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Journal of Strategic Studies

Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations - 1915Edward J. Erickson

To cite this Article Erickson, Edward J.(2005) 'Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations - 1915',Journal of Strategic Studies, 28: 3, 529 — 548

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Bayonets on Musa Dagh: OttomanCounterinsurgency Operations –

1915

EDWARD J. ERICKSON

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army (retired)

ABSTRACT This article examines the Ottoman military’s escalatory response toviolence and frames the Armenian insurrection of 1915 in the historical contextof contemporary early twentieth-century counterinsurgency campaigns. A casestudy is presented, from a military historian’s perspective, of counterinsurgencyoperations conducted by the Ottoman Army’s 41st Infantry Division againstArmenian insurgents on Musa Dag (Musa Dagh) in an operational area south ofIskenderun (Alexandretta). In this particular operational area, it appears that themodern label which most closely approximates what happened there is ethniccleansing. Finally, the article concludes with an objective assessment of theeffectiveness of the Ottoman Army’s counterinsurgency operations.

Introduction

The most controversial issue in the history of the Ottoman war effort inthe First World War is the events surrounding the massacre anddeportation of the Armenian population of eastern Anatolia in 1915.Interpretations of what happened range from a total genocide to thesimple movement of displaced persons.1 The modern Republic ofTurkey stands accused of ‘genocide denial’ while Armenian writersstand accused as ‘Armenian Falsifiers’.2 There is almost no middleground between these extreme positions and the emotional nature ofthe controversy makes objective dialogue and inquiry very difficult.This article examines the Ottoman military’s escalatory response to

violence and frames the Armenian insurrection of 1915 in the historicalcontext of contemporary early twentieth-century counterinsurgency

Correspondence Address: Edward Erickson, 133 North Broad St, Norwich, NY,13815, USA. E-mail: eerick@norwich.net

The Journal of Strategic StudiesVol. 28, No. 3, 529 – 548, June 2005

ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/05/030529-20 ª 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/01402390500137465

campaigns. A case study is presented, from a military historian’sperspective, of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Otto-man Army’s 41st Infantry Division against Armenian insurgents onMusa Dag (Musa Dagh) in an operational area south of Iskenderun(Alexandretta). In this particular operational area, it appears that themodern label which most closely approximates what happened is ethniccleansing. Finally, the article concludes with an objective assessment ofthe effectiveness of the Ottoman Army’s counterinsurgency operations.

Counterinsurgency and the Ottoman Army

At the beginning of the twentieth century, de facto counterinsurgencydoctrines were beginning to emerge based on the British Army’sconduct of the Boer War, the German suppression of the Herero andthe American occupation of the Philippines. The Ottoman Army itselfhad a long and difficult history of counterinsurgency in such widelyseparated theatres as Albania, Arabia, Armenia, Caucasia, Libya,Macedonia, Mesopotamia and Yemen.The American example was brutal in the extreme and, most

famously, included the devastation of the island of Samar in 1901.On Samar, General Jacob H. Smith was in charge of a pacificationcampaign that included deportation, the burning of villages, the killingof captives and children, and the destruction of property, homes, cropsand livestock.3 Smith operated under the aegis of General ArthurMacArthur’s General Orders No. 100, which dated from the Civil War,and allowed commanders to treat partisans and guerrillas withsummary imprisonment, deportation and execution.4 On Luzon andMindanao, the pacification programs were less aggressive and werelimited to actual anti-guerrilla operations as well as a civic improve-ments program. However, by late 1902, America had pacified thePhilippines. The German experience in South-West Africa was,likewise, brutal in the extreme against the Herero people. The Germancolonial forces, the Schutztruppen, employed both ‘genocide andfamine’ in a ferocious campaign of suppression between 1904 and1906.5

However, it was the British who established the modern principles(as they were in 1914) for the successful conduct of counterinsurgencyoperations. This stemmed from their successful operations in the BoerWar after the defeat of the Boer conventional forces. As the Boercommandos began to conduct successful guerrilla operations, FieldMarshal Lord Roberts turned to non-traditional tactics that revolvedaround separating the guerrillas from their source of supply, the Boercivilian population.6 In November 1901, Roberts’ army began to builda giant web of blockhouses connected by barbed wire to cordon off the

530 Edward J. Erickson

guerrillas. This forced the commandos into ever-smaller areas.Simultaneously, the Boer civilian population was deported from theirhomes to the world’s first concentration camps to further isolate theBoer commandos and many of the homes, crops and livestock weredestroyed as well. As an unfortunate, although unintended, conse-quence of the incarceration, thousands of Boer civilians died incaptivity of disease and neglect. Finally, the British Army was organisedinto highly mobile columns, which conducted relentless search anddestroy operations to hunt down the Boer commandos. Within a year,this multi-dimensional strategy forced the collapse of the Boercommandos.The Ottoman Army also waged very effective anti-guerrilla

campaigns in its empire from the mid-1870s through 1912.7 TheOttoman Army tended to ruthlessly suppress rebellion within theempire; the ‘Bulgarian Horror’ of 1876 and the Adana Massacre of1909 were the most famous examples of this policy.8 In 1914, theOttoman State was engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign in Yementhat had been active since 1911.9 The weak condition of Ottomanforces assigned there allowed the army to do little more than to hold thekey cities and control the railway to the north.10 Occasionally, thearmy did assassinate insurgents and conduct search and destroyoperations in Yemen, but it lacked the strength to bring operationsthere to a successful conclusion.To what extent these operations influenced the Ottoman Army’s

counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics is problematic at the presenttime. However, it is a fact that the Ottoman Army used contemporaryGerman manuals and publications in its training programs. It is also afact that many Ottoman General Staff officers maintained an activeinterest in contemporary military affairs.11 Perhaps the most compel-ling evidence that the Ottomans maintained an interest incounterinsurgency may be found in the connection between GermanGeneral Colmar von der Goltz and Ottoman Colonel Pertev.12 Pertevwas a protege of von der Goltz and maintained an active correspon-dence with him after the Boer War in which they discussed operationsand lessons learned.13 This ongoing relationship is described also inPertev’s biography of von der Goltz and reflected the continuinginterest that von der Goltz maintained in the Ottoman Army. Pertevwas an ardent admirer of von der Goltz and was instrumental inassisting him to introduce many ideas concerning organisation andtraining into the Ottoman Army.14 It was through Pertev that many ofvon der Goltz’s ideas about recent operations made their way into theminds of the Ottoman Army’s officer corps.15

