistle on the truth ofac-tually existing socialism. Butyou neverdid this. You published some essays onPolish communism, but they are marked by a dialectic of sociological critiqueand the maintenance of socialist commitment. Did it ever feel like your workwas in danger ofbeing 'filed away'as 'dissident'?

After leaving Poland I was inundated with offers to join all sorts of 'sovietolo-gist' establishmenís, and with invitations to write for their journals. I was one ofthe 'Warsaw six' - the 'dissident' professors of Warsaw University who weredemoled and expelled on 25 March 1968 on the accusation of fomenting stu-dent riots - and the case was widely publicised in trie Western press. I refusedthe offers. I had no intention of living the second half of my life off the fírst (asthings looked then, I could live quietly and happily ever after out of my 'dissi-dent past'). I wanted to remain what I was, a socíologist, and re-establishingmyself in that role in new surroundings was to me a matter of personal honestyand self-respecl. Most importantly, were I to have succumbed to the seductiveoffers and recycled myself into a 'sovietologist', I certainly would have foundmyself out of place among the hosts (and-very soon have been found to be outof place by them), as much as I found myself (and was found) to be out of placein 'really existing socialism'. Being 'anti-communist' was certainly not enoughto make us feel comfortable in each other's company.

You arrived at Leeds in 1971. How congenial were British intellectual - andspecifically sociological - debates to your concems? You arrived in the days

44

ofstudent radicalism.discussed in Poland, .

Beware similarities.astray. From my newbellion, some full of nexhilárating stories ofnival, a Woodstock a\s took to the st

E. P. Thompson, wlhis devastating newsp;together with the othejpectations. At the timeist revolution was just ,'sociological deductio:and gone as far as it \. Thompson's

who indeed, instead ofBritish 'New Left', m<was the 'collateral casmust admit, though, theand could not make mycent witness to the testi

I remember that Penthe empirical and shunrof an excess of theory,tea (soon afterwards thebrace the worst varietyTheir differences notwitunclean realities of humistic' (a rather morbid, ntual). Years later, Richasentment of that time, v>more about money and 1

Is there anything that yo

Myself, warts and all. O¡

~ere \vas the answer:5->Ti in the ne\ post-

an into the attitudes;• me most prolound.:áer 'believers' like

-•"iright conservative~g symptoms of anThere was little tracez¿. Most certainly. itrrospect attracted so: *'as now to fmd out

^-cer of pressures froni~:sr,¿ on the truth ofac-~i^sned some essays on-{¡úciological critique' erfeel like your work

'. ail sorts of 'sovietolo-• journals. I was one of• University who wereson of fomenting stu-• estera press. I refused:ny life off the first (as

• afier out of my 'dissi-ü and re-estabh'shingsr of personal honestyimfaed to the seductive~ú.y would have founde faeen found to be out.»md) to be out of placeí¿ certainly not enough

^h iniellectual — and:u arrived in the days

of student radicalism: Did all ofthis seein lo be continuous with what you haddiscussed in Poland, or did it all seem like middle-closs self-indulgence?

Beware similarities. They are treacherous. They easily misdirect and leadastray. From my new English friends, fresh from the battlefields of student re-bellion, some full of nostalgia and some blowing on their burnt fingers, I heardexhilarating stories of a protracted, joyful an.d thoroughly enjoyable youth car-nival, a Woodstock avant le letter. It struck me right away that when Warsawstudents took to the streets no one laughed.

E. P. Thompson, who was then the gurú of the British 'intellectual left', inhis devastating newspaper review of my Between Class and Élite, accused me,together with the other exiled 'dissidents', of betraying the Western Left's ex-pectations. At the time Thompson believed that the British proletarian-social-ist revolution was just around the next córner, while in the book I presented my'sociological deduction' that the British labour movement had ran its courseand gone as far as it was capable of going, a prognosis that time was to cor-robórate. Thompson's iré was directed mostly against Leszek Kolakowski,who indeed, instead of offering the hoped for shot in the arm to the emergentBritish 'New Left', moved promptly to the right of the political spectrum. Iwas the 'collateral casualty', so to speak, of Thompson's main frustration. Imust admit, though, that his judgment was not completely erroneous. I did not,and could not make myself, share in the illusions of the 'New Left'. I was a re-cent witness to the testing of those illusions, and to their failure of the test.

I remember that Perry Anderson castigated E. P. Thompson for sticking tothe empirical and shunning theory. For me, however, both antagonists sufferedof an excess of theory, and of a kind of theory that was clearly not my cup oftea (soon afterwards the majority of the 'New Left' was enthusiastically to em-brace the worst variety of the excess in the form of Althusserian dogmatism).Their differences notwithstanding, they were too detached from the messy andunclean realities of human life. They seemed to me to be equally 'intellectual-istic' (a rather morbid, most incapacitating disease that may befall the intellec-tual). Years later, Richard Rorty poignantly articulated for me my vague re-sentment of that time, when he called on the intellectuals of the Left to speakmore about money and less about stigma, complexes and political correctness.

Is there anything that you continué to carry with you from the early essays?

Myself, warts and all. Or at least, this is what I would wish to be true.

1960s Annotated Bibíiography

• (1962): "Valúes and Standards of Success of the Warsaw Youth".The Polish Sociological Bulletin, 2 (l-2):77-90.

The Communist period in Poland was not meant simply to consist in a newtype of political power. It was also intended by its protagonists to be a type ofsocial system that would establish solidarity and provide the solution to theproblems of material want in a country that had recently proved itself to bedeeply divided ethnically and remarkably unable to develop itself. The Com-munists were going to pave the way to this utopia by taking the men andwomen who had been delivered to them by the past and by transforming theminto something new. As Bauman says in conversation in this book, these newmodel citizens of Communist Poland were going to be "friendly and confi-dent, trustworthy and trustful, free from fears, from suspicion towards othersand from humiliating docility". Amongst other things, this paper implicitlyasks a very simple question: Are these new model people to be found? Today,that seems to be a fairly straightforward and obvious question, but in Poland inthe late 1950s and early 1960s, it was much more explosive. The paper focus-es on Warsaw youth precisely because, if the question is going to be given apositive answer, it is going to be found here. First, Warsaw was being rapidlyrebuilt after the devastation of the Nazi occupation, and its population wasgrowing as attempts were made to urbanise a previously rural population.Second, youth was a group that had little or no positive memory of a Polandbefore Communism and, therefore, they had been always schooled and edu-cated in the ways of socialism. Bauman's sociology emerged in the period ofrelative stability and of disciplinary and ideológica! stabilisation that followedthe disturbances of the Polish October of 1956. The context of his early work- and therefore of this paper - was an investigation into how it was that hopesof a free Poland could have so quickly dissipated, and where future hopesmight be found. After all: "People needed salvation badly, and whatevercolour or shape salvation was to take, it could only comefrom society. Of thatsociety, sociology was to tell the truth" (Bauman & Tester 2001:18). Conse-quently, this paper looks in three directions. First, it looks to Warsaw youth inorder to see if the Communist citizen exists. Second, it looks to Warsaw-youthin order to tell the sociological truth about the likelihood of them being theagents of salvation. Third, it asks what salvation means for that group. If an

46

ideal typical Bauman pBaurnan reports on an <of positivistic sociologof a split between the fcritical message. The {viewers of the Polish Btive sample of Warsawthe paper is a fairly straing to read. However \h to that which was

man reports that on themodel socialist citizen cand with the subordinacharacteristic for the yeclare an exceptionally iesting work and familywere unimportant for"wealth, an interesting 1ly defining the details oJyouth knew what they \e of this paper is

agents of social salvatioiit comes to their own trosists in inchoate aspiratilogical truth that is reveatainly prove to be an unfthem. Beneath the surfa<socialism heralds the ne1

is also realistic enough t<salvation with youth. Ththe application of the neí

• (1962): "Social StrtWorks". The Polish

Dennis Smith has commeby Bauman in The Polishganization, he felt that "h

hy

e Warsaw Youth".

1 to consist in a newonists to be a type ofe the solution to the/ proved itself to belop itself. The Com-taking the men andy transforming themhis book, these new''friendly and confi-cion towards othershis paper implicitlyto be found? Today,ion, but in Poland in'e. The paper focus-going to be given av was being rapidlyits population was

y rural population.lemory of a Polandschooled and edu-

;ed in the period of;ation that followedíí of his early workw it was that hopesvhere future hopesdly, and whateverom society. Of that•2001:18). Conse-o Warsaw youth ins to Warsaw youthof them being ther that group. If an

ideal typical Bauman paperas imagined, it is not anything like this piece. Here,Bauman reports on an empirical research project and he uses the paraphernaliaof positivistic sociology: graphs, diagrams and statistics. There is somethingof a split between the paper's almost managerial mode of presentation and itscritical message. The paper reports "on interviews carried out by 103 inter-viewers of the Polish Radio Public Opinión Research Centre on a representa-tive sample of Warsaw youth of male sex, aged 18-24" (p. 77). To this extentthe paper is a fairly straightforward research report and it is not terribly engag-ing to read. However what it is obviously seeking to do is offer an alternativetruth to that which was stressed by the state and the Party. In particular, Bau-man reports that on the basis of this study it is impossible to conclude that themodel socialist citizen exists. That citizen should be concerned with solidarityand with the subordination of personal ambitions to social goals, but, "it ischaracteristic for the young people being exarnined, taken as a whole, to de-clare an exceptionally intensive acceptance of two valúes: the need for inter-esting work and family happiness" (p. 84). Broader questions of public issueswere unimportant for Warsaw youth. The dominant aspirations were for"wealth, an interesting life, independence, to see much in life, without actual-ly defining the details of the particular status" (p. 88). In other words, Warsawyouth knew what they wanted, but they had little idea of what it meant. Themessage of this paper is clear: the young men of Warsaw are unlikely to be theagents of social salvation since they are not socially engaged. Moreover, whenit comes to their own troubles and ambitions, for Warsaw youth salvation con-sists in inchoate aspirations rather than anything tangible. In short, the socio-logical truth that is revealed by this study is that Warsaw youth will almost cer-tainly prove to be an unfertile ground for any hopes that others seek to plant inthem. Beneath the surface then, this paper is a critique of the contention thatsocialism heralds the new man of solidarity and social engagement, and yet itis also realistic enough to avoid falling into any trap of the kind that identifiedsalvation with youth. The paper is an exercising in deflaü'ng presumptions bythe application of the needle of sociology.

• (1962): "Social Structure of the Party Organization in IndustrialWorks". The Polish Sociological Bulletin, 3-4 (5-6):50-64.

Dennis Smith has commented that when he found a couple of papers publishedby Bauman in The Polish Sociological Bulletin on Warsaw youth and Party or-ganization, he felt that "both pieces were written in a very impersonal manner

47

... The articles themselves were precise, careful and as dry as dust" (Smith! 999:62). It is not too hard ío see Smith's poir.t, bul as with the paper on War-saw youth, there is also something devioas going on in this discussion of theParty in an industrial works. In this paper Bauman is asking the saine questionthat he asked of Warsaw youth: who are the agents of social salvation? In thisstudy, the focus of attention shifts to the Party, the industrialised workers and,significantly, intellectuals in the role of technicians. Bauman starts by quotingthe Rules of the Polish United Workers' Party, which state that the Party in anindustrial plant has the job of making sure that production targets are achievedby a properly organised and efficient labour forcé. But what Bauman uncoversis that the Party militants and the workers are occupying two different moraluniversos, and possess two quite different personality types. According toBauman, Party militants are 'extroverted' and they possess a personality that isoriented towards commitment to the goals of the Party. However their militan-cy decreases once these extroverts reach the age of about forty. Meanwhile,the introverted personality is more typical of the workers who are concernedsimply to do their job and get on with life without too much external interfer-ence. Bauman argües that as the number of extroverts in an industrial plant de-clines, the number of introverts increases. He is saying that in time, loyalty tothe Party and positive commitment to its ideology will decrease in Poland,leaving only sullen acceptance and apathy. But there is another layer of mean-íng to this paper, a layer that becomes clear if it is considered in the context ofwhat Bauman remembers as having been his major sociological problem. Hewanted to understand why the promises of the Polish October had proven to beso fleeting and so quickly lost: "I knew our hopes had been dashed, and waseager to find out what went wrong and where our mistake lay" (Bauman &Tester 2001:24). Now, according to Solomon John Rawin, an especially 're-markable development' after 1956 was "the process of accommodation be-tween the intelligentsia and the regime, and the virtual restoration of the intel-ligentsia to its traditional position of ascendancy in the Polish social structure"(Rawin 1968:353). To put this in to the terms of Bauman's later sociology ofintellectuals, one of the problems that was raised by 1956 was that of the rela-tionship of the intellectuals with institutionalised power (this is one of the keyissues that is explored in Bauman's Legislators and Interpreten). Bauman'spaper implies that the intellectuals in the industrial works are not going to bethe agents of social salvation because there is a coming together of the inter-ests of the intellectuals as technical managers with those of the Party militants.In the terms of Bauman's later work, the intellectuals as industrial technicianseasily and gladly played the role of legislators. According to Rawin, this is a

48

specificaüy Polish pltermining factor in obourgeois ideology £gy". He went on to cgentsia within the So<pecially within the inrepudiation of interéscialism, is essentiallymodern organization'paper is an early inst;ais and it also pointsmath of October 195íman's answer is uneqlikely agent of social:

• (1964): "EcononThe Case of Po(2):203-216.

Bauman's Marxism, athe role of humanity aiopposed to any positiocessity about social ch;visionism. In this papeused as the point of d<temporary Poland. Th<Poland after the Secoistate. Although pre-waexample, its electricityDenmark, and steel proand Spain), neverthelesto find a trace of straigirural life and, without}Poland with a "traditioithe system of social ncontinuously re-createccial status" (p. 205). 1Whereas orthodox theo

;\v as dust" (SmithA t t h ¡he paper onWar-

;his discussion of thev.nc ilu.' same question,vtal salvation? In thiss-.nalised woikers and,

:-.-an stans by quoting— th.u the Party in an— . '.u^ts are achieved. í\ Batimán uncoversc -.\\ ditíerent moral

:MV>. According tos> a ivn-onality that is-,-, \o\c-r their militan-.vi KTty. Meanwhile,- x \v~o are concerned-.o:-. ívrernal interfer-<.- industrial plant de-ruc i- ame. loyalty to..• jecsase in Poland,¿-VCKÍ- layer of mean-TSCSC a the context of¡ooccal problem. Her^xr iic proven to berx?sr. ¿asfaed. and was;a»; iív" iBauman &.•u, a: eioecially 're-

_vv.-GErodarion be-iSOTCOc of the intel-:.>;iC >xal structure":- - ;a'e°- íociology of- v^ rae of the rela-n» ;oeoítb.ekey

i'-r>i.'eT7 - Bauman'sC.-.EÍ 3«.x going to be

-f tis inter-

-r^isrr¿ sdmicians-_ - v-s^. mis is a

specifically Polish phenomenon and ií reflects the historical fact that, "the de-termining factor in orienting the inteiligentsia toward socialism was the anti-bourgeois ideology and anti-entrepreneurial bias in the inteiligentsia ideolo-gy". He went on to contend that "the main element in the 'fit' of the inteili-gentsia within the Socialist order is the elitist pattern of social organization, es-pecially within the industrial system. The premise of social solidarity and therepudiation of interest conflicts, inherent in the conceptual framework of so-cialism, is essentially a translation of the elitist perspective into the terms ofmodern organization" (Rawin 1968:376). In short, this superficially soporifícpaper is an early instalment in Bauman's long- standing interest in intellectu-als and it also points towards an answer to a question thrown up by the after-math of October 1956: Is the industrial plant the site of social salvation? Bau-man's answer is unequivocal: no, no social group in industrial production is alikely agent of social salvation.

