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Review: When Muslims and Modernity MeetAuthor(s): Asef BayatSource: Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 6 (Nov., 2007), pp. 507-511Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20443955

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8/12/2019 Bayat 2007 - When Muslims and Modernity Meet

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A

SYMPOSIUM

ON

POLITICAL

ISLAM

When Muslims and

Modernity

Meet

ASEF

BAYAT

ISIM/Leiden

University

In the

aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in

the

U.S., a series of

events ranging

from the

Madrid

bombings

of

March 11, 2004, the

murder of Dutch filmmaker van

Gogh

in No

vember

2004,

followed

by

the London blasts

of

July 7, 2005, riots in the French banlieues

inNovember 2005, and then the cartoon cri

sis in Denmark

have caused a

profound

anx

iety

about

the Islamic threat to

security and

the

cultural

well-being of Europe.

The native

majority seems to view the Muslim

minority

as

a

danger

to

the

indigenous

demography

(currently estimated

at

11-12

million or

3%

of

the continent) and cultural

landscape

of the

continent

in a

remarkably

similar

fashion that

Muslim elites in

the Middle East perceive

rur

al

migrants as

distorting

the

cultural integrity

and modern make-up of their cities. So, the

growth of

mosques, Islamic schools, head

scarves,

the traditional clothes,

and

facial hair

have

been

turned into an

anomaly

in the Eu

ropean urban

setting,

in

the

same manner

that the spread of squatter

settlements,

street

vendors,

traditional religiosity-allegedly re

sulting from poverty,

anomie,

and extrem

ism-are seen

as

ruralizing

the Middle East

ern

modern

urbanity,

turning

such

metropo

lises as Cairo or

Istanbul into cities of

peas

ants (Bayat, 2007). Underlying this appre

hension in both

Europe and the Middle East

is the

prevailing belief that the

traditional

culture

collides with rational behavior

and

organized

modern life. Just as the

urban elite

in

the

Muslim Middle

East (politicians and

planners,

for

instance) fear

the

distorting

peasant

culture,

the

European majority

dread

Islamic

traditions,

which

they

fear

are

undermining liberal

democracy,

individual

freedom,

and rational

ways of life.

Indeed,

the predominance

of what

Mahmood Mam

dani

(2004)

calls

cultural

talk in

Europe

has

virtually Islamized ethnic

designations

and

urban

problematiques. Thus, Turkish,

North

African, or South

Asian minorities are invari

ably

labeled as

Muslims,

and

immigration

problems

as

Islamic. What are

the under

When Islam and Democracy

Meet: Muslims

in

Europe

and

in

the United States,

by

Jocelyne Cesari.

New

York, NY:

Palgrave,

2006.

280pp.

$24.95

paper.

ISBN:

1403971463.

The Islamic

Challenge: Politics and

Religion

in Western

Europe,

by

Jytte

Klausen.

New

York,

NY:

Oxford

University

Press,

2005.

264pp. $34.95

cloth. ISBN:

0199289921.

Islamic

Modernism, Nationalism, and

Fundamentalism:

Episode

and

Discourse,

by Mansoor

Moaddel. Chicago,

IL:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

2005.

424pp.

$24.00 paper. ISBN: 0226533336.

lying

issues

in

this tension?

Do the sources

of

conflict

lie in

the

clash

between Islamic

tra

dition-al

values and the

modern fabric of Eu

ropean life? The

three

books under

consider

ation,

despite

their

different

depths

and

per

spectives, offer useful

historical

entry

and

so

ciological

backdrop

to

grapple

with

these

questions.

To

begin with,

as both

Jocelyn

Cesari and

Jytte Klausen

demonstrate,

the

Muslim mi

nority

in

Europe

and

the U.S.

represent

a het

erogeneous

entity

differentiated

by ethnicity,

class,

educational

background,

and

religious

inclinations.