As far as is known today, the Ottoman War Academy did not includea distinct block of instruction on counterinsurgency operations in its

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915 531

curriculum.16 However, it is known from the memoirs of severalofficers that at least one instructor at the War Academy covertlylectured about counterinsurgency operations. Mustafa Kemal and hisclassmates wrote that Lieutenant Colonel Nuri Bey secretly gave alecture about guerrilla warfare.17 Since many of the professionalofficers in the Ottoman Army served on active operations in thesuppression of insurrections, both prior to and after their tours at theOttoman War Academy, it is logical to believe that it was a topic ofdiscussion in their studies there.In any case, by 1914 there was a considerable body of practical

applications available concerning the suppression of insurgency.Moreover, the Western powers had set precedents in the use ofextremely brutal operational methods, which included a variety ofmethods aimed at the civilian population. These methods includeddeportation, starvation, imprisonment and the destruction of propertyand livestock. The Ottoman Army was certainly aware of theseprecedents and had used many of them previously in its owncounterinsurgency operations.

Armenian Activities and the Ottoman Response

Difficulties with the Armenian population began in 1877 during theRusso-Turkish War and continued intermittently into 1914. Encour-aged by the successful insurrections and independence of the Serbs,Bulgars and Greeks, dissident Armenian elements in the OttomanEmpire began to form revolutionary committees, both in secret and inpublic, a formula that had worked especially well for the Christianpeoples in the Balkans. There were several outbreaks of Armenianviolence before the First World War.18 These were the ‘SasonRebellion’ in 1894–96, the ‘Ottoman Bank’ incident in Constantinoplein 1895 and the ‘Second Rebellion’ in 1908. These failed, but Albanianand Macedonian rebellions in 1911–12 encouraged further outbreaksof Armenian violence. Furthermore, continued oppression and the Pan-Turkic philosophies of Zia Gokalp further worried and inflamedArmenian opinion. The author acknowledges that there is a muchwider political and social context to the problem of Ottoman-Armenianrelations; however, a fuller description of these perspectives is outsidethe scope of this article.In July 1914, the Ottoman Consulate in Kars intercepted a telegram

outlining the smuggling of 400 rifles into the Eliskirt valley.19 Otherintercepted letters sent by the Dasnak Committee (predominant amongthe numerous Armenian nationalist committees of the time) requestedweapons from the Russians. Also during the summer of 1914, theArmenian Committees conducted the important Erzurum Congress

532 Edward J. Erickson

under the leadership of the Dasnaks. Armenian representatives fromevery major eastern Anatolian city were present. Ostensibly conductedto peacefully advance Armenian concerns through legitimate means,the Ottomans regarded the Congress as the seedbed for laterinsurrection. It was here, the Ottomans were convinced, that strongArmenian-Russian links solidified into detailed plans and agreementsaimed at the detachment of Armenia from the Ottoman Empire.By September the commander of the Erzurum Fortress received a

report that the Armenian regiments in the Russian Army weremobilised and were conducting war-training exercises.20 Indicators ofpotential violent intent accumulated as Ottoman authorities foundbombs and weapons hidden in Armenian homes. For example, the 4thReserve Cavalry Regiment, patrolling from its lines in Koprukoy,discovered Russian rifles cached in Armenian homes in Hasankale on20 October, which were confiscated.21 The tempo of army operationsagainst Armenian dissidents accelerated.In early October 1914 (prior to the commencement of hostilities), the

Ottoman Third Army was receiving reports of Armenians who were ex-Russian soldiers returning to Turkey with maps and money.22 Therewere reports from infantry battalions concerning Armenian meetings atwhich large numbers of aggressively nationalist people were gather-ing.23 In late October 1914, the Third Army staff informed theOttoman General Staff that large numbers of Armenians with weaponswere moving into Mus, Bitlis, Van and Erivan.24 Additionallydisturbing to the military staffs at all levels was an increasingrecognition that thousands of Armenian citizens were deliberatelyleaving their homes in Ottoman territory and travelling into Russian-held territory with most of their earthly possessions. Although Turkeywas still officially at peace with Russia, many Ottoman officers were bynow convinced that Russia was actively conspiring to foment anArmenian revolt.The situation went from bad to worse as Russia declared war on

Turkey in November 1914. Throughout November, December and intoJanuary 1915, many similar reports to the Ottoman General Staffoutlined the danger posed by armed Armenians in the Third and in theFourth Army areas. Incidents of terrorism increased, particularlybombings25 and assassinations of civilians and local Ottomanofficials.26 On 25 February 1915, a ciphered cable went from theOperations Division of the Ottoman General Staff to the First, Second,Third and Fourth Armies; the Irak Command; I, II, III, IV, V ArmyCorps; and to the Jandarma Command. The cable contained the chiefof the Operations Division’s newly-issued Directive 8682 titled‘Increased Security Precautions’.27 This directive noted increaseddissident Armenian activity in Bitlis, Aleppo, Dortyol and Kayseri,