• (1964): "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Élite Formation:The Case of Poland". International Social Science Journal, 1(2):203-216.

Bauman's Marxism, and for that matter his entire sociológica! work, stressesthe role of humanity as the agent of praxis in the world. Bauman's work standsopposed to any position that identifies an inevitability of laws of historical ne-cessity about social change. This is one of the crucial aspects of his Marxist re-visionism. In this paper it is possible to see that philosophical position beingused as the -point of departure for a sociological analysis of changes in con-temporary Poland. The context of this paper is the rapid industrialization ofPoland after the Second World War, and under the aegis of the Communiststate. Although pre-war Poland was not a classical undeveloped country (forexample, its electricity production was greater than that of Hungary, Romanía,Denmark, and steel production was higher than in Sweden, Australia, Hungaryand Spain), nevertheless it was a largely rural economy. And here it is possibleto^find a trace of straight Marxism in Bauman: Marx condemned the idiocy ofrural life and, without going that far, 'Bauman associates the rural economy ofPoland with a "traditional mentality ... solidly entrenched in and nourished bythe system of social relations almost unmodified for many generations andcontinuously re-created, since inheritance almost exclusively determined so-cial status" (p. 205). It was this world that rapid industrialization melted.Whereas orthodox theorizing would have contended that industrialization and

49

capitalism necessarily follow on from pre-industrial production and feudalism,Bauman argües that "there was nothing about pre-industrial society whichmade ils develcpment into an industrial one inevitable". According to Baumanindustrialization was the result of a contingent "convergence of many factors"and "it occurred once in history and in one relatively small part of the globe"(p. 204). This is a theme that returns in Bauman's later development of a theo-ry of modemity, when he links it specifically to Western Europe. What all ofthis means is that Poland was industrialised only as a result of 'organized andplanned action' (p. 205). The agent of that organised and planned action was,of course, the Communist Party, although Bauman never mentions it by ñame.Instead he talks about "adherents of central economic planning based on cen-tralization of ownership ofbasic means of production" (p. 207). From this ob-servation Bauman goes on to consider the implications of this planned action .for the social structure in Poland. But it would seem that one of his main con-cerns was to try to work out why the urbanised and industrialised peasantrywere relatively disinterested in the arguments about freedom and liberty thatwere attracting dissident intellectuals. Bauman's explanation is fairly straight-forward: however terrible life might have been in the new towns, still it wasmuch better for the peasants become proletarians than it had been on the land:"The majority of former peasants and artisans in Poland perceived the changein their social status as a real advancement; they exchanged a shabby andshaky living in an apparently independent, but in fact severely exploited 'en-terprise'... for a stable and safe existence in civilized and attractive urban con-ditions". Bauman went on: "At least by the young people leaving the land oftheir forefathers and becoming factory workers, this was undoubtedly consid-ered as upward mobility" (p. 208). Or, put another way, the newly industri-alised workers would have responded to calis that they become the agents ofsocial salvation with absolute incredulity; they had already been saved andcould remember the conditions from which they had been delivered. Indeed,Bauman implied that there was no common cause between intellectuals andindustrial workers. He spoke about the continuation of the "tradition of rela-tive separation of the socially differentiated milieu" (p. 209). The workers donot aspire towards social mobility because they had already experienced it,while the children of the oíd political élites could only achieve mobilitythrough engagement with the managerial and technical demands of the newlyindustrialised Poland. They were no longer needed as propagandists for indus-trialization and social change because that train had by now been set in mo-tion. All that remained was recognition that now "administrative and manage-rial issues took precedence. over the tasks of propaganda" (p. 216). Conse-

quently, their socialtalk of freedom and 1

• (1965): "Social iish Sociological

"This paper is an attfavour or hamper de-*innovational (creativvery curious short pkStanislaw Ossowski <social structure. But •per is that it is writteThere is little sense ticultural issues, ratheia theoretical basis feHochfeld). To this exgoing on and, indeedleaps into life. BaumEis possible to divide ather homogeneous orsituation in which huístraightforward mechhere) and in which thneous societies that iithat "this society is cprivileges and deprivwhich these classes ;classes". Or these helcase there are many s<tively autonomous anerarchy" (p. 55). In h<personality structuresnew members into cíedamentally conservatmulti-dimensional heexists... to co-ordinaipendencies of the ind

50

-:o;iion and feudalism.zc^rrial society whk'h.-• A-cording to Baunian

nr-ce of many factors"¿r-ül part of the globo

--zr'.elopmentoíatheo-

--— : Europe. NVhat al! of• rrííilt of 'organi/ed and. ^.iplanned action * as.

r.-rmentions it by nar.ic..; --¿nning based on cín--" -. 207). Froni this ob-rj- :f this planned .u^r.on-^ ene of his mam .vn-; ircustrialised pe¿>sr-^">': -eedom and Ubeo nat-.j-inon is fairly scsidu-zz sew towns. sñll u «a>•c n had been on the ~;ind:i23C perceived the cr¿ageenchanged a sható> jaiir. íeverely exploiee -en-c sj¿ aitractive urbs .x«n-reccie leaving the am o:i - ••& undoubtedly COE- **&. the nevK

j¿ aiready been saveca: baen deliverei Bo; berreen intelfecnaeE oí the "tradiwn ar i

i otd achie^ B

-¿nódstrativecasmda" (p. --°- a

quently, their social character would also be one that would look askance attalk of freedom and liberty.

• (1965): "Social Structure and Innovational Personality". The Pol-ish Sociological Bulletin, 1:54-59.

"This paper is an attempt in formulating the socio-cultural conditions whichfavour or hamper development of the two opposite models of personality: (A)innovational (creative), (B) traditional (conservativa)" (p. 54). So begins thisvery curious short piece. At one level this article demónstrales the influence ofStanislaw Ossowski on Bauman, in that it is an attempt to relate personality tosocial structure. But what is much more immediately noticeable about the pa-per is that it is written in a very dry, seemingly abstractly theoretical manner.There is little sense that this piece has any connection with pressing social andcultural issues, rather it seems to be about nothing more than the provisión ofa theoretical basis for subsequent empirical work (in the manner of JuliánHochfeld). To íhis extent it is impossible not to suspect that something else isgoing on and, indeed, as soon as this paper i s read between the lines it ratherleaps into life. Bauman ties personality to social structure by contending that itis possible to divide all known societies into one of two categories; they are ei-ther homogeneous or heterogeneous. Homogeneous societies are typifíed by asituation in which human needs are satisfied at the level of individual action orstraightforward mechanical co-operation (there are traces of Emile Durkheimhere) and in which there is a single system of valúes. But it is really heteroge-neous societies that interest Bauman. They can be mono-cultural to the extentthat "this society is divided into classes differing, in their rights and duties,privileges and deprivations, but there exists one single pattern according towhich these classes are differentiated and individuáis ascribed to particularclasses". Or these heterogeneous societies can be multi-dimensional: "In thiscase there are many sepárate and inter-crossing systems of differentiation rela-tively autonomous and not co-ordinated by any conscious pattern of valué hi-erarchy" (p. 55). In homogeneous and mono-cultural heterogeneous societies,personality structüres are similar in that they are both concerned to socialisenew members into clear valué systems. Here then, personality structure is fun-damentally conservative. The situation is completely different in the case ofmulti-dimensional heterogeneous -societies. Here "no unique cultural patternexists ... to co-ordinate and bestow meaning on the totality of multivarious de-pendencies of the individual's needs satisfying process and on the diversifíed

51

determinants of the individual behaviour" (p. 56). In this siíuation then, the in-dividual exists in a multiplicity of social roles, each of which has its ownvalué system that mighl be coherent in itself but is not necessarily compatiblewith the valúes of any other role. As such, the individual is confrontad withconfusión over valúes and is required to make active choices: "In these condi-tions human acts cease to be parts of any single and all-embracing cultural sys-tem ... Thus the human behaviour is atomized into sepárate situations insteadof being systematic. Pattern of choice is substituted for pattern of behaviour inthe role of the behavioural guide" (p. 55). The implications of this situation areillustrated when Bauman writes that "each particular act of behaviour has dif-ferent meanings in various co-existing and reciprocally relativizing ... cultur-al systems. Each act is morally, emotionally and catexically ambiguous" (p.56). The individual is forced to make choices but without ever being able toturn to a court of appeal that will say that some choices were good and othersbad: "Thus the human behaviour in a multi-dimensional society ... becomes asequence of choices. Each situation bears now a cluster of alternative solu-tions. Predominance of some solutions over others is now being obtained ...by diffuse aggregate or expected rewards and punishments administered byany autonomous social forces" (p. 57). One of the fascinating possibilities la-tent within that quotation is that it anticipates in a quite remarkable way Bau-man's discussion of liquid modernity). To be an actor in a multi-dimensionalhetcrogeneous society then is necessarily to be possessed of an innovative per-sonality. And what that personality in no small part innóvales is precisely it-self. Bauman said that the only restraints that confront the innovational per-sonality are those that "are superimposed by the external action of the higherlevéis of the social organization - but they are not built into the individual mo-tivational structure. Thus the human behaviour's inevitable attribute is con-stant tensión between inner culturally determined drives and external struc-turally determined brakes" (p. 58). Now what makes all of this come to life isthe context in which it was written. As Bauman's early work had shown therewas an emerging social structure in Poland that was creating a climate inwhich personality structures were becoming remarkably conservative. And yetBauman's work was also quite clcar that Poland was a multi-dimensional hét-erogeneous society (or at least, Poland fitted that category very closely). In thepaper on economic growth and élite formation (discussed above), Bauman hadcommented that thanks to rapid industrialization Polish society was withoutuniversal valúes: "Manifold valué standards intertwine here in highly unex-pected ways" (p. 211). Consequently, contemporary Poland expressed a con-tradiction; its social structure ought to genérate innovational personality types

52

and yet it was typjfjpaper on social strudrum. The contradiction' (that is to say, tvation. In short, thesponsible makers ofwhich men and worrtions and structural rbeing what they COLfold. First, and implisclerosis in Polish soexperience that its elnot responsible forpointed to a paralysifgranted that the greatsive and unhamperedety" (p. 59).

• (1966): "Two NBulletin, 2:58-74

This is another odd pesome assumptions abThe bulk of the papelceptualization of ma:these particular quest:simply parachuted intin the last couple of p;rations ('comments' istuals as an avant-gard<style of this paper is mtion. In the fírst of thetween mass culture anment he attributes to ¿mass Communicationstion of where the 'masthis matter by linkinging the debate about c

is siuiation thon. the in-of which has its ownnecessarily compatible

jual is contivnted \vithhoicís: "In these condi-embracing cultural sys-larate siuiations instead• pattem ot" behaviour inionsot this situación are,ct oí behaviour has dif-v relativizing .. - cultur-•xically ambipous" tp.hout ever heing able to?s \vere good and othersalsociety ...becomesaster of altemaive solu-no\ beine c-bcuned ...iments admirasered bycinaürg possipiliñes la-te renurkaWe vuy Bau-: in 2 muln-vfeineíiswoal;ed o: an iniwnve per-nnovates is prsasely it-•nt tis innovsóooal per-mal secón o: ns big^r.t inte tbe in¿^^^2- n>o-?\-ira>i5 artrireie is ccc-

ive<all o:

and yet it was typified by the exact opposite, conservative personalities. Thispaper on social structure and personality provides the answer to that conun-drum. The contradiction is the result of the 'higher levéis of social organiza-tion' (that is to say, the state apparatus) putting a brake on the chances of inno-vation. In short, the state was preventing men and women from being the re-sponsible makers of their own choices, and it was also creating a situation inwhich men and women were forced to live in a tensión between their motiva-tions and structural restraints. The state was preventing men and women frombeing what they could be. The consequences of mis tensión would be two-fold. First, and implicit to the argument of this paper, there would be a moralsclerosis in Polish society because innovative personality would learn throughexperience that its choices were not freo and, therefore, that in the end one isnot responsible for one's own choices. Second, and explicitly, Baumanpointed to a paralysis of social innovation in Poland since "it can be taken forgranted that the greater the number of innovative personalities, the more inten-sive and unhampered is the dynamics and developmental potential of the soci-ety" (p. 59).

• (1966): "Two Notes on Mass Culture". The Polish SodologicalBulletin, 2:58-14.

This is another odd paper, which is either sliced out of a larger work or makingsome assumptions about the meanings that will be brought to it by readers.The bulk of the paper is made up of two unlinked discussions about the con-ceptualization of mass culture. The reasons why Bauman concéntrales onthese particular questions about mass culture are not explained; the reader issimply parachuted into a discussion and finds it already in progress. But then,in the last couple of pages, Bauman brings them together to make some decla-rations ('comments' is too weak a word) about the cultural role of the intellec-tuals as an avant-garde. It ought also to be added that the prose (or translation)style of this paper is not terribly helpful from the point of view of communica-tion. In the first of the two notes Bauman pays attention to the relationship be-tween mass culture and social infrastructure. He begins by mocking the argu-ment he attributes to American sociologists that mass culture is the result ofmass Communications. Bauman's point is that this thesis rather begs the ques-tion of where the 'mass' comes from in the first place, and he seeks to resolvethis matter by linking the 'mass' to the social infrastructure. Bauman is shift-ing the debate about culture away from technologies of communication and

53

making it entirely sociological. As Bauman put the matter: "For culture to be-come 'mass', it is not enough to set up a televisión station. Sometning mustíirst happen to social structure. Mass culture is in a way a superstructura rest-ing upon what we shall tentatively cali "mass social structure'" (p. 59). A pageor so later this comment is hardened up a little, "for a culture to acquire a'mass' character ... the social conditions of the members of the society - and,consequently, also the criteria determining the functional utility of elements ofculture - must become standardized" (p. 60). He identifies three tendencies to-wards mass standardization. First there is dependence on the market and espe-cially the industrialised market which 'standardizes things' (p. 62), which di-rects the same commodities to all, and thus flattens taste hierarchies: "Fromthe very outset of the industrial revolution the development of industry hasconsisted - from the point of view of the market - in a serialization and uni-versalization of the production of commodities which had previously, on ac-count of their rarity, been accessible only to the privileged. and which for thisreason had enjoyed a special prestige and had been particularly coveted" (p.62). He speculates that this process explains the allure of the 'rare' and'unique' in contemporary markets; they are ways of re-establishing hierarchies(it might be added that the 'new' and 'fashionable' also achieve that end; thereare traces of Werner Sombart and Georg Simmel here, and perhaps even ofThorstein Veblen). The second tendency towards mass standardization comesfrom dependence on organization. Here, Bauman's point is that in contempo-rary social life, individuáis must secure a place in an organizational structure ifthey are going to be able to have any confidence in their ability to satisfyneeds. There is a universalization of experience: "To satisfy his needs, to ac-quire goods indispensable for it, man must win a position in an organization.This becomes for everybody, whatever his or her profession, the supreme in-strumental valué. Organizations differ one from another, and so do the posi-tions in the organizations, but the need for some position in some organizationis common to everyone" (p. 63). What this means is that there are no excep-tions from the rule; all is massifíed, all the same. Third, mass culture is a su-perstructura! consequence of dependence on technology. Here, the hint is thattechnology takes innovative and creative potential away from men and womenby making them helpless: "Technical equipment makes all our actions consid-erably easier, but at the same time renders us helpless when faced by the ad-versities of fate, however trivial" (p. 64). In this first note on culture, Baumanconcludes that "man becomes dependent on the market, on organization andon technology because he cannot by-pass them on the road from the expendi-ture of his creative energy to the acquisition of the goods indispensable for its