In

addition,

both authors attest

to

the

fact

that the conflict

of tradition and

modernity

bears little

purchase

in

explaining

the

roots of the

current clash

between

the

Muslim

minority

and the

native

majority

in

the

West

today.

But,

as

to

the

underlying log

ic

behind

the

conflict,

the studies do

not

of

fer

fresh

insights.

The

studies are

preoccu

pied

primarily

with individuals

(immigrants)

and

organizations,

rather than with

historical

context within which

the

Muslim

minority's

relationships

with the host

society

are

sys

tematically

examined.

I

propose that

the

key

507

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issue lies in the European

projection of a

modernity, Europeanness,

the costs of which

many Muslim migrants

cannot afford, even

though they wish they

were able to. The fact

is that groups

in

general,

whether Muslim or

non-Muslim, possess

differential

capacities

(or capitals)

to cope with the exigencies

of

modernity.

While

segments

of the European

Muslims have indeed succeeded

in this path,

others

are in the throes of a

protracted

strug

gle.

On the

whole,

three groups

within the

Muslim minority

can be

currently identified.

First are the

secular

Muslims,

those

who

seem to be fully integrated

as they try to

reach out to the majority culture,

economy,

and social interaction,

even

though

they are

frustrated by the

fact

that many

natives do

refuse to recognize

them

as

Europeans.

In

France, 87%

of Muslims surveyed said

they

believed Islam

was

compatible

with

the

French

Republic.

The elite

segment

of this

Muslim

group,

or

what Klausen calls Euro

pean

Muslim

leaders,

is the

subject

of

Klausen's

Islamic Challenge. Despite

its

quite

narrow

focus,

Klausen's study

sheds a

posi

tive light on the social make-up and the

worldviews

of these Muslims who

represent

some

2,000-3,000

influential

individuals

ac

tive in

politics, media,

business, religious,

and civil society organizations.

Klausen sug

gests that

European Muslims, represented by

these

leaders,

constitute

a new interest

group,

which

will

affect the

European

politi

cal

systems

as a result of their

participation

in

the

political

process.

These

Muslims embrace

liberal democracy,

resent

the extremism of

fundamentalist Sheikhs and radicals, respect

human

rights

as

a

God-given gift

that cannot

be taken

away,

and wish to build

a

Euro

pean

Islam

through

the

reinterpretation

of

religious

texts.

Possessing

the

necessary

re

sources-higher education, respectable

jobs,

information

and

relevant knowledge-the

group

is

enabled

to

handle and live

a

Euro

pean

life.

They enjoy

and

take

advantage

of

what

modernity offers-including

liberal

democracy-and

know

how

to

maneuver

within it.

The second strain

within the Muslim

mi

nority

consists

of

young

extremist

groups,

linked

to transnational

networks,

who

make

up only

a

very

small

portion (Dutch

police,

for

instance, say

there

are some

150

such

persons

in the

Netherlands).

But

these radi

cals, who get much of the media attention,

are hardly traditional

in

the sense of being

fed the norms and values of their parents'

home culture. They are largely second-gen

eration

ethnic

or non-white

Europeans or

converts, who rarely speak native languages,

nor have much knowledge about tradition

al

Islam, but are influenced by what Olivier

Roy describes as

a

de-cultured Islam.

In

other

words,

it is neither the

traditional cul

ture

nor

the culture of Islam (whatever

that is), but primarily the deculturation of

religion-the construction of a pure, ab

stract,

and

fundamentalist

Islam

devoid

of

human cultural experience and influence

that inform these young Muslims. Suspended

from their own ethnic values and dejected by

the host culture which views

them

in

suspi

cion and

derision, they

look

desperately

for

an

outlet

to

forge identities. Detached from

the

governing values

of

ancestry, yet en

gulfed by

the

multiplicity

of

lifestyles,

and

overwhelmed

by the

flow

of transnational in

formation,

the

truth of

which

they can sel

dom

ascertain,

these

youngsters tend

to re

sort

to

an imagined authentic reference-a

trans-local, global, and abstract Islam

stripped

of

cultural influences,

one that can

be

exploited

for

arbitrary use/abuse.