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915 533

and furthermore identified Russian and French influence and activitiesin these areas. The Operations Division directed that the Third and theFourth Armies increase surveillance and security measures. Allrecipients of the cable were instructed to increase coordination amongthemselves. Finally, the cable specifically directed that any ethnicArmenian soldiers should be removed from Ottoman headquartersstaffs and taken out of important Ottoman command centres. The finalmeasure contained in Directive 8682 was probably taken in response toa report from the Ministry of the Interior’s Intelligence Division to theOttoman General Staff’s director of intelligence.28 In this report it wasnoted that the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople was transmit-ting military secrets and dispositions to the Russians.By mid-March 1915, the tactical situation in the Dogubeyazıt-Van

region had considerably worsened. Cevdet Bey, the governor of Van,reported numerous massacres of isolated Muslim villagers by armedgroups of Armenian guerrillas.29 At this time, the staff of the ThirdArmy was sufficiently concerned over the possibility of armedinsurrection that it began to shift Jandarma (Gendarmarie: a para-military internal security force) and army units into the area to meet thethreat. By 25 March, the Van Jandarma Depot Battalion (augmentedwith artillery), the 17th and 28th Reserve Cavalry Regiments, and the44th Infantry Regiment (a unit of the 1st Expeditionary Force) hadbeen deployed into the Van region.30

The Armenian Rebellion

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when and where the rebellions brokeout first. Many Western writers and historians have concluded that theOttomans themselves deliberately instigated the revolts by enforcingintolerable conditions on the Armenians.31 These acts included murder,rape and lesser humiliations, which served to provoke an Armenianreaction. The Turks dispute this and today claim that it was theArmenians, encouraged by the Russians and French in the aftermath ofSarikamis, who first rose in revolt. Whether resistance or revolt,modern Turkish military histories claim that the real fighting began inthe village of Satak (modern Catak, about 20 kilometres southeast ofthe city of Van), which by 15 April 1915 was completely cut off fromthe outside.32

In fact, armed revolts by the Armenians soon broke out in manyareas of southeastern Anatolia. There is no question that the Russianssupported the Armenians with money, weapons and encouragement.33

Four Druzhiny, or regiments of the Armenian National Council, wereformed from enthusiastic volunteers, who were eager to invade theOttoman Empire.34 The ‘Ararat Unit’ was composed of the 2nd, 3rd

534 Edward J. Erickson

and 4th Druzhiny regiments and was assigned to capture the lakesidecity of Van. The event most associated with the beginning of therebellion occurred when insurgents seized most of Van in a fierce attackon 14 April 1915.35

Venezuelan soldier of fortune Rafael De Nogales observed the battlefor Van, which went on for two weeks, while fighting for the Ottomansas a mercenary in April 1915. De Nogales noted, ‘Deputy to theAssembly from Erzerum, Garo Pasdermichan, passed over with almostall the Armenian troops and officers of the Third Army to the Russians,to return soon after, burning villages and mercilessly putting to theknife all of the peaceful Mussulman villagers that fell into theirhands’.36 He continued, ‘the Armenians of the Vilayet of Van rose enmasse’. De Nogales was present for the siege of the city of Van itselfand noted that the Armenians were heavily armed and fought withcourage and determination.37

In late May 1915, Ambassador Morgenthau sent a confidentialreport to Washington specifically identifying additional areas in easternAnatolia that contained armed Armenians (see Map 1).38

He noted that, ‘Apart from the mountainous region in easternArmenia, and the Zeitoun district, North of Alexandretta, the

MAP 1AREAS OF INSURGENCY IDENTIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU, 25MAY 1915

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915 535

Armenians no more than other dissatisfied communities, possess themeans or determination to give expression to their wishes’.39

Morgenthau went on to elaborate on the nature and the large scaleof the insurrection:

. . .it would seem as if an Armenian insurrection to help theRussians had broken out at Van. Thus a former deputy here, onePastormadjian who had assisted our proposed railway concessionssome years ago, is now supposed to be fighting with the Turkswith a legion of Armenian volunteers. These insurgents are said tobe in possession of a part of Van and to be conducting guerrillawarfare in a country where regular military operations areextremely difficult. To what extent they are organised or whatsuccesses they have gained it is impossible for me to say; theirnumbers have been variously estimated but none puts them at lessthan ten thousand and twenty-five thousand is probably closer tothe truth.40

Cumulatively, the Ottomans, the Russians, an independent Venezuelanobserver and the American Ambassador in Constantinople indicatedthat a large number of Armenians, who possessed large numbers ofweapons, revolted in the eastern provinces of Anatolia in support of aRussian offensive.41 This point is often overlooked in examinations ofwhat happened to the Armenians in 1915. In any case, the Ottomanswere unprepared for violence on this scale and did not have adequateforces in position to deal with the problem. In spite of months oftension the Ottoman Army was largely unprepared for outbreaks ofviolence on the scale of the Van rebellion. There were pitched battlesbetween the insurgents and the Jandarma, the Ottoman Army’sparamilitary irregular units and the few regular army units in the area.Beginning in mid-April, the Ottoman General Staff began to shiftreinforcements into the region. In order to suppress the insurgents atVan, for example, the Ottoman General Staff was forced to divert theFirst Expeditionary Force (a full army division equivalent) from thefront where it was needed against the Russians.42

The fighting spread largely southwest and northwest from theepicentre at Van. Donald Bloxham has characterised the Ottomanstate’s political response in this period as genocidal and moving ‘fromregional measures to general policy’.43 Likewise, the development ofthe Ottoman General Staff’s military policy toward the Armenianrebellion can be characterised as moving from a localised response to ageneral counterinsurgency campaign. Over a three-month period,May–July 1915, the Ottomans deployed substantial forces into theregion to conduct a sustained counterinsurgency campaign. The

536 Edward J. Erickson

operations of the Ottoman Army’s 41st Infantry Division nearAlexandretta provide a case study of how the army transitioned froma condition of unreadiness to participation in a full-blown counter-insurgency campaign.