54

regeneration. Thus, itthe fundamental reas<the life situations of fare still diverse" (p. 6meaning of the distirquently, this is a notedifferent approaches tof one cultural activit;reflect immanent quaabout superiority ha\e of the cultur

but in its infrastructurand anticipates FierreBach is invariably idcthat some forms of m¡states that "any staterpurely sociological: tidealing with fish occiof people who listen tthat was where this p¡but in the last coupleway in to this particulit might actually requidoes for them to listelhand for the productiothat he can democratisrior/inferior dichotom;tus and membership tnecessary to learn to ípop music. From thisanee of the división ofof the división of cultconcludes with the prcaway, then all men anciment' that is free cultiply the culture of an isof the entire society" (

UT: "For culture to be-.uion. Something must\ superstructura rest-!ctmv"'(p. 59).Apagea culture to acquire ars of the society - and,.ü utility of elements of¡es three tendencies to--n the market and espe-nes/ ip. 62). which di-ste merarchies: "From•prr-en; of industry has.;. síruüization and uni-hac previously, on ac-cec. and which for thisunailaily coveted" (p.ure oí the 'rare' and

:sn-Mi>hing hierarchiesacíueve that end; there.'. aac perhaps even of<c£Xt>rdization comesni i> ti.it in contempo-

nal structure ifI? ibiliry to satisfy

jü-ó ais needs, to ac-organization.

the supreme in-er. .EX so do the posi-c ir ¿eme organizationra: aere are no excep-^ casi culture is a su-•v. Herí, the hint is thatrrrc men and women¿I CKT acüons consid-üus óced by the ad-íe ce oüture. Bauman?_ x .Tganization and-_T¿L: rym ihe expendi-> róipensable for its

regeneration. Thus, it is in the growing similarity of these roads that 1 perceivethe fundamental reason for the increasing preponderance of these features inthe life situations of people which are common and general over those whichare still diverse" (p. 65). The second of the two notes on culture focuses on themeaning of the distinction between the 'superior' and the 'inferior'. Conse-quently, this is a note about cultural valué. After running through a range ofdifferent approaches to the problem, Bauman concludes that the identificationof one cultural activity or product as 'superior' in relation to any otherdoes notreñect immanent qualities of that former activity or product: "If statementsabout superiority have any objective sense, this must be sought not in thestructure of the cultural commodities being classified, and not even in culture,but in its infrastructure" (p. 70). In a comment that recalls Friedrich Nietzscheand anticipates Fierre Bourdieu's sociology of taste, Bauman mentions thatBach is invariably identified as of higher cultural valué than pop music, andthat some forms of manners are identified as more refined than others, and hestates that "any statement about superiority ... can only have a sense that ispurely sociological: that people who listen to Bach and use two forks whendealing with fish occupy in the structure of society a position superior to thatof people who listen to Johnny Hallyday and eat fish with a knife" (p. 70). Ifthat was where this paper ended it could be filed away and largely forgotten,but in the last couple of pages Bauman starts to talk about intellectuals. Hisway in to this particular problem is through the comment that for intellectualsit might actually require far greater effort for them to enjoy pop music than itdoes for them to listen to Bach. Here, Bauman is using pop music as a shoríhand for the productions of mass culture. Bauman seems to make this point sothat he can democratise the meanings of culture and mus free it from the supe-rior/inferior dichotomy. He argües that since the intelligentsia achieves its sta-tus and membership through education, through learning, and that since it isnecessary to learn to appreciate Bach, so the intelligentsia can learn to enjoypop music. From this follow "two intertwined consequences: the disappear-ance of the división of people into superior and inferior, and the disappearanceof the división of cultural valúes into superior and inferior" (p. 71). Baumanconcludes with the proposition that as soon as these classifícations are clearedaway, then all men and women might be able to engage in the 'creative exper-iment' that is free cultural creation: "An élite or avant-garde culture is not sim-ply the culture of an isolated group: it is the raw material for the future cultureof the entire society" (p. 74).

55

• (1966): "Moglichkeithen und metodologische Klippen soziologis-cher Forschungen". Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 14 (1):32-44.

Originally published in Polish, this is one of the few pieces appearing by Bau-man in Germán translation in these years. The following quotations are there-fore translated from Germán into English. The árdele generally presents ananalysis of the interrelationship between sociological methodology and So-cialist practice and how Socialism, after many unfruitful years of discussionsabout the actual relevance of sociology, can benefit from a revitalised sociolo-gy and awareness of certain methodological obstacles to understanding. AsBauman initially states that "the real need of the Socialist project against ne-cessity or deprivation demands this [sociological] research. An empirical soci-ology for the people, creating its own existence under the guidance of the Par-ty and State, is acutely necessary not only as a source dealing with informationabout the current social situation and its developmental tendencies but also asa collection of practical illustrations for the rational management of the socie-tal process" (p. 32). Thus, it is here clear that Bauman sees sociology as an im-portant contribution in order 'for the people' to understand its own existencebut also as a tool in the hands of the powerful in order to understand, controland predict social Ufe. We here already see the contours of the distinction be-tween 'sociology as rationalisation' and 'sociology as manipulation, whichBauman ten years later developed in more detail in Towards a Critical Sociol-ogy. Moreover, we see a potential hint at a schism between the people and thepowerful guiding the former. Bauman goes on to show how sociology prac-ticed on a Marxist foundation can contribute to independent research on sociallife and need not limit itself to rely on the materials gathered by other socialsciences such as economy, history or law studies. He moreover illustrates howsociology, in its ambition to be able to support the rational control of people,and to understand and even predict their behaviour, must especially be able tounderstand the intricate connections between a multitude of different factors:"Every science ínvestigates the connections and the interplay between certainvariables ... One needs to know the determinante of the human behaviour, theinterconnections between the consequences of the situation and the inner mo-tives of personality, in order to determine the elementary effects of the 'histor-ical condition' in order to obtain the desired and planned creation of history"(p. 33). Therefore, he goes on to claim that "a link of great importance existsbetween 'historical conditions' and 'social processes', namely human ingenu-ity ... When one analyses the demands for sociological research based on its

56

subject-matter, ihenof this 'no-man's laior 'no-man's land" <tive, historical or s'public issues' in Clieves to be the specpecially when socitplanning of humanstrange consideringdecades to dwell onology. However, incertain methodologibased on his own pcialist Poland that Imarksistowskiej teo,ety)from 1964. Prinbated: (l)methods city of one's sample.no universal methocconundrum of the hutilisation of underabout the scientifícBauman commence:view techniques anthrough this extractwhole. Bauman hertsurvey or interviewpie questions relatinthe problem of the cthe conditions to wh- the relationship b£knowledge and behadom materialises asbe eliminated, the lasuch aspects as thetude' of the respondebeing in the world.'ence' - that the researesponden! are equi

Klippen soziologis-Philosophie, 14 (1):

ees appearing by Bau-; quotations are there-generally presents aninethodology and So-il years of discussionsi a revitalised sociolo-to understanding. Asist project against ne-ch. An empirical soci-e guidance of the Par-ding with Informationtendencies but also asagement of the socie-is sociology as an im-ind its own existence0 understand, controlof the distinction be-manipulation, which

<rds a Critical Sociol-en the people and thehow sociology prac-snt research on socialhered by other social•eover illustrates howlal control of people,especially be able to

¿ of different factors:play between certainluman behaviour, theon and the inner mo-effects of the 'histor-1 creation of history"^at importance existsmely human ingenu-•esearch based on its

subject-matter, then these demands are exactly concerned with investigationsof this 'no-man's land'" (p. 33). It is this specific link, the intermediar}' sphereor 'no-man's land' stretching between the individual situation and the collec-tive, historical or structural conditions, or between 'personal troubles' and'public issues' in C. Wright Mills's famous terminology, which Bauman be-lieves to be the specific locus of sociological investigation and attention - es-pecially when society, like in the Socialist regimes, insists on the rationalplanning of human cohabitation. The airn of the article thus seems relativelystrange considering Bauman's continuous rejection throughout the last threedecades to dwell on and deal with questions of research methods and method-ology. However, in this early piece Bauman's errand is to refer and discusscertain methodological reflections on the practically applied research methodsbased on his own personal experiences and those of other colleagues in So-cialist Poland that Bauman had elaborated in more detail in the book Zarysmarksistowskiej teorii spoleczenstwa (Outline of the Marxist Theory of Soci-ety) from 1964. Primarily two central topics related to research designs are de-bated: (1) methods of questioning, and (2) how to determine the representativ-ity of one's sample. Initially Bauman importantly emphasises "that there areno universal methods" and that "the accuracy with which they reproduce theconundrum of the human condition is the only determining criterion for theutilisation of understanding" (p. 34). After expressing severe reservationsabout the scientific valué and accuracy of observation studies (pp. 34-35),Bauman commences with a relatively simple delineation of survey and inter-view techniques and how to ask people about their social conditions andthrough this extract knowledge extrapólate about the nature of society as awhole. Bauman hére lists two classical and central problems relating to suchsurvey or interview methods relying on extracting information by asking peo-ple questions relating to their experiences of their own prívate existence: (1)the problem of the competence of the respondent vis-á-vis the knowledge ofthe conditions to which the questions relate, and (2) the problem of exactitude- the relationship between the adequacy of the answers given and the actualknowledge and behaviour of the respondent. Whereas the former problem sel-dom materialises as an actual problem in the research process and easily canbe eliminated, the latter is much more consequential and frequent. It relates tosuch aspects as the 'personality structure', 'motivational structure' or 'atti-tude' of the respondent - in other words to the psychic dimensión of his or herbeing in the world. The problem here concerns the classical notion of 'infer-ence' - that the researcher may be lead to believe that the answers given by therespondent are equivalen! to how the person in question would actually re-

57

spond in a concrete situation. And this is, as Bauman indícales, the problem ofpredicting human behaviour in 'natural' or 'actual' circumstances from the an-swers included in quesfionnaires or interview situations. By doing so. the re-searcher commits a fallacy by suggesting an identity between 'research labo-ratory' and 'real life'. From this fallacy result the aforementioned two majorproblems: (1) that of exactitude; the fací that the respondent is a person whooccupies several different and diverging roles in social and cultural life meansthat any one-dimensional and unilinear inference from answer to action cannotbe expected also because of the intermediary and mediating role played by therelationship between researcher and respondent, the milieu of the conductedinterview and the topic of the interview; and (2) the problem of competence,that is concerned with the problem relating to the fact that people may beasked to answer questions relating to hypothetical or actual situations in whichthey are actually either moved by internal motivations of which they are un-conscious and unaware or by externa! forces and pressures, such as coerción orthreats, of which they have no controlling ability. In either case the responsegiven should not be interpreted as a direct indicator of what the interviewed in-dividual would actually do if he or she were out there in real life situations.Thus, there is no one-way connection between professed attitude and actualaction allowing for exact prediction of human behaviour based on interviewsor surveys. Furthermore, Bauman discusses the element of normatíve pressurecontained e ven in the simplest of survey questions such as: 'How often do yougo to the theatre?'. Even here answers cannot be taken as exact representationof the actual frequency of the visits to the theatre because the respondent mayfeel the desire or urge to state higher frequency than is actually the case be-cause of the normative pressures implicitly involved, especially if the personbelongs to a group bf people, e.g. the intellectuals, for whom frequent visits tothe theatre are regarded as a norm or are expected. From Bauman's expositionthese two problems pose serious challenges for anyone trying to understandsocial life through survey or interview techniques. Subsequently, Bauman con-céntrales on his critique relating to the representatívity of research findings inthe phase of data processing and interpretation. Here he critically examines Ihe'pluralist-behaviourist' tendency to reduce the social whole or totality to thesum of the individual parts and mus goes on to criticise quite a lot of the ongo-ing research into voting behaviour especially in the U.S.A. but presumablyalso in the Socialist countries. He emphatically states that "a 'totality' does notjust amount to a mass of individuáis but is also a special syslem constituted bytheir inner connections and dependencies ... Individual behaviour is nol onlydependen! on personal peculiarities but also on the external conditions through

which these individuáisture of society of the peíthe operation of a sociefpending development -quency of individual peeconnections between thewhole" (p. 40). He goesshock other scientists ancif presented with the idedom sample of its cellsgestions that the analysiscould commence from dselection of its sepáratevoice' that permeates thi.analysis neglects social :future occurrences. Thisenees because it boils dosoup of aggregated attitiwhether the merciless crical research technique insion in later years to conBauman concludes the pical social research: "Myseem banal for the experiin place ... The only intesome of the difficulties aods without paying any astill in anonymous third-emphasise that "the readbecause of his criticism aiods of any valué whatsowould be more misleadinout deficienciés and everfor the researcher ... A raments but when it comespowerful tool just as thethan an axe for shaving"investígate the human comination, simple yet freq

58

icates, the problem of¡nstances froin the an-. By doing so, the re-tween 'research labo-mentioned two majorident is a person whond cultural life meansiswer to action cannoting role played by thelieu of the conducted>blem of competence,t that people may belal situations in whichof which they are un-:s, such as coerción orher case the responsemt the interviewed in-in real life situations.id attitude and actualr based on interviewsof normative pressureis: 'How often do yous exact representatione the respondent mayactually the case be-pecially if the personhom frequent visits toBauman's expositiontrying to understand

quently, Bauman con->f research findings inritically examines thehole or totality to theuite a lot of the ongo-S.A. but presumablyt "a 'totality' does notsystem constituted bybehaviour is not only:al conditions through

which these individuáis are connected with others and especially on the struc-ture of society of the persons concerned. This means that the investigation ofthe operation of a society - and even more the possibility of predicting its im-pending development - not only demands a description of the statistical fre-quency of individual peculiarities but moreover also requires an analysis of theconnections between these individuáis such as an analysis of the structure as awhole" (p. 40). He goes on to suggest that the neglect of such a fallacy wouldshock other scientists and that "the biologist would respond with astonishmentif presented with the idea that an organism could be described through a ran-dom sample of its cells just as the engineer would be ver}' surprised by sug-gestions that the analysis of the entire mechanical structure of a machine toolcould commence from dissembling the machine and haphazardly analysing aselection of its sepárate units" (p. 41). The entire notion of 'one man, onevoice' that permeates this type of sociological snapshots entailed in statisticalanalysis neglects social structure and its impact on individual behaviour andfuture occurrences. This understanding is also ignorant of individual differ-ences because it bous down everybody's expressed altitudes to an anonymoussoup of aggregated altitudes. After reading the piece, one is left to wonderwhether the merciless critique aimed against almost any type of methodologi-cal research technique in this piece is the reason behind Bauman's own aver-sión in later years to conduct empirical social research altogether? However,Bauman concludes the piece by stating that he is not at all opposed to empiri-cal social research: "My intention was rather to state a few warnings that mayseem banal for the experienced Marxist research but nevertheless appear to bein place ... The only intention of the author in this article has been to presentsome of the difficulties and problems relating to the analysed research meth-ods without paying any attention to their beneficial aspects" (p. 43). Bauman,still in anonymous third-person usage, in euphemistical manner continúes toemphasise that "the reader might have gotten the impression that the authorbecause of his criticism and scrutiny of these methods deprives the same meth-ods of any valué whatsoever and therefore throws them overboard. Nothingwould be more misleading man such a conclusión. There are no methods with-out deficiencies and every method causes certain methodological difficultiesfor the researcher ... A razorblade as well as an axe are equally precise instru-ments but when it comes to deforestation the axe is much better. The axe is apowerful tool just as the razorblade but it is much better to use a razorbladethan an axe for shaving" (p. 43). Bauman-'s main point is that when trying toinvestígate the human condition in all its complexity, contingency and deter-mination, simple yet frequently applied research methods focusing on the in-

59

dividual while neglecting social structure are relatively deficient but also thatit is indeed important to investígate and analyse the social problems in order tounderstand the Socialist development.