And then

there

is

a

significant

but little

known third

group of

Muslims

to

which

nei

ther

Cesari nor Klausen pay serious attention.

It

includes the

first

generation immigrants

who

try to speak the European languages,

strive to hold

regular jobs,

and

wish

to live

a

normal

life,

but are oriented to

practicing

many aspects

of their home

culture-food,

fashion, rituals, or private religious practices.

Most of them

strive

to survive

and to live

with

dignity,

invest

in

their

children

to

get by

in

the societal

settings they

often

find

too

complex

to

operate.

So

they

are inclined

to

restore and revert to their

immediate

circles,

the

language

and

religious

groups,

informal

economic

networks,

and communities

of

friends and status

groups

built

in the

neigh

borhoods or

prayer

halls. In

sum,

they

feel at

home on the

margin

of the mainstream.

As such, this feeling at home on the mar

gin

is

hardly

a

thing

of

Islam,

nor a

sign

of

resentment

against modernity,

or

a

primor

dial desire for tradition.

Rather,

it

represents

a familiar theme

in

the classical

Chicago

School of urban

sociology-a typical

coping

strategy

that

lower-class

immigrants

often

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Symposium 509

pursue

when

they encounter complex

for

eign life-worlds. It

reflects

the paradoxical

re

ality of peripheral communalism

that

enables

the

members

to

get around

the

costs,

to en

dure,

and to

negotiate

with the mainstream

in

an

attempt

to

be

part of it.

Because to im

merse fully

in

the mainstream requires cer

tain

material, cultural,

and

informational

ca

pabilities

that most

plebian migrants,

Muslim

or

non-Muslim, do

not

possess, which

com

pel

them

to

seek

alternative

venues.

Thus,

being

part

of an

organized economy

de

mands regular payment of various dues and

taxes;

if

you

cannot afford

them,

then

you go

informal.

If

a migrant cannot afford to pay for

the cost of

fixing

his bathroom

through

regu

lar companies, then he will look

for,

or gen

erate,

a network of

friends, relatives,

and

lo

cals

to

mobilize

support.

If he cannot afford

to

shop

in the

mainstream

modern

super

markets,

or to

borrow money

from

regular

banks (because

he does not have the credit

and

credentials),

then he resorts to ethnic

street bazaars to

get

his affordable

supplies,

and to informal credit associations to secure

loans.

When he

lacks

the

necessary

informa

tion and skill to function within the modern

bureaucratic organizations-which

do not

understand

flexibility, negotiation,

and inter

personal

relations-he

relies on

the locals

with

whom

he

establishes flexible transac

tions

based

upon mutual

trust and

reciproci

ty.

If

people

cannot

function

within

a culture

that

is

perceived

to be

inhospitable,

too for

mal

and

strict,

then

they

are

likely

to

get

in

volved

in

the ones that

they

fit.

An

unintended consequence of these eco

nomic and cultural processes is the likely re

vitalization

of

negative integration,

in

paral

lel and

peripheral communities, where

ethnic

networks

or

religious

rituals are revived

to

serve as structures of

support

and survival.

It

is no

surprise

that

ghettoization

is

especial

ly

more

pronounced

among

lower-class

British Muslims where

unemployment

re

mains three times

higher

than

that among

other

ethno-religious groups (Cesari, p. 23).

This

process

of

feeling

at home on

the

mar

gin represents a way to cope with the im

peratives

of

modernity

embodied in the bu

reaucratic

arrangement,

the

discipline

of

time, space,

fixed

and

formal

contract,

and

the

like.

Unless

host societies are

prepared

to

maximize

these

people's capabilities

and

minimize their costs of

integration, such

mi

grants are compelled to seek refuge in

their

informal

marginal

existence. This

process

is

by

no

means

specific

to Muslim

migrants'

lives

in

Europe.