Early Operations – 41st Infantry Division

On 4 August 1914, the Ottoman General Staff ordered the organisationof the Halep Jandarma division as a part of the ongoing militarymobilisation of the armed forces in Halep (Aleppo).44 This division’s1st, 2nd and 3rd Provisional Regiments were composed of battalions ofthe professional field gendarmarie (seyyar jandarma). The men weretrained to military standards and were armed and equipped like theactive Ottoman Army. On 16 October, the jandarma division wasdeactivated and its regiments transferred elsewhere. However, aprovisional infantry division was maintained in its place and it wasassigned the depot battalions of the 72nd, 76th and 78th InfantryRegiments. In this reduced role it continued to conduct militarytraining for new conscripts that included marching, marksmanship andmanoeuvres.45 In effect, from mid-October 1914 through mid-April1915, there were no Ottoman Army combat units (of battalion-size orlarger) in northern Syria and the Alexandretta area (modernIskenderun), capable of either coastal defence or counterinsurgencyoperations.On 9 April 1915, the provisional division was reorganised and was

activated as the regular Ottoman Army’s 41st Infantry Division,composed of the 131st, 132nd and 133rd Infantry Regiments.46 Thesethree regiments were built around the nucleus of the depot battalionsand were made up of reservists and recruits. The new infantry divisionwas assigned a tactical area (named the Iskenderun Bolgesi or theAlexandretta Area) within the Ottoman Fourth Army’s area ofoperations. Cemal Pasa commanded the Fourth Army and wasresponsible for road, area and coastal security operations, as well asthe operational front along the Suez Canal.47 Lieutenant ColonelHuseyin Husnu Abdullah commanded the division, which was giventhe mission of coastal and area defence for Iskenderun and the coast,and road security against bandits and insurgent Armenians.48 ColonelHuseyin assigned the 131st and 132nd Infantry Regiments to internalsecurity duties in Zeytin (Zeitoun) and Urfa (Sanliurfa) and the 133rdInfantry Regiment to coastal defence duties near Iskenderun (Alexan-dretta).The activation of the 41st Infantry Division was taken in reaction to

a pattern of dissident Armenian and allied naval activity in theIskenderun area. As early as October 1914, the British consul at Aleppo

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915 537

noted that ‘all the Christians sympathise with England and France andwould welcome with joy a swift British or even French occupation’.49

Armenian groups of the region were in contact with the allies inNovember 1914 and had volunteered to ‘support a possible disembar-kation at Alexandretta, Mersina or Adana’ and, moreover, promised‘valuable assistance could also be provided by the Armenians ofmountainous districts, who, if supplied with arms and ammunition,would rise against Turkey’.50 In December 1914, there was also anincrease in allied naval activity and British landing parties were‘gleefully greeted’ by Armenians.51 Numerous naval bombardmentsalso contributed to the overall picture of impending intervention andinsurgency.52 In particular, the city of Dortyol was of particularconcern to the Ottoman Army General Staff, which sent out warningmessages outlining insurgent activity and subversive coordination withthe allies in Dortyol, Bitlis and Halep.53

Despite the threat and importance of its ongoing missions, the 41stInfantry Division was ordered to send two infantry battalions (of ninein the division) to assist in training the newly formed 53rd InfantryDivision. Moreover, the Ottoman General Staff ordered the division tosend the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion,132nd Infantry Regiment to Iraq to reinforce the faltering militarysituation there.54 These battalions never returned to their parentdivision and the 41st Infantry Division was forced to activate twoprovisional infantry battalions of poorly-trained recruits and reserviststo replace them. The division also had a small field artillery forceassigned to support its infantry, which was composed of a battery fromthe 22nd Mountain Artillery Regiment and a battery from the 35thArtillery Regiment.55 Finally, the Ottoman General Staff assigned anirregular volunteer cavalry troop to the division for reconnaissance andsecurity operations (Humus Gonullu Suvari Bolugu).56 In comparisonwith other Ottoman Army infantry divisions, the 41st Infantry Divisionwas under-equipped with artillery, engineers and medical support.Moreover its infantry battalions were 20 per cent under strength andcontained numbers of older reservists.57 This reflected the overall lowpriority given to the Ottoman Fourth Army by the General Staff.As the Armenian insurgency increased in scale and spread south-

ward, the 41st Infantry Division found itself being drawn into theconflict. Within the division’s tactical area, Armenian insurrectionsbroke out in the mountainous areas near Maras and Urfa in June andJuly of 1915. Cemal’s Fourth Army staff believed that the Urfainsurgency was instigated and supported by the French.58 To betteraccommodate this expanding mission, Cemal modified the tacticalareas of his army by tailoring them to better fit the reported threats ofinsurgency.59 The 41st Infantry Division was assigned a revised tactical

538 Edward J. Erickson

area known as the IInci Bolge (Second Area) and a new commander,Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Emin.60 The new tactical area was smallerthan the Iskenderun Bolgesi and coincided very closely with the areasidentified by Ambassador Morgenthau in May (see Map 2).61