• (1966): "Three Remarks on Contemporary Educational Prob-lems". The Polish Sociological Bulletin, 1:76-89. Also published as:(1967): "Some Problems of Coníemporary Education". Interna-tional Social Science Journal, 19 (3):325-337.

Of the two English-language versions of this paper, the 1967 translation is byfar the most accessible; the prose style is much íighter and the typographymuch better than the one in The Polish Sociological Bulletin. Therefore, ailquotations from this paper are from the 1967 versión. This paper is somewhatdeceptive, because the title implies an almost policy focus as well as a turn onBauman's work towards processes of education. Yet at the very beginning ofthe paper Bauman makes it clear that neither implication holds good: "Toe au-thor of the remarks which follow is neither an educationalist by training ñor asociologist whose work lies in the field of educational sociology" (p. 325). In-stead, Bauman states, he carne to write this paper because questions about ed-ucation emerged in the course of his investigation of contemporary Poland. Inother words, this paper might not be a contribution to educational sociology,but it is a contribution to sociology of education, and therefore it raises broadsocial and cultural questions as opposed to specific issues about educationalstraíegy, process or policy. Bauman says that what became clear to him in hisstudy of Poland were three 'áreas in which it is possible to identify a link be-tween education and pressing social problems. The first problem that Baumanidentifies is that of the 'missing social function of youth'. He tends to confíateyouth with adolescence and defines adolescence as the stage in the life cyclewhen the biological maturity of the human body has outstripped the social andcultural roles that are considered appropriate to a given age group. Bauman ex-plains that because of environmental and dietary improvements, the period ofadolescence is lengthening in industrial societies: "In modern industrial soci-eties the period of adolescence has become greatly prolonged and the speedwith which this change has taken place, compared with the low rate of struc-tural change and cultural adaptation typical of past centuries, has been so rap-id, if measured by cultural-historical yardsticks, that our civilization, caughtby surprise, has been unable to keep up with it and to provide cultural institu-tions, functionally relevant to the new social problem" (p. 326). There might

60

well be a hidden criticman is identifyirig a gare too rooted in tra<women, but what is dean increasingly Ipng 5solutely no social or cibut nevertheless nece:lems of its own: "Partby an emphasis on 'rijin production is associthen is a time of righiyouth become socialisiunprepared ío accept tithe dominant social s<young people enter intt"society grants progrespendent on their parerpushing further and ftmake young people reparents fully responsibwhy young people conyouth in a condition oíthey are prevented frorjBauman identifies theHere, his argument is tucation stresses the imsuch as moral codes, dlarly important to notedeterminants are becorbehaviour. The role obackground by the incthem" (p. 330). Baumatemporary Poland, be"mould a new type of rdestíny than those typeless "socialist societiescivilization, and bear ain socialist societies, tocoming more importar

/ defícient but also thatial problems in order to

Educational Prob-.9. Also published as:ducation". Interna-

• 1967 translation is byer and the typographySulletin. Therefore, allTiis paper is somewhat;us as well as a turn onthe very beginning of

n holds good: "The au-nalist by training ñor aociology" (p. 325). In-ise questions about ed-ntemporary Poland. Ineducational sociology,lerefore it raises broad;ues about educationalime clear to him in hisi to identify a link be-problem that Bauman'. He tends to confíatestage in the life cyclestripped the social andge group. Bauman ex-v'ements, the period oflodern industrial soci-•longed and the speedthe low rate of struc-

aries, has been so rap-ar civilization, caught•ovide cultural institu-(p. 326). There might

well be a hidden critique of actually existing socialism here, in so far as Bau-man is identifying a general trend in which social and cultural arrangementsare too rooted in tradition to be able to keep up with changing men andwomen, but what is definitely the case is that he is arguing that adolescence isan increasingly long stage of the life cycle in which young people have ab-solutely no social or cultural role; they are too young to engage in production,but nevertheless necessarily engage in consumption. And that créales prob-lems of its own: "Participation in the redistribution of goods is accompaniedby an emphasis on 'rights' in the defínition of social role, while participationin production is associated with an emphasis on 'duty'" (p. 327). Adolescencethen is a time of rights without dudes, and its increasing length means thatyouth become socialised into mis situation to such an extent that they are quiteunprepared to accept the constraints and restraints of duty. Bauman argües thatthe dominant social solution to this dilemma is to defer the moment whenyoung people enter into the sphere of duties, but that in turn merely means that"society grants progressively to older age groups the right to be completely de-pendent on their parents for financial support, and services, and that we arepushing further and further up the age scale the moment when we begin tomake young people responsible for their own deeds, and cease to hold theirparents fully responsible for them" (pp. 328-329). For Bauman this explainswhy young people confront the duties of adult life as a problem; society keepsyouth in a condition of socially and culturally arrested development in whichthey are prevented from assuming responsibility for their own actions. Second,Bauman identifíes the problem of 'extra-cultural determinants of behaviour'.Here, his argument is that a problem emerges in industrial society because ed-ucation stresses the irnportance of cultural determinants on life (determinantssuch as moral codes, discipline, qualifications and so forth), but "it is particu-larly important to note that in modern technical civilizations ... the structuraldeterminants are becoming more and more influential upon individual humanbehaviour. The role of internalized behavioural patterns is pushed into thebackground by the increased pressure of external necessities in conflict withthem" (p. 330). Bauman is quite explicit that this problem can be found in con-temporary Poland, because while actually existing socialism is trying to"mould a new type of man who will be more noble, more worthy of the humandestiny than those types of personality produced by other systems", neverthe-less "socialist societies, like all other modem societies, are based on technicalcivilization, and bear all the attributes peculiar to such civilizations. Thereforein socialist societies, too, it may be said that the structural determinants are be-coming more important in moulding human behaviour" (p. 331). Or put an-

61

other way, the aggression, apathy and escapism that is produced in young peo-ple by the conflict between the valúes of education and capitalism are going tobe duplicated in the conditions of actually existing socialism because of theconilict between the education of the 'new man' and socialist production. Theworld made no sense according to the truths that had been propagated by edu-cation. According to Bauman this conflict explains the sociológica! discoverythat Polish youth leave school highly optimistic and committed, but quicklybecome indifferent and apalhetic as soon as they confront the exigencies of'the non-school environment': "The ideáis of young people who had alreadyleft school and were employed ... were ... minimalistic, egocentric, defensive;the impression one had was that these ... young people were anxious above allto carve out for themselves from an uncertain, incomprehensible and, most im-portant, uncontrolled world outside, a small prívate world, consisting of mat-ters and things which were certain and which they themselves could control"(p. 331) The construction of the 'new man' of socialist commitment had ledonly to the dream of a thoroughly privatised and individual!sed life. For Bau-man this meant that education must stop promoting ideáis in abstraction fromthe wider world of 'technical civilization' and, instead, it ought to be extendedto soften the blow of the gap between school and work: "In Poland, which is aplanning country, not only must the educator be a planner, but the plannermust also be an educator" (p. 334). The third problem with education was thatof 'emotional security'. With this Ítem Bauman retums to the theme of themulti-dimensional heterogeneous society. He argües that such societies arecharacterised by 'the growing specialization and environmental isolation ofoccupations' to such an extent that individuáis "rapidly conclude that there isno such thing as a general principie which would enable them to predict withany precisión the behaviour of all the people with whom they come into con-tact in one situation or another". Bauman suggests that it is possible to observedifferent people behaving in different ways in the same situations, and that in-dividuáis are forced to concede that they are like this too. As such, it is impos-sible to look at valúes, self or others and to "combine them into a coherent sys-tem free of inner contradictions. This leads most frequently to a relativistic ap-proach to known rules and pattems, and to the conviction that no norms or pat-terns are absolute" (p. 334). Driving the point home Bauman says: "Man todayis faced not only with a diversity of situations that are independent of each oth-er and not associated in one common system, but also with a diversity of viewsas to what kind of behaviour is proper in each situation. This intensifíes stillmore his feeling of relativity, the inconclusiveness of all precepts and prohibi-tions" (p. 335). The result is a condition of deep emotional insecurity precise-

62

]y because there is notlmeasure of confidenceanxiety. Bauman meníiappeal of religión (p. 3;more often leads the irhilistic altitudes to all n.but also the valué of an)right, or noble actions fis possible to identify iicialism. Bauman links 5plies that these are preciate 'new men' who willthe paradox was one wmen and women. He adplicity and diversity, an<iour". Bauman wantedawhich "the young persoíby chance influences, feindividual decisions ancprovidence or historicalactions" (p. 337).

• (1966): "The Limil45-162. Also publi;Planning'", in GroThe Guidance of IHuí.

This paper started life asative Administration GiStates, in July 1964. To ti

' the extent to which it shcvided into East and Wesfact, contrary to the factsa product of that situaticand to its conference in istyle central planning asBauman, actually existir

roduced in young peo-:apitalism are going to.ialism because of the-•ialisí production. Theen propagated by edu--iociological discoveryimmitted, but quicklyront the er.igencies ofople who had alreadyegocentric, defensive;veré anxious above allicnsible and, most im-"ld, consisting of rnat-\selves could control"commitment had led

lualised ufe. For Bau-tls in abstraction from; ought to be extended'In Poland, which is anner, but the plannerith education was thats to the theme of themt such societies arejnmental isolation ofconclude that there is: them to predict withi they come into con-is possible to observeituations, and that in-. As such, it is impos-TI into a coherent sys-:ly to a relativistic ap-that no norms or pat-ean says: "Man todayependent of each oth-h a diversity of views. This intensiñes stillprecepts and prohibi-al insecurity precise-

ly because there is nothing external in which it might be possible to vest anymeasure of confidence and certainty, and so individuáis are bedevilled withanxiely. Bauman mentions in passing that this is the source of the continuedappeal of religión (p. 335) although the discovery of the relativity of all ideáismore often leads the individual to "disillusionment by adopting cynical, ni-hilistic attitudes to all rules and principies, by denying not only absolute truths,but also the valué of any criteria at all fordistinguishing right actions from lessright, or noble actions from less noble" (p. 336). Reading between the lines, itis possible to identify in this paper a dialectical critique of the chances of so-cialism. Bauman links socialism to industrial technical societies and then im-plies that these are precisely the worst kinds of societies in which to try to cré-ate 'new men' who will be noble and do the right thing. Bauman's answer tothe paradox was one which reflects his deep-seated confidence and trust inmen and women. He advocated an education system which promotes "multi-plicity and diversity, and henee it must recognize relativity in codes of behav-iour". Bauman wanted an education system which would lead to a situation inwhich "the young person must be prepared, by an enlightened teacher, and notby chance influences, for the fact that his life will consist of a whole series ofindividual decisions and choices, and that no one and nothing, either divineprovidence or historical necessity, can relieve him of the responsibility for hisactions" (p. 337).

• (1966): "The Limitations of 'Perfect Planning'". Co-existence, 5:45-162. Also published as: (1967): "The Limitations of 'PerfectPlanning'", in Gross, Bertram M. (ed.): Action Under Planning:The Guidance of Economic Development. New York: McGraw-Hill.

This paper started life as a paper to a conference that was held at the Compar-ative Administration Group's Research Seminar at Minnowbrook, UnitedStates, in July 1964. To this extent one of the interesting aspects of the paper isthe extent to which it shows that the oíd Cold War myth that the world was di-vided into East and West without any cultural traffic between them was, infact, contrary to the facts. There were links between scholars, and this paper isa product of that situation. Bauman's contribution to the work of the Group,and to its conference in the United States, was lo offer an analysis of Soviet-style central planning as a distinctive mode of administration. According toBauman, actually existing socialism practised the principie of 'perfect plan-

63

ning' and, in so doing, the system made a number of assumptions about theenvironment in which it was operating. Planning was 'perfect' a!l the time itwas guided by a single agent thaí operated according to one - and only one -"factor determining the totality of social action" (p. 146). First, for planning tobe perfect the system had to be self-sufficient in resources, and these resourceshad to be manageable according to the goal of the construction of socialism.An attempt to meet this need of perfect planning was the establishment in1949 of Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Aid) as an agency whichwas intended to manage cross-national planning to enable the Soviet Unionand its satellites to achieve economic self-sufficiency (one intended result ofthis strategy was a turning away from economic activity with the West and, un-intentionally, an exacerbation of the attractiveness of Western commodities forEastern consumers). Second, perfect planning demanded 'perfect informa-tion'. The managers of the plan needed to have complete information about theavailability of resources and the extent to which they could be freely manipu-lated. Third, the plan required that "the planning agent be capable of makingdecisions which are not only realistic but also most effective in ternas of theoverall systemic goals" (p. 147). Here then, the planners had to ignore person-al interests and uphold only the 'interests of the system'; they had to be pos-sessed of the executive power to choose between competing interests in rela-tion to the needs of the system. Thus, these competing interests had to be madecomparable: "The alternative among which selection is to be made must be re-ducible to a common denominator, commensurable, exhaustible by a simpleand universal quantifying and quantifiable measure" (p. 147). This meant thatperfect planning was incompatible with the forces at play in multi-dimension-al, heterogeneous, Polish sbciety, a problem that was exacerbated by the fourthassumption of planning: social homogeneity, "in the sense that there are noevents which are at the same time beneficial for one part of the system andharmful for another; in other terms, that the system does not consists of partswhich have mutually competing interests" (p. 147). Finally, and perhaps pre-cisely because of the extent to which it was out of kilter with the society thathad been made by rapid industrialization (that is, with the society that planningmade and needed), perfect planning required 'perfect hierarchic control'. Per-fect planning required that the commands of the planners were translated in animmediate and undistorted way into the action of men and women and that"there ought to be no place for any autonomous sources of power of influence"(p. 147). Apart from being a discussion of the problems of perfect planning,this paper is also another dimensión of Bauman's analysis of the contradic-tions of contemporary Polish society. In particular, a theme that comes across

from this paper is one tisions of Party structuretheme of the decline ofues, and of its gradual sperformativity. It seem<motivated by an attempíand poverty, whereas thtablish the world as a rasystemic demands. Whítrying to express a faithagers uphold nothing m

• (1967): "Polish Yo

In this paper Bauman tathem to try to develop ;ment of the young. Thesimilar question: Whythe kinds of political accialism whilst, indeed,be blunt: why is youth <ological definition of ytlates this particular grophase during which in<ready existing social wthe life and behaviouradaptation of the indivi*this definition then, yoiization is handed over,there is a tensión betwibehaviour' that youngBauman contends thatsituation that "the youtlconditions than the oldíder the impact of new ;eral orientations, imageimportant points from'of the adult population'

64

assumptions about the•perfect' all the time it) one — and only one -). First, for planning toes, and these resourcesstruction of socialism.s the establishment inid) as an agency whichable the Soviet Unionone intended result ofwith the West and, un-istern commodities forded 'perfect informa-information about the

mld be freely manipu-be capable of makingective in terms of the

, had to ignore person-:'; they had to be pos-eting interests in rela-terests had to be made0 be made must be re-haustible by a simple147). This meant that

y in multi-dimension-cerbated by the fourth:nse that there are noart of the system and9 not consists of partsally, and perhaps pre-• with the society that; society that planning;rarchic control'. Per-, were translated in anand women and thatf power of influence"1 of perfect planning,/sis of the contradic-me that comes across

from this paper is one that connects with issues that were raised in his discus-sions of Party structure, élite formation and innovationai pcrsonality. It is íhetheme of the decline of political activism on the basis of commitment to val-úes, and of its gradual subordination to technical and managerial questions ofperformativity. It seems that for Bauman the oíd political élites were at leastmotivated by an attempt to make a world fít for humans and free from injusticeand poverty, whereas the technicians and managers are more concerned to es-tablish the world as a rational system that opérales according purely to its ownsystemic demands. Whatever their failings, the oíd political élites were at leasttrying to express a faith in human activism, whereas the technicians and man-agers uphold nothing more than a thoroughly mechanistic 'image of man'.