It

is a widespread

global

phenomenon. Rural migrants

in

Cairo,

Tehran,

Istanbul,

or

Casablanca

undergo

more

or

less similar experiences as many res

idents with

Turkish

or

Moroccan origin

in

Germany

or

in the

Netherlands.

However,

anti-Muslim rhetoric of the

mainstream

polit

ical and

intellectual

circles,

not to

mention

the

ultra-nationalist

parties

(National

Front

in

France,

Geert

Wilders's party

in

Holland,

Germany's neo-Fascists,

Danish

People's

Par

ty,

and

the

American

evangelical

preachers),

further

push

such Muslim minorities to seek

sanctuary

in

themselves.

Otherwise, they

yearn

for

a modern

life

of relief

and

recogni

tion,

but strive to

manage

and minimize

its

detriments.

Muslims' varied encounters

with

the

forces

of

modernity

in

the

Islamic

heartland

are

not

terribly

different from

those

residing

current

ly

in the

West. Like their

counterparts

in

Western Europe,

the Muslim

population

in

the

Middle East

is

also divided

into

segments

with different religious intensity (secular lib

eral, moderate

Muslims,

fundamentalists,

and

violent

trends)

and

differential

experiences of

encounters with

modernity.

Mansoor Moad

del's ambitious

book,

Islamic

Modernism,

Nationalism,

and

Fundamentalism,

shows

with

impressive

detail and

clarity

how the

Middle East has been

home

to

many overar

ching

secular and

religious

ideologies,

in

cluding

Islamic modernism

(wanting

to

rec

oncile Islam with

modernity),

liberal

nation

alism, and lately the exclusivist fundamen

talist

Islam.

Rather

than

being

rooted in

some traditional

psyche

or

cultural

make-up

of

Muslims,

fundamentalism

is an

historical,

indeed,

a modern

movement. It

is,

according

to Moaddel,

an

exclusivist

religious

reaction

to

monolithic secular

states

(Moaddel

dis

agrees

with those who

view

this movement

as a

reaction

to

foreign domination ).

Where

a

pluralistic

intellectual

market

prevailed,

in

clusive

ideologies

such

as

liberalism

and Is

lamic modernism flourished. Whether or not

one

agrees

with the

term

fundamentalism

(I

prefer

to

use

the

term

Islamism),

it still

re

quires

further

clarification.

In

my

understand

ing,

Islamism

developed

as

the

language

of

self-assertion

to

mobilize those

(largely

mid

dle-class

high achievers)

who

felt

marginal

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ized by the dominant economic, political,

or

cultural processes

in

their

societies, those for

whom the perceived

failure of both

capitalist

modernity and socialist

utopia made

the

lan

guage of morality (religion)

a

substitute

for

politics. In a sense, it

was the Muslim middle

class

way

of

saying

no

to

those who they

considered their excluders-their

national

elites, secular governments,

and these gov

ernments' Western allies. Hence,

they re

buffed

Western cultural domination, its

po

litical rationale,

moral sensibilities,

and nor

mative

symbols,

even

though

in

practice

they

shared many

of those

traits,

as

in

their

neck

ties, food,

education,

and

technologies

(Bay

at 2007).

Even though Moaddel's

argument may not

hold for

the

growth of

fundamentalist ide

ologies

in the current pluralist

settings such

as

Europe

or in

Turkey,

he

neglects

the ele

ment

of

new

awareness

and rhetoric about

the real or imagined global domination

that

has

come about due to the educational

growth and global

information flows. Never

theless,

his

emphasis

on

indigenous

and

modern sources of fundamentalist

Islam is

crucial. Yet the book concentrates primarily

on the intellectual

elites,

the

producers

of

ideas-a

theme that holds its

own

important

merit,

but offers little

on

the

worldviews

of

ordinary

people,

on

how these

grand

dis

courses

are

perceived

and

negotiated

at the

base.