On 29 July 1915, the 1st Battalion, 133rd Infantry Regiment wassent to Antep (Gaziantep) to fight insurgents.62 The 132nd InfantryRegiment (composed of three infantry battalions) was ordered,likewise, to suppress ‘five hundred Armenian guerrillas’ (cete) nearZeytin.63 The town of Zeytin itself was a hotbed of insurgent activityand in the words of American consul and missionary Reverend J.E.Merrill, ‘it is said that there were thirty-seven previous attempts atrebellion and this time the place was provisioned for it’.64 Merrillcontinued and confirmed guerrilla activity by noting that ‘a real dangerof attacks by Armenian outlaws on Mohammadan refugees who havereplaced Armenian villagers in Zeitoun’ existed in the region. The fightto subdue Zeytin was costly and was only resolved by a direct assaulton the town.65

On 30 July 1915, the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry Regiment wassent to Antakya (Antioch) where it went into action against 500–600insurgents.66 The Ottoman battalion went into action against

MAP 2SECOND OPERATIONAL AREA 41ST INFANTRY DIVISION, JULY 1915

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915 539

insurgents who had constructed a well-built trench system. TheArmenian fortifications were so strong that they fell only to a directbayonet assault, in which the battalion lost four killed and 18wounded. Contemporary Ottoman observers also noted that the onlyway to rout out the rebels was at the point of a bayonet.67 Theseoperations in Antep, Zeytin and Antakya were characterised by directassaults on known points of Armenian resistance.

Operations on Musa Dag

One of the most famous engagements of the Armenian Rebellionoccurred southwest of Antioch on Musa Dag (or Musa Dagh), amountain in modern Hatay province.68 In military terms, the MusaDag engagements provide a detailed exposition of the Ottoman Army’sapplication of counterinsurgency warfare. The battle was immortalisedin Franz Werfel’s novel titled The Forty Days of Musa Dagh.69

Although a work of historical fiction, Werfel based his book oninterviews with survivors and much of his contextual information isvery specific and therefore probably accurate. Using information fromWerfel’s book and Ottoman sources it is possible to examine theOttoman military response on Musa Dag at the tactical level.The Armenians on Musa Dag lived in six villages and numbered

about 5,500 inhabitants, of whom 1,556 were males over 14 years ofage.70 According to Werfel, they had initially 50 Mauser rifles and 250Greek military rifles, which were carefully buried and hidden in gravesuntil they were needed.71 The Armenians on Musa Dag organisedthemselves into ‘three main divisions; a fighting-formation; a bigreserve, and a cohort of youth’.72 The fighting men numbered 860 fitArmenian males, the reserve was composed of 1,100 older or unfit men,and there were 300 boys, who were used as scouts.73 Werfel noted thatevery fighting man had either a military rifle (of which there were 300)or a hunting rifle. Sixty Armenian deserters from the Ottoman Armysoon joined the insurgents. They and the men of the area, many ofwhom had served in the army (some were combat veterans of theBalkan Wars), trained the Armenian villagers in fighting methods.The Armenians used their time well as the Ottomans began to move

their thinly stretched combat forces into the area. By mid-July, theArmenians were hard at work fortifying their villages and the entirepopulation was put to work in this endeavour.74 This involved thedigging of trenches, the clearing of fields of fire, and the emplacement ofobstacles including thorny scrub. Positions were also prepared in thehigh mountains into which the villagers could retreat. Sentries wereposted along the likely avenues of approach to alert the defenders to theapproach of the Ottomans.75

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On 7 August 1915, the 41st Infantry Division began its counter-insurgency operations against the Armenian villages on the mountain ofMusa Dag. The daily war diary of the 41st Infantry Division on thatday reported that many Armenian children had joined in the fighting ashad numbers of Armenian deserters from the Ottoman Army.76 Therewas sporadic fighting for several days as the Ottomans marshalled theirforces and attempted to locate and fix the points of resistance. Werfeldescribed the first encounter at the village of Bitias in which 400Ottoman soldiers conducted a poorly-coordinated frontal attack on thewell-camouflaged and well-entrenched Armenians (also numbering 400in two trench lines).77 The over-confident Ottomans were routed andthe Armenians captured numbers of Ottoman rifles, which were left onthe field. However, once the Ottomans were alerted to the strength ofdefences and the determination of defenders they immediately changedtheir tactics. The Ottomans soon identified the location of theArmenian defences and manoeuvred around the village, making theposition untenable for its defenders.78

The Armenians were pushed southeast and 1st and 2nd Battalions,131st Infantry Regiment (altogether about 870 trained infantrymen)began a large operation against insurgent Armenians in the village ofHacıcıbılı Koyu on 9 August.79 In the village were some 1,500–1,800Armenians, heavily armed and determined to resist.80 This time, thetwo Ottoman battalions conducted better reconnaissance and carefullyencircled the village. The regimental commander then brought up hisartillery. After a brief bombardment, the Ottomans assaulted andcarried the village with a bayonet attack. More than 1,000 weapons ofvarious types were found in the village (while this number of weaponsseems unusually large it conforms to Werfel’s descriptions). Thesurvivors and their families were rounded up and sent into temporarycamps for movement out of the area. The regiment receivedcongratulations from the corps commander for its victory.81

On 13 August 1915, the 41st Infantry Division received orders totake several villages in the sector and to disarm the remainingArmenian villagers who lived there. Preparation and movement forthese operations went on for several days and by 15 August, thedivision had encircled the village of Ermeni Koyu.82 The villagersrefused to disarm themselves and the division was forced to assault thevillage. Ermeni Koyu was taken on the next day and also producedlarge numbers of captured weapons. This battle was described inWerfel as occurring on 14 August at the ‘North and South Bastions’and, moreover, he noted that the Ottoman force again split into twodivisions of equal strength supported by artillery.83 Clearly, theOttomans learned quickly to respect their enemy and adjusted theirtactics accordingly. In these operations, the 131st Infantry Regiment