• (1967): "Polish Youth and Politics". Polish Round Table, 1:69-77.

In this paper Bauman takes up themes from his other pieces on youth and usesthem to try to develop an understanding of the political horizons and engage-ment of the young. The paper seems to be looking in two ways, but asking asimilar question: Why is youth taken as a social group refusing to engage inthe kinds of political action stressed by the opposition to actually existing so-cialism whilst, indeed, also failing to engage actively with the system? Or tobe blunt: why is youth disappointing everyone? The paper begins with a soci-ological definition of youth. Typically Bauman develops a definition which re-lates this particular group to the wider social structure. Youth is defined as "aphase during which individuáis are being allocated into the mesh of the al-ready existing social web", w'here "the cultural institutions which conditionthe life and behaviour of youth are aimed predominantly, if not entirely, atadaptation of the individuáis for the sake of stabilizing the system" (p. 69). Bythis definition then, youth can be defined as a life cycle stage in which social-ización is handed over, from the family and to social institutions. However,there is a tensión between the 'already existing social web' and the 'life andbehaviour' that young people bring to them. In a somewhat Simmelian vein,Bauman contends that this tensión is an inevitable consequence of the socialsituation that "the youth, however, are being brought up in somewhat differentconditions than the older generations. Their personalities are being formed un-der the impact of new and unprecedented experiences. That is why their gen-eral orientations, images of success in life and role experíences differ in manyimportant points from what is generally accepted among the appropriate partsof the adult population" (p. 70). As such, to the extent that youth is a group in

65

a society that is changing (andgiven that Bauman's sociology always assumessocial change). liien it is also a group that will, first, experience institutionsand established reiationships as constraining and. second. always stand to beattacked by more established social groups because of their refusal simply toaccept their allocation to the pre-existing 'social web'. In a society that is ex-periencing rapid social change, youth will always be radical in that, for socialstructural reasons, they will not be able readily and easily to accept the estab-lished world that surrounds them. The question that interests Bauman isv/hether or not that radicalism leads to political action. He argües that the an-swer to that question hinges upon three factors: first, whether there are chan-nels of political action that are "sufficiently broad, dispersed and differentiatedto be approachable to most of those who wish to"; second, the extent to whichpolitical activity is identified as providing "ampie opportunities of relativelyrapid and far-reaching promotion in culturally important and prestige-bestow-ing hierarchies and/or in increasing access to the highly valued social goods'";third, whether a given group of youth considers that it has been denied a socialstatus or cultural goods to which it was entitled, and to which it believes that"modifying the socio-political system as wel] as the distribution of prestigeand other important goods" is the only way of remedying this invidious situa-tion (p. 72). Bauman proposes that these three conditions are met only veryrarely, not least because youth as a group ínvariably has more local concenison its mind: "Let us remember that, in 'normal' times and conditions, youth,culturally forced to be preoccupied with intricate tasks of role-selection androle-adaptation, can pay only little if any attention to he problems not directlyrelevant to these tasks" (p. 72). Consequently, youth are eitherpolitically inac-tive or inclined to reduce political questions to the level of personal instru-mentality, where instrumentality is defined by the extent to which an actionwill assist in securing a desired social role. In that latter way, the meaning ofpolitics is both broadened and made shallow. Politics is reduced to personaltroubles. According to Bauman, and here it is impossibie not to detect a hint ofnostalgia given his own biography, there has only been one period ín Polishhistory when youth engaged in political action for non-instrumental reasons:"This took place immediately after the war ... Threatened in the very basis ofits existence by the Germán occupation, cut off from literally all life opportu-nities, frustrated in all its normative and comparative life expectancies, thePolish youth grown up during the war or immediately before it could achieveits life goals ... by no means but poh'tical struggle" (p. 73). But the problemwas that he passions that were unleashed by the Communist dream of the ac-tive reconstitution of Poland were quickly (and necessarily) institutionalised

66

and thereby taken awthe far-reaching, boldty succeeded. howeviand in supplying it wternal tensions" (p. 74other essays on the sethere is a social strucstand over and againslogical reflection of thman was committed, aand political activism'talgia, and concluded Iical activism. Either ited. With the structuranowadays Job and fam:of view of politics, misphere. The question tricalism is therefore to inot previously suspectíbe that youth might nohave stopped being rad

• (1967): "In Mem«Yearbook, 1:203-2'

Julián Hochfeld died into return to the Univeríteacher. Bauman make¡bodied, and which it is jgy is "to make the humacording to Bauman, Hocfore us all', between coiing principies of our owor passive acceptance cchoice is put in those terto humanity and associalman thought" (p. 204). IWorld War he was invo¡

ciology always assumesexperience institutions

>ind, always stand to be1" their refusal simply to. In a society that is ex-adical in that, for socialsily to accept the estab-.it interests Bauman is. He argües that the an-whether there are chan-ersed and differentiated>nd, the extent to whichDortunities of relativelynt and prestige-bestow-' valued social goods'";las been denied a socialo which it believes thatdistribution of prestigeng this invidious situa-ions are met only veryas more local concernsand conditions, youth,s of role-selection ande problems not directly: either politically inac-vel of personal instru-ent to which an action¿r way, the meaning ofis reduced to personale not to detect a hint ofn one period in Polishi-instrumental reasons:led in the very basis ofterally all life opportu-life expectancies, the

jefore it could achieve. 73). But the problemlunist dream of the ac-•arily) institutionalised

and thereby taken away from youth: "Radicalism of the socialist government.the far-reaching, bold, even audacious political program of the communist par-ty succeeded, however gradually, in channell ing the radicalism of the youthand in supplying it with reliable patterns of behavioural expression for its in-ternal tensions" (p. 74). Here, Bauman is returning to the theme ofsome of hisother essays on the social structure of actually existing socialism in Poland:there is a social structuration of activism in which those structures come tostand over and against the chance of action in the future. This is also a socio-logical reflectión of the central point of the Marxist revisionism to which Bau-man was committed, and which he helped develop in Poland. So what of youthand political activism? Bauman managed to steer away from the trap of nos-talgia, and concluded that it is possible to identify two altitudes towards polit-ical activism. Either it is pursued for personal instiumental ends or it is avoid-ed. With the structuration of Poland "most of the young Polish people arenowadays job and family-oriented" (p. 75). Or put another way, from the pointof view of politics, most of them are now concerned only with the personalsphere. The question that is left dangling is whether this means that youth rad-icalism is therefore to be found elsewhere, in places and actions where it wasnot previously suspected. Bauman's implicit but hopeful conclusión seems tobe that youth might not be political, but it does not therefore follow that theyhave stopped being radical.

• (1967): "In Memory of Julián Hochfeld". Polish Round TableYearbook, 1:203-204.

Julián Hochfeld died in 1966, shortly after leaving UNESCO in París in orderto return to the University of Warsaw. This is Bauman's obituary for his oídteacher. Bauman makes it clear that one of the qualities that Hochfeld em-bodied, and which it is possible to learn from him, is that the stake of sociolo-gy is "to make the human world more suitable for human beings" (p. 204). Ac-cording to Bauman, Hochfeld put into clear sight the 'basic choice that lies be-fore us all', between commitment, self-knowledge and clarity about the guid-ing principies of our own work so that the world might be made more human,or passive acceptance of the demands of management and power. Once thechoice is put in those terms, the decisión is clear; we must choose commitmentto humanity and associate ourselves with "the great-humanistic tradition of hu-man thought" (p. 204). Hochfeld was born in August 1911. Before the SecondWorld War he was involved in socialist organizations, and during the war he

67

tbught with the Second Corps of the Polish Army. He returned to Poland in1945 and immediatcly in volved himself once again in politics, as a member ofthe Polish Sociaiist Party. He was eiected on a number of occasions to con-stituent assemblies. His intellectual work was carried out at the University ofWarsaw, and in 1951 he was the first director of the Department of HistoricalMaterialism. That is where Bauman arrived in 1953. (Hochfeld's biographicaldetails can be found in Adamek 1984). Bauman understood Hochfeld's intel-lectual work as being informed by three methodological principies. First, po-litical phenomena ought to be treated as elements of a social structure; second,such phenomena ought to be analyzed in terms of their connection to other as-pects of the social structure; third, attention ought to be paid to the influence ofthose other aspects of the phenomenon in question (p. 203). Hochfeld himselfapplied these principies to a study of the British Labour movement (Hochfeld1957; the British Labour Party was, of course, one of Bauman's early concernstoo), and it is not unreasonable to identify these methodological principies asunderpinning Bauman's work on Polish society in the 1960s. As Bauman hascommented, little of Hochfeld's work has been translated into English (Bau-man & Tester 2001:22). But some traces can be found. Hochfeld wrote a briefyet excellent obituary to C. Wright Mills in which he demonstrated sympathyfor Mills's ethic: "He ... places on the scholar the responsibility of being on theside of the weak, the oppressed, the exploited, as against the power élite"(Hochfeld 1962:5). Meanwhile, in a posthumously published paper on 'TheConcept of Class Interest' Hochfeld attempted to rescue the concept from ab-straction or ideology and, instead, reconfigured it as a theoretical category thatmight be empirically operable (Hochfeld 1967). However, if this might makeit seem that Hochfeld was a rather textually-tied Marxist, it is clear from an-other paper that, for hirn, Marxism was worth this much attention precisely be-cause it opened up the possibility of the human making of the human world.Hochfeld might well have been a very committed Marxist, but it does notthereby follow that he accepted the orthodoxies of state Marxism. This pointcomes across very clearly towards the end of a paper on Two Models of theHumanization of Labour' (Hochfeld 1961). Hochfeld explores the argumentthat aspects of Marxism might no longer be relevant for twentieth century in-dustrial society, and he suggests that those who accept that argument out ofhand and who condemn Marxism as utopianism are immensely narrowminded. He rehearses his condemnation of these people in terms that one canalmost expect to fmd in Bauman: "Perhaps success is in store only for thosewho have mastered the techniques of adapting themselves and others to thegrowing demands for rational action and who have left the shaping of condi-

68

tions to which people ntechnical progress or teverything that exceed:goes beyond 'the kingThe contempt lies in this opposing it with the cknowledge of factors cof great social structureof searching for attainnlives and generales maithose lacking the nece¡sceptics who have accgrammes for the humaiand going beyond puréand the managed" (Honever give up being critthe 'what is' from the fBauman's sociological

• (1967): "Image ofological Remarks)

This paper is vitally imsociological work. Loopart of the 1960s, Zdzisindividual appears to beexperience that is inevitresembles Marx's theoíness; with its emphaí(Walaszek 1977:346)..!doing, indeed shows th;and creative in the woiwork is predicated upoitellectual image of inveour" (p. 12). Behind allthe world from which -aBauman's cognitive a ¡work based? Bauman i<

returned to Poland inolitics, as a member ofr of occasions to con-ul at the University of•partment of Historicalochfeld's biographical•tood Hochfeld's intel-il principies. First, po->cial structure; second,:onnection to other as-laid to the influence of03). Hochfeld himselfmovement (Hochfeld

uman's early concernslological principies as960s. As Bauman hased into English (Bau-iochfeld wrote a brief•monstrated sympathydbility of being on thetinst the power élite"ilished paper on Thethe concept from ab-

ioretical category thater, if this might make;t, it is clear from an-ittention precisely be-of the human world.

rxist, but it does notMarxism. This point

i 'Two Models of thexplores the argumenttwentieth century in-that argument out of: immensely narrowin terms that one cani store only far those/es and others to thehe shaping of condi-

tions to which people must adapt themselves either to the impersonal course oftechnical progress or to those currently exercising social auíhority. Perhapseverything that exceeds ihe limits of improving man's 'animal existence" andgoes beyond 'the kingdom of necessity' is an illusion" (Hochfeld 1961:15).The contempt lies in the two uses of the word 'perhaps', and clearly Hochfeldis opposing it with the counter claim, 'perhaps not'. After all, "our fairly vagueknowledge of factors capable of modifying current trends in the developmentof great social structures does not permit us to deny co'mpletely the possibilityof searching for attainments the lack of which weighs heavily on many humanlives and generales many phenomena of anomie". Hochfeld continued: "Onlythose lacking the necessary amount of scepticism will hasten to applaud thesceptics who have acclaimed too promptly as illusory and utopian all pro-grammes for the humanizatioñ of labour exceeding man's 'animal existence'and going beyond puré manipulation in the relations between the managersand the managed" (Hochfeld 1967:15). In other words, Hochfeld is saying:never give up being critícal, never give up hoping, and never give up opposingthe 'what is' from the point of view of the 'what might become'. This is alsoBauman's sociological spirit.

• (1967): "Image of Man in the Modern Sociology (Some Method-ological Remarks)". The Polish Sociological Bulletin, 1:12-21.