Indeed,

Moaddel's

preoccupation

with

episode-or

bounded

temporal

constellation

of

major

events-to

explain ideology

forma

tion would leave little

ground

to examine

how ideas

are constructed among social

groups. In other words, in his scheme, ide

ologies

are the

products

of

particular

times/episodes,

rather than of

particular

so

cial

groups.

Iwould not

dispute

that attribut

ing fixed

ideas to

particular

social

classes

as

a means

to

pursue

their

objective

interests

is a

misguided

approach.

Yet,

I

would

not

write off

altogether

the

role of

interests

in

forming

ideas.

But I

take

a different under

standing

of

interests.

Perceived

in

Isaac Bal

bus's sense as

having

a

stake

in

or

being

affected

by (Balbus,

1973:

279),

interests

in

my understanding

includes

both material and

non-material

(like

respect, honor,

or

moral

certitude)

elements,

and refers

to

those

that

are articulated

by

the

agents

themselves

rather than fixated as objective by

outside

observers.

Perceived as

such,

interests

in

the end play a central part in

determining

why certain individuals or

groups uphold

certain ideas or patterns of

behavior at cer

tain times. This is

crucial because

it

can help

us understand why differential Muslim mi

norities with different positions

and capaci

ties espouse different

relationships with mod

ern

life,

with some of

the mainstream

im

mersed easily in its rationale

while others

have to

negotiate and navigate

their

way

through

diverse venues to minimize

their

costs.

Why

is

it that despite the complex dy

namics and

struggles

of

Muslim communities

to live a life similar

to most inhabitants in Eu

rope, opinion makers in the continent con

tinue to

project

the

interaction in terms of

cultural clash for which

Islamic traditional

ism is

supposedly responsible?

Historically,

European elites seemed to express

reluctance

to host

immigrant communities

in

their

homeland. Instead, they welcomed

guest

workers -from ex-colonies

or

nations such

as

Turkey

and those of North

Africa

and

South Asia-who were

expected

to

return

home

after performing

their

functions

as fac

tory or construction workers. Once European

elites realized that Muslim

immigrants

were

here to

stay, anxiety arose;

it reached a

crisis

point

when that

anxiety

in

recent

years

turned

into

fear-fear of terrorism, of

in

creasing

Muslim

immigration,

of

eroding

lib

eral

democracy,

and

the loss of

European

character,

even

though

in

reality

violent

groups

remain

extremely

small and

many

or

dinary

Muslims

embrace liberal

democracy.

It

appears

then

that the multiculturalism that

countries like the Netherlands were practic

ing

in

1960s

and

1970s

has

been rather disin

genuous

since

it

was

designed

not

to

equip

the

guest-workers

with

the

necessary

ca

pacity

and skills to live a

life

of

fellow Euro

peans,

but to enable them

to

return to their

home

countries.

So

while

the

relentless

process

of

global

ization has turned

Europe

into a

multi-ethnic

continent,

the mainstream

Europeans

have

yet

to

acknowledge

and come

to

terms

with

this historic shift.

In

reality,

a multi-ethnic

Eu

rope

means also

a

multi-religious citizenry;

it

means

recognizing

the

reality

of

mosques,

minarets, headscarves,

even

burqas

in

the

public

squares

along

with

churches, temples,

and the like.

But

the assimilationist

senti

ments fail

to

acknowledge

that co-existence

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Symposium 511

and integration imply a two-way process of

give and take. Klausen is right when she

charges

the

European nativists with wanting

the Muslim minority

to

change (and

when

they do, Muslims

do not

get recognition),

but

refusing to change themselves. Instead, they

lump the Muslim minority together under

the

broad cultural religious category (as

Mus

lims), with little attention to differences and

conflicts within the

category,

and without re

gard to their desires, dilemmas, and struggles

to cohabit in

peace.