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915 541

lost six men killed, 26 men wounded and had 25 men missing inaction.84 The regiment reported the expenditure of 20,353 rifle bullets,30 shrapnel shells, 47 high explosive shells, and also reported the loss ofeight rifles and three pistols.85 These operations illustrate that the 41stInfantry Division understood the importance of isolating and sealingthe insurgents inside their villages.Five days later, the local Armenians fled their villages, which had

become death traps, and moved into the high mountains. In two moredays of search and destroy operations (18–19 August), nine insurgentswere killed. On 20 August 1915, the division reported that ‘noArmenians remained in nearby Antakya’.86 After an operational pause,the 41st Infantry Division began pursuit operations and again went intoaction against the ‘Canakkale Armenians’ (Canaklık Ermeniler) nearthe summit of Musa Dag on 31 August.87 Fighting was heavy andresulted in the fall of the mountain. Pursuit operations were renewedagainst the fleeing survivors.The division war diary for August 1915 noted that the Armenians

had paid bandit gangs (of actual criminals) to fight against the army.88

Furthermore, the diary noted that many older Armenians wereresponsible for the coordination of joint guerrilla operations betweenthe Armenian villages. In the minds of the Ottomans, when combinedwith the active participation of children as fighters, this appeared asevidence of an insurgency that was widely supported by the Armenianpopulation. In spite of these volatile issues, the Fourth Army continuedto coordinate the evacuation the surviving Armenians from the area ofoperations.89

There were reports of atrocities committed against the Armenians,which were received and investigated by the 41st Infantry Division.Reports reached the division on 13 August 1915 that severeunprovoked massacres of Armenians had occurred near Musa Dag.90

The division also received a report on 15 August of a massacre of over30 Armenians in Alaaddın Koyu. A detachment was sent there toinvestigate and confirmed that the village was burnt.91 Moreover, thedetachment found seven burnt bodies as well and made a completereport to the XII Corps headquarters. These reports, as well as othersfrom throughout Anatolia, resulted in a three-member commissionbeing dispatched in the fall of 1915 to investigate reports of atrocitiesand abuses against the Armenians.92

Operations continued against insurgent Armenians in September1915. On 7 September, the division reported its concern about Frenchagents who were in contact with the insurgent groups. The agents hadcome ashore from French naval vessels, which included the Frenchbattleship Victor Hugo.93 The division staff of the 41st InfantryDivision was very concerned about the possibility of the Armenians

542 Edward J. Erickson

insurgents supporting a French amphibious landing in the Gulf ofIskenderun.94 However, the anticipated landing never occurred,although a number of French naval demonstrations were staged inthe gulf, including the evacuation of some of the survivors of Musa Dagby the French cruisers Guichen and Jeanne d’ Arc.95

Mid-September saw an increase in the tempo of operations againstArmenians in the Urfa area as the Fourth Army was forced to send inreinforcements to assist the 41st Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion,130th Infantry Regiment was dispatched from the 23rd InfantryDivision in Syria, arriving in Urfa on 30 September 1915.96 In itslargest battle against the insurgents on 18 October, this battalionsuffered 13 men killed and 31 officers and men wounded.97 A secondbattalion from the 23rd Infantry Division joined the counterinsurgencycampaign on 28 October and was deployed to fight guerrillas aroundthe city of Tarsus.By late fall 1915, the 41st Infantry Division gained the upper hand on

the insurgency in its sector of responsibility and combat operationsdrew down by November 1915.98 The 41st Infantry Division remainedon coastal and internal security duties in the Iskenderun vicinity for theremainder of the war. The division survived the war to become a part ofthe postwar Ottoman Army and it later fought in the National War ofLiberation.

Conclusions

In the 41st Infantry Division’s tactical area in 1915, the Ottoman Armyfought a very successful counterinsurgency campaign against Armenianguerrillas and insurgents. It appears from the records examined in thisstudy that the division was ordered to eliminate rebellious activity in itsassigned operational area. There is no indication that the divisionreceived orders for the general killing of the Armenian population.Nevertheless, the 41st Infantry Division eradicated the insurgency in itssector by killing or displacing the majority of the local Armenianpopulation and, as a matter of historical fact, by 1916 literally noArmenians remained in the 41st Infantry Division’s tactical area. Amodern label associated with operations of this severity and magnitudeis ethnic cleansing.At the operational level, the Fourth Army assigned the division a

tactical area that clearly defined its mission and its responsibilities.Although the division was under strength in infantry and artillery, itaggressively executed its assignment by bringing the fight to its enemy.The division employed contemporary counterinsurgency tactics thatincluded the encirclement and destruction of insurgents in villages,search and destroy missions to isolate and destroy guerrillas in

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915 543

mountainous terrain, and weapons searches and confiscation. Oftenthese tactics resulted in the destruction of Armenian villages and wereaccompanied by large numbers of insurgent casualties. Objectively,however, these tactics seem to have resulted from the necessity to clearnests of resistance with the bayonet. It must be noted that, whenincidents of the deliberate massacre of Armenians were reported, thedivision investigated the circumstances and submitted reports to theFourth Army.Within six months, the 41st Infantry Division completed its mission

and restored stability and civil order to its assigned area. OtherOttoman Army infantry divisions participated in counterinsurgencyoperations against the Armenians in tactical areas to the north (the 36thInfantry Division) and the northwest (the 44th Infantry Division) of the41st Infantry Division. These divisions produced similar successfulresults.99 In terms of how the armies of the day dealt with counter-insurgency, the Ottoman Army employed a very conventional approachthat reflected contemporary Western de facto doctrines. Althoughovershadowed by the horror of the Armenian massacres and deporta-tions, the Ottoman Army was arguably very effective in itscounterinsurgency campaign against the Armenian insurgency in 1915.