This paper is vitally important to understanding the foundations of Bauman'ssociological work. Looking back on some of Bauman's work from the earlypart of the 1960s, Zdzislawa Walaszek wrote of Bauman that "his image of anindividual appears to be a fiction, an identity existing independently of humanexperience that is inevitably structured by role expectations. His epistemologyresembles Marx's theory that the world is objectified in practical conscious-ness; with its emphasis on man's obligation to make his own world"(Walaszek 1977:346). .In this paper Bauman explores the 'fiction' and, in sodoing, indeed shows that he is committed to a view of human being as activeand creative in the world. In this paper Bauman argües that all sociologicalwork is predicated upon what he called a 'cognitive a príori' which is "an in-tellectual image of investigated world which is prior to any research endeav-our" (p. 12). Behind all sociological work then, there is an assumption aboutthe world from which all understanding is deduced. What then was ZygmuntBauman's cognitive a príoril Upon what assumptions was his sociologicalwork based? Bauman identified in contemporary sociology two different im-

69

ages of man, which push in quite contrary directions. The mechanistic imageeither seeks to genérate probabilistic knowledge through the analysis of howhuman behaviour responds to external stimuli, or to develop a systemicknowledge that identifies the foundations of societal equilibrium so that dis-turbances to that condition might be specified and managed all the more effi-ciently. Whereas this mechanistic image identifies human action as a responseto external stimuli, Bauman advocated instead an 'activistic' image in which itis presumed that "human acts are not only 'reactions', but also 'procreations'.If we remove i rom the human act all what is possibly determined by the valuéof 'input' variables still something will be left". Bauman identifíed this residueas that which "distinguishes any human being from any machine and is re-sponsible for the fact that the human behaviour is only partly predictable" (p.14). Consequently, whenever action is predictable, as it is when it is routinisedand managed, some damage musí nave been done to what it is that makes hu-man being different from anything else in the world. From this it is no surprisewhen Bauman's cognitive a priori emerges as identification with "the lessmanagerial, even anti-managerial, more traditional, humanistic variation ofsociology", and as one that "aims at making the human behaviour less pre-dictable by activating inner, motivational sources of decisión - supplying thehuman beings with ampler knowledge of their situation and so enlarging thesphere of their freedom of choice" (p. 15). For Bauman then, to be human is tobe unpredictable, and in unpredictability lies freedom. His sociological workwas - and largely remains - organised around this deeply ironic cognitive apriori that quite obviously embraces ambiguity (or, as Bauman was later tohave it, ambivalence) over and above the clear-cut. However Bauman's adop-ción of this cognitive a priori cannot be justified in any non-circular fashion.Perhaps this is what Walaszek was thinking of when she called it a 'fiction'. AsBauman said of any and every cognitive a priori: "The pre-empirical image ofman is not so much a regrettable 'bias' as indispensable pre-condition of anyresearch. One cannot do without it" (p. 13). The image of man that is pre-sumed in any sociological work is not the voice with which that work speaks;more strongly it is the very ability of that work to speak. Bauman tried to argüethat there are in fact criteria upon which the a priori image of man might bejustified as something more than a fiction. First, the images of man that arepresumed by the sociological work "may be more or less empirically relevant,that means they can serve better or worse their basic function of orderíng andexplaining available research data and inspiring cognitively fruitful ques-tions". Second, Bauman identified a criterion of particularity. He suggestedthat the validity of a cognitive a priori could be judged to the extent that it

70

transcends the particu.cultural, class, nationalof man that are availabless approvable ethicaltradict given moral ideeall three of these justifiing. The first justifica!realm of research databut that would lead toduced from facts (in whsophical gloss that ougSecond, the argument tuniversality presupposeclass, nation, ethnicity care themselves theoreticextent that they are pre-;ciple of justification byvices in the study of magramme, and this prognthe very moment the irrby ethical approval failsare themselves deducedage of man, that they pdifficulty multiplies wh<contradict given moral iidentification of such aman's first defence (emporí relevance of the emp;orí necessarily refutes,activistic image of manthat it would, and that c,But Bauman's immediatifore his work is unscienclear about his ultímate Aity. In 1967, Bauman ideare those, like himself, wtry to select carefully, tathere are "those who discurated with 'philosophic

ic mechanistic imagei the analysis oí howdevelop a systemiclilibrium so that dis-:ed all the more effi-; action as a responsetic' image in which itt also 'procreations'..-•nnined by the valuédcntified this residue

machine and is re-anly predictable" (p.\vhen it is routinisedi u is that makes hu-; this it is no surpriseanón with "the less•.lanistic variation ofbehaviour less pre-

sión - supplying theand so enlarging theen. to be human is tois sociological work.y ironic cognitive a3auman was later tover Bauman's adop-lon-circular fashion.¿lledit a 'fiction'. As;-empirical image ofnre-condition of anyoí man that is pre-

.h that work speaks;auman tried to argüe_se of man might be^e> of man that areMüpirically relevant,3oa of ordering andively fraitful ques-.sr.ty. He suggested:c the extent that it

transcends the particular interests of "human groups discriminated by theircultural, class, national and similar peculiarities". Third, the competing imagesof man that are available to socioiogy and sociológica! work "may be more orless approvable ethically, that means they can sponsor and coiroborate or con-tradict given moral ideology the scholar or his public subscribe to" (p. 13). Bulall three of these justifications fail because they are based on circular reason-ing. The first justification fails because it presumes that there is an externalrealm of research data that is ontologically independent of the image of man,but that would lead to the conclusión that the cognitive a priori is either in-duced from facts (in which case it is not an a priori at all) or an optional philo-sophical gloss that ought to be subjected to the strictures of Occam's Razor.Second, the argument that an image of man can be justified on account of itsuniversality presupposes the identification of criteria of particularity (such asclass, nation, ethnicity or, although Bauman did not mention this, gender) thatare themselves theoretically dependent and only empirically identifiable to theextent that they are pre-identified as relevant. Bauman himself denied the prin-cipie of justification by universality when he wrote that "methodological de-vices in the study of man are coined to match and fit a particular research pro-gramme, and this programme is determined in all its significant dimensions atthe very moment the image of man is ... chosen" (p. 20). Third, justificationby ethical approval fails because the criteria of ethical approval or disapprovalare themselves deduced from the same cognitive a priori, from the same im-age of man, that they purportedly judge. This too is circular reasoning. Thisdifficulty multiplies when Bauman says that the a priori may "corrobórate orcontradict given moral ideology the scholar or his public subscribe to". Theidentification of such a 'moral ideology' is itself either circular, or like Bau-man's first defence (empirical relevance), it fails because it presumes the a pri-ori relevance of the empirical sphere that the conception of the cognitive a pri-ori necessarily refutes. Bauman's sociological imagination focuses upon anactivistic image of man because, in the last instance, Bauman made a choteethat it would, and that choice was itself immune to sociological justification.But Bauman's immediate rejoinder to any attack from the direction that there-fore his work is unscientific would be that, unlike the attacker, at least he isclear about his ultimate valúes, at least he is clear about the status of his activ-ity. In 1967, Bauman identified two different kinds of sociologists. First thereare those, like himself, who "are aware of their theoretical assumptions and sotry to select carefully, taking into account all their implications", and secondthere are "those who disdain stubbornly or disbelieve that what they do is sat-urated with 'philosophical' notions and so are helpless and disarmecl while

71

facing the real choice" (p. 21). It is precisely because of the depth of Bauman'sself-awareness of the foundations of his sociological work l!iat it is so im-mensely powerfu!.

• (1967): "Modern Times, Modern Marxism". Social Research, 34(3):399-415. Also published as: (1969): "Modern Times, ModernMarxism", in Berger, Peter L. (ed.): Marxism and Sociology: Viewsfrom Eastern Europe. New York: Appleton Century Crofts.

Bauman's work in the 1950s and 1960s occupied a very specific social struc-tural position. It was an analysis of the institutional forms and implications ofactually existing socialism in Poland, even as those institutions claimed a mo-nopoly of the possession of the truth and, thereby, sought to exempt them-selves from any kind of social enquiry. But thinkers such as Bauman, whosought to relate institutions to social structure, and who saw claims to truth asproducís of social, cultural and political relationships could not but come tosee ihe large-scale organizations of actually existing socialism itself as objectsof legitimate analytical scrutiny. And, if they so sought neither could they re-tain a commitment to Marxism without developing a brand of Marxism whichwas radically divergent from that of the Party. In the historical circumstancesof Poland in the 1950s, the result was the emergence of a Marxist revisionismor humanism, of which Bauman was one of the most prominent exponents. Itsought to emphasise the role of action rather than necessity in the constitutionof the world and, therefore, it inevitably meant that existing structures, institu-tions and árrangements were analyzed as restrictions on action. Furthermore,in so far as action was identified with the human making of the world in whichhumans would uve, so it also became the case that action was itself understoodas an expression of human ethical responsibility. Everything which hinderedthat action, everything which said that history was made by some agencyother than free humans, consequently became an offence to human dignity.This article is an expression of Bauman's interpretation of Marxism, It waseriginally published in English in 1967, and reprinted in a book of Eastern Eu-ropean Marxist revisionist writings which was edited by Peter Berger in 1969.The two versions of the paper are identical. All page references in this discus-sion are from the copy in the Berger collection. Like a lot of Bauman's otherwork from this period, this paper is looking in two directions. On the surface itis an outline of the case for Marxism as a form of analyzing social life that isuniquely able to avoid the reduction of the human person to 'economic man',

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'social man' or any otreality, from which allas such. pursuing ihe jenvironment" (p. 1). IMarxism lo economicpaper is also a critiquePoland. To this extent,man's Tiction' of the acoperationalise it as a piargumenl for Marxismcial phenomena to the ¡why it is that the kind cman action and praxis -swer is that positivislicny because, wilh its err.potheses to the type imcognitive and practicadominates contemporaiintegration our epoch i,man the main concern c"units, e.g., the humantheir positions in the othese organizations ch<highest probability of a>gesture towards the m<concerns of large-scalebecomes increasingly cganizations, so there wiand therefore humans •managerial interests asthe point of view of movereóme): "Organizadmultiplicity of opportuímogeneous universum.alistic', relatively stablepragmatics are looked icommunication channewith these organization,inance in intellectual v.

" the depth of Bauman's\\ork that it is so im-

Social Research, 34íern Times, Modern.ind Sociology: Viewsentury Crofts.

-\c social struc-ms and implications ofatutions claimed a mo-meht to exempt them-such as Bauman, whoi <a\ claims to truth ascould not but come to;ialism itself as objects: neither could they re--and of Marxism which¡Ñiorical circumstances' a Marxist revisionismrominent exponents. It-ÑIÍY in the constitutionuna structures, institu-n action. Furthermore,; of the world in whichi was itself understoodvtning which hinderednade bv some agencyace to human dignity.>i of Marxism. It wasa book of Eastern Eu-Peter Berger in 1969.

:erences in this discus-¡cc of Bauman's otherneos. On the surface it—-g social life that is>-co "economic man',

'social man' or any other abstraction and instead captures "the only genuinereaiity, from which all of these models depart and to which they refer ... manas such, pursuing the process of l iv ing through and by his social and culturalenyironment" (p. 1). In this way Bauman explicitly rejects the reduction ofMarxism to economic determinism (p. 2). But scratch slightly deeper and thepaper is also a critique of the dominance of managerialism in contemporaryPoland. To this extent, the paper can be understood as an attempt to put Bau-man's 'fiction' of the activistic image of man onto a firmer Marxist footing andoperationalise it as a principie of the critique of the social structure. Bauman'sargument for Marxism begins with his characteristic manoeuvre of relating so-cial phenomena to the social structure In this instance he begins by ponderingwhy it is that the kind of Marxism that he embraces - the kind that stresses hu-man action and praxis - is so often condemned as being 'unscientific'. His an-swer is that positivistic knowledge has come to occupy a position of hegemo-ny because, with its emphasis on "qualification, atomization, limitation of hy-potheses to the type immediately and experimentally verifiable" it reflects thecognitive and practical modes of the managerialism and organization thatdominates contemporary social structure: "In terms of institutions of societalintegration our epoch is one of large-scale organizations". According to Bau-man the main concern of these organizations is with the manageability of their"units, e.g., the human beings who perform the roles ascribed to them due totheir positions in the organizational structure. The main instrumental valúesthese organizations cherish are the set of manageable stimuli assuring thehighest probability of achieving the expected response" (p. 3). There is a cleargesture towards the mechanistic image of man in that understanding of theconcerns of large-scale organizations. Bauman argües that as social structurebecomes increasingly characterised by - and dependen! upon - large-scale or-ganizations, so mere will be an increasing emphasis on instrumental questions,and therefore humans will be seen as units to be manipulated according tomanagerial iníerests as opposed to independen! agents of action (indeed, fromthe point of view of management, independen! activism is a problem to beovereóme): "Organization itself is an attempt at limitation of the unboundedmultiplicity of opportunities; an attempt at structuration of an amorphic, ho-mogeneous universum. Organization is concerned with what is restricted, 're-alistic', relatively stable. Factors which fall outside this domain of interest andpragmatics are looked upon at best as being like the unmanageable 'noise' incommunication channels" (p. 4). Positivistic science is entirely compatiblewith these organizational concerns and, thereby, it achieves a position of dom-inance in intellectual work precisely because of its access to research grants

73

and power. Positivism gives the mangers of organization (thal is to say. tiiemanagers of human action), the kind of knowledge about s t imul i that they de-sire, but in so doing 'man as such' is completely atomised into different socialroles. Moreover, thanks to the media and cultural production in organised so-cial structures, it is possible to identify "an unmistakable tendency toward put-ling personal problems into managerial terms. How to adapt myself to theharsh demands of life? How to become a person such as people like me to be?How to adjust my dreams and cravings to the environment I can neitherchange not even influence? These and the like are the dominant themes of thepopular ideology, this diluted concoction of the managerial world-outlook, itsinverse, parodistic bránd" (p. 6). Marxism is the chance of the emancipation of'man as such' from the banal hell of managerialism. Whereas managerialismarticúlales only the institutional and organizational dimensions of social struc-ture, "still, though the individual is stunned and silenced, there exists another'functional prerequisite' of man in his anthropological frame of reference, pri-or to any kind of social demand, which views the society itself as a better orworse means to adjust the natural and cultural environment to human needs"(p. 6). Consequently, this 'anthropological frame of reference' (which is 'priorto any kind of social demand', just like Bauman's later postmodern ethics), isfundamentally critical. Marxism itself becomes critical theory in so far as it isa recovery of the insight that human action is concerned with humans living inand through the natural environment, and in so far as it challenges dominantlarge-scale institutions from the point of view of the understanding that theytoo can become 'like nature' (in Lukacsian terms, a 'second nature') and aretherefore incompatible with human anthropology. For Bauman, Marxism is "akind of knowledge which shows how to 'manipúlate the human environmentby enlarging the scope of information in human minds', instead of how to 'ma-nipúlate human behaviour by modifying the pattern of external situationalpressures'. Now, this kind of knowledge makes human behaviour less, notmore predictable. It functions in a manner exactly opposite to the knowledgecreated to suit the managerial world" (p. 7). From this it follows that whereMarxism is connected with managerial concerns it is an offence to both theMarxian tradition and human being. Modem Marxism is that which emanci-pates the possibility of human action making modern times, even though thataction will be condemned by the managers of large-scale institutions and re-quire that men and women start seeing themselves as activisitc agents in theworld rather than just self-instrumentalists.

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• (1968): "Marx aScience Informe

This is a fairly techn;tance of Marxism feachieve that end it isculture. One of the inEnglish at least) thatsaid that what he tooJtured and structuring,turing that attracted his noticeable that Bautic image of man; whanalysis of the practicarguing that thereforeBauman begins hisWilliams's Keywordsthe word 'culture' anca production of the rr'natural' humans). Osomething into which.terpretation of culturesible to distinguish being for the perfectionthis context, culture \. 20). The standards

worth, are taken by Bhigher classes becomtman points out that w!some currency in Eurform in socialist socieireplaced with a value-Europe and that part cEurope" (p. 22). Althcnally resulted in the ithose others, Baumanteenth century as a moof a recognition of a n<different cultures canr

ni (that is to say. thei s t imuli that they de-d into diff erent socialjtion in organised so-lendency toward put-adapt myself to the

people like me to be?mment I can neither•minant themes of theial world-outlook, its'f the emancipation oficreas managerialismisions of social struc-1, there exists anotherame of reference, pri-y itself as a better orlent to human needs"ence' (which is 'prior>ostmodern ethics), isneory in so far as it isvvith humans living inchallenges dominantderstanding that they:ond nature') and areiuman, Marxism is "a• human environmentastead of how to 'ma-f external situational\r less, not>ite to the knowledgeit follows that where•i offence to both thes that which emanci-nes, even though thate institutions and re-;tivisitc agents in the

• (1968): "Marx and the Contemporary Theory of Culture". SocialScience Information, 1 (3): 19-33.