Thus, the association of

Al-Qaeda violence

with Islam, and the latter

with scenes

of veiled

women

walking

in the

streets

of

Amsterdam

or

Berlin,

instanta

neously conjure up

the image of Muslims and

Islam

as

Europe's cultural

Other. And this is

happening at a

time when Europeans seem

to

aspire

to revive their troubled national

identities

in

the

aftermath

of

European

inte

gration and an accelerated globalization.

Once

again,

Islam-or rather

contradistinction

with

Islam,

the

idea

that

we are different

has come

to play

that crucial role

in

forging

such

an

identity.

This

is

not new. The

early

modern

Europe

also

built

its identity partly

in

relation

to

Islam and the

Ottoman Empire.

However,

then, Europe

suffered from

an

in

feriority complex -with

the

Christians

anxi

ety over

Islamic wealth and

might

(Vitkus,

1999), whereas

today

it

boasts on a superior

ity

fixation (as

in

the

Dutch

politician, Geert

Wilders).

In

both times,

anxiety

seems

to

guide

Europe's

relations with

Islam.

References

Balbus,

Isaac. 1973.

The Concept

of

Interest in

Pluralist

and Marxist

Analysis, in The

Politics

and

Society

Reader, edited by

I.

Katznelson,

G.

Adams,

P.

Brenner, and

A.

Wolfe.

New

York:

David

McKay

Co.

Bayat, Asef. 2007. Making Islam Democratic: So

cial

Movements

and the

Post-Islamist

Turn. Pa

lo Alto: Stanford

University

Press.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2004. Good

Muslim, Bad

Muslim:

America,

the Cold War, and

the Roots

of

Terror. New

York: Pantheon.

Viktus, Daniel. 1999.

EarlyModern Orientalism:

Representation

of Islam

in

16th

and

17th

Cen

tury

Europe,

inWestern

Views of Islam

in

Me

dieval and

Early

Modern

Europe,

edited

by

D.

Blanks

and

M.

Frassetto.

New

York:

St. Martin's

Press.

Are

Muslims Really That Special?

HALDUN

GULiALP

Yyldyz

Technical

University, Istanbul

hgulalp@superonUine.com

In an

interview with the Washington Post,

only weeks before

the

invasion

of

Iraq,

I de

clared that

September

11 came as

the

turn

ing point that

sealed the end of Islamism.

Perhaps

because

of

my undergraduate edu

cation

in

economics,

I

was used

to

making

ceteris paribus

assumptions,

but

failed

to

mention it in

the interview. My intention was

to

join

the

chorus

of

opposition

that

was

al

ready growing against the war by indicating

that itwas

unnecessary and unjustified. One

could say

that

my

prediction

about the end of

Islamism

failed,

but I

believe

that

the situa

tion is

more complex

than that.

In

fact,

there

seem

to

be at least

two

lessons

in it

for soci

ologists: one

heartening,

and the other dis

heartening.

The

first

is that

predictions

do not

always

hold in

sociology,

because our ideas direct

our behavior. This may be found heartening

because

it

is about the

power

of our

theories:

theorists

may

make a

difference.

The

second,

When

Islam

and

Democracy

Meet:

Muslims

in Europe

and in

the United States,

by

Jocelyne Cesari.

New

York,

NY:

Palgrave,

2006. 280pp.

$24.95

paper.

ISBN:

1403971463.

The Islamic

Challenge: Politics and

Religion

in

Western

Europe,

by

Jytte

Klausen. New

York,

NY:

Oxford

University Press,

2005. 264pp.

$34.95

cloth.

ISBN:

0199289921.

Islamic

Modernism,

Nationalism, and

Fundamentalism: Episode and

Discourse,

by

Mansoor

Moaddel.

Chicago,

IL:

University of Chicago Press, 2005. 424pp.

$24.00 paper.

ISBN:

0226533336.

however, is

that

our ideas

may be

wrong and

may therefore

mislead us.

One might add

that the more

subtle and

sophisticated our

Contemporary

Sociology

36, 6