NOTES

1 The most widely accepted view outside Turkey is that the insurgency was a purely defensive,

and spontaneous, resistance to Ottoman oppression and deportation.

2 There is an entire genre of literature presenting extreme viewpoints associated with this

subject. Recent examples of books that present extreme cases are: Peter Balakian, The Burning

Tigris, The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response (NY: HarperCollins 2003) and

Turkkaya Ataov (ed.), The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period (Ankara: The Turkish

Historical Society Printing House 2001).

3 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defence, A Military History of the

United States of America (NY: The Free Press 1984) p.295. Smith’s nickname was ‘Hell roarin’

Jake.’

4 Ibid.

5 Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume I: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press

2001) p.496. Genocide as a term had not come into usage so the use of the term by this scholar

may be ahistorical.

6 Thomas Packenham, The Boer War (NY: Random House 1979) pp.566–83.

7 Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail, The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913

(Westport, CT: Praeger 2003) pp.2–11, 37–44, 51–5.

8 Ibid.

9 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi, VIncı Cilt, Hicaz, Asir,

Yemen Cepheleri ve Libya Harekatı 1914–1918 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi 1978)

pp.413–16.

10 Ibid. pp.125–44.

544 Edward J. Erickson

11 See Erickson, Defeat in Detail (note 7) pp.11–15, 58–9, for discussions of German influence

and training.

12 Pertev (later Pertev Demirhan) was a graduate of the War Academy and an Ottoman General

Staff Officer. During the Balkan Wars, Pertev served as the Chief of Operations of the

Ottoman General Staff.

13 Feroz Yasamee, ‘Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Boer War’, in Keith Wilson (ed.), The

International Impact of the Boer War (London: Acumen 2001) pp.193–210. Later during the

Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, Pertev served as a military observer and sent combat reports

directly to von der Goltz.

14 Erickson, Defeat in Detail (note 7) pp.24–33.

15 Pertev Demirhan, Generalfeldmarschall Colmar von der Goltz: Das Lebensbild eines grossen

Soldaten (Gottingen: Gottinger Verlagsanstalt 1960) pp.74–91.

16 Author’s correspondence with Dr Mesut Uyar (Captain, Turkish Army), Director of Archives,

Turkish Military Academy, Ankara, Turkey, 24 Sept. 2004. Dr Uyar attributes this to the fact

that all news of counterinsurgency operations was suppressed during the reign of Abdulhamid.

17 Yavuz Abadan,Mustafa Kemal ve Cetecilik (Istanbul: Varlık Kitabevi 1972) pp.24–7; Ali Fuat

Cebesoy, Sınıf Arkadasım Ataturk (Istanbul: Kanaat 1996) pp.53–6; Asım Gunduz,

Hatıralarım (Istanbul: Kervan Kitapcılık 1973) pp.19–22. Mustafa Kemal attended the

Ottoman War Academy from 1902–05.

18 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Turk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, IIIncu Cilt, 5nci Kısım (1793–

1908), (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi 1978) pp.597–606.

19 Muammer Demirel, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Erzurum ve Cevresinde Ermeni Hareketleri

(1914–1918) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1996) p.17.

20 Ibid. Even though Russia was already at war with the Central Powers, the Ottomans were very

disturbed by the mobilisation of Armenians on the Russian side of the frontier.

21 Ibid. pp.17–18.

22 Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etut, Ankara, Turkey (ATASE), Headquarters, Third

Army, Report on Criminal Activity, 8 Oct. 1914, Archive 2818, Record 59, File 2–25.

23 ATASE, Report from Hudut Battalion to Headquarters, IX Corps, 22 Oct. 1914, Archive

2818, Record 59, File 2–39.

24 ATASE, Headquarters, Third Army Report to Acting Commander-in-Chief, 23 Oct. 1914,

Archive 2818, Record 59, File 1–41, 1–42.

25 Kamuran Gurun, Ermeni Dosyasi (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi 1983). Included in this

book are numerous reports sent to the Ottoman General Staff and the Ministry of Defence

from the Third and Fourth Army commanders.

26 ATASE, Headquarters, V Corps Report, 25 Feb. 1915, on the bombing incident in Ankara,

Archive 2287, Record 32, File 8.

27 ATASE, First Division, Ottoman General Staff cable, 25 Feb. 1915, Archive 2287, Record 32,

File 9.

28 ATASE, Special ciphered correspondence No. 2086, Chief, Second Division, Ministry of the

Interior to Chief, Second Division, Ottoman General Staff, 31 Jan. 1915, Archive 2029, File 2.

29 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu

Ordu Harekatı Cilt I (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi 1993) pp.587–8.

30 Ibid. p.588.

31 For varied commentary see Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (NY: Charles Scribner’s

Sons 1931); Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian

Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 1999); Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.),

Remembrance and Denial (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press 1998); Alan Moorehead,

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915 545

Gallipoli (NY: Harper & Row 1956); and Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s

Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Press 1918).

32 Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatı (note 29) p.591.

33 W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of the Wars on the Turco-

Caucasian Border, 1828–1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1953) pp.242, 299–

301.

34 Michael A. Reynolds, ‘The Ottoman-Russian Struggle for Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus,

1908–1918: Identity, Ideology and the Geopolitics of World Order’, unpublished PhD

dissertation, Princeton University, 2003, p.206.

35 Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatı (note 29) p.591.

36 Rafael De Nogales, Four Years Beneath the Crescent (NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1926) p.45.

37 Ibid. pp.73–97. Although the Ottoman Army employed De Nogales, as a Christian, he was

much in sympathy with the Armenians.

38 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland, Mor-

genthau to the Secretary of State, 25 May 1915, RG 353 (Internal Affairs, Turkey), Roll 41.