This is a fairly technical paper in which Bauman seeks to establish the impor-tance of Marxism for an analysis of contemporary culture. Bul in order toachieve that end it is first of all necessary to develop a working definition ofculture. One of the interesting aspects of this paper is that it is the first time (inEnglish at least) that Bauman talks about Claude Lévi-Strauss. Bauman hassaid that what he took from Lévi-Strauss was the thesis that social life is struc-tured and structuring, and that it was the analysis of the processes of that struc-turing that attracted him to structuralist theorizing (Bauman 1992a:211). But itis noticeable that Bauman reads Lévi-Strauss through the prism of his activis-tic image of man; what is important is the way that Lévi-Strauss opens up ananalysis of the practice of structuring without, however, falling into the trap ofarguing that therefore human life is always and necessarily already structured.Bauman begins his argument in a way that almost pre-empts RaymondWilliams's Keywords project. He provides an archaeology of the meanings ofthe word 'culture' and points to its roots in the Greek conception of culture asa production of the manipulation of natural resources (resources íhat include'natural' humans). Culture is not something that humans have, rather it issomething into which, and by which, they grow. According to Bauman, this in-terpretation of culture contains within a hierarchy according to which it is pos-sible to distinguish between the more and the less cultured: "The active striv-ing for the perfection of the human being presupposes a 'breeding ideal'. Inthis context, culture very clearly becomes a partisan or evaluative category"(p. 20). The standards of the ideal, and therefore of the evaluations of culturalworth, are taken by Bauman to be traditionally linked to class, such that thehigher classes become the epitome of culture and cultivation. However, Bau-man points out that while this evaluative definition of culture might still havesome currency in Europe (and he argües that it is maintained in a modifiedform in socialíst societies; p. 21), it has been subjected to critique and has beenreplaced with a value-free definition which "grew out of an encounter betweenEurope and that part of the world which developed in relative isolation fromEurope" (p. 22). Although the European encounter with other cultures origi-nally resulted in the imposition by Europeans of the label 'primitive' uponthose others, Bauman points to the work of Gustav Klemm in the mid nine-teenth century as a moment when the export of hierarchy collapsed in the faceof a recognition of a non-evaluative difference. Klemm released the thesis thatdifferent cultures cannot be judged as being 'better' or 'worse' according to

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some universally applicable measure but, rather. they are merely different ex-pressions of the universal propensity of humans to have culture. Bauman fol-lows the irnplications of this thesis up to the 1960s, and he points out that it ledlo the conclusión that if all cultures are merely different, then non-Europeancultures cannot possibly be spoken of according to European standards. Theresult was a situation in which the theoretical position "may be and is beingused by those who would like to relieve their own and other people's con-sciences by stating that the miserable living standard of the 'primitive'peoples, when compared with European standards, is outweighed by other val-úes which are rated higher by these peoples than a full stomach and comfort-able lodgings". Bauman's scorn and contempt for this kind of claim is madeeven clearer when he goes on to contend that "by a peculiar coincidence, theidea of 'equity' and alternativeness of cultures reached the peak of its popular-ity precisely at that time when the vast majority of the 'primitive' peoples ac-cepted their European-iike pattern of life, and ceased to be satisfied with theirpoverty, which followed the final destruction of their traditional social struc-tures by the world market" (p. 25). In other words, the others are said by theEuropeans to be different all the time they do not answer back, and as mis-guided as soon as they do mobilise for themselves. Lévi-Strauss is introducedby Bauman as a means of overcoming the problems that are created by the as-sertíon that cultures are irreducibly different and that this difference must beaccepted to such an extent that critique founders in the face of celebration. Theimportance of Lévi-Strauss resides in the fact that he accepted the differencesbetween cultures but nevertheless related them to universal human qualities.Lévi-Strauss refused to be seduced by surface appearances and, instead,looked for the 'ultímate fact' of human life, a fact that he found ín the struc-tures of human thinking. Lévi-Strauss overcomes the fragmentation of cultureby identifying them all as structures of signs that are linked to the "intellectualstructures which reproduce or project the alternatives of human existence".However, Bauman says, Lévi-Strauss takes the wrong turn in relating cultureto structures of thought; what is needed instead is an approach that follows thelead of Marx. Marx saw the 'ultímate fact' of human existence, the 'fact' that

-unifies despite surface differences, in "the existing human being, the activehuman being who creates and consumes goods and is actively engaged in or-ganizing the world" (p. 28). Bauman discusses the principies of a Marxist ap-proach to culture, and he says that "the most striking feature in the Marxian in-terpretation of cultural phenomena is the continual transformation of both the'natural' and 'social' world, the process of constant mutual readjustment be-tween man and he world he lives in. The centre of gravity in Marxian doctrine

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is in the category oassumed by scme iculture becomes tiaround them. And yas a kind of structurfectuated through thmade more predictaThis cultural organi;community becometem and by ascribiifunction" (p. 30). Nthat, as a structure, ccial environment intraces of Bauman'sMarxism has provenmensions of social lideal with the culturaidentified merely as,come to stand over"modern society is aand social structure.pear to him as externciology of culture is:manity.

• (1968): "SemiotiInformation, 7 (í.

This is another ratheworking towards a thesources to see what hLévi-Strauss, this onebeit without any refeiWest. The paper is wthan is usually the agraphs to try fo illustnone way in which thisdiscussion because he

merely different ex-•ulture. Bauman fol-points out that it led

. then non-Europeanpean standards. Thenay be and is beingother people's con-

1 of the 'primitive'eighed by other val-omach and comfort-nd of claim is madeliar coincidence, the• peak of its popular-rimitive' peoples ac-e satisfied with theirditional social struc-thers are said by theír back, and as mis-Strauss is introducedje created by the as-s difference must bee of celebration. Theípted the differencessal human qualities.•anees and, instead,2 found in the struc-mentation of cultured to the "intellectualf human existence".en in relating cultureoach that follows theitence, the 'fact' thatan being, the activeively engaged in or-óles of a Marxist ap-re in the Marxian in-ormation of both the -aal readjustment be-in Marxian doctrine

is in the category of 'praxis' and not in 'economic determinism', as is falselyassumed by some interpreters of this theory" (p. 29). By this approach then,culture becomes the process through which humans transform the worldaround them. And yet culture is also a slructure: "Culture can be conceived ofas a kind of structurization, or arrangement, of the social environment. It is ef-fectuated through the process of historical praxis by which the environment ismade more predictable and, henee, more easily manipulated by man" (p. 30).This cultural organization takes place through and in terms of signs: "Ahumancommunity becomes a cultural community by employing a specific sign sys-tem and by ascribing to each sign a definite, universally accepted, controlfunction" (p. 30). Needless to say however, this activity creates the problemthat, as a structure, culture comes to restrict the human manipulador, of the so-cial environment in the future (once again then, it is possible to identify thetraces of Bauman's activistic image of man). Bauman's conclusión is thatMarxism has proven itself to be exceptionally able to analyze the material di-mensions of social life, but that it is also necessary for Marxism to be able todeal with the cultural dimensión. If Marxism does not do this, and if culture isidentifíed merely as a set of signs that was structured once but which has nowcome to stand over and above human praxis, then the result is clear to see"modern society is characterized by a succession o maladjustments in cultureand social structure. The constraints to which a human being is subjected ap-pear to him as external and unavoidable" (p. 32). The stake of the Marxist so-ciology of culture is nothing less than the return of the world to activistic hu-manity.

• (1968): "Semiotics and the Function of Culture". Social ScienceInformation, 1 (5):69-80.

This is another rather technical piece of work in which Bauman is clearlyworking towards a theory of culture, and drawing on the currently available re-sources to see what help they provide. Whereas the previous paper drew onLévi-Strauss, this one includes a*technical application of semiotic theory, al-beit without any reference to the semioticians who became influential in theWest. The paper is written in a much more consciously theoretical languagethan is usually the case with Bauman, and he even develops formulae andgraphs to try to illustrate his argument about semiotics and culture. But there isone way in which this paper is very typical Bauman; he engages in a technicaldiscussion because he wants to see whether this material will cast light on so-

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cial lii'e, nol for reasons of grand theorization. According to Bauman, culturecan be defined as 'the specifically human fonn' of the processes by which theenvironment is ordered and made orderly. To this extent, culture consists in:firsl, 'assimilatory structuralization directed towards the external environmentof human individuáis': and second, 'the accommodative structure of the hu-man organism'. In the ilrst case - assimilation - the concern is to order the ex-ternal environment in such a way that it fits in with the systemic needs that areimposed upon it, while in the second case - accommodation - the concern iswith the continuous restructuring of the environment so that it can meet chang-ing needs and opportunities. As Bauman put it: "The common denominator ofboth vital processes .'.. is a continuous effort to shift from a relatively moreuniform and amorphic stale to a more heterogeneous (e.g. more 'structured')state. The degree of 'structuralization' of a pattern can be measured by ascer-taining the probability of some events and the improbability of some others"(p. 70). Building on these contentions, Bauman asserts that "viewed in semi-otic perspective, the cultural function appears to consist in reducing the inde-terminacy of the human worid" (p. 71). He identifies two ways in which thisfunction is carried out: first, through structuralization which increases the pre-dictability of the human environment and; second, "by information transfer,that is, by an interpretation of the signáis from actual environmental struc-tures" (p. 71). This is where semiotics comes into the picture; it is a means ofthe interpretation of those signáis as signs. In a move that is typical of his so-ciological practice, Bauman relates the meanings of signs to social structure.In that spirit he identified two different kinds of signs. The first kind consistsin those which are "primary in relation to their position in the social structure".Here, the sign is a principie of social differentiation, but there is a problem be-cause if they become dispersed and too easily available, they lose their mean-ing and semiotic valué. An example of this problem might be the increasinglyeasy access to high-performance sports cars. Where the car as a sign was onceprimary in relation to the position of the sign possessor in the social structure(so that possession of that car was a sufficient sign of prestige), now anyonecan possess certain kinds of cars and so they lose prestige and valué. Theirmeaning becomes semiotically ambivalent. And in a dynamic social situatron,that dispersal indeed happens relatively easily. Second, there are signs "whichare secondary or derivative in relation to social position" (p. 74). Here, the ma-nipulators of this kind of sign have to créate a direct linkage between sign andsocial structure to such an extent that alternative uses of the sign are imper-missible. As an example Bauman mentions military uniforms: "Nobody canbecome an army officer just by buying an adequate uniform. Because of this

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restriction, however, ving the proper desigmsigns are tied to the octherefore they only cotime that the social suture does change, the (floats free. Bauman 1change therefore implino single meaning. TIreplaced with "a 'quizand of signs cut off frctial meaning, so that tiread that comment asmodernity. It becomesthe implications of thi¡like code', all contení)heights of mastery thedilettantism is an inev<when information hastural signs" (p. 77). TIof liquid modernity. Bevitable, then "the socpleteness of the socialson responsible for det'the individuation driv

• (1968): "MacroscPoland", in The íHague/Paris: Moi

Context makes this a r;UNESCO book whichried out in a range of cand concerns of Polishcal precept of relating"internal structure ofwhen analysed in the 1analysed in the framev

ig lo Bauman, culturei'ocesses by which thei t , culture consists in:externa! environmente structure of the hu-ern is to order the ex-/stemic needs that areilion - the concern isiiat it can meet chang-amon denominator ofom a relatively more.g. more 'structured')e measured by ascer-lility of some others"hat "viewed in semi-in reducing the inde-o ways in which thisich increases the pre-information transfer,environmental struc-ture; it is a means ofit is typical of his so-is to social structure.he fírst kind consiststhe social structure".here is a problem be-.hey lose their mean-it be the increasinglyar as a sign was oncen the social structure•estige). now anyoneige and valué. Theirimic social situation,ere are signs "whichp. 74). Here, the ma-ge between sign and' the sign are imper-brms: "Nobody can>rm. Because of this

restriction, however, we can assume with confidence that any individual bear-ing the proper designations is indeed an army officer" (p. 74). These kinds ofsigns are tied to the occupation ot'a specific position in the social structure andtherefore they only continué to nave an unambiguous cultural meaning all thetime that the social structure remains unchanged. As soon as the social struc-ture does change, the connection of the sign to role disappears, and so the signfloats free. Bauman follows through on these insights to argüe that socialchange therefore implies a 'proliferation of codes' (p. 76), in which signs haveno single meaning. The possibility of a universal code of meanings has beenreplaced with "a 'quiz like culture' composed of crumbs of inconsistent codesand of signs cut off from their proper structures and thus deprived of their ini-tial meaning, so that they can be treated one-dimensionally". It is hard not toread that comment as an anticipation of themes from discussions about post-modernity. It becomes even less avoidable when Bauman goes on to discussthe implications of this situation: "In spite of all the shortcomings of this 'quizlike code', all contemporaries in some way particípate in it, regardless of theheights of mastery they have achieved in their 'professional code'. Quiz-likedilettantism is an inevitable attribute of the proliferation of codes in an epochwhen information has been prometed to the role of the most significan! of cul-tural signs" (p. 77). There even follows an anticipation of Bauman's analysisof liquid modernity. Bauman makes the point that if dilettantism becomes in-evitable, then "the sociocreative power of signs, causing a permanent incom-pleteness of the social condition the human individual faces, makes each per-son responsible for determining his own social position". What Bauman called'the individuation drive' becomes 'exploratory' (p. 77).

• (1968): "Macrosociology and Social Research in ContemporaryPoland", in The Social Sciences: Problems and Orientations. TheHague/Paris: Mouton/Unesco.

Context makes this a rather poignant piece of work. The paper is a chapter in aUNESCO book which outlines the sociological work that was then being car-ried out in a range of countries. Bauman provided a discussion of the contextand concerns of Polish sociology. In the paper he takes up his main sociologi-cal precept of relating social phenomena to social structure. He says that the"internal structure of a particular social science is much better-understoodwhen analysed in the frame of reference of its outer 'social space' than whenanalysed in the framework of an abstract 'flow from within"' (p. 169). Given

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the time lags in publishing, there is no doubt that Bauman wrote this piece be-fore the book was published in 1968, bul the irony is that consequently thisdiscussion of Polish sociology appeared at more orless exactly the same timethat Bauman was being removed from Polish academic life. He was expelledfrom the University of Warsaw on 25 March, 1968, after the state authoritiesseized the opportunity of a wave óf student unrest to deal with revisionist in-tellectuals such as Bauman. In another terrible irony, or at least an irony giventhe concern of Bauman's work with the alienation, sense of insecurity and con-fusión that typified youth in the Poland that actually existing socialism hadmade, one of the official reasons for his expulsión from the University was'the corruption of youth'. In this paper Bauman identifies five reasons for thegrowth and specific chcracter of sociology in post-war Poland. First, he pointsout that in the post-war period Poland experienced extremely rapid industrial-ization, and that the discipline came to fulfil a definite social role: "As a so-ciety moves from the traditional to the industrial stage of its development, so-cial science is substituted for social ideology, and ethics in the role of the ref-erence pattern defining social situations as human behaviour is determinedmuch more by the external situational pressure, uncontrolled by the actor, thanby the internalized cultural motivations" (p. 170). With this first point, Bau-man is saying that in Poland sociology became important because it became away in which men and women could relate their personal troubles to the pub-lic issues (the allusion to C. Wright Mills is quite delibérate; for more on linksbetween Bauman and Mills, see Bauman & Tester 2001; Tester 2004). Second,Polish sociology also fítted in with the social engineering concerns of the newstate in that it was seen as the source of data about the kinds of macro-socialprocesses with which centralised planning was concemed. Third, Polish soci-ology was inclined quickly to become Marxist sociology because of the deeproots that Marxism had planted in Poland in the pre-war period. Bauman saidthat "the validity of the Marxist tradition was to a great extent responsible forthe stress laid upon the theoretical and macro-social part of sociological in-quiry" (p. 171). Fourth, Polish sociology was shaped by a public expectationthat the intellectual, and specifically the sociologist, be the bearer of truth irre-spective of external pressures (this is a theme which Bauman emphasised inhis Inaugural Lecture at the University of Leeds). Bauman wrote that "in thecircumstances created by the ... crisis of valúes, sociology is looked upon bythe broad public not as an occupation or even a branch of science, but as a vo-cation or mission; as the vocation of those men and women who are morallyresponsible for discovering truth and making it available to all people, for cor-recting what is considered to be wrong in current social organization, for mak-

80

ing human life easimeant that the socitrolled in her or hisplaced a trust in theis properly justifiedsociologist is sounding fully the publicveloped in its specilinked with the movishOctoberof 1956the very beginning \l of social perfecl

gate goals and meartions"(p. 172). Ifalto use Bauman's owisociology to explainsociology was invesigist tended to be idertent that sociology ceorganizations that el.edge. It was almost iisting socialism everthere is another waysociology played ouaround 1998-2005 hbooks tackling contéand identity. The acáes the possibility thatcatión was, precisely,matter - and who woliquid modernity. Bymark of Bauman's co:of a desperate recogniit is necessary to try o

.n wrote this piece be-hat consequently thisexactly the same timelite. He was expelled:r the state authoritiesal with revisionist in-it least an irony givenof insecurity and con-xisting socialism hadn the University was:s five reasons for theoland. First, he pointsmely rapid industrial-social role: "As a so-f its development, so-in the role of the ref-aviour is determinedlled by the actor, thanthis first point, Bau-t because it became a1 troubles to the pub-ate; for more on linkslester 2004). Second,; concerns of the new:inds of macro-sociald. Third, Polish soci-' because of the deepperiod. Bauman said;xtent responsible forrt of sociological in-a public expectatione bearer of truth irre-uman emphasised inan wrote that "in theiy is looked upon byscience, but as a vo-

aen who are morally.o all people, for cor-•ganization, for mak-

ing human lite easier, safer and happier" (p. 171). According to Bauman thismeant that the sociologisi in Poland was always in the public gaze and con-trolled in her or his professional life and work by public demands. The publicplaced a trust in the sociologists, and asked for "convincing proofs that its trustis properly justified and unmistakeably addressed, that the knowledge of thesociologist is sound, deserving and earning honestly its popularity and repay-ing fully the public interest invested in it" (p. 172). Fifth, Polish sociology de-veloped in its specific way because, according to Bauman, it was intimatelylinked with the movements for social reform that were crystallised in the Pol-ish October of 1956: "Due to this not accidental coincidence, sociology fromthe very beginning was looked upon by public opinión as a heretofore lackingtool of social perfection, as a kind of 'social ideology' which ought to promúl-gate goals and means for the general rebuilding of crucial societal organiza-tions" (p. 172). If all of these themes are pulled together, it becomes possibleto use Bauman's own understanding of the character and significance of Polishsociology to explain why the Polish state expelled sociologists. Quite simply,sociology was invested with such a great social significance, and the sociolo-gist tended to be identified as a personification of moral virtues, to such an ex-tent that sociology could not fail to be dangerous from the point of view of anyorganizations that claimed to be the rightful possessor and site of all knowl-edge. It was almost inevitable that the Polish state in the times of actually ex-isting socialism eventually would come to expel its critica! sociologists. Butthere is another way in which the distinctly Polish view of the importance ofsociology played out in Bauman's own biography. In the period betweenaround 1998-2005 he published a considerable number of relatively littlebooks tackling contemporary buzzwords such' as community, globalizationand identity. The account of sociology that is provided in this 1968 paper rais-es the possibility that what Bauman was trying to do with that flurry of publi-cation was, precisely, to find or constitute a public for whom sociology wouldmatter - and who would hold sociology to account - in the circumstances ofliquid modernity. By this argument, the flurry of books therefore is either amark of Bauman's commitment to the constitution of that public, or it is a signof a desperate recognition of failure: the last book disappeared into the void, soit is necessary to try once again.

81

• (1969): "The End of Polish Jewry - A Sociological Review". Bul-letin on Soviet and EastEuropean Jewish Affairs, January:3-8.

In the little book Idenlity, Bauman wrote that "one can ... make a vocation, amission, a consciously chosen destiny out of one's fate of no choice" (Bauman2004a: 14). A fate is something that befalls us, which we do not choose and forwhich we are not responsible, while a destiny is something that is chosen,something that we do choose. With the argument that a destiny can be madeout of a fate, Bauman is arguing that it is possible to transform what other havedone to us, to turn the tables on those who would manage our subjectivitythrough the imposition of meanings upon us and, instead, adopt those mean-ings as principies of our own unpredictable and human subjectivity. This isprecisely what Bauman has done with his Jewishness; it was an identity thatwas imposed upon him by the Polish authorities during an anti-Semitic cam-paign that they managed in 1967-1968, and he has transformed that catego-rization, precisely to use it as a challenge to anti-Semites and their ilk. Baumanhas carried out an identical move with his status as an 'exile' (Tester 2004).Bauman has communicated a subjective sense that Jewishness was, in the firstinstance, a fate that was imposed upon him from outside. In a conversationwith Richard Kilminster and lan Varcoe, he said: "On the whole, for most ofmy life and the greater part of it, Jewishness played a very small role, if at all.The first time it was brought to my awareness, was in 1968 - mis eruption ofanti-Semitism" (Bauman 1992a:226). It is precisely this sense of being madeaware of one's Jewishness that is the nub of the fate, but what Bauman hasdone is transform it into a destiny. It has become an integral part of who andwhat he is. As one sign of this, in the Identity book he remarks: "I suppose myJewishness is confirmed by Israeli iniquities paining me still more man atroci-ties committed by other countries" (Bauman 2004a: 11). But the shift of Jew-ishness from fate to destiny does not happen like the changing of a pair ofshoes, and neither should it be presumed to be painless. This extraordinary pa-per on 'The End of Polish Jewry' is a product of the time when, for Bauman,Jewishness was still a fate alone. It is the first piece to be published after hisexile from Poland, and it is perhaps his most poignant piece of work. Irfthe pa-per Bauman is trying to use his sociological imagination to try to make senseof his own personal troubles. And that attempt in turn shows that the use of asociological imagination is not at all a road to comfort. Bauman begins blunt-ly: the 1968 wave of anti-Semitism "set the seal on the fate of Polish Jewry, acommunity of rich cultural traditions going back some one thousand years".Bauman identifies 1968 with nothing less than a 'Final Solution' (p. 3). He

82

points out that this <manipulated by thosbaser instincts of th"the leaders of a parthe Jews remaining iall social and ideólo;cant factor" (p. 3). n

upon a group of whcishness. Unlike prevrected not against a ccustoms and autonontheir lives to beingthemselves as Polesman went on: "For ssiderations identical'ident and entirely nalidentify a profound sthe taken for granteddestroyed by power fand women had nevéimpossible to read th<ogy of ambivalence.Bauman has to ask iscampaign. He was quof Jews themselves. Ition of many of Polaisible to speak any 1<"within Polish societyof Polish Jewry but <form part of the Poliswave of anti-Semitisnwards who was directtion of the embitteredrected towards the Je\, the midd:

ministration, party ofltives of the academicleadership to blame feespecially keen to den

gical Review". Bul-irs, January:3-8.

. . . make a vocation, a>f no choice" (Baumando not choose and forething that is chosen,i destiny can be madesform what other haveinage our subjectivityad, adopt those mean-n subjectivity. This isit was an identity thatan anti-Semitic cam-

nsformed that catego-and their ilk. Bauman'exile' (Tester 2004).

¡hness was, in the firstde. In a conversationhe whole, for most ofry small role, if at all.968 - this eruption of, sense of being made)ut what Bauman hassgral part of who andmarks: "Lsuppose mystill more than atroci-But the shift of Jew-

:hanging of a pair ofrhis extraordinary pa-ie when, for Bauman,De published after hisce of work. In the pa-i to try to make senselows that the use of a5auman begins blunt-ate of Polish Jewry, aone thousand years".

Solution' (p. 3). He

points out that this campaign was a shock to its victims, first because it wasmanipulated by those in power and, "conducted in the open and directed at thebaser inslincts of the masses" and, second, because it had been initiated by"the leaders of a party emanating from a movement in which the majority ofthe Jews remaining in Poland, had placed their hopés of a final eradication ofall social and ideológica! reaction, of which anti-Semitism had been a signifi-cant factor" (p. 3). The Party leadership had imposed an identity and a fateupon a group of who believed that what was important was their shared Pol-ishness. Unlike previous waves of anti-Semitism in Poland, this one "was di-rected not against a comparatively isolated, sepárate community with differentcustoms and autonomous political system, but against people who had devotedtheir lives to being part and parcel of the Polish community and regardedthemselves as Poles even when conscious of their Jewish background". Bau-man went on: "For such people the acceptance in their daily conduct of con-siderations identical with the Polish national and political interest was self ev-ident and entirely natural" (p. 3). It is hard not to read sentences like that andidentify a profound sense of existential and subjective confusión in which allthe taken for granted ways of acting, thinking and being in the world had beendestroyed by power forcing men and women into categories which those menand women had never dreamt could apply to them. More narrowly, it is alsoimpossible to read those sentences and not think forward to Bauman's sociol-ogy of ambivalence. However, within this particular text, the question thatBauman has to ask is one about why the Party had initiated this anti-Semiticcampaign. He was quite clear that it had nothing to do with actions on the partof Jews themselves. Indeed Bauman argües that after the war and the emigra-tion of many of Poland's remaining Jews in 1957-1958, it was scarcely pos-sible to speak any longer of an identifiable Jewish community. By 1968,"within Polish society Jews were active only as individuáis, representative notof Polish Jewry but of the sepárate professional and regional bodies whichform part of the Polish nation as a whole" (pp. 3-4). Consequently, the 1968wave of anti-Semitism was not directed at Jews so much as at scapegoats, to-wards who was directed, "the whole accumulated aggressiveness and frustra-tion of the embittered and disillusioned mass" (p. 4). The hostility that was di-rected towards the Jews meant that the social masses and, Bauman points outparticularly, the middle classes ('consisting of officials of state and local ad-ministration, party officials, regular officers of the armed forces, and execu-tives of the academic enterprises'), were given someone other than the Partyleadership to blame for their disappointments and frustrations. The Party wasespecially keen to defuse the hostility that was building up in the middle class

83

because of "the unique part it is playing in the Polish social and political sys-!em, where its members are responsible for the daüy implementation of gov-ernmcnt decisions, thus being directly in charge of the everyday lives of thepopulation at large" (p. 4). The leadership needed to keep the middle classesacquiescent because its members were the managers and technicians of the in-dustrialised society that the Party was building. Bauman went on to discuss thesocial composition of Jews in Poland, but concluded with the outline of fivedifferent groups of Jews which would respond in different ways to their perse-cution. First, he identified the oíd comrades who had since youth invested alltheir hopes for equality and justice in Polish revolutionary and worker groups.Bauman said that they would stay in Poland even despite the hostility that wasbeing directed towards them: "Ideológica! and moral consideration play amuch more important role among the factors deciding the conduct of the mem-bers of this group than do other considerations of a more material nature. Theyare determined above all to retain their pride" (p. 7). Second, the there was thegroup of older Jews who "were not so to speak professional communists" (aswere the first group), who would only remain in Poland if they had no alterna-tive; unlike the first group they would not remain out of principie. This groupwould only stay if they had neither the opportunity ñor the confídence to startlife again elsewhere. Third, the "scientists, writers and journalists" who werenow identified as Jewish but whose lives were inextricably entwined withPolish culture would have to confront a difficult problem. They would be in nodoubt that, as Jews, they no longer had a place in Poland, and yet "the possi-bility of breaking their links with that culture, and separation from the creativemilieus of which they are conscious of forming a part, and which provide themwith conditions for their own creativity seems to them impossibly difficult andagainst their nature" (p. 7). Fourth, Bauman identified members of the oldergeneration who were economically and professional independent; this groupwas aware that it was in possession of exportable skills and was thus typicallyseeking to get out of Poland as quickly as possible. The final group was that ofyoung people. Bauman argües that many members of this highly educatedgroup "were astonished to discover only after having been questioned by se-curity organs ... that they are no longer described as students of the differentfaculties, but as Jews" (p. 8). Although the members of this group mightpresently be confused, nevertheless in them Bauman thought it possible to findsome cause for hope. This group possessed a "sense of social consciousness[that] invests its endeavours with a readiness for personal sacrifice for the gen-eral good. It is well endowed with moral courage and not only moral courage,consistency as well as firm moral principies" (p. 8). But, in all, this paper is

desperately melanctBauman's intellectu;possibility of beingthose Poles who hacBauman wrote: "Soment to Polish cultuírulers of Poland for ifully fledged citizen;in Poland, embitterefree of walls and baríthe end of the thousa

84

>cial and political sys-nplementation of gov-everyday lives of the

:ep the rniddle classesI technicians of the in-went on to discuss theith the outline of fivent ways to their perse-nce youth invested allry and worker groups.-• the hostility that wasconsideration play a: conduct of the mem-material nature. Theyand, the there was the)nal communists" (asf they had no alterna-principle. This grouple confidence to start3urnalists" who werecably entwined withThey would be in no

1, and yet "the possi-ion from the creativeI which provide themDossibly difficult andicmbers of the olderapendent; this groupid was thus typicallylal group was that ofhis highly educated:n questioned by se-lents of the different)f this group might:ht it possible to fmdocia! consciousness.acrifice for the gen-only moral courage,in all, this paper is

desperately melancholy. The paper is very much the closing of a chapter inBauman's intellectual and personal life. It is dominated by a sense of the im-possibility of being Polish and Jewish, and of the costs that this entails. Ofthose Poles who had been taught by the anti-Semites that they were Jewish,Bauman wrote: "Some will leave the country bearing in their hearts attach-ment to Polish culture, Polish landscape, and a sense of resentment against therulers of Poland for denying the Jews - as Jews - the right to be recognised asfully fledged citizens of their country. Others might go on living out their livesin Poland, embittered, suspicious and suspect, within their ghettoes this timefree of walls and barbed wire, but full of similarly tired people. And this marksthe end of the thousand year history of Polish Jewry" (p. 8).

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