39 Ibid. p.2.

40 Ibid. p.3.

41 The author recognises that some scholars question De Nogales and Morgenthau as reliable

sources. However, in this context, their information reinforces Ottoman and Russian reports.

42 Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatı (note 29) pp.591–7.

43 Donald Bloxham, ‘The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalisation and the

Development of a Destruction Policy’, Past and Present 181 (2003) pp.141–91.

44 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, 3, (unpublished staff study) Sıtkı Atamer, 1969,

ATASE Record 26–344.

45 Ibid. p.3.

46 Ibid. p.4.

47 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi, IVncu Cilt nci Kısım,

Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Harbin Baslangıncından Ikinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar

(Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi 1979) p.288. The four other tactical areas in Cemal’s Fourth

Army were the Birinci, Ikinci, Cebelilubnan Kıyıları and the Akka-Hayfa-Yafa (First, Second,

Lebanon Mountain and Haifa-Jaffa).

48 Fahri Belen, Birinci Cihan Harbinde, Turk Harbi, 1918 Yılı Hareketleri, Vnci Cilt (Ankara:

Genelkurmay Basımevi 1967) p.248.

49 The National Archives (TNA), Kew, Mallet to Edward Grey, 14 Oct. 1914, FO 438/3, 59458.

50 TNA, Cheetham to Edward Grey, 12 Nov. 1914. Boghos Nubar, an influential Armenian

leader, presented this idea in Cairo to the British. FO 438/4, 70404.

51 Bloxham, ‘The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916’ (note 43) pp.174–6. Professor Bloxham

also noted that a British landing party blew up a strategically important railway bridge on 18

Dec. 1914.

52 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Harp Mıntakaları, Sehir ve Kasabaların _Isgal, _Istirdat ve

Bombardıman Tarihleri (Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası 1937) p.54. Between 12 Feb. and 19

Aug. 1915, Iskenderun was bombarded four times, Mersin twice, and Dortyol, Tarsus and

Adana once each.

53 ATASE, Directive 8682, Chief, Operations Division, OGS to armies, 25 Feb. 1915, Archive

2287, Record 32, File 9.

54 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, p.4.

55 Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Harbin Baslangıncından Ikinci Gazze

Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar (note 47) p.282.

546 Edward J. Erickson

56 Ibid.

57 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri Tarihi Osmanli Devri Birinci Dunya

Harbi Idari Faaliyetler ve Lojistik, Xncu Cilt (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi 1985) pp.213–

14.

58 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Harbin Baslangıncından Ikinci Gazze

Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar (note 47) p.332. Thus to the Ottomans, the Armenian rebellion

appeared to be an Entente orchestrated affair with the Russians supporting Armenian

insurgents in northeast Anatolia and the French supporting Armenian insurgents in southeast

Anatolia.

59 Ibid., Kroki (Overlay) 17.

60 _Ismet Gorgulu, On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912–1922, Balkan-Birinci Dunya-_Istiklal Harbi,

(Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurum Basımevi 1993) p.141. Mehmet Emin’s chief-of-staff was Major

Mumtaz.

61 The city of Adana and 200 kilometres of coastline were transferred to the newly-activated 44th

Infantry Division.

62 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, p.5.

63 Ibid. Depending upon the context, cete may be translated as guerrilla, bandit or insurgent.

64 NARA, Letter from American Consul, Aleppo to Morgenthau, 14 June 1915, RG 353

(Internal Affairs, Turkey), Roll 41.

65 Ali Fuat Erden, Suriye Hatıraları (Istanbul: Kultar Yayınları 2003) pp.144–5.

66 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, p.5.

67 Erden (note 65) p.146.

68 The Musa Dag mountain is in actuality a rugged extended area covering over 250 square

kilometres.

69 Franz Werfel, The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, trans. Geoffrey Dunlop (NY: Viking Press

1934).

70 Ibid. p.166.

71 Ibid. p.225.

72 Ibid. p.239.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid. pp.242–4.

75 Ibid.

76 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, 6. This corroborates Werfel’s information.

77 Werfel (note 69) pp.324–30. Werfel describes this battle as occurring on 4 Aug., but Turkish

sources place it on 7 Aug.

78 Ibid.

79 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, p.6. The two Ottoman infantry battalions were

authorised almost 2,000 men on paper. However, at this time the 1st and 2nd battalions of the

131st Infantry Regiment were operating at less than half of their authorised strength or 44% of

their required personnel. This reflected the low priority of units operating in this theatre of

operations.

80 Ibid. p.6

81 The division was then assigned to the Ottoman XII Corps, which was commanded by Fahri

Pasa.

82 Ibid. p.7.

83 Werfel (note 69) pp.365–75.

84 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, p.8.

85 Ibid.

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915 547

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid. p.9. Evidently, this particular group of Armenians originated from the Gallipoli

peninsula.

88 Ibid.

89 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, IV

Cilt, 2nci Kisim, Ikinci Gazze Muharebesi Sonundan Mondros Mutarekesi’ne Kadar Yapilan

Harekat, 21 Nisan 1917–30 Ekim 1918, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi 1986) pp.698–704.

See ‘Logistics and Support, Armenian Problems’.

90 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, p.7.

91 Ibid.

92 ATASE, Jandarma Headquarters to the Ministry of War, 26 Sept. 1915, Archive 2287, Record

13, File 3.

93 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, p.9.

94 Ibid.

95 Werfel (note 69) pp.775–90.

96 ATASE, 23ncu Piyade Tumen Tarıhcesi, p.24, (unpublished staff study) Sefik Mete, undated,

ATASE Record 26–412.

97 Ibid. p.25.

98 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Kroki (Overlay) (note 58) p.55.

99 Ibid. p.282.

548 Edward J. Erickson